Guidance

Country policy and information note: security situation, Ukraine, October 2026 (accessible)

Updated 22 October 2026

Version 3.0, October 2026

Executive summary

Ukraine continues to be affected by an international armed conflict following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Russian forces continue to occupy parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, as well as Crimea.

The situation remains fluid as the conflict is ongoing. Decision makers should consult sources and tools such as ACLED’s Ukraine Conflict Monitor for ongoing and near real-time information when considering cases.A state of war, civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down do not of themselves establish a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. As such, the question is whether the person faces a real risk of serious harm such that they qualify for Humanitarian Protection.

In general, in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, particularly in frontline, near-frontline and border areas, the level of indiscriminate violence is at such a high level that there are substantial grounds for believing that a civilian would, solely on account of their presence in those oblasts, face a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

Active hostilities are concentrated in the eastern, southeastern and northeastern parts of the country, particularly in frontline and border areas. As such, the level of indiscriminate violence throughout the rest of Ukraine is not at such a high level that that test is met. This includes:

(a) in areas where Ukrainian forces are not directly engaging with the Russian military, or facing frequent missile attacks; and

(b) oblasts away from the frontline which may have also experienced violence and civilian casualties, often because of increased Russian long-range missile and drone strikes.

The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. Decision makers must consider each case on its facts.

The state is generally not able to provide protection against serious harm arising from indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict.

Internal relocation is likely to be reasonable in general. There are parts of Ukraine where the level of indiscriminate violence does not reach the threshold required to establish a real risk of serious harm solely on account of a person’s presence there, including areas outside the frontline, near frontline and border regions most affected by the conflict.

Ukraine is a designated state under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. However, due to the ongoing conflict, where a claim is refused it is unlikely to be certifiable as clearly unfounded.

Each case must be considered on its individual facts. The onus is on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

Section updated: 31 August 2026

About the assessment

This section considers relevant evidence – including country information, refugee and human rights law and policy, and case law – to assess whether, in general:

• the security situation is such that there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules

• the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection

• internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution or serious harm

• if refused, a claim is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

For details on how CPIT makes its assessments, gathers and presents country information, its research methodology and disclaimers and explainers on coverage, source selection, maps, translations and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in developing CPIT products, see About country policy and information notes.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks

1.1.1 Decision makers must:

• assess credibility (see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status).

• check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

• consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

• consider language analysis testing, where available, in cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

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2. Exclusion

2.1.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

2.1.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection, which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status.

2.1.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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3. Convention reason(s)

3.1.1 A state of civil instability and/or where law and order has broken down, which might exist in some places outside of government control, do not of themselves give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

3.1.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).

3.1.3 However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general security situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.

3.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

4. Risk

4.1.1 In general, in Donetsk, Luhansk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts, particularly in frontline, near-frontline and border areas, the level of indiscriminate violence is at such a high level that there are substantial grounds for believing that a civilian would, solely on account of their presence in those oblasts, face a real risk of serious harm within the meaning of paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

4.1.2 Active hostilities are concentrated in the eastern, southeastern and northeastern parts of the country, particularly in frontline and border areas. As such, the level of indiscriminate violence throughout the rest of Ukraine is not at such a high level that that test is met. This includes:

• in areas where Ukrainian forces are not directly engaging with the Russian military, or facing frequent missile attacks; and

• oblasts away from the frontline which may have also experienced violence and civilian casualties, often because of increased Russian long-range missile and drone strikes.

4.1.3 Paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules only apply to civilians who must be non-combatants. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

4.1.4 Even where there is not in general a real risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict, a person may still face a real risk of serious harm if they are able to show that there are specific reasons over and above simply being a civilian affected by indiscriminate violence.

4.1.5 Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

4.1.6 The situation remains fluid as the conflict is ongoing. Decision makers should consult sources and tools such as ACLED’s Ukraine Conflict Monitor for ongoing and near real-time information when considering cases.

4.1.7 In the case Elgafaji [2009] EUECJC-465-07, the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) held that:

‘the existence of a serious and individual threat to the life or person of an applicant for subsidiary protection is not subject to the condition that that applicant adduce evidence that he is specifically targeted by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances’; and

‘the existence of such a threat can exceptionally be considered to be established where the degree of indiscriminate violence characterising the armed conflict taking place … reaches such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian … would, solely on account of his presence … face a real risk of being subject to that threat.’ [paragraph 43]

4.1.8 Whilst a country guidance case on Iraq, in QD (Iraq) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 620, the Court of Appeal held that ‘for the purposes of article 15(c), there is no requirement that the armed conflict itself must be exceptional’. What is required is an intensity of indiscriminate violence ‘great enough to meet the test spelt out by the ECJ’ in Elgafaji [paragraph 36].

4.1.9 The Home Office Humanitarian protection in asylum claims lodged on or after 28 June 2022 further notes that:

‘… the situation will be one where the level of violence is such that, without anything to render them a particular target, civilians are at real risk of random injury or death due to indiscriminate violence. … caseworkers must focus on the level of violence and not the nature of the armed conflict

‘… The reference to a ‘material part’ in the test is a reference to the claimant’s home area or, if appropriate, any potential place of internal relocation, where the fear of serious harm is clearly limited to specific parts of the country.

‘The fear of possible but unlikely risk is insufficient to meet the test as there must be a realistic threat of real harm. In many cases where there is armed conflict in a country, civilians may well be fearful of being caught up in violence. However, paragraph 339CA(iv) is only engaged where an individual can show there is a real risk of serious harm on account of indiscriminate violence.’

4.1.10 Ukraine remains affected by an armed conflict following Russia’s full-scale invasion in February 2022. Russian forces continue to occupy parts of Donetsk, Luhansk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson oblasts, as well as Crimea, whilst the majority of Ukraine remains under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Active hostilities remain concentrated along the frontline separating government-controlled and Russian-controlled territory (see Origins of the invasion and events, Map of Ukraine and Territorial control).

4.1.11 Displacement of Ukrainian nationals continues, particularly from occupied and conflict-affected areas, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimating that 58% of internally displaced persons (approximately 2.25 million people) originated from raions under full or partial occupation. The largest concentrations of internally displaced persons are located in Dnipropetrovska oblast (611,000), Kharkivska oblast (469,000), Kyiv city (341,000) and Kyivska oblast (315,000). As of September 2025, IOM estimated that there were approximately 4.5 million returnees who had previously been displaced residing in government-controlled areas of Ukraine (see Displacement).

4.1.12 Between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026, the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) recorded 123,424 security incidents across Ukraine, including battles between armed forces, explosions and remote violence and incidents of violence against civilians. The number of recorded security incidents increased from 37,571 during the first half of 2025 to 45,182 during the first half of 2026. ACLED also recorded 109,155 conflict-related fatalities, including both civilians and military service personnel, during the same period (see Origins of the invasion and events, Displacement, Military casualties and Fatalities and injuries).

4.1.13 Conflict-related violence continues to result in civilian injuries and fatalities across Ukraine. The United Nations Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) verified 2,514 civilian fatalities and 12,142 civilian injuries during 2025, compared with 2,088 civilian fatalities and 9,138 civilian injuries during 2024. During the first 6 months of 2026, HRMMU verified a further 1,396 civilian fatalities and 7,978 civilian injuries, compared with 1,122 civilian fatalities and 5,734 civilian injuries during the corresponding period in 2025 (see Civilian injuries and fatalities). HRMMU noted that these figures are likely to underestimate the true number of civilian casualties, as only verified cases are included. However, when considered against Ukraine’s estimated population of approximately 39.5 million people (see Population), the overall number of verified civilian casualties remains low. The 14,656 civilian casualties verified during 2025 represented approximately 0.04% of the population (see Civilian injuries and fatalities).

4.1.14 Data published by ACLED indicates significant geographical variation in the scale and intensity of violence. Of the 123,424 security incidents recorded between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026, approximately 83% occurred in Donetsk, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts. Donetsk alone accounted for 35,367 incidents, whilst Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy and Kharkiv oblasts each recorded more than 14,000 incidents. By contrast, western oblasts including Chernivtsi, Zakarpattia, Ternopil, Volyn and Ivano-Frankivsk each recorded fewer than 100 incidents during the same period (see Number and locations of security events).

4.1.15 ACLED fatality data indicates a similar pattern. Of the 109,155 conflict-related fatalities (military personnel and civilians) recorded between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026, 45,943 occurred in Donetsk oblast and 42,362 occurred in Kherson oblast – therefore accounting for approximately 81% of all recorded fatalities. Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy oblasts also recorded higher numbers of combined military and civilian fatalities than much of the remainder of Ukraine (see Number and locations of security events).

4.1.16 Civilian casualties, including both injuries and fatalities, are recorded across a wider geographical area than active conflict events and conflict-related fatalities. HRMMU reported that 63% of the 14,656 civilian casualties verified during 2025 occurred in frontline areas. During the first 7 months of 2026, civilian casualties were recorded in between 12 and 20 regions each month. Between January and June 2026, HRMMU verified 9,374 civilian casualties, of which approximately 35% to 45% resulted from long-range missile and drone attacks. Such attacks caused deaths and injuries in urban areas located more than 30 kilometres from the frontline. However, the greatest concentration of civilian harm remained in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Sumy and Dnipropetrovsk oblasts. Whilst Kyiv also records relatively high numbers of civilian casualties as a result of long-range attacks, the available information does not indicate that casualties occurred at such a frequency or scale that a civilian would, solely on account of their presence in the city, face a real risk of serious harm (see Civilian injuries and fatalities).

