Guidance

Country policy and information note: humanitarian situation, Sudan, February 2024 (accessible)

Updated 5 March 2024

Executive summary

Violent conflict between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Response Forces (RSF) broke out on 15 April 2023. This has created a humanitarian situation in the country which is said to be dire.

The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs noted that 24.7 million people are in need of humanitarian assistance compared to 15.8 million before the outbreak of the conflict (a 57% increase). The fighting has displaced a total of 7.8 million people – 6.1 million internally and 1.7 to neighbouring countries - as at 30 January 2024. Prior to the conflict, Sudan had over 3 million internally displaced people thus bringing the total number of displaced people to 10.7 million according to the International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix. In addition, over 13,000 people have died in Sudan since the conflict started.

There have been widespread and indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure while insecurity, bureaucratic access impediments, looting, attacks against humanitarian premises and warehouses, and lack of fuel have hampered humanitarian access and delivery. Despite the challenges, 163 humanitarian organisations have provided multisectoral life-saving assistance to 4.9 million people as well as agriculture and livelihood support to 5.7 million people since the start of the conflict.

In general, the humanitarian situation in Khartoum, Darfur, Kordofan, Al Jazira and Sennar (which have experienced the most intense fighting) is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to torture or inhuman or degrading treatment as set out in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR. The humanitarian situation tends to be relatively better in states further away from active hostilities. However, the situation remains fluid while the conflict is ongoing.

Humanitarian needs vary across the country, tending to decrease in severity the further away a person resides from the active hostilities. However, the displacement of populations to states that are currently less affected by the conflict has led to significant burden on humanitarian assistance in those areas.

In general, internal relocation may be possible to those regions less affected by direct fighting but this can change at any time due to the volatility of the situation with previously peaceful states becoming the centre of fighting as seen in the case of Al Jazira and Sennar. Each case will need to be considered on the most current information. There are parts of the country under government control, particularly the east, where it will be reasonable for a person to relocate.

Freedom of movement both within and from and to the country is severely limited by the fighting, insecurity due to banditry and other criminality along the roads, high fuel costs and closure of the commercial airspace. This may affect the ability to relocate.

Assessment

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is information in the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

• that the general humanitarian situation is so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of serious harm because conditions amount to inhuman or degrading treatment as within paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR)
• a person is reasonably able to relocate within a country or territory
• a grant of asylum, humanitarian protection or other form of leave is likely, and
• if a claim is refused, it is likely or unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, still consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3. In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons for considering whether one (or more) of the exclusion clauses is applicable. Each case must be considered on its individual facts and merits.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 A severe humanitarian situation does not of itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.2 Without a link to one of the 5 Refugee Convention grounds necessary to be recognised as a refugee, the question to address is whether the person will face a real risk of serious harm in order to qualify for Humanitarian Protection (HP) (see the Asylum Instruction on Humanitarian Protection).

2.1.3 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3.Risk

3.1.1 The humanitarian situation varies from state to state. Conditions in the centre, south and west of the country – specifically in Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan as well as Gezira and Sennar, where fighting is concentrated – are likely to be so severe that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is in general a real risk of serious harm as set out in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iii) of the Immigration Rules/Article 3 ECHR.

3.1.2 Conditions decrease in severity with distance from the active hostilities. In general, they are unlikely to breach Article 3 in the east of the country, including Red Sea, River Nile, Kassala, and Blue Nile states, where fighting has been less intense. However, the situation remains volatile with fighting spreading to the east. Each case must be considered on its individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they face a real risk of serious harm.

3.1.3 Since April 2023, Khartoum and neighbouring towns, including Omdurman and Bahri, as well as the Darfur states and North Kordofan state, have been the epicentres of the fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Response Forces (RSF). As at December 2023 the fighting had spread eastwards to Al-Jazirah and Sennar. The fighting has led to the occupation, destruction and looting of health and humanitarian facilities and warehouses; suspension of humanitarian operations and adversely affected humanitarian access (for more detail about the location of the conflict and an assessment of risk as a result of indiscriminate violence, see the country policy and information note, Sudan: Security situation).

3.1.4. The civil conflict has made an already poor economic situation worse. As at October 2023 the International Monetary Fund (IMF) World Economic Outlook noted that the inflation rate (average consumer price) rose from 138.8% in 2022 to 256.2% in 2023, unemployment rose from 32.1% in 2022 to 46% in 2023; Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita dropped from US$ (current prices) 723.03 in 2022 to US$ 533.85 in 2023, and real GDP growth fell from -2.5% in 2022 to -18.3 % in 2023. The World Bank estimates that approximately 33% of the population are living in extreme poverty, which it defines as income of less than US$2.15 per day at 2017 prices. The Central Bank of Sudan and local commercial banks in conflict areas have closed, leaving people without access to cash and financial assets.

3.1.5 According to the UN Office for the Co-ordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) revised Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan, the number of people in need of some form of humanitarian assistance increased from 15.8 million before the conflict to 24.7 million in May 2023, around half the population (see Economic situation and People in need).

3.1.6 The World Food Programme estimated that approximately 19 million (40%) of the population are acutely food insecure, with the levels of insecurity highest in West Darfur (64%), West Kordofan (64%), Blue Nile (57%), Red Sea ((56%) and North Darfur (54%). Humanitarian organisations have provided food assistance in at least 14 states since the start of the conflict (see Food security).

3.1.7 The OCHA estimated that 19.9 million were in need of water and sanitation, with crumbling infrastructure leaving 17.3 million people without access to basic level drinking water supply and approximately 24 million without access to proper sanitation facilities. Support agencies targeted 6.1 million for WASH assistance, with at least 4 million reached since the conflict started (see Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)).

3.1.8 The healthcare situation remains dire due to attacks on health facilities, lack of medical supplies and insecurity preventing access, particularly in conflict areas. OCHA reported that about 70% to 80% of health facilities in conflict affected areas are non-functional. The World Health Organisation (WHO) documented 60 verified attacks on health facilities, 34 deaths and 30 injuries between 15 April and 14 December 2023 compared to 23 attacks, 7 deaths and 4 injuries in the whole of 2022 (see Healthcare). Health care is also strained in states not directly affected due to the influx of displaced people. Approximately 11 million people were in need of health assistance with 7.6 million targeted for assistance. As at 31 December OCHA stated humanitarian organisations had reached 24% of those targeted for assistance (see Assistance in healthcare).

3.1.9 The conflict has led to the destruction of housing, household assets and public infrastructure. An estimated 5.7 million are in need of shelter and non-food items assistance with 1.9 million targeted for assistance. OCHA reported that in 2023 since the beginning of the year, cluster partners have provided diverse forms of shelter and Non Food Items assistance to 603,695 Sudanese people and 282,215 refugees received shelter and Non Food Items NFI assistance. The figures include 439,575 IDPs, returnees and vulnerable residents in 18 States and 211,880 refugees that received assistance since April 2023 (see Provision of Shelter and NFI).

3.1.10 The fighting has severely impacted education. Schools and educational institutions remain closed in the conflict-affected areas including Khartoum, Al Jazirah, South Darfur, West Darfur and West Kordofan. According to OCHA, as of November 2023 the conflict had deprived about 12 million children of schooling since April, with the total number of children in Sudan who are out of school reaching 19 million. Of this total, 6.5 million children have lost access to school due to increased violence and insecurity, with at least 10,400 schools now closed in conflict - affected areas. Schools are also used to shelter IDPs (see Education). US$131.0 million was required to assist 4.3 million out of the 8.6 in need of educational assistance. At the end of November only US$ 27.0 million (or 20.6%) of the required funding had been received. Only 87,433 [or 2%] of the 4.3 million targeted children had been reached with assistance.

3.1.11 The International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix reported noted that as of  30 January 2024 the conflict has displaced 7.8 million people – 6.1 million internally and 1.7 million mixed population to neighbouring countries (see Total displacement). The vast majority of the displaced are from Khartoum (64.9%) while South Darfur hosts the highest number of IDPs (12.9 % of total IDPs). For information of states producing and hosting IDPs see in other states see  (see Internally displaced people (IDPs).

3.1.12 Sudan has received hundreds of millions of pounds from the international community to support ongoing humanitarian needs, however according to the Financial Tracking Services (FTS), as of February 2024, US$1.11 billion (43.1%) of the US$2.6 billion required funding had been received leaving a funding gap of US$1.46 billion (56.9% (see Funding).

3.1.13 Insecurity, targeted attacks on aid workers, aerial bombardments, roadblocks, movement restrictions have constrained humanitarian access to food, water, healthcare and education in conflict areas. Infrastructure damage has led to internet and electricity blackouts and fuel, water, and food shortages, creating logistical challenges for humanitarian operations. The humanitarian mission in Wad Madani, Al Jazira state has been suspended since December 2023. Shelling and aerial bombardments in the outskirts of Sennar also remains a significant challenge. Displacement into states less affected by direct conflict has also constrained the humanitarian situation there (see Access to humanitarian assistance).

3.1.14 However, from April to November 15th, 163 humanitarian agencies gave 4.9 million people humanitarian help. With 376,300 out of 563,600 (or 67%) targeted people assisted. For information of number of people assisted in each state see Provision of assistance).

3.1.15 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

4. Internal relocation

4.1.1 Internal relocation may be possible in areas not directly affected by conflict, such as Red Sea, River Nile, Northern and White Nile states. Some internally displaced populations (IDPs) have self-relocated in search of safety. However, the situation remains fluid with fighting being reported in previously unaffected states such Al Jazirah, Sennar, River Nile, Gedaref, Kassala and Red Sea. There are parts of the country under government control, particularly the east (for information on areas under government control see Security situation) where it will be reasonable for a person to relocate. However, Each case must be considered on its facts and in light of most current information.

4.1.2 Relocation from or through a conflict-affected areas is unlikely to be reasonable. Persons would need to return to an area or city not affected by the conflict, such as Port Sudan, then, if not remaining in the city, relocate from there. However, since the outbreak of the conflict freedom of movement has been limited in practice due to conflict-related risks. Road and airport closures due to the fighting have restricted people’s movement away from conflict-affected areas to seek safety and access humanitarian aid and other services. In addition, scarcity of fuel, banditry, criminality, and illegal checkpoints have impeded movement (see Freedom of Movement and country policy and information note, Sudan: Security situation).

4.1.3 For further guidance on considering internal relocation and factors to be taken into account see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5.Certification

5.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

5.1.2. For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

This contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment.

The structure and content of this section follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

6. Geography and administrative division

6.1.1 For information on geographic location, size and administrative divisions of Sudan see Country and information note: Security situation Sudan, June 2023.

6.2 Population size  

6.2.1 A May 2023 report by CARE International (CI report May 2023) noted: ‘Population data for Sudan is difficult to glean from secondary data as the last official census was in 2008’. It then stated that ‘Sudan has a total population of 49.7 million with an annual growth of 2.75%.’^{[footnote 1]} US CIA Factbook updated 13 December 2023 estimated Sudan’s 2023 population to be 49,197,555.^{[footnote 2]} The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Data Exchange (OCHA HDX 2023), estimated Sudan’s population (excluding refugees) at the end of 2022 to be 48,748,901 and (including refugees) to be 49,887,897.^{[footnote 3]}.

6.2.2 CPIT has produced below table based on OCHA HDX 2023 data that shows Sudan’s population by state.^{[footnote 4]}

State	Population (including refugees	Population excluding refugees
Abyei PCA	250,000	250,000
Al Jazirah	5,705,029	5,687,557
Blue Nile	1,357,645	1,344,267
Central Darfur	1,797,765	1,786,503
East Darfur	1,313,743	1,213,951
Gedaref	2,613,485	2,545,604
Kassala	2,922,045	2,811,446
Khartoum	9,452,977	9,146,191
North Darfur	2,806,903	2,775,652
North Kordofan	2,170,273	2,160,476
Northern	1,024,332	1,023,194
Red Sea	1,556,251	1,549,857
River Nile	1,655,605	1,651,873
Sennar	2,180,763	2,170,863
South Darfur	3,963,470	3,912,372
South Kordofan	2,061,243	2,017,962
West Darfur	1,941,286	1,940,860
West Kordofan	1,786,309	1,713,462
White Nile	3,328,773	3,046,811
Total	49,887,897	48,748,901

6.3 Demographic profile

6.3.1 CPIT has produced the below table based on data from CIA world Fact book and UN Population division portal showing basic demographic indicators.

Factor	Data
Population growth rate	2.55% (2023 estimates)[footnote 5]
Population (total)	48 to 49.2 million (2023 estimate)[footnote 6] [footnote 7]
Life expectancy	66.1 years (2023) estimate) [footnote 8]
Total fertility rate (per woman)	4.32 (2023 estimates) [footnote 9]
Birth rate	33.3 births /1000 population (2023)[footnote 10]
Death rate	6.2 deaths/1000 population (2023)[footnote 11]
Maternal mortality rate (deaths per 100,000 live births)	295 (2023 estimates) [footnote 12]
Infant mortality rate (per 1,000 live births)	37.5 (2022) [footnote 13] or 41.4 (2023) [footnote 14]
Literacy rate (age 15 and older)	Total: 60.7%; male 65.4%, female 56.1% (2018)[footnote 15]

6.3.2 With respect to ethnicity, US CIA Factbook December 2023 noted that Sudan has over 500 ethnic groups with Sudanese Arabs making up approximately 70% of the population. Other major ethnic group are Fur, Beja, Nuba, Ingessana, Uduk, Fallata, Masalit, Dajo, Gimir, Tunjur, Berti. Arabic and English are the official languages and a majority of the population is Sunni Muslim with a small Christian minority.^{[footnote 16]}

7. Economic situation

7.1 Overview

7.1.1 An April 2022 report by Acaps, an independent information supplier providing humanitarian analysis^{[footnote 17]}, noted:

‘Sudan has been facing a socioeconomic crisis caused by the unstable political situation that followed the widespread demonstrations against the politics of former president Omar Hassan al-Bashir in April 2019. The military takeover of the transitional government in October 2021 has further deteriorated the economic situation in Sudan as it resulted in the suspension of international aid, on which Sudan has been depending. Since October 2021, the Sudanese pound has lost about a third of its value, inflation rates have been increasing, there have been shortages of hard currency, and there are no sufficient foreign reserves.’^{[footnote 18]}

7.1.2 A March 2023 report by the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), a leading provider of early warning and analysis on acute food insecurity around the world^{[footnote 19]} noted: ‘Sudan’s economic conditions remain poor as low foreign currency reserves and currency depreciation result in high inflation rates and conflict and political instability disrupt business activity … The ongoing depreciation of the currency is causing the prices of imported goods, including agricultural inputs, to remain at very high levels and is generally contributing to the very high cost of living.’^{[footnote 20]}

7.1.3 A report by the Gender, Growth and Labour Markets in Low Income Countries Programme (G2LM/LIC) published in September 2023 and based on various sources noted: ‘The challenges Sudan has experienced since 2018 have wreaked havoc with its economy. Sudan was reclassified from a lower middle-income country to a low-income country in 2019. The growth of its GDP has been negative since 2018, averaging -2.3% per annum over 2018-2022. Per capita GDP fell by an average of 5.4% per annum from 2018 to 2021 and by 3.0% per annum on average since the 2012 …’^{[footnote 21]}

7.1.4 A 4 October 2023 WB press release noted ‘… In Sudan, economic activity is expected to contract by 12% because of the internal conflict, which is halting production, destroying human capital, and crippling state capacity.’^{[footnote 22]}According to IMF World Economic Outlook report 2024, Sudan’s economic growth rate was -18.3% and was projected to improve to 0.3% in 2024^{[footnote 23]}.

