Policy paper

African and classical swine fever disease control strategy for Great Britain

Published 14 May 2026

Applies to England, Scotland and Wales

Introduction

Purpose of document

This document describes how government and others would manage an outbreak of African swine fever (ASF) or classical swine fever (CSF) in Great Britain (England, Scotland and Wales). It sets out the measures to be applied within the framework of national law, together with the wider arrangements and approaches in place to reduce the risk of an incursion of ASF or CSF into Great Britain.

The strategy will therefore help all parties that might be affected by an outbreak of ASF or CSF to consider how they can be better prepared to respond quickly and to identify the measures they need take to mitigate the potential impact of these control measures.

In this document, reference to ASF or CSF is intended to refer to the specific disease. Where the collective term ‘swine fever’ is used, it is intended to refer to both ASF and CSF.

Approach

This strategy was developed in collaboration with delivery partners, veterinary experts, disease consultants at the National Reference Laboratory and industry representatives, including pig producers and processors. It provides context for the prevention of swine fever outbreaks and explains how the law will be applied where swine fever is suspected or confirmed in Great Britain.

This strategy reflects the provisions of the Diseases of Swine Regulations 2014 and the Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) Regulations, both as amended in England. It sets out the control measures to be applied from the point of suspicion of swine fever in Great Britain through to the recovery of disease freedom.

The legislation in Scotland and Wales differs in some respects from that in England. However, the approach taken in Scotland and Wales will follow that set out in this strategy, with any necessary alterations to reflect the legislative position in Scotland and Wales.

This strategy is a living document. Government will regularly review its policies and preparedness measures to ensure they remain fit for purpose.

Swine fever can spread irrespective of regional or political boundaries. The management of an outbreak therefore requires complementary and consistent measures across Great Britain.

This strategy is endorsed by the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra), the Scottish Government and the Welsh Government (together referred to as ‘government’). The responsibility for managing outbreaks rests with the respective governments.

Northern Ireland is recognised as a separate epidemiological unit and would operate separately in accordance with its own legislation, although similar control measures would be expected to apply in the event of an outbreak.

This control strategy is consistent with the following:

• the Great Britain animal health and welfare principle that ’prevention is better than cure’
• sharing responsibility and cost, requiring close working between government and industry in developing and delivering disease controls
• meeting international obligations to trading partners
• mitigating the risk of spread of disease to third countries
• ongoing obligations for the welfare of animals
• wildlife management policies
• Defra’s contingency plan for exotic notifiable diseases of animals in England
• Welsh Government’s contingency plan for exotic notifiable diseases of animals
• Scottish Government’s exotic diseases of animal’s contingency framework plan
• the United Kingdom contingency plan for exotic notifiable diseases of animals, which sets out the structures, roles and responsibilities for a rapid and effective response to animal disease

Strategic disease control framework

Overview of diseases: swine fevers (African swine fever and classical swine fever)

ASF and CSF are severe, contagious haemorrhagic diseases affecting all animals in the Suidae family, including domestic pigs and wild boar. Although they share many similar clinical signs and can cause comparable impacts on pig health, they are caused by 2 different viruses with distinct incubation periods and underlying biology. African swine fever (ASF) is caused by African swine fever virus (ASFV), an Asfivirus. Classical swine fever (CSF) is caused by classical swine fever virus (CSFV), a Pestivirus. The specific strain of virus and the type of pigs affected greatly influence the severity of clinical signs.

Both ASFV and CSFV can occur in acute, mild or chronic forms. The acute form can cause severe disease from which most infected pigs die. Because ASF and CSF present with very similar clinical symptoms, they can only be reliably distinguished through laboratory diagnostic tests. Read about how to spot ASF and how to spot CSF.

You can also read information specific to Scotland and Wales:

• ASF information specific to Scotland
• CSF information specific to Scotland
• ASF information specific to Wales
• CSF information specific to Wales

Neither ASFV nor CSFV poses a known risk to human health, so the measures outlined in this strategy focus solely on animal health.

ASFV has never been detected in the United Kingdom. The government routinely reviews the risk of introduction based on global disease trends. Current ASFV risk assessments estimate the risk of entry of ASFV through live animals and products of animal origin (POAO) from affected European countries is medium (occurs regularly), while the risk of introduction through human-mediated pathways including the movement of non-commercial porcine POAO is high (occurs very often). Infection with ASFV has persisted in wild boar populations with spillover into domestic pigs in several European countries. ASFV is endemic in much of sub-Saharan Africa but is currently spreading through Asia, Europe, the Caribbean and Oceania.

CSFV was eradicated from Great Britain in 1966. Since then, the occasional outbreaks have occurred but were successfully contained and eradicated. The most recent outbreak in 2000 affected 16 farms and led to the culling of approximately 75,000 pigs, with approximately £4.4 million paid in compensation.

Spread of disease

Pigs can become infected with ASFV or CSFV through direct contact with an infected pig or its faeces, tissues or body fluids. Infection can also occur if pigs ingest material contaminated with the virus, such as food waste containing tissues from infected animals or parts of an infected carcase. Both viruses can survive for long periods in meat products, including for several years in frozen and cured products. Infected pigs shed virus in secretions and excretions, particularly blood and tissues, which can lead to significant contamination of the environment.

The viruses can be spread through contaminated objects (often referred to as ‘fomites’) like vehicles, footwear, clothing or farm equipment, and they can be carried short distances by animals or insects that pick it up on their bodies without becoming infected themselves.

Aerosol transmission has been demonstrated experimentally over a short distance, but it is not considered a significant route of spread for swine fever.

ASFV can be spread by biological vectors, especially soft ticks of the genus Ornithodoros, which can become infected and subsequently transmit the virus. Current evidence suggests that ticks are not a risk factor for ASFV within the UK.

Offspring of CSFV-infected sows can become infected in the uterus. Congenitally infected piglets, as well as piglets infected shortly after birth may become persistently infected and can shed virus for months, often showing only mild or non-specific clinical signs.

Disease management principles

Managing exotic diseases primarily involves managing risk. Exotic diseases are defined as those not normally present in the country. Therefore, risk management for swine fever consists of:

• preventing incursion of disease by putting in place day to day measures to prevent entry into Great Britain
• detecting it quickly through surveillance and notification of disease suspicion
• stopping it spreading
• stamping it out
• preparedness ahead of an outbreak to reduce impact

Disease control objectives

The government’s primary objective during any swine fever outbreak is to contain and eradicate the disease in domestic or feral pigs and restore disease-free status as quickly as possible. To achieve this, the government will act swiftly and decisively, working closely with operational partners and stakeholders to:

• minimise the number and duration of premises affected
• minimise any impact on pig producers, meat processors and other related industries, and on domestic and international trade in pigs and pig products
• reduce excessive burdens on businesses
• prevent the exchange of swine fever virus between kept and feral pigs
• support sustainability within industry
• minimise the number of pigs that need to be culled either for disease control purposes or to safeguard animal welfare
• minimise the overall cost of the outbreak and the burden on the taxpayer and public as well as the impacts on tourism, the environment, rural economy and wider economies

Throughout this strategy we use the term ‘kept pigs’ to refer to all Suidae (including domestic pigs, wild boar and their hybrids) that are kept as farmed animals, pets or in pannage (pasturing swine in wood or forest). We use the term ‘feral pigs’ to refer to those living freely in the wild.

Approach to disease control

Our approach to disease control includes:

• conducting horizon scanning to monitor global swine fever developments and identify emerging threats
• carrying out risk assessments to inform risk management actions that reduce the likelihood of disease entering Great Britain
• maintaining robust contingency plans and conducting outbreak simulation exercises to test preparedness and implement lessons learnt following these exercises
• detecting and reporting clinical signs early to enable rapid diagnosis and limit disease spread before control measures are activated, thereby reducing the initial size of the outbreak
• containing and eradicating disease promptly at affected premises through humane culling of pigs on infected premises
• tracing animals, people, vehicles and other potential fomites immediately, to prevent further transmission
• limiting the risk of any further spread of disease from infected, connected or nearby premises through movement bans, cleansing and disinfection, and enhanced national-level biosecurity measures
• undertaking risk assessments informed by epidemiological evidence and modelling before easing restrictions
• continuing heightened surveillance on premises within disease control zones before easing restrictions on a phased basis
• considering the costs and benefits of control measures to support informed decision-making
• ensuring compliance with international trade obligations for swine fever under the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH) Terrestrial Code

Maintaining disease freedom

ASF and CSF are not normally present in the UK. To reduce the likelihood of these diseases entering Great Britain, it is important to understand the potential routes of introduction and implement effective risk-mitigating measures. Resources are targeted at the measures that are considered most cost-effective in reducing the risk of introduction.

If swine fever virus enters Great Britain and is not detected at the point of entry (detection in live pigs is unlikely as only healthy animals should be exported) there will be a period of undetected circulation. During this silent spread phase of swine fever, the virus can rapidly and uncontrollably spread within domestic pig herds or into feral pig populations, significantly influencing the eventual size of the outbreak.

Vigilance and prompt reporting

Vigilance by pig owners for clinical signs of ASFV and CSFV is essential for early detection and limiting spread. Keepers are expected to maintain herd-health vigilance and consult their private veterinary surgeon when they notice clinical signs, behavioural changes, or other health indicators. The private veterinary surgeon must consider whether swine fever is a differential diagnosis (one of several possible diseases with similar symptoms), as mild forms of swine fever can resemble several endemic diseases. Failure to consider swine fever may delay reporting and allow infection to spread undetected for some time.

Movement, standstill, animal identification, and tracings

‘General orders’ refer to legal instruments issued under the Animal Health Act 1981 to control notifiable diseases. Together with best practice guidance these help mitigate the risk of disease spread associated with the day-to-day operations of the pig industry. They outline standstill rules (temporary restrictions preventing animals from leaving premises for a specified period after other animals have arrived), identification and registration requirements that ensure robust traceability across the pig supply chain. They also address risks arising from animal by-products (ABPs) and from vehicles used in live pig transport. These measures reduce the likelihood of undetected spread of exotic diseases, such as swine fevers, and support effective epidemiological investigations when disease is suspected or confirmed.

More information on the General licence for the movement of pigs, sheep and goats.

Information is also available on animal movements in Wales and animal movements in Scotland.

International surveillance and monitoring

Government monitors the international disease situation closely. Preliminary outbreak assessments are published on GOV.UK on notification of a disease outbreak from the EU or the World Organisation for Animal Health (WOAH). For outbreaks of ASF and CSF in an EU member state, a country bordering the EU or a trading partner, more in-depth qualitative risk assessments may be carried out by government.

These assessments consider the level of threat that the disease incident presents to Great Britain at the time and in the future. They help Defra and the devolved governments understand the level of risk and guide decisions on appropriate preventative controls, including emergency import restrictions and safeguard measures for goods from high-risk countries.

When disease is not present in the country, controls need to be proportionate to the risk. By monitoring the international situation, the option to vary preventative controls is considered against changing threats. Government works closely with other agencies to deliver proportionate controls at borders. Relevant stakeholder organisations will be updated immediately when any such change is made and advised of any additional safeguard measures required.

Surveillance within Great Britain

Great Britain maintains disease-free status through a programme of ongoing surveillance for swine fevers. This includes the official investigation of suspected cases in kept or feral pigs, with diagnostic samples submitted and tested when required. This is supported by a number of other scanning surveillance approaches, including:

• trained veterinary inspectors conducting veterinary assessments and diagnostic investigations on samples and carcases submitted to veterinary laboratories
• ante-mortem and post-mortem inspections of animals and carcases in abattoirs and game handling establishments for signs of disease by Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland official veterinarians
• support from private veterinary surgeons during clinical and routine farm visits, giving advice to keepers on pig health issues, farm assurance schemes and CSF serological surveillance of boars either entering or resident at EU-approved artificial insemination centres licensed for semen export
• undertaking pre-export serological testing for CSFV antibodies in certain pigs

The Animal and Plant Health Agency (APHA)’s Surveillance Intelligence Unit (SIU) delivers scanning surveillance for pig diseases to detect, characterise and monitor new or emerging threats. The Great Britain Scanning Surveillance Network (which comprises Veterinary Investigation Centres at APHA, Scotland’s Rural College (SRUC) and other partner diagnostic service providers) supports this work through the diagnostic investigation of samples and carcases submitted from unusual or unexplained cases. APHA-SIU monitors trends in laboratory submissions, including undiagnosed cases, to identify early indicators of exotic or emerging disease.

The UK Health Security Agency’s Tick Surveillance Scheme provides insight on tick species distribution through the National Biodiversity Network, helping track any emergence of competent vectors for ASFV. The National Biosecurity Network also records feral pig sightings across the UK through citizen science, using the iNaturalist UK app. This provides additional information that supports wider disease surveillance and risk assessment.

Import controls

Great Britain enforces strict import controls on animals and animal products to protect animal and public health. Emergency safeguard measures may be introduced for goods originating from countries experiencing outbreaks of exotic diseases, including ASF or CSF. The government monitors the animal health status of trading partners, and during an outbreak it swiftly amends or suspends import controls of porcine animals, products and related by-products from high-risk areas.

Imports of porcine animals and products into Great Britain are only permitted from approved EU or EFTA and non-EU countries with the required animal health status. Imports of live porcine animals and porcine products, including germinal products are not allowed from any territory affected by swine fever.

Limited pork and pork products may be accepted from disease-free areas within affected territories that Great Britain has officially recognised and listed for trade purposes. These products are required to undergo risk mitigation treatment, such as heat treatment, to ensure any potential swine fever virus is inactivated. Great Britain applies regionalisation as a risk management tool, allowing trade to continue from approved disease-free areas of trading partners, regardless of the partner’s animal health status. Under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement, Great Britain also recognises regionalised areas within EU member states for disease control and trade purposes.

Under the Border Target Operating Model, live pigs, germinal products and any commodities subject to safeguard measures are classified as high risk. Where safeguard measures do not apply, raw, chilled or frozen pork, pork products and ABPs are considered a medium risk. Processed and canned pork products are categorised as low risk, since processing treatments can inactivate the swine fever virus.

Medium and high-risk consignments entering Great Britain from the EU or the rest of the world must be pre-notified and accompanied by an export health certificate signed by an official veterinarian. These consignments are subject to risk-based veterinary checks on arrival either at the point of destination, border control post, or other approved premises.