4.1.17 However, decision makers must consider each case on its facts. Even where there is not a real risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict in general, a person may still face a real risk of serious harm if they are able to show that there are specific reasons over and above simply being a civilian affected by indiscriminate violence.

4.1.18 For guidance on considering serious harm where there is a situation of indiscriminate violence in an armed conflict, including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction, Humanitarian Protection.

5. Protection

5.1.1 The state is generally not able to provide protection against a breach of Article 3 ECHR because of indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict if this occurs in individual cases.

5.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Internal relocation

6.1.1 Internal relocation is likely to be reasonable. This is because, in general, there are parts of Ukraine where the degree of violence does not reach such a high level that substantial grounds are shown for believing that a civilian would, solely on account of their presence there, face a real risk of serious harm. This includes areas outside the frontline, near frontline and border regions most affected by the conflict. Available information indicates that western oblasts and some central oblasts experience comparatively lower levels of conflict activity.

6.1.2 Whether internal relocation is reasonable must be assessed on the facts of the individual case, taking into account the person’s personal circumstances and the conditions in the proposed place of relocation.

6.1.3 Decision makers must consider each case on its facts using up-to-date information on the conflict (see Number and locations of security events and ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor).

6.1.4 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

7. Certification

7.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it must be considered for certification under section 94(3) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 as Ukraine is listed as a designated state. Such a claim must be certified under section 94(3) if you are satisfied it is clearly unfounded.

7.1.2 However, due to the ongoing conflict, where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’.

7.1.3 Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

7.1.4 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

The COI provides the basis for the assessment and the executive summary. Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

The cut-off date for COI included in this note is 24 August 2026.

For details on how CPIT gathers and presents country information, its research methodology and disclaimers and explainers on coverage, source selection, maps, translations and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in developing CPIT products, see About country policy and information notes.

8. Russian invasion of Ukraine

8.1.1 For information on the Russian invasion of Ukraine, see the country information section in previous Ukraine: Security Situation CPINs.

9. Geography and demography

9.1 Map of Ukraine

9.1.1 Ukraine is the second largest country in Europe^{[footnote 1]}, with a total area of approximately 603,500 square km^{[footnote 2]}.

9.1.2 Ukraine has 27 administrative divisions; 24 oblasts (regions), one Autonomous Republic (Crimea) and two cities with special status (Kyiv and Sevastopol). Below is a United Nations (UN) map of Ukraine indicating the country’s 24 oblasts and the Autonomous republic of Crimea^{[footnote 3]}:

9.1.3 See also Territorial control and Location and nature of conflict events for conflict-related mapping.

9.2 Population

9.2.1 As of 1 January 2026, World Population Review estimated the population of Ukraine to be 39,535,849, and the population density to be 68.2 people per square km based on projections of the latest UN data from 2024^{[footnote 4]}.

9.2.2 World Population Review estimated Ukraine’s population at 39.0 million in 2025, compared with 37.9 million in 2024, 37.7 million in 2023, 41.0 million in 2022 and 44.3 million in 2021^{[footnote 5]}.

9.2.3 See Ukraine Population 2026 by Oblast – Live Clock for real-time population estimates by oblast in Ukraine.

10. Displacement

10.1 Numbers

10.1.1 In January 2026, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) published the Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan (HNRP 2026), which stated: ‘Government data indicates that approximately 130,000 people were evacuated between June and October 2025 with support from authorities and humanitarian partners, while many more fled on their own. Based on the 2025 displacement and evacuation trends, up to 504,000 people are projected to be newly displaced in 2026, including through new evacuations.’^{[footnote 6]}

10.1.2 In January 2026 the International Rescue Committee (IRC), an international NGO responding to humanitarian crises^{[footnote 7]}, published a protection analysis report covering the period July-September 2025 (IRC January 2026 report), which stated: ‘According to IOM [International Organization for Migration] data, by the end of September 2025, the country hosts an estimated 3.7 million de facto internally displaced persons (IDPs) and 4.5 million returnees in government-controlled areas. The nature of this crisis is overwhelmingly protracted, with nearly three-fourths (73%) of IDPs having been displaced for over two years.’^{[footnote 8]}

10.1.3 In February 2026, Human Rights Watch published their annual report on the human rights situation, covering 2025 (HRW 2025 report) which stated that ‘At least 3.8 million Ukrainians were registered as IDPs as of April [2025] …’^{[footnote 9]}

10.1.4 In July 2026 the United Nations International Organization for Migration (IOM) published the Internal Displacement Report which included a survey of approximately 40,000 randomly selected respondents from government-held Ukraine between April and June 2026 (IOM survey round 24). The IOM survey round 24 stated: ‘As of June 2026, displacement remained stable, with 3.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) recorded across Ukraine, the same level as in March. IDPs accounted for 12.5 per cent of the population, while displacement remained protracted: 68 per cent had been displaced for more than two years. At the same time, new displacement continued, with an estimated 132,000 people displaced during the three months preceding data collection.’^{[footnote 10]}

10.1.5 The same source noted that ‘There are an estimated 3.9 million de facto IDPs in Ukraine. Between April and June 2026, the share of IDPs in the total population remained broadly stable, at 12.5 per cent in June 2026 compared with 12.5 per cent in March 2026.’^{[footnote 11]}

10.2 Oblasts of origins

10.2.1 The IOM survey round 24 noted that 58%, or an estimated 2.25 million IDPs, originated from raions [2nd level administrative districts^{[footnote 12]}] under occupation and published the following graph^{[footnote 13][footnote 14]}:

Table 1: Top 5 oblasts of origin of IDPs (%of IDPs)

Oblast	% of total IDPs
Donetska	31%
Kharkivska	17%
Zaporizka	11%
Khersonska	10%
Dnipropetrovska	7%
Other oblasts	24%

10.2.2 The same survey noted that: ‘Origins of recent displacement remained concentrated. The top three oblasts of origin — Donetska (42%), Sumska (14%) and Khersonska (11%) — accounted for 67 per cent of all displacement reported in the three months prior to interviews, indicating continued displacement from frontline areas. The most common destinations were Kharkivska (16%), Kyivska (13%) and Dnipropetrovska (12%) oblasts.’^{[footnote 15]}

10.3 Oblasts of displacement

10.3.1 The IRC January 2026 report stated:

‘Despite the fact that nearly three-fourths (73%) of all IDPs have been displaced for more than two years, pointing to the protracted nature of the crisis, new movement remains a stark reality. In the three months leading up to October 2025, an estimated 325,000 individuals underwent new displacement or re-displacement within the country, representing nine per cent of the total IDP population.

‘This persistent risk of forced movement is further highlighted by the considerable number of IDPs currently residing in high-risk areas. As of the most recent assessment, one-third of all internally displaced persons, amounting to 1,274,000 individuals (34%), currently reside in frontline raions. The largest overall concentrations of the total IDP population—many of whom are likely located in proximity to these risk zones—reside in Dnipropetrovska (15% or 557,000 IDPs) and Kharkivska (11% or 415,000 IDPs) Oblasts. The vulnerability of these large host communities, especially those near the frontline, to potential secondary displacement or exposure to hostilities underscores the urgent requirement for protective measures and access to durable solutions.’^{[footnote 16]}

10.3.2 The IOM survey round 24 published stated:

‘Most IDPs (72%) intended to remain in their current locations beyond the next three months. A further 11 per cent reported intentions to return to their place of origin, while seven per cent planned to move elsewhere. Ten per cent remained uncertain about their future intentions.

‘Among IDPs intending or hoping to return, 82 per cent would do so only after active hostilities end …

‘Long-term intentions varied by displacement duration. IDPs displaced within the past year were more likely to plan or hope to return (48% versus 38%), while those displaced for more than one year were more likely to intend local integration (43% versus 35%).’^{[footnote 17]}

10.3.3 The same source noted that:

‘At the oblast level, Dnipropetrovska Oblast hosted the largest estimated number of IDPs (587,000; 15%), followed by Kharkivska Oblast (492,000; 13%). Kyiv City (382,000; 10%) and the surrounding Kyivska Oblast (310,000; 8%) had the third and fourth largest estimated IDP populations, respectively. Approximately one-third of all IDPs are estimated to reside in frontline raions (34%; around 1.32 million persons).

