Country and policy information note: humanitarian situation, Syria, July 2025 (accessible)
Updated 16 September 2025
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Executive summary
Syria remains one of the world’s most challenging humanitarian environments. The civil war devastated the economy, destroyed infrastructure, and displaced over half of the population. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimates that 16.5 million of Syria’s 23.9 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance.
About 60 percent of the population suffers from food insecurity, millions live in inadequate accommodation, roughly half of the hospitals are non-functional, and millions face issues accessing sufficient clean water and safe sanitation systems.
There are approximately 7.4 million internally displaced persons in Syria, with over 2 million living in temporary shelter arrangements such as camps, which suffer from severe overcrowding and poor living conditions.
However, the general humanitarian situation in Syria is not so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules or based on the general approach to Article 3 ECHR “living conditions” cases set out in OA (Somalia) (CG) [2022] UKUT 33 (IAC) (2 February 2022). The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.
All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.
Assessment
Section updated: 20 May 2025
About the assessment
This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general:
- the humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
- internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm
- a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.
Sources cited in the country information may refer interchangeably to Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), or the interim or de facto government or authorities. Within this assessment, we use the (new) Syrian government and, since 8 December 2024 they are considered the controlling party of the state or a substantial part of the territory of the State (for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention).
The value of the Syrian Pound (SYP) has changed significantly in the months since the fall of Al-Assad on 8 December 2024. CPIT has not provided GBP conversions for SYP figures in sources published before January 2025. For sources published from January onwards, CPIT has provided conversions because the exchange rate has been more stable.
CPIT used SP Today for SYP/GBP and xe.com for USD/GBP conversions.
1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals
1.1 Credibility
1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).
1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when such a check has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).
1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).
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1.2 Exclusion
1.2.1 Under the Al-Assad regime, human rights violations were systematic and widespread. Civilians also suffered human rights abuses at the hands of other parties to the conflict.
1.2.2 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion causes. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.
1.2.3 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).
1.2.4 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.
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2. Convention reason(s)
2.1.1 A severe humanitarian situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.
2.1.2 In the absence of a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP).
2.1.3 However, before considering whether a person requires protection because of the general humanitarian situation, decision makers must consider if the person faces persecution for a Refugee Convention reason. Where the person qualifies for protection under the Refugee Convention, decision makers do not need to consider if there are substantial grounds for believing the person faces a real risk of serious harm meriting a grant of HP.
2.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
3. Risk
3.1.1 The general humanitarian situation in Syria is not so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).
3.1.2 Whilst not country-specific to Syria, decision makers should note the Upper Tribunal (UT)’s findings and general approach to assessing humanitarian conditions in OA (Somalia) (CG) [2022] UKUT 33 (IAC) (2 February 2022):
‘In an Article 3 “living conditions” case, there must be a causal link between the Secretary of State’s removal decision and any “intense suffering” feared by the returnee. This includes a requirement for temporal proximity between the removal decision and any “intense suffering” of which the returnee claims to be at real risk. This reflects the requirement in Paposhvili [2017] Imm AR 867 for intense suffering to be “serious, rapid and irreversible” in order to engage the returning State’s obligations under Article 3 ECHR. A returnee fearing “intense suffering” on account of their prospective living conditions at some unknown point in the future is unlikely to be able to attribute responsibility for those living conditions to the Secretary of State, for to do so would be speculative.’ (Headnote 1)
3.1.3 Based on the findings in OA, the threshold for granting humanitarian protection under paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules in an Article 3 ECHR “living conditions” case is very high. The onus is on the person to demonstrate that they would be unable to obtain food, water, accommodation and other absolute essentials on return to Syria (including through their support networks) and that this would cause intense suffering which would be ‘serious, rapid and irreversible’.
3.1.4 In determining this, their individual personal circumstances must be carefully considered. This is includes, but is not limited to, factors such as gender, age, marital status, medical conditions and any other relevant vulnerabilities. Support could also come from family, friends, community or tribal affiliations. Humanitarian aid organisations also operate in Syria but are unable to reach all of those in need given the high levels of need, insufficient donor funding and security concerns in some locations. UNHCR may be able to assist with return and reintegration support across a number of different humanitarian sectors upon a person’s return to Syria. Remittances from abroad may also be relevant. Similarly, the Home Office can offer financial assistance of up to £3,000 via the voluntary returns service (see Assistance available to returnees).
3.1.5 Nearly 14 years of civil war have devastated Syria’s economy, which has contracted by 85% and moved from 68th to 129th in global gross domestic product (GDP) rankings since the start of the conflict. About one third of the population lives in extreme poverty (less than 1.70 GBP per person per day) (see Basic indicators, Economy, Poverty).
3.1.6 A humanitarian survey of 1,924 households in Hama, Homs and Rural Damascus governorates, conducted between 16 and 20 January 2025, found that the average monthly income for a five-person household was 83.38 GBP in Hama, 105.91 GBP in Homs, and 87.67 GBP in Rural Damascus. The survey also found that the average daily wage for an unskilled worker was between 2.80 and 3.10 GBP. Available information indicates that there is a shortage of stable full-time employment opportunities, however government statistics from 2024 indicate that the total unemployment rate (i.e. the combined rate for both males and females) was 12.9%, falling from a peak of 48.3% in 2015. In February 2025, the new government raised public sector salaries by 400%, bringing the minimum salary from 279,910 SYP [22.13 GBP] to 1,200,000 SYP [95.23 GBP]. However, there was no evidence that these raises have been implemented at the time of writing (see Salaries and income, Employment).
3.1.7 Many people are unable to afford the cost of basic goods and services. According to a survey of 1,018 communities across all governorates conducted between 23 December 2024 and 2 January 2025 (‘the whole-of-Syria survey’), 82% of these communities perceive that income does not cover the cost of living. According to the World Food Programme, the value of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (the essential monthly needs of a five-person household) was 2,653,000 SYP (210.54 GBP) in the second week of January 2025. The UN’s Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) indicated that the minimum wage covers 10 percent of the basket’s cost. The minimum cost to rent a two-bedroom property in Rural Damascus, or a poor neighbourhood of Damascus city, is reportedly c.1,000,000 SYP (78.12 GBP) per month. In Aleppo, the minimum rent is c.1,250,000 SYP (97.66 GBP). However, reports indicate that real estate and rental prices have been fluctuating, so these figures may no longer be accurate. CPIT was only able to find one estimate for the total cost of living, which put the minimum monthly cost for a family of five at 9,098,433 SYP (710.82 GBP) for January 2025. Based on this figure, a single person would need about 1,819,687 SYP (142.16 GBP) per month to cover the cost of living (see Cost of living, Rent prices).
3.1.8 Syria remains one of the world’s most challenging humanitarian environments. The UNOCHA estimated that as of March 2025 there are 16.5 million people (c.69% of the population) in need of humanitarian assistance (see paragraph 8.2.1 for a definition of people in need (PIN)), and that, in all governorates, over 50% of the population is in need of at least some form of humanitarian assistance. In each of the following governorates, over 70% of the population is in need: Aleppo, Hasakah, Daraa, Deir Ezzor, Idlib, and Raqqa. However, the UN’s definition of humanitarian assistance is very wide. It includes ‘Early Recovery and Livelihoods’; Education; Non-Food Items; Sanitation and Hygiene (water is listed separately). Therefore not all people classed as being in need of humanitarian assistance are exposed to conditions which would lead to ‘intense suffering’, nor that it would be ‘serious, rapid and irreversible’ as set out in OA (Somalia) (see Overview of humanitarian situation, Number and location of people in need).
3.1.9Humanitarian initiatives operate in Syria but are generally insufficient due to insufficient funding and level of need. The UNOCHA aimed to target 8 million out of the 16.5 million people in need during the period January–June 2025. In the ‘whole-of-Syria survey’, over 75% of communities in all governorates except Damascus responded ‘No’ to the question of whether the majority of people in their community have access to humanitarian assistance. In Damascus, 55% responded ‘No’ (see Access to humanitarian aid).
3.1.10 The UNOCHA estimated 7 million people to be in need of shelter-related assistance during the period January–June 2025. In the ‘whole-of-Syria survey’, over 50% of communities in the governorates of Aleppo, Damascus, Hama and Lattakia indicated that the majority of people in the community live in unfinished, abandoned or damaged residential properties (see Type of accommodation by governorate).
3.1.11 The UNOCHA estimated that 14.56 million (approximately 61% of the population) are food insecure. On top of the impact of conflict, displacement and the economic crisis, sources indicate that environmental factors are having a negative impact on agriculture in Syria. The prices of some food items have reportedly decreased since the fall of Al-Assad, but the economy remains unstable. It is therefore too soon to say whether price reductions will persist in the long term. One source suggests that the number of Syrians suffering from ‘insufficient food consumption’ decreased from 11.1 million to 8 million between November 2024 and February 2025. Even with this drop, however, the figure of 8 million includes over 40% of the population of most Syrian governorates. Several sources indicate that significant numbers of households resort to harmful coping mechanisms in order to meet their food needs (see Food security).
3.1.12 Syria’s healthcare system suffered greatly as a result of the conflict. According to the WHO, as of January 2025, half of the country’s hospitals are non-functional, and an estimated 15.8 million people are in need of healthcare. The whole-of-Syria survey found that 64% of the 1,018 surveyed communities perceived adequate healthcare to be inaccessible to most people in the community, with the main reasons for this being the costs of both health services and transportation to health facilities (see Healthcare).
3.1.13 The UNOCHA estimates that 14.4 million people in Syria are in need of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH) assistance, with 77.5% of those considered to be in ‘acute need’. In March 2024, the UNOCHA also estimated 90% of Syrians have access to improved sanitation from the previous year (facilities that hygienically separate human waste from human contact). Despite this, sanitation issues such as challenges accessing functional toilets, wastewater disposal, and sewage systems remain. A March 2024 assessment by the UNOCHA found that 17% of the population either did not have soap and/or water at their handwashing facility or did not have a handwashing facility at all (see Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)).
3.1.14 Available evidence indicates that as of 2024, there were approximately 8 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Syria. As of January 2025, about 2.3 million, mostly women and children, lived in camps and other IDP sites, where living conditions are very poor. About 70% of IDP sites are critically overcrowded, according to the UNOCHA. In March 2024, the UNOCHA assessed 100% of IDP site residents to be in need of humanitarian aid. As of May 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimated that there were approximately 7.4 million IDPs in Syria. Whilst 711,557 people were newly displaced following the offensive against the Assad regime which began in November 2024, 1,186,147 people are reported to have returned to their area of origin since December 2024 (see Internally displaced persons (IDPs)).
3.1.15 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
4. Protection
4.1.1 The state is not able to provide protection against a breach of Article 3 because of general humanitarian conditions if this occurs in individual cases.
4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
5. Internal relocation
5.1.1 The evidence in this and the other country policy and information notes on Syria does not indicate that there are restrictions on movement across government-controlled areas, or that any restrictions (for example, checkpoints) are unreasonable or insurmountable.
5.1.2 Whilst it is reasonable to conclude it must be possible, based on significant numbers of returnees from neighbouring countries such as Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan and Iraq going to different onward destinations, the situation is unclear in areas controlled by other groups, and on travel between different areas.
5.1.3 Syria also remains one of the world’s most challenging humanitarian environments. This applies across the whole country. Therefore, even if it is reasonable to expect a person to move to a different location, it may be more challenging to show it is reasonable to expect them to stay there, especially if they do not have a support network capable of ensuring access to their basic needs. Without this, internal relocation is unlikely to be reasonable.
5.1.4 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
6.Certification
6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).
Country information
About the country information
This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.
The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.
This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.
The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 16 May 2025. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.
US dollar to British pound currency conversions throughout this note have been based on the exchange rate of 1 USD = 0.79 GBP.
Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.
7. Socio-economic situation
7.1 Basic indicators
7.1.1 CPIT produced the following table using information from various sources:
| Population | 23.9 million[footnote 1] (2024 estimate. The source did not state whether this number includes recent refugee returns) |
| Life expectancy | 74.8 years (2024 estimate)[footnote 2] |
| Maternal mortality rate (deaths per 100,000 live births) | 30 (2020 estimate)[footnote 3] |
| Infant mortality rate (deaths per 1,000 live births) | 15.1 (2024 estimate)[footnote 4] |
| Population living in extreme poverty (less than $2.15 [1.70 GBP] per day[footnote 5], | 33.1% (2024 estimate)[footnote 6] |
| Child malnutrition (number of stunted children under 5) | 650,000 (2023 estimate)[footnote 7] |
| Literacy rate (age 15 and older) | 86.4%[footnote 8] |
| Average years of education | 9 years[footnote 9] |
| Population completing primary school (% of relevant age group) | 62% (2023 estimate)[footnote 10] |
7.2 Economy
7.2.1 In October 2024, the European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA) published a report entitled ‘Syria – Country Focus’ (the October 2024 EUAA report). The report, citing various sources, stated:
‘Currency depreciation, rising inflation, disrupted supply networks, and increased costs of transportation have driven up the prices of household goods. Most Syrian households faced significant difficulties in meeting basic needs, with over two-thirds of households being partially or completely unable to meet their basic needs due to rising prices and unemployment. As a result, many households reportedly had to rely on borrowing money, buying goods on credit, and use child labour as coping mechanisms.’[footnote 11]
7.2.2 In December 2024, Deutsche Welle (DW) published an articled entitled ‘What’s next for Syria’s devastated economy?’ which stated:
‘Syria’s economy contracted by 85% during nearly 14 years of civil war, which decimated infrastructure and sparked hyperinflation. The challenges are enormous and recovery will require support from the rest of the world.
‘Syria’s economy was worth $67.5 billion (€63.9 billion) [53.4 billion GBP] in 2011 - the same year that large-scale protests broke out against President Bashar Assad’s regime, which sparked a rebel insurgency that escalated into a full-blown civil war. The country was placed 68th among 196 countries in global GDP rankings, comparable to Paraguay and Slovenia. By last year, the economy had fallen to 129 in the league table, having shrunk by 85% to just $9 billion [7.12 billion GBP], according to World Bank estimates. That put the country on par with the likes of Chad and the Palestinian Territories. Almost 14 years of conflict, international sanctions and the exodus of 4.82 million people - more than a fifth of the country’s population - has taken its toll on what was already one of the poorest nations in the Middle East.
‘… The conflict caused a significant devaluation in the Syrian pound, which led to a huge fall in purchasing power.
‘Last year, the country witnessed hyperinflation - very high and accelerating inflation, the Syrian Center for Policy Research (SCPR) said in a report published in June [2024]. The consumer price index (CPI) doubled compared to the previous year.
‘SCPR said more than half of Syrians were living in abject poverty, unable to secure basic food needs. The two main pillars of the Syrian economy - oil and agriculture - were decimated by the war. Although tiny compared to other Middle East countries, Syria’s oil exports accounted for about a quarter of government revenue in 2010. Food production contributed a similar amount to GDP.
‘Assad’s regime lost control of most of its oil fields to rebel groups, including the self-declared Islamic State (IS) and later Kurdish-led forces.
‘International sanctions, meanwhile, severely restricted the government’s ability to export oil. With oil output reduced to less than an estimated 9,000 barrels per day in regime-controlled areas last year, the country became heavily reliant on imports from Iran.