High-risk consignments are subject to full (100%) documentary, identity and physical checks. Medium risk consignments undergo full documentary checks and a smaller proportion (1 to 30%) of identity and physical checks. Low-risk goods must be pre-notified and accompanied by commercial documentation to ensure traceability, but they are not routinely checked unless intelligence indicates a specific risk. Great Britain also audits exporting authorities to verify standards and official controls. Consignments transiting through other countries must meet the same certification requirements and are checked on a risk basis on arrival.

Imports of pork and pork products from outside the EU into Great Britain for personal consumption or use are prohibited, except for limited exemptions such as infant food, special foods and pet foods for specialist medical diets. In response to recent disease outbreaks, equivalent restrictions have also been applied to personal imports of pork and pork products from the EU during disease outbreaks.

See the guidance on importing live animals or animal products, and bringing food into Great Britain.

There is also animal and POAO imports guidance for Wales and animal and POAO imports guidance for Scotland.

Biosecurity

Biosecurity measures are a set of management and physical actions designed to reduce the risk of introduction, establishment and spread of disease to, from and within the pig herd. All pig keepers must implement a robust biosecurity plan informed by industry good practices and veterinary guidance, and must review it regularly as part of routine husbandry. These plans should address both external biosecurity measures (preventing virus entering onto the farm, for example through controls on visitors, vehicles and feed) and internal ones (preventing virus spread within the farm through hygiene, separation of age groups and equipment management). Farm assurance schemes and veterinary attestation requirements for exports also support high biosecurity standards by ensuring regular verification and continuous improvement of on-farm practices.

On-farm biosecurity relies on strict control of farm access for people, vehicles and equipment. This includes rigorous cleaning and disinfection protocols, particularly for visitors and shared machinery, using only Defra-approved disinfectants.

Essential biosecurity practices include:

• controlling the access and movement of people, vehicles and equipment
• hygiene (cleansing and disinfection)
• pest and vermin control
• fencing or housing that prevents access by feral pigs
• animal health and husbandry good practices
• planning and training

Government provides biosecurity advice for all pig keepers, including guidance on recognising the signs of ASF and recognising the signs of CSF. Private veterinary surgeons and industry organisations play a key role in offering on-farm advice and support.

It is illegal to feed swill, catering waste, kitchen scraps or any other animal products to pigs in Great Britain as these products can contain ASFV and CSFV and if they get into pigs, they can cause an outbreak. This remains one of the most important measures for preventing introduction of diseases such as swine fever. To support compliance, government and industry maintain ongoing awareness campaigns highlighting the risks associated with feeding waste food to pigs. The GB Pig Core Group (a key industry body representing the Great Britain pig production sector, focusing on disease surveillance, welfare, and emergency planning) is updated regularly by government on any change in ASF or CSF risks. Seasonal campaigns are also undertaken at times when the likelihood of waste food being fed to pigs increases (for example around Halloween and Christmas), supported by targeted public messaging on the risks and practical steps required to prevent disease spread.

See our guidance on disease prevention for livestock keepers.

Control of African swine fever virus and classical swine fever virus pathogens

Handling and importation of samples that contain or may contain ASFV or CSFV is regulated under the Specified Animal Pathogens Order 2008 and Importation of Animals Pathogen Order 1980, both as amended.

Laboratories handling ASF or CSF virus must hold a licence under the Specified Animal Pathogens Order and operate in accordance with the conditions of that licence. They must also be either:

• designated by the Secretary of State as the National Reference Laboratory for ASF or CSF
• specifically authorised by the Secretary of State as an Official Laboratory for ASF or CSF

Vaccinating against swine fever is not permitted in the UK unless specifically authorised by government as an emergency control measure where disease spread cannot be contained by other means. Restricting vaccine use prevents the risk of introducing virus or new variants and helps maintain clear, reliable disease surveillance and diagnosis.

National Expert Group on African swine fever and classical swine fever

The National Expert Group (NEG) on ASF and CSF operates continuously and provides veterinary, technical and scientific advice to support policy development. It gives recommendations on disease control measures during an outbreak. The group includes specialists from APHA and the National Reference Laboratory, such as epidemiologists and virologists.

The Pig Expert Group within APHA-SIU contributes to the NEG, providing specialist intelligence based on diagnostic findings and data from wider livestock and feral pig data. Other experts such as wildlife (or feral pig) specialists, entomologists, mathematical modellers, meteorologists and animal health economists may be consulted as needed.

The NEG may provide advice on a range of issues, including:

• the role of vectors (such as soft ticks) and other mechanical transmission pathways in the spread of ASF, and the control measures required at infected premises.
• the involvement of feral pig populations within or near disease control zones, and whether zone size or shape should be adjusted
• whether a pig may be spared from culling
• the use of vaccination for CSF (and potentially ASF) if required during an outbreak

Suspicion of swine fever in Great Britain

Notification to the Animal and Plant Health Agency

ASF and CSF are notifiable diseases. This means if anyone suspects swine fever in a pig, pig carcase, or a sample they must report it immediately to APHA by calling:

• 03000 200 301 in England
• 03003 038 268 in Wales
• your local Field Services Office in Scotland

If you are unsure whether to report disease you must contact an APHA vet for advice.

Veterinary inquiry

Once suspicion of swine fever is reported, the APHA duty vet will liaise with the Veterinary Exotic Notifiable Disease Unit (VENDU) team to begin an investigation. If suspicion cannot be ruled out based on the information provided over the phone, VENDU will arrange for a veterinary inspector to visit the premises.

Details of the case are recorded in a Notifiable Disease Incident report form, which is shared with relevant government teams. This report form is updated as further information becomes available, and until swine fever is either confirmed or negated.

Actions at suspect premises

When APHA decides that a veterinary inspector must visit the premises, APHA will verbally inform the reporter of the suspect pig or carcase and the person responsible for the pigs that:

• further investigation is necessary
• no pigs, pig carcases, personnel, vehicles or any other animals, materials or objects that may be infected or contaminated with swine fever virus must be moved off the premises

On arrival, the veterinary inspector will issue the occupier with a written restriction notice (EXD01(DOS)) designating the premises as a ‘suspect premises’. This notice formalises the restrictions that were previously issued verbally.

The veterinary inspector, working with specialist veterinarians will carry out a thorough investigation to assess whether suspicion of swine fever can be ruled out on clinical grounds. If the investigation concludes that swine fever is not suspected, the veterinary inspector will immediately remove the premises restrictions by serving a revocation notice (EXD05(DOS)). If clinical suspicion remains, the veterinary inspector will collect appropriate samples and submit these for laboratory analysis.

Restrictions will remain in place until the presence of swine fever is confirmed or ruled out. In some cases, the restrictions may be modified or an activity licensed where the veterinary inspector considers the risk of spread can be sufficiently mitigated.

The keeper must ensure the welfare of pigs throughout any period under restriction. During this time, epidemiological investigations will continue to determine how long the disease may have been present, identify the likely source of infection, and assess where it originated on the premises. In anticipation that swine fever might be confirmed, the veterinary inspector will start to prepare culling plans so that action can be taken quickly if disease is confirmed, including coordinating logistics with APHA. The investigation may also identify animals, vehicles, equipment or other items that could have carried infectious or potentially infectious material onto or off the premises, enabling these to be traced (see ‘Contact premises’).

Once laboratory test results have been reviewed, the Chief Veterinary Officer (CVO) will determine whether swine fever can be ruled out or confirmed. If ruled out, all restrictions will be removed immediately. If swine fever is confirmed, the premises will be issued with an EXD02 (DOS) restriction notice designating it as an ‘infected premises’ and triggering the measures outlined in ‘Actions at infected premises’.

During the investigation, the premises must maintain up-to-date records of further instances of disease, mortality and any changes in production data. This information must be provided to officials to help determine whether further visits or re-testing are required and how frequently they should occur.

Epidemiological inquiry

A veterinary inspector will undertake an epidemiological assessment to determine:

• the likely source of infection
• how long swine fever may have been present on the premises
• any movement of potentially infected animals, carcases, equipment, vehicles or other items from the premises
• other premises that may have been exposed or become infected
• whether feral pigs may have contributed to the introduction or spread of the virus

The veterinary inspector will continue this investigation until these facts have been established as far as possible, or until the presence of disease can be ruled out.

Contact premises

As a result of the epidemiological inquiry and the proximity of other pig premises to a suspect or infected premises, other premises or places are often identified where infection may have come from or spread to. This is based on the principle of disease kernels – the concept that disease transmission risk is highest close to infected premises and decreases with distance. These are regarded as ‘contact premises’. Disease spread can occur in many ways including movement of live animals, people, farm equipment, vehicles, slurry or manure.

When a contact premises is identified though tracings from an infected premises, the risk of disease spread to susceptible animals and the extent of the investigation will be determined using a risk-based approach. The following actions may be taken:

• the contact premises will be placed under restrictions and monitored for a specified period of time
• all pigs will be inspected and any pigs showing signs of disease will receive a full clinical examination, and where necessary will be sampled and tested as appropriate for swine fever
• the clinical records (including any medicine use) and movement records of the traced animals will be reviewed
• re-testing will be carried out if epidemiological evidence indicates that further investigation is required
• movement restrictions will be applied, although movement of things on or off the premises may be licensed by a veterinary inspector subject to an assessment of the risk of disease spread
• germinal products moved during the period when disease may have been present will be traced and destroyed

A contact premises will be considered as ‘dangerous contact premises’ if a veterinary risk assessment (VRA) concludes pigs on the premises are at high risk of exposure to infection.

Dangerous contact premises and pre-emptive culling

A premises is considered a dangerous contact when the risk of swine fever exposure is high due to epidemiological links such as pig movement tracings or proximity to an infected premises. Where the risk of virus exposure is high, pigs may be pre-emptively culled to limit the risk of further spread. This may also apply to suspect premises within existing disease control zones.

Scenarios where the CVO may decide pigs should be culled ahead of laboratory confirmation (often referred to as ‘slaughter on suspicion’) include:

• when disease is not already present in the country or region but there is a strong indication that it is present at the premises, such as interim laboratory results combined with a serious or deteriorating clinical picture
• a suspect premises in a high-pig-density area, where delaying culling could significantly increase the risk of disease spread
• at an suspect premises within an existing disease control zone where there is a serious or deteriorating clinical picture
• a dangerous contact premises with pigs showing clinical signs consistent with swine fever
• a dangerous contact premises where epidemiological evidence indicates a strong likelihood of disease

In these cases, the CVO from each of the devolved governments may authorise culling without waiting for full laboratory results. Samples will be collected to establish the extent of infection if positive, and to generate data to support outbreak investigations. If disease is confirmed the premises will be re-designated as an infected premises.

At a contact premises where results are negative but pre-emptive culling has been carried out, restrictions remain in place until preliminary and secondary cleansing and disinfection and sentinel pig restocking is completed. This is because virus may still be present due to the epidemiological link with an infected premises, even where pigs on the premises have not become infected.

For suspect premises with no epidemiological link to an infected premises that was pre-emptively culled, restrictions will usually be lifted immediately without requiring full cleansing and disinfection or restocking with sentinel pigs, as virus is unlikely to be present.

Zones on suspicion of disease

When swine fever is suspected at a premises, a temporary control zone (TCZ) may be put in place around the suspect premises pending the outcome of laboratory tests, as a precautionary measure to reduce the risk of undetected spread. This is assessed on a case-by-case basis. The decision to declare a TCZ is made jointly by the CVOs of the relevant government based on veterinary and scientific advice.

In a TCZ the movement of pigs off a premises is prohibited except under licence (see annex B). The main purpose of this measure is to prevent the movement of pigs out of the area before a protection and surveillance zones are declared if disease is confirmed. Government is unlikely to impose further restrictions within the zone unless considered necessary by the CVO.

A TCZ may be considered where there are no confirmed cases of swine fever in Great Britain and:

• a decision is taken to kill pigs at the suspect premises ahead of confirming disease
• evidence suggests that pigs are deliberately being moved out of the area to avoid any future disease control zone

In addition to the 2 scenarios above, a TCZ may also be considered when swine fever has already been confirmed in Great Britain and if:

• there are clinical signs leading to strong suspicion of disease on a contact premises and a decision is taken to kill the pigs
• the suspect premises is in a pig dense area where there would be a high risk of lateral spread if disease were subsequently found to be present – this may include when the suspect premises is close to the edge of a disease control zone
• if the suspect premises is not within a disease control zone but the veterinary inspector assessment of the situation at the suspect premises warrants wider controls

Any Great Britain administration may declare a TCZ in response to an suspect premises being declared in another administration, if proximity to the relevant administration’s border makes this necessary.

The TCZ can be any size considered appropriate for controlling the spread of disease and this will be determined when the zone is declared. It is likely to be a minimum of 10km.

The TCZ will be lifted when disease is negated at the suspect premises or will be replaced by a ‘controlled zone’ following confirmation of disease in kept pigs.

Special cases – establishments and temporary residence

Swine fever may be suspected in pigs at places where they are not normally kept, such as establishments or at animal gatherings (for example markets, fairs, shows). In such cases it is likely the pigs arrived already infected. Special procedures therefore apply if swine fever is suspected or confirmed at such locations. This is explained below. For establishments and gatherings within disease control zones specific measures apply.

For the purposes of this strategy, ‘establishments’ refer to slaughterhouses, knacker’s yards and game handling establishments. 

Suspicion at an establishment

When APHA is notified of disease suspicion in pigs at an establishment, the establishment will be placed under restrictions.

When suspicion arises at a slaughterhouse, the official veterinarian will instruct the food business operator to invoke their contingency plan with the objective of minimising any disease spread, and to preserve any evidence required for a veterinary inquiry by APHA. Further movement of animals onto the premises is prohibited and no pigs or pig products may leave the establishment while investigations are ongoing.

In slaughterhouses processing multiple species including pigs, other animals, animal products or animal by-products will also be under restrictions. Personnel at the establishment, including slaughterhouse staff, will also be subject to movement restrictions as necessary. Any hauliers present must remain on site must not leave until authorised by the veterinary inspector. Official veterinarians in Scotland operating under Food Standards Scotland have veterinary inspector powers to issue formal restrictions if necessary.

The slaughter of pigs and any other animals in a multispecies abattoir will be halted until the veterinary inspector arrives to inspect the pigs before slaughter. If swine fever is ruled out on clinical grounds, restrictions will be lifted and normal business operations can resume. All meat that had been detained can be released for sale subject to compliance with food hygiene requirements.

If swine fever cannot be ruled out, samples will be taken and restrictions will remain in force usually for 24 to 48 hours, until laboratory results enable disease to be confirmed or ruled out. The veterinary inspector will determine the most appropriate sampling approach for pigs in the lairage, prioritising animals that are either moribund or showing clinical signs.