‘Displacement remained highly protracted, with 68 per cent of IDPs having been displaced for more than two years. At the same time, new displacement continued at a pace comparable to previous GPS rounds: an estimated 132,000 individuals, representing around three per cent of all IDPs, had been displaced within the three months preceding data collection. Origins of recent displacement remained concentrated. The top three oblasts of origin — Donetska (42%), Sumska (14%) and Khersonska (11%) — accounted for 67 per cent of all displacement reported in the three months prior to interviews, indicating continued displacement from frontline areas. The most common destinations were Kharkivska (16%), Kyivska (13%) and Dnipropetrovska (12%) oblasts.’^{[footnote 18]}

10.3.4 The same source published the following map and table of estimated IDP presence by oblast of displacement^{[footnote 19]},^{[footnote 20]}:

Table 2: Top 5 IDP-hosting oblasts (% of total IDPs)

Oblast	% of total IDPs
Dnipropetrovska	15%
Kharkivska	13%
Kyiv	10%
Kyivska	8%
Zaporizka	6%
Other oblasts	48%

10.3.5 The IOM survey round 24 noted that ‘Among all IDPs, 43 per cent lived in large cities, 27 per cent in small towns or urban-type villages, seven per cent in suburbs, and 23 per cent in rural areas, villages or farms.’^{[footnote 21]}

11. Conflict in Ukraine

11.1 Military casualties

11.1.1 In an article entitled ‘What are the military casualty estimates for the Russia-Ukraine War?’, published by the Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica and last updated in July 2026, it was noted:

‘In December 2024, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said 43,000 Ukrainian soldiers had been killed and 370,000 injured since February 2022; he also said 198,000 Russian soldiers had been killed and 550,000 injured. None of these claims was verifiable; Russia has said its losses are less than Ukraine’s. U.S., British, and European officials have also made estimates, while independent researchers and journalists have used open-source data to count losses.

‘In June 2025, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), based in Washington, D.C., released an analysis that estimated Russian military casualties (killed, wounded, and missing) would reach one million during the summer of 2025. It also estimated Ukrainian military casualties since 2022 to be 400,000, including an estimated 60,000–100,000 soldiers killed.’^{[footnote 22]}

11.1.2 On 4 February 2026, Reuters reported that the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky, said: ‘”In Ukraine, officially the number of soldiers killed on the battlefield - either professionals or those conscripted - is 55,000”’^{[footnote 23]}

11.1.3 The same article noted: ‘… Zelenskiy … added that on top of that casualty figure was a “large number of people” considered officially missing. Zelenskiy had previously cited a figure for Ukrainian war dead in an interview with the U.S. television network NBC in February 2025, saying that more than 46,000 Ukrainian servicemen had been killed on the battlefield.’^{[footnote 24]}

11.1.4 In January 2026, the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a United States-based non-profit policy research organisation^{[footnote 25]}, published an assessment of military casualties in the Russia-Ukraine war. Drawing on its own estimates, UK Ministry of Defense data, analysis of data collected by the Russian news outlet Mediazona and the BBC Russian Service, and interviews with U.S., European, Ukrainian and other government officials, CSIS stated:

‘Assessing casualties and fatalities in wartime is difficult and imprecise, and various sides have incentives to inflate or shrink the numbers for political purposes. According to CSIS estimates, Russian forces suffered nearly 1.2 million battlefield casualties, which include killed, wounded, and missing, between February 2022 and December 2025 … There were roughly 415,000 Russian casualties in 2025 alone, with an average of nearly 35,000 casualties per month. In addition, there were roughly 275,000 to 325,000 Russian battlefield fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025.

‘…Ukrainian forces likely suffered somewhere between 500,000 and 600,000 casualties, including killed, wounded, and missing, and between 100,000 and 140,000 fatalities between February 2022 and December 2025. Combined Russian and Ukrainian casualties may be as high as 1.8 million and could reach 2 million total casualties by the spring of 2026.’^{[footnote 26]}

11.1.5 In an article published by the BBC in February 2026, it was noted that:

‘The BBC, along with Russian news outlet Medizona and volunteer researchers, has so far verified that 40,201 Russian soldiers were killed in 2025.

‘According to our analysis, we estimate that the total number killed in 2025 will reach 80,000, which would be the most deadly year for Russian losses in Ukraine since the full-scale invasion was launched on 24 February 2022.

‘This calculation takes into account obituaries that cite 2025 as the year of death or burial, but we have not yet fully processed or cross-checked.

‘Confirmed deaths for 2024 now stand at 69,362 - roughly comparable to the combined totals for 2022 and 2023 - and the curve has steepened since late 2024.

‘We have confirmed the deaths using official reports and a probate data registry - an official registry of cases after someone dies - as well as newspaper articles, social media posts from relatives or close friends and data from new memorials and graves.

‘In total, the BBC has now identified the names of 186,102 Russian soldiers killed in the war.

‘The true death toll is generally accepted to be much higher, as many deaths on the battlefield are not recorded.

‘Military experts believe our analysis might represent 45-65% of the total, putting the potential number of Russian deaths at between 286,000 and 413,500.

‘…Based on estimates from sources including the UA Losses website, which the BBC has cross-referenced, we estimate that the number of Ukrainians killed is as high as 200,000.’^{[footnote 27]}

11.2 Territorial control

11.2.1 On 24 June 2026, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW) published the below map showing areas occupied by Russia in Ukraine as of February 2026^{[footnote 28]}. Note that the numbers 1-4 on this map designate locations of events and are not relevant to this section:

11.2.2 For real-time updates on territorial control, see:

• Institute for the Study of War’s Interactive Map: Russia’s Invasion of Ukraine

• Institute for the Study of War’s Map Room

• ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor

12. Conflict events

12.1 Sources and definitions

12.1.1 The majority of the data included in this section is obtained using the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Data Export Tool. The fundamental unit of observation used by ACLED is the ‘event’, of which there are 6 event types and 25 sub-event types, both violent and non-violent^{[footnote 29]}. The ACLED codebook provided the following definitions for each of the different security events (see the ACLED codebook for more information):

• Battles – a violent interaction between two organized armed groups at a particular time and location. Battles can occur between armed and organized state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination thereof.

• Explosions/Remote violence – incidents in which one side uses weapon types that, by their nature, are at range and widely destructive. The weapons used in Explosions/Remote violence events are explosive devices, including but not limited to: bombs, grenades, IEDs, artillery fire or shelling, missile attacks, air or drone strikes, and other widely destructive heavy weapons or chemical weapons

• Protests – an in-person public demonstration of three or more participants in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them. Events include individuals and groups who peacefully demonstrate against a political entity, government institution, policy, group, tradition, business, or other private institution

• Riots – violent events where demonstrators or mobs of three or more engage in violent or destructive acts, including but not limited to physical fights, rock throwing, property destruction, etc. They may engage individuals, property, businesses, other rioting groups, or armed actors

• Strategic developments – captures contextually important information regarding incidents and activities of groups that are not recorded as Political violence or Demonstrations events, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics within and across states. The inclusion of such events is limited, as their purpose is to capture pivotal events within the broader political landscape

• Violence against civilians – violent events where an organized armed group inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. By definition, civilians are unarmed and cannot engage in political violence. Therefore, the violence is understood to be asymmetric as the perpetrator is assumed to be the only actor capable of using violence in the event. The perpetrators of such acts include state forces and their affiliates, rebels, militias, and external/other forces^{[footnote 30]}.

12.2 Number and locations of security events

12.2.1 Event counts should not be viewed as a direct measure of the risk faced by civilians. Individual events can vary considerably in scale and impact, and the recording of a higher number of events does not necessarily indicate a proportionately higher risk to civilians. ACLED data are therefore used in this section primarily to demonstrate the location, concentration and frequency of conflict-related activity across Ukraine rather than as a standalone measure of civilian harm.

12.2.2 The below table was produced by CPIT using data collected by ACLED and extracted using their Data Export Tool^{[footnote 31]}. Between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026, ACLED recorded 123,424 security events across Ukraine, with the highest concentrations occurring in the eastern and southern frontline oblasts. Donetsk accounted for the largest number of events (35,367), followed by Kherson (20,979), Zaporizhzhia (16,550), Sumy (16,466) and Kharkiv (14,320). While levels of violence remained highest in areas directly affected by hostilities, the total number of recorded security events increased over the reporting period, rising from 37,571 in the first half of 2025 to 45,182 in the first half of 2026. By contrast, western and central oblasts generally experienced significantly fewer incidents.

Security events between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026

Oblast	1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025	1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025	1 January 2026 to 30 June 2026	Total
Donetsk	12,178	12,797	10,392	35,367
Kherson	6,080	7,394	7,505	20,979
Sumy	7,220	4,253	4,993	16,466
Zaporizhzhia	3,058	4,540	8,952	16,550
Kharkiv	3,829	4,652	5,839	14,320
Dnipropetrovsk	1,035	3,011	3,348	7,394
Chernihiv	2,114	2,028	2,081	6,223
Luhansk	609	324	365	1,298
Mykolaiv	239	340	309	888
Crimea	92	280	389	761
Kyiv City	275	210	170	655
Odesa	161	218	200	579
Kyiv	109	129	125	363
Poltava	123	74	109	306
Cherkasy	119	99	79	297
Kirovohrad	72	52	65	189
Zhytomyr	64	30	41	135
Khmelnytskyi	59	41	42	142
Lviv	24	43	45	112
Vinnytsia	25	27	26	78
Rivne	22	28	30	80
Ivano-Frankivsk	18	32	21	71
Volyn	16	26	29	71
Ternopil	19	17	9	45
Zakarpattia	8	12	15	35
Chernivtsi	3	14	3	20
Total by period	37,571	40,671	45,182	123,424

12.2.3 The below image was taken from the interactive map found on the ACLED Ukraine Conflict Monitor which ‘provides near real-time information on the ongoing war, including an interactive map, a curated data file, and weekly situation updates.’^{[footnote 32]} The figures in the key below are slightly lower than the total recorded in the table above, as ACLED has not included events coded as Protests, Riots or Strategic Developments.

