Policy paper

Prime Minister's strategic steer to the nuclear sector following the 2025 Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce's Review

Published 26 November 2025

Purpose of this steer

Today, I am establishing a clear and ambitious course to renew our nuclear sector, to accelerate the safe, secure, and affordable delivery of nuclear projects across civil, defence, and decommissioning.

The UK is a nation with a proud history in sovereign nuclear technology. The Civil and Defence nuclear sectors are investing heavily in capabilities and infrastructure to deliver the ambition of the Industrial Strategy for a Nuclear Nation.  Nuclear technology is vital to our country’s economic growth, energy security, and national defence. It delivers reliable, low-carbon electricity and supports our nuclear deterrent. It provides an extraordinary industrial opportunity, where UK innovators and companies lead the world.

We are building on this legacy with clear commitments on the future of our nuclear deterrent, our submarine programmes, Sizewell C and the SMR programme. Coupled with the export potential, there is an enormous opportunity if the UK can seize it.

To realise this potential and deliver the next generation of nuclear projects in the UK, our nuclear regulation will need to be world-class: fast-paced, safe, and coherent.

As we have embarked on the modernisation and expansion of our civil and defence nuclear programmes, prompt and cost-effective completion of projects is a national priority. It will help get our energy bills down and ensure our security in the face of rising global threats. Safety, security, and environmental protection remain non-negotiable, but delivery on time and budget is essential. It is the foundation of investor confidence and public trust.

The findings of the independent Nuclear Regulatory Taskforce make clear that radical change is needed and my government will act with urgency to deliver that change. I warmly welcome it and endorse its approach, and accept the principle of all the recommendations it has set out. We have committed to complete implementation within two years, subject to legislative timelines on elements requiring primary legislation.

Regulation must be proportionate and enabling to support safe and timely delivery. This strategic steer marks the starting point of a system-wide reset. We are already in the final stages of designating a new National Policy Statement for Nuclear Energy Generation, which sets out a nuclear planning framework for projects beyond 2025. Our flagship Planning and Infrastructure Bill includes a number of reforms which will support future nuclear deployment. Now is the time for every part of the system, lawfully and transparently, to push the boundaries of what is possible, to serve the national interest.

My government wants to be very clear about the priority we place on our nuclear sector – a deliverer of growth, jobs and clean energy. That is why I want to set out the strategic priorities for both our civil and defence nuclear programmes, including the vital work of decommissioning and waste management, and to be clear what these objectives mean in practice.

Government departments, regulators and dutyholders in the nuclear sector all have a part to play. This strategic steer is not for the shelf, it must be embedded now, in strategies, operating plans, and performance measures. Delivery is essential; it is the test of whether we meet this moment for the good of our country’s future.

Principles for delivery – an enabling approach

Pace as a security imperative

Across our economy, delays cost money. Given the long timescales, this is particularly significant in nuclear. Every month wasted means higher bills for energy consumers and the taxpayer, more uncertainty, and the UK left exposed to the next global shock. Modernisation of the nuclear deterrent – the foundation of our national security – is essential. That’s why I expect regulators and dutyholders to adopt clear programme planning, run evidence reviews in parallel where the law allows, and to deliver firm service standards with transparent milestones. If an approach protects people and the environment and gets the job done faster, take it. If it piles on cost and time without clear benefit, stop it. Regulators and dutyholders need to collaborate more effectively to stop wasteful gold-plating which is ultimately paid for by the British public.

Uncompromising on safety and security — proportionately applied

Great Britain’s nuclear safety regime is respected the world over for its rigour and independence, and that will endure. However, regulation must address the whole system, not just its individual parts. I expect our regulators to be active enablers of progress, while maintaining the independence of individual regulatory decisions in relation to their purposes and duties.

The nuclear sector – particularly the Defence Nuclear Enterprise – is interconnected and complex, and local decisions can have adverse impacts in the wider system. I expect regulators and dutyholders to take a wider view to ensure national security and safety is considered in the round, enabling pace and delivery across the complex and interconnected landscape.