7.1.5 CPIT has produced the below table showing basic economic indicators for Sudan based on IMF data^{[footnote 24]}.

-	2023	2024 (projected)
Economic growth rate (real GDP)	-18.3	0.3
GDP current prices (billion US$)	25.57	25.83
GDP per capita (current US$ )	533.85	525.73
Inflation rate (average consumer price)	256.2	152.4
Unemployment rate (percentage)	46%	47.2%
Gross debt (as % of GDP)	256	238.8
Population (millions)	47.9	49.14

7.2 Employment

7.2.1 A 2020 report by the International Labour Organisation (ILO report 2020), noted:

‘Among the working age population (15+), 57 per cent of Sudanese are in the labour force, and the remaining 43 per cent of the population is not economically active. Unemployment among women is significantly higher, up to three times that of males. Unemployment is also relatively higher for high-skilled individuals. The educational profile of the unemployed indicates one out of four have a university/tertiary education. Twenty-six per cent of the unemployed persons in the Sudan are in Khartoum, and 44 per cent of them have university/tertiary education. The main source of household livelihoods as reported is the primary sector: crop farming and animal husbandry (45 per cent), wages and salaries (36 per cent), and own business (20 per cent). A smaller portion of households depend on pensions (1 per cent), remittances (3 per cent), and humanitarian aid.

‘… there is a very large informal economy in the Sudan, with a labour force that is characterized by seasonal migration, around 85 per cent of workers engaged in vulnerable employment and 60 per cent of the labour force engaged in subsistence agriculture.^{[footnote 25]}

7.2.2 A September 2022 report by UNICEF noted ‘More than a third of youth aged between 15 and 24 [were] unemployed in 2021, with males being slightly disadvantaged (46% vs 31%).’^{[footnote 26]} As of October 2023, IMF reported that unemployment rate in Sudan was 47.2% compared to 32.1% in 2022.^{[footnote 27]}

7.2.3 A February 2021 report by Challenge Fund for Youth Employment, which ‘was launched in 2019 by the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs to create more, better and more inclusive jobs for 200,000 young people in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa, the Middle East and North Africa,^{[footnote 28]} noted ‘A significant portion of the Sudanese workers is engaged in the informal sector.’ ^{[footnote 29]} An October 2023 report by ILO stated also noted that: ‘Most of Sudan’s employment is self-employment, particularly in agriculture and retail.’^{[footnote 30]}

7.3 Poverty

7.3.1 1. A WB brief for Sudan dated April 2023 noted:

‘There is currently no recent and credible poverty estimate for Sudan. The most recent official estimates of poverty in Sudan are based on the 2014/15 National Household Budget and Poverty Survey. At the time, 61.1% of Sudan’s population had levels of per capita expenditure below the national poverty line. Poverty rates vary significantly across states with above average rates observed in Red Sea state, Kordofan and Darfur. If the world Bank International poverty line is used, the incidence of extreme poverty was 15.3 % equivalent to 5. 6 million Sudanese in 2014.

‘… Projections based on GDP suggest that the share of the population living with less than $2.15 per day has increased consistently in recent years and became more urbanised, reaching 33% in 2023 from 20% in 2018.’^{[footnote 31]}

7.3.2 According to the ADB ‘Sudan Economic Outlook’ report, ‘The poverty rate rose from 64.6% in 2021 to 66.1% in 2022^{[footnote 32]}. The WB defined poverty rate as the ratio of the number of people whose income falls below the poverty line. Poverty data is expressed in 2017 purchasing power parity (PPP) prices. The global poverty line for low income country [to which Sudan belong] is US$2.15^{[footnote 33]}.

7.3.3 Multiple sources have highlighted the impact of the current socioeconomic situation on child forced labour, trafficking and forced recruitment. On 2 September 2023 Arab News reported that ‘Child soldiers are being recruited by both sides in Sudan’s ongoing civil war’. The report quoted a journalist based in Nyala town Darfur saying: ‘Severe and widespread poverty has driven many children into the arms of the militias.’’^{[footnote 34]} UNHCR reported in June 2023: ‘In the current disrupted socio-economic situation, the risk of neglect and exploitation of children is on the rise. Deprived from family attention and care, children are even more at risk of being induced into forced labour, recruited into armed groups and even trafficked, especially in East Sudan.’^{[footnote 35]} And on 20 January Al Jazeera reported that a Sudanese activist based in Khartoum said in an interview that: ‘poverty and the constant threat of sexual violence have led to many early marriages.’^{[footnote 36]}

8. Banking

8.1.1 The United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) revised Humanitarian Response Plan for Sudan published on 17 May 2023 (OCHA HRP May 2023) noted that large sections of the capital including banks ‘have been looted, damaged, or targeted by rocket attacks. The central bank was set ablaze, and local commercial banks closed and ATMs not functioning, leaving people without access to cash and financial assets.’ The same source, citing NetBlocks, a ‘global internet monitor’^{[footnote 37]} noted that, ‘Internet connectivity has been severely disrupted, operating at only 4 per cent capacity.’^{[footnote 38]}

8.1.2 An August 2023 article by Susanne Jaspars, a Senior Research Fellow at SOAS University of London and Tamer Abd Elkreem, a Lecturer in the Department of Sociology and Anthropology and the Deputy Director of the Peace Research Institute at the University of Khartoum, published by African Arguments, a pan-African platform for news, investigation and opinion,^{[footnote 39]} (Jaspars and Elkreem, August 2023) noted: ‘The banking system has collapsed in parts of the country … [and] many banks closed, so cash withdrawals were no longer possible. Digital money transfers became difficult but have remained possible to a limited extent. For many people, this has affected access to income, savings, remittances, and humanitarian aid.’’^{[footnote 40]}

8.1.3 A December 2023 UNICEF report on the impact of the conflict on service delivery (UNICEF report December 2023) noted:

‘The ongoing conflict poses significant challenges to the banking system, which was already characterized as fragile prior to the conflict. Twelve banks (accounting for 25 per cent of banking system capital) have capital adequacy ratios below the regulatory 12 per cent minimum … The banking sector is highly concentrated; the five largest banks account for 55 per cent of the sector’s total assets. Over half of the bank branches are located in only two states: Khartoum (44 per cent) and Gazira (11 per cent), while the remaining 16 states have 45 per cent of the total bank branches.

‘The key payment systems in Sudan are operated by the [Central Bank of Sudan] CBoS and the Electronic Banking Services (EBS) company, a technical arm of CBoS. The CBoS uses Sudan Real Time Gross Settlement (SIRAG) banking system linking all banks to the central bank… The EBS operates a national switch; where banks can access a range of products and services such as Swift, automated teller machines, points of sale, cards, apps, and billers, and is also the operator of the banking system clearing house. Almost all banks are dependent on EBS for electronic services, except five (Bank of Khartoum, Faisal Islamic Bank, Alsalam Bank, Al Baraka Bank and Omdurman National Bank), that have their own switches…’^{[footnote 41]}

8.1.4 On the impact of the conflict on the banking system the UNICEF report December 2023 observed:

‘… The CBoS electronic data system is housed in the headquarters, while its backup is housed in its Khartoum branch, near SAF general command building and the EBS main data system server is housed in CBoS Khartoum branch, with its backup server located close to the CBoS headquarters. These locations are the epicentre of fighting. The systems became inaccessible shortly after the onset of the conflict, their power supply was cut off, and operating them via generator power was not possible. Bank-to-bank payments were cut off, preventing the transfer of money between accounts because electronic clearance was not functioning. Banks thus were not able to deliver any electronic payment services.

‘The conflict has also resulted in the destruction of banking system infrastructure with significant damage to buildings, furniture, computers, and electronic systems. In Khartoum, account holders in all bank branches have been unable to access their accounts as all banks were closed. Though banks outside Khartoum have been operational, a lack of inter-branch linkages due to the centralization of banking operations in Khartoum and heavy dependence on headquarters, has posed a challenge. Bank of Khartoum, which has its own independent switch, succeeded in accessing its server, providing it with stable power supply and managed to intermittently restore its systems online, since the early days of the conflict, to provide digital services to its customers including billing payments, and Western Union cash remittances. Since July, many other banks have been able to restore their systems.

‘Recently, CBoS managed to restore its core banking system, connecting about 23 out of the 37 banks in Sudan, however, it has not managed to restore the electronic clearance system, and money transfer between banks is not yet possible. Mobile money transfers, mobile payments and electronic banking applications are functional but with frequent system disruptions due weaknesses in the communication networks, internet outages and frequent power cuts.^{[footnote 42]}

8.1.5 The same source further noted that: ‘Sudan is primarily a cash-based society’ but ‘accessing cash has been difficult for the affected population since the conflict erupted.’^{[footnote 43]} OCHA humanitarian update report 19 October 2023 noted: For instance, the disruption in the banking system continues to affect the ability of people, government institutions and humanitarian organizations to withdraw or transfer money, pay for services and procure supplies. Cash availability or access to cash has been a recurring issue raised by several partners as many are not able to get their project funds as the banking system is not fully functional.’^{[footnote 44]}

8.1.6 As a result dependence on mobile money transfer services has increased since the conflict and informal money transfer and banking agents operators have emerged to help address the need for cash withdrawal but they charge a substantial fee ranging from 10–50 per cent of the transfer value, depending on the location and availability of cash^{[footnote 45]}.

8.1.7 In December 2023 Data Friendly Space (DFS), a U.S. based INGO working globally to make modern data systems and data science accessible to the humanitarian and development communities^{[footnote 46]} and iMMAP, an international not-for-profit organization that provides information management services to humanitarian and development organizations,^{[footnote 47]} published a report on the situation in Sudan between October and November 2023, based on secondary data review (DFS and iMMAP report December 2023). The report stated:

‘… Continued disruptions in the banking system impede individuals, government entities, and humanitarian bodies alike. This limitation severely impacts organizations’ capacity to access and transfer funds, resulting in challenges to make payments for essential services and procure necessary supplies. Limited access to cash remains a recurring problem for numerous aid organizations who are unable to access project funds due to the incomplete functionality of the banking system. As a result, organizations cannot reach people with humanitarian support and people in need struggle to access services like healthcare, food, clean water etc.’^{[footnote 48]}

9. Security situation

9.1.1 For detailed information on the security situation in Sudan including fatalities and destruction of civilian infrastructure see Country policy and information note: security situation, Sudan, June 2023 However, there have been changes since the publication of this report.

9.1.2 A November 2023 report by the International Office for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), which collects, analyses and disseminates information about displaced people,^{[footnote 49]} (IOM report November 2023) noted that continued incidents of conflict occurred across multiple hotspots particularly in Darfur, Kordofan and Khartoum, several armed groups, such as the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) and the Sudanese Liberation Movement (SLM Mini-Minawi) renounced their commitment to neutrality and more localized fighting has emerged in South Kordofan North Darfur, South Darfur, and Blue Nile.’^{[footnote 50]}

9.1.3 According to a January 2024 situation report by the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED), which collects information on the dates, actors, locations, fatalities, and types of all reported political violence and protest events around the world^{[footnote 51]} since fighting first broke out on 15 April, ACLED reports approximately 4,000 incidents of political violence and more than 13,000 fatalities. From 25 November to 5 January 2024, there were over 640 political violent incidents and 720 recorded deaths with the majority - over 440 incidents and 315 reported deaths occurring in Khartoum. Al-Jazirah state had the second largest number of political violence occurrences, with over 70 and more than 110 reported fatalities.^{[footnote 52]}

9.1.4 The same source further noted:

‘After the conflict between the RSF and the SAF broke out in April 2023, Wad Madani emerged as a critical humanitarian hub, hosting hundreds of thousands of internally displaced people (IDP) escaping the conflict in Khartoum. It served as the initial destination for those leaving the capital before seeking refuge in other countries or Sudanese states, owing to its strategic location in the southeast of Khartoum …

‘On 15 December 2023, the RSF initiated a large-scale offensive against the SAF, with RSF forces advancing toward the outskirts of Wad Madani, where the clashes concentrated for three days in at least 17 distinct towns and villages …

‘On 18 December… the RSF gained control of Wad Madani and most other cities in al-Jazirah state…

‘During the attack in al-Jazirah, there were widespread atrocities committed by the RSF. RSF troops were accused of looting several civilian populated areas, while also killing and raping local residents and displaced citizens … After gaining control of Wad Madani and al-Haj Abdallah, the RSF restricted civilian movement by preventing them from fleeing to Sennar. This action further exacerbated the challenges of accessing humanitarian aid and the last few functioning health facilities by civilians attempting to escape the conflict zones, contributing to the overall humanitarian crisis in the region.’^{[footnote 53]}

9.15 The same source further observed:

‘The capture of al-Jazirah by the RSF stands as a defining moment in the ongoing conflict with the SAF. This event has not only led to an expansion of hostilities into new territories, particularly in the middle regions such as Sennar state, but it has also brought forth threats of RSF attacks on River Nile, Gedaref and Port Sudan. Simultaneously, the fall of Wad Madani city has triggered ethnic mobilization across areas under SAF control, casting doubt on the SAF’s ability to protect these regions. Furthermore, this situation has the potential to prompt defections within the SAF ranks in response to their withdrawal from Wad Madani, with many Sudanese calling the SAF chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan to step down.’^{[footnote 54]}

9.1.6 According to the International Crisis Group January 2024 Crisis Watch report the RSF advanced south into Sennar, White and Blue Nile states and after capturing Wad Medani the army began to arm civilians in Al Jazirah and the RSF threatened to continue offensives into eastern Gedarif, Kassala and Port Sudan if civilian recruitment continued. The source further reported the formation of new militias that support army and the RSF -SAF fighting has turned into ethnic-based conflict between non-Arab Nubian SPLM-N (al-Hilu) and RSF-affiliated Misseriya and Hawazma Arab militias.^{[footnote 55]}

9.1.7 According to the Global Protection Cluster, a network of NGOs, international organisations and UN agencies engaged in protection work in humanitarian crises including armed conflict^{[footnote 56]} as of 31 December 2023 there were 202 hotspot sites, 72 hotspot localities and 13 hotspot states in Sudan.^{[footnote 57]} CPIT has produced below chart based on the Global Protection Data showing the number of  hotspot sites and localities in each of the 13 states. For information on the names of  hotspot localities see Global Protection Cluster, ‘Protection Hotspots in Sudan’, as of 31 December 2023

9.1.8 ‘The Protection Sector hotspot mapping distinguishes between (1) chronic conflict hotspots – areas that are a­ffected by prolonged, protracted and/or repeated inter-communal violence, armed attacks and low intensity conflict (2) acute conflict hotspots – areas that are currently aff­ected by new violence, armed attacks or active armed conflict and (3) at-risk locations – location that are at risk of inter-communal violence or armed conflict in the near future, and/or where civilians are at risk of attacks.’^{[footnote 58]}

Protection hotspot in Sudan as of 31 December 2023:

Area	Hotspot sites	Localities
South Darfur	48	10
North Darfur	38	7
West Kordofan	22	6
Central Darfur	18	8
South Kordofan	18	7
West Darfur	18	7
Blue Nile	15	4
Al Jazirah	6	6
Khartoum	6	6
North Kordofan	5	5
East Darfur	5	3
White Nile	2	2
Gedaref	1	1

9.1.1 The Global Protection Cluster has provided the below map of Sudan showing protection hotspots.”^{[footnote 59]}

10. People in need

10.1 Nationality

10.1.1 The OCHA HRP May 2023 noted: ‘The situation in Sudan has significantly worsened since the last update on humanitarian needs was released in November 2022 … The number of people in need (PiN) of humanitarian assistance has increased from 15.8 million, estimated in November 2022, to 24.7 million in May 2023, representing a 57 per cent increase.’^{[footnote 60]} The figures of the PiN comprised of 15.1 million vulnerable residents, 7.2 million IDPs, 1.1 million refugees and 1.3 million returnees.^{[footnote 61]}

10.1.2 With respect to children, a November 2023 report by UNICEF, stated that 13.6 million children were in need of humanitarian assistance and 3 million children were internally displaced as at 31 October 2023.^{[footnote 62]}