The veterinary inspector’s initial assessment will include consideration of the chillers’ capacity, means of separation and any requirement to cleanse and disinfect. Once the assessment is complete, they will issue instructions to the food business operator on how the remaining pigs are to be killed, and how the carcases and pig by-products must be stored during the investigation. These measures are intended to minimise any risk of cross-contamination. Meat originating from the suspect pigs, or meat that may have come into contact with such meat, will be detained until the investigation concludes.

APHA will investigate the source of any suspect animals as well as any premises visited enroute to the abattoir, and apply restrictions as necessary. Such premises will be managed as contact premises.

Suspicion at temporary residences

If disease is suspected at an animal gathering (such as a livestock market, collection centre, approved export collection centre or show), the site will be treated as a suspect premises and placed under restrictions. All animal movements on or off the location will be halted while initial investigations are carried out.

Investigations will initially focus on establishing whether swine fever should be suspected and whether samples need to be taken. If clinical findings rule out disease, restrictions will be lifted and normal business operations may resume.

If samples are required to confirm or rule out the presence of swine fever, then restrictions will remain in place until laboratory results are received. Given the temporary nature of gatherings, measures will focus on how to minimise any impact on animal welfare during this period. Further animal movements into or out of the gathering will occur only in exceptional circumstances with agreement from the veterinary inspector and subject to licence conditions. Organisers of animal gatherings must maintain contingency plans that include provision for the temporary care of animals.

If disease is suspected at a veterinary practice or any temporary holding facility, proportionate measures will be applied.

In all cases, the origin of the suspect animals will be investigated. Officials will identify any animals or vehicles that may have left the premises with potentially infected pigs or items likely contaminated with swine fever. Restrictions will be served at the source, destination and other relevant contact premises deemed necessary by the veterinary inspector.

Suspicion in transit

If swine fever is suspected in transit, such as during the roadside inspection of a livestock vehicle, a veterinary inspector will direct the vehicle to a safe location to inspect the pigs. If swine fever cannot be ruled out on clinical grounds and samples need to be taken, a formal notice will be issued restricting the movement of the vehicle and pigs. While this suspicion of swine fever in transit is unlikely, this is treated as a special case since the vehicle is unlikely to be the source of infection. As a precautionary measure the vehicle’s routes will be traced and any source or contact premises placed under restriction.

The vehicle and pigs will be moved to an appropriate destination to be determined by the veterinary inspector where they will (if appropriate) be detained. The destination premises will be placed under restrictions until test results are confirmed.

Negative test results to disease investigations

Laboratory test results to rule out swine fever can take up to a week. For ASF, initial polymerase chain reaction (PCR) results are usually available within 12 hours. Where 2 consecutive PCR tests are negative, the relevant CVO might confirm that ASFV is not present and no further virological or serological testing is undertaken. CSF results may take longer than a week, particularly in cases where serological discrimination between CSF and other pestiviruses is required. If laboratory tests or veterinary investigations rule out swine fever or any other notifiable disease, all restrictions on the premises will be lifted immediately.

Diagnostic investigation

Reference laboratory

The address of the National Reference Laboratory for ASFV is:

WOAH Reference Laboratory
The Pirbright Institute
Ash Road
Pirbright
Woking
Surrey
GU24 0NF

The address of the National Reference Laboratory for CSFV is:

Animal and Plant Health Agency
Woodham Lane
Addlestone
KT15 3NB

Laboratory tests

Swine fever can only be confirmed following testing at the relevant National Reference Laboratory using validated and accredited tests (to detect virus or antibodies) as set out in the retained EU diagnostic manuals for CSF (Commission Decision 2002/106/EC) and ASF (Commission Decision 2003/422/EC), as amended. To support timely differential diagnosis when either disease is suspected, samples are sent in parallel to both National Reference Laboratories.

Interim test results are usually available within 24 to 48 hours, although some diagnostic testing may take several days to complete. Additional tests can be undertaken when a virus is isolated, which can help identify the origin of the virus.

On occasion, an investigation may be initiated following a non-negative result from pre-export or pre-entry testing of boars at artificial insemination centres. APHA will follow the same procedures as for any clinical suspect case.

Confirmation of a case of swine fever in kept pigs in Great Britain

Confirming swine fever

If the laboratory tests confirm the presence of swine fever virus, the CVO of the relevant devolved administration will formally declare an outbreak of swine fever. A decision is taken in consultation with the CVOs for the rest of the UK, during or after an Amber teleconference.

Once disease is confirmed, a series of actions is initiated including declaring relevant disease control zones, confirming measures within the zones, mobilising resources and carrying out certain actions at the infected premises as required by legislation.

For a first confirmed case, government will establish the National Disease Control Centre (NDCC) and Central Disease Control Centres (CDCC) in line with each administration’s exotic disease contingency plan.

International notification obligations

Within 24 hours of confirming swine fever, the UK CVO will notify WOAH, the EU and trading partners of the outbreak. Once WOAH is notified, the UK will lose its ASF or CSF freedom status.

WOAH, the EU and trading partners will continue to receive regular updates on subsequent cases and the evolving disease situation.

Trade and safeguard measures on Great Britain pigs and pig products

Exports to Northern Ireland

Although Northern Ireland is part of the UK SPS zone, movements of pigs and pig products from Great Britain to Northern Ireland will be restricted during a swine fever outbreak to protect Northern Ireland’s animal health status. This reflects longstanding arrangements to safeguard biosecurity in Northern Ireland. Where feasible, regionalisation will be agreed so that movements from areas outside disease control zones can resume under specified conditions.

Exports to the EU

Great Britain will be subject to EU safeguard measures following confirmation of swine fever. Exports of pigs and pig products, including germinal products, untreated meat and animal by-products (ABPs), will be prohibited by EU safeguard measures. The specific measures and areas affected will depend on the exact disease situation. In the absence of a regionalisation agreement, it is possible that initial safeguard measures will extend beyond restricted areas to account for any uncertainty in the early stages of the outbreak. However, this will immediately be amended as evidence of our understanding of the disease situation increases.

Under the EU-UK Trade and Cooperation Agreement there is an ongoing agreement between the EU and the UK to recognise areas or zones delimited for disease control and trade purposes. In addition, the legislation that governs swine fever controls in Great Britain closely aligns with EU requirements. These will facilitate discussions either before or during an outbreak that will ensure that exports from disease-free areas can continue.

Exports to non-EU countries

Export health certificates (EHCs) which have been agreed with non-EU countries vary according to each country’s import conditions. Some countries may still suspend imports from the UK during an outbreak even though EHCs can be signed.

During outbreaks of swine fever, government will liaise with exporters, British embassies overseas and veterinary authorities of the relevant countries to keep export markets open and facilitate exports as far as possible. Customer Information Notes will be issued on government websites to inform exporters about trade restrictions.

Controlled zones 

Once disease is confirmed the following controlled zones will be established to reduce the risk of spread to other pig premises in the area. Within each of these zones specific measures and requirements will be implemented. The extent of a zone may be amended following a risk assessment considering the epidemiological situation, and the domestic and feral pig population.

For ease of reference in this strategy, we use the term ‘controlled zones’ when describing measures in the protection zone, surveillance zone and restricted zones 1, 2 and 3, as the controls that apply across these zones are mostly the same with limited differences. A summary of the restrictions on the movement of pigs, pig products and activities which can spread disease is in annex B.

Protection zone

A protection zone is declared on confirmation of CSF or ASF on a premises, except where the premises is a slaughterhouse or a temporarily holding location. A protection zone will cover at least 3km around the infected premises.

Surveillance zone

A surveillance zone is declared alongside the protection zone and covering an area of at least 10km around the infected premises. The surveillance zone will not be declared if the premises is a slaughterhouse or temporary holding location as described under ‘Suspicion at an establishment’.

Restricted zones (relevant only to ASF)

Restricted zone 3

A restricted zone 3 is declared where ASF is confirmed in domestic pigs on 2 or more premises that are epidemiologically linked or geographically close. The size of restricted zone 3 is determined by the specific epidemiological characteristics of the outbreak and may replace any existing protection zone and surveillance zone around the affected premises.

Restricted zone 2

A restricted zone 2 is declared where ASF is confirmed in 2 or more feral pigs that are epidemiologically linked or geographically close. A restricted zone 2 will usually replace a feral pig control zone (FPCZ) and must cover, at minimum, the same area. The size and extent of the zone is determined based on the epidemiological situation and other risk factors for spread in the affected area. Measures that apply in this zone are discussed in the ‘Feral pigs’ section.

Restricted zone 1

A restricted zone 1 serves as a buffer zone between the infected area and disease-free areas that must be declared around any restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3.

New infected premises in existing zones

Where new infected premises are confirmed within an existing protection zone or surveillance zone, the boundaries of these zones will be revised and extended as necessary in line with legal requirements, which may include establishing overlapping zones. If an infected premises is detected in a geographically distinct area, government will declare a new protection zone and surveillance zone.

Cross-border zones in Great Britain

If the infected premises where disease has been confirmed is located near a border with another country in Great Britain, which means the zone to be declared extends into that country, both administrations will make a declaration relating to the zone.

Disease control measures in kept pig zones

When a controlled zone is declared, the movement of pigs and pig products into, within or out of the zone is restricted. Pig products include fresh meat, meat products, germinal products and animal by-products such as manure, slurry, litter and used bedding. Vehicles used to transport livestock are also subject to controls, along with activities such as pig gathering, breeding and hunting. The full list of prohibited activities is provided in annex B.

Certain pig products are exempt from these restrictions. These include ‘safe commodities’ as defined by WOAH’s Terrestrial Code, such as gelatine, POAO that have undergone the required risk-mitigating treatment, and composite products where all POAO ingredients have either been treated or sourced from outside the zone.

Movements of pigs and pig products may be permitted under licence, subject to VRA and strict conditions determined to reduce any residual risk. Live pigs may be licensed to move for immediate slaughter, to approved animal by-product plants for processing, or to other premises for production or welfare reasons. Samples for diagnostic purposes, non-porcine animals and any material that could be contaminated with swine fever virus may also need to be licensed to move off a premises in the zone. Restrictions are stricter in the protection zone, surveillance zone and restricted zone 3 to reflect the higher risk of spread in these zones (further details in annex B).

Licensed movements must meet the vehicle and transport requirements set out in legislation. Vehicles must be leak- and escape-proof, and be sealed under inspector supervision before departure. Journeys must be made by the most direct route possible, with no stopping or unloading until arrival at the destination premises. Vehicles must be cleansed and disinfected immediately on completion of each journey. After loading at the premises of origin, the wheels and wheel arches must be visibly clean and sprayed with a Defra-approved disinfectant listed under the ‘General Orders’ category.

In addition to these controls, pig keepers in the zone must keep detailed records. Dead domestic or feral pigs and their carcases must be reported to APHA which may then require a licence to be removed for disposal. Keepers are also expected to immediately notify APHA of any signs of disease such as changes in production, morbidity and mortality. All keepers will need to establish cleansing and disinfection points and ensure vehicles and personnel comply with the mandatory biosecurity measures set out in legislation and any additional requirements specified in the zone declaration.

Pig keepers, particularly those operating outdoor premises, must implement robust measures to prevent contact between domestic and feral pigs, as well as other wild animals or rodents that may act as fomites. In practice this may mean erecting feral-pig-proof fencing.

Details of licensing conditions, including specific requirements in each zone, are provided in annex B.

National movement ban

When swine fever is first detected there will be limited understanding of the epidemiological situation. There will be high uncertainty about the source of the outbreak and extent of any undetected spread. In response, government will act swiftly and use powers under the Movement of Animals (Restrictions) Orders (as amended) in England, Wales or Scotland to declare a wider disease control zone. The intention will be to reduce the risk of undetected spread in the early phase of the outbreak until the disease picture becomes clearer. The geographical extent of the zone will be made clear in the declaration and may extend nationally, comparable in scope to a national movement ban.

The declaration will set out the measures to apply. These may include all the restrictions described under ‘Disease control measures in kept pig zones’ or a combination of them as recommended by the National Emergency Epidemiology Group. Live pig movements will likely be prohibited, with some specific movements allowed under licence. The approach will be determined based on the disease situation, balancing the benefits of restrictions with the impact on industry. Risks may be reduced by limiting the type of movements permitted and applying strict biosecurity and standstill requirements. Controls will always be proportionate to the risk posed by the specific virus variant and epidemiological situation, and will remain in place until a VRA shows they are no longer required. A national movement ban is not intended as a long-term measure.

Surveillance within controlled zones

APHA will conduct surveillance within controlled zones to determine the disease distribution and identify any undetected spread. Premises with pigs will be identified using data from registered pig keepers, with support from foot patrols to detect unregistered keepers. Pig movement data and feral pig distribution data may also be used.

Veterinary inspectors will visit all pig holdings, where practical, to inspect pigs, check production and health records, and verify that mandatory biosecurity and record-keeping requirements are being implemented. Where inspection findings are unsatisfactory, a veterinary inspector may clinically examine and sample pigs for laboratory testing. In the protection zone, all pig holdings will be inspected, while in the surveillance zone and restricted zones, APHA will determine the appropriate approach to detect disease. These inspections, alongside pre-movement checks and testing, generate valuable surveillance data and add confidence that areas outside zones remain disease-free.

Early detection of disease relies on pig keepers reporting any suspicious clinical signs, sick or dead pigs to APHA straight away.

For ASF, APHA will collect or sample carcases from the first 2 dead pigs over 60 days old that die in each ‘epidemiological group’ each week, on a premises for virological testing at the National Reference Laboratory. An epidemiological group is a group of animals sharing roughly the same likelihood of exposure to a pathogen, usually defined by common management practices or a shared environment (such as a herd, flock or pen). This approach is well evidenced and will provide reliable detection of disease if present.

APHA will use the notification data to determine which premises to visit and collect or sample carcases for laboratory testing. Where there are insufficient mortalities to trigger surveillance visits, APHA may take targeted samples from any dead, sick or weak pigs instead. Surveillance data gathered will also underpin epidemiological analysis by the National Emergency Epidemiology Group on the origin and spread of infection and support advice to the national expert group (NEG), chief veterinary officers (CVOs) and policy teams.

Premises in the free area

Government will not impose any specific control measures on holdings outside declared disease control zones if swine fever has been confirmed only in kept pigs. However, if there is uncertainty about the extent of disease or evidence indicative of potential spread over a wider area, government may introduce proportionate controls outside of the standard disease control zones. This approach is preferred over extending existing zones such as the surveillance zone, as the measures to apply in such situations are much stricter, with more demanding requirements that must be satisfied before the zone can be lifted.