As part of this enabling approach, I expect regulators to prioritise timely and proportionate assessment and permissioning of new nuclear technologies, and for dutyholders to standardise evidence for repeat units, so we learn once and replicate many times. Where decisions need to be made to prioritise, we expect these decisions to be made transparently across relevant regulators, with support from departments in horizon scanning. Focus should be on issues that drive the greatest risk, applying As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) and Best Available Techniques (BAT) consistently. We should avoid revisiting previous decisions. Time must be treated as a clear risk factor in its own right. Where further mitigation offers only marginal benefit, that judgement should be recorded, and we must move forward without delay.

We are publishing new guidance: Ways of Working – principles to guide the application of ALARP and BAT in the nuclear industry, alongside this steer, to support consistent application of ALARP and BAT. I would like to see both regulators and industry embed the principles it sets out and have asked Secretaries of State for Energy Security and Defence to ensure that progress is made to do this.

One‑team regulation

Our regulators, planning bodies, and government departments must act as one team, forming a single, joined-up regulatory system. To enable this, timetables should be aligned, relevant evidence shared, and joint or parallel reviews conducted where appropriate, so that developers and dutyholders receive a single, coherent set of requirements. Early and regular engagement on projects helps build a shared understanding between regulators and dutyholders and enables the exchange of views and expectations. Dutyholders should experience clearer, more joined-up interactions and benefit from faster decision making. Successful collaborative structures – such as the Sellafield G6 - that bring together government, regulators and dutyholders and resolve issues promptly, with decisions recorded openly and transparently, should be used as default and built upon.

International engagement

Our regulators should work closely with trusted overseas regulators, and create areas for collaboration such as recognising credible assessments from international partners. This approach will be particularly important in enabling the import and export of the technology underlying SMRs and AMRs.

By considering credible foreign evidence and progressing joint reviews with trusted partners, we will avoid wasteful duplication and accelerate progress. Regulators should align where international standards and certifications can be recognised, in order to support the import and export of advanced nuclear technologies. Clear guidance should be published on how such evidence is weighed in UK casework, alongside service standards for information exchange. The government envisages an approach that will support international market access for UK suppliers and speed up permitting for designs with records of credible international approvals here at home.

Annex to Strategic Steer – National priorities

1. Civil nuclear

1.1 Closing the energy security gap:

The retirement of our fleet of Advanced Gas-Cooled Reactor (AGRs), the last of which was built in the 1980s, risks leaving a dangerous gap in Britain’s low-carbon energy supply. UK nuclear capacity is projected to fall to around 3 to 4 GW by 2030, down from about 6 GW today and a peak of 12.7 GW in the mid-1990s. We want to avoid a ‘nuclear gap’ by enabling existing stations to continue running where demonstrably safe, such as through the potential 20-year lifetime extension of Sizewell B, and by getting Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C online as soon as possible. We also want to see maximal replication between Hinkley Point C and Sizewell C, ensuring lessons are learned and efficiencies gained to support the next generation of the nuclear fleet.

1.2 Enabling a mixed fleet

The UK is committed to a diverse and balanced civil nuclear programme. In addition to large-scale reactors, we want to support deployment of Advanced Nuclear Technologies (ANTs) to provide reliable, low-carbon baseload power and to develop and unlock new technologies such as high-temperature industrial heat and clean hydrogen production. Great British Energy – Nuclear’s (GBE-N) SMR programme will follow a clear, replicable template, setting the standard for a future fleet. This approach will enable rapid deployment and deliver value for the taxpayer.

Alongside GBE-N’s SMR programme, we want to support privately financed advanced nuclear projects in the UK. We will shortly publish an Advanced Nuclear Framework which will provide a pathway for privately-led advanced nuclear technologies, with Great British Energy - Nuclear assessing project proposals, the National Wealth Fund exploring potential investment opportunities and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero exploring revenue support for viable projects. We expect the regulators to have due regard to the framework when it is published.