‘… Some Syria watchers have warned that it could take nearly 10 years for the country to return to its 2011 GDP level and two decades to be fully rebuilt. They are also concerned that Syria’s prospects could worsen in the event of any further political instability.’[footnote 12]
7.2.3 In January 2025, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) published a flash update on developments in Syria as of 21 January 2025. The report stated: ‘Across the country, there is an urgent need to restore livelihood opportunities and address the extensive damage to businesses and infrastructure to support the recovery of the local economy and the re-establishment of sustainable enterprises.’[footnote 13]
7.2.4 In January 2025, REACH, a ‘leading humanitarian initiative’ which ‘directly feeds into aid response and decision-making by providing accessible and precise information on the humanitarian situation of crisis-affected populations’[footnote 14], published a report entitled ‘Unpacking the effects of thirteen years of crisis: A snapshot of humanitarian needs in post-Assad Syria’ (‘the January 2025 REACH report’). The report was based on a ‘JNA [Joint Needs Assessment] conducted between 23 December 2024 and 2 January 2025’, which was ‘the first Whole-of-Syria multisectoral assessment since the change in the political context’. Alongside the report, REACH published an interactive dashboard displaying the data. According to the Methodology section of the dashboard, the data covered 1,018 communities across all Syrian governorates, with a total of 1,370 key informants (KIs) interviewed. KIs were asked questions about the situation in ‘the last 14 days’.[footnote 15]
7.2.5 The report stated:
‘While price volatility [for cooking fuel] is expected to persist, insufficient livelihoods and low purchasing power compound Syria’s prolonged economic crisis. Income gaps that fail to meet basic needs were reported by 82% of communities, while 64% highlighted a lack of suitable employment opportunities. As a result, households have resorted to coping strategies such as depleting savings, selling belongings and reducing spending on health and education. Historically prevalent economic sectors, such as agriculture reported by 45% of communities, were cited as the primary source of income for many.’[footnote 16]
7.2.6 In January 2025, UNOCHA published a report entitled ‘Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab Republic – January – March 2025’ (the January 2025 UNOCHA report) which outlines ‘the humanitarian response priorities for 1 January - 31 March 2025, aiming to address the most urgent humanitarian needs’.[footnote 17] The report stated:
‘Syria’s economic crisis, characterized by soaring inflation, currency devaluation, and rising commodity and services prices, continues to drive needs across the country. The cost of living, as measured by the minimum expenditure basket (MEB), rose by 21 per cent in a year and more than tripled in just two years. Given this rise in costs, the minimum wage can only cover 16 per cent of the food component of the MEB, reflecting the growing challenges families face in meeting their basic needs. This economic hardship, combined with limited employment opportunities, is pushing more households into poverty and aid dependency, driving up response costs and eroding the impact of humanitarian efforts. Effects of the economic crisis impact female headed households and other vulnerable groups, such as women, adolescent girls, and persons with disabilities (PWD) more systematically, increasing the risks of various forms of gender-based violence (GBV) and the use of negative coping mechanisms, such as child marriage, child labour and sexual exploitation, among others. The World Bank’s economic update in October 2024 forecast that Syria’s gross domestic product will contract by 1 per cent in 2025, while extreme poverty is projected to increase from 33.1 per cent in 2024 to 37.4 per cent in 2025.
‘… In addition to insecurity and ongoing displacement, the economic situation remains dire across Syria, compounded by declining public services. While prices have stabilized, living conditions continue to be strained by reduced purchasing power and challenges with banking transactions and liquidity. Additionally, fuel, electricity and water shortages continue to be reported across governorates.’[footnote 18]
7.2.7 An article published by UAE-based[footnote 19] outlet The National on 7 February 2025 highlighted dramatic fluctuations in the value of the Syrian pound and confusion among Syrians over the SYP/USD exchange rate. It stated:
‘The Syrian pound has been mysteriously disappearing from the markets since the fall of the Assad dynastic rule in December [2024], driving up its value, although fluctuations are quick and steep.
‘On a good day, Mr Farah [a currency exchange dealer in Damascus] makes $12 [9.49 GBP] in profit and on others he loses money, partly because no one is certain of the exchange rate to the dollar, with dealers across Damascus quoting wildly different rates. On Tuesday [4 February 2025], the currency was trading at 8,500 Syrian pounds to the US dollar [0.79 GBP] in the morning, 7,000 in the afternoon and 9,500 the following day.
‘The volatility illustrates the challenges to transforming post-Assad Syria from a business backwater into a modern economy free from the monopolies and legal murkiness that scared away investment and contributed to the creation of a sizeable underclass.
‘Mr Farah used to go hungry before the Assad regime fell to forces led by Hayat Tahrir Al Sham, a group now in control of most of the country. Currency control disappeared overnight.
‘… Syria went from a country where the mere mention of the word “dollar” in regime areas could land a person in jail, to an economy starting to dollarise, as confidence in the national currency remains low.
‘Under the former regime, the Syrian pound collapsed, reaching 15,000 to the dollar [0.79 GBP] on the eve of Assad’s downfall on December 8, compared with 50 Syrian pounds to the dollar on the eve of the revolt against his rule in March 2011.
‘One dollar [0.79 GBP] currently equals 9,000 to 10,000 Syrian pounds.
‘For the past three weeks, the Central Bank, now run by an HTS appointee, has been restricting access to deposits in the local currency, companies and individual account holders say.
‘The Syrian pound has become so scarce that some companies have started paying their employees in dollars, which deprives them of benefits from an appreciating Syrian pound, mainly lower costs of goods priced in the pound.’[footnote 20]
7.8.7 On 4 March 2025, the Arab News, a Saudi-based English-language news site[footnote 21] reported on the partial lifting of sanctions imposed during the rule of Bashar al-Assad:
‘The EU announced on Feb. 24 that it has suspended restrictions on Syria’s oil, gas, electricity, and transport sectors with immediate effect, while also easing its ban on banking ties to allow transactions for humanitarian aid, reconstruction, energy, and transport.
‘In addition, five financial entities - the Industrial Bank, Popular Credit Bank, Saving Bank, Agricultural Cooperative Bank, and Syrian Arab Airlines - have been removed from the asset freeze list, allowing funds to reach Syria’s central bank…
‘[The EU said] … that the continuation of sanctions relief hinges on the interim government’s performance. The bloc warned that sanctions could be reinstated if Syria’s new authorities do not implement reforms …
‘Aid agencies and economists warn that further delays in lifting sanctions could do more harm than good, particularly during this critical transition.’[footnote 22]
7.2.9 On 6 March 2025, a spokesperson from the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) announced:
‘“We are lifting asset freezes on 24 Syrian entities that were previously used by the Assad regime to fund the oppression of the Syrian people, including the Central Bank of Syria, Syrian Arab Airlines, and energy companies. At the same time, sanctions on members of the Assad regime and those involved in the illicit trade in captagon remain in place. This approach underscores our commitment to help the people of Syria rebuild their country and economy …”’[footnote 23]
7.2.10 On 13 May 2025, US President Donald Trump announced that US sanctions on Syria will be lifted.[footnote 24] The announcement ‘… had an almost immediate effect, as the Syrian pound strengthened against the US dollar by about 25 percent, in a boost to a country suffering through economic hardship.’[footnote 25] On 16 May 2025, the World Bank announced that it would restart operations in Syria after it cleared more than $15millon of debt with financial backing from Saudi Arabia and Qatar.[footnote 26]
7.3 Salaries and income
7.3.1 In February 2025, NGOs Welt Hunger Hilfe (WHH) and the Syrian Association for Relief and Development (SARD) published the findings of a ‘Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment’ conducted in the governorates of Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama (‘the February 2025 WHH/SARD report’). The data was collected in 19 sub-districts between 16 and 20 January 2025.[footnote 27] 1,924 respondents answered a survey on behalf of their household, 59 key informants were interviewed, and 3 focus group discussions were conducted.[footnote 28] The table below shows the average household income and wages by governorate[footnote 29] (the average household size of respondents was 5.18).
| Governorate | Average monthly income | Average daily wage for skilled worker | Average wage for unskilled worker |
|---|---|---|---|
| Hama | 105.43 USD (83.38 GBP) | 110,700 SYP (8.79 GBP) | 35,080 SYP 2.78 GBP) |
| Homs | 133.95 USD (105.91 GBP) | 79,840 SYP (6.34 GBP) | 36,620 SYP (2.91 GBP) |
| Rural Damascus | 110.88 USD (87.67 GBP) | 106,110 SYP (8.42 GBP) | 39,610 SYP (3.14 GBP) |
7.3.2 The same source also indicated, however, that a significant majority of households did not have a regular income. It stated: ‘Only 23.54% of the surveyed households reported earning regular income from the main sources. At the governorate level, 24.79% of households from Hama indicated they received a regular income, while only 20.0% of households from Homs reported the same, however, for Rural Damascus it was a greater a little bit than others 26.33%.’[footnote 30]
7.4 Employment
7.4.1 The January 2025 REACH report was informed by a survey of key informants in a total of 1,018 communities spread across all Syrian governorates. For the question ‘What are the challenges in securing enough income, money, or resources for living?’, key informants were able to choose as many options as they wanted from a list of ‘challenges’. Overall, 64% of communities perceived ‘lack of employment opportunities that match peoples skills’ as a challenge, and 56% perceived ‘low demand for worker’ as a challenge.[footnote 31]
7.4.2 The February 2025 WHH/SARD report, which covered Hama, Homs and Rural Damascus governorates, stated: ‘Data was collected on the [survey] respondents’ main sources of income, revealing that daily labour 60.03%, employment 24.22%, loans from family and friends 20.48%, and remittance 15.49% were the primary income sources among the assessed households.’[footnote 32]
7.4.3 On 19 February 2025, the UN Development Programme (UNDP) published a report entitled ‘The impact of the conflict in Syria: a devastated economy, pervasive poverty and a challenging road ahead to social and economic recovery’ (the UNDP report). The report, which cites various sources and ‘examines several scenarios for how quickly the [Syrian] economy could return to its 2010 level’[footnote 33], stated:
‘The conflict in Syria resulted in the loss of more than 3 million jobs within its first five years. This was driven by the destruction of enterprises and infrastructure, the rapid economic decline, the public finance crisis, and the deteriorating security situation.
‘From the early years of the conflict, these massive job losses triggered a wave of external migration as many Syrians sought opportunities abroad. The unemployment rate surged from 8% in 2010 to 24% in 2023 (official data), with levels exceeding 50% in 2015–2016, during the peak of the fighting.
‘Youth and women were disproportionately affected. By 2022, youth unemployment had reached 60%, three times higher than in 2010. Meanwhile, female unemployment more than doubled by 2023, compounding the already low female workforce participation, which in 2010 was just one-third that of men.’[footnote 34]
7.4.4 The same source also provided the below graph showing levels of unemployment between 2010 and 2024[footnote 35]:
| Gender | Year | Unemployment rate |
|---|---|---|
| Male | 2010 | 6.2% |
| Male | 2015 | 42.4% |
| Male | 2024 | 31.2% |
| Female | 2010 | 22.0% |
| Female | 2015 | 67.2% |
| Female | 2024 | 62.2% |
| Year | Total unemployment rate |
|---|---|
| 2010 | 8.6% |
| 2015 | 48.3% |
| 2024 | 12.9% |
7.4.5 It should be noted that the press release for the report above stated that ‘One in four Syrians are now jobless’[footnote 36], however, the report did not provide any further additional information regarding this assertion.
7.5 Cost of living
7.5.1 In March 2024, UNOCHA published a report entitled ‘Syrian Arabic Republic: 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview’ (the March 2024 UNOCHA report), which covered ‘the period from January 2023 through December 2023’ and aimed ‘to provide consolidated humanitarian analysis to inform coordinated, strategic humanitarian response planning for 2024’.[footnote 37] The report stated:
‘In October 2023, the food basket for a family of five cost SYP 928,587, which is a 100 per cent increase compared to the beginning of the year. The cost has also quadrupled in two years. Although the monthly minimum wage doubled to SYP 187,940 in August 2023, it only covers 20 per cent of the total basket cost. This is a significant reduction in purchasing power compared to three years ago when the minimum wage covered 50 per cent of the total basket cost.’[footnote 38]
7.5.2 A conversion from SYP to GBP has not be included in the above paragraph as a result of the large differences between the 2023 and 2025 rates of exchange. For more information see Note on currency conversions.
7.5.3 The October 2024 EUAA report stated, citing various sources:
‘In March 2024, the World Food Programme (WFP) reported that the cost of Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) – a monetary threshold for what a family of five needs in a month to cover its essential needs, including goods, services, utilities, and resources – was SYP 2 756 489 [EUR 203] [168 GBP]. In May 2024, UNOCHA reported that the cost of living in Syria measured by MEB nearly doubled compared to a year before, resulting in the minimum wage covering only 10% of MEB and 20 % of a family’s monthly food needs. According to UNOCHA, in June 2024, a local survey revealed that the average monthly cost of living for a family of five in Damascus increased to over SYP 13 million [EUR 953] [788.66 GBP]. The same month, “the minimum monthly cost required to survive” reached SYP 8 100 000 [EUR 594] [491.55 GBP], reflecting a 4.1 % increase since the end of March.
‘Receiving remittances from abroad was the most significant factor in reducing the risk of poverty. In 2022, remittances from abroad accounted for 12% of total household income in Syria, which constituted a significant rise from around 3% in 2009. According to the Humanitarian Needs Assessment Programme (HNAP) survey data, as reported by the World Bank, in 2022, 37% of Syrian households (equivalent to 1.54 million households) received monthly remittances averaging 57 US dollars [45 GBP], which constituted more than one-third of their total income. The total value of remittances reached approximately 1.05 billion US dollars [830,068,598 GBP], constituting a 39% increase from 2021. Geographically, receiving remittances from abroad was “relatively more common” in the households located in the areas under GoS [Government of Syria] control (40%) and formerly displaced households (60%). Households in Damascus, Deir Ez-Zor, and Homs governorates received the highest share of remittances, with Damascus having a share of 67%. In Latakia governorate, 67% of households received remittances in 2022, while in Tartous governorate, the figure was 16%. In an interview with EUAA, Joseph Daher noted that, for the majority of Syrians, their income was insufficient to cover the cost of living. Therefore, remittances from abroad were vital, averaging between 50 [39 GBP] and 100 [79 GBP] US dollar per month, which was 2 to 4 times the minimum salary.’[footnote 39]
7.5.4 In October 2024, the World Bank published a report entitled ‘Macro Poverty Outlook for Syrian Arab Republic: October 2024’ which stated: ‘Syria’s protracted economic contraction is projected to extend into 2025 due to a multitude of challenges stemming from conflicts both within Syria and across the region. Subject to extraordinarily high uncertainty, real GDP is projected to contract by 1.5 percent in 2024 and 1.0 percent in 2025, extending the 1.2 percent decline in 2023; this projection assumes that the regional conflict will remain largely contained over the coming year.’[footnote 40]
7.5.5 In the survey conducted for the January 2025 REACH report, one of the questions was ‘What are the challenges in securing enough income, money, or resources for living?’. KIs were able to choose as many options as they wanted from a list of ‘challenges’. In all governorates, KIs selected ‘Income does not cover cost of living’ more than any other option. Across the country as a whole, 82% of the surveyed communities perceived ‘Income does not cover cost of living’ as a challenge.[footnote 41]
7.5.6 In December 2024, Kassioun, the newspaper of a Marxist-Leninist communist Syrian political party called The People’s Will Party[footnote 42], updated its ‘Kassioun Cost of Living Index’ for January 2025, with an estimated minimum cost of living of 9,098,483 SYP (710.82 GBP) per month for a family of five. The Index’s methodology states that food accounts for 50% of the cost of living, while other needs (housing, transportation, education, clothing, health, household items, communications, etc.) account for the remaining 50%.[footnote 43] This means that the Index calculated the cost of food to be about 4,500,000 SYP per month, which is considerably higher than the figure provided by the World Food Programme (see paragraph 7.5.8). This is likely due to differing methodologies (see this Kassioun article for information on how the price of the monthly food basket was calculated).