13. Fatalities and injuries

13.1 Total estimated between 1 January 2025 – 30 June 2026

13.1.1 Note: ACLED fatality estimates include both civilian and military deaths and should be interpreted with caution when assessing the risk to civilians. The figures do not distinguish between combatants and non-combatants and are therefore not directly comparable to verified civilian casualty data. ACLED fatality data are included to illustrate broader patterns and concentrations of conflict-related violence rather than to quantify civilian risk.

13.1.2 The below table was produced by CPIT using data collected by ACLED and extracted using their Data Export Tool^{[footnote 33]}. Between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026, ACLED recorded 109,155 conflict-related fatalities across Ukraine.

13.1.3 The majority of fatalities were concentrated in the oblasts of Donetsk (45,943) and Kherson (42,362), which together accounted for over three quarters of all recorded deaths during the period. Significantly lower, but still notable, numbers of fatalities were recorded in Kharkiv (7,764), Zaporizhzhia (5,600) and Dnipropetrovsk (4,125). While fatalities remained concentrated in eastern and southern areas, the overall number of recorded deaths declined over time, decreasing from 42,173 in the first half of 2025 to 30,767 in the first half of 2026. Fatalities in central and western oblasts were comparatively low throughout the reporting period.

Fatalities between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026

Oblast	1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025	1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025	1 January 2026 to 30 June 2026	Total
Donetsk	21,165	14,795	9,983	45,943
Kherson	15,777	14,018	12,567	42,362
Kharkiv	2,281	2,751	2,732	7,764
Zaporizhzhia	1,155	1,883	2,562	5,600
Dnipropetrovsk	281	1,858	1,986	4,125
Sumy	1,056	543	612	2,211
Luhansk	259	45	52	356
Kyiv City	73	105	63	241
Odesa	33	33	46	112
Chernihiv	16	54	27	97
Crimea	13	10	62	85
Kyiv	16	15	24	55
Mykolaiv	14	10	9	33
Poltava	19	2	18	39
Ternopil	0	38	0	38
Kirovohrad	0	25	1	26
Zhytomyr	4	15	3	22
Khmelnytskyi	6	4	2	12
Lviv	0	7	2	9
Cherkasy	0	0	8	8
Vinnytsia	0	2	1	3
Ivano-Frankivsk	2	0	2	4
Rivne	1	0	3	4
Chernivtsi	0	2	0	2
Volyn	2	0	0	2
Zakarpattia	0	0	2	2
Total by period	42,173	36,215	30,767	109,155

13.2 Civilian injuries and fatalities

13.2.1 The Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) monitors and reports on the human rights impact of the conflict in Ukraine. HRMMU states that it collects and verifies information on civilian casualties and harm using a range of sources and is assessed for credibility and cross-checked against other available sources^{[footnote 34]}. HRMMU also note that reported casualty and damage figures are likely to underrepresent the true extent of civilian harm, particularly in areas where access constraints and ongoing hostilities limit verification^{[footnote 35]}. HRMMU casualty data is also subject to ongoing verification. As additional information becomes available, including through further investigations and access to previously unavailable information, HRMMU may revise casualty figures reported in earlier publications. As a result, figures cited in subsequent reports may differ slightly from those originally published for the same reporting period. See the HRMMU website for more information regarding their methodology.

13.2.2 In July 2026, the HRMMU published the following infographic on total estimated civilian casualties since February 2022, including by year and by month^{[footnote 36]}:

Civilian casualties since 24 February 2022

68,147 total civilian casualties

16,874 killed

51,273 injured

1. By year:

Year	Killed	Injured
2022	8,423	12,670
2023	1,975	6,651
2024	2,088	9,138
2025	2,549	12,176
Jan-July 2026	1,839	10,638

2. By months

	2022	2023	2024	2025	2026
Jan killed		205	169	149	167
Jan injured		539	524	770	767
Feb killed	378	144	156	131	195
Feb injured	469	457	360	592	761
Mar killed	4313	183	130	179	218
Mar injured	3019	590	498	922	1242
Apr killed	842	189	141	223	242
Apr injured	1905	493	603	1169	1423
May killed	589	178	182	191	282
May injured	1152	687	732	865	1794
Jun killed	435	186	162	249	298
Jun injured	1109	693	725	1416	2041
Jul killed	390	166	248	312	437
Jul injured	1154	690	1118	1482	2610
Aug killed	347	158	204	260
Aug injured	922	561	936	949
Sep killed	415	145	215	249
Sep injured	986	548	1268	1068
Oct killed	317	181	198	183
Oct injured	795	433	940	1021
Nov killed	189	113	174	242
Nov injured	542	363	912	1006
Dec killed	208	127	109	181
Dec injured	617	597	522	916

13.2.3 According to HRMMU data, at least 68,147 civilian casualties (16,874 killed and 51,273 injured) were recorded in Ukraine between 24 February 2022 and July 2026. Civilian deaths were highest in 2022, during the initial phase of the full-scale invasion, but casualties continued to be recorded throughout the conflict. While fatalities generally declined after 2022, the number of injuries increased again from 2024 onwards, reaching over 12,000 in 2025. Data for January to July 2026 indicate that civilian harm remained significant, with 1,839 deaths and 10,638 injuries recorded during the first seven months of the year.

13.2.4 On 12 January 2026, HRMMU stated that:

‘The year 2025 was the deadliest for civilians in Ukraine since 2022, the UN Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU) said today in its monthly update on civilian harm.

‘HRMMU verified that conflict-related violence in Ukraine in 2025 killed 2,514 civilians and injured 12,142. The total number of killed and injured civilians in 2025 was 31 per cent higher than in 2024 (2,088 killed; 9,138 injured) and 70 per cent higher than in 2023 (1,974 killed; 6,651 injured).

‘The vast majority of casualties verified by HRMMU in 2025 occurred in government-controlled territory from attacks launched by Russian armed forces (97 per cent; 2,395 killed and 11,751 injured).’^{[footnote 37]}

13.2.5 The same source opined that: ‘“The 31 per cent increase in civilian casualties compared with 2024 represents a marked deterioration in the protection of civilians,” Danielle Bell, head of HRMMU said. “Our monitoring shows that this rise was driven not only by intensified hostilities along the frontline, but also by the expanded use of long-range weapons, which exposed civilians across the country to heightened risk.”’^{[footnote 38]}

13.2.6 The HRMMU also considered the areas and demographics of civilians killed in 2025:

‘Sixty-three per cent (9,253) of all casualties in 2025 occurred in frontline areas.

‘Older persons were particularly affected, as they constitute a large portion of those remaining in frontline villages. HRMMU documented that individuals aged 60 years and above accounted for over 45 percent (742 killed) of civilians killed in frontline areas in 2025, despite representing only 25 percent of the national population.

‘Civilian casualties caused by short-range drones increased by 120 per cent in 2025, resulting in 577 civilians killed and 3,288 injured, compared with 226 killed and 1,528 injured in 2024. For example, on 25 December [2025], a short-range drone struck a car with volunteers conducting evacuations in Kostiantynivka, Donetsk region, killing one humanitarian worker and injuring two others. On 6 December [2025], a short-range drone killed a woman and injured her two adult children in occupied Horlivka, Donetsk region.

‘“The expanded use of short-range drones has rendered many areas near the frontline effectively uninhabitable,” Bell said. “As essential services shut down and infrastructure is destroyed, it has become too dangerous in some communities even to provide emergency medical care or evacuate civilians. In 2025, many people who had endured years of hostilities were ultimately compelled to leave their homes.”’^{[footnote 39]}

13.2.7 The same source also considered Russia’s use of long-range weapons:

‘A massive increase in the use of long-range weapons by the Russian armed forces starting in June 2025 also caused an increase in civilian harm in urban centers across Ukraine. Regular, hours-long, nightly attacks with hundreds of weapons killed and injured civilians, destroyed civilian property and infrastructure, and created anxiety across the country.

‘Long-range weapons (missiles and loitering munitions) caused 35 per cent of civilian casualties in Ukraine in 2025 (682 killed and 4,443 injured), a 65 per cent increase in killed and injured compared with 2024 (531 killed and 2,569 injured).

‘In the deadliest attack in 2025, long-range weapons launched by the Russian Federation struck the western city of Ternopil on 19 November [2025], killing at least 38 civilians, including eight children. Ten families lost at least two members each. At least 99 others, including 17 children, were injured.