1.3 Fuels and the market signal:

Industry deserves clarity and confidence as we chart the course ahead. In September 2025, we announced plans to legislate to end the use of Russian Uranium in the UK by the end of 2028. This provides clear signalling to industry of the need to invest in alternative supply chains and we are supporting this through the £300m investment in a UK High Assay Low Enriched Uranium (HALEU) supply chain in the UK. Nuclear regulators should pay full regard to any future announcements by government on civil nuclear fuel usage in the UK.

2. Defence nuclear

2.1 Securing the future of our deterrent:

A modernised nuclear deterrent is the bedrock of the UK’s national defence and the cornerstone of its commitment to NATO and global security. In the face of rising global threats and growing Russian aggression, the UK is moving to a warfighting readiness to deter and strengthen security. That is why this government remains steadfast in its commitment to sustaining the nuclear deterrent as a National Endeavour, bringing together partners from across government and industry, and supporting the DNE’s role as a powerful engine for growth which invests in skills and drives innovation and technologies that help improve productivity across the breadth of the UK economy. This commitment is reinforced by the nuclear ‘triple lock’ which commits to:

1. The ongoing build of the four Dreadnought Class submarines at Barrow-in-Furness, and continued support for high-quality, high-status apprenticeships and jobs, alongside continued investment in the supply chain across the country.

2. The maintenance of our nuclear deterrent– securing protection for both the UK and NATO Allies.

3. The delivery of all future upgrades needed for the UK’s submarines to patrol the waters and keep our country safe.

2.2 Ambitious recapitalisation

To secure the future of the deterrent the government is undertaking a major programme of recapitalisation across the defence nuclear portfolio. This includes two submarine programmes in build (Astute and Dreadnought), one in design (SSN-AUKUS), a replacement warhead programme (Astraea) and the largest infrastructure upgrades in a generation, including our Naval Bases. We must continue to work at pace to ensure a safe, secure and environmentally responsible approach for the disposal of the UK’s decommissioned submarines and nuclear liabilities. For the first time since the 1990s we are also exploring options to re-establish a nuclear fuel cycle for reactor fuel for defence purposes in a way that is fully consistent with the UK’s international obligations.

These critical programmes will be supported by the implementation of our Strategic Defence Review recommendations, enabling us to sustain our deterrent now and into the future. This is a complex and challenging endeavour involving a portfolio which has some of the largest and most advanced programmes in government. We must work even more closely together across government, defence, industry and regulators to achieve our shared mission: to deliver capabilities, deter the threat and protect the nation.

3. Nuclear decommissioning

3.1 Accelerating hazard reduction:

The legacy hazards at NDA sites, particularly at Sellafield, must be reduced at pace. I expect proportionate, practical solutions that tackle the greatest hazards first, considering risks holistically, with credible schedules that bring timelines forward, not push them back.

3.2 Spent fuel and radioactive waste:

The safe and secure management of spent fuel and radioactive waste remains a matter of public trust and national responsibility. Progress towards a Geological Disposal Facility (GDF), alongside the development of modern interim storage, is an important part of this journey. Regulators should work with dutyholders to ensure that well‑evidenced treatment, packaging and storage solutions are implemented in a timely manner, providing clarity and predictability so that projects may plan with confidence.

3.3 Plutonium disposition:

The UK’s civil separated plutonium inventory represents a security and stewardship challenge. This material will be placed beyond reach, through immobilisation in a form suitable for ultimate disposal. Regulators should support timely decision‑making and execution that enables this.

3.4 Submarine disposal and liability management

The government is committed to responsibly disposing of the UK’s decommissioned submarines and nuclear liabilities. This includes regenerating the defueling infrastructure in Devonport Dockyard and implementing an enduring capability for the safe disposal of current and future decommissioned submarines.

We remain committed to the safe management of our nuclear materials and reusing special nuclear materials appropriately and collaboration will continue between the Defence Nuclear Enterprise (DNE) and Nuclear Decommissioning Authority, utilising their wider supply chain for best practice, learning, efficiencies and economies of scale.