7.5.7 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated: ‘Soaring inflation and the depreciation of the SYP has led to a sharp rise in the cost of living, with minimum wage covering only 16 per cent of the food component of the MEB, making food unaffordable for many. Rising commodity prices exacerbate economic challenges, pushing thousands into severe food insecurity.’[footnote 44]
7.5.8 On 21 January 2025, the World Food Programme (WFP) published a report entitled ‘WFP Syria Price Bulletin – Flash Updates’ – Issue #5 – January 14, 2025’ which stated:
‘The highest value of MEB [Minimum Expenditure Basket, defined as the essential monthly needs of a five-person household[footnote 45] recorded in the second week of December at 3,275 thousands [3,275,000] SYP [259.90 GBP], this could be attributed to the spike of the exchange rate that led to transit increase in prices. In addition, the partial removal of subsidy on bread, fuel and gas cylinder has led to this record increase of the MEB.
‘In the second week of January 2025, the MEB value dropped back to 2,653 thousands [2,653,000] SYP [210.54 GBP] influenced by the reduction of the prices many food items and fuel prices.
‘Nevertheless, the current value of MEB is higher by 23% from the same month last year and by 182% from last 2 years.’[footnote 46]
7.5.9 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Economic strain and inflation: Income-expenditure gaps persist across regions, with expenditures far exceeding incomes, even in households with multiple earners. Depreciation of the Syrian pound (SYP) and Turkish lira, coupled with soaring inflation, has drastically increased the MEB/SMEB [Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket], intensifying household vulnerabilities. The SMEB cost has increased by 12 to 24 per cent in one year, with an average worker needing 60 days’ wages to afford it across Hasakah, Raqqa, and Deir ez-Zor governorates and Manbij subdistrict.
‘Livelihood challenges: Unemployment, job losses, and lack of services remain significant barriers to meeting basic needs. Many households rely on unsustainable coping strategies, including borrowing money, selling productive assets, or engaging in high-risk or degrading jobs, which compromise long-term resilience.’[footnote 47]
7.5.10 On 12 February 2025, the UNOCHA published an update on the humanitarian situation in Syria (‘the February 2025 UNOCHA report’) which stated: ‘Across Syria, the cost of living, measured by the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB), rose by six per cent in December 2024, according to WFP, with food costs accounting for a significant portion. The minimum wage only covers 10 per cent of the MEB, leading many families to experience severe food insecurity.’[footnote 48]
7.5.11 See Food security for more information.
7.5.12 On 3 February 2025, ‘independent Syrian nonprofit…media organization’[footnote 49] Enab Baladi published an article entitled ‘Despite the increase, Employees’ salaries meet quarter of family needs’ which stated:
‘State employees in Syria are waiting to receive their salaries at the beginning of February [2025]. The latest increase approved by the new Syrian administration has quadrupled salaries compared to the previous regime.
‘The new increase percentage reached 400%, and despite this, the salary value remains significantly lower than family needs, which have now approached ten million Syrian pounds [793.59 GBP].
‘… Despite its inability to cover needs, the Ministry of Finance decided not to grant the increase to all employees, without clearly specifying which categories would receive it. It indirectly stated that the increase would only be for those whose “qualifications match their jobs,” while others would remain on the old salary.
‘… On January 5, the interim government in Damascus raised salaries for public sector employees by 400%, according to Finance Minister Mohammed Abazeid.
‘The estimated cost of the increase is around 1.65 trillion Syrian pounds (approximately 127 million US dollars [100,385,377 GBP]), and it will be funded from current state resources, in addition to a mix of regional aid, new investments, and efforts to release frozen Syrian assets abroad, as stated by the minister.
‘There are more than 1.25 million employees on the public sector payroll in Syria, according to statements from sources in the Ministry of Finance.
‘Before the decision, the minimum wage in Syria was equal to 278,910 Syrian pounds [22.13 GBP], while the lowest salary for employees after the recent increase will reach 1.2 million Syrian pounds [95.23 GBP].
‘At the beginning of this year, the average cost of living for a Syrian family of five, according to the kassioun Index of Living Costs, exceeded 14.5 million Syrian pounds [1150.70 GBP], with the minimum reaching about 9.1 million Syrian pounds [722.16 GBP], highlighting the significant gap that separates the minimum wage from the constantly rising average living costs.
‘To balance income and expenses, most Syrians rely on multiple sources of income, with remittances from expatriates outside Syria and secondary jobs being the primary sources. Families often forgo essentials in their lives to reduce their spending.’[footnote 50]
7.5.13 The article published by the National in February 2025 stated:
‘In Damascus, even premium chocolate made by the capital-based manufacturer Zanbarakji fell from 600,000 [47.61 GBP] Syrian pounds to 490,000 [38.89 GBP]. Electrical goods and appliances suddenly became far more affordable for those earning decent Syrian pound-dominated incomes, albeit a tiny segment of society.
‘At The Wall coffee shop in the old quarter, the price of one kilo of coffee beans has fallen from 140,000 [11.11 GBP] pounds to 100,000 [7.94 GBP] in the past two weeks. Converted to dollars, the price of coffee and almost every other product, has remained the same.
‘One employee at The Wall said the number of customers has not increased noticeably despite the price decline. “There is still no purchasing power,” he said.
‘The owner of a large phone shop was forced to lower prices on old merchandise priced in Syrian pounds to be able to compete. He has started quoting prices in the dollar to avoid more potential losses from pound fluctuations.
‘A retired government worker who was shopping with his wife said he has not felt any difference in prices because the couple live mainly on a $200-a-month [158.10 GBP] transfer from their son in Egypt. These dollars now fetch significantly less in pounds. “Every gain is cancelled by a loss in Syria,” the man said.
‘Without sustained measures to lift Syria from the doldrums and restore confidence, currency gains look set to have little effect on the overall economy.’[footnote 51]
7.6 Poverty
7.6.1 The October 2024 EUAA report, citing various sources, stated:
‘As of 2023, more than 90% of the Syrian population lived in poverty. As noted by the World Bank, as of 2022, which is the latest data, 5.7 million Syrians were impacted by extreme poverty, defined as living on less than 2.15 US dollars [1.70 GBP] per person per day. Another 14.5 million people lived in poverty, defined as less than 3.65 dollars [2.89 GBP] per person per day … Poverty rates were reportedly highest among households headed by women and IDP [Internally displaced persons] households.’[footnote 52]
7.6.2 The October 2024 World Bank report stated: ‘Consistent with a continued decline in per-capita GDP, extreme poverty is forecast to increase to 28.8 percent in 2023, 33.1 percent in 2024, and 37.4 percent in 2025, pushing over a third of the population into extreme poverty.’[footnote 53]
7.6.3 CPIT was unable to find more recent data on poverty levels in Syria in the sources consulted (Bibliography).
8. Overview of humanitarian situation
NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.
8.1 Background
8.1.1 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Fourteen years since the onset of the crisis, Syria is grappling with a catastrophe of unprecedented magnitude, with new developments adding to the existing crises and taking a heavy toll on the people living in Syria. Protracted displacement, ongoing hostilities leading to acute protection threats, economic decline exacerbated by global inflation, the spill over effects of regional deteriorations, climate and environmental impacts, and most recently the uncertain future of governance in the country, are the biggest challenges Syrians currently face.
‘… Since the change of authorities on 8 December [2025], hostilities and insecurity remain active across Syria, particularly in the north-eastern parts of the country, resulting in movement restrictions and damage to vital infrastructure, including water stations, bridges, markets and service providers. Humanitarian access remains a challenge in parts of north-east Syria, with internal and external border crossings across Syria in various states of functioning.’[footnote 54]
8.1.2 The January 2025 REACH report stated:
‘The Joint Needs Assessment highlights that humanitarian needs persist across the Whole of Syria. The majority of communities surveyed reported varying levels of hardship, with 49% classifying their needs as “severe,” corresponding to an inability to fully meet their basic needs, threatening the mental and physical wellbeing of the population. Another 36% of the communities reported “high” needs, suggesting that most people were able to meet their essential needs, but living conditions remained very poor.
‘In Hama and Aleppo, the proportion of communities facing severe needs exceeded 60%, driven by the impact of prolonged conflict, displacement and economic decline. These areas also reported considerable damage to or destruction of infrastructure, further complicating relief and stabilisation efforts. ’[footnote 55]
8.1.3 In March 2025, UNOCHA published a report entitled ‘Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab Republic – January – June 2025’ (the March 2025 UNOCHA report). The report stated that following an assessment, the decision was taken to extend the humanitarian response plan set out in the January 2025 UNOCHA report by an additional 3 months.[footnote 56] The report stated:
‘Syria entered a new era in 2025, but the humanitarian crisis is far from over. Continuous hostilities in the northern and southern parts of the country, and recently in the coastal area, continue to trigger additional needs among the population, including displacement and protection concerns, as well as hindering humanitarian operations and access. Across the country, incidents involving unexploded ordnance (UXO) and explosive remnants of war have become a daily reality. Economic hardships persist across governorates due to liquidity shortages limiting access to cash, which in turn presents challenges for the population as well as for humanitarian actors. Scarce electricity, cash, and public service provision amidst price fluctuations further strain livelihoods and aid delivery.’[footnote 57]
8.2 Number and location of people in need
8.2.1 A Technical Manual published in July 2024 by the Joint Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF), a partnership of donors, United Nations agencies, NGOs, global clusters and other stakeholders which sets the standards for the analysis and estimation of humanitarian needs[footnote 58], noted that it used the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), a humanitarian coordination forum[footnote 59], definition of people in need (PIN)[footnote 60] which stated:
‘People in Need are a sub-set of the population affected and include those members:
- ‘whose physical security, basic rights, dignity, living conditions or livelihoods are threatened or have been disrupted, AND
- ‘whose current level of access to basic services, goods and social protection is inadequate to re-establish normal living conditions with their accustomed means in a timely manner without additional assistance.’[footnote 61]
8.2.1 The January 2025 REACH report included the map below.[footnote 62] It ‘… presents an indicative picture of the severity of needs at the district level across Syria. It is based on the perceived severity of needs as reported by the majority of assessed communities within each district: “In your perception, how critical was the level of needs in this community in the last 14 days?”’
8.2.2 The March 2025 UNOCHA report published the below graphic showing the number of people they assess to be in need of humanitarian assistance in 2025 and the number of people they are targeting for assistance between January and June 2025[footnote 63]:
| Total | Women | Children | Older people | With disability | Requirements (US$) | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| People in need 2025 | 16.5M | 4.2M | 7.4M | 0.8M | 2.8M | $2B |
| Targeted (Jan-June 2025) | 8M | 2.4M | 3.6M | 0.4M | 1.3M |
8.2.3 The March 2025 UNOCHA report published the below map showing the people in need by governorate and severity by sub-district:
8.2.4 The scale used for this map using the following definitions:
| Categorisation | Description |
|---|---|
| 1 – Minimal | Area has: essential basic services and ability to meet basic needs for survival, protection and dignity |
| 2 – Stressed | Area has: Deterioration of physical or mental wellbeing Sporadic threats to human rights and/or use of stress coping strategy Stressed basic services and borderline inability to meet basic sectoral needs |
| 3 – Severe | Area has: Elevated and increasing deterioration of physical or mental wellbeing and human rights, AND Regular threats to human rights and/or accelerated erosion of strategies and/or assets, AND Moderate strain on basic services and moderate inability to meet basic needs for survival, protection, and dignity. |
| 4 – Extreme | Area has: Elevated mortality or risk of death, AND Widespread violations of human rights and/or unsustainable reliance on negative coping strategy, AND High strain on basic services and/or extreme inability to meet basic needs for survival, protection, and dignity |
| 5 – Catastrophic | Area has: Widespread mortality or risk of death, AND Widespread and systemic violations of human rights and/or exhaustion of coping options and mechanisms, AND Collapse of basic services and/or total inability to meet basic needs for survival, protection, and dignity. |
8.2.5 For further information about the methodology used for the above map, see pages 93 – 102 of the March 2024 UNOCHA report.
8.2.6 Using the figures in the map above and June 2024 population data provided by the UNOCHA Syria Population Task Force[footnote 65], CPIT produced the following table, which gives estimates for the proportion of people in need in each governorate. The March 2024 UNOCHA report stated that people in need estimations ‘… are based on primary data … and secondary data reviews, validated by expert’s reviews’, and that many of the figures ‘… are best possible estimates, based on sometimes incomplete and partial datasets, using the methodologies for data collection and triangulation of information which were available at the time’.[footnote 66]
8.2.7 The figures for ‘People in Need’ appear to be rounded to the nearest hundred thousand. The percentages in the table are intended as a rough estimate.
| Governorate | Population | People in Need (PiN) | PiN as a % of population |
|---|---|---|---|
| Aleppo | 4,754,560 | 4,000,000 | 84% |
| Hasakah | 1,447,069 | 1,200,000 | 83% |
| Raqqa | 933,444 | 700,000 | 75% |
| Suwayda | 446,048 | 300,000 | 68% |
| Damascus | 1,812,584 | 800,000 | 44% |
| Daraa | 1,081,657 | 800,000 | 74% |
| Deir Ezzor | 1,234,199 | 1,000,000 | 81% |
| Hama | 1,524,494 | 800,000 | 52% |
| Homs | 1,505,561 | 1,000,000 | 66% |
| Idlib | 3,179,920 | 2,800,000 | 88% |
| Lattakia | 1,299,538 | 700,000 | 54% |
| Quneitra | 149,374 | 100,000 | 67% |
| Rural Damascus | 3,395,491 | 1,9000,000 | 56% |
| Tartous | 939,918 | 500,000 | 53% |
8.2.8 The March 2025 UNOCHA report included the following map highlighting the people targeted for humanitarian assistance between January and June 2025[footnote 67]:
9. Shelter
9.1 Overview
9.1.1 The January 2025 REACH report stated:
‘Shelter was reported as the first priority need of assessed communities. In 37% of all assessed communities, the majority of people were living in either an unfinished or abandoned house, damaged residential building, non-residential structure, such as garage, or emergency shelters, notably tents. Among communities in Aleppo, 40% of them reported that the main shelter type was an unfinished or abandoned building and 14% reported they lived in damaged buildings. Aleppo has been particularly affected by recent shelling and fighting, including at the Tishren Dam which dirupted [sic] water and and electricity delivery for more than 400,000 people. Widespread looting has also been noted in Aleppo.
‘In Idleb, which was severely impacted by the 2023 earthquake, unfinished or abandoned buildings were the second most common type of shelter, while in Damascus, though only a few communities could be assessed, unfinished or abandoned buildings were reported as the primary shelter type. When looking at damaged infrastructure, Hama had the highest proportion of communities with damaged residential buildings. Nearly threequarters of assessed communities there reported shelter damage, with 24% saying that “almost all” buildings were unusable, 21% indicating the same for “many” buildings, and another 21% noting “some” unusable buildings in their community.’[footnote 68]
9.1.2 On 13 February 2025, US government-funded news site[footnote 69] Al Hurra published an article which stated:
‘Damascus may seem like a big city when viewed from above, but the reality seen from inside is a tragic picture of a capital city that lacks many services and homes.
‘The real estate market … only includes some neighbourhoods. It does not include areas on the outskirts which have been razed to the ground by Al-Assad’s military operations over the years.
‘For example, in the city of Darayya, located west of the capital, Syrians are unlikely to find homes for rent due to the scale of the destruction.