Enhanced biosecurity requirements to prevent further spread of swine fever may also be required outside of the declared disease control zones. For example, vehicles used to transport livestock from premises where pigs are kept to a slaughterhouse may be required to undertake cleansing and disinfection before loading the animals and before leaving the slaughterhouse.

Government has the power to restrict movement of pigs, pig products or anything that can spread swine fever anywhere in the country when there is evidence to suggest there is considerable risk of swine fever spread in the area.

Where pigs are moved under licence from a zone to a destination in the free area, a veterinary inspector will serve a restriction notice on the destination premises. The occupier will be required to keep the arriving pigs separate from all other pigs on the premises for at least 15 days from the day they arrived. Pigs must not be removed from the premises during this time and there must be no form of contact with pigs already on the premises. Where pigs originate from a surveillance zone, the veterinary inspector will apply at least the same movement restrictions that were in force at the premises of origin. In all cases, the veterinary inspector may impose additional measures they consider necessary to reduce the risk of disease spread.

Special cases – establishments and temporary residence

Confirmation of swine fever at an establishment

Where swine fever is confirmed at an establishment, special measures will apply. The establishment is not treated as an infected premises because pigs are likely to have arrived already infected. However, it is still likely other pigs in the lairage may have been exposed, and carcases within the establishment may be contaminated with swine fever virus.

Any remaining pigs will be killed without delay and the meat from those animals detained and kept separate from all other meat in the establishment. Where swine fever is confirmed, the food business operator will be required to dispose of the affected meat as category 2 animal by-product. The veterinary inspector will specify what actions are needed, including cleansing and disinfection of the establishment.

Unless the establishment turned out to be the disease source it is likely restrictions will be lifted and the establishment will be allowed to resume operations. However, restrictions cannot be lifted until at least 24 hours after cleansing and disinfection is completed to the satisfaction of the veterinary inspector.

Disease control zones are not ordinarily declared around establishments.

Confirmation of swine fever at an animal gathering

If swine fever is confirmed, disease will be controlled at the gathering premises in much the same way as any other infected premises. The premises will be placed under restrictions. If deemed appropriate, the culling of all pigs will take place at the gathering. If considered inappropriate, arrangements will be made to move the pigs to a suitable place for killing.

Non-swine species may be licensed off the premises by a veterinary inspector, subject to appropriate biosecurity protocols, including cleansing and disinfection of vehicles after unloading at the destination premises. If pigs are present or kept at the destination premises, a veterinary inspector may decide that the destination premises should be placed under restrictions for a period to ensure disease has not been introduced.

Confirmation of swine fever in transit

If disease is confirmed, the vehicle will be cleansed and disinfected as directed by a veterinary inspector. The premises at which the vehicle or pigs are located at the time of confirmation will be treated as an infected premises due to the risk of contamination and potential onward spread while results from tests are awaited.

Control of establishments in zones

To operate a slaughterhouse in certain zones (protection zone, surveillance zone and restricted zone 3) or to receive pigs from these zones or the free area, that slaughterhouse must be ‘designated’. An application is made to the relevant authority which verifies the slaughterhouse’s suitability for designation, after which the designation is formally approved on behalf of the relevant minister. The slaughterhouse must meet the requirements for sourcing pigs and separation as necessary, have sufficient cleansing and disinfection facilities for hauliers, and have clear processes for handling any restricted meat produced.

Pigs originating outside a controlled zone and slaughtered outside these zones are not subject to additional controls, and there is no requirement for the meat to be marked or treated, except where restrictions have been imposed through a declared wider disease control zone or other means. The practice of allowing cleansing and disinfection of vehicles away from the slaughterhouse may be suspended in such instances.

Movement of pigs from outside the zones to slaughterhouses within the zones may be licensed early in an outbreak due to their lower disease risk, provided the receiving slaughterhouse is designated and all licence conditions are met. Meat obtained from such pigs can be sold fresh. Vehicles will be required to undergo full cleansing and disinfection before leaving the slaughterhouse. There is no requirement to control meat cutting plants, cold stores, processing plants or other places receiving carcases or meat from animals originating outside the zones but slaughtered within the zones.

Fresh meat and meat products obtained from pigs originating from a protection zone, surveillance zone or restricted zone 3 will be classified as ‘restricted meat’ and subject to strict controls. Following slaughter at a designated slaughterhouse (ideally within the same zone) a special mark (a crossed-through oval health mark) must be applied. The meat cannot be sold fresh and must undergo risk-mitigating treatment as prescribed by the Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) Regulations 2008 (as amended). Prior to treatment it may only be licensed to move to designated cutting plants, cold stores or processing plants. Fresh meat from pigs originating in the protection zone must move in sealed containers. Even after the zones are lifted, meat from pigs slaughtered prior to that point remains restricted and subject to the same handling and treatment requirements.

Where fresh meat and meat products from the restricted zone 3 are intended for the domestic market, government may decide based on a VRA that treatment is not required. Where meat is permitted to move untreated on the domestic market, it cannot be exported.

In all cases fresh meat must be collected, stored and transported separately from products which are not authorised to move.

Control of animal gatherings in zones

No animal gatherings in the protection zone, surveillance zone or restricted zone will be allowed to have pigs present. Gatherings of other species may be allowed subject to appropriate biosecurity and being separated from any pig premises such that there is no risk of disease spread.

If a market, show or other gathering has pigs present at the time a controlled zone is declared, movements on and off that premises will be prohibited. During this time, the gathering is treated like any other premises, and animal gatherings have contingency plans in place to care for animals during this time.

Non-swine animals will be allowed to leave the gathering as soon as is practically possible, subject to appropriate cleansing and disinfection. If the animals return to a farm where pigs are present, a veterinary inspector may decide that the destination premises should be placed under restrictions for a period to ensure disease has not been introduced.

Approximately 48 hours is needed to allow a preliminary assessment of the disease situation. Subject to veterinary risk considerations and licensing by a veterinary inspector, pigs may then be licensed to leave the gathering and move to the farm of origin, farm of a new owner, or to slaughter as requested by the pig keeper or owner. A veterinary inspector may decide that the destination premises should be placed under restrictions for a period to ensure disease has not been introduced.

Stakeholder awareness and communication

During an outbreak, government will make information available to all pig keepers, veterinary practitioners and other stakeholders, particularly those within controlled zones. Communication will evolve as the situation develops and will outline the clinical signs of swine fever, what to do if disease is suspected, the current disease situation, the control measures in place, and relevant legislative and licensing procedures.

Pig keepers are responsible for staying informed and are advised to register for APHA text alerts in advance. They should also know how to check whether their premises fall within a zone and understand the restrictions that apply to them. Owners and occupiers will be informed of the results of any ASF or CSF testing on their pigs and what those results mean, as well as any resulting restrictions or requirements.

All livestock owners, including keepers outside zones, have responsibilities. General and targeted communications will keep them informed of the disease situation, how restrictions may affect their businesses, and the importance of maintaining high levels of biosecurity. Keepers will be reminded to remain vigilant for signs of disease and of the ban on feeding swill or food waste.

Government and industry bodies will support this by raising public awareness of the risks, encouraging vigilance, and providing practical advice on preventing disease introduction and spread.

Although an outbreak of swine fever is unlikely to have a direct impact on the general public, information will be made available to explain the disease, the outbreak and the control measures being taken. The main message will be that swine fever does not have any public health implications. Food and feed safety advice will be provided by the Food Standards Agency or Food Standards Scotland.

Actions at infected premises

When disease is confirmed, a restriction notice will be served on the occupier, setting out what restrictions apply and designating the place where disease has been confirmed as an infected premises.

The restriction notice will make it clear what constitutes the area or boundary of the infected premises and will take account of factors such as highways which may divide the holding. Even if the premises are in the same ownership or part of the same holding, separate restriction notices will be served on each premises.

If disease is confirmed on common land, the common will be treated as an infected premises and the same infected premises restrictions will apply. These restrictions may also apply to bye-lands.

Movement and access controls

Once swine fever is confirmed, pigs, carcases or anything suspected of being contaminated with swine fever must not be moved. A veterinary inspector may license the movement of people, vehicles, equipment or other animals (excluding pigs) on and off the premises after carrying out an inspection, subject to a separate risk assessment. Any personnel or vehicles permitted on the infected premises will be required to observe strict biosecurity protocols. Vehicles must be cleansed and disinfected before entering and leaving the infected premises.

Public rights of way, such as footpaths and bridleways, can present a significant risk of local spread through the general public if close enough to the infected premises. The veterinary inspector will assess the risk and APHA will work with the appropriate local authority as necessary to seek closure of public rights of way on the infected premises. It is anticipated that public rights of way will not need to be closed over a wide area although in some limited circumstances, where the risk of spread of swine fever is high, it may be necessary to seek the closure of footpaths close to an infected premises.

Measures when tick vectors are suspected or confirmed at an African swine fever infected premises

Although available evidence suggests that ticks are not a risk factor for ASFV in the UK, when ASF is confirmed in Great Britain expert advice will be sought to determine the potential involvement of biological vectors (soft ticks) or other mechanical transmission by insects in the epidemiology of the disease. If these are involved, experts will help in determining the appropriate control measures to be taken at infected premises.

If the presence of vectors is suspected or possible on an infected premises, the premises will be inspected. The inspection will target pigs’ living and resting quarters and the surrounding area, to confirm the presence or absence of vectors. Experts will be engaged in the identification and confirmation of competent vectors, as necessary.

If the presence of tick vectors is confirmed:

• the vectors will be collected and examined using appropriate laboratory approaches to confirm whether ASFV is present
• further monitoring and control measures will be implemented on the premises and the surrounding area
• appropriate measures to eliminate vectors and other insects will be implemented at the infected premises in addition to cleansing and disinfection

The control of the tick vector can be very difficult due to its long life cycle, ability to survive long periods without feeding, the possibility of hosts other than pigs and the ability to hide deep within crevices in buildings where it is difficult to target with relevant treatment.

Tracing potentially infected material from an infected premises

Swine fever virus can persist for long periods in pork and other pig products. Therefore, any pigs that left an infected premises in the period between the likely entry of virus and confirmation of disease (whether for slaughter, to another premises for production, to ABP processing, or for germinal product collection) are considered potentially exposed. Germinal products and any animal by-products obtained from such pigs are also considered potentially infected.

All such pigs and pig products are traced promptly. Pig products are withdrawn and disposed of immediately as category 2 animal by-products by means of an official notice served on the person in possession of those products.

If a slaughterhouse has received pigs from an infected premises within the tracing window, APHA will notify the food business operator and the official veterinarians from the Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland. All fresh meat, meat products and ABPs derived from those pigs must be immediately withdrawn and disposed of. Any other pig products that have come into contact with them must also be traced (generally to the first processing plant, or if the meat products are not processed, the packing plant), withdrawn and disposed of. The Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland will issue any destruction notices required.

Where products have already left the establishment, the food business operator will be responsible for notifying recipients so they can either withdraw and dispose of them and notify any onward recipients to dispose of such products. Legislation requires food business operators to retain records for inspection. Meat products including fresh meat and animal by-products will be traced as far as necessary and withdrawn, but not from end consumers. Germinal products obtained within the tracing window must be withdrawn and disposed of immediately.

Compensation is not payable for any products withdrawn and disposed of under these controls.

Culling of pigs

When disease is confirmed on the premises, restrictions already imposed on the premises will remain in force and pigs will be humanely culled without delay, whether or not they currently show clinical signs of disease. Culling is undertaken by qualified personnel contracted by APHA under the supervision of a veterinary inspector. An epidemiological investigation will seek to establish where the disease came from and where it may have spread.

There are several considerations taken into account when culling animals for disease control purposes, including:

• protecting the health and safety of personnel who are involved in the operations on the infected premises
• rapid response – needing to cull animals as soon as possible to reduce the risk of spread of disease
• animal welfare, which is subject to strict legal controls
• minimising the risk of spread of disease to other premises during on-farm culling
• minimising the risk of spread of disease through the wild animal population, such as feral pigs and wild boar

Disposal of carcases

Carcases of animals culled as part of disease control are transported by APHA-contracted operators in leak-proof vehicles under strict biosecurity protocols. Carcases will normally be disposed of or destroyed under the supervision of APHA field vets by commercial incineration, rendering, or at a licensed commercial landfill. Other disposal methods may be used where appropriate, taking into account the risk of disease spread, public health, environmental considerations and land use or planning requirements.

Compensation and valuation

Compensation provisions for animals culled for disease control purposes are set out in the Diseases of Swine Regulations 2014 (as amended). The regulations provide that:

• for pigs determined to be affected with swine fever the compensation will be at half the pig’s value immediately before it became affected as determined by individual valuation
• for unaffected pigs culled in order to control swine fever, the compensation will be the market value of the animal immediately before culling

APHA maintains a list of approved valuers, and only those on that list may value animals culled for swine fever control.

Compensation is also payable on anything seized by APHA and not returned, except where the seizure was due to non-compliance.

Compensation is not available for consequential losses (that is, income that the animal would have generated in the future, for example through producing offspring or finishing pigs to slaughter weight).

Breeds at risk and other specialist pigs

Legislation permits exemptions from culling for certain pigs provided this does not compromise disease control. Such pigs include those kept:

• in zoos or wildlife parks for educational or scientific purposes (referred to as ‘specialist pigs’)
• for the conservation of genetic resources such as native breeds (referred to as ‘breeds at risk’)

For ease of reference these categories will be referred to as ‘breeds at risk’. This applies to pigs at an infected premises or dangerous contact premises where culling would otherwise take place.

The decision to exempt breeds at risk or other specialist pigs from culling is made by the relevant minister, informed by a VRA and expert advice such as from the UK Genetics for Livestock and Equines (UKGLE) Committee. Wider risks and impacts will also be considered, such as the implications for trade, the need for restrictions to remain in place for longer, and potential delays to lifting disease control zones. These decisions will only be taken in exceptional circumstances. To date, no circumstances have been identified that would justify exempting infected pigs from culling.

When a decision is taken to spare animals on a premises, the veterinary inspector will serve a notice outlining the biosecurity measures that the occupier must follow to minimise the risk of disease spread. Any non-compliance with conditions could lead to an immediate withdrawal of the exemption and the culling of pigs.

Isolation facilities must be available on farm, and strict biosecurity must be enforced to prevent disease spread. Spared pigs will be regularly inspected and tested before, during and after the isolation period to confirm disease status.