10.1.3 The OCHA HRP report May 2023 noted that majority of PiN were in Khartoum (12.1%), followed by North Darfur (11.0%), South Darfur (9.4%), Al Jazirah (8.1%), White Nile (7.7%), West Darfur (6.1%) Kassala (5.7%), Central Darfur (5.3%), Gedaref (4.9%), South Kordofan 4.5%) and North Kordofan (4.1%).^{[footnote 63]}

10.1.4 CPIT has produced the table below showing the population and the PiN in each state in 2023 based on OCHA data.^{[footnote 64]}

State	Population excluding refugees	PiN - excluding refugees	Population (including refugees)	PiN including refugees	PiN as % of population (including refugees )
Abyei PCA	250,000	200,750	250,000	200,750	80%
Al Jazirah	5,687,557	1,997,778	5,705,029	2,018,214	35%
Blue Nile	1,344,267	717,211	1,357,645	731,596	54%
Central Darfur	1,786,503	1,266,024	1,797,765	1,278,396	71%
East Darfur	1,213,951	731,299	1,313,743	826,723	63%
Gedaref	2,545,604	1,153,661	2,613,485	1,233,863	47%
Kassala	2,811,446	1,315,003	2,922,045	1,414,924	48%
Khartoum	9,146,191	2,807,836	9,452,977	2,995,252	32%
North Darfur	2,775,652	2,623,040	2,806,903	2,652,917	95%
North Kordofan	2,160,476	1,029,655	2,170,273	1,039,022	48%
Northern	1,023,194	380,277	1,024,332	381,369	37%
Red Sea	1,549,857	827,584	1,556,251	850,520	55%
River Nile	1,651,873	632,011	1,655,605	635,583	38%
Sennar	2,170,863	850,150	2,180,763	859,793	39%
South Darfur	3,912,372	2,290,711	3,963,470	2,343,267	59%
South Kordofan	2,017,962	1,065,859	2,061,243	1,107,238	54%
West Darfur	1,940,860	1,539,659	1,941,286	1,540,072	79%
West Kordofan	1,713,462	677,768	1,786,309	747,712	42%
White Nile	3,046,811	1,566,016	3,328,773	1,910,584	57%
Total	48,748,901	23,586,478	49,887,897	24,681,639	49%

11. Displaced population

11.1 Total displacement

11.1.1 The IOM ‘Monthly Displacement Overview’ February 2024 (IOM Overview report February 2024 noted:

‘…In late December 2023, Sudan DTM analysed extensive displacement data to produce an updated, comprehensive estimate of persons displaced within Sudan, accounting for both those displaced before and after 15 April 2023. DTM Sudan reported that approximately 9,052,822 persons were internally displaced in Sudan, while an estimated 1,574,135 individuals were displaced across Sudan’s borders into neighbouring countries. Additionally, 120,797 IDPs were foreign nationals (approximately 2 per cent of total IDPs across Sudan).’^{[footnote 65]}

11.1.2 The OCHA SSR 4 February 2024 noted:

‘Of the 10.7 million people displaced, 1.7 million have fled to neighbouring countries, the vast majority (62 per cent) being Sudanese. Chad hosts the majority of arrivals at 37 per cent, with South Sudan at 30 per cent, Egypt at 24 per cent while Ethiopia, Libya and the Central African Republic host the remainder. This creates additional humanitarian needs in a region that is already in deep crisis. Their needs are overwhelming: shortages of food, shelter, healthcare, and sanitation, all combine to place them at heightened risk of disease, malnutrition, and violence, according to the IOM. that about 10.7 million people are now displaced by conflicts in Sudan of which 9 million are displaced inside the country.’^{[footnote 66]}

11.1.3 IOM Overview report February 2024 has provided below figure showing monthly displacement between 21 April and 31 December 2023:

11.2 Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs)

11.2.1 The IOM report January 2024 noted:

‘Since 15 April 2023, DTM Sudan estimated that 6,036,176 individuals (1,201,356 Households) were displaced across 6,512 locations, within 180 localities, across all 18 states in Sudan. Recent clashes resulted in an unprecedented rate of displacement in Sudan—with an average increase of approximately 200,000 IDPs every week. The number of displacements that occurred in 2023 (6,036,176) was over 5 times greater than the number of displacements estimated to have occurred in 2022 (235,963). The number of individuals displaced was higher, and the frequency of population displacement was more frequent, during the 8.5 months since 15 April 2023 as compared to the cumulative 20 years prior.’ ^{[footnote 67]}

11.2.2 With respect to the origins of IDP, the same source stated:

‘As the epicenter of conflict, Khartoum experienced the greatest displacement nation-wide, with an estimated 3,681,297 individuals displaced from Khartoum state since 15 April 2023. Following Khartoum, and with the exception of East Darfur, residents originating from the Darfur states experienced the highest numbers of population displacement represented by the following estimates: South Darfur (1,867,019 individuals), North Darfur (1,085,684 individuals), Central Darfur (665,483 individuals) and West Darfur (353,689 individuals). Over 509,796 individuals in Aj Jazirah state were displaced, (approximately 275,796 IDPs were primarily displaced and approximately 234,000 IDPs were secondarily displaced) over the course of three days in December 2023. As such, Aj Jazirah is the area of origin for the sixth largest proportion of IDPs (335,959 individuals).’ ^{[footnote 68]}

11.2.3 CPIT has produced below table based on IOM^{[footnote 69]} data and OCHA data^{[footnote 70]} showing IDPs states of origin and proportion of IDP to state population and total IDP population.

State	Total Population	IDPs originating	As % of state population	IDPs as % of total IDPs
Al Jazirah	5,705,029	470,212	8.2%	7.7%
Central Darfur	1,797,765	249,562	13.9%	4.1%
East Darfur	1,313,743	75,535	5.7%	1.2%
Khartoum	9,452,977	3,525,379	37.3%	57.8%
North Darfur	2,806,903	498,143	17.7%	8.2%
North Kordofan	2,170,273	42,690	2.0%	0.7%
Sennar	2,180,763	15,592	0.7%	0.3%
South Darfur	3,963,470	936,434	23.6%	15.4%
South Kordofan	2,061,243	63,135	3.1%	1.0%
West Darfur	1,941,286	188,497	9.7%	3.1%
West Kordofan	1,786,309	21,819	1.2%	0.4%
White Nile	3,328,773	8,090	0.2%	0.1%
Total	38,508,534	6,095,088		100.0%

11.2.4 1. Regarding the states where the IDPs have relocated, the same source stated:

‘… The states hosting the highest numbers of IDPs are South Darfur (18% of total displaced, as of 31 December 2023), North Darfur (13% of the total displaced population), Central Darfur (9% of the total displaced population) and East Darfur (9% of the total displaced population). North Darfur and South Darfur are where the most IDPs originated and where most are hosted, indicating that the majority of displaced households sheltered in their state of origin. Given the sustained pace of armed clashes, it is likely that the short distance travelled by IDPs reflects their financial or physical inability to travel rather than their optimism that they will soon return to their area of origin.’ ^{[footnote 71]}

11.2.5 IOM Overview report February 2024 as provided the below table showing displacement by state since April 2023.^{[footnote 72]}

State of displacement	Localities	Locations	IDPs	IDPs % (grand total)
Al Jazirah	8	1,492	389,881	6%
Blue Nile	7	126	131,474	2%
Central Darfur	8	21	373,935	6%
East Darfur	9	28	660,830	11%
Gedaref	12	252	377,643	6%
Kassala	10	187	166,228	3%
Khartoum	7	204	44,769	1%
North Darfur	17	114	460,188	8%
North Kordofan	8	537	147,095	2%
Northern	7	327	402,675	7%
Red Sea	8	176	239,027	4%
River Nile	7	878	700,827	12%
Sennar	7	369	434,627	7%
South Darfur	18	47	703,118	12%
South Kordofan	14	357	127,637	2%
West Darfur	7	43	128,540	2%
West Kordofan	14	509	101,030	2%
White Nile	9	880	503,264	8%
Grand total	117	6,547	6,092,788	100%

11.2.6 With respect to IDP shelter, the IOM January 2024 report observed:

‘IDPs’ shelter typologies also reflect a dire financial and humanitarian situation. An alarming 19 per cent, or 334,594 households, were estimated to shelter in abandoned buildings, gathering sites, schools or other public buildings. Most IDP households in Sudan sheltered within the host community (49%, or 884,926 households). IDPs’ choice to reside with the host community may reflect their support from tribal connections and sheltering where a known social network exists. However, sheltering with communities increases demands on resources and may spur social tensions. Around a quarter of IDP households (27%, or 483,474 households) were sheltering in IDP camps. Individuals more commonly sheltered in the host community, camps, gathering sites (154,189) and schools or other public buildings (158,658), before rented accommodation (103,609).’^{[footnote 73]}

11.2.7 With respect to gender and age distribution of the IDPs, the same source noted:

‘‘In every age bracket analysed by DTM Sudan, female IDPs outnumbered male IDPs. Most IDPs were between 18 and 59 years old (3,602,156), of whom 1,875,529 (52%) were women. The next most populous age range of IDPs was between 6 and 17 years old (2,716,145), of whom, 53 per cent were females and 47 per cent were males. Notably, an estimated 24 per cent of all IDPs were children between the ages of 0 and 5 years old …’ ^{[footnote 74]}

11.3 Status and treatment of displaced populations

11.3.1 OCHA humanitarian update 7 December 2023 noted:

‘Since April 2023, UNHCR and its partners reached over 455,000 internally displaced persons (IDPs) with protection, relief supplies, shelter and cash assistance in a challenging and complex operational environment. In 2023, UNHCR supported nearly 85,000 of the most vulnerable IDPs and members of the host community with cash support of some US$3.2 million. UNHCR implements multi-purpose cash assistance for protection and basic needs along with cash for shelter programmes benefitting displaced people and host communities living together. In addition, UNHCR, together with its partners, is piloting cash for economic empowerment initiatives. This three-tiered cash approach aims to improve social protection and to catalyse community-driven economic recovery. Prior to the conflict, UNHCR’s cash interventions were centred on Darfur, while after its start, UNHCR’s cash interventions also reached people in the east and the north of the country.’^{[footnote 75]}

11.3.2 IOM report November 2023 has provided below figure showing the IDPs access of various services.^{[footnote 76]}

Access to services (proportion of IDPs) provided in the state:

	Not available at all	Available but not affordable	Available to access with no complication	Available but not good quality	Available but not safe to access	Available but too far from location	Available but overcrowded
Water	-	53%	21	20%	2%	3%	1%
Market Food	-	95%	-	2%	1%	2%	-
Market NFI	1%	73%	7%	1%	13%	5%
Healthcare	24%	31%	2%	39%	2	2%	-
Education	75%	4%	3%	7%	-	-	10
Transport/ Fuel	10%	61%	10%	12%	-	7%	-
Electricity	48%	7%	7%	37%	-	-	-
Government services	56%	20%	3%	6%	-	14%	-

11.3.3 IDPs access to services differed from state to state. For information on each state see IOM DTM Overview report February 2024.

‘Sanitation is particularly poor in IDP sites, since available facilities are under pressure because of the large influx of IDPs. In White Nile, the few available sanitation points are insufficient to serve the influx of displaced people. As at 2 August 2023, water demand in IDP sites in White Nile state had risen from 15m3 before the conflict to more than 300m3 per day.

‘The available sewer installation in White Nile IDP sites had also been exceeded, developing a risk of transferring waterborne diseases.‘^{[footnote 77]}

12. Food security

12.1 Overview

12.1.1 The WFP noted in its Sudan webpage noted:

‘The humanitarian situation in Sudan is teetering on the brink of catastrophe after conflict erupted across the country in mid-April 2023. Since 2019, the number of people facing acute food insecurity has more than tripled from 5.8 million to nearly 18 million. Nearly 5 million of these are in emergency levels of hunger.

‘The key drivers of the worsening food security situation include intensified conflict and growing intercommunal violence, economic crisis, soaring prices of food, fuel and essential goods, and below average agricultural production.’^{[footnote 78]}

12.1.2 The December 2023 report by the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), an innovative multi-partner initiative for improving food security and nutrition analysis and decision-making,^{[footnote 79]} noted:

‘The latest projection update of Sudan reveals that intense conflict and organized violence, coupled with the continued economic decline, have driven approximately 17.7 million people across Sudan (37 percent of the analysed population) into high levels of acute food insecurity, classified in IPC Phase 3 or above (Crisis or worse) between October 2023 and February 2024. Of those, about 4.9 million (10 percent of the population analysed) are in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency), and almost 12.8 million people (27 percent of the population analysed) are in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis).

‘… The most acutely food insecure populations are in states affected by high levels of organized violence, including Greater Darfur, Greater Kordofan and Khartoum – especially the tri-city area of Khartoum, Bahri and Omdurman. Across all areas heavily affected by conflict and organized violence, civilians experiencing movement restrictions, including due to sieges, are at heightened risk of high levels of food insecurity.’^{[footnote 80]}

12.1. 3 Citing various sources, the DFS and iMMAP report December 2023 noted:

‘… In Khartoum state, 3.9 million people (55 percent of the population) face high level of food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above), while in Greater Darfur about 5.3 million people (that represent 46 percent of the total population in Darfur region) are likely to be in Phase 3 or above. In Greater Kordofan, about 2.7 million (44 percent of the total population in Kordofan states) are in Phase 3 or above. These are the highest ever recorded figures during the harvesting season in Sudan.