‘The same applies to the neighbourhoods of Eastern Ghouta, like Al-Qaboun, Harasta and Jobar, where most homes have been razed to the ground and been transformed into hills of destruction.
‘This destruction is not limited to Damascus, but can be seen in the eastern neighbourhoods of Aleppo, for example, and in the centre of the city of Homs, where property prices are skyrocketing, according to Mohammed Tallawy.
‘Tallawy told Al Hurra that “having a house has become a miracle in Homs … people don’t have the luxury of choosing neighbourhoods,” due to the return of many families and the high prices.
‘He added that this has forced many, including his own family, to take the decision to head to northern Syria to live in Idlib and areas in rural Aleppo.
‘Unlike Damascus and the other cities that were formerly under control of the Al-Assad regime, real estate prices in Idlib and Aleppo countryside have fallen significantly.
‘According to Tallawy, a house [in those areas] previously worth 10,000 USD [7,903 GBP] would now be for sale for only 5,000 USD [3,952 GBP]. He indicated that this also applies to rental prices.’[footnote 70]
9.1.3 The March 2025 UNOCHA report stated that there were 7 million people in need of shelter assistance in 2025.[footnote 71] The report listed the following shelter related needs:
‘ Urgent housing repair and rehabilitation for refugee returnee and IDP returnee families who have returned to their areas of origin and found their homes looted or partially damaged, and alternative shelter activities such as renting support for those who found their houses totally damaged.
‘… Establishment of alternative shelter options for IDPs in the north-east who are sheltered in schools, or temporary education facilities to minimize the impact on schooling. Emergency shelter support to the emergency collective centres, such as the provision of sealing-off kits to ensure adequate protection until alternatives are found.
‘ Provide emergency shelter and NFI [Non-Food Items] assistance to IDPs in north-west Syria camps through tent replacement, NFI distribution, winterization support, and placement of vulnerable families living in tents who cannot return home into existing vacant transitional shelters. Additionally, provide shelter and NFI support—including housing repairs and rehabilitation—to vulnerable returning families whose homes were looted or partially damaged, and offer rental assistance to those whose houses were completely destroyed.
‘ Essential infrastructure rehabilitation and services to achieve functional living conditions.’[footnote 72]
9.2 Type of accommodation by governate
9.2.1 The dashboard for the January 2025 REACH report provided data based on the responses of key informants in 1,018 communities across Syria. The following tables, produced by CPIT using data from the dashboard, shows their responses to the question ‘In what type of shelter do the majority of people in the community live?’ [footnote 73]
Aleppo (152 communities surveyed)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 40% |
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 39% |
| Damaged residential building | 14% |
| No Consensus | 7% |
Hasakah (177)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Unfinished or abandoned residence | 8% |
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 89% |
| Non-residential structure | 2% |
| Emergency Shelter | 1% |
| No Consensus | 1% |
Raqqa (68)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 94% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 6% |
Suweida (17)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 76% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 24% |
Damascus (11)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 70% |
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 20% |
| No Consensus | 10% |
Daraa (53)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 75% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 15% |
| No Consensus | 8% |
| Damaged residential building | 2% |
Deir Ezzor (24)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 67% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 29% |
| No Consensus | 4% |
Hama (102)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Damaged residential building | 36% |
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 30% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 22% |
| No Consensus | 7% |
| Non-residential structure | 4% |
| Emergency Shelter | 1% |
Homs (46)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 53% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 26% |
| No Consensus | 16% |
| Damaged residential building | 5% |
Idlib (225)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 38% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 25% |
| Damaged residential building | 21% |
| No Consensus | 14% |
| Emergency Shelter | 1% |
Lattakia (72)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Damaged residential building | 50% |
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 31% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 19% |
Quneitra (13)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 100% |
Rural Damascus (59)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 66% |
| Unfinished or abandoned residential building/house/apartment | 22% |
| No Consensus | 7% |
| Damaged residential building | 5% |
Tartous (1)
| Response | % of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Solid/finished house/apartment | 100% |
9.3 Rent prices
9.3.1 On 24 December 2024, ‘international Arab news site and newspaper’[footnote 74] Al Araby Al Jadeed published an article entitled ‘Rent in Aleppo jumps 20% after fall of Al-Assad’ which stated:
‘The real estate market in Aleppo [governorate] witnessed a revival after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, increasing house prices and rents by 10 – 20%. Further fluctuations are expected in light of the need for the governorate to build 350,000 flats as part of its reconstruction.
‘… Shawkat Bilal [head of a housing association and real estate expert] told Al Araby Al Jadeed that real estate sale prices in Aleppo 15 days after the fall of Bashar Al-Assad’s regime increased 10 – 15%, suggesting that this percentage may increase in the near future with the return of IDPs and refugees. On the topic of rents, he explained that people from Aleppo do not like to rent, but despite this rents have gone up by about 20%.
‘Asked about the average rents in mid-range residential areas, he responded that the rent for a two-bedroom flat in Saif Al-Dawla neighbourhood, for example, is over 25,000,000 SYP per year, the equivalent of 2,000 USD [1,581 GBP], explaining that rent had previously increased since March 2024 by 50% in low-cost areas and 100% in modern areas (New Aleppo, Al-Shahbaa).
‘… He pointed out that the city planning scheme is still inadequate and needs to be expanded and developed, explaining that Aleppo contains 22 informal residential areas where over half of the population lives…’[footnote 75]
9.3.2 On 29 December 2024, Enab Baladi published an article entitled ‘Rent prices rise by 30% in Daraa which stated:
‘The Daraa governorate in southern Syria is witnessing a rise in rental prices, especially following increased demand for homes due to the return of some displaced persons from Lebanon, Jordan, northern Syria, and Turkey to their cities and towns.
‘… According to Enab Baladi‘s correspondent in Daraa, rents have risen between 30% and 40%, with no apartment renting for less than 750,000 Syrian pounds (about $50 [39.51 GBP]), and prices can reach six million pounds (about $400 [316.10 GBP]) depending on the location, size, and features of the house.
‘… After his house in Daraa al-Balad was destroyed by the previous regime’s airstrikes, Hussein Zatima has rented a home in the Shamal al-Khat neighborhood for nearly ten years.
‘He told Enab Baladi that the landlord requested an increase in the monthly rent from 800,000 Syrian pounds to 1,200,000 Syrian pounds (about $80 [63.22 GBP]).
‘Currently retired from a government job with a salary of 300,000 Syrian pounds (about $20 [15.81 GBP]), Zatima noted that there is no law regulating landlords, and the greed and the residents’ need for housing compel them to exploit the current situation.
‘… In front of his destroyed home in the Daraa camp, Khaled al-Soudi mentioned that he currently faces two options: either increase the rent as requested by the landlord, who has raised it from 800,000 to one million Syrian pounds, or return to live in his destroyed home, as he cannot afford any increase since he works as a government employee in Daraa.
‘Regarding finding an alternative, al-Soudi said that rents in the countryside are lower, but the distance from work incurs transportation costs, which have also risen recently.
‘As for Haytham Aliyan, a resident of the Daraa camp, he lives in an unfinished room in the Daraa camp at a monthly rent of 600,000 Syrian pounds (about $40 [31.63 USD]), but his landlord has recently asked him to increase the rent to 800,000 pounds.
‘Aliyan works in construction for a wage that does not exceed 75,000 Syrian pounds a day, and he fears becoming homeless if the landlord continues to pressure him, forcing him to return to his destroyed home until he can repair it.
‘… Mohammed al-Masalmah, a real estate office owner in Daraa, informed Enab Baladi that the return of displaced persons has led some to demand that tenants, even those who lived for free, vacate their homes, prompting them to look for alternatives and revitalizing the real estate market in the province.
‘He added that leases are agreements between the tenant and the landlord that are not subject to specific pricing regulations, but rather are based on mutual consent according to the price set by the landlord.
‘The commercial mindset governs the balance of profit and loss since the price of a home can reach 700 million Syrian pounds (about $50,000 [39,540 GBP]), making a monthly rent of less than one million pounds unacceptable to the landlord, as it is seen as a losing project in light of the costs associated with the home, according to al-Masalmah.’[footnote 76]
9.3.3 On 29 January 2025, Al Araby Al Jadeed published an article entitled ‘Real estate and rental prices rise in Damascus’ which stated:
‘Real estate and rental prices in Damascus are currently witnessing a notable increasing, despite the stagnation of the market. It costs a minimum of 1,000,000 SYP [78.12 GBP] to rent a house with regular cladding in the Rural Damascus area. This is considered the lowest price for a two-bedroom house.
‘For a house with high-quality cladding in the centre of Damascus, the rent could be as high as 5,000,000 SYP per month, roughly the equivalent of 500 USD [395.48 GBP], with rent being paid every year or every six months.
‘… Samer Al-Halabi, who works in real estate, explained that monthly rents in any area within Damascus are no less than 2,000,000 SYP [156.25 GBP] and can reach 5,000,000 SYP [390.62 GBP] per month in some areas. He indicated that the price differs according to the house’s cladding, the area, and the floor area.
‘… Salim Al-Azmeh, a Syrian citizen who recently returned from Turkey with his family, has been unable to find any furnished apartment in central Damascus for less than 12,000 USD [9,490 USD] per year.’[footnote 77]
9.3.4 On 6 February 2025, Qatar-based news outlet[footnote 78] Al Araby TV published an article about the housing crisis in Homs which stated:
‘The housing crisis in Homs is deteriorating with the increase in the number of families returning from the north and from abroad.
‘The city suffers from weak infrastructure as well as a diminishing number of flats suitable to live in.
‘Abu Yusuf, who owns a real estate office … told Al Araby TV that rent prices have multiplied by three since the fall of the regime, and people are unable to pay these prices.
‘… The lack of supply and the rise in demand are considered the main two reasons for the exaggerated rental figures which shock returning IDPs and refugees.
‘This situation portends a bigger crisis, with the number of people wishing to return to their city expected to increase at the end of the current school year.’[footnote 79]
9.3.5 On 13 February 2025, Al Hurra published an article which stated:
‘[Ahmad] Mardini, who returned to Damascus two weeks ago, told Al Hurra that all his attempts to find a house for a low price had failed. He added that “the cheapest house in Dammar neighbourhood in Damascus is 400 USD [316.36 GBP] per month!”
‘… If recent returnees … want to rent houses in other areas that are more affluent than Dammar, they should take into account that the price will be more than 700 USD [553.63 GBP] for a single flat consisting of two rooms and a hall.
‘… The high prices of Damascus real estate, and especially rental prices, are not new, but go back to recent years. However, the level they have reached following the fall of the Al-Assad regime has been a shock to the many Syrians who have taken the decision to return.
‘… Damascus-based journalist Muhammad Suleiman told Al Hurra that the housing crisis in Syria existed before the fall of the Al-Assad regime “but worsened after that historic milestone due to the return of people in large numbers.”
‘… Suleiman said: “Annual rents in Damascus now range from 8,000 [6,328 GBP] to 12,000 [9,492 GBP] USD (between 600 and 1,000 dollars [475 to 791 GBP] per month).”’[footnote 80]
9.3.6 On 16 February 2025, Enab Baladi published an article entitled ‘House rents in Syria: Inflation without intervention’ which stated:
‘Despite the relative improvement in the exchange rate of the Syrian pound against the dollar and the decline in prices of some goods in the market, the rental sector continues its upward trend.
‘This increase is attributed to several main factors, most notably the growing demand for housing due to the return of some Syrians after the fall of the Syrian regime, the scarcity of available apartments, and the inability of many residents to purchase properties, as reported by Enab Baladi. This has led them to rely on renting despite the high cost.
‘Rental prices vary greatly between neighborhoods within major cities, where factors such as geographic location, availability of essential services, and proximity to the city center play a crucial role in determining prices.
‘Zaher, a real estate office owner in the Rukn al-Din neighborhood of Damascus, told Enab Baladi that rents in upscale areas of the capital range from 7 to 10 million Syrian pounds per month (between 700 and 1000 USD [553 – 791 GBP] on average based on black market exchange rates), and they can reach up to 100 million pounds when paid annually (about 10,000 USD [7,909 GBP]), noting that prices vary based on location and building modernity.
‘In middle-class neighborhoods like Rukn al-Din and Nahr Aisha, prices range from 4 to 5 million pounds per month (approximately 400 to 500 USD [316.36 – 395.48 GBP]), while in popular [i.e., less affluent] areas, prices range from 1 to 2.5 million pounds (about 100 to 250 USD [79.11 to 197.74 GBP), according to the real estate office.
‘Zaher indicated a stagnation in the purchase of properties amid an influx toward rentals, emphasizing that this is due to the halt in legal property transfer procedures in the land registry.
‘In rural Damascus, Fares Ahmad Zain, a real estate office owner in Eastern Ghouta, told Enab Baladi that rents in the area start from 1 million pounds [78.12 GBP] per month, explaining that the availability of housing was greater during the previous regime, but the return of residents after its fall has led to increased demand against a backdrop of supply shortages.
‘On the other hand, an Enab Baladi correspondent in Aleppo province reported that annual rents range between 15 and 30 million Syrian pounds (between 1500 and 3000 USD [1,186 to 2,373 GBP]), while in some upscale areas, they reach much higher levels, with most properties rented on annual contracts.
‘Although prices are relatively lower in popular [i.e, less affluent] neighborhoods, they remain a significant burden on low-income families.
‘…Economic analysts believe that inflation is the major obstacle in the real estate market, with al-Dibs [an economic researcher] explaining that “addressing inflation is not an easy matter, and it cannot be solved in a short period, which means that pressures on the rental market will continue for a long time.”’[footnote 81]
9.4 Prevalence of renting
9.4.1 CPIT produced the following table using data from the February 2025 WHH/SARD report[footnote 82] to show the percentage of households in each governorate according to their ‘shelter tenure status’.
Hama (605 households surveyed)
| Shelter tenure status | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Ownership | 49% |
| Rental | 30% |
| Hosted | 18% |
| Unclear | 3% |
Homs (700 households surveyed)
| Shelter tenure status | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Ownership | 55% |
| Rental | 24% |
| Hosted | 20% |
| Unclear | 1% |
Rural Damascus
| Shelter tenure status | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Ownership | 46% |
| Rental | 37% |
| Hosted | 16% |
| Unclear | 1% |
10. Food security
10.1 Overview
10.1.1 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Syria ranks 6th globally in the November 2024–May 2025 Hunger Hotspot Outlook. 14.56 million people are food insecure, of whom 9.1 million are classified as acutely food insecure (including 1.3 million severely food insecure), and 5.4 million are at risk of hunger.
‘… Environmental, economic, and social pressures have eroded resilience at both the household and community levels, making it progressively harder for populations to recover from or adapt to the escalating food insecurity. The destruction of infrastructure and widespread displacement due to the conflict has left millions without access to food, deepening the crisis.
‘There is an alarming deterioration of food consumption patterns and a reduction in dietary diversity as households sharply reduce access to nutritious diets. Vulnerable populations, particularly women and children, bear the brunt of food insecurity, with intrahousehold food allocation practices often prioritizing men, leaving women and children with limited access to nutritious food. The potential subsidy removal on bread further worsens food insecurity situation for the most vulnerable.
‘Dependence on foreign trade and centralized services has left the food system vulnerable to disruptions, where the local food production is unable to compete, worsened by trade restrictions, further hindering food access.