Preliminary and secondary cleansing and disinfection of the premises will be carried out in accordance with legislation. The supervising veterinary inspector will adapt the process accordingly to ensure the health and welfare of pigs in isolation are not impacted.

Only pigs eligible for special measures on the premises will be considered for this derogation, which for breeds at risk includes registration with the relevant breed society. Other pigs on the same premises would not be exempt from culling.

It is the responsibility of the pig keeper to notify the veterinary inspector if breeds at risk or other specialist animals are present on a suspect or contact premises. Keepers of breeds at risk are strongly advised to produce a contingency plan setting out how spared pigs would be kept isolated and the biosecurity protocols that would be implemented. Keepers in Great Britain can also register that they have ‘at risk’ pig breeds on their premises in advance of a disease outbreak. This registration does not guarantee that the animals registered as breeds at risk on the premises will be spared. It will help give advance information to APHA officials that can be used during an outbreak.

The UKGLE Committee has published the list of approved UK pig breeds at risk and the associated criteria. This is not a closed list and if evidence can be provided to support the criteria the committee will consider further submissions to include additional breeds on the list. Equally, a breed can be removed from the list if they no longer fulfil all criteria.

Cleansing and disinfection

The approach to cleansing and disinfection will always be proportionate to the level of contamination and only carried out on parts of the premises that pigs would have access to on restocking. It must be thorough, carried out safely and present the minimal risk of polluting the environment. Products must be used in line with manufacturers’ instructions or, where not available, under a veterinary inspector’s directions.

There are 2 phases to cleansing and disinfection of an infected premises: preliminary and secondary. In both phases the approaches must include measures to control vermin.

Preliminary cleansing and disinfection

The purpose of preliminary cleansing and disinfection is to ‘damp down’ virus on the premises in order to reduce the risk of local spread. The process is carried out under the direction of APHA and funded by government.

It starts during culling and continues until completion of culling and carcase disposal. The procedure primarily involves the surface application of a Defra-approved disinfectant listed under the ‘General Orders’ category, by spraying areas which pigs had access to, as well as areas used for culling (other than fields or pastures, slurry lagoons, or areas where disinfectant would have no effect).

Immediately following culling:

• carcases are sprayed with an approved disinfectant before removal from the culling site – if disposal is delayed for any reason, carcases will be securely stored and sprayed with disinfectant at least once a day until removed
• tissues and any spilled blood will be removed as part of preliminary cleansing and disinfection and, where possible, disposed of with the carcases – if carcases have already left the infected premises, the material will be double-bagged and disposed of appropriately, for example by incineration or by adding it to ABPs from another infected premises for disposal
• manure, used bedding or litter will be thoroughly soaked with disinfectant
• any equipment, containers, utensils, surfaces or other materials that cannot be effectively cleansed and disinfected will need to be destroyed by the keeper under veterinary inspector supervision
• where preliminary cleansing and disinfection cannot take place immediately, any potentially contaminated items such as pig products, equipment, substances or materials must be isolated and secured until treatment can be carried out

Preliminary cleansing and disinfection are deemed complete 24 hours after the last application of disinfectant, which must remain in contact with surfaces during that period. Once preliminary cleansing and disinfection is complete, APHA will inspect the premises and issue a Certificate of Preliminary Disinfection (EXD25). Any necessary preparatory work on the premises prior to secondary cleansing and disinfection will not begin until preliminary cleansing and disinfection has been completed.

Secondary cleansing and disinfection

Secondary (final) cleansing and disinfection is the responsibility of the occupier of the premises and must be carried out at their expense under APHA supervision. The main purpose of secondary cleansing and disinfection is to eliminate swine fever virus from the premises and prevent recurrence of disease following restocking.

Regardless of whether the occupier intends to restock, APHA may serve a legal notice requiring secondary cleansing and disinfection. If the owner fails to comply, APHA can arrange for this to be completed by others at the expense of the owner.

Parts of the premises that cannot be effectively cleansed and disinfected for justified reasons will remain under restriction for an extended period until a veterinary inspector is satisfied that they no longer pose a risk.

Before secondary cleansing and disinfection can begin, the occupier will be required to prepare the premises so that surfaces can be cleansed and disinfected safely and effectively. This may include general tidying to allow access, and removing manure, litter and slurry from buildings. The extent of cleansing and disinfection required will be detailed in a ‘schedule of work’ form completed by APHA in agreement with the occupier.

The process itself involves a programmed series of steps to ensure virus is eliminated from the premises. After a 7-day rest period, the premises is reviewed and either a second round of cleansing and disinfection or just disinfection is carried out as needed.

Where necessary a veterinary inspector may require portable fittings and equipment to be removed. Vehicles on the premises must also be cleansed and disinfected before they can be licensed to move off the premises.

Manure and bedding must be removed and either destroyed or treated. Options include steaming to at least 70°C, burning, burial at sufficient depth, or stacking to heat along with spraying with disinfectant and leaving for at least 42 days, as well as either covering or re-stacking as needed to ensure even treatment. Slurry must be stored for at least 60 days after the last potentially contaminated material is added unless a veterinary inspector authorises a shorter period.

Secondary cleansing and disinfection must be recorded with the date and time of completion to be checked and signed by a veterinary inspector. APHA will then carry out a final inspection. If the standard is satisfactory, a ‘Certificate of final cleansing and disinfection (EXD26)’ will be issued. Where necessary, the veterinary inspector may require repair works such as sealing cracks or crevices, to further reduce the risk of disease recurrence before cleansing and disinfection can be certified.

Premises or areas that cannot undergo effective cleansing and disinfection

Examples of premises or areas that cannot undergo effective cleansing and disinfection include:

• open-air or outdoor production systems
• premises on natural soil
• indoor or outdoor units where the indoor areas are directly linked to natural soil type outdoors

In such cases the veterinary inspector will issue instructions in line with the general principles of cleansing and disinfection, and where necessary will specify alternative approaches considered to maximise the chances of eliminating swine fever virus from the environment.

Vehicle cleansing and disinfection requirements

In a swine fever outbreak, certain vehicles will be required to undergo cleansing and disinfection in accordance with legislative requirements. This applies to vehicles that are:

• transporting carcases of dead pigs and other ABPs (particularly from an infected premises, contact premises or suspect premises)
• moving pigs or pig products under licence

Vehicles will not be allowed to leave the destination premises or establishment without cleansing and disinfection if they have transported pigs, pig products, other livestock, or material that could be contaminated.

In a protection zone or restricted zone 3 any vehicle that has been used to transport pigs cannot leave the zone after cleansing and disinfection unless it has been inspected and licensed to leave by an inspector.

If a pig is transported from a premises in the protection zone, surveillance zone, restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3, cleansing and disinfection must take place at the destination premises immediately after unloading and before leaving the destination premises.

Any vehicle used for the transport of pigs and pig products will require cleansing and disinfection before loading and immediately after unloading, and the vehicle must dry before the next use. After loading and before leaving the premises of origin the wheels, wheel arches and steps must be cleansed and disinfected, so they are visibly clean. The operator must ensure that there is no visible contamination. All cleansing and disinfection of vehicles will be required to be completed in line with relevant legislation and any additional directions from a veterinary inspector.

Where cleansing and disinfection is required at a premises, the keeper or occupier of the premises will be responsible for providing adequate facilities, equipment and materials at their own expense.

Welfare of pigs

All pig keepers have a duty of care to their animals and should anticipate problems (including those associated with disease control measures) and make appropriate plans to mitigate the effects. This should form a routine part of their business planning processes and may include arrangements for additional housing or feed.

In the normal course of business, a farmer would expect to assume responsibility where it becomes necessary to cull stock for welfare reasons. The introduction of disease control measures does not alter this obligation and normal business planning should cover action necessary to protect the welfare of animals in the event of an emergency.

There will be an initial period during any disease outbreak where the movement of pigs is prohibited. This may give rise to the risk of welfare problems and farmers should have their own contingency plan for mitigating such problems through management or husbandry practices. These might include building or using temporary housing or taking additional feed to the stock.

In the event of an outbreak, government and other organisations will provide general welfare advice and practical support. When the disease risk permits, farmers will be allowed to move pigs to slaughter or possibly to other premises under a licence that requires strict biosecurity.

If all other options are exhausted and welfare problems remain, farmers may need to carry out welfare culling on farm. This must be undertaken by a suitably trained and competent person holding the appropriate certificate of competence, using an approved method and suitable equipment. Guidance will be provided on disposal options and licences issued where required.

Keepers will still need to prepare to deal with fallen stock. Guidance will be issued through the National Fallen Stock Co. The obligation to notify APHA of any dead pigs or pigs showing signs of disease will still apply.

A livestock welfare disposal scheme would only be introduced as a last resort, and only where essential to prevent unacceptable welfare outcomes. If introduced, a disposal scheme would only apply to pigs that cannot be moved under licence for immediate slaughter in a slaughterhouse. Farmers will not be compensated for animals culled under such a scheme.

Licensing

The legal framework underpinning the measures described in annex B in disease control zones allows for the licensing of certain movements or activities in certain circumstances.

Where there is licence provision and, based on expert opinion, it is concluded that allowing a movement or activity would not risk spreading disease, a licence may be issued.

Licences will have conditions which are considered necessary to reduce the risk of possible disease spread. Licences may be in the form of a:

• specific one-off movement licence – applied for through APHA, allowing a one-off movement or activity subject to conditions
• specific multiple movement licence – applied for through APHA, allowing a specific number of movements or activities to take place over a defined period, subject to conditions, without having to apply for separate licences for each movement or activity
• general licence – allowing a movement or activity to take place without applying for a licence, so long as the conditions of the licence can be met

As part of its preparedness for outbreaks, government maintains a library of template licences for ASF and CSF that can be used or modified in an outbreak.

Licensing strategy

In the early stages of an ASF or CSF outbreak there will be considerable uncertainty about the extent of spread of disease and how long it has been present in Great Britain. During this time government will prioritise establishing the disease situation and preventing undetected spread. Strict controls will be imposed, potentially over a wide area and movements or activities will not automatically be licensed even where legislation allows. Decisions will take account of both the local and national epidemiological situation and advice from the National Emergency Epidemiology Group.

The approach to movement licensing will be in phases. Licensing of specific movements or activities will be risk-based, balancing the risk of disease spread against the operational needs of the pig industry. Where movements or activities present no risk of spread (for example movement of a safe commodity), exemptions from restrictions are set out in legislation.

In the initial phase, only essential movements or activities necessary to prevent or alleviate animal welfare issues may be licensed. Low-risk movements, such as direct movements to slaughter will follow before higher-risk movements such as live pig movements between premises.

Government recognises that the structure of pig production in Great Britain may require certain movements within the same supply chain (pig pyramids), where those moves are essential as part of the production cycle to prevent potential animal welfare issues. While this strategy is not intended to directly address the wider impact of controls on the pig industry, legislation makes provision for such movements under licence, subject to VRA may be permitted where they are deemed essential, and risks can be effectively mitigated. 

Government will engage with pig industry stakeholders through GB Pig Core Group to assess the impact of control measures and determine what can reasonably continue during the outbreak. At the same time, government strongly urges the industry to put in place appropriate contingency plans.

Veterinary risk assessment

VRAs underpin key policy and operational decisions during a swine fever outbreak. They provide the evidence base for whether some actions can be undertaken without risking disease spread, such as licensing movements, resizing or lifting zones or taking exceptional decisions such as sparing pigs from culling or applying pre-emptive slaughter. Every derogation from any prohibition in legislation must be supported by a VRA. This ensures disease control measures are proportionate and are based on available scientific evidence.

APHA leads on VRAs. Assessments are done by veterinary epidemiologists or other subject matter experts, drawing on outbreak intelligence, epidemiological data, virological and laboratory evidence, and the results of surveillance. All VRAs consider both the background risk of the outbreak and the additional risk posed by the proposed movement or activity. Other factors considered include virus persistence, likely pathways of spread, and uncertainty in the available evidence. In Scotland, the Centre of Expertise on Animal Disease Outbreaks may undertake VRAs on behalf of Scottish Government. Policy teams and the CVOs are the risk managers. They make the final decision on whether the outcome of a risk assessment is acceptable if recommended mitigations are implemented. Depending on the nature of the risk question, the Animal Disease Policy Group (ADPG) may be involved in deciding if risk is acceptable.

Lifting and resizing disease control zones

Decisions to lift or amend the size of disease control zones must be based on a VRA. For feral pig control zones and ASF restricted zones, legislation requires specific factors to be considered, including:

• the disease profile
• the geographical situation
• ecological and hydrological factors
• meteorological conditions
• the presence and distribution of vectors
• epidemiological enquiries
• laboratory results
• other relevant evidence

In practice the VRA will also take account of:

• how long disease has been present in the country
• when preliminary or secondary cleansing and disinfection was completed at the infected premises
• the outcome of ongoing surveillance in both domestic and feral pigs
• the population size of both feral and kept pigs

Movement licensing

All movements are risk assessed by a veterinary inspector. A full generic VRA is completed to inform the licence and its conditions. For lower-risk moves, a rapid risk assessment is undertaken, while higher-risk moves require a local VRA which is reviewed by the licensing veterinary inspector or the Veterinary Technical Operations Team. This includes live pigs, pig products and activities otherwise prohibited in the zone. The VRA will consider the health status of the premises of origin, type and destination of the movement, inspection and testing results where required, and whether cleansing, disinfection, biosecurity and transport conditions will be met. For live pigs in particular, movements that increase the susceptible population in a zone or movement from a disease control zone to a premises outside a zone are not preferred and will only be licensed if necessary for animal welfare or business continuity and if the risk can be effectively mitigated. The balance between disease risk and need is determined by risk managers on a case-by-case basis. Where the risk of disease spread is too high the licence will not be granted.

Vaccination

Currently there is no safe and effective vaccine against ASF licensed for use in Great Britain. Therefore, this section sets out the vaccination policy for CSF only.

The use of vaccination against CSF is ordinarily prohibited and only possible as an emergency control option where evidence suggests CSF is likely to spread. In such cases, the government must first declare an emergency vaccination zone and publish an emergency vaccination plan. Thus, within Great Britain, no one is allowed to vaccinate pigs against CSF unless officially authorised to do so. This prohibition simplifies the detection and control of disease.

Classical swine fever vaccine

One type of CSF vaccine currently considered viable for use in Great Britain is a live attenuated vaccine, such as the C strain vaccine. The C strain is highly effective in domestic pigs, providing rapid immunity from a single vaccine dose. It has also been used effectively in mainland Europe through baits, to control CSF in feral pigs. Laboratory testing of pigs cannot differentiate between pigs vaccinated with this vaccine and pigs infected with a field strain of the virus, so the strict controls outlined in this section apply to minimise the risk of disease spread.