‘… [T]he concentration of highest levels of severity and prevalence of food insecurity [are] in areas where the conflict is more intense. West Darfur (22%), Central Darfur (17%) Khartoum (17%), and West (16%) and South Kordofan (15%) are the states projecting the largest proportion of population experiencing IPC 4 by February 2024.’^{[footnote 81]}

12.1.4 According to a November 2023 WFP report that analysed the relationship between conflict and the rising food prices in Sudan (WFP report November 2023):

‘The greater Darfur, the Kordofans and Khartoum States account for approximately 40 and over 80 percent of the total national production of sorghum and millet [the most consumed stapple foods], respectively. Agricultural activities in these States have been hampered by episodes of active conflict leading to reduced planting which is likely to result in reduced harvests. The fallout of the conflict has been observed in other neighbouring States where sorghum is produced [Gedarif, El Gazira, Blue Nile, Sennar, White Nile], which may contribute to deficits in cereal crop production both regionally and nationally. Shortages in local markets and price spikes in the near-to-medium term are likely to occur, leading to a further erosion of the already compromised household purchasing power.’^{[footnote 82]}

12.1.5 The OCHA SSR February 2024 noted:

‘About 16 million people in Sudan have insufficient food consumption, according to the World Food Programme (WFP)’s Hunger Map. Darfur has the highest ratio of people with insufficient food consumption; in four of five states, it is more than 40 per cent of their respective state populations. West Darfur has about 49 per cent of its people with insufficient food consumption, in Central Darfur it is 46 per cent, in North Darfur 42 per cent, in South Darfur 41 per cent, and in East Darfur 33 per cent. According to the latest Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC) report on Sudan, 17.7 million people are acutely food insecure across Sudan between October 2023 and February 2024, including 4.9 million who are in emergency levels of acute food insecurity.’^{[footnote 83]}

12.1.6 The OCHA Humanitarian Dashboard of 31 December 2023 (OCHA HD 31 December 2023) noted: ‘Vulnerable groups, including women, children, persons with disabilities, refugees, and internally displaced persons, continue to face severe food insecurity conditions.’ ^{[footnote 84]}

12.1.7 For details on food situation in all states, see WFP Sudan Hunger Map.

12.2 Food prices

12.2.1 A September 2023 report by FEWS NET observed:

‘Staple foods prices indicated mixed trends across main markets in Sudan during the third week of September, the peak lean season, due to the continued disruption to flows and supplies. Price increases of 10-20 percent were seen in the main markets across Greater Darfur and Greater Kordofan, as well as in Dongola market in Northern state, as a result of tightened market supplies and increased marketing and transportation costs. By contrast, sorghum and millet prices in the markets of Ed Damazin, Sennar, and Gedaref … showed an unseasonal decline of around 10 percent driven by the continued disruptions to trade flow along key corridors, particularly from east to west, and in market functionality in conflict-affected areas. On average, the retail price of sorghum in September was 6 percent higher than in September 2022, while millet price is 16 percent lower compared to September 2022 prices… Locally produced wheat prices recorded the highest price increase of 29 percent compared to September 2022 … Overall, cereal prices remain significantly above their five-year average – 252, 259, and 175 percent higher for sorghum, wheat, and millet, respectively – driven by high production and transportation costs, high inflation, and persistent local currency depreciation …’^{[footnote 85]}

12.2.1 WFP has produced below table showing staple price changes in key markets: ^{[footnote 86]}

State	Market	Commodity	September 2023	Year on year	% change from March
North Darfur	Al Fashir	Sorghum	1,988	42%	43%
North Darfur	Al Fashir	Millet	2,200	-8%	34%
Blue Nile	Damazin	Sorghum	1,225	-35%	-18%
Blue Nile	Damazin	Millet	2,125	-15%	6%
West Kordofan	El Fula	Sorghum	1,467	-8%	60%
West Kordofan	El Fula	Millet	2,367	-7%	122%
North Kordofan	El Obeid	Sorghum	1,267	-10%	32%
North Kordofan	El Obeid	Millet	2,000	-17%	45%
South Kordofan	Kadugli	Sorghum	1,817	40%	82%
South Kordofan	Kadugli	Millet	2,200	10%	10%
Kassala	Kassala	Sorghum	925	-20%	16%
Kassala	Kassala	Millet	1,750	-30%	40%
White Nile	Kosti	Sorghum	1,000	-18%	25%
White Nile	Kosti	Millet	1,850	-31%	23%
Red Sea	Port Sudan	Sorghum	840	-15%	-11%
Red Sea	Port Sudan	Millet	1,380	-32%	-1%

12.2.3 A December 2023 report by the US Agency for International Development (USAID) commented that ‘Surging market prices due to diminished access to agricultural livelihoods and transportation routes, insecurity, and shortages of basic goods continue to threaten food security countrywide, according to the UN World Food Program (WFP).’^{[footnote 87]}

12.3 Provision of food assistance

12.3. 1 In its Sudan webpage, no date, WFP noted: ‘Despite widespread insecurity and access constraints, WFP has delivered life-saving food and nutrition assistance to over 5.2 million people since the start of the conflict – including in some of the most hard-to-reach areas in the Darfur region.’^{[footnote 88]}

12.3. 2 The OCHA HD 31 December 2023) noted:

‘Between 1 January and 31 December the FSL Cluster has reached 10.86M people across Sudan with life-saving food and emergency livelihoods assistance with the support of 39 FSL Partners. Around 157 localities were covered with FSL response in 18 states with 4.68M beneficiaries with Food assistance and 6.2M with emergency livelihoods response.

‘Between 15th April and 31st December the FSL sector has reached 9.49M people with life-saving food and emergency livelihoods assistance during the reporting period. The FSL response covered 154 localities in 18 states with 3.76M beneficiaries provided with food and 5.72M beneficiaries provided with emergency livelihoods assistance.

‘Whilst the FSL Cluster was able to reach 10.86M people since the beginning of 2023, it is only 72.4% of the overall target. The FSL sector was unable to reach the remaining 28.6% due to security reasons, access constraints, and other limitations caused by the escalation of the conflict in Sudan.’^{[footnote 89]}

12.3.3 The same source noted that 42 organisations worked in the FSL cluster and that of the US$581.2 million required for FSL cluster US$ 293.4 million (50.5%%) had been received.^{[footnote 90]}

13. Education

13.1 Impact of fighting on education

13.1.1 The OCHA HRP 17 May 2023 observed with respect to the impact of the conflict on education:

‘Education has been severely affected, with schools and educational institutions remaining closed in conflict-affected areas, namely Khartoum, Aj Jazirah, South Darfur, West Darfur and West Kordofan. With approximately 6.9 million children not attending school before the conflict, the learning crisis has deepened with higher levels of risk of physical and mental threats, including recruitment into armed groups. As of 11 May, schools and educational institutions have started to reopen in areas not affected by hostilities, preparing for the final academic year examinations.’^{[footnote 91]}

13.1.2 The same source added:

‘The conflict has negatively impacted the education of affected girls, boys and adolescents, including children with disabilities who face challenges in accessing inclusive quality education in a safe and protective learning environment. In addition, the conflict exposes vulnerable children to a range of life-threatening risks such as GBV including child marriage; female genital mutilation (FGM); human / sex trafficking and SEA recruitment by armed actors and child labour. Structured learning programmes protect children from exploitation, abuse, and involuntary recruitment into armed groups.’^{[footnote 92]}

13.1.3 A 15 November 2023 report by OCHA observed:

‘The conflict has deprived about 12 million children of schooling since April, with the total number of children in Sudan who are out of school reaching 19 million, Save the Children (SC) and the UN Children’s Agency (UNICEF) reported. Of this total, 6.5 million children — or 1 in every 3 children in the country — have lost access to school due to increased violence and insecurity, with at least 10,400 schools now closed in conflict - affected areas. Meanwhile, over 5.5 million children who reside in areas less affected by war are waiting for local authorities to confirm whether classrooms can be re-opened. Before April, nearly 7 million children were already out of school. If the war continues, no child in Sudan can return to school in the coming months, exposing them to immediate and long-term dangers, including displacement, recruitment into armed groups and sexual violence. Sudan is on the brink of becoming home to the worst education crisis in the world,” according to UNICEF.’^{[footnote 93]}

13.1.4 OCHA HRD 18 December 2023 noted:

‘More than half of children enrolled in schools in the conflict-affected states, approximately 6.4 million children, had their learning disrupted and suspended till the end of Oct 2023. In addition, 2 million school-aged children have been internally displaced and have no access to education services. Schools have been destroyed with some occupied by armed groups and IDPs. These schools remain far from safe and protective spaces. Despite the school re-opening plans in place, only River Nile has re-opened schools in a phased manner and there are on-going school re-opening discussions in the rest of the states.’^{[footnote 94]}

13.2 Assistance in education

13.2.1 OCHA HRD 31 December 2023 noted that of the US$131.0 million funding required for the education cluster to assist 4.3 million people out of the 8.6 million people in need, US$15.5M (11.9%) had been received as at 31 December 2023.^{[footnote 95]} The same source noted that 16 organisations provided educational assistance.^{[footnote 96]}

13.2.2 A November 2023 report by UNICEF stated:

‘… UNICEF and partners established 751 child friendly safe learning spaces since January 2023 to provide close to 187,000 children, including over 94,000 girls, structured learning and an opportunity to resume friendships, socialize with their peers, engage in playful learning, develop skills, receive care and basic psychosocial support towards their holistic development by trained and attentive teachers.

‘During the reporting period, UNICEF established 77 new safe learning spaces, including in safe pockets in hotspot states like East Darfur, West Darfur, and the Kordofans and welcomed around 13,900 additional children. Of these, almost 5,700 girls and boys received learning materials and 4,108 adolescents actively engaged in adolescent-led sports, cultural, and health clubs to further enhance their overall wellbeing and holistic development. Moreover, 1,118 facilitators have been trained and equipped with skills to support children’s wellbeing and learning.

‘UNICEF’s Learning Passport continues to support uninterrupted learning for affected children, including those in areas of active conflict, displaced or on the move. Currently, over 33,000 children (with more than 7,300 users in October alone) both in Sudan and in neighbouring countries have been reached with access to quality, inclusive and gamified education through the programme.’ ^{[footnote 97]}

13.2.3 OCHA HRD 31 December 2023 noted:

‘The Education emergency response has provided education opportunities to 87,433 (44,419 girls) crisis-affected children. Safe learning centres have been established to ensure children’s safety. The children have been supported with psychosocial services, learning materials and recreational materials.

‘Furthermore, the Education Sector has been pushing its advocacy for school re-opening with the State ministry of Education.

Education gaps remain huge with only 87,433 of the 4.3 million targeted children reached. 2 million school aged children have been internally displaced and an estimated 5 million children are still trapped in conflict hotspots.

There are two main challenges to re-opening schools - lack of finances to support the teacher’s salary and the fact that 8% of schools are used as shelter by displaced people.’^{[footnote 98]}

The Education emergency response has provided education opportunities to 87,433 (44,419 girls) crisis-affected children Safe learning centres have been established to ensure children’s safety. The children have been supported with psychosocial services, learning materials and recreational materials.

‘Education gaps remain huge with only 87,433 [or 2 %] of the 4.3 million targeted children reached. 2 million school aged children have been internally displaced and an estimated 5 million children are still trapped in conflict hotspots.

‘There are two main challenges to re-opening schools - lack of finances to support the teacher’s salary and the fact that 8% of schools are used as shelter by displaced people.’^{[footnote 99]}

14. Healthcare

14.1 Access to health care before the conflict

14.1.1 CI report May 2023 observed: ‘Before the conflict broke out in 2023, 70% of the population reported that they had access to a health facility within 30 minutes travel from their home and 80% has access to health facilities within one-hour’s travel; however, these facilities were poorly equipped (including limited electricity) and had minimal staff with the appropriate range of skills to meet the needs of the community…’^{[footnote 100]}

14.1.2 Acaps report 21 June 2023 noted:

‘Before the April conflict, access to healthcare was already severely constrained throughout Sudan, which faced a shortage of facilities, personnel, medicine, and equipment.

‘… Sudan was unable to maintain a steady supply of medicine and medical resources because of poor macroeconomic conditions and a lack of hard currency. A 2022 survey found that an average of 31%, 30%, and 51% of critical medication was respectively available in public, private, and humanitarian-supported health facilities. Aid and medical supplies were mostly dispatched from Khartoum, and laboratory tests and other aspects of health provision were performed in the capital, where there was a highly centralised health system. During the 2022 flooding, the affected population lacked access to basic medicine and first aid kits …  Insecurity is expected to continue disrupting this supply chain in Khartoum, with several health facilities, labs and warehouses being occupied, affecting conflict-affected and flood-prone states. Furthermore, humanitarian-run facilities require permission from SAF to resupply, which is being frequently blocked in RSF-controlled areas.’^{[footnote 101]}

14.2 Access to health care before the conflict

14.2.1 A September 2023 article ‘by Alaa Dafallah and others published by Conflict and Health, a peer reviewed open access journal documenting the public 1. health impacts and responses related to armed conflict, humanitarian crises and forced migration^{[footnote 102]} stated:

‘Healthcare services have been severely compromised. As of 23rd July, less than one third of hospitals in conflict zones are functional, with 70% of hospitals out of service. Of the 59 hospitals out of service in conflict zones, 17 were attacked by artillery and 20 were evacuated, of which 12 have been forcibly militarized and converted into barracks by the RSF. The remaining hospitals suspended services due to power outages, shortage of fuel for generators, lack of medical supplies and critical lack of health workers. Additionally, the RSF also seized multiple public health assets critical for service delivery including the National Public Health Laboratory, the Central Blood Bank, and the National Medical Supplies Fund, contributing to critically low medical supplies and blood reserves across several other states …

‘In-service hospitals are reporting severe health worker shortages. Health workers are among thousands that have fed the capital since the start of the war severely limiting capacity in hospitals. The remaining health workers are either unable to access health facilities due to fear for their safety or are exhausted, burdened by acute shortages in specialized cadres such as surgeons and anaesthetists and medical supplies.

‘Violence against health workers, albeit not new to Sudan, has escalated. Since the commencement of the conflict, 13 health workers were killed, 4 have been abducted by militia and 9 are reported missing.’^{[footnote 103]}

14.2.2 The WHO’s September 2023 situation report noted:

‘More than 70% of health facilities in conflict-affected states areas are non-functional, leading to extremely limited – and sometimes no – access to health care for millions in Sudan, who are either trapped in war zones or displaced.

‘Shortages of medicines and medical supplies, including treatment for chronic diseases continue to be reported despite provision of supplies by health partners, including WHO. Health care workers have not been paid for four months, triggering strikes in some states like Red Sea, Northern and Kordofan.

‘Insecurity, displacement, limited access to medicines, medical supplies, electricity and water continue to pose enormous challenges to the delivery of health care across the entire country. Both states directly affected by the conflict such as Khartoum, West, Central and South Darfur, and North and South Kordofan and relatively peaceful states feel the brunt of the war and its effect on health care. States not directly affected by the war are receiving displaced people, hence the strain on health care and other services.

‘… Closure of the Khartoum-Kadugli and Dilling-Kadugli roads is affecting the dispatch of medical supplies to several states in the western part of the country.’^{[footnote 104]}

14.2.3 The October 2023 OCHA humanitarian access situation report noted ‘About 70 to 80 percent of hospitals in conflict-affected states are non-functional because of ongoing attacks combined with insecurity, shortages of medical supplies, and lack of cash to meet operational costs and salaries. For example, only 77 out of the 107 government-run dialysis centres are currently functional and those in place are severely limited in capacity, affecting more than 9,000 patients.’^{[footnote 105]}

14.2.4 The OCHA HRD noted that as of 31 December 2023: ‘The health system and infrastructure in Sudan was already inadequate before the conflict With combat largely centered around urban centers, 70% of health facilities have become nonfunctional in conflict affected areas while remaining areas have significant shortages of staff, equipment, and medical supplies. Healthcare worker salaries have also been unpaid since the conflict began.’^{[footnote 106]}

14.3 Attacks on health facilities

14.3.1 According to WHO Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA), which displays data from countries with complex humanitarian emergencies, from 15 April to 14 December 2023, there had been 60 verified attacks on health facilities which caused 34 deaths and 30 injuries compared to 23 attacks, 7 deaths and 4 injuries in the whole of 2022. The report further noted that of the 60 verified attacks [from 15 April – 14 December 2023] 39 attacks impacted facilities, 8 transport, 23 personnel, 7 patients, 17 supplies, 7 warehouses.^{[footnote 107]}

14.3.2 CPIT has produced below figure based on WHO SSA data showing numbers of monthly attacks and casualties from 15 April to 14 December 2023.^{[footnote 108]}

Number of attacks and casualties 15 April to 14 December 2023:

Month	Attacks	Deaths	Injuries
April	27	8	18
May	19	0	0
June	4	2	3
July	3	1	17
August	3	0	0
October	4	23	0

14.4 Disease outbreak

14.4.1 The UN Security Council report on the situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan (UNITAMS) of November 2023 noted with respect to health:

‘…More than 70 per cent of hospitals in the conflict-afflicted states are no longer functional. Disease outbreaks – including cholera, dengue fever, malaria and measles – that were under control before the conflict have been on the rise owing to the disruption of public health services and causing deaths. WHO launched a funding appeal to raise $145.2 million to provide medical support to 7.6 million people in dire need of health assistance.’^{[footnote 109]}

14.4.2 UNICEF report November 2023 noted:

‘… According to the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH), outbreaks of cholera and dengue fever (in Gedarif, Gezira and Khartoum), and measles continue. As of 31 October, there have been more than 2,200 cases of acute watery diarrhoea (AWD) and 77 associated deaths. Meanwhile, the cumulative number of suspected measles cases has reached over 1,100 with active cases in Blue Nile, Gezira, Sennar and White Nile. All these factors are jeopardizing an already exhausted health system, making any further disruptions of the health care services across the country cost at least 10,000 young lives by the end of 2023.’^{[footnote 110]}

14.4.3 The 24 December OCHA Sudan cholera outbreak flash update noted:

‘At least 8,267 suspected cases of cholera, including 224 associated deaths (case fatality rate of 2.7 per cent), were reported as of 23 December from 46 localities of nine states, according to the Federal Ministry of Health (FMoH) and the World Health Organization (WHO) Sudan Outbreaks Dashboard. This is an increase of about 104 per cent compared to the number of cases reported on 23 November 2023. So far, there are 2,240 suspected cases and 77 associated deaths in Red Sea; 2,005 suspected cases of cholera and 49 associated deaths in Gedaref; 1,859 suspected cases and 26 associated deaths in Aj Jazirah; 1,090 suspected cases and 31 associated deaths in White Nile; 525 suspected cases and 26 associated deaths in Khartoum; 346 suspected cases and eight associated deaths in South Kordofan; 113 suspected cases and four associated deaths in Sennar; 86 suspected cases and three associated deaths in Kassala; and three suspected case in Blue Nile.’^{[footnote 111]}

14.5 Healthcare assistance

14.5.1 The OCHA SSR 17 August 2023 stated:

‘While the conflict has affected health services in states directly impacted by the fighting, states that have not witnessed active conflict are also suffering from the lack of supplies, especially as newly displaced people are arriving from conflict areas. Currently, an estimated 11 million people in Sudan need urgent health assistance, including about 4 million children and pregnant and breastfeeding women who are acutely malnourished, and more than 100,000 children under the age of five with severe acute malnutrition (SAM) with medical complications who need specialized care at stabilization centres. Hospitals, ambulances, supplies, warehouses, health workers and patients have been attacked in Sudan.’^{[footnote 112]}

14.5.2 WHO report September 2023 noted:

‘WHO is working intensively to continue to distribute lifesaving medical supplies. Since the start of the war in Sudan, WHO has shipped over 1000 metric tons of medicines, medical supplies and equipment including trauma kits, blood bags, medicines for chronic diseases and infectious diseases, diagnostic kits, cold-chain equipment and incinerators. 770 metric tons have been dispatched from Port Sudan to WHO hubs in different states, 240 metric tons have been distributed to government health authorities and partners.