‘The 2024-2025 agricultural season will not meet expectations due to significant decrease in rainfall, a sharp increase in the prices of agricultural production inputs, recent conflict damaging agriculture-livelihood infrastructure, displacement during the beginning of the sowing season for winter crops, disruption to supply chains, energy deficits, and restricted land access for farmers due to conflict and EO [explosive ordnance].’[footnote 83]
10.1.2 The January 2025 REACH report stated:
‘Food was identified as the second priority need by communities in Syria. While many households relied on previously stored food, 91% of communities reported that purchasing food from stores and markets remained the primary source. Overall, 75% of communities noted that people were unable to access sufficient food.
‘Economic challenges, particularly rising food prices, were reported across all governorates as the main barrier to accessing adequate food supplies. This is corroborated by REACH’s Rapid Market Assessments (RMA) in northern Syria which show that, despite markets being largely operational, price increases restricted consumers’ ability to purchase essential goods.’[footnote 84]
10.1.3 On 6 February 2025, the WFP published a report which stated: ‘Food insecurity in Syria remains one of the major concerns during this transition period with over half of the population food insecure, including nearly 3 million people projected to be severely food insecure.’[footnote 85]
10.2 By governate
10.2.1 The March 2024 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Food needs are widespread across Syria and with significant concentrations in Idleb (73 per cent estimated in need of food assistance), Al-Hasakeh (71 per cent), Quneitra (65 per cent), Hama (59 per cent), Ar-Raqqa (59 per cent), Aleppo (58 per cent), and Deir-ez-Zor (50 per cent) governorates. These governorates continued to be impacted by the instability of the security situation and the widespread economic crisis. Al-Hasakeh, Quneitra, Deir-ez-Zor, Al-Raqqa, and Hama governorates’ high food insecurity rates are driven by the decades of war heightened by worsening economic and agricultural situation heavily impacting people’s livelihoods.’[footnote 86]
10.2.2 The dashboard for the January 2025 REACH report provided data on food security, based on the responses of key informants (KIs) in 1,018 communities across Syria. The following table, produced by CPIT using data from the dashboard[footnote 87], shows KIs’ responses to the question of how much of their community’s population lacks sufficient food.
Aleppo (152 communities surveyed)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 34% |
| Half or less than half | 25% |
| None | 18% |
| All or almost all | 12% |
| More than half | 12% |
Hasakah (177)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 40% |
| Half or less than half | 38% |
| More than half | 11% |
| None | 10% |
| All or almost all | 2% |
Raqqa (66)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 65% |
| Half or less than half | 24% |
| None | 6% |
| More than half | 5% |
Suweida (17)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| None | 82% |
| Some | 12% |
| More than half | 6% |
Damascus (11)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| None | 45% |
| Some | 45% |
| Half or less than half | 9% |
Daraa (53)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 42% |
| Half or less than half | 36% |
| More than half | 15% |
| None | 8% |
Deir Ezzor (24)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 42% |
| None | 29% |
| More than half | 17% |
| Half or less than half | 29% |
Hama (102)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| None | 38% |
| Some | 28% |
| Half or less than half | 21% |
| More than half | 10% |
| All or almost all | 4% |
Homs (46)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 43% |
| Half or less than half | 24% |
| None | 24% |
| More than half | 7% |
| All or almost all | 2% |
Idlib (225)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| None | 29% |
| Some | 24% |
| Half or less than half | 23% |
| More than half | 14% |
| All or almost all | 11% |
Lattakia (72)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| None | 58% |
| Some | 35% |
| Half or less than half | 6% |
| More than half | 1% |
Quneitra (13)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| None | 77% |
| Some | 23% |
Rural Damascus (59)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 31% |
| Half or less than half | 27% |
| More than half | 19% |
| None | 19% |
| All or almost all | 5% |
Tartous (1)
| Response | Percentage of KIs who chose this response |
|---|---|
| Some | 100% |
10.2.3 The February 2025 WHH/SARD report published the findings of a ‘Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment’ conducted in the governorates of Rural Damascus, Homs and Hama. The data was collected in 19 sub-districts between 16 and 20 January.[footnote 88] 1,924 respondents answered a survey on behalf of their household, 59 key informants were interviewed, and 3 focus group discussions were conducted.[footnote 89] The table below shows how households responded to part the survey about the level of hunger they experience[footnote 90]:
Hama (605 households surveyed)
| Hunger level | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Little hunger | 61% |
| Moderate hunger | 32% |
| Severe hunger | 7% |
Homs (700 households surveyed)
| Hunger level | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Little hunger | 71% |
| Moderate hunger | 26% |
| Severe hunger | 2% |
Rural Damascus (619 households surveyed)
| Hunger level | Percentage |
|---|---|
| Little hunger | 63% |
| Moderate hunger | 33% |
| Severe hunger | 5% |
10.2.4 The same source also noted, however, that a significant proportion of households across the three governorates are forced to resort to ‘harmful coping strategies’ to meet their essential food needs. The source categorises the coping strategies as either ‘none’, ‘stress’, ‘crisis’ or ‘emergency’. An example of a ‘stress’ coping strategy is borrowing money, a ‘crisis’ strategy could be skipping meals, while an ‘emergency’ strategy might involve ‘engaging in risky activities’ (see page 37 of the full report for further details). The report stated:
‘The livelihood coping strategies assessment reveals that the majority of households are employing severe coping mechanisms, with 43.04% relying on emergency strategies, followed by 34.93% using crisis strategies. Only 13.57% of households adopt stress strategies, and a mere 8.47% report no coping strategies, indicating severe livelihood challenges and a significant reliance on unsustainable measures to meet basic needs in the targeted areas.’[footnote 91]
10.2.5 The WFP’s HungerMap LIVE is an interactive map which ‘leverages the power of big data and predictive analytics to track and predict food security in near real-time’.[footnote 92] Below is a screenshot of the map of Syria on 21 February 2025, which shows that, in most Syrian governorates, there was a very high prevalence (above 40% of the population) of insufficient food consumption.
10.2.6 According to the map’s methodology, ‘people with insufficient food consumption refers to those with poor or borderline food consumption, according to the Food Consumption Score’. It also states that ‘poor food consumption typically refers to households that are not consuming staples and vegetable every day and never or very seldom consume protein-rich food such as meat and dairy’, and that ‘borderline food consumption typically refers to households that are consuming staples and vegetables every day, accompanied by oil and pulses a few times a week’.[footnote 93] The map did not state the proportion of people with ‘poor food consumption’ vs. ‘borderline food consumption’.
10.2.7 For more information on the Food Consumption Score, see the ‘Glossary’ section of HungerMap LIVE.[footnote 94]
10.2.8 The same source included a graph showing the ‘trend of the number of people with insufficient food consumption over the past three months’. The graph indicated that, as of 21 February 2025, the number had decreased by 3,120,000 since 21 November 2024, when the total number stood at 11,133,000. On 21 February 2025, the number was 8,014,000.
10.2.9 However, a separate graph indicated an increase in the ‘number of people using crisis or above crisis food-based coping’ over the same period, from 9,596,000 to 11,075,000.[footnote 95] This graph uses the Reduced Coping Strategies Index, which ‘measures the frequency and severity of the behaviours households engage in when faced with shortages of food or financial resources to buy food … a higher score indicates that households are employing more frequent and/or extreme negative coping strategies’.[footnote 96]
10.2.10 For more information on the Reduced Coping Strategies Index, see the ‘Glossary’ section of HungerMap LIVE.
10.3 Price of food
10.3.1 The January 2025 WFP report stated: ‘Over the past 6 weeks, the country has experienced notable reduction in food prices. That might not be sustainable after the application of the unified customs tariff.’[footnote 97]
10.3.2 The same source included a section on the price of bread at government-subsidised bakeries and stated:
‘Transitioned areas [areas formerly controlled by Al-Assad]: Following the partial bread subsidy removal, the price of [subsidised] bread in Syria remains stable around the 4068 SYP [0.32 GBP] per bundle (1.5 Kg) after the subsidy reduction in the second week of December, 419% increase compared to the selling price in November averaging 575 SYP [0.05 GBP] per bundle of (1.1 Kg) . Nevertheless, the government announced the full removal of bread subsidy within the upcoming 2 months. If implemented, the current bundle is expected to cost between 8000 and 9000 SYP [0.62 – 0.70 GBP]. This will cause a huge burden on the food insecure household which relies heavily on bread consumption for their survival.
‘NES [North East Syria]: The price of bread remained stable at around 2,000 SYP [0.16 GBP] per bundle (1.1 KG)
‘NWS [North West Syria]: The subsidized bread in NWS only exist in some areas within Aleppo with a stable price averaged at 11.5 TL [Turkish Lira] [0.25 GBP] per (1.1 KG).’[footnote 98]
10.3.3 The report included the following table showing the change in price of key food items[footnote 99]:
10.3.4 On 18 February 2025, Enab Baladi published an article about food prices in Ras al-Ain, a city in Hasakah governorate. The article stated:
‘The markets in the city of Ras al-Ain, northwest of al-Hasakah, are witnessing dissatisfaction among residents, as there have been no noticeable changes in the prices of goods, despite the improvement in the value of the Syrian pound over the past two months.
‘Some residents believe that the “slowness” in adjusting prices by traders increases their financial and living burdens and that the slight decrease in some goods is merely an “attempt to appease” at best.
‘Currently, one US dollar [0.79 GBP] is equivalent to about 10,000 Syrian pounds, after being 15,500 pounds in December 2024, while its [the US dollar’s] price against the Turkish lira is 35.88 pounds, according to the website “S-P Today,” which specializes in currency prices.
‘According to Enab Baladi’s observations, the price of a liter of vegetable oil has decreased slightly from 65,000 pounds to 60,000 pounds [5.08 - 4.69 GBP], while the price of a kilogram of sugar has dropped from 11,000 pounds to 8,000 pounds [0.86 - 0.62 GBP], and the price of a kilogram of tea has decreased by 6,000 pounds [0.47 GBP].
‘On the other hand, the prices of vegetables remain unchanged, with a kilogram of tomatoes priced at 14,000 pounds [1.09 GBP], cucumbers at 10,000 pounds [0.78 GBP], and potatoes at 7,000 pounds [0.55 GBP]. As for sweets, there has been no drop in prices, as the minimum price remains at 40,000 pounds [3.12 GBP] per kilogram, while medicine prices have increased by 20%.
‘… Al-Jassem told Enab Baladi that prices do not align with the rise in the value of the pound against the dollar, considering that consumers are subjected to a process of “scamming and emptying their pockets” by shop owners.
‘Meanwhile, Salma Murad (36 years old) is not fully pleased with the increase in teachers’ salaries to 4,850 Turkish lira [105.39 GBP], due to the depreciation of the Turkish lira against the Syrian pound, which has decreased from 450 to 250 Syrian pounds for each Turkish lira, while the prices of basic goods remain unchanged.
‘She stated to Enab Baladi that shops require payment in Syrian pounds, and if payment is made in Turkish lira, the amount is calculated at a multiplied rate, despite the fact that the Turkish lira has remained stable against the dollar.’[footnote 100]
10.4 Food aid
10.4.1 The February 2025 UNOCHA report stated: ‘The UN and its partners are providing assistance as security and logistical conditions permit. Over 3.6 million people across Syria have been provided with bread since 27 November, while an additional 445,000 received hot meals, food baskets and other types of food aid. Nutrition partners have screened over 88,000 children and 50,000 pregnant and lactating women over the past two weeks.’[footnote 101]
10.4.2 On 14 May 2024, the WFP published a situation report which stated that:
- ‘WFP reaches 1.5 million people monthly with targeted emergency food assistance, school meals, nutrition, and livelihoods interventions; cash assistance continues uninterrupted, despite liquidity challenges.
- ‘Since 6 March [2025], WFP continues to provide emergency food and nutrition assistance to those impacted by the escalation of violence in coastal areas. So far, WFP reached over 40,000 people in rural Latakia and Tartous.
- ‘WFP is furthering discussions with interim authorities to strengthen social safety net systems in Syria; this includes the provision of subsidized bread to those most in need, which has become critical after the removal of large-scale subsidies. WFP aims to provide wheat flour to public bakeries, including through the Grain from Ukraine initiative, ensuring access to affordable bread for 2 million people in hunger hotspots. The project is expected to be launched by the end of May.’[footnote 102]
11. Healthcare
11.1 Overview
11.1.1 The March 2024 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Over 14.9 million people in Syria are estimated to be in need of life-saving primary and secondary health care assistance in 2024, a slight decrease of around 400,000 people from last year. This includes 5.1 million IDPs, 2.3 million children under 5 years – including 532,595 live births expected, 4.1 million women of reproductive age (15-49 years), more than 700,000 older persons, and 2.4 million Persons with Disabilities. Districts classified severe (3) and extreme (4) in the health sector severity have respectively increased from 89 and 113 in 2023 to 122 and 118 in 2024.’[footnote 103]
11.1.2 In February 2025, the World Health Organization (WHO) published a report entitled ‘Syria Health Sector Bulletin – January 2025’ (‘the February 2025 WHO report’) which stated:
‘The health situation in Syria, severely impacted by nearly 14 years of conflict, remains critical with half of the country’s hospitals non-functional and 15.8 million people in need of healthcare. Recent events have brought a renewed sense of hope, yet challenges persist. 2024 witnessed 84 attacks on medical facilities, with 77 occurring in the last two months alone, exacerbating the already dire situation. The health sector also faces barriers such as shortages of medicines and medical supplies, transportation issues, and the distances to facilities, which significantly limit access to essential services. This is compounded by the difficulties in obtaining and replacing vital medical equipment due to external sanctions, leading to a “chilling effect” with suppliers wary of engaging with Syrian entities. As a result, hospitals also struggle with outdated and non-functional devices, exacerbated by difficulties in securing spare parts and contracting maintenance services. Furthermore, the ongoing shortages of electricity and fuel directly impact health service delivery, affecting everything from dialysis machines to ICU [intensive care unit] equipment. Or at the same time, increasing operational costs due to high dependency on fuel powered generators. A significant migration of healthcare workers has left many positions unfilled, exacerbating the gaps in the quantity and quality of services. This loss of personnel is critical, as it further strains the ability of the health system to meet the needs of the population.
‘… Nearly 14 years of instability have undoubtedly had a direct impact on the availability of medicines and the provision of medical services in Syria. Recent political events are presenting opportunities to strengthen and rebuild the health sector. In the last month alone, over 124 tonnes of medical supplies were transported through cross-border operations from Türkiye, and an additional 32.5 tonnes entered Syria through Damascus by WHO. Throughout 2024, WHO had managed to deliver nearly 200,000 tons of medical supplies, including medicines, equipment, and WASH items. WHO also provided almost 8.95 million treatment courses, supported nearly 1.85 million medical procedures, and facilitated over 326,000 trauma consultations. Every funding opportunity is seized and active advocacy to raise funds for the medicine and supplies needs across Syria. Working closely with the new Ministry, the aim is to leverage these recent political developments to further enhance the efforts and ensure Syria becomes increasingly self-reliant in the future.’[footnote 104]
11.1.3 The January 2025 REACH report stated:
‘In 64% of communities, healthcare was reported as inaccessible, with two key challenges being economic: the high costs of health services and the expensive transportation to reach facilities. The lack of medical equipment at healthcentres was also reported among the top three barriers. The three governorates in which the highest proportion of communities indicated a lack of access to healthcare were Aleppo with 84% of communities, Lattakia 79%, and Dara 70%.’[footnote 105]
11.2 Key issues
11.2.1 The February 2025 WHO report stated:
‘Main gaps in the Syrian health system:
- Infrastructure and accessibility: Approximately 43% of hospitals and 63% of primary healthcare centers are partially or non-functional. Many areas remain inaccessible due to ongoing conflict, leaving vulnerable populations without basic healthcare services.