Other types of CSF vaccines, including Differentiation of Infected from Vaccinated Animals (DIVA) vaccines authorised for use in the EU, are also available. A key factor in deciding whether any vaccine is suitable for use in Great Britain will be how quickly it provides effective and reliable immunity against CSF and whether its use supports the necessary surveillance and trade requirements.

One such DIVA vaccine is Suvaxyn CSF Marker. This is a live recombinant vaccine that is a chimera between a bovine viral diarrhoea virus (BVDV) and CSFV. It allows animals infected with field virus in vaccinated pig populations to be identified using a specific test. The vaccine is safe and provides rapid and effective immunity. However, there are limitations to its marker system as infection of pigs with ruminant pestiviruses related to CSF can lead to false-positive results. While a viable option for emergency use in Great Britain, such a decision will still require careful consideration given the potential to complicate surveillance as well as the uncertainty around how trading partners will react.

Use of vaccination to control swine fevers

Vaccination of pigs against CSF provides an additional method of controlling the spread of CSFV. However, decisions to vaccinate are complex. Vaccination is not a cure for CSF but can prevent pigs from becoming infected. It could therefore be a useful tool in stopping CSFV spread to currently unaffected regions: vaccinating groups of pig farms in or surrounding an affected area could reduce the risk of disease leaving that area. It can also be used within an individually infected or suspect farm to reduce the build-up of virus while culling takes place. These measures can therefore reduce the number of premises that eventually become infected with CSFV and need to have animals culled.

In many circumstances vaccination will not be an effective control method, as:

• vaccination is expensive – both to purchase and deploy, requiring the use of qualified people (normally veterinarians) to vaccinate pigs
• a vaccination campaign distracts vets from the primary task of identifying and controlling swine fever
• vaccines take time to provide immunity, and can supress signs of infection, leading to apparently healthy pigs shedding virus
• vaccinating pigs may trigger international trade restrictions that are slower to lift than those for non-vaccinated disease control, and the presence of vaccinated pigs may hinder trade resumption – though it is anticipated that DIVA vaccines would ease this concern among trading partners

Vaccination is unlikely to be considered an appropriate control measure in the initial stages, or during a controlled CSF outbreak. The use of vaccination may be considered during a prolonged epidemic, where there is a dramatic increase in the number of premises where disease is being confirmed each day, or in areas of very high pig density. Its most likely application is to reduce the risk of infection and spread prior to culling.

Government would consider whether there is a case for vaccinating breeds at risk on a case-by-case basis but only as part of an emergency CSF vaccination plan.

Controls if vaccine is used

An emergency vaccination zone will be declared primarily to delimit the area for vaccination and to restrict the movement of pigs and pig products out of that area. Fresh meat obtained from non-DIVA vaccinated pigs will be considered ‘restricted meat’ and must be marked and moved for risk-mitigating treatment in line with the Products of Animal Origin Regulations. Export restrictions may also apply to vaccinated pigs and to untreated meat and meat products, whether or not a DIVA vaccine has been used.

Restrictions will remain in force for at least 6 months after the last pig in the vaccination zone is vaccinated. The zone may be lifted earlier if a DIVA vaccine is used, or if all vaccinated pigs have been slaughtered and preliminary cleansing and disinfection has been completed on all infected premises.

The full measures will be set out in the declaration informed by the specific circumstances of the outbreak. These are expected to include:

• a ban on all pigs leaving the vaccination zone except where licensed by a veterinary inspector
• a ban on seropositive pigs leaving their holding unless to slaughter in a designated slaughterhouse under licence
• a ban on collecting semen, ova and embryos from seropositive pigs
• restrictions on the movement of piglets from seropositive sows
• restrictions on restocking premises with pigs

A seropositive pig is one that gives a positive result on serological testing, showing it has been exposed to swine fever virus. In a vaccination zone this will usually be due to vaccination, but it is also possible the pig was infected with a field strain before full immunity developed.

Where a DIVA vaccine has been used, laboratory testing can differentiate between seropositive pigs that have been vaccinated and those exposed to field strain. In these circumstances restrictions on seropositive pigs may be subject to licence following DIVA testing.

Recovery

Despite the mitigation and control measures implemented during an outbreak of swine fever, there can be considerable further work required. This includes re-establishing third-country markets, publishing an epidemiology report, identifying lessons learnt, responding to European Commission missions (official audits and inspections to verify compliance with EU animal health requirements) and related enquires, and supporting operational partners and industry to return to their pre-outbreak position.

Duration of zones

Restrictions within the declared disease control zones will remain in force until an epidemiological survey has been completed and all pig holdings within those zones have been confirmed free from disease. Surveillance activities will begin as soon as practicable following the satisfactory completion of preliminary cleansing and disinfection at all infected premises in the zone.

Protection zone

A protection zone will remain in force until all the following criteria are met:

• all pigs at the infected premises have been culled and disposed of
• at least 15 days have passed since completion of preliminary cleansing and disinfection
• where required, vector control measures have been completed
• APHA has completed surveillance visits to all pig holdings in the protection zone and there is no suspicion or confirmation of disease

Once lifted, measures in the surrounding surveillance zone will continue to apply to all holdings in the former protection zone for at least another 15 days unless the surveillance zone is revoked or replaced by another declaration.

Surveillance zone

A surveillance zone must remain in force until all the following criteria are met:

• all pigs at the infected premises have been culled and disposed of
• at least 30 days have passed since completion of preliminary cleansing and disinfection at the infected premises
• all pig premises within the surveillance zone have received a surveillance visit

Where a restricted zone 3 is declared for ASF and it incorporates a protection zone and its surrounding surveillance zone, both zones may be replaced by the restricted zone 3 with a surrounding restricted zone 1.

Restricted zones 1 and 3

For ASF only, a restricted zone 3 will remain in force until all the following criteria are met:

• culling, disposal of carcases and preliminary cleansing and disinfection are finished at all infected premises.
• APHA has carried out surveillance visits to all pig holdings in the restricted zone 3 and the surrounding restricted zone 1 with no suspicion or confirmation of disease
• a risk assessment has confirmed that lifting the zone will not risk further spread of disease

The surrounding restricted zone 1 will remain in place until the restricted zone 3 it surrounds is removed.

Repopulation of infected premises

For swine fevers not linked to biological vectors:

Restrictions on infected premises remain in place until either:

• at least 6 months have passed since the satisfactory completion of secondary cleansing and disinfection, and a veterinary inspector confirms there is no continuing risk of disease spread
• sentinel pigs have been introduced onto the premises following satisfactory completion of secondary cleansing and disinfection, and no evidence of disease is detected through clinical examination or laboratory testing of samples from those pigs

APHA will license the introduction of sentinel pigs onto premises only after a specified period has passed since secondary cleansing and disinfection was satisfactorily completed. The pigs must come from premises free of swine fever restrictions and be pre-movement tested at the owner’s expense to confirm they are free from disease. A veterinary inspector will specify the minimum number of sentinel pigs necessary to detect disease on premises if present, and these must be introduced into all parts of the premises potentially exposed to disease.

APHA may license sentinel pigs to be introduced either:

• at least 15 days after satisfactory completion of secondary cleansing and disinfection, or
• following a risk assessment where secondary cleansing and disinfection cannot be completed, at least 3 months after completion of preliminary cleansing and disinfection

Where pigs have outdoor access, a veterinary inspector will determine when restocking can take place. Significant time will need to elapse to allow for natural virus decay, particularly when culling took place on natural soil type areas of the premises.

All pigs must be introduced at the same time or within 15 days of the first pigs arriving on the premises unless otherwise specified by a veterinary inspector on the licence. Following introduction onto the premises, a veterinary inspector must visit the premises 15 to 30 days after the final sentinel pig arrived to inspect the herd, and conduct the required clinical and laboratory examinations on a representative number of pigs in accordance with the diagnostic manual.

APHA will only lift restrictions on the premises if all clinical inspections, examinations and laboratory testing prove negative for swine fever. The occupier may then fully restock. These same controls apply to dangerous contact premises where pigs have been pre-emptively culled.

For African swine fever – infected premises linked to vectors

Where ASF has been linked to soft tick vectors, APHA will not permit sentinel pig restocking until 6 years have passed, unless either:

• specific vector eradication measures have been carried out on the premises under APHA’s supervision
• it can be demonstrated that persistence of vectors on the premises does not pose any significant risk of ASF transmission

APHA will then license sentinel pigs to be introduced to monitor for disease on the premises as described under ‘For swine fevers not linked to biological vectors’.

Once 60 days have elapsed since their introduction, a veterinary inspector will:

• inspect all pigs on the premises
• clinically examine and sample a representative number of pigs within each epidemiological group for laboratory testing

This is in line with epidemiological advice to give a high degree of confidence in detecting disease if present.

If a premises is confirmed to be free from disease, APHA will lift all restrictions and permit full restocking.

Feral pigs

The feral pig situation in Great Britain differs significantly from the rest of Europe, where wild boar populations are larger, denser and more widely distributed, with free movement across borders through extensive forest corridors. In Great Britain feral pig populations are limited to a small number of geographically distinct areas. In England they occur in Kent and East Sussex, West Dorset, the Forest of Dean (Gloucestershire) and Devon and Somerset. In Scotland, populations exist in Dumfries and Galloway, and in parts of the Highland region. In Wales there are feral pigs in the Forest of Dean extending into parts of the country. These populations are either temporary or self-sustaining, mainly consisting of escaped or released domestic pigs, wild boar, or hybrids of these.

Wild boar may only be kept under licence in accordance with the Dangerous Wild Animals Act 1976, or under the Zoo Licensing Act 1981 when exhibited in wildlife or farm parks. Both licences are issued and enforced by local authorities who determine the requirements to ensure secure keeping. Under the Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981 it is an offence to release wild boar or allow their escape into the wild, unless licensed by Natural England (NE), Natural Resources Wales (NRW), or NatureScot.

In the absence of a confirmed outbreak of swine fever, government policy on feral pigs is to monitor and manage populations to sustainable numbers rather than eradicate them. Forestry England actively manages the Forest of Dean population through culling, while on private or other public lands management is the responsibility of landowners. Government supports this where practical by providing information and guidance.

Swine fever could be introduced into feral pigs through several pathways, including fomites (such as vehicles, people, clothing or equipment), feeding or scavenging of contaminated pork products, or contact with infected kept pigs. The risk is reduced through awareness and enforcement of rules regarding feeding food scraps, secure disposal of waste food, and adherence to good biosecurity and husbandry practices on pig holdings.

A qualitative VRA on transmission between feral and kept pigs concluded that while these potential routes remain viable, existing disease control measures, along with strict biosecurity on pig holdings, will be sufficient to mitigate any spillover risks from feral pigs. The limited distribution and size of feral pig populations in Great Britain means any disease occurrence is likely to remain localised, reducing the scope for widespread dispersal. However, spread over wider areas is still possible once disease establishes in a feral pig population. This will make demonstrating disease freedom much more complex than in closed domestic pig premises and has direct implications for both control and trade.

Surveillance for swine fevers in feral pigs

Passive surveillance is the most effective approach for the early detection of swine fevers in feral pig populations, particularly for ASF. In Great Britain swine fever surveillance in feral pigs is a joint effort between Forestry England, APHA and local authorities, with support from NRW, NatureScot and other relevant bodies.

In England, current surveillance efforts are concentrated in the Forest of Dean and the Kent and Sussex border as these are the only areas known to have self-sustaining feral pig populations. Forestry England rangers retrieve carcases of dead feral pigs and submit samples for laboratory testing at the ASF National Reference Laboratory. Forestry England retains the sampled carcases until negative test results are confirmed, after which they are disposed of appropriately. In Wales, Forestry England and NRW work together to ensure that carcases retrieved from the extension of the Forest of Dean into Wales are also sampled and tested.

Local authorities support surveillance by reporting carcases of feral pigs found on public land under their management or on private land. Reports are made through Defra helplines for triage by an APHA duty vet. Once sampled, carcases are also retained until laboratory test results are confirmed, after which they are incinerated.

A similar approach operates in Scotland, where feral pigs killed in road traffic collisions or found dead are tested through a scheme involving Transport Scotland, NatureScot, Forestry and Land Scotland (FLS) and APHA.

The Food Standards Agency and Food Standards Scotland also contribute to surveillance by inspecting carcases of shot feral pigs presented at game handling establishments. Any suspect cases are followed up through the normal ‘report cases’ system.

No additional surveillance of feral pig populations is carried out when swine fever is absent from the UK.

Presence of feral pigs in kept pig zones

Regardless of whether swine fever is suspected in feral pigs, whenever there is an incursion of swine fever into kept pigs, epidemiologists will quickly require information on the presence or otherwise of feral pigs in and around controlled zones to assess their potential involvement in the incursion and to model possible spread.

The veterinary inspector’s inspection of the infected premises will include an assessment of whether there is any indication that feral pigs may have been involved in the disease incursion. Relevant bodies (for example NE, NRW, NatureScot, Science and Advice for Scottish Agriculture (SASA)) will be consulted immediately to advise if population data indicates feral pigs are present within the disease control zones. Field inspections may also be undertaken to provide additional evidence on the presence or absence of feral pigs in areas within disease control zones declared in response to ASF in kept pigs.

If feral pigs are confirmed to be present within a controlled zone a NEG meeting will be convened immediately to:

• agree necessary actions to improve information on feral pig numbers, density and distribution
• determine the size of the feral pig control zone or restricted zone 2, should swine fever be suspected in feral pigs

Passive surveillance of feral pigs in the area will be undertaken which will include laboratory testing of feral pig carcases found dead or shot. Keeper obligations to monitor and report any indications of swine fever presence in their pigs will still apply.

The size and extent of disease control zones for kept pigs is not determined by the presence of feral pig populations. However, if further infected premises are identified with no clear epidemiological links and feral pig involvement cannot be ruled out, expert advice will be sought on whether the size or boundaries of the disease control zones should be adjusted to take account of feral pig populations.

Hunting of feral pigs, and movement of carcases or products obtained from feral pigs, is prohibited in disease control zones unless licensed.

Suspicion of swine fever in feral pigs

There are 2 scenarios:

Scenario 1: swine fever is not known to be present in domestic pigs in the area, but unusual mortality or signs of disease are observed in feral pigs

These signs will be investigated in consultation with the relevant administration within Great Britain. If carcases are available these will be examined and where necessary, samples taken. Vigilance for signs of swine fever in domestic pig populations is considered the most appropriate route to identify the first case of swine fever in Great Britain. If swine fever were absent from Great Britain, it is unlikely that it would be suspected in feral pigs without very strong evidence.