‘… WHO launched 14 mobile clinics and primary health care centres in Khartoum, Kassala, Red Sea, White Nile states, Sennar State, Gezira and North Darfur States … Ten more mobile clinics will be launched in September.

‘WHO has been conducting weekly online trainings on case management since the start of the conflict; these sessions have been conducted by more than 10 000 health care workers to date …

‘Two WHO trauma experts trained 20 health care workers from five states in mass casualty management (MCM). These 20 doctors and nurses, brought together from nine hospitals, will in turn train others. Thirty health care workers who participated in MCM prior to the war had trained 200 others.

‘The same WHO experts also trained 14 emergency doctors from five states on pre-hospital trauma care … as trained trainers …’^{[footnote 113]}

14.5.3 UNICEF report November 2023 noted: ‘Despite challenges, UNICEF and partners have reached 5.9 million people with health supplies.’^{[footnote 114]}

14.5.4 The OCHA HRD 31 December 2023 noted that US$ 178.6 million funding was required for health of which US$ 132.4 million (74.1% had been received. ^{[footnote 115]} The same source further noted that 41 organisations worked in the health cluster reaching 24.0% of the 7.6 million targeted for assistance^{[footnote 116]} and that:

‘Throughout 2023, health partners have provided medical supplies for 3.3 million treatments. Despite the complex nature of the conflict and multiple challenges, the health cluster partners managed to maintain their reach supporting 1.8 million people with medical consultations (28% of the targeted population). Over 17,000 trauma consultations, 3,873 mental health consultations and 5,800 psychosocial support sessions were provided and 86,000 deliveries were supported.

‘Health partners reported that 503 health facilities were supported including 421 primary healthcare centers, 41 hospitals, and 13 specialized centers, as well as 28 mobile clinics to improve access to care. In December, additional mobile clinics were deployed to Kassala, Gedarif, Blue Nile and North Darfur providing 6,700 SRH focused medical consultations.

‘An Integrated Multisectoral Cholera Response Plan is being implemented in 18 states with Cholera Taskforces and rapid response teams established in affected states. Starting November 2023, an Oral Cholera Vaccination (OCV) campaign was carried out with 99.6% administrative coverage in Gezira and Gedaref and 64.5% coverage in Khartoum states.’^{[footnote 117]}

14.5.5 The same source added:

‘Though partners have extended themselves to maintain their support for health care services after the conflict began, only 23% of targeted people were reached by the health cluster partners between April to December 2023 due to limited funding and access constraints. Partners have also had limited ability to scale up in response to the changing context such as the cholera outbreak where gaps remain in the provision of support to cholera treatment centers and oral rehydration points.’ ^{[footnote 118]}

14.5.6 For details of the health assistance provided by ICRC see Sudan: Essential services at breaking point after two months of fighting.

15. Water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH)

15.1 Access to WASH prior to April 2021

15.1.1 A WHO/UNICEF joint monitoring progress report published in August 2022 provided the following information regarding WASH provision in Sudan in 2021:

• 27% of the population had basic water service, 56% limited service and 17% no service
• 7% had basic sanitation service, 75% limited service and 19% no service and
• 17% had basic hygiene service, 14 % limited service and 68% no service^{[footnote 119]}.

15.1.2 A November 2023 report by Acaps on the impact of the conflict on WASH (Acaps report November 2023 noted:

‘Water access in Sudan was already precarious for many people before the start of the current conflict. As at November 2020, around 32% of Sudan’s population did not have access to basic domestic water supply for drinking and household use, and only 28.2% of Sudan’s population had access to both domestic water supply and sanitation facilities.

‘At a national level, coverage for drinking water was estimated at 60% as at December 2022. Blue Nile, Gadaref, and Red Sea were the states with the lowest levels of coverage. Among the rural population, only 53% had access to a drinking water source within a 30-minute walk, 28% had to walk more than 30 minutes to find drinking water, and the remaining 19% consumed contaminated water. 28% of water sources had insufficient water, and 25% were reported as not functioning as at November 2022.’^{[footnote 120]}

15.1.3 With respect to sanitation Acaps report November 2023 noted:

‘In 2020, more than 10.5 million people in Sudan practised open defecation, meaning that they defecated in bushes and other open areas. The country has the most people practising open defecation in the Middle East and North Africa regions.

‘Open defecation can result in human waste contaminating water sources used for drinking water, such as rivers. This risk increases especially during the rainy season, as floods often carry waste and discharge it into larger bodies of water. This can expose the population to waterborne diseases. Particularly for women, a lack of privacy when practising open defecation also creates the risk of sexual harassment or violence.

‘By 2022, half of Sudan’s schools had no water access or only had dysfunctional facilities. Handwashing facilities were only available in 10% of schools in the country.’ ^{[footnote 121]}

15.2 Access to WASH post April 2023

15.2.1 CARE report May 2023 observed:

‘Nationwide, the crumbling WASH infrastructure has left 17.3 million people lacking access to basic level drinking water supply, and approximately 24 million lacking access to proper sanitation facilities with more than 10.5 million people practicing open defecation … As the clashes continue, reports indicate a destruction of public infrastructures that further challenges the already limited water and sanitation infrastructure. …There is concern people may drink from the Nile or use the same toughs as animals as there is a lack of potable water, which may increase diarrheal disease and other water-borne illnesses. Moreover, 46% of schools do not have access to sufficient drinking water services and 71% of schools reported not having any handwashing facilities. Lack of access to clean water disproportionately affects women and children as they are more vulnerable to the safety and protection risks associated with adaptations …’^{[footnote 122]}

15.2.2 The World Health Organization Situation report published in July 2023 stated: ‘The lack of safe drinking water in hotspot states like Khartoum due to some water stations going out of service is forcing people to use water from unsafe sources, increasing the risk of water-borne diseases.’ ^{[footnote 123]}

15.2.3 Citing a number of sources, the Acaps report November 2023 noted:

‘Among the IDPs in Sudan, about 7% live in formal camps, approximately 4% in improvised shelters, 5% in schools or public buildings, and 4% in informal open-area settlements. In mid-August, IOM identified WASH services as one of the main needs for these IDPs.

‘In formal camps, while access to treated water sources is high, water is insufficient for the population. For example, in White Nile camps, over 90% of households reported collecting water from treated sources, but only 5–54% of households (depending on the camp) reported having at least 10L of drinking water storage per person … Access to WASH facilities is also low and varies between camps. The range between camps is 6–15% for households with access to soap and 71–90% for households defecating in toilets.

‘In informal settlements or makeshift shelters, access to WASH services is more precarious …The lack of sanitation facilities leads them to resort to open defecation, creating the risk of diseases and infections …

‘As at 18 July, the RSF had taken control of four water supply stations in Khartoum: Beit El Mal (Omdurman), Burri (Khartoum), El Mogran (Khartoum), and Khartoum North (Khartoum). This has resulted in water cuts in Khartoum North and Omdurman. Several water station workers have also been detained …

‘In Darfur region, the situation is similar, as damage to power and water stations and the risks for technical staff to access them have resulted in constant water cuts since the start of the fighting. Garbage in urban neighbourhoods has also been left uncollected for weeks, and dead bodies have remained in the streets for days. With the onset of the rainy season, these increase the risk of water contamination and waterborne disease transmission. The drinking water shortage remained a problem as at 13 August. There are some reports of civilians dying from hunger and a lack of clean water, although there is a lack of up-to-date numbers.’ ^{[footnote 124]}

15.2.4 A December 2023 report by UNICEF stated:

‘Khartoum and other areas in the war zone have suffered acute water shortages due to the destruction of the water supply facilities. All states have also suffered water shortages due to electricity outages and fuel shortages needed to operate the water supply stations. Furthermore, the unavailability of water purifying materials also has deterred the operation of water corporations for clean water supply. The loss of purifying materials is either due to access and security issues or insufficiency of financing to import needed materials given the looting and destruction that affected the warehouses of the Water, Environment and Sanitation Unit and water corporations.’^{[footnote 125]}

15.2.5 Citing sources, DFS and iMMAP report December 2023) noted:

‘Unrepaired damaged infrastructure and high fuel prices lead to a decline in water trucking, contributing to lack of access to safe drinking water across Sudan.

‘In conflict-affected areas of Khartoum and Darfur, large water treatment plants and water supply systems that normally serve up to one million people are no longer functioning due to conflict-related damage and a lack of staff. In IDP camps and smaller localities affected by conflict, hostilities have also damaged water pumps, causing temporary or longer-term water cuts.

‘Fuel is often unavailable, leading to volatile and high costs. Since April [2023], there has been a 300-400% increase in the cost of operating water systems and water trucks, ultimately leading to a decline in the operation of fuel-dependent water supply systems and water pumping stations, as well as water trucking. This impacts people living in remote communities in particular.^{[footnote 126]}

15.2.6 The same source added:

‘… [U]rban areas, and areas with high numbers of IDPs have been unable to accommodate the growing number of people with adequate WASH services. Overcrowding in these areas results in significant pressure on limited water supply and sanitation facilities, leading to increased unhygienic practices such as open defecation and increased protection risks as people are required to travel far distances to access water. At the national level, 38% of surveyed IDP households stated that water was available but not affordable and 22% said it was available but not good quality, while 36% said it was available with no complication. Despite 36% of respondents facing no challenges in accessing water, over two million IDPs rely on WASH partners daily across Sudan. REACH data shows that in West Darfur, 59% of the key informants reported that their main drinking water sources were unprotected, and 26% reported that most people were not using any sanitation facilities and were instead practicing open defecation. Key WASH needs for IDPs and host communities include sustainable water supply, as well as access to latrines.’^{[footnote 127]}

15.2.7 The IOM February 2024 report noted that as of 28 January 2024, 21% of IDP households surveyed nationally stated that water was available to access with no complication, 35% said it was available but not affordable, 20% said it was available but not good quality, 2% said it was available but not safe to access, 3% said it was available but far from location and 1% said it was available but overcrowded. while 36% said it was available with no complication. ^{[footnote 128]}

15.3 Wash assistance

15.3.1 According to OCHA HRD 18 December 2023, 14.9 million people were in need of WASH, 6.1 million were targeted for assistance, US$230.9 million funding was required for WASH of which US%89.6 million (38.8%) had been received as of 30 November 2023. ^{[footnote 129]} Noting that 89 organisations worked in WASH cluster the same source added:

‘WASH sector partners supported humanitarian WASH interventions to reach around 4 million people [65.5% of those targeted], of which 1.9 million people accessed basic water services, 2 million accessed adequate, protected, and gender-sensitive sanitation services, and more than 278,000 accessed gender-sensitive hygiene and reached with environmental health interventions. ^{[footnote 130]}

15.3.2. Acaps report November 2023 noted: ‘As at 24 August, humanitarian responders were actively providing WASH services in IDP sites across the country, although challenges such as liquidity issues, fuel shortages, power shortages, and insecurity persisted’.^{[footnote 131]} According to OCHA HRD 28 November 2023 ‘WASH sector partners supported humanitarian WASH interventions to reach around 4 million people (65.5% of those targeted), of which 1.9 million people accessed basic water services, 2 million accessed adequate, protected, and gender-sensitive sanitation services, and more than 278,000 accessed gender-sensitive hygiene and reached with environmental health interventions.’^{[footnote 132]}

15.3.3 UNICEF report November 2023 observed:

‘UNICEF continued to provide lifesaving WASH services to 16 of the most conflict affected states in Sudan reaching around 952,500 additional people (including 524,000 children) with safe drinking water, around 23,400 people (including 12,900 children) with appropriate sanitation services, and around 628,500 (including 346,000 children) with hygiene promotion interventions. Additionally, around 24,400 people (including 6,100 children) benefitted from the distribution of critical WASH supplies, mainly hygiene kits, soap and jerry cans.’^{[footnote 133]}

15.3.4 The OCHA Cholera outbreak flash report 24 December 2023 stated with respect to WASH:

‘The provision of safe drinking water, water chlorination and water quality monitoring, and hygiene promotion/cleaning campaigns are ongoing in Gedaref, Aj Jazirah, White Nile, Kassala, Red Sea, Sennar, and Blue Nile states, as well as providing supplies to Khartoum. Activities are underway for chlorinating over 3,000 water supply sources/shock chlorination of hand-dug wells (HDW), including water storage and distribution points (donkey carts, water tankers), with over 2.5 million people reached.’^{[footnote 134]}

15.3.5 According to the OCHA HRD report as at 31 December 2023, 88 organisations worked in the WASH cluster, 107.7% of the targeted people had been reached with assistance and US$ 96.9 million (42.0%) of the US$ 230.9 million funding required for WASH had been received. ^{[footnote 135]}

15.3.6 The same source added:

‘The WASH cluster has three main components for response. The water supply targeting 4.3 million people was almost achieved for the year, this mainly because of supporting the bulk water treatment with chemicals (polymer and chlorine) in urban areas, enabling the partners to cover more people with less money. However, this is unsustainable and will depend on how long the consumables are supplied by partners for the existing water treatment plants. A sanitation target of 0.9 million is reported to be achieved mainly because of supporting the maintenance and operation of existing facilities and the construction/ rehabilitation of emergency temporary latrines. Again, these were not very sustainable and were to maintain the public health guidelines. The cluster is about 30% (3.5/4.8 million) short of achieving the hygiene promotion result of reaching 4.8 million people. One of the key reasons for underachievement was the shortfall of supplies or means to practice hygiene due to limited funding.’^{[footnote 136]}

16. Shelter and non-food items (NFI)

16.1 Overview

16.1.1 The Global Shelter Cluster, Shelter & NFI Cluster Coordination Meeting 8 January 2024 (Global Shelter Cluster Meeting report 8 January 2024) stated:

‘There are 5.7 million people (an increase from 3 million) in need of shelter assistance, but the Shelter & Non-Food Items (NFI) Cluster in Sudan faces multiple challenges as it strives to provide critical assistance to vulnerable populations. Before 15 April 2023, shelter and NFI needs were already acute, exacerbated by the significant underfunding of the cluster’s work.