- Reproductive health services: There is limited access to reproductive health services, increasing risks for maternal and child health. This includes restricted access to prenatal care, safe childbirth, and post-natal support.
- Economic instability and resource shortages: Economic instability and inadequate funding have forced a heavy reliance on humanitarian aid, which is often insufficient.
- Energy shortages: Shortages of electricity and fuel critically impact the delivery of health services, including the operation of essential equipment such as dialysis machines and incubators.
- Human resources: Staffing shortages, exacerbated by security concerns and low incentives, strain the health system further. Mental health needs are also severely underserved, compounding stress-related disorders, anxiety, depression, and gender-based violence.
The main challenges:
- Uncertainty under new leadership – awaiting further clarity on health strategy, protocols, and operational modalities for health partners. Shortage of trained health staff and medical service providers, especially in rural areas
- Shortage of funding for health projects with NGOs to cover the shortage in primary and secondary health care centers and donor redlines for rehabilitation of structures
- Socioeconomic crisis and poverty lead to increased burdens on patients, especially those suffering from chronic diseases
- Disrupted referral pathway
- Most medical devices in public hospitals need maintenance or replacement
- Low level of health awareness in the community, especially in areas where displaced persons and returnees are present
- Poor determinants of health include lack of clean water, sanitation, electricity, sufficient shelter, and food security
The most important and immediate needs in the health sector:
- Support to primary health, mental health, and psychosocial support services with a focus on rural areas and anticipated areas for both refugee and IDP returns
- Rehabilitation of damaged health facilities (primary health care centers and hospitals)
- Providing medicines, supplies and medical equipment to support primary and secondary health services
- Support to the ambulance system and referral system
- Support patients with chronic diseases, with special attention for renal failure and thalassemia and cancer patients
- Advocacy and coordinated action for the restoration of basic services which affect poor health outcomes.’[footnote 106]
11.2.2 The February 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Across Syria, there is a rising need for trauma and surgical care, particularly due to an alarming increase in UXO [unexploded ordnance] incidents. Moreover, a significant rise in influenza-like illnesses and severe acute respiratory infections has put additional strain on health services. The lack of adequate insulation and heating for displaced populations exacerbates risks, especially cold-related illnesses.
‘• In north-east Syria, the NES Health Working Group has phased out its support for 23 health facilities as of 6 February due to funding challenges. There is a critical need for referral facilities for severe acute malnutrition, particularly in Al-Hasakeh.
‘• In north-west Syria, over 30 health facilities, including major hospitals, were damaged or destroyed in former front-line areas of Idleb and western Aleppo, requiring restoration. Over 100 health facilities are out of funds, and operational facilities struggle with insufficient supplies, trained personnel, and funding. Three primary health centers suspended services in Idleb on 3 February due to underfunding.’[footnote 107]
11.3 Healthcare provision by governate
11.3.1 The March 2024 UNOCHA report included the following graphic showing the state of the healthcare sector in different governorates.[footnote 108] ‘SDs’ means ‘Sub-Districts’. For information on the methodology, see paragraph 8.2.4 and pages 99-100 of the report.
11.3.2 CPIT was unable to find more recent data at this level of detail and with the same methodology in the sources consulted (see Bibliography).
11.3.3 However, other kinds of data were available, such as the data found in the dashboard accompanying the January 2025 REACH report (for information on the methodology, see paragraph 7.2.4). The following table, produced by CPIT using this data[footnote 109], shows some key findings by governorate. It should be noted that the percentages do not reflect the proportion of the population in each governorate with access to adequate healthcare. Instead, they indicate the proportion of key informants who gave a certain answer. In Aleppo, for example, 84% of key informants answered ‘No’ and 14% answered ‘Yes’. Regarding the response ‘No Consensus’, the dashboard’s Methodology section stated: ‘[I]n the communities where more than one (1) KI was found, an aggregation process of the information was conducted for that community to have one (1) result per community’. The dashboard uses ‘No Consensus’ ‘for those cases in which the aggregation process was inconclusive according to the different KI responses for that community’.[footnote 110]
Aleppo (152 communities)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 84% |
| Yes | 14% |
| No Consensus | 2% |
Hasaka (177)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 58% |
| Yes | 42% |
Raqqa (66)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 29% |
| Yes | 71% |
Damascus (11)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 36% |
| Yes | 45% |
| No Consensus | 18% |
Daraa (53)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 70% |
| Yes | 19% |
| No Consensus | 11% |
Deir Ezzor
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 54% |
| Yes | 46% |
Hama (102)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 69% |
| Yes | 28% |
Homs (46)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 65% |
| Yes | 28% |
| No Consensus | 7% |
Idlib (225)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 65% |
| Yes | 33% |
| No Consensus | 2% |
Lattakia (72)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 79% |
| Yes | 21% |
Quneitra (13)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 46% |
| Yes | 54% |
Rural Damascus (59)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 60% |
| Yes | 37% |
| No Consensus | 4% |
Tartous (1)
| Access to adequate healthcare when needed by the majority of people in the community | % |
|---|---|
| No | 100% |
12. Water, Sanitation and Hygiene (WASH)
12.1 Overview
12.1.1 The March 2024 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Overall, 13.56 million people are in need of WASH assistance, of whom 51 per cent are women and girls, 44 per cent are children and 17 per cent have a disability. Almost 1.5 million more people are in acute need (+23 per cent) and 22 per cent more subdistricts (43) are now in need, including new geographical areas compared to 2022 (i.e. Tartous, Lattakia) … Only 54 per cent of the population in Syria has access to an improved water source [defined as a drinking-water source that is ‘likely to be protected from outside contamination, and from faecal matter in particular’[footnote 111].
‘… Lack or inadequate quantity of safe water is leading households to revert to unsafe and often expensive alternative water sources to meet or complement their needs, negatively impacting public health and the household economy and their protection.
‘… Economic downturn and limited household finances remain a challenge for vulnerable communities and households in accessing safe and equitable WASH services and hygiene items and hinder the adoption of coping mechanisms for water and wastewater services access (ex: water trucking). Overall, 32 per cent of Syrians were not able to access some of the needed hygiene items.
‘… Observations on handwashing practices indicate that, countrywide, 17 per cent of people did not have soap and/or water at the handwashing facility or did not have a handwashing station at all.’[footnote 112]
12.1.2 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Syria’s vulnerability to climate-induced shocks is heightened by the long-lasting impacts of conflict and compounded by water scarcity. The average Syrian has access to only 355 m³ of clean water per year. A 15 per cent rainfall deficit in 2023 further restricted water access for 8.5 million people, including 1.8 million already severely affected. Increasingly frequent climate anomalies induce natural hazards–such as prolonged, extreme heatwaves and winters as well as erratic rainfall, and unpredictable cycles of droughtlike conditions and flooding–exacerbate Syria’s water scarcity and pose serious risks to human, animal, and plant health.’[footnote 113]
12.1.3 The same source also stated: ‘As of November 2024, 14.4 million people are in need, with 77.5 per cent in acute need. Over 870,000 more people are in need compared to last year, mostly in northern Syria.’[footnote 114] The report estimated that 2.5 million people would be targeted for WASH assistance by aid programs in January – March 2025.[footnote 115]
12.1.4 The same source also stated:
‘ Humanitarian WASH needs are estimated to increase over the coming months, among old and new displacements, disruption of water and sanitation services and power supply, ongoing hostilities, water and vector borne disease (WVBD) spread, water scarcity, socio-economic crisis, new spike of inflation, and onset of winter.
‘ Ongoing hostilities have caused a significant deficit in water and power infrastructure, affecting the operation of WASH systems. Subsequent disruption in WASH service provision increases public health risks, especially within communities already affected by a prolonged water crisis or recent active AWD [acute watery diarrhoea] transmission. Low wastewater treatment capacities and widespread disposal of untreated wastewater pose significant public health and environmental concerns.
‘ Critically bad sanitation conditions, poor hygiene practices and deterioration of water quality cause increased public health risks, including WVBD and leishmaniosis, and alarming and unprecedent malnutrition rates. By end of 2024, several AWD cases were reported in northern Syria.’[footnote 116]
12.1.5 The January 2025 REACH report stated: ‘The sources of drinking water varied across communities, with 40% relying on piped networks as their main drinking water source. However, in governorates like Idleb, Aleppo and Lattakia, private water trucking – generally more expensive and less safe – was a primary source. In 44% of communities, access to drinking water was reported as the top WASH need, followed by the rehabilitation of water networks and storage tanks.’[footnote 117]
12.2 By area
12.2.1 The March 2024 UNOCHA report stated:
‘[O]nly half of the households in northern Syria reported having sufficient water during the 30 days prior to the assessment (47 per cent in the north-east and 53 per cent in north-west Syria, a situation exacerbated by the recent attacks). In Deir-ez-Zor and Al-Hasakeh governorates, 25 per cent of households reported access to safe water as an unmet need. In some areas of As-Sweida Governorate, people have access to less than 15 litres of water per day. In Dar’a, 61 per cent of people reported insufficient water from all available sources.
‘… Despite overall 90 per cent of Syrians having access to improved sanitation [defined as sanitation facilities ‘that hygienically separate human waste from human contact’[footnote 118]], 29 per cent still face challenges in accessing functional toilets or with wastewater disposal (39 per cent of households in northern Syria). To varying degrees, in Tartous (33 per cent), Dar’a (38 per cent) and As-Sweida (60 per cent) governorates, people have no access to the sewage system. Low wastewater treatment capacities and widespread disposal of untreated wastewater pose significant environmental and public health concerns, such as the AWD/cholera outbreak.
‘… In northern Syria, 13 per cent of female-headed households could not access sanitary pads. In north-east Syria, 70 per cent of respondents have had to modify their hygiene practices because of a lack of sufficient water.
‘… About 11 per cent of households in northern Syria reported that they do not have a handwashing facility, 80 per cent of households reported that the existing facilities are located outside the shelters.’[footnote 119]
12.2.2 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated: ‘In north-east Syria, water scarcity remains a major challenge, with over 80 per cent of water supply systems not functioning mainly due to damaged power systems. This caused 1.8 million people to lack access to safe water, including 610,000 residents and IDPs in Al Hasakeh, with Alouk water station not operational.’[footnote 120]
13. Internally displaced persons (IDPs)
13.1 Numbers and recent movements
13.1.1 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘The ongoing conflict in Syria has led to significant and prolonged displacement, resulting in 8 million IDPs. In 2024, a total of 823,302 individuals were displaced, with 522,600 of them returning in December alone. The high number of IDPs has intensified severe overcrowding in displacement sites, increasing the urgent need for emergency shelters, NFIs [non food items] as well as repairs and rehabilitation of existing shelters. Currently, approximately 2.3 million people are residing in 1,774 displacement sites in northern Syria.’[footnote 121]
13.1.2 Citing data from the Population Task Force as of June 2024, the same source also stated:
‘Over two million IDPs, mostly women and children and comprising 31 per cent of the total IDPs in Syria, remain in camps designed to act as a last resort for the short term. Most last resort sites such as informal settlements/camps, planned camps and collective centres are characterized by a lack of camp management systems, poor shelter conditions, overcrowding and varying degrees of access to basic services, increasing the exposure to GBV [gender based violence] of women, boys and girls and leaving IDPs in camps vulnerable and in need of humanitarian aid.
‘… Over five million IDPs reside outside of camps in Syria, who comprise 69 per cent of the total IDPs in Syria. The majority of IDPs out of camps are concentrated in Aleppo (20 per cent), Rural Damascus (19 per cent) Idleb (15 per cent), Damascus (12 per cent) and Lattakia (9 per cent) Governorates, according to June 2024 Population Task Force data. This group consists of people displaced by hostilities - many of whom are in protracted displacement or have been displaced multiple times and face heightened protection risks. This concentration of displaced populations exacerbates the shortages and access limitations present throughout the country. Out of camp IDPs face psychosocial distress due to disruption in daily routines, exposure to forced evictions, lack of access to land tenure and breakdown in the social fabric.’[footnote 122]
13.1.3 The January 2025 REACH report stated:
‘Many people going back to their areas of origin have faced severe challenges due to damaged infrastructure, lack of basic services and security risks, such as unexploded ordnance. In several governorates, local services and infrastructure appeared to be stretched beyond capacity. In Aleppo, 53% of communities reported overwhelmed services, as well as 45% of communities in Hama and 23% in Rural Damascus.
‘System strain and infrastructure damage were also two of the main reasons why some in-camp IDPs who initially went back to their place of origin eventually returned to camps. The movement intentions survey conducted by REACH in late December in five camps in NES suggests that only a small minority of people there intended to go back to their place of origin in the short term. The main cited conditions for a dignified return were access to livelihoods, basic services and rehabilitation of shelters.’[footnote 123]
13.1.4 The February 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘As of 9 February [2025], the number of people who remain newly displaced in Syria since 27 November [2024] is over 617,000 people – a decrease of 35,000 people from two weeks ago, … Over 40 per cent of them are in Idlib, and 17 per cent are in Aleppo. Nearly 31,000 newly displaced people live with at least one form of disability.
‘Since 27 November, over 828,000 IDPs have returned to their areas of origin. This returnee figure includes the return of 615,000 people who were newly displaced during this period and 213,000 people who were displaced before 27 November.
‘… Across borders, UNHCR [United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees] reported that some 270,000 Syrians have crossed back into the country as of 5 February.’[footnote 124]
13.1.5 In March 2025, UNOCHA published a humanitarian situation report (the March 2025 UNOCHA situation report), covering events between 11 and 26 March 2025, which stated:
‘Population movements and renewed displacement continue in Syria, with around 674,000 people newly displaced since November [2024]. Over 1.05 million people have returned to their areas of origin, including 444,000 people who were internally displaced in the country prior to 27 November [2024].
‘Departures from camps remain limited, with around 158,000 people leaving camps in north-west Syria since December [2024]. Damaged homes, inadequate services, and the threat of unexploded ordnance are key barriers to return.’[footnote 125]
13.1.6 On 9 May 2025, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) published an infographic which stated:
‘In Syria, an estimated 7.4 million individuals remain internally displaced (IDPs), residing both within communities and in IDP sites. Of the total IDP population, 5.4 million are estimated to be living outside IDP sites, while 1.97 million reside in 1,671 IDP sites, primarily in Northwest Syria (NWS). However, recent events since November 27, 2024, have triggered further displacement, with over 711,557 new IDPs reported. At the same time, IDP returns continue, with 1,186,147 individuals reported to have returned home since November 27, 2024, including 337,868 returning from IDP sites since December 8, 2024.’[footnote 126]
13.2 Humanitarian needs
13.2.1 The March 2024 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Syria’s IDPs constitute almost 33 per cent of the people in need of humanitarian assistance in 2024; and of the 7.2 million IDPs, 5.5 million are in need of humanitarian assistance.
‘… Twelve years into the crisis in Syria, over two million IDPs, mostly women and children, remain on sites designed to serve as a last resort in the short term. Most last resort sites, such as informal settlements/camps, planned camps and collective centres, are characterized by lack of camp management systems, poor shelter conditions, overcrowding and varying degrees of access to basic services, leaving IDPs in such sites vulnerable and in need of humanitarian aid.
‘… 85 per cent of IDPs in camps reported being unable or completely unable to meet their basic needs.
‘… Of the 7.2 million IDPs, over five million are out-of-camp IDPs, residing in urban centres as well as rural suburbs. This group consists of people displaced by conflict and insecurity - many of whom are in protracted displacement or have been displaced multiple times, and face heightened protection risks. With 87 per cent of IDPs now residing in urban centres, existing facilities and infrastructure struggle to meet the growing demand for medical services. This concentration of displaced populations exacerbates the shortages and access limitations present throughout the country. Out-of-camp IDPs face psychosocial distress due to disruption to daily routines, exposure to forced evictions, lack of access to land tenure and breakdown of social fabric.