Scenario 2: swine fever is present in domestic pigs in Great Britain

Swine fever would be suspected in feral pigs in or around a controlled zone if:

• unusual mortality or signs of disease are observed in feral pigs
• there is evidence of feral pigs entering an infected premises during the period a veterinary inspector suspects disease
• there is other strong epidemiological evidence

Zones on suspicion of disease in feral pigs

Following initial investigations, government may conclude that it officially suspects swine fever may be present in feral pigs and further action is needed to confirm or negate this suspicion. The appropriate minister may then declare a feral pig investigation zone.

Government will consider the size and shape of a feral pig investigation zone on a case-by-case basis, taking account of expert advice. Key factors in determining the size and boundaries of a feral pig investigation zone will be the feral pig population size, its distribution, and the surrounding habitat and geographical barriers.

All feral pigs shot or found dead within the feral pig investigation zone must be presented for sampling and testing to confirm whether disease is present. If sufficient carcases are not found naturally, feral pigs will be tracked and killed by experts employed by government delivery agents, and carcases tested for swine fever in order to determine whether disease is present.

Outside of this surveillance activity, capturing or killing feral pigs is prohibited, as doing so risks spreading disease. An exception may be made through a licence, if a pig farm premises needs to capture or kill feral pigs to prevent them infecting kept pigs.

Where the epidemiological situation warrants it, some of the more stringent controls that apply in feral pig control zones may also be applied to pig premises within feral pig investigation zones, to reduce the risk of disease spreading to kept pigs or to other areas. Such a decision will depend on the epidemiological situation and will be based on expert advice. Government will work closely with industry to introduce appropriate controls on a voluntary basis in a feral pig investigation zone.

The feral pig investigation zone will not be lifted until swine fever has either been confirmed or negated in feral pigs. Disease will be negated based on epidemiological and expert advice, taking into account the size and structure of the feral pig population as well as the number of feral pigs sampled for laboratory testing and the outcome of such testing.

Confirmation of swine fever in feral pigs in Great Britain

The relevant CVO will confirm disease in feral pigs once laboratory testing confirms swine fever virus and following a teleconference between the Great Britain CVOs. On confirmation, a feral pig investigation zone will be declared. The size of the zone will be determined based on expert advice taking account of geography and the distribution of feral pigs in the area.

Given the limited feral pig population in Great Britain, a single feral pig control zone is expected to be sufficient to contain and eradicate swine fever. For ASF in feral pigs, multiple feral pig control zones in distinct areas or a single restriction zone 2 may be required if multiple cases are detected. This decision will be informed mainly by the epidemiological links between cases and the proximity between affected areas.

Restricted zones for African swine fever

A restricted zone 2 may be declared where ASF is confirmed in 2 or more feral pigs within an area and there is evidence they are epidemiologically linked or geographically close. The restricted zone 2 must at least cover the feral pig control zones and will normally replace it. Once a restricted zone 2 is declared, a restricted zone 1 will automatically be declared to form a buffer zone between affected and disease-free areas.

Measures and surveillance in feral pig zones

Government will work with its delivery agents to prepare a feral pig swine fever eradication plan. The government’s approach is to immediately eradicate disease in the feral pig population without spreading virus beyond the affected areas. The NEG along with feral pig experts will advise on the most appropriate eradication methods for the location and feral pig population.

These measures may include but are not limited to:

• fencing areas to limit the movement of feral pigs
• restricting public access to infected areas
• suspending hunting and cull activities during the initial stages of infection
• searching for and collecting of carcases to remove infectious or potentially infectious material from the environment
• hunting and trapping feral pigs by government delivery agents
• culling the affected feral pig population to eliminate disease
• culling surrounding feral pig populations to reduce density and avoid further spread

Surveillance in feral pig zones will mostly be carried out through carcase searches for sampling and laboratory testing.

The purpose of controls in a feral pig control zone, restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 1 is to eradicate disease in feral pigs and prevent spillover into domestic pigs. The declaration will make clear which measures apply. In practice, the general prohibitions and exemptions set out for kept pig zones will also apply in the restricted zone 2, with licensing and transport requirements enforced in the same way.

Disease control measures that could be introduced in a feral pig zone include:

• the movement of live feral pigs is prohibited unless licensed by the relevant authority, regardless of the disease situation in Great Britain
• hunting or killing of feral pigs is only permitted under licence
• any feral pig carcase found must be reported immediately and cannot be moved except under licence
• fresh meat from feral pigs hunted in a controlled zone cannot enter the market unless it has tested negative in accordance with the Diagnostic Manual
• carcases, fresh meat and other products from feral pigs cannot move within or out of a zone unless licensed, and all such movements are subject to transport and vehicle requirements
• feral pig meat from a feral pig control zone or restricted zone 2 that tests negative must be specially marked and heat-treated before entering the food chain

The following measures apply to premises in a feral pig control zone with pigs to prevent disease entering or spreading among kept pigs:

• kept pigs must be restricted to housing or secure areas where they cannot come into contact with feral pigs
• feral pigs must be prevented from accessing any material that could come into contact with kept pigs
• pigs, germinal products and ABP movements onto or off premises are only permitted under a licence issued by a veterinary inspector
• disinfection facilities must be provided and used at entrances and exits to pig housing and to the premises itself
• carcases or parts of feral pigs must not be brought onto premises
• feral pigs shot by occupiers to protect stock must be isolated from kept pigs and made available for examination, sampling and testing
• if a feral pig is shot by occupiers, the location of the shooting should be cleansed and disinfected where appropriate
• material or equipment that may have been in contact with a feral pig in the infected area must not be brought onto premises
• occupiers must keep an up-to-date record of pigs on the premises and provide this to a veterinary inspector when requested (the first census for outdoor pigs may be based on an estimate)
• pigs, semen, ova and embryos must not be moved out of the feral pig control zone without a licence, and must not be exported
• anyone who has contact with a feral pig in the infected area must take steps to avoid spreading infectious or potentially infectious material
• anyone who finds the carcase of a feral pig must immediately notify officials so it can be sampled and tested for swine fever

Vaccination of feral pigs

It is unlikely that vaccination would be an appropriate control method to control swine fevers in the small feral pig populations present in Great Britain. However, in the exceptional circumstances that the eradication policy is unsuccessful in controlling disease in feral pigs, vaccination for CSF may be considered. It is likely in such circumstances that vaccine would be applied through baiting, which has been used effectively for CSF control in mainland Europe. Experience on the continent suggests that several periods of baiting are needed to provide immunity in the feral pig population.

It is thought that vaccinating feral pigs will not lead to rapid eradication, and given its long-term trade impacts, it is not a control method of choice.

Recovering international disease freedom

Lifting EU safeguard measures

EU safeguard measures apply only to pigs and pig products from areas under restriction. They lapse when the relevant disease control zone is lifted. Where the Commission has imposed a safeguard measure, Great Britain will submit evidence of freedom from disease to support removal as soon as zone restrictions end.

Restoring trade with the rest of the world

For ASF there is no formal procedure for official recognition. The UK may declare itself free from ASF when it meets the requirements outlined in Chapter 15.1 of the Terrestrial Code. As part of this, Great Britain will compile and present surveillance and epidemiological evidence of freedom from disease to WOAH and where necessary, to trading partners and the EU, to support the lifting of safeguards and resumption of trade.

For CSF, WOAH official recognition is required. Great Britain must submit evidence that meets the surveillance requirements in Chapter 15.2 of the Terrestrial Code. WOAH must accept this evidence before official CSF-free status is regained. The same evidence base will be used with the EU to support the removal of safeguard measures.

Some trading partners may accept regionalisation or limited trade before official freedom is regained. Others may require additional assurances. Government and industry will pursue bilateral arrangements, using timely surveillance outputs and epidemiological data to demonstrate freedom from disease.

If swine fever is confirmed in feral pigs, special measures and monitoring must continue for at least 24 months after the last case in feral pigs to substantiate freedom and support the lifting of remaining trade restrictions.

Annex A: legislation

UK primary legislation

The Animal Health Act 1981 (as amended) and the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (as amended) provide the enabling powers for the legislation that governs the prevention and control of ASF and CSF in Great Britain.

The Animal Health Act 2002 (as amended) amended the 1981 Act and supplemented its existing powers by allowing animals to be slaughtered wherever necessary to prevent the spread of disease. Scotland made similar provision in the Animal Health and Welfare (Scotland) Act 2006 (as amended).

Secondary legislation

The domestic legislation underpinning the control of ASF and CSF in Great Britain is the Diseases of Swine Regulations 2014 (as amended). Additional supporting domestic legislation (all as amended) include:

England

• The Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) (England) Regulations 2008
• The Movement of Animals (Restrictions) (England) Order 2002
• The Pigs (Records, Identification and Movement) Order 2011
• Animal By-Products (Enforcement) (England) Regulations 2013
• Transport of Animals (Cleansing and Disinfection) (England) (No.3) Order 2003
• The Animal Gatherings (England) Order 2010
• The Disease Control (England) Order 2003
• The Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectants) (England) Order 2007

Wales

• The Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) (Wales) Regulations 2008
• The Movement of Animals (Restrictions) (Wales) Order 2003
• The Pigs (Records, Identification and Movement) (Wales) Order 2011
• The Animal By-Products (Enforcement) (Wales) Regulations 2014
• Transport of Animals (Cleansing and Disinfection) (Wales) (No.3) Order 2003
• The Animal Gatherings (Wales) Order 2010
• The Disease Control (Wales) Order 2003
• The Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectants) (Wales) Order 2007

Scotland

• The Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) (Scotland) Order 2008
• The Movement of Animals (Restrictions) (Scotland) Order 2003
• Pigs (Records, Identification and Movement) (Scotland) Order 2011
• Animal By-Products (Enforcement) (Scotland) Regulations 2013
• Transport of Animals (Cleansing and Disinfection) (Scotland) Regulations 2005
• The Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectants) (Scotland) Order 2008
• The Disease Control (Interim Measures) (Scotland) Order 2002

Relevant assimilated EU law (applicable across Great Britain)

• Commission Decision 2003/422/EC – ASF Diagnostic Manual
• Commission Decision 2002/106/EC – CSF Diagnostic Manual
• Regulation (EC) No 1069/2009 – Animal by-products (ABP) framework
• Regulation (EU) No 142/2011 – ABP implementing measures

Annex B: African swine fever and classical swine fever main movement controls

This list is not a definitive summary of the requirements of the Diseases of Swine Regulations (as amended). It is only intended as a guide to the main movement controls and associated measures that may apply in temporary control zones and controlled zones (‘controlled zones’ may include protection zone, surveillance zone and restricted zones ). Controls in feral pig investigation zones, feral pig control zones and emergency vaccination zones are discussed in the relevant sections.

While legislation sets out the minimum requirements that must be met before any move can even be considered, it is VRAs that determine whether a licence is issued and what specific conditions apply. This ensures all movements are risk-based and allowed only if risk can be mitigated.

Temporary control zone

General restrictions

Pigs, pig products (POAO, ABPs, germinal products), personnel, vehicles, equipment and other things that could spread swine fever, including non-porcine livestock, cannot move on or off a premises within the TCZ unless licensed.

Movement licensing

Although legislation allows derogations (partial exemptions) from restrictions in a TCZ, in practice the zone will usually be lifted or replaced once laboratory results are available. Because of the short period a TCZ remains in place, and taking into consideration the risks of moving pigs before disease is confirmed or negated, live pigs may not be licensed to move off premises (including to slaughter) unless it is essential to prevent or resolve a serious welfare issue.

The conditions for any licensed movement will be detailed on the licence following a VRA.

Biosecurity measures in the temporary control zone

All premises within a TCZ must follow strict biosecurity measures, including:

• keeping up-to-date records of pig numbers and categories, deadstock and animals showing signs of illness
• confining or isolating pigs as directed by a veterinary inspector
• not spreading pig manure or slurry unless licensed
• providing and maintaining cleansing and disinfection facilities at all entrances and exits, including to pig units
• following any veterinary inspector instructions to control vermin
• ensuring people and vehicles entering or leaving premises observe all premises biosecurity measures including cleansing and disinfection requirements

Controlled zones (protection zone, surveillance zone and restricted zone)

Movement of live pigs

General restrictions

Pigs cannot move within, into or out of a controlled zone unless licensed.

Movement to designated slaughterhouses

Pigs may be licensed to move from a premises within a controlled zone to a designated slaughterhouses for immediate slaughter, but only if the minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted have been met or are guaranteed to be satisfied.

These are:

• the premises of origin must have been visited by a veterinary inspector as part of surveillance visits, with no disease detected
• no disease must be detected following clinical inspection of all pigs on the premises
• each pig being moved must receive a clinical examination, and where this is not sufficient to rule out disease, sufficient samples must be taken from pigs in the consignment for laboratory testing
• all inspections, examinations and necessary sampling must be completed within 48 hours of the movement
• where testing is required, negative laboratory results must be obtained before movement

The minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted differ depending on the zone of origin.

Protection zone – If the pigs originate from a premises in the protection zone, the food business operator is required to notify the Food Standards Agency or Food Standards Scotland in advance of their intention to receive pigs from the protection zone. The Food Standards Agency or Food Standards Scotland must then supervise the whole process from slaughter to obtaining meat from the pigs. Specifically, the Food Standards Agency or Food Standards Scotland must check pigs for signs of disease at ante-mortem and post-mortem, ensure pigs are kept and slaughtered separately from all other pigs (if practical as the last batch of slaughter for the day), and supervise cleansing and disinfection of all areas used.

Surveillance zone – If the pigs originate from a premises in the surveillance zone, movements to a designated slaughterhouse must comply with the minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted that are applicable for all controlled zones.

Restricted zones 2 and 3 – For pigs originating from a premises in the restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3, government may allow derogation from the pre-movement clinical examination and testing requirement. This will largely depend on the disease situation and the findings from previous veterinary inspector surveillance visits. This derogation is not available to premises in the protection zone or surveillance zone.

Restricted zone 1 – Pigs from the restricted zone 1 may be licensed to move for immediate slaughter in any slaughterhouse whether designated or not, regardless of its location inside or outside the zone. To rule out disease, a veterinary inspector must visit the premises and inspect all pigs and complete any required pre-movement testing of pigs being moved to rule out disease. Government may allow a derogation from this requirement depending on disease situation.