‘The intensity of the new clashes and their seemingly indiscriminate nature are causing widespread damage and devastation to housing, household assets, and public infrastructure, prompting many to flee their homes. 1.9 million people (an increase from 1.5 million) will be targeted by the Shelter & NFI Cluster’s response; the increase is more modest due to challenges with access, fuel, market functionality, and banking services. USD$ 212.4 million is required for an adequate shelter response…

‘Countless people fleeing for their lives urgently need shelter and NFI assistance, as many, including children, women, elderly, and others with specific needs, find themselves crammed into overcrowded public buildings, or forced to sleep outdoors exposed to severe weather and threats. Immediate provision of shelter will be critical to ensure privacy and safety, mitigate GBV risks, and safeguard displaced populations from harsh environmental conditions to preserve their health amid the upcoming rainy season. Provision of essential household items will be crucial for restoring basic daily activities. Items such as bedding and cooking utensils, solar lamps for safety and security after dark, and solar chargers for maintaining connectivity, as well as mosquito nets to combat the upcoming malaria season, are all vitally important.’^{[footnote 137]}

16.1.2 Citing a number of sources, DFS and iMMAP report December 2023 observed:

‘The effects of the rainy season and subsequent flooding as well as ongoing clashes have led to the continued damage and destruction of housing, including homes, IDP camps, and makeshift shelters, causing further displacement. Simultaneously, this increased displacement from conflict-affected areas such as Khartoum and Central, and South Darfur has put severe strain on host communities across River Nile, Al Jazirah and parts of Darfur sheltering displaced persons, leading to a decrease in support for IDPs as host community needs are no longer being met.

‘… While previously the majority of IDPs were taken in by host community families, the strain on resources and worsened living conditions this has caused have led to a reported dwindling of host community solidarity as the conflict continues, leading IDPs to seek shelter elsewhere. The total percent of IDPs seeking accommodation with host communities has now fallen from 77% to 69%, yet only 11% of IDPs can afford to rent accommodations on their own. The number of people seeking shelter in public buildings have risen significantly, with UNICEF now reporting over 1000 schools being used as shelters for IDPs across Sudan, while previous data stated just 171 schools. The number of IDPs living in open and makeshift shelters has also risen from 0.1 to 5%, with the remaining 9% sheltering in IDP camps, with poor living conditions caused in particular by a lack of adequate WASH services.
‘In overcrowded shelters, the specific needs of women, children, and older people are unmet, such as separate latrines for women, and safety and accessibility for older people, people with disabilities, women and children, causing many to sleep outdoors or rotate between living in makeshift shelters and open areas where they are exposed to severe weather conditions and protection risks including GBV…’^{[footnote 138]}

16.1.3 The same source added:

‘In the latest data from West Darfur, 46% of key informants reported that access to adequate shelter had worsened in the month prior (September 2023), and 68% of these same informants reported that shelters in their settlement had been completely destroyed by conflict, whereas 25% reported their shelters as severely damaged and 24% as moderately damaged. Many informants also noted that shelter is inaccessible due to those shelters being occupied by armed groups and due to restrictions of movement within their settlements. The most common shelters reported by key informants were semi-permanent mud-brick or adobe shelters (33% of respondents), finished house or apartment (25%), a makeshift or improvised shelter (24%), and emergency shelters such as tents.’^{[footnote 139]}

16.1.4 1CPIT has produced below table based on IOM data^{[footnote 140]} showing IDP shelter categories in each state as of November 2023.

State	Number of displaced households	Camps	Host Community	Rented accommodation	Improvised/critical shelters	Schools/public buildings	Open area/informal
Al Jazirah	77,285	0%	81%	1%	0%	16%	5.5 %
Blue Nile	26,283	0%	66%	30%	0%	1%	3%
Central Darfur	74,787	22%	32%	0%	2%	11%	33%
East Darfur	132,146	2%	80%	2%	2%	13%	1%
Gedaref	74,887	0%	79%	14%	0%	6%	1%
Kassala	33,272	0%	76%	17%	0%	6%	1%
Khartoum	8,942	0%	80%	19%	0%	1%	0%
North Darfur	91,975	19%	45%	<1%	2%	10%	24%
North Kordofan	28827	0%	94%	<1%	1%	4%	1%
Northern	80,009	0%	85%	8%	0%	8%	<1%
Red Sea	47,884	0%	53%	33%	2%	6%	5%
River Nile	139,267	0%	80%	16%	<1%	5%	<1%
Sennar	86,848	0%	84%	5%	<1%	3%	8%
South Darfur	140,623	18%	39%	0%	2%	35%	5%
South Kordofan	25,012	0%	76%	1%	0%	12%	12%
West Darfur	25,708	0%	52%	0%	3%	43%	2%
West Kordofan	19,813	0%	95%	1%	0%	3%	1%
White Nile	100,115	17%	64%	7%	0%	9%	3%

16.1.5 The IOM has provided the below figure showing shelter categories by households as of 24 January 2024.^{[footnote 141]}

Shelter categories (by households)	Numbers	Percent
Camps	79,264	7%
Host communities	816,983	67%
Improvised/critical shelters	12,414	1%
Rented accommodation	84,744	7%
Schools or other public buildings	145, 860	12%
Open are informal settlements	74,418	6%

16.1 Provision of shelter and NFI

16.1.1 The OCHA HRD 31 December 2023 noted that US$212.4 million was required for the Shelter/NFI cluster of which US99.5 million (46.9%) had been received as at 31 December 2023^{[footnote 142]}. The same source stated that 25 international organisations worked in the Shelter/NFI cluster.^{[footnote 143]}

16.1.2 The same source noted:

‘Since the beginning of the year, cluster partners have provided diverse forms of shelter and NFI assistance to 603,695 Sudanese people and 282,215 refugees.

‘This includes 439,575 IDPs, returnees and vulnerable residents, that were supported post April 15, across 18 states… To alleviate their situation, partners distributed 79,286 NFI kits, 4,827 cash vouchers for NFI kits, 3,371 emergency shelter kits, 2,130 tents, and 388 cash grants for shelter repair. Moreover, 60 cash grants were provided for shelter, and 30 communal shelters were set up, while 5 generators were distributed to health facilities.

‘This also includes 211,880 refugees, supported post April 15, across 8 states – White Nile, Gedaref, East Darfur, Kassala, North Darfur, Blue Nile, and Aj Jazirah, with 37,580 NFI kits, 7,537 emergency shelter kits, 3,700 cash grants for shelter, 3,074 tents and 30 communal shelters. Additionally, 6 camps in White Nile and neighboring communities benefited from construction of embankments for flood mitigation, while 4 camps in Gedaref underwent desilting of the drains for flood preparedness, as well as prepositioning of excavators for the rapid response amidst flood emergencies.’^{[footnote 144]}

16.1.3 The Global Shelter Cluster Meeting report 8 January 2024 provided the following information with respect to Shelter and NFI assistance from 15 April to December 31 2023:

• 131.6K overall households reached of which 50% received partial assistance - the overall household reached represents the maximum number of households at locality level that have received either NFI or Shelter assistance
• 19% received Shelter cash assistance
• 4% received NFI cash assistance
• 25 organisations in 18 states worked in Shelter and NFI cluster
• households assisted: 90K IDPs, 54K refugees, 3K returnees and 3K vulnerable residents^{[footnote 145]}

17. Electricity

17.1 Access

17.1.1 According to the WB as of 2021 (latest data available) 49.4% of the rural population and 84.2 % of the urban population had access to electricity.^{[footnote 146]}

17.1.2 OCHA update report 2 May 2023 reported that electricity infrastructure has been damaged by the fighting.^{[footnote 147]} According to Acaps 4 May 2023 report: ‘In all conflict-affected areas, infrastructure damage has led to … electricity blackouts … creating logistical challenges for humanitarian operations.’^{[footnote 148]} ACLED report December 2023 also noted that persistent clashes between the SAF and the RSF lead to severe shortages electricity.^{[footnote 149]}

17.1.3 IOM report November 2023 noted with respect to availability of electricity to IDPs that electricity: was not available at all to 49% of IDPs, was available but not good quality to 38% of IDPs, was available to access with no complication to 8% of IDPs and was available but not affordable to 5 % IDPs^{[footnote 150]}.

17.1.4 UNICEF report December 2023 stated:

‘Electricity has been proved to play a crucial role in the service delivery of health, WASH, cash transfers, especially during the conflict with power interruption as a major constraint to service delivery. Destruction of power infrastructure during the conflict has further exacerbated various challenges. The available capacity of electricity is only 2,799 megawatts(MW), compared to a peak demand of 3,800 MW, leaving a shortfall of 1,000 MW thus leading to major load-shedding. Additionally, 46 per cent of the population does not have access to electricity.’^{[footnote 151]}.

18. Freedom of movement

18.1.1 For information on freedom of movement see Country policy and information note, Security Situation, Sudan, June 2023.

18.1.2 A December 2023 report by the Global Protection Sector, stated:

‘The Protection Sector in Sudan has received reports that clashes between RSF and SAF in Al Jazirah state are putting civilians at risk, and that civilians are being prevented from moving safely out of conflict affected areas… While IOM DTM estimates that up to 300,000 civilians fled Wad Madani and other areas of Al Jazirah in the first days of the fighting, civilians attempting to flee areas affected by the conflict in Al Jazirah following the consolidation of control over the state by RSF are reportedly facing significant barriers in doing so. In particular, key routes out of Wad Madani, Tamboul and Hasahisa are reportedly almost completely blocked to civilians attempting [sic] to flee. In some cases, reports indicate that RSF turned back civilians attempting to flee, ordering them to remain in locations where they felt insecure. Some reports indicate that even pregnant women experiencing medical emergencies have struggled to move. Those in affected areas have attributed the movement restrictions to RSF’s perception of the political affiliation of the civilian populations residing there.’^{[footnote 152]}

18.1.3 On 29 December 2023, Al Jazeera reported that:

‘According to civilians, UN agencies and local monitors, the RSF is obstructing people from leaving towns and cities in Gezira state, whose capital is Wad Madani. Gezira is the breadbasket for the rest of Sudan and was a haven for hundreds of thousands of displaced people who relocated from the war-torn capital, Khartoum, earlier in the war, which began in April.

‘About 300,000 people fled – many for a second time – to regions under army control when the paramilitary attacked Gezira, but many are now denied passage through RSF checkpoints.

‘Those stuck in Gezira said the RSF has committed a myriad of human rights abuses, including subjecting women and girls to sexual violence and killing people for refusing to leave their homes. However, many people don’t have a way to escape, even if the RSF lets them.’^{[footnote 153]}

19. Humanitarian assistance

19.1 Humanitarian actors

19.1.1 According to OCHA operational presence report 18 December 2023, there were 163 organisations comprising of 87 national non-governmental organisations (NNGOs), 58 international non-governmental Organisations 86 national organisations (INGOs), 11 UN agencies, 6 governmental organisations and a Red Crescent that operated in 18 states, 186 localities in operating in Sudan.^{[footnote 154]}

19.1.2 CPIT has produced below table based on OCHA operational presence report as of 15 November 2023.^{[footnote 155]} The table shows the number of organisations working in the food security and livelihoods (FSL), shelter and non-food items (Shelter and NFI), education, WASH and health clusters which are the focus of this report.

State	FSL	Shelter and NFI	Education	WASH	Health
Al Jazirah	9	4	1	23	10
Blue Nile	13	4	4	27	14
Central Darfur	4	1	-	7	6
East Darfur	7	2	2	20	7
Gedaref	13	7	2	30	11
Kassala	12	2	2	11	11
Khartoum	5	1	1	7	6
North Darfur	7	5	2	24	7
North Kordofan	6	1	3	6	2
Northern	4	1	-	3	4
Red Sea	8	3	2	7	3
River Nile	4	-	1	5	1
Sennar	4	1	2	8	2
South Darfur	6	2	2	10	7
South Kordofan	13	2	4	9	11
West Darfur	2	6	3	9	4
West Kordofan	3	2	1	9	3
White Nile	6	6	3	19	3
Total	39	22	16	89	40

19.1.3 For a full list of organisations operating in Sudan as of 15 November 2023 see OCHA, ‘Sudan: Operational Presence (3W) – Post 15 April (as of 15 November 2023)’, 18 December 2023.

19.2 Access to humanitarian assistance

19.2.1 OCHA SSR 5 July 2023 stated:

‘… insecurity and bureaucratic access impediments, notably the lack of visas for NGOs, and attacks against humanitarian premises and warehouses continue to hamper the ability of partners to safely deliver aid and services at scale. Particularly, humanitarians are facing tremendous difficulties to reach people in need in conflict-affected areas in Khartoum, Darfur and the Kordofan states, where the situation is extremely concerning. Tragically, at least 15 aid workers have been killed since the start of the conflict, many more injured and some remain still unaccounted for as communications remain dysfunctional in large areas. At last count, 44 warehouses of humanitarian partners had been looted, 76 of their offices had been ransacked and at least 188 vehicles stolen.’^{[footnote 156]}

19.2.2 The August 2023 OCHA humanitarian access situation report covering June to July 2023 (OCHA HASR August 2023) noted:

‘… Since the start of the conflict in Sudan, a total of 19 aid workers have been killed, 14 of them in the Darfur region. Another 18 humanitarians were attacked and beaten in a single incident in July in Khartoum. Countless others have faced abuse and intimidation by armed actors. At least 26 aid workers have been detained since mid-April, and many others report having faced attempts of forced recruitment by armed groups.

‘The looting of aid facilities, warehouses and supplies continues to have a major impact on the humanitarian response, diminishing the availability of in-country supplies and equipment, delaying the delivery of life-saving assistance and services, and dealing a significant financial blow to an already underfunded response… Since the start of the conflict, 50 humanitarian warehouses and 83 offices have been looted and 202 vehicles stolen. Looting of medical supplies, in particular, has been extensive and left humanitarian-run and civilian medical facilities – only 20 per cent of which remain open country-wide – unable to sustain operations. Food stores and nutrition supplies have also been targeted, resulting in shortages even in areas where stocks were prepositioned. This has put millions of people, including hundreds of thousands of children, at an increased risk of acute malnutrition and even starvation.

‘Bureaucratic and administrative impediments (BAIs) are increasingly weighing on efforts to scale up the humanitarian response in Sudan. While some humanitarian partners have been able to secure visas, many others are currently unable to obtain visas to deploy international personnel into Sudan in a timely manner. By the end of July, the humanitarian community had some 220 pending visa applications, many of which were submitted more than two months ago … The delays in the processing of entry visas for UN and INGO staff is limiting the presence of humanitarian relief workers inside Sudan. The inability of new staff to reach the country is also exacerbating the already depleted capacity of exhausted teams on the ground.