‘Long-range weapons launched by the Russian Federation also killed 32 civilians, including five children, and injured 170, including 17 children, in Kyiv city on 31 July [2025], the highest verified number of civilian casualties in the capital since the Russian Federation launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.’^{[footnote 40]}

13.2.8 Using data reported by the HRMMU, CPIT has compiled the table below showing verified civilian deaths during three reporting periods between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026:

	1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025	1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025	1 January 2026 to 30 June 2026	Total
Civilian fatalities	1,122	1,392	1,396	3,910

13.2.9 Using data reported by the HRMMU, CPIT has compiled the table below showing verified civilian injuries during three reporting periods between 1 January 2025 and 30 June 2026:

	1 January 2025 to 30 June 2025	1 July 2025 to 31 December 2025	1 January 2026 to 30 June 2026	Total
Civilian injuries	5,734	6,408	7,978	20,120

13.2.10 The below information specifically considers security events that have impacted on civilian injuries and fatalities throughout 2026, as reported by the HRMMU.

13.2.11 The January 2026 HRMMU civilian protection update report noted:

‘Conflict-related violence killed at least 161 civilians and injured 757 others. The number of civilian casualties was similar to that recorded in January 2025.

‘Attacks involving long-range weapons (missiles and drones) launched by Russian armed forces accounted for 39% of all civilian casualties, killing 54 civilians and injuring 305. Most of these casualties occurred near the frontline, where 97 civilians were killed and 444 injured. Short-range drones caused the highest number of casualties, resulting in 54 deaths and 207 injuries. Artillery and multiple launch rocket system attacks killed 26 civilians and injured 156, while aerial bombardments killed 17 and injured 81. A further 18 civilians were killed or injured in incidents involving explosive remnants of war (ERW) or mines.

‘The overwhelming majority of civilian casualties (99%) occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Civilian casualties were recorded across 12 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv.’^{[footnote 41]}

13.2.12 The February 2026 HRMMU civilian protection update report noted:

‘Conflict-related violence in February 2026 killed at least 188 people and injured 757. Total casualties were similar to January 2026, but 31 per cent higher than in February 2025 (130 killed; 592 injured) and 83 per cent higher than in February 2024 (156 killed; 360 injured).

‘Attacks with long-range weapons (missiles and drones) caused about 36 per cent of all civilian casualties (60 killed; 276 injured), most of them in cities and towns far from the frontline.

‘Near the frontline, short-range drone attacks remained the primary cause of civilian casualties (52 killed; 222 injured). Aerial bombs caused 47 per cent more casualties in February (40 killed; 107 injured) compared with January (17 killed; 83 injured).’

‘The vast majority of civilian casualties (97 per cent) occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Civilians were killed or injured across 15 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv.’^{[footnote 42]}

13.2.13 The March 2026 HRMMU civilian protection update report noted:

‘In March 2026, at least 211 civilians were killed and 1,206 injured, representing a 49 per cent increase compared with February 2026 (191 killed; 759 injured) and a 29 per cent increase compared with March 2025 (178 killed; 922 injured). The number of civilian casualties in March is the highest since July 2025.

‘Attacks with long-range weapons (missiles and drones) remained the primary cause of civilian casualties, accounting for 36 per cent of the total (61 killed; 448 injured), with most casualties occurring in cities and towns far from the frontline.

‘Short-range drones were the second leading cause of civilian casualties (66 killed; 369 injured) and accounted for the highest number of civilians killed in March in Ukraine, while remaining the primary cause of civilian casualties near the frontline.

‘Daily attacks near the frontline involving short-range drones, as well as artillery systems and aerial bombs, accounted for 63 per cent of civilian casualties in March, with older persons disproportionately affected, representing 50 per cent of those killed and 40 per cent of those injured.

‘The vast majority of civilian casualties (97 per cent) occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Civilians were killed or injured across 19 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv.’^{[footnote 43]}

13.2.14 The same report noted: ‘In the first quarter of 2026, civilian casualties (556 killed; 2,731 injured) were 20 per cent higher than in the first quarter of 2025 (456 killed; 2,284 injured) and remained at similarly high levels to the last quarter of 2025 (588 killed; 2,930 injured).’^{[footnote 44]}

13.2.15 The April 2026 HRMMU civilian protection update report noted:

‘At least 238 civilians were killed and 1,404 injured in Ukraine in April 2026, marking the highest monthly civilian casualty toll since July 2025. This is an 18 per cent increase compared with April 2025 (223 killed; 1,169 injured) and a 13 per cent increase compared with March 2026 (216 killed; 1,242 injured).

‘Attacks with long-range weapons (missiles and drones) were the primary cause of civilian casualties, accounting for 43 per cent of the total (84 killed; 628 injured), with most casualties occurring in cities and towns far from the frontline. Civilian casualties from long-range weapons increased by 38 per cent compared with March 2026 (61 killed and 456 injured).

‘At least 54 per cent of all civilian casualties (139 killed; 744 injured) occurred near the frontline as a result of artillery shelling, rocket attacks, drone strikes, and aerial bombardments. Short-range drones killed 80 civilians and injured 481, making this type of weapon the second leading cause of civilian casualties. More civilians were killed and injured by this type of weapon than in any other month since the start of the full-scale invasion.

‘The vast majority of civilian casualties (96 per cent) occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Civilians were killed or injured across 16 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv.’^{[footnote 45]}

13.2.16 The same report noted: ‘The highest numbers of killed and injured occurred in Kherson city (26 killed and 201 injured), Dnipro city (23 killed and 115 injured), Nikopol city (16 killed and 93 injured), and Odesa city (15 killed and 80 injured). In the first four months of 2026, civilian casualties (815 killed; 4,174 injured) were 21 per cent higher than in the same period of 2025 (682 killed; 3,453 injured).’^{[footnote 46]}

13.2.17 The May 2026 HRMMU civilian protection update report noted:

‘At least 274 civilians were killed and 1,763 injured in Ukraine in May 2026, marking the highest total number of civilians killed and injured since April 2022. This is a 93 per cent increase compared with May 2025 (191 killed; 865 injured) and a 23 per cent increase compared with April 2026 (240 killed; 1,422 injured).

‘Attacks with long-range weapons (missiles and drones) were the primary cause of civilian casualties, accounting for 45 per cent of the total (115 killed; 803 injured), with most casualties occurring in urban centres, such as Kyiv and Dnipro, far from the frontline.

‘Short-range drones were the primary cause of civilian casualties near the frontline, killing 64 civilians and injuring 539. More civilians were killed and injured by this type of weapon in May than in any other month since 24 February 2022.

‘Other civilian casualties near the frontline resulted from aerial bombardments (57 killed and 179 injured), artillery shelling and MLRS attacks (28 killed and 208 injured). In addition, 10 civilians were killed and 34 injured in incidents involving explosive remnants of war (ERW) and mines.

‘The vast majority of civilian casualties occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Civilians were killed or injured across 20 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv.

‘The highest numbers of killed and injured occurred in Kyiv (26 killed and 102 injured), Zaporizhzhia (15 killed and 91 injured), Kherson (14 killed and 221 injured), and Dnipro (8 killed and 83 injured).’^{[footnote 47]}

13.2.18 The June 2026 HRMMU civilian protection update report presented the data from the first six months of 2026. The report noted that ‘In the first six months of 2026, civilian casualties (1,396 killed; 7,978 injured) were 37 per cent higher than in the same period in 2025 (1,122 killed; 5,734 injured) and 114 per cent higher than in the same period in 2024 (940 killed; 3,442 injured).’^{[footnote 48]}

13.2.19 The same report included the following graph comparing civilian casualties for the first six months of each year from 2024-2026^{[footnote 49]}:

13.2.20 The same report noted:

‘At least 293 civilians were killed and 1,990 injured in Ukraine in June 2026. Following the sharp increase documented in May, civilian casualties continued to rise, reaching the highest total number of civilians killed and injured since April 2022. The June civilian casualties were 10 per cent higher than in May 2026 (282 killed; 1,794 injured) and 37 per cent higher than in June 2025 (249 killed; 1,416 injured).

‘… In June, long-range weapons (powerful missiles with area-wide effects and drones) remained the leading cause of civilian casualties, accounting for 45 per cent of the total (126 killed; 907 injured). Most casualties from these weapons occurred far from the frontline in urban centres such as Kyiv and Dnipro. Near the frontline, civilian casualties caused by short-range drones reached their highest monthly level since 24 February 2022 (89 killed; 588 injured).

‘Aerial bombardments (44 killed; 280 injured), artillery shelling and Multiple Launched Rocket System attacks (27 killed; 171 injured), as well as incidents involving explosive remnants of war and mines (7 killed; 44 injured), also continued to cause civilian casualties.