‘… • Water trucking services (mostly unregulated) are the main source of water for 64 per cent IDP sites residents, only 27 per cent households are connected to water network and 11 per cent do not have access to sufficient water for longer than 20 days in a month. Forty-five per cent of the households reported issues with toilet functionality or wastewater disposal. This indicates a continued need for medium-term investment in IDP site infrastructure to provide more sustainable, affordable, and safer way to supply water and dispose of wastewater.
‘• Despite the sector’s assistance, 62 per cent of IDPs in sites could not access one or multiple hygiene items and 30 per cent faced barriers to effective handwashing. Disruptions and poor quality of services in IDP sites have also direct negative physical and mental well-being and protection consequences, notably on children, elderly, women, and girls, and can ease the spread of water and vector borne disease, as AWD/cholera and leishmaniosis.’[footnote 127]
13.2.2 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Of the 2.3 million people living in IDP sites, 1,045,425 of them in 972 IDP sites in north-west Syria are classified as being in extreme and catastrophic situations, with the majority not willing to return home due to extreme damage to infrastructure and housing … 69.5 per cent of IDP sites are critically overcrowded: Overcrowded sites lead to sub-standard living conditions and heightened protection and GBV risks … Over 300,000 IDPs live in 10 camps, over 150 informal settlements and 74 collective centres in north-east Syria, with another 300,000-400,000 individuals in host communities … Territorial changes have led to the loss of access to numerous sites, including two camps in Menbij, leaving thousands of households without support … Infrastructure in IDP sites needs to be maintained, to reduce the risks and impacts of floods: 30 per cent of IDP sites flooded in the past year.’[footnote 128]
13.2.3 The same source also stated:
‘• Thousands of newly-displaced individuals in north-east Syria reside in temporary overcrowded receptions centres with reduced access to WASH goods and services. Vulnerable populations are increasingly exposed to the risk of infectious diseases and GBV incidents.
‘• Disruptions in existing IDP sites in the north-west and north-east have direct physical and mental well-being and protection consequences, notably on children, elderly, women and girls.
‘… In north-west and north-east Syria, over 2 million IDPs living in camps and informal settlements are still in need of life-saving WASH services. In north-east Syria, new IDPs in emergency collective centres lack proper access to life-saving WASH services. Two thirds have not received any water supply and sanitation services.’[footnote 129]
13.2.4 The February 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘The lack of basic services, destruction of homes, transportation costs, lack of livelihood opportunities and explosive ordnance contamination are amongst the key challenges facing returnees. In Homs, partners reported that 30 per cent of the population in Talbiseh requires shelter support due to damaged houses, while 200 houses in Tir Maallah sustain structural damage. Protection partners reported that some returnees are adopting harmful coping mechanisms, such as child labor, due to financial and economic challenges. In addition, tensions between recent returnees and host communities have also been observed in several areas.’[footnote 130]
14. Access to humanitarian aid
14.1 By sector
14.1.1The March 2025 UNOCHA report included the graphic below, which shows the number of People in Need and the number of people who the UNOCHA intended to support with humanitarian interventions (‘people targeted’) in January – June 2025. The number of people targeted was reliant on funding needs being met, but the report indicated that the humanitarian response was severely underfunded (see Funding). As a result, the actual number of people receiving humanitarian assistance is likely to be lower than the figures shown.[footnote 131]
14.1.2 On 8 May 2025, UNOCHA published an infographic (the May 2025 UNOCHA infographic) which included data on how many people had received humanitarian assistance in each sector between January and March 2025. The below table was produced by CPIT using data from the infographic:
| Sector | People Targeted | People Reached / % of Target |
|---|---|---|
| Food Security: Food Assistance | 5.4 million | 1.5 million / 28% |
| Food Security: Livelihoods/Agriculture | 5.4 million | 0.15 million / 3% |
| Camp Coordination and Management | 2.5 million | 0.3 million / 12% |
| Nutrition | 1.2 million | 0.5 million / 44% |
| Non Food Items (Core) | 0.52 million | 0.1 million / 18% |
| Non Food Items (Winter) | 0.50 million | 0.24 million / 48% |
| Shelter | 0.23 million | 0.2 million / 74% |
| Protection | 2.9 million | 0.96 million / 42% |
| Early Recovery and Livelihoods (Direct) | 1.6 million | 0.28 million / 17% |
| Early Recovery and Livelihoods (Indirect) | 1.6 million | 0.9 million / 53% |
| Health: Medical Procedures | 3.0 million | 5.9 million |
| Health: Treatment Courses | 3.0 million | 2.4 million |
| Water, Sanitation and Hygiene | 2.5 million | 3.4 million / 100% |
| Multi-Purpose Cash | 0.37 million | 0.2 million / 54% |
| Education | 1.05 million | 0.44 million / 42% |
14.2 Funding
14.2.1 The January 2025 REACH report stated: ‘[A]ccess to humanitarian assistance remained critically low across all governorates. In Lattakia, 99% of communities reported no access to aid in the 14 days prior to data collection, while Aleppo and Hama both suggested that 93% of communities did not have access to assistance. The primary barrier to aid was simply the lack of available humanitarian assistance, reported by 83% of communities surveyed.’[footnote 134]
14.2.2 The REACH report’s dashboard provided the following data[footnote 135] (for details on the methodology see paragraph 7.2.4)
Aleppo (152 communities surveyed)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 93% |
| Yes | 4% |
| No Consensus | 3% |
Hasakah (177)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 80% |
| Yes | 20% |
| No Consensus | 1% |
Raqqa (66)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 77% |
| Yes | 23% |
Suweida (17)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 88% |
| Yes | 12% |
Damascus (11)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 55% |
| Yes | 36% |
| No Consensus | 9% |
Daraa (53)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 87% |
| Yes | 4% |
| No Consensus | 9% |
Deir Ezzor (24)
14.4 Funding
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 88% |
| Yes | 13% |
Hama (102)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 93% |
| Yes | 5% |
| No Consensus | 3% |
Homs (46)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 83% |
| Yes | 17% |
Idlib (225)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 86% |
| Yes | 11% |
| No Consensus | 3% |
Lattakia (72)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 99% |
| Yes | 1% |
Quneitra (13)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 92% |
| Yes | 8% |
Rural Damascus (59)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 79% |
| Yes | 19% |
| No Consensus | 2% |
Tartous (1)
| Access to humanitarian assistance for the majority of people, whether within or outside their communities | Percentage |
|---|---|
| No | 100% |
14.2.3 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Since the change of authorities on 8 December [2024], hostilities and insecurity remain active across Syria, particularly in the north-eastern parts of the country, resulting in movement restrictions and damage to vital infrastructure, including water stations, bridges, markets and service providers. Humanitarian access remains a challenge in parts of north-east Syria, with internal and external border crossings across Syria in various states of functioning.’[footnote 136]
12.2.4 For further information on ongoing armed conflict in Syria, see the CPIN Syria: Security Situation.
12.2.5 The February 2025 WHH/SARD report stated: ‘During the past three weeks [prior to being surveyed], only 3.79% of respondents reported receiving cash assistance from the government, UN agencies, or INGOs [international NGOs]. Geographically, the majority of respondents [who received cash assistance] were located in Hama 49.32%, followed by Homs 34.25% and Rural Damascus 16.44%.’[footnote 137]
12.2.6 The May 2025 UNOCHA infographic published the below table showing the number of people who received humanitarian assistance in each governorate between January and March 2025:
14.2.7 In May 2025, UNOCHA published an overview of their humanitarian response between January and March 2025. The overview contained the below map showing the number of people in different governorates and communities across Syria who can access humanitarian assistance:
14.2.8 Services Advisor is a ‘web app for Refugees, Humanitarian Organizations and Coordinating bodies, which provides up-to-date information about availability of humanitarian services’[footnote 140] which is run by UNHCR. Information regarding the availability of humanitarian services across the different governorates in Syria can be found on the Syria Services Advisor website.
14.3 Groups with reduced access
14.3.1 The March 2024 UNOCHA report stated:
‘It is crucial to recognize the intersectionality of disabilities and various factors such as gender, age, and disability itself when examining unmet needs and barriers to accessing essential services. By July 2023, an estimated 17 per cent of the Syrian population was living with a disability. As with most people in need in Syria, people living with disabilities encounter numerous societal barriers, both attitudinal and environmental, which are hindering their access to opportunities and services.
‘… The repercussions of the earthquakes [in 2023] extend beyond mere physical destruction, revealing a distinctly gendered impact, as highlighted by UN Women’s post-earthquake gender analysis in north-west Syria. The earthquake further exacerbated both exposure to violence and the challenges faced by women and girls to access services and distributions. While women and girls are often prioritized in emergency shelters, their freedom of movement diminishes due to the presence of unrelated men and boys. Living in a mixed-gender environment exposes women and girls to higher levels of control by male family members, in line with traditional gender norms and limitations often imposed to save the family “honor”. As a consequence, women and girls are less likely to use (shared) toilets and bathing sites, to access distributions and other humanitarian aid.
‘… Infrastructure and basic services on [IDP] sites are generally not suitable for persons with disabilities. In IDP sites in north-west Syria, 59 per cent do not have shelters habilitated to accommodate persons with disabilities and 88 per cent do not have services easily accessible for persons with disabilities.
‘… Sufficiently trained and equipped health workers are essential to provide integrated essential health service packages and provide gender-sensitive and comprehensive services. Yet, Syria is facing major gaps around the quality and quantity of health workers which negatively affects access and availability of health services. Lack of female medical staff further limits women and girls’ access to health facilities due to social restrictions.’[footnote 141]
14.3.2 The January 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘Women and girls are less likely to safely access humanitarian assistance compared to men and boys, and this is further exacerbated for those living with interlinked vulnerabilities (e.g., age, ability, marital and displacement status). Women, particularly mothers, often face difficulties in decision-making regarding their own lives and health and that of their children … Female-headed households also often face greater economic vulnerability, which leads to a higher percentage of female-headed households being unable to afford costs of education, health services, nutrition and non-food items.
‘… Humanitarian service delivery points and distribution areas are identified by communities and GBV experts as locations where GBV occurs. Even though GBV may take place in or out of camps, overcrowded settings increase the exposure to GBV. Collective shelters and crowded distribution points entail safety risks for women and girls. The risks are exacerbated when the design of the assistance does not include GBV risk mitigation measures tailored to each sector intervention.
‘… Persons living with disabilities in Syria encounter numerous societal barriers, both attitudinal and environmental, which hinder their access to opportunities and services, and which are compounded by the intersectionality of disabilities with other factors like gender and age … An estimated 17 per cent of the Syrian population lives with a disability.’[footnote 142]
14.4 Funding
14.4.1 The February 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘On 28 January, the UN and humanitarian partners launched the Syria Humanitarian Priorities, appealing for US$1.2 billion [949.1 million GBP] to support 6.7 million most vulnerable people in Syria through March 2025. This includes reaching 5.4 million people with food aid, 3 million people with health care, and 2.5 million people with clean water and sanitation. As of 11 February, the plan is less than 10 per cent funded, having received only $112 million [88.58 million GBP] out of the $1.2 billion [949.1 million GBP] required through March.
‘The humanitarian community is concerned over the recent temporary suspension of US foreign assistance. In north-east Syria, where nearly 3 million people need assistance, humanitarian partners are heavily reliant on US funding to provide around 90 per cent of all humanitarian activities. In the absence of this funding, humanitarian coordination and programs are receding in many areas, leaving large numbers of people even more vulnerable.’[footnote 143]
14.4.2 The March 2025 UNOCHA situation report stated:
‘In north-east Syria, during the past two weeks, 90% of regular food assistance activities were paused due [to] U.S. funding suspension, which is estimated to impact 161,000 people and six IDP camps home to 9,000 households in urgent need of food support, with the majority of them facing aid stoppages by the end of March. In north-east Syria, there are over 80,000 returnees, with the majority returning to Dier ez-Zor, where over two thirds have not been supported with any type of food assistance according OCHA’s Rapid Needs Assessment that was published on 24 March and covers 33% of the affected communities across Syria.
‘… The U.S. suspension of humanitarian activities in February and March has significantly impacted many organizations and sectors. In north-east Syria, IDPs residing in emergency collective centers and camps are particularly affected, with some organizations securing waivers to implement only limited life-saving activities. Health, nutrition, GBV and lately Shelter and NFI sector teams finished their contracts as of March due to the funding issue, creating substantial gaps in coordination and Information Management responsibilities.’[footnote 144]
14.4.3 The March 2025 UNOCHA report stated:
‘The Syria Humanitarian Response Plan 2024 remains severely underfunded, with only 35.6 per cent of the $4.1 billion United States Dollars ($) total requirements covered as of mid-March 2025. In addition, the Humanitarian Response Priorities document covering January to March 2025 is only 11.7 per cent funded, leaving 88.9 per cent of funding requirements unmet as of mid-March 2025. From 1 January to 30 June 2025, the UN and humanitarian partners appeal for $1.97 billion to cover activities prioritized to respond to the most immediate needs of 8 million people targeted countrywide.’[footnote 145]
14.5 Assistance available to returnees
14.5.1 In April 2025, the UNHCR launched a website called Syria is Home which provides information on processes and services available to an individual on their return to Syria in the form of questions and answers. The website stated:
‘Is financial support or cash assistance available for returnees?
‘If you have returned to Syria or are planning to return soon, UNHCR offers support to help you restart your life. This includes in particular a one-time return and reintegration grant and guidance on available services.’
‘What kind of support can you receive?
‘Return and Reintegration one time Cash assistance: If you are registered as a refugee in a neighboring country or elsewhere, you may be eligible for a one-time cash grant to support your return. Information will be progressively available on this website and in countries of departure, especially through UNHCR country offices. You can also contact the nearest Community Centre in your area of return.
‘Cash may be provided in Syrian pounds or USD.
‘UNHCR works closely with agencies like WFP [World Food Programme] and UNICEF to ensure different types of support complement each other.
‘Essential non-food items (NFIs):
‘Where cash is not yet available, or for individuals in particularly vulnerable or destitute conditions, UNHCR may provide non-food items (NFIs) such as mattresses, solar lanterns, and winterization kits. These items are intended to help meet urgent needs only.
‘… What types of other assistance can returnees expect e.g., food assistance, core relief items?
‘UNHCR scaled-up community-based interventions inside Syria to support returnees both refugee returnees, internally displaced people and local communities, focusing on strengthening the resilience and enhancing access to vital services.
‘Types of assistance provided by UNHCR and our partners include:
- Legal support (for civil documentation)
- Some medical assistive devices may be provided based on need and availability
- Gender-based violence (GBV) and child protection case management
- Awareness raising on protection from sexual exploitation and abuse
- Mental health and psycho-social support
- Limited Multi-purpose cash assistance (based on assessed needs)
- Livelihood support
- Shelter support
- Inclusive care for the elderly and persons with disabilities
- Orientation/Referral towards other services providers, support programmes etc
‘Food assistance is being provided by WFP in collaboration with SARC [Syrian Arab Red Crescent] in certain areas baed on vultnerability criteria.’[footnote 146]
14.5.2 See the Syria is Home website for more information on topics such as documentation and legal matters, protection and safety, housing and shelter, healthcare, employment and economic conditions and education.
Research methodology
The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.
Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:
- the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
- how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
- the currency and detail of information
- whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources
Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.
Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.
The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.
Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.
Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.
Terms of reference
The ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.
The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:
- socio-economic indicators, including statistics on life expectancy, literacy, school enrolment, poverty rates, levels of malnutrition[footnote 147]
- socio-economic situation, including access and availability to:
- food
- water for drinking and washing
- accommodation and shelter
- employment
- healthcare – physical and mental
- education
- support providers, including government and international and domestic non-government organisations
- variation of conditions by location and/or group
- whether government is purposely withholding or not delivering support services, if so to which areas/groups
- internally displaced persons (IDPs) – numbers, trends and location
Bibliography
Sourced cited
Al Araby Al Jadeed
-
About us (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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Real estate and rent prices rise in Damascus (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 23 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Rent in Aleppo jumps 20% after fall of Al-Assad (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 24 December 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Al Araby TV
-
About us (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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The number of homes is insufficient and rent is extraordinarily high…Housing crisis suffocates the people of Homs (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 6 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Al Hurra
-
About us (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Damascus real estate rivals that of Istanbul…Why? (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 13 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Al Jazeera
-
Trump’s decision to lift Syria sanctions fuels dreams of economic revival, 16 May 2025. Accessed: 19 May 2025
-
US decision to lift sanctions on Syria: Here’s what you need to know, 13 May 2025. Accessed: 19 May 2025
-
World Bank says Syria eligible for new loans after debts cleared, 16 May 2025. Accessed: 19 May 2025
Arab News
-
About us, no date. Accessed: 12 March 2025
-
Why sanctions relief is critical to Syria’s recovery and political future, 4 March 2025. Accessed: 12 March 2025
CIA World Factbook
- Syria, updated 16 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Deutsche Welle
- What’s next for Syria’s devastated economy?, 12 December 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Food Security Cluster Handbook
- Minimum Expenditure Basket, updated 7 December 2023. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Enab Baladi
-
About us, undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Despite the increase, employees’ salaries meet quarter of family needs, 3 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
House rents in Syria: Inflation without intervention, 16 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Ras al-Ain: Prices remain unchanged despite improvement of Syrian pound’s value, 18 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
European Union Agency for Asylum
- Syria – Country Focus, 22 October 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Inter-agency Standing Committee (IASC)
-
Humanitarian Population Figures, April 2016. Accessed: 21 March 2025
-
Who We Are, no date. Accessed: 21 March 2025
Joint and Intersectoral Analysis Framework (JIAF)
-
Homepage, no date. Accessed: 21 March 2024
-
JIAF 2: Technical Manual, July 2024. Accessed: 21 March 2025
Kassioun
-
About PWP, 28 November 2023. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
9 million SYP… The minimum cost of living for a Syrian family at the start of 2025 (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 29 December 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
REACH
-
Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard, undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Unpacking the effects of thirteen years of crisis: A snapshot of humanitarian needs in post-Assad Syria (January 2025 – Whole of Syria), 22 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
What we do, undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
The National
-
About us, undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Syrians baffled by sharply fluctuating currency, 7 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
United Nations Development Programme
- The impact of the conflict in Syria: a devastated economy, pervasive poverty and a challenging road ahead to social and economic recovery, 19 February 2025. Accessed: 25 March 2025
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
-
Services Advisor: Making Connections, Improving Lives, 7 March 2017. Accessed: 20 May 2025
-
Syria governorates IDPs and IDP returnees overview as of 8 May 2025, 9 May 2025. Accessed: 19 May 2025
-
Syria is Home – Frequently Asked Questions, no date. Accessed: 20 May 2025
United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
-
Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab Republic – January to June 2025, 27 March 2025. Accessed: 31 March 2025
-
Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab Republic – January to March 2025, 28 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Syria Humanitarian Response (January - March 2025), 8 May 2025. Accessed: 19 May 2025
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Syrian Arab Republic: Flash Update No. 12 on the Recent Developments in Syria (as of 21 January 2025), 21 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 1 (As of 12 February 2025), 12 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report No. 4 (As of 26 March 2025), 27 March 2025. Accessed: 31 March 2025
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Syrian Arab Republic: Overview of humanitarian response (HCT-coordinated) January - March 2025, 7 May 2025. Accessed: 19 May 2025
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2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic, 3 March 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Welt Hunger Hilfe/Syrian Association for Relief and Development
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Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment Report – Rural Damascus, Hama, and Homs, January 2025, 14 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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JMSNA Dashboard, 12 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
World Bank
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Data: Syrian Arab Republic, undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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Fact Sheet: An Adjustment to Global Poverty Lines, 14 September 2022
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Macro Poverty Outlook for Syrian Arab Republic: October 2024, 10 October 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
World Food Programme
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HungerMap LIVE: Project overview, updated 2 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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HungerMap LIVE (Glossary), accessed 21 February 2025
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WFP Syria Price Bulletin – Flash Updates – Issue #5 – January 15, 2025, 21 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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WFP Syria Emergency Response – External Situation Report – 5 February 2025, 6 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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WFP Syria Emergency Response - External Situation Report - 8 May 2025, 14 May 2025. Accessed: 20 May 2025
World Health Organization
-
Improved sanitation facilities and drinking-water sources, undated. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
Syria Health Sector Bulletin – January 2025, 3 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Sources consulted but not cited
Enab Baladi
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Salary increases tied to production in Syria, 11 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
-
400% increase in salaries in Syria, 5 January 2025
European Union Agency for Asylum
- Country Guidance: Syria, 15 April 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Food Security Cluster
- FSS Whole of Syria Dashboard November 2024 Actuals Response Analysis, 20 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation
- Situation Report – Syria – 10 January 2025, 10 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Middle East Eye
- Syria: Falling food prices ease pressure as lira recovers on markets, 8 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
National Public Radio
- Voices from the new breadlines in Syria: Who’s waiting? And why?, 14 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
REACH
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Humanitarian Situation Overview in Syria (HSOS) Northeast Syria – June 2024, 30 July 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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Northwest Syria – Rapid Market Assessment (RMA) – 13 – 14 January 2025, 29 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
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REACH Northeast Syria – Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA) 2024 – Overview, January 2025, 27 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Refugees International
- Ensuring a Safe, Secure, and Dignified Future for Displaced Syrians, 16 December 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Save the Children
- Child stunting in Syria could reach levels never seen before as earthquakes threaten to push 665,000 people into hunger, 17 May 2023. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Syria Direct
- False improvement and speculation: What is happening to the Syrian pound?, 13 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
Turkish Red Crescent
- Minimum Expenditure Basket in North West Syria Technical Report (November 2024), 9 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
United Nations Development Programme
- The impact of the conflict in Syria: A devastated economy, pervasive poverty and a challenging road ahead to social and economic recovery, 19 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia
- Syria at the crossroads: Towards a stabilized transition, 26 January 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund
- Syrian Arab Republic – Humanitarian Situation Report No. 5, 1 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
United Nations Office for Project Services
- Strengthening essential healthcare services for the people of Syria, 2 February 2025. Accessed: 25 February 2025
United States Agency for International Development
- Syria – Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #4, Fiscal Yeear (FY) 2024, 2 February 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
UPI
- Humanitarian aid starting to flow into Syria, 2 January 2025
Welt Hunger Hilfe
- Multisectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA) Aleppo and Idleb Governorates Northwest Syria (NWS) – September 2024, 5 November 2024. Accessed: 25 February 2025
World Food Programme
- Hunger Hotspots: FAO-WFP early warnings on acute food insecurity, November 2024 to May 2025 Outlook, 21 November 2024
Version control and feedback
Clearance
Below is information on when this note was cleared:
- version 2.0
- valid from 14 July 2025
Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section
The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.
Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – End of section
Changes from last version of this note
First version since the fall of the Al-Assad regime.
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CIA World Factbook, Syria (People and Society), updated 16 January 2025 ↩
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CIA World Factbook, Syria (People and Society), updated 16 January 2025 ↩
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CIA World Factbook, Syria (People and Society), updated 16 January 2025 ↩
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CIA World Factbook, Syria (People and Society), updated 16 January 2025 ↩
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World Bank, Fact Sheet: An Adjustment to Global Poverty Lines, 14 September 2022 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 7), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Page 81), 3 March 2024 ↩
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CIA World Factbook, Syria (People and Society), updated 16 January 2025 ↩
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CIA World Factbook, Syria (People and Society), updated 16 January 2025 ↩
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World Bank, Data: Syrian Arab Republic (Education), undated ↩
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EUAA, Syria – Country Focus (Page 80), 22 October 2024 ↩
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DW, What’s next for Syria’s devastated economy?, 12 December 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Flash Update… (Page 5), 21 January 2025 ↩
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REACH, What we do, undated ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (Methodology), undated ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 4), 22 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 3), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Pages 6-7), 28 January 2025 ↩
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The National, Syrians baffled by sharply fluctuating currency, 7 February 2025 ↩
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Arab News, Why sanctions relief is critical to Syria’s recovery and political future, 4 March 2025 ↩
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FCDO, Update on Syria: Lifting asset freezes on 24 entities, 6 March 2025 ↩
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Al Jazeera, US Decision to lift sanctions on Syria: Here’s what you need to know, 13 May 2025 ↩
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Al Jazeera, Trump’s decision to lift Syria sanctions fuels dreams of economic revival, 16 May 2025 ↩
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Al Jazeera, World Bank says Syria eligible for new loans after debts cleared, 16 May 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 2), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 17), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, JMSNA Dashboard (Livelihoods), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 27), 12 February 2025 ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (Livelihoods), undated ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 24), 12 February 2025 ↩
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UNDP, The impact of the conflict in Syria … (Page 4), 19 February 2025 ↩
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UNDP, The impact of the conflict in Syria … (Page 31), 19 February 2025 ↩
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UNDP, The impact of the conflict in Syria … (Page 32), 19 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab…, 3 March 2024 ↩
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: UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Page 2), 3 March 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Page 76), 3 March 2024 ↩
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EUAA, Syria – Country Focus (Pages 80-81), 22 October 2024 ↩
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World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook for Syrian Arab… (Page 2), 10 October 2024 ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (Livelihoods), undated ↩
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Kassioun, 9 million SYP… (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 29 December 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 32), 28 January 2025 ↩
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Food Security Cluster Handbook, Minimum Expenditure Basket, updated 7 December 2023 ↩
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WFP, WFP Syria Price Bulletin – Flash Updates – Issue #5… (Page 3), 21 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 28), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 8), 12 February 2025 ↩
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Enab Baladi, Despite the increase, employees’ salaries…, 3 February 2025 ↩
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The National, Syrians baffled by sharply fluctuating currency, 7 February 2025 ↩
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EUAA, Syria – Country Focus (Page 80), 22 October 2024 ↩
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World Bank, Macro Poverty Outlook for Syrian Arab… (Page 2), 10 October 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Pages 6-7), 28 January 2025 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Pages 2-3), 22 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 4), 27 March 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 4), 27 March 2025 ↩
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IASC, Who We Are, no date ↩
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JIAF, JIAF 2: Technical Manual (page 32), July 2024 ↩
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IASC, Humanitarian Population Figures (section 3.1), April 2016 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 3), 22 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 4), 27 March 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 5), 27 March 2025 ↩
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Syria Population Task Force, Population Data, June 2024 (available by request from the HDX) ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Page 2), 3 March 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 5), 27 March 2025 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 3), 22 January 2025 ↩
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Al Hurra, About us (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), undated ↩
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Al Hurra, Damascus real… (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 13 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 45), 27 March 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 45-46), 27 Mar 2025 ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (Shelter), undated ↩
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Al Araby Al Jadeed, About us (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), undated ↩
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Al Araby Al Jadeed, Rent in… (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 24 December 2024 ↩
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Enab Baladi, Rent prices rise by 30% in Daraa (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT) ↩
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Al Araby Al Jadeed, Real estate… (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 23 January 2025 ↩
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Al Araby TV, About us (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), undated ↩
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Al Araby TV, The number of… (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 6 February 2025 ↩
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Al Hurra, Damascus real… (translated by Arabic speaker working in CPIT), 13 February 2025 ↩
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Enab Baladi, House rents in Syria: Inflation without intervention, 16 February 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, JSMNA Dashboard (Winterization and Shelter), 12 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 32), 28 January 2025 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 3), 22 January 2025 ↩
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WFP, WFP Syria Emergency Response – External Situation Report… (Page 1), 6 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Page 76), 3 March 2024 ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (Food Security), undated ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 2), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 17), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 36), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Pages 37-38), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WFP, HungerMap LIVE: Project overview, updated 2 January 2025 ↩
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WFP, HungerMap LIVE (Glossary), accessed 21 February 2025 ↩
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WFP, HungerMap LIVE (Syrian Arab Republic), accessed 21 February 2025 ↩
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WFP, HungerMap LIVE (Syrian Arab Republic), accessed 21 February 2025 ↩
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WFP, HungerMap LIVE (Glossary), accessed 21 February 2025 ↩
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WFP, WFP Syria Price Bulletin – Flash Updates – Issue #5… (Page 4), 21 January 2025 ↩
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WFP, WFP Syria Price Bulletin – Flash Updates – Issue #5… (Page 5), 21 January 2025 ↩
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WFP, WFP Syria Price Bulletin – Flash Updates – Issue #5… (Page 4), 21 January 2025 ↩
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Enab Baladi, Ras al-Ain: Prices remain unchanged despite…, 18 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 6), 12 February 2025 ↩
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WFP, Syria Emergency Response - External Situation Report - 8 May 2025, 14 May 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic (Page 78), 3 March 2024 ↩
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WHO, Syria Health Sector Bulletin – January 2025 (Page 3), 3 February 2025 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 4), 22 January 2025 ↩
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WHO, Syria Health Sector Bulletin – January 2025 (Pages 3-5), 3 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 8), 12 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab Republic (Page 80), 3 March 2024 ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (Health), undated ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (Methodology), undated ↩
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WHO, Improved sanitation facilities and drinking-water sources, undated ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Pages 87 – 88), 3 March 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 7), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 40), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 40), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 40), 28 January 2025 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 4), 22 January 2025 ↩
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WHO, Improved sanitation facilities and drinking-water sources, undated ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Pages 87 – 88), 3 March 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 40), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 38), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 11), 28 January 2025 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 3), 22 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 3), 12 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 1), 26 March 2025 ↩
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UNHCR, Syria governorates IDPs and IDP returnees overview as of 8 May 2025, 9 May 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Pages 43, 44, 89), 3 March 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 26), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 40), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 3), 12 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 4), 27 March 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 6), 27 March 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 4), 27 March 2025 ↩
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REACH, Unpacking the effects of thirteen years… (Page 3), 22 January 2025 ↩
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REACH, Joint Needs Assessment 2024-2025 Dashboard (AAP), undated ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 7), 28 January 2025 ↩
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WHH/SARD, Joint Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment… (Page 63), 12 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syria Humanitarian Response (January - March 2025), 8 May 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Overview of humanitarian response …, 7 May 2025 ↩
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UNHCR, Services Advisor: Making Connections, Improving Lives, 7 March 2017 ↩
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UNOCHA, 2024 Humanitarian Needs Overview: Syrian Arab… (Pages 48-79), 3 March 2024 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities – Syrian Arab… (Page 14), 28 January 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 5), 12 February 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Syrian Arab Republic: Humanitarian Situation Report… (Page 4), 26 March 2025 ↩
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UNOCHA, Humanitarian Response Priorities … January to June 2025 (Page 4), 27 March 2025 ↩
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UNHCR, Syria is Home – Frequently Asked Questions, no date ↩
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See, for example, the UN’s Human Development Index for country-specific data, no date ↩