‘Access challenges are compounded by the need to obtain travel permits for staff movements within the country. Many of these permissions take time to obtain, delaying access to areas outside Port Sudan and create great difficulties to access harder to reach areas, such as Khartoum and the Darfur region.’^{[footnote 157]}

19.2.3 OCHA SSR 2 November 2023 noted:

‘The intensified hostilities across Sudan and other impediments and obstacles faced by aid organizations continue to make access to people in need extremely challenging and unpredictable. In August and September, 131 incidents impacting humanitarian operations were reported. The highest number of incidents continued to be recorded in Khartoum (31 per cent) where 41 incidents were reported across six localities. Active hostilities represent 69 per cent of incidents, followed by violence against humanitarian personnel and assets (15 per cent) and operational interference against humanitarian partners (11 per cent). In combination with insecurity, the lack of commitment from the parties to the conflict to enable crossline delivery of aid hampers humanitarian partners’ ability to provide assistance to hard-to-reach areas. There have been several reports of reluctance and denials for crossline delivery of food items and essential medical supplies, especially in Khartoum …

‘While the number of looting incidents and attacks against humanitarian personnel trended lower during August-September – with 19 incidents reported in comparison to 66 in June-July – several serious incidents occurred during the reporting period. At the end of August, an international NGO worker was reportedly killed in Nyala, South Darfur, bringing the total number of aid workers killed since 15 April to 20, 15 of them in the Darfur region. In early September, 20 trucks were attacked and looted in North Kordofan, during which one driver sustained a major injury. This led to the suspension of movements to Kordofan and Darfur states until parties to the conflict committed to ensuring safe passage.’^{[footnote 158]}

19.2.4 The UN Secretary General’s report on the situation in Sudan and the activities of UNITAMS 13 November 2023 observed:

‘Numerous challenges, including insecurity, and power dynamics among armed groups, bureaucratic impediments, funding shortfalls, poor or limited telecommunications systems and poor infrastructure have complicated negotiations for secure and unhindered access to affected areas. In addition, the looting of humanitarian premises and warehouses has hampered the delivery of assistance. Humanitarian access remains severely limited, especially in Khartoum, Darfur and Kordofan, where humanitarian needs are considered to be the highest. More than 70 per cent of the 6.3 million people who are close to famine are in areas where access is extremely limited owing to active fighting and insecurity. From 15 April to 30 September, 931 incidents impacting humanitarian operations have been reported, of which 36 per cent were the result of active hostilities, 26 per cent were the result of violence against humanitarian personnel, assets and facilities and 20 per cent constituted bureaucratic impediments. At least 20 humanitarian workers have been killed and 30 injured since the start of the conflict.’^{[footnote 159]}

19.2.5 Asharq-Al-Awsat, ‘the leading Pan-Arab newspaper and one of SRMG’s flagship media brands’, covering ‘politics, economics and culture, as well as health, science and technology’, reported that:

‘Aid agencies are looking at delivering aid to Sudan on a new route from South Sudan as they struggle to access much of the country, a senior UN official said on Monday, nine months into a war that has caused a major humanitarian crisis… Aid agencies lost access to Wad Madani, a former aid hub in the important El Gezira agricultural region southeast of Khartoum, after the RSF seized it from the army last month… UN and other agencies have been largely restricted to operating out of Port Sudan on the Red Sea coast, and delivering aid from Chad into the western region of Darfur, where there have been waves of ethnically-driven killings …’^{[footnote 160]}

19.2.6 In January 2024, UN OCHA reported that:

‘Insecurity and safety concerns are the main operational challenges in Al Jazeera State, with humanitarian missions suspended since 15 December 2023 and virtually no humanitarian partners operating in Wad Medani as the conflict is still ongoing.

 ‘In Sennar, the security situation remains a significant challenge as shelling and aerial bombardment continue to be reported in the outskirts of Sennar, … Interruptions of Internet and mobile networks, bank services, and cash liquidity have continued to pose challenges to the operations of humanitarian organizations…’^{[footnote 161]}

19.3 Provision of assistance

19.3.1 See also subsections above for information on the provision of assistance in different needs sectors.

19.3.2 OCHA HASR August 2023 stated:

‘Despite the multitude of access challenges, OCHA-led on-the-ground access and [Civil-Military Coordination] CMCoord negotiations have facilitated the movement of 683 trucks in June and July, carrying 31,444 MT of relief items to vulnerable and displaced people in need in 13 out of the 18 states in Sudan: Al Jazeira, Blue Nile, East Darfur, Gedaref, Kassala, Khartoum, North Kordofan, Northern, Red Sea, River Nile, South Kordofan, West Kordofan and White Nile states.

‘The OCHA deconfliction and access negotiation system has allowed humanitarian partners to deliver relief items to Khartoum (2,892 MT), North Darfur (550 MT), North Kordofan (180 MT), South Kordofan (810 MT), West Kordofan (420 MT) and White Nile (10,897 MT). This included 30,300 MT of food items, 160 MT of emergency shelter and non-food items, and 170 MT of health and nutrition supplies.

‘In July, 13 new localities were reached for the first time since 15 April through the OCHA Humanitarian Information Sharing Mechanism. These include Abu Jubayhah and Abassiya in South Kordofan, Ar Rahad and El Obeid of North Kordofan, An Nuhud and El Fula of West Kordofan, and nine localities in East Darfur: Ad-Du’ain, Abu Jabra, Abu Karinka, Adila, Assalaya, Bahr el Arab, El Ferdous, Yassin and Schearia.’^{[footnote 162]}

19.3.3 The OCHA humanitarian access situation report covering 1 August to 30 September 2023 noted:

‘In August and September, OCHA’s deconfliction and access negotiation system has allowed humanitarian partners to deliver about 99,534 MT (2,221 trucks) of relief items, of which 27,801 MT were for direct distribution and 71,453 MT for prepositioning. Supplies have been delivered across Aj Jazirah, Blue Nile, Kassala, Gedaref, White Nile, River Nile, Red Nile, North Darfur, South Darfur, West Darfur, East Darfur, Northern and Khartoum states. Both crossline and cross-border modalities have been used … Among the hard-to-reach locations reached in August and September, South Kordofan, North Kordofan, West Kordofan, North Darfur, South Darfur, West Darfur and East Darfur were accessed through active engagement. OCHA facilitated the movement of 3,400 MT (68 trucks) of food and nutrition supplies to Karrari and Jebel Aulia localities in Khartoum in August and September.

‘… Under the framework of the Humanitarian Information Sharing Mechanism (HISM) for cross-border operations between Chad and Sudan, OCHA successfully facilitated the passage of 1,217.29 MT (47 trucks) from multiple UN agencies … The assistance targeted populations in various locations in West Darfur, including Ag Geneina, Ardamata, and Kulbus …’ ^{[footnote 163]}

19.3.4 OCHA reported on 15 December 2023: ‘Despite various challenges … affecting the delivery of humanitarian assistance in many parts of the country, the humanitarian organizations have reached about 4.9 million people with multisectoral life-saving assistance and 5.7 million people with agriculture and livelihood support since the start of the conflict.’^{[footnote 164]}

19.3.5 OCHA has produced below table showing number of people in need and reached versus targeted in each state as of 15 November 2023:^{[footnote 165]}

State	People in need	Targeted for assistance	Reached with assist	Reached As % of targeted
Al Jazirah	2,000,000	1,600,000	737,100	47%
Blue Nile	731,600	563,600	290,000	51%
Central Darfur	1,300,000	735,400	293,600	40%
East Darfur	826,700	563,600	376,300	67%
Gedaref	1,200,000	967,700	321,100	33%
Kassala	1,400,000	1,100,000	371,400	34%
Khartoum	3,000,000	2,500,000	430,000	17%
North Darfur	2,700,000	1,700,000	383,300	23%
North Kordofan	1,000,000	837,600	32, 200	4%
Northern	381,400	291,700	79,000	27%
Red Sea	764,400	592,000	139,300	24%
River Nile	635,600	446,100	201,000	45%
Sennar	859,800	652,100	52,500	8%
South Darfur	2,300,000	1,600,000	302,800	18%
South Kordofan	1,100,000	753,800	233,400	17%
West Darfur	1,500,000	1,000,000	53.800	5%
West Kordofan	747,700	584,200	15,500	3%
White Nile	1,900,000	1,500,000	543,400	36%
Total	24,700,000	18,100,000	4,900,000	27%

19.4 Funding

19.4.1 The OCHA reported 15 December 2023 noted that: ‘the revised 2023 Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) requires US$2.6 billion to provide life-saving multi-sectoral and protection assistance to 18.1 million people in desperate need through the end of this year. According to the [FTS] Financial Tracking Service [ a centralized source of curated, continuously updated, fully downloadable data and information on humanitarian funding flows^{[footnote 166]}, the appeal is only 39.3 per cent funded, with $1,007.7 million received as of 15 December.’^{[footnote 167]}

19.4.2 The FTS reported that as of 21 February 2024, US$1.11 billion (43.1%) of the US$2.6 billion required funding had been received leaving a funding gap of US$ 1.46 billion (56.9%).^{[footnote 168]}

19.4.3 The FTS provided this table of the top ten donors to the coordinated plan.^{[footnote 169]}

Donor	(US$ millions)	As % share of coordinated plan
United States of America	549.1	49.6%
European Commission	122.5	11.15
Central Emergency Response Fund	58.1	5.2%
Saudi Arabia	38.0	3.4%
Germany	36.7	3.3%
United Kingdom	35.1	3.2%
Canada	28.3	2.6%
Sweden	26.7	2.4%
Netherlands	24.7	2.2%
Switzerland	23.3	2.1%
Total	906.6	85.15

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2013. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

All the COI included in the note was published or made publicly available on or before the ‘cut-off’ date(s). Any event taking place or report/article published after these date(s) is not included.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
• the currency and detail of information
• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared and contrasted to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Terms of reference

A ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) is a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The Home Office uses some standardised ToR, depending on the subject, and these are then adapted depending on the country concerned.

For this particular CPIN, the following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

• geography and demography
• economic situation
  • inflation
  • poverty
  • income
• People in need
• water and sanitation (WASH)
• food security
• shelter
• education
• humanitarian aid
  • access
  • providers

• security (see Country policy information note: security situation, Sudan June 2023

• freedom of movement (see Country policy information note: security situation, Sudan June 2023

Bibliography

Sources cited

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• ‘Humanitarian access snapshot’, 4 May 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

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• ‘Sudan’ (socio economic crisis), 13 April 2022. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Africa Development Bank (ADB), ‘Sudan Economic Outlook’, 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Al Jazeera

• ‘”Can’t trust the Janjaweed”: Sudan’s capital ravaged by RSF rule’, 20 January 2024. Last accessed: 23 January 2024

• ‘‘No way to leave’: Sudan paramilitary traps civilians in breadbasket state’, 29 December 2023. Last accessed: 23 January 2024

Arab News, ‘Sudan conflict poses threat of long-term societal harm as recruitment of child soldiers surges’, 2 September 2023. Last accessed: 23 January 2024

Asharq-Al-Awsat, ‘Agencies Consider New Aid Route into Sudan as Humanitarian Crisis Worsens’, 16 January 2024. Last accessed: 23 January 2024

Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED):

• ‘Situation Update December 2023 Sudan: Unraveling the Conflict Dynamics in Darfur’, 1 December 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• ‘Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan’ 12 January 2024. Last accessed 2 February 2024

Care International (CI), ‘Rapid Gender Analysis Policy Brief: Sudan Conflict Response’, 5 May 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Challenge Fund for Youth, ‘Sudan Scoping Report’, February 2021. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Dafallah, A., Elmahi, O. K.O., Ibrahim, M. E., Elsheikh, R. E. and Blanchet, K., Conflict and Health 17, ‘Destruction, disruption and disaster: Sudan’s health system amidst armed conflict’, September 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Data Friendly Space (DFS) and iMMAP, ‘Sudan Crisis Situational Analysis’, 18 December 2023. Last accessed 22 December

Famine Early Warning System Network (FEWS NET):

• ‘High prices and limited access drive high needs through the post-harvest season’, September 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• ‘Exceedingly high cost of living and conflict undermine benefits of harvest ’, 31 March 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Gender, Growth, and Labour Markets in Low Income Countries Programme G2LM/LIC, ‘The Structure of the Labor Force and Employment in Sudan’, September 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Global Protection Cluster:

• ‘Protection of Civilians’ Flash Update 1: Civilians Struggle to Reach Safety from Fighting in Al Jazirah’, 25 December 2023. Last accessed: 23 January 2024

• ‘Protection Hotspots in Sudan’ 31 December 2023 Last accessed: 23 January 2024

Global Shelter Cluster, ‘Sudan’, 8 January 2024. Last accessed 23 January 2024.

Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC,) ‘Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for October 2023 - February 2024’ 12 December 2023. Last accessed 23 January 2024

International Labour Organisation (ILO):

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• ‘Second Regional Report on Jobs and Growth in North Africa (2018-21): Developments through the COVID-19 Era’, October 2022. Last accessed 22 December 2023

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• ‘DTM Sudan Monthly Displacement Overview (03)’, 30 November 2023. Last

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Jaspars, Susan and Alkreem, Tamaer Abd, Africa Arguments, ‘Sudan’s Crisis: Can Cash Transfers Prevent Starvation and State Collapse?’ Africa Arguments, 29 August 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

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• ‘The Impact of Sudan’s Armed Conflict on the Fiscal Situation and Service Delivery’, December 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

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• ‘Clashes between SAF and RSF - Flash Update No. 9’, 2 May 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

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• ‘Sudan: Eight months of conflict - Key Facts and Figures (15 December 2023)’, 19 December 2023. Last accessed 23 January 2024

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UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Data Exchange (OCHA HDX):

• ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Needs Overview’, 24 May 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• ‘Sudan: 2023 HNO Baseline Data’, November 2022. Last accessed 22 December 2023

UN Population Division, ‘UN Population Division Data Portal’, (Sudan), no date

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), ‘High Commissioner Urges Sudanese Generals To Cease the Violence and Return To Political Talks, and Calls on Those with Influence in the International Community to End the Tragedy and Increase Financial Support to Humanitarian Agencies’, 12 September 2023. Last accessed: 23rd January 2024

UN Security Council (UNSC), Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in the Sudan: Report of the Secretary-General’, 13 November 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

United Nations News (UN News), ‘“WFP resumes operations in Sudan, amid full-blown humanitarian ‘catastrophe’’’, 1 May 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

United States CIA World Factbook:

• ‘United Kingdom’, last updated 13 June 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• ‘Sudan’, last updated 13 June 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• United States of America International Development USAID, ‘Sudan - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024’, 5 December 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

World Bank (WB):

• ‘To Avert a “Lost Decade,” Africa Must Urgently Achieve Stability, Increase Growth, and Create Jobs’ 24 October 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• ‘The World Bank in Sudan’, last updated 30 March 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023         

• ‘Poverty & Equity Briefs Sudan’, April 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

World Food Programme (WFP):

• ‘Sudan’, no date. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• ‘Armed conflict as a cause of hunger: Unpacking the relationships between conflict and rising food prices in Sudan’, 24 November 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

World Health Organisation (WHO):

• ‘Health emergency Situation Report No. 2’, 16 July 2023. Last accessed: 23 January 2024

• ‘Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA)’, last updated 14 December 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

• ‘Health emergency Situation Report No. 3’, 30 September 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

Sources not cited

ACAPS:

• ‘Sudan’, 13 April 2022. Last accessed 6 July 2023

• ‘Update on the humanitarian situation with a focus on the impact on healthcare’, 27 April 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), ‘Fact Sheet: Conflict Surges in Sudan , updated 5 May 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

Care International (CI), ‘Sudan: A forgotten crisis the world must pay attention to now’, 22 January 2024. Last accessed: 23 January 2024

Dabanga, ‘White Nile villagers appeal as RSF deny siege’, 23 January 2024

France 24, ‘Sudan civilians rush for arms as paramilitaries advance’ 28 December 2023

Government of Sudan Ministry of Finance and Economic Planning ‘Voluntary National Review for 2022’ 2 June 2022. Last accessed 6 July 2023  

Human Rights Watch (HRW), ‘Interview: Life in Sudan, while a conflict rage’ 17 May 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), ‘Sudan: Essential services at breaking point after two months of fighting’, 19 June 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF):

• ‘Sudan: Violence and bureaucratic obstruction put medical care in jeopardy’, 23 June 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

• ‘Sudan: End the ban on lifesaving surgical supplies’, 14 November 2023. Last accessed 23 January 2024

Food Security Cluster, High-Level Pledging Event to Support the Humanitarian Response in Sudan Key Messages from FSL Cluster Sudan’ June 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF):

• ‘Over one million children newly displaced in two months as Sudan faces escalating conflict’, 15 June 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023  