Free area – Pigs may move to a designated slaughterhouse in a protection zone, surveillance zone, restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3 or to any slaughterhouse in a restricted zone 1, provided the licensing requirements are met.

Movement to approved animal by-product plants

Pigs may be licensed to move from a premises in a controlled zone to an approved ABP plant either within or outside the zone for slaughter and processing, provided the minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted are met or can be guaranteed to be satisfied. These requirements are:

• pigs are slaughtered by the end of the working day on which they arrive at the plant
• the premises of origin have been visited by a veterinary inspector as part of surveillance visits, with no disease detected
• no disease is detected following clinical inspection of all pigs on the premises
• each pig being moved receives a clinical examination, and where this is not sufficient to rule out disease, sufficient samples are taken from pigs in the consignment for laboratory testing
• all inspections, examinations and necessary sampling are completed within 48 hours of the movement
• where testing is required, movement only proceeds once negative laboratory results have been obtained

For pigs originating from any restricted zone, government may allow derogation from the required pre-movement clinical examination and laboratory testing.

Movement to another pig premises (movement to live)

Pigs may be licensed to move off a premises in a zone to another premises to prevent welfare issues, provided the minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted can be met or guaranteed. For premises in the protection zone this derogation is not available other than in exceptional circumstances.

The minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted are:

• the purpose of the movement must be to ensure the health or welfare of the pigs
• for pigs moving from a premises in the surveillance zone at least 15 days must have passed since preliminary cleansing and disinfection of the infected premises became effective
• the premises of origin must have been visited by a veterinary inspector as part of surveillance visits, with no disease detected
• no disease must be detected following clinical inspection of all pigs on the premises
• each pig being moved must receive a clinical examination, and where this is not sufficient to rule out disease, sufficient samples must be taken from pigs in the consignment for laboratory testing
• all inspections, examinations and necessary sampling must be completed within 48 hours of the movement
• where testing is required, movement must only proceed once negative laboratory results have been obtained
• pigs being moved off a premises within the surveillance zone, restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3 must have been resident on the premises of origin for at least 20 days with no pigs having been introduced in that period unless they were kept epidemiologically separate with no form of direct or indirect contact
• pigs originating from a premises in a surveillance zone or restricted zone 3 can only move to a premises that is confirmed to be part of the premises of origin’s production chain or under the same ownership as the premises of origin and the move is determined to be necessary to complete the production before slaughter

For pigs originating from any restricted zone government may allow derogation from required pre-movement clinical inspection, examination and laboratory testing.

Under exceptional circumstances where serious welfare situations may arise, government may permit pigs to move from a premises in any zone to a premises within or outside a zone under strict monitoring conditions. Pigs in the protection zone moving under such circumstances can only move to a premises either within the protection zone or surveillance zone to mitigate risk of further spread. APHA will only issue a licence for this purpose if it can be guaranteed that pigs will either be kept in an empty unit or epidemiologically separate from pigs already present at the destination premises.

Other live pig movements

Derogation is available for other live pig movements in specific situations, including:

• to move pigs to and from a veterinary surgery for treatment where a veterinary surgeon cannot attend the premises
• to allow pigs to transit through a protection zone, surveillance zone or both without stopping or unloading if the premises of origin and destination are both outside the zones and the most direct route requires going through the zone
• to return a stray pig to its owner

Movement of germinal products (semen, ova and embryos)

General restrictions on germinal product movement

Germinal products obtained from pigs kept in a protection zone or surveillance zone cannot move within, into or out of those zones unless licensed.

Germinal products cannot be moved outside of a restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3.

There is no restriction on germinal products obtained from pigs kept in a premises in a restricted zone 1. 

Moving germinal products within or out of protection and surveillance zones, and out of restricted zones 2 and 3

Germinal products from pigs kept within a protection zone, surveillance zone, restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3 may be licensed to move:

• within the same protection zone or surveillance zone
• outside all protection zones, surveillance zones, restricted zones 2 and restricted zones 3

The movement must satisfy the legal criteria for a licence to be granted, which are:

• the premises of origin must have been visited by a veterinary inspector as part of surveillance visits, with no disease detected
• no disease must be detected following clinical inspection of all pigs on the premises
• each donor pig must receive a clinical examination, and where this is not sufficient to rule out disease, the donor pig must be sampled for laboratory testing
• all inspections, examinations and necessary sampling must be completed within 48 hours of the collection
• where testing is required, movement of the germinal products may only proceed once negative laboratory results have been obtained
• the germinal products must be collected, stored and transported separately from any pig products that have not been licensed to move

For germinal products originating from restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3, government may allow derogation from the requirement for pre-collection clinical examination of donor pigs.

Movement into controlled zones

Germinal products obtained from pigs kept in the free area or surveillance zone may be licensed to move into the protection zone. Only germinal products obtained from pigs kept in the free area may be licensed to move into the surveillance zone. Movement from the protection zone will not be permitted.

Movement of germinal products for disposal

Germinal products may move to an approved ABP plant for disposal or processing provided both of the following are true:

• the licence conditions are met
• disposal or processing will be done in accordance with the ABP regulations

Germinal products from controlled zones must be kept separate during collection, transport and storage from any other pig product not licensed to move.

Movement of fresh meat and meat products

General restrictions

Fresh meat or meat products obtained from pigs that originated from the protection zone, surveillance zone, restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3 cannot move unless licensed.

Movements that can be licensed

Such fresh meat or meat products may be licensed to move, provided the minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted are met. These include:

• the fresh meat or meat product must be from pigs moved and slaughtered under the relevant conditions for their zone of origin
• fresh meat and meat products from pigs that originated from the protection zone, surveillance zone or restricted zone 3 can only move to a cutting plant, cold store or other processing premises
• the fresh meat or meat product must be marked with the crossed-through oval mark as prescribed under the Products of Animal Origin (Disease Control) Regulations 2008 (as amended)
• fresh meat from pigs originating from the protection zone can only move in sealed containers
• fresh meat or meat product intended for sale to the final consumer must have undergone risk-mitigating treatment prescribed under the Products of Animal origin (Disease Control) Regulations 2008 (as amended)

Derogations from risk-mitigation treatment for fresh meat from pigs originating from the restricted zone 3 is discussed under ‘Control of establishments in zones’. If a derogation is granted, meat cannot be exported but may be moved and sold fresh in Great Britain under licence.

Movement of fresh meat to approved ABP plant

Fresh meat and meat products from pigs that originated from any controlled zone may be licensed to move to an approved ABP plant. These must be collected, stored and transported separately from other pig products that have not been licensed to move.

Movement of animal by-products

General restrictions

ABPs (including manure, slurry and used bedding) from pigs kept in a protection zone or surveillance zone cannot move within or out of those zones unless licensed. If the ABPs are from pigs kept in the restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3, the restriction only applies to movement out of those zones. There is no restriction on moving ABPs from pigs kept in a restricted zone 1.

Movements that can be licensed

ABPs may be licensed to move, provided that:

• the movement is to an approved ABP plant for processing or disposal, and follows ABP regulations
• the ABPs are collected, stored and transported separately from all other pig products that have not been licensed to move

In addition, if the ABPs are from pigs kept in a protection zone or surveillance zone, the vehicle used must be sealed after loading by an inspector or under their supervision.

If the ABPs are from pigs kept in restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3, the movement for processing or disposal can be to a temporary collection plant rather than to an approved ABP plant. The movement must follow ABP regulations.

Manure, slurry, used bedding or litter from a protection zone or restricted zone 3 may be licensed to move, provided it is processed in accordance with ABP regulations, for disposal in a landfill.

Manure, slurry, used bedding or litter from a surveillance zone or restricted zone 2 may be licensed to move, provided it is either:

• processed in accordance with ABP regulations, for disposal in any landfill
• moving for disposal in an authorised landfill

Pig products obtained from pigs kept in a premises that subsequently falls within a zone

General restrictions

When a premises is later determined to be within a zone, all products obtained from pigs kept on such premises cannot move without licence unless the general exemptions discussed apply. In such cases the minimum legal criteria for the relevant product and zone will need to be met before licensing.

Other movements or activities

Activity or Commodity	Prohibition	May be licensed?	Minimum legal criteria for a licence to be granted
Pig gatherings (markets, shows, fairs)	Not permitted in protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Unlikely (No)	N/A
Breeding by itinerant service	Not permitted in protected zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	N/A
Breeding by artificial insemination	Not permitted in protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	Any equipment used must not have left the zone since it was declared
Home slaughter on premises	Not permitted in protected zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3	No	N/A
Use of pig product in raw pet food	Not permitted in protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3	No	N/A
Feral pig hunting	Not permitted in protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	N/A
Products obtained from feral pigs hunted in a zone	Not permitted in protected zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	Negative test for disease
Feral pig products (carcases, fresh meat, ABPs)	Not permitted in protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	N/A
Non-susceptible animals	Movement restricted in protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	Non-porcine livestock may move within the same premises across a public or private road If it is livestock, the movement is either to a slaughterhouse, veterinary surgery or to premises or market with no pigs
Anything liable to transmit disease (fodder, equipment, clothing)	Movement restricted in protected zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	The thing being moved is collected, stored and transported separately from products not licensed to move
Diagnostic samples (ABPs)	Movement restricted (as ABPs) protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone 2 or restricted zone 3	Yes	N/A
Pig transport vehicles (other than those moving licensed pigs)	Not permitted in protection zone or surveillance zone or restricted zone	Yes	N/A

Annex C: glossary of terms

Affected with swine fever

Pigs ascertained to be sick, showing clinical signs of disease or confirmed to be infected with African swine fever or classical swine fever.

Amber teleconference

A meeting convened during strong suspicion of disease prior to confirmation to assess risk and agree next actions. The relevant Chief Veterinary Officer may negate disease, escalate to confirmation (red alert), or require further evidence.

Animal gathering

An occasion at which animals are brought together for sale, show or exhibition, for collection for onward consignment within Great Britain, or for inspection to confirm that they possess specific breed characteristics.

Approved disinfectant

A disinfectant approved under the Diseases of Animals (Approved Disinfectants) Order 2007. 

Asfivirus

The genus of viruses to which African swine fever virus belongs.

Composite product

A manufactured or processed product containing more than one ingredient, at least one of which is of animal origin.

Contact premises

Premises formally designated as contact premises following epidemiological assessment indicating a risk of disease transmission to or from those premises.

Dangerous contact premises

Contact premises assessed as presenting a high risk of disease transmission following veterinary risk assessment.

Designated establishment

A slaughterhouse, knacker’s yard or game handling establishment formally approved to operate under specified disease control conditions during an outbreak.

Designated premises

Premises, other than an establishment, formally approved to operate under specified disease control conditions during an outbreak.

Diagnostic manual

The retained EU legislation, namely Commission Decision 2002/106/EC (classical swine fever) and Commission Decision 2003/422/EC (African swine fever), setting out diagnostic procedures, sampling methods and criteria for the evaluation of laboratory tests for the confirmation and differential diagnosis of those diseases.

DIVA vaccine

A vaccine that enables differentiation between infected and vaccinated animals through appropriate diagnostic testing.

Epidemiological tracing

The inquiry and assessment of disease risk factors, movements and contacts associated with a suspect or infected premises to identify the source and potential spread of infection.

Establishment

A slaughterhouse (where slaughtering and dressing of animals, the meat of which is intended for human consumption take place), knackers’ yard (where animals are killed but not for the food chain), and game handling establishment (where game and game meat obtained after hunting are prepared for placing on the market).

Feral pig

Pigs of the family Suidae, including wild boar and their hybrids, which are living in a wild or free-living state and are not under the control of a keeper, including animals that have escaped or been deliberately released.

Fomite

Any object or material capable of carrying infectious agents such as ASF or CSF virus. For example, vehicles, equipment, feedstuffs, clothing, footwear. May also include scavenging animals, vermin, and so on.

Free area

An inanimate object or material capable of carrying infectious agents and transmitting infection between animals, including contaminated vehicles, equipment, clothing, or feed.

GB Pig Core Group

A Great Britain stakeholder group comprising representatives of the pig and pork supply chain, operating under agreed terms of reference to support government in the development and maintenance of disease control policy for pigs.

Germinal product

Semen, ova and embryos of animals intended for breeding purposes.

Health mark

The official mark applied to meat to indicate that it has been produced in an approved establishment and subject to official controls in accordance with applicable food hygiene legislation.

Infected premises

Premises on which ASF or CSF has been officially confirmed and to which disease control measures apply.

Kept pig

Pigs of the family Suidae, including domestic pigs, wild boar, and their hybrids, which are kept under the control of a keeper, whether for farming, breeding, exhibition or as pets.

Licensed movement

The movement of pigs, pig products or other relevant material authorised by a general or specific licence issued under disease control legislation.

National movement ban

Short lasting restrictions on the movement of pigs or pig products across Great Britain likely to be declared in the early phase of an outbreak when uncertainty is high.

Official veterinarian

Private veterinary surgeons who are qualified to deliver government-funded statutory testing and other veterinary services on behalf of government.

Soft tick (Ornithodoros spp.) 

Tick species of the genus Ornithodoros capable of transmitting African swine fever virus.

Pannage

The practice of releasing pigs into woodland or forest areas to forage.

Pestivirus

The genus of viruses to which classical swine fever virus belongs.

Pig products

Germinal products, products of animal origin, animal by-products and derived products.

Regionalisation

The recognition of defined geographical areas within a country as having a distinct animal health status for the purposes of disease control and trade.

Restricted meat

Meat, including meat that has come into contact with meat, produced on or after the date a protection zone or surveillance zone is declared (or an earlier date specified for disease control purposes), and derived from restricted animals originating from an infected area, protection zone or surveillance zone, or from pigs vaccinated against classical swine fever within the preceding 6 months or other specified period.

Sentinel pigs

A pig introduced onto previously infected premises after completion of cleansing and disinfection for the purpose of monitoring for the presence of disease.

Seropositive

A pig that has tested positive for antibodies to African swine fever or classical swine fever.

Suspect premises

Premises where African swine fever or classical swine fever is suspected but not yet confirmed and to which disease control measures may apply.

Swill feeding 

The feeding of catering waste or other prohibited material to pigs in breach of applicable regulations.

Terrestrial code

The WOAH Terrestrial Animal Health Code, which sets international standards for animal health, disease prevention and safe trade in terrestrial animals and their products.

Vector

Ticks of the species Ornithodoros erraticus, or any other tick or insect species specified by the appropriate authority, capable of transmitting African swine fever virus.