‘The vast majority of civilian casualties in June occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. Civilians were killed or injured across 13 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv. The highest numbers of killed and injured in June 2026 occurred in Zaporizhzhia (23 killed and 229 injured), Kherson (18 killed and 236 injured), Dnipro (25 killed and 77 injured), and Kyiv (11 killed and 112 injured).’^{[footnote 50]}

13.2.21 The same report included the following map showing civilian casualties in the first 6 months of 2026 by the territory in which they occurred. The map shows that 93% of the 1,396 civilian fatalities and 98% of the 7,978 injuries occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine, highlighting the concentration of civilian harm in Ukrainian-held areas affected by frontline fighting and Russian attacks^{[footnote 51]}:

	Killed	Injured
Controlled by the government	1302	7781
Occupied by the Russian Federation	94	197

13.2.22 The same report included the following map showing civilian casualties from 24 February 2022 to 30 June 2026 by the territory in which they occurred. The map shows that 82% of the 16,431 civilian fatalities and 90% of the 48,613 injuries occurred in areas under the control of the Government of Ukraine. While civilian casualties were recorded across the country, the figures indicate that civilian harm was concentrated in Ukrainian-held areas, predominantly in the east and south exposed to ongoing hostilities and Russian attacks^{[footnote 52]}:

	Killed	Injured
Controlled by the government	13542	43825
Occupied by the Russian Federation	2889	4788

13.2.23 The July 2026 HRMMU civilian protection update report noted:

‘At least 437 civilians were killed and 2,610 injured in Ukraine in July 2026, a 30 per cent increase compared to June 2026 (298 killed; 2,041 injured) and a 70 per cent increase compared to July 2025 (312 killed; 1,482 injured). The number of civilians killed was the highest since May 2022. The number of child casualties (17 killed; 166 injured) was the highest since April 2022.

‘Long-range weapons (missiles and drones) remained the leading cause of civilian casualties, accounting for 38 per cent of the total (183 killed; 967 injured). Most casualties from these weapons occurred far from the frontline in urban centres.

‘Civilian casualties from aerial bombardments (105 killed; 753 injured) increased by 143 per cent compared with June 2026 (45 killed; 308 injured), with glide bombs becoming the second leading cause of civilian casualties.

‘Civilian casualties caused by short-range drones near the frontline reached their highest monthly level since 24 February 2022 (111 killed; 710 injured) and caused 27 per cent of all casualties.

‘Civilians were killed or injured across 14 regions of Ukraine and the city of Kyiv. The highest numbers of killed and injured were documented in the cities of Kyiv (54 killed; 202 injured), Kherson (34 killed; 424 injured), Zaporizhzhia (27 killed; 280 injured), and Sumy (20 killed; 152 injured).

‘The verified figures include 25 civilians killed and 50 injured in territory of Ukraine occupied by the Russian Federation. Increasingly limited publicly available information about civilian casualties in occupied territory has made verification more challenging and means that the actual number of civilian casualties there is likely significantly higher.’^{[footnote 53]}

13.2.24 HRMMU reporting for January to July 2026 indicates that civilian casualties occurred across much of Ukraine, with the highest numbers of killed and injured recorded in Kyiv, Kherson, Zaporizhzhia, Dnipro, Odesa, Nikopol and Sumy. Frontline and near-frontline areas, particularly in Kherson, Zaporizhzhia and Sumy oblasts, experienced significant harm from short-range drones, artillery shelling, multiple launch rocket system (MLRS) attacks and aerial bombardments, while urban centres located further from the frontline, including Kyiv, Dnipro and Odesa, were frequently affected by long-range missile and drone strikes.

13.2.25 Regarding the cause of civilian casualties, HRMMU reporting for January to July 2026 indicates that throughout the reporting period, long-range missiles and drones were consistently the leading cause of civilian casualties overall, accounting for around 36% to 45% of all casualties in most months. Short-range drones were the primary cause of casualties near the frontline and caused record levels of civilian harm during 2026, while aerial bombs, including glide bombs, artillery and MLRS attacks also resulted in substantial numbers of deaths and injuries. In July 2026, aerial bombardments became the second leading cause of civilian casualties, alongside continuing high casualty levels from long-range and short-range drone attacks.

13.2.26 In July 2026, People in Need published ‘Protection Monitoring Report Round 5 for Eastern and Southern Ukraine’ (PiN July 2026 report), presenting the results of the fifth round of protection monitoring conducted from January to March 2026 in eastern (Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia oblasts), and southern Ukraine (Mykolaiv oblast)^{[footnote 54]}. In relation to Mykolaivksa oblast, the report stated:

‘In Q1 2026, Mykolaivska oblast remained outside active frontline changes, with no recorded shifts along the line of contact. However, the region continued to experience regular long-range air and UAV strikes, reflecting its role as an important rear logistics hub. Strike activity primarily targeted energy and transport infrastructure, including railway assets, contributing to recurring disruptions in utilities and increased operational risks … Despite the comparatively lower frequency of strikes compared to other southern regions, the cumulative impact maintained elevated vulnerability across key urban and logistical areas.’^{[footnote 55]}

13.2.27 In relation to Dnipropetrovska oblast, the same report stated:

‘In Q1 2026, Russian Armed Forces made limited territorial advances in Dnipropetrovsk oblast, concentrated in the southeastern part of Synelnykove district, covering approximately 16.5 km². Despite minimal frontline changes, … [there were] intensified strikes on key logistics routes, particularly along the Pavlohrad–Pokrovsk axis used for interregional movement. Nikopol district remained one of the most affected areas, with a sharp increase in UAV-related strikes toward the end of the quarter. This led to disruptions in transport services and local livelihoods, increasing risks for civilians … Additional impacts were recorded on critical infrastructure, including temporary power outages and strikes on railway nodes …’^{[footnote 56]}

13.2.28 In August 2026, the Danish Refugee Council (DRC) published its quarterly protection monitoring report covering 1 April–30 June 2026 (DRC August 2026 report), based on quantitative data collection from surveys of 188 households corresponding to 443 individuals along with key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus group discussions (FGDs) conducted in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia, Kherson, Sumy, Donetsk and Mykolaiv Oblasts.^{[footnote 57]} The report stated:

‘Attacks on civilians and civilian objects intensified during April–June 2026, increasing civilian deaths and injuries, damaging homes and civilian infrastructure … The deterioration was most evident in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Kherson, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Sumy Oblasts, where the expanding use of FPV drones, guided aerial bombs, missiles, artillery and long-range unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) increased both the geographical reach and unpredictability of attacks. June 2026 saw the highest number of civilian causalities since April 2022, with at least 293 civilians killed and 1,990 injured in frontline communities as well as locations further from the frontline such as Kyiv city and Kyiv Oblast Ukraine.

‘Protection monitoring indicates that civilians in frontline, near-frontline and border communities continue to face the highest levels of risk, while attacks affecting locations previously perceived as relatively safer demonstrate that the threat is expanding geographically.’^{[footnote 58]}

13.2.29 In relation to the type of attacks and the effects on civilians, the same source stated: ‘The increasing use of FPV drones has fundamentally altered civilian risk patterns by reducing warning time and increasing the unpredictability of attacks, making routine activities … increasingly dangerous.’^{[footnote 59]}

13.2.30 In relation to Nikopolskyi raion in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, the same source stated: ‘Despite escalating insecurity, significant numbers of civilians remain in high-risk areas. In Nikopolskyi raion, approximately 59,000 people reportedly continued living in settlements affected by repeated shelling and FPV drone attacks.’^{[footnote 60]}

13.2.31 In relation to the presence of mines and other explosive ordnance, the same source stated: ‘The risk posed by mines and other explosive ordnance remained consistently high during April– June 2026, with no evidence of a meaningful reduction across assessed frontline, near-frontline and previously conflict-affected areas. The highest levels of risk continued to be reported in Kherson, Mykolaiv, Kharkiv and Donetsk Oblasts, where longstanding contamination is compounded by ongoing hostilities, repeated shelling, remote mining and the expanding use of FPV drones. Although no confirmed mine or UXO incidents were identified through protection monitoring in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts during the reporting period, explosive ordnance remained a significant concern due to repeated strikes and the potential presence of unexploded munitions following attacks.’^{[footnote 61]}

14. Freedom of movement

14.1.1 Article 33 of the Constitution of Ukraine guarantees freedom of movement, choice of residence and the right to leave the territory of Ukraine^{[footnote 62]}. See Country Policy and Information Note, Ukraine: Military Service for information on how martial law affects freedom of movement.

14.1.2 In their 2026 annual report, Freedom House noted that:

‘The full-scale invasion has caused significant displacement. … the danger of land mines and unexploded ordnance prevents refugees and IDPs from returning home …

‘… Mobilization reforms of 2024 obligated all men of military age to self-report their updated location, biographic data, and contact information in a new government-run mobile application. …

‘In August 2025, the Ukraine government announced that men aged 18 to 22 would be permitted to cross the country’s borders freely. Previously, men aged 18 to 60 were barred under martial law from leaving the country. The Ukrainian government framed the policy change as an effort to help young Ukrainians maintain ties with the homeland and pursue education abroad, while also responding to demographic pressures and youth discontent.’^{[footnote 63]}

14.1.3 In July 2026, the UNHCR published Ukraine Protection Survey 3 based on a survey of households across government-held Ukraine. The survey examined a range of protection issues safety and freedom of movement. The UNHCR stated that the survey:

‘… provides analysis of over 13,000 interviews conducted in three intervals within a year from April 2025 to April 2026 … Qualitative information of 476 key informant interviews conducted in 51 hromadas during the three survey rounds complements the quantitative analysis. Data collection took place from March to April 2025 (Protection Survey 1), August to September 2025 (Protection Survey 2) and from March to April 2026 (Protection Survey 3).’^{[footnote 64]}

14.1.4 The Ukraine Protection Survey 3 noted that:

‘80% of respondents can enjoy their freedom of movement in Ukraine (areas under temporary occupation are excluded), while 17% report some limitations to their freedom of movement. Compared to the first survey round a year ago, a slight deterioration in people’s ability to move freely by 3% was
observed in the second and third round. Male respondents report higher limitations to their freedom of movement at 21% compared to female (14%), further elevated to 25% among younger male respondents with an average age of 44 years. War-affected respondents also report higher barriers
to their freedom of movement than IDPs and returnees at 25%.