• ‘Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report’, 16 June 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):

• ‘UNHCR highlights difficulties in aid delivery amid escalating conflict in Sudan’, 17 June 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

• Sudan- IDP Emergency Response November 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

United Nations World Food Programme (WFP), ‘Comprehensive Food Security and Vulnerability Assessment (CFSVA) – Sudan    Summary Report, Q1 2023’, June 2023. Last accessed 6 July 2023

World Bank Blogs ,‘New World Bank country classifications by income level: 2022-2023’, 1 July 2022. Last accessed 6 July 2023

World Food Programme ‘Conflict in Sudan: Food Security Analysis and Forecast’, May 2023. Last accessed 22 December 2023

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1. CI, ‘Rapid Gender Analysis Policy Brief: Sudan Conflict Response’ (page 2), May 2023 ↩

2. CIA World Factbook, Sudan’ (section people and society), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

3. OCHA HDX, ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Needs Overview’ (Data and Resources), 24 May 2023 ↩

4. OCHA HDX, ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Needs Overview’ (Data and Resources), 24 May 2023 ↩

5. CIA World Factbook, ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

6. UN Population Division, ‘UN Population Division Data Portal’, (Sudan), no date ↩

7. CIA World Factbook ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

8. UN Population Division, ‘UN Population Division Data Portal’ (Sudan), no date ↩

9. UN Population Division, ‘UN Population Division Data Portal’ (Sudan), no date ↩

10. CIA World Factbook ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

11. CIA World Factbook ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

12. CIA World Factbook, ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

13. UN Population Division, ‘UN Population Division Data Portal’ (Sudan), no date ↩

14. CIA World Factbook, ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

15. CIA World Factbook, ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

16. CIA World Factbook, ‘Sudan’ (section on population), updated 13 December 2023 ↩

17. ACAPS, ‘Who we are: In short’, no date ↩

18. ACAPS, ‘Sudan’ (socio economic crisis), 13 April 2022 ↩

19. FEWS NET, ‘About FEWS NET’, no date ↩

20. FEWS NET, ‘Exceedingly high cost of living and conflict undermine benefits of …’, 31 March 2023 ↩

21. G2LM/LIC, ‘The Structure of the Labor Force and Employment in Sudan’ (page 3), September 2023 ↩

22. WB, ‘To Avert a “Lost Decade,” Africa Must Urgently Achieve Stability, … ’ 24 October 2023 ↩

23. IMF, World Economic Outlook 2024 Data – Sudan, October 2023 ↩

24. IMF, World Economic Outlook 2024 Data – Sudan, October 2023 ↩

25. ILO ‘The potential of skills development and recognition for regulated labour …’ (page 55), 2020 ↩

26. UNICEF, ‘The Situation of children in Sudan: Country Factsheet’, September 2022   ↩

27. IMF, World Economic Outlook 2023 Data – Sudan, October 2023 ↩

28. Challenge Fund for Youth, ‘Sudan Scoping Report’ (page 1), February 2021 ↩

29. Challenge Fund for Youth, ‘Sudan Scoping Report’ (page 1), February 2021 ↩

30. ILO, Second Regional Report on Jobs and Growth in North Africa …’ (page 16), October 2022 ↩

31. ‘Poverty & Equity Briefs Sudan’, April 2023 ↩

32. ADB, ‘Sudan Economic Outlook’, 2023 ↩

33. WB, ‘Poverty & Equity Briefs Sudan’, April 2023 ↩

34. Arab News, ‘Sudan conflict poses threat of long-term societal harm as … ’, 2 September 2023 ↩

35. UNHCR, ‘Protection Brief Sudan, June 2023’, 4 June 2023 ↩

36. Al Jazeera, ‘”Can’t trust the Janjaweed”: Sudan’s capital ravaged by RSF rule’, 20 January 2024 ↩

37. NetBlocks, About, no date ↩

38. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’ (page 8-9), 17 May 2023 ↩

39. Africa Arguments, ‘About us’, no date   ↩

40. Jaspars and Elkreem , Africa Arguments, ‘Sudan’s Crisis: Can Cash Transfers …’ 29 August 2023 ↩

41. UNICEF, ‘The Impact of Sudan’s Armed Conflict on the Fiscal …’, (page 8), December 2023 ↩

42. UNICEF, ‘The Impact of Sudan’s Armed Conflict on the Fiscal …’, (page 9), December 2023 ↩

43. OCHA, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Update 19 October 2023 ↩

44. UNICEF, ‘The Impact of Sudan’s Armed Conflict on the Fiscal …’, (page 10), December 2023 ↩

45. UNICEF, ‘The Impact of Sudan’s Armed Conflict on the Fiscal …’, (page 10), December 2023 ↩

46. DFS, ‘What we do’, no date ↩

47. iMMAP, ‘About us’, no date   ↩

48. DFS and iMMAP, ‘Sudan Crisis Situational Analysis’ (page 9), 18 December 2023 ↩

49. IOM, ‘About DTM’, no date ↩

50. IOM, ‘Monthly displacement overview (03), (page 1), 28 November 2023 ↩

51. ACLED, ‘About ACLED’, no date ↩

52. ACLED, ‘Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan’ 12 January 2024 ↩

53. ACLED, ‘Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan’ 12 January 2024 ↩

54. ACLED, ‘Sudan: The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) Gains Ground in Sudan’ 12 January 2024 ↩

55. ICG Crisis Watch Sudan January 2024 ↩

56. Global Protection Cluster, ‘Who we are’ no date ↩

57. Global Protection Cluster, ‘Protection Hotspots in Sudan’, as of 31 December 2023 ↩

58. Global Protection Cluster, ‘Protection Hotspots in Sudan’, as of 31 December 2023 ↩

59. Global Protection Cluster, ‘Protection Hotspots in Sudan’, as of 31 December 2023 ↩

60. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’ (page 6), 17 May 2023 ↩

61. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’ (page 13), 17 May 2023 ↩

62. UNICEF, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 12: October 2023’ (page 1),12 November 2023 ↩

63. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’ (page 16), 17 May 2023 ↩

64. OCHA HDX ‘Sudan: 2023 HNO Baseline Data’, November 2022 ↩

65. IOM, ‘Monthly Displacement Overview(05)’ (page 1), 2 February 2024 ↩

66. OCHA, ‘Sudan Situation Report’, 4 February 2024 ↩

67. IOM, ‘Sudan’s Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates’ (page 3), January 2024 ↩

68. IOM, ‘Sudan’s Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates’ (page 3), January 2024 ↩

69. IOM, ‘Monthly Displacement Overview’ (page 3), 2 February 2024 ↩

70. OCHA HDX ‘Sudan: 2023 HNO Baseline Data’, November 2022 ↩

71. IOM, ‘Sudan’s Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates’ (page 3), January 2024 ↩

72. IOM, ‘Monthly Displacement Overview’ (page 2), 2 February 2024 ↩

73. IOM, ‘Sudan’s Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates’ (page 5), January 2024 ↩

74. IOM, ‘Sudan’s Internally Displaced Persons 2023 Estimates’ (page 5), January 2024 ↩

75. OCHA, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Update’, Last updated 7 Dec 2023 ↩

76. IOM, ‘DTM Sudan - Monthly Displacement Overview (03)’ (page 4), 30 November 2023 ↩

77. Acaps, ‘Impact of the current conflict on WASH needs’, (page 3),11 September 2023 ↩

78. WFP, Sudan no date ↩

79. IPC, ‘Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for October 2023 - …’ 12 December 2023 ↩

80. IPC, ‘Sudan: Acute Food Insecurity Projection Update for October 2023 - …’ 12 December 2023 ↩

81. DFS and iMMAP, ‘Sudan Crisis Situational Analysis’ (page 21 ), 18 December 2023 ↩

82. WFP, ‘Armed conflict as a cause of hunger…’ (pages 9-10), 24 November 2023 ↩

83. OCHA, ‘Sudan Security Report’ 4 February 2024 ↩

84. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ 31 December 2023 ↩

85. FEWS NET, ‘High prices and limited access drive high needs through the …’, September 2023 ↩

86. WFP, ‘Armed conflict as a cause of hunger: Unpacking the …’ (page 9), November 2023 ↩

87. USAID, ‘Sudan - Complex Emergency Fact Sheet #5, Fiscal Year (FY) 2024’, 5 December 2023 ↩

88. WFP, ‘Sudan’, no date ↩

89. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ 31 December 2023 ↩

90. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ 31 December 2023 ↩

91. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’ (page 10), 17 May 2023 ↩

92. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Revised Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’ (page 20), 17 May 2023 ↩

93. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Seven months of conflict - Key Facts and Figures’, 15 November 2023 ↩

94. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard as of 15 November 2023’ (page 4), 18 December 2023 ↩

95. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (pages 1, and 4), 31 December 2023 ↩

96. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (page 4), 31 December 2023 ↩

97. UNICEF, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 12 October 2023’ (page 1), 21 November 2023 ↩

98. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (page 4) 31 December 2023 ↩

99. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard as of 15 November …’ (page 4) 18 December 2023 ↩

100. CI, ‘Rapid Gender Analysis Policy Brief: Sudan Conflict Response’ (page 3), May 2023 ↩

101. Conflict and Health, ‘About’ ↩

102. Dafallah and others, Conflict Health, ‘Destruction, disruption and..’, (pages 1-2), September 2023 ↩

103. Dafallah and others, Conflict Health, ‘Destruction, disruption and..’, (pages 1-2), September 2023 ↩

104. WHO, ‘Health emergency Situation Report No. 3’, 30 September 2023 ↩

105. OCHA ‘Humanitarian Access Situation Report August - September 2023’, 30 October 2023 ↩

106. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (page 6) 31 December 2023 ↩

107. WHO, ‘Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA)’, last updated 14 December 2023 ↩

108. WHO, ‘Surveillance System for Attacks on Health Care (SSA)’, last updated 14 December 2023 ↩

109. UNSC , Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the UNITAMS …’ (para 41 ), 13 November 2023 ↩

110. UNICEF, ‘Humanitarian Situation Report No. 12: October 2023’, (page 2),17 November 2023 ↩

111. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Cholera outbreak Flash Update No. 5’, as of 24 December 2023 ↩

112. OCHA, ‘Sudan Situation Report’, 17 August 2023 ↩

113. WHO, ‘Sudan health emergency Situation Report No. 3’, 30 September 2023 ↩

114. UNICEF, ‘Humanitarian Situation Report No. 12: October 2023’ (pages 1, 3), 17 November 2023 ↩

115. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (page 1) 31 December 2023 ↩

116. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (page 6) 31 December 2023 ↩

117. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (page 6) 31 December 2023 ↩

118. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’ (page 6) 31 December 2023 ↩

119. WHO/UNICEF, ‘Progress on WASH in health Care facilities 2000-2021…’ (Annex 3), August 2022 ↩

120. Acaps, ‘Impact of the current conflict on WASH needs’, (pages 2 to 3), 11 September 2023 ↩

121. Acaps, ‘Impact of the current conflict on WASH needs’, (page 3),11 September 2023 ↩

122. CARE, ‘Rapid Gender Analysis Policy Brief: Sudan Conflict Response’ (page 3), May 2023 ↩

123. WHO, ‘Health emergency Situation Report No. 2’, 16 July 2023 ↩

124. Acaps, ‘Impact of the current conflict on WASH needs’, (pages 3- 4),11 September 2023 ↩

125. UNICEF, ‘The Impact of Sudan’s Armed Conflict on the Fiscal …’ (page 36), December 2023 ↩

126. DFS and iMMAP, ‘Sudan Crisis Situational Analysis’ (page 35), 18 December 2023 ↩

127. DFS and iMMAP, ‘Sudan Crisis Situational Analysis’ (page 35), 18 December 2023 ↩

128. IOM, ‘DTM Sudan - Monthly Displacement Overview (05)’ (page 4), 2 February 2023 ↩

129. OCHA ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard as of 15 November …’ (page 1), 18 December 2023 ↩

130. OCHA ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard as of 15 November …’ (page 12), 18 December 2023 ↩

131. Acaps, ‘Impact of the current conflict on WASH needs’, (page 3),11 September 2023 ↩

132. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard As of 31 October 2023’, 28 November 2023 ↩

133. UNICEF, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Situation Report No. 12: October 2023’, 21 November 2023 ↩

134. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Cholera outbreak Flash Update no 5’, 24 December 2023 ↩

135. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Response Dashboard’, (page 1 and 17) as of 31 December 2023 ↩

136. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Response Dashboard’, (page 17), as of 31 December 2023 ↩

137. Global Shelter Cluster, ‘Sudan’, 8 January 2024 ↩

138. DFS and iMMAP, ‘Sudan Crisis Situational Analysis’ (page 31), 18 December 2023 ↩

139. DFS and iMMAP, ‘Sudan Crisis Situational Analysis’ (pages 30-31), 18 December 2023 ↩

140. IOM ‘ Monthly Displacement Overview (03) November 2023 (page 5) ↩

141. IOM, ‘Monthly Displacement Overview(05)’ (page 3), 2 February 2024 ↩

142. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Response Dashboard’, (page 1), as of 31 December 2023 ↩

143. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Response Dashboard’, (page 16), as of 31 December 2023 ↩

144. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Humanitarian Response Dashboard’, (page 16, as of 31 December 2023 ↩

145. Global Shelter Cluster, ‘Sudan’, 8 January 2023) ↩

146. World Bank, ‘Sudan’ no date ↩

147. OCHA, ‘Clashes between SAF and RSF - Flash Update No. 9’, 2 May 2023 ↩

148. ACAPS, ‘Humanitarian access snapshot’ (pages 2 - 3), 4 May 2023 ↩

149. ACLED, ‘Sudan: Unraveling the Conflict Dynamics in Darfur’, 1 December 2023 ↩

150. IOM, ‘Monthly Displacement Overview (03), (page 4) November 2023 ↩

151. UNICEF, ‘The Impact of Sudan’s Armed Conflict on the Fiscal …’ (page 31), December 2023 ↩

152. Protection Cluster, ‘Protection of Civilians’ Flash Update Civilians struggle … ’, 25 December 2023 ↩

153. Al Jazeera, ‘‘No way to leave’: Sudan paramilitary traps civilians in …’, 29 December 2023 ↩

154. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Operational Presence (3W) - Post 15 April as of 15 Nov …’, 18 December 2023 ↩

155. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Operational Presence (3W) - Post 15 April as of 15 Nov …’, 18 December 2023 ↩

156. OCHA, ‘Sudan Situation Report’, last updated 5 Jul 2023 ↩

157. OCHA, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Access Situation Report (June - July …’ (pages 2-3), 15 August 2023 ↩

158. OCHA, ‘Sudan Situation Report’, last updated 2 November 2023 ↩

159. UNSC, ‘Situation in the Sudan and the activities of the UNITAMS … ’ (para 40), 13 November 2023 ↩

160. Asharq-Al-Awsat, ‘Agencies Consider New Aid Route into Sudan as … ’, 16 January 2024 ↩

161. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Clashes in Wad Medani between the SAF and RSF… ’, updated 9 January 2024 ↩

162. OCHA, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Access Situation Report (June - July …’ (pages 4), 15 August 2023 ↩

163. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Access Situation Report August – September 2023’, 30 October 2023 ↩

164. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Eight months of conflict - Key Facts and Figures …’, 19 December 2023 ↩

165. OCHA, ‘Humanitarian Response Dashboard’, last updated 18 December 2023 ↩

166. FTS, ‘What is the Financial Tracking Service (FTS) and How to use it?’ ↩

167. OCHA, ‘Sudan: Eight months of conflict - Key Facts and Figures …’, 19 December 2023 ↩

168. FTS, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’ last updated 28 December 2023 ↩

169. FTS, ‘Sudan Humanitarian Response Plan 2023’,  21 February 2024 ↩