‘Respondents with specific needs exhibit more movement limitations at 22%, further heightened to over 25% if respondents are above 60 years. Specifically, older persons at risk and single-headed household stand out as the two categories with greatest movement restrictions at 28% and 32%.’^{[footnote 65]}

14.1.5 The same survey looked at respondents’ reported reasons constraining freedom of movement:

‘Risk of air raid sirens and air attack is a main reason constraining people’s freedom of movement (35%). Returnees (52%) and war-affected (45%) respondents report this constraint more often than IDPs (30%). Female respondents also report these concerns more often (46%) than males (41%), while it is a lesser concern among older respondents (31%) than
younger ones (38%).

• ‘13% of respondents note constraints due to the lack of barrier-free infrastructure or transport as well as lack of assistive devices. These constraints are highest among respondents over 60 years at 19% as well as those with specific needs at 21%. This constraint is also heightened for IDPs at 16% compared to war-affected (10%) and returnee (10%) respondents.

• ‘Overall, 21% of respondents do not have their own transport and 8% cannot afford public transport. IDPs report more
  often than others not having their own transport at 22%, while affordability constraints for public transport remain at 8%.
  This constraint is reportedly also higher among female respondents with 23% reporting not having their own transport,
  and 10% facing affordability constraints (as compared to 19% and 5% respectively among males).

• ‘23% report limitations to their freedom of movement due to mobilization risks, and 11% due to the checkpoints. Both are
  significantly elevated for male respondents at 41% and 20% respectively, and are the top two constraining factors for
  males of younger age.

• ‘With regards to access to civil and identity documentation, the survey confirms that respondents in government-controlled
  areas of Ukraine do not face significant barriers to documentation. Documentation challenges are severe for Ukrainian
  residents arriving from the temporarily occupied territories as well as among newly displaced, including those evacuated.’^{[footnote 66]}

14.1.6 The Ukraine Protection Survey 3 included the below infographic on perceptions of safety^{[footnote 67]}:

59% of respondents reported feeling unsafe or only somewhat safe. This deteriorated across the year, rising by 12% from 55% in round 1 of the survey to 67% in round 3.

Do you feel safe? (overall)

Yes	41%
Somewhat	39%
No	20%

Do you feel safe? (by survey round)

	Yes	Somewhat	No
Round 1	45%	40%	15%
Round 2	47%	34%	19%
Round 3	33%	43%	24%

14.1.7 The same surveys found that respondents most frequently associated negative perceptions of safety with the war generally (90%) and air strikes specifically (70%). Whilst concerns about the war and air strikes dominated responses, it is important to note that respondents also referred to a range of other factors affecting their perceptions of safety, including the economic situation and fear of poverty (11%), the temporary occupation of parts of Ukraine (8%) and not living in their own home (5%)^{[footnote 68]}.

14.1.8 The same source noted that:

The prevalence of specific needs is associated with lower perceptions of safety at 63%, 8% more than households without a specific need prevalence. Feeling unsafe is particularly high among respondents with a chronic illness (67%) and among single-headed households (72%).

‘Perceptions of safety are better in central and western macro-regions, with concerns reported at 41% and 30% respectively, while concerns are highest in Kyiv (72%) and the southern macro-region (72%) followed closely by the eastern (70%) and northern (68%) macro-regions.

‘Of those 59% of respondents who feel not or only somewhat safe, 27%
report a high negative impact of the security situation in their day-to-
day life, while 63% report some negative impact and 10% report only
limited negative impact. For the 20% of respondents who report
feeling unsafe, the share of those experiencing a high negative impact
on their lives stands at 48%.’^{[footnote 69]}

14.1.9 The same source also found:

‘War-related fears in general and airstrikes specifically are the two dominant factors for negative safety perceptions across the country, with lesser prevalence in the western-macro region. Fear of airstrikes is highest in the North and in Kyiv. Socio-economic concerns are highest in the western macro-region … Fear of energy blackouts are highest in the northern and southern macro-regions, while concerns over communal tensions are heightened in central and western regions.’^{[footnote 70]}

14.1.10 In relation to perception of safety, the DRC August 2026 report stated: ‘Bombardment or the threat of shelling was identified as undermining safety by 92% of respondents in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia Oblasts, 86% in Kharkiv Oblast and 100% of respondents in Mykolaiv and Kherson Oblasts. In Sumy Oblast, 58% of surveyed households reported feeling unsafe…’^{[footnote 71]}

14.1.11 In March 2026, the IRC published ‘Protection Monitoring Snapshot January 2026’ for Eastern and Southern Ukraine which stated: ‘In Donetska oblast, where 70% of respondents report feeling unsafe in their shelter or accommodation, perceived insecurity aligns with documented protection threats on the ground. In other regions, however, prolonged exposure to danger has led to the normalization of risk, causing affected populations to underestimate the actual severity of the protection environment.’^{[footnote 72]}

14.1.12 The Ukraine Protection Survey 3 also published the below infographic on intentions to evacuate. It noted that ‘29% of respondents surveyed in the three rounds live in the 30km belt along the frontline. Nearly 43% of respondents intend to leave their homes should the security situation deteriorate; over one third (34%) was undecided and 17% do not intend to leave their homes. Within a year, the percentage of people planning to evacuate dropped by 11%, while those reluctant or not planning to evacuate rose from 44% to 55%.’^{[footnote 73]}

Evacuation intentions (overall)

Yes	43%
Undecided	34%
No	17%
Prefer not to say	6%

Evacuation intentions (by round)

	Round 1	Round 2	Round 3
Yes	51%	40%	40%
Undecided	25%	34%	39%
No	19%	19%	16%
Prefer not to say	5%	7%	5%

14.1.13 Evacuation intentions were also explored in the survey:

‘For the 17% of respondents with no evacuation intentions, the following are their main reasons to stay behind: 29% said that this is their home and they feared losing everything if they evacuated, while 27% do not know where to go or have no alternative place to go to. While these were consistently mentioned as top two reasons for not evacuating across all three surveys, in round 3, a significantly higher percentage (38%) did not intend to evacuate
for fear of losing everything, while lacking an alternative was less
prevalent (18%) than in previous rounds.

‘15% reported lacking the financial resources to evacuate, while over 9% noted poor health conditions as their impediment. 12% of respondents said that considering their age, they prefer to spend the remainder of their lives there and die at home. The average age of those respondents is 67 years. Nearly 6% were worried about not being received well elsewhere, 4% are working at their current place of stay and 3% worried about not being able to return once they leave.

‘Of the 77% of respondents with an evacuation intention or who are undecided, the vast majority, 85%, will be able to evacuate, either on their own or with the support of family or neighbors. 15% of respondents, however, noted that they would need help to evacuate … This ratio changes among those with a firm evacuation intention to 89% able to evacuate, while nearly 11% note they would need help or could not evacuate at all, while among those undecided this ratio stands at 79% to 21%. These patterns remained consistent with little variation across the three survey rounds.’^{[footnote 74]}

14.1.14 The survey findings continued:

‘Of the 43% of respondents with the intention to evacuate, over 80% are mobile and have the means to leave if they need to. 9% would rely on support from family or neighbours to do so. 9% would need help to evacuate but don’t know who could help them. Only few respondents (1%) said they would not be able to evacuate at all.

‘Of the 34% undecided respondents, 63% are mobile and have the means to leave if they need to. 15% would rely on support from family or neighbours to do so. 15% would need help to evacuate but don’t know who could help them and 6% don’t think they could evacuate at all even if they
decided to do so.

‘‘Women aged over 60 with a specific need have least ability to evacuate even if they intend to do so or are undecided, with 30% reporting barriers.’^{[footnote 75]}

14.1.15 The PiN July 2026 report stated:

‘Freedom of movement restrictions remained shaped by a combination of security-related, physical, infrastructure and economic barriers across monitored oblasts [Dnipropetrovsk, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia and Mykolaiv]

‘…While fear of mobilization remained the primary concern reported in urban locations (60%) …key informants in rural areas more frequently referred to the physical inaccessibility of transportation for older persons, persons with disabilities, and other persons with reduced mobility (71%). This was followed by the partial or complete absence of public transportation in some hromadas, including irregular transportation schedules, high transportation costs including private transportation, poor road conditions, and long distances to administrative and service centres.

‘…Key informants noted that transportation providers are often unwilling to maintain routes in rural or frontline areas due to limited profitability and operational costs exceeding potential income.’^{[footnote 76]}

14.1.16 The DRC August 2026 report stated:

‘Restrictions on freedom of movement and conflict-induced displacement intensified during April– June 2026 across eastern and south-eastern Ukraine as escalating hostilities, expanding FPV [First Person View] drone attacks and continued aerial bombardment further constrained civilian movement and accelerated displacement. The most severe impacts were observed in frontline and border communities in Kharkiv, Donetsk, Dnipropetrovsk, Zaporizhzhia and Kherson Oblasts, while continued insecurity in Sumy Oblast drove further displacement from border areas … Across assessed locations, movement restrictions increasingly resulted from insecurity, damaged infrastructure and practical barriers to displacement rather than formal restrictions alone, leaving many civilians unable to move safely or exercise meaningful choice regarding evacuation.

‘…In Zolochivska Hromada in Kharkiv Oblast, residents described routine activities such as travelling to a pharmacy or grocery shop as life threatening because of the pervasive presence of drones …

‘…Documentation barriers, limited transport, inaccessible public services and uncertainty regarding relocation assistance frequently delay evacuation, even where households recognise the immediate security risks.’^{[footnote 77]}

See also: Displacement.

Terms of Reference

The ‘Terms of Reference’ are the main topics and issues relevant to the scope of this note and provides the framework for the country information. In this note, they were:

• Geography and demography

• Conflict-induced displacement

  • Trends in oblasts populations are displaced from, and to

• Actors in conflict:

  • Military casualties

  • Territorial control since December 2024

• Geographical scope of conflict/violence

• Nature of violence: methods and tactics, any trends in nature of violence

• Number of security incidents and any trends:

  • frequency and density in relation to population

  • variation by place

• Number of civilian casualties and any trends, including:

  • fatalities and injuries

  • variation by place and time

• Freedom of movement

Bibliography

Sources cited

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED),

• ACLED codebook, no date

• Data Export Tool – Ukraine: 1 January 2025 – 30 June 2026, 28 July 2026

• Ukraine Conflict Monitor, no date.

BBC News, The Russian village that lost its men to war, 20 February 2026

Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS),

• About CSIS, no date

• Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine, 27 January 2026

• Danish Refugee Council, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026), 20 August 2026

• Encyclopaedia Britannica, What are the military casualty estimates for the Russia-Ukraine War?, 6 July 2026

• Freedom House, Ukraine: Freedom in the World 2026 Country Report, 2026

Human Rights Monitoring Mission in Ukraine (HRMMU),

2025 deadliest year for civilians in Ukraine since 2022, UN human rights monitors find, 12 January 2026

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — January 2026, January 2026

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — February 2026, February 2026

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — March 2026, March 2026

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — April 2026, April 2026

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — May 2026, May 2026

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — June 2026, June 2026

Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — July 2026, July 2026.

Human Rights Watch (HRW), Annual report on the human rights situation in 2025, 4 February 2026

Institute for the Study of War, Key Developments in Russian-occupied Ukraine, June 18 to June 24, 2026, 24 June 2026

International Organization for Migration (IOM), Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population Survey Round 23 (May 2026), 5 May 2026

International Rescue Committee (IRC),

• About, no date

• July-September 2025 Protection Monitoring Report, 29 January 2026

• People in Need, Protection Monitoring Report Round 5, 1 July 2026

Permanent Committee on Geographic Names (PCGN), Toponymic factfiles, Ukraine, updated October 2025

Reuters, Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers killed on battlefield, Zelenskyy tells French TV 4 February 2026

World Population Review,

• Largest Countries in Europe 2026, 2026

• Ukraine Population 2026, 1 January 2026

United Nations, Ukraine, 1 March 2014

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, July 2026

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Humanitarian Needs and Response Plan 2026, 13 January 2026

Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Constitution of Ukraine, 28 June 1996

Sources consulted but not cited

Amnesty International, Report on the human rights situation (covering 2024), 29 April 2025

BBC News, Ukraine in maps: Tracking the war with Russia - BBC News, 22 August 2024

Kyiv Post, Ukraine’s Banking Sector Never Closed. Not Even for War, 5 May 2024

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ukraine Protection Survey #1, June 2025

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Ukraine Protection Survey #2, November 2025

US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ukraine, 23 April 2024

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An update of the security situation in Ukraine since December 2024.

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1. World Population Review, Largest Countries in Europe 2026, 2026 ↩

2. World Population Review, Largest Countries in Europe 2026, 2026 ↩

3. UN, Ukraine, 1 March 2014 ↩

4. UN World Population Review, Ukraine Population 2026, 1 January 2026 ↩

5. UN World Population Review, Ukraine Population 2026, 1 January 2026 ↩

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7. IRC, About, no date ↩

8. IRC, July-September 2025 Protection Monitoring report (page 4), 29 January 2026 ↩

9. HRW, Annual report on the human rights situation in 2025, 4 February 2026 ↩

10. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 2), 21 July 2026 ↩

11. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 2), 21 July 2026 ↩

12. PCGN, Toponymic factfiles, Ukraine, updated October 2025 ↩

13. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 5), 21July 2026 ↩

14. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 3), 21July 2026 ↩

15. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 2), 21July 2026 ↩

16. IRC, July-September 2025 Protection Monitoring report (page 7), 29 January 2026 ↩

17. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 7), 21July 2026 ↩

18. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 3), 21July 2026 ↩

19. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 3), 21July 2026 ↩

20. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 4), 21July 2026 ↩

21. IOM, Ukraine — Internal Displacement Report — General Population… (page 8), 21July 2026 ↩

22. Encyclopaedia Britannica, What are the military casualty estimates for the… War? 6 July 2026 ↩

23. Reuters, Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers killed on battlefield … 4 February 2026 ↩

24. Reuters, Fifty-five thousand Ukrainian soldiers killed on battlefield … 4 February 2026 ↩

25. CSIS, About CSIS, no date ↩

26. CSIS, Russia’s Grinding War in Ukraine, 27 January 2026 ↩

27. BBC, The Russian village that lost its men to war, 20 February 2026 ↩

28. ISW, Key Developments in Russian-occupied Ukraine, June 18 to June 24, 2026, 24 June 2026 ↩

29. ACLED, ACLED codebook (Event types and sub-event types), no date ↩

30. ACLED, ACLED codebook (Event types and sub-event types), no date ↩

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32. ACLED, Ukraine Conflict Monitor, no date ↩

33. ACLED, Data Export Tool – Ukraine: 1 January 2025 – 30 June 2026, 28 July 2026 ↩

34. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — January 2026, page 7 ↩

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36. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — July 2026, page 2 ↩

37. HRMMU, 2025 deadliest year for civilians in Ukraine since 2022, UN human …, 12 January 2026 ↩

38. HRMMU, 2025 deadliest year for civilians in Ukraine since 2022, UN human …, 12 January 2026 ↩

39. HRMMU, 2025 deadliest year for civilians in Ukraine since 2022, UN human …, 12 January 2026 ↩

40. HRMMU, 2025 deadliest year for civilians in Ukraine since 2022, UN human …, 12 January 2026 ↩

41. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — January 2026, page 2 ↩

42. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — February 2026, page 2 ↩

43. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — March 2026, page 2 ↩

44. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — March 2026, page 2 ↩

45. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — April 2026, page 2 ↩

46. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — April 2026, page 2 ↩

47. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — May 2026, page 2 ↩

48. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — June 2026, page 2 ↩

49. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — June 2026,page 4 ↩

50. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — June 2026, page 4 ↩

51. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — June 2026, page 4 ↩

52. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — June 2026, page 5 ↩

53. HRMMU, Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict — July 2026, page 2 ↩

54. People in Need, Protection Monitoring Report Round 5 (page 4), 1 July 2026 ↩

55. People in Need, Protection Monitoring Report Round 5 (page 6), 1 July 2026 ↩

56. People in Need, Protection Monitoring Report Round 5 (page 6), 1 July 2026 ↩

57. DRC, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026) (page 3), 20 August 2026 ↩

58. DRC, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026) (page 7), 20 August 2026 ↩

59. DRC, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026) (page 8), 20 August 2026 ↩

60. DRC, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026) (page 6), 20 August 2026 ↩

61. DRC, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026) (page 9), 20 August 2026 ↩

62. Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine, Constitution of Ukraine, 28 June 1996 ↩

63. Freedom House, Ukraine: Freedom in the World 2026 Country Report, 2026 ↩

64. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 7, July 2026 ↩

65. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 17, July 2026 ↩

66. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 17, July 2026 ↩

67. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 10, July 2026 ↩

68. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 10, July 2026 ↩

69. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 11, July 2026 ↩

70. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 11, July 2026 ↩

71. DRC, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026) (page 7), 20 August 2026 ↩

72. IRC, Protection Monitoring Snapshot January 2026 (page 1), 12 March 2026 ↩

73. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 12, July 2026 ↩

74. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 12, July 2026 ↩

75. UNHCR, Ukraine Protection Survey #3, page 14, July 2026 ↩

76. People in Need, Protection Monitoring Report Round 5 (page 4), 1 July 2026 ↩

77. DRC, DRC quarterly protection monitoring report (April – June 2026) (page 5-6), 20 August 2026 ↩