Risk assessment on the likelihood of spread of sheep pox and goat pox to Great Britain from EU and EFTA member states in June 2025 (executive summary)
Published 5 November 2025
This summary outlines a qualitative risk assessment which has been completed to assess the risk of sheep and goats in Great Britain becoming infected with sheep pox and goat pox (SPGP) through legal and illegal trade as well as personal movements from EU and EFTA member states. The risk is assessed as of June 2025.
Please note this is the executive summary only. To request the full risk assessment, please contact ukassurance@defra.gov.uk.
This risk assessment concluded that the overall annual likelihood of SPGP viruses being introduced into Great Britain is medium (event occurs regularly) with high uncertainty, due to the risk from personal imports. All other pathways had a likelihood no greater than low (event is rare but does occur).
The overall likelihood of a sheep or goat being exposed to the virus should SPGP virus enter Great Britain was high (event occurs very often) with medium uncertainty predominantly due to the high risk from commercial trade in live animals.
The consequences of a SPGP incursion were considered major (major impact for small population, systems significantly compromised and abnormal operation, if at all, high level of monitoring required) with medium uncertainty. This impact is primarily due to the potential economic and welfare impacts on Great Britain’s commercial lamb industry.
Background
The epidemiology of SPGP across Europe has changed in the last two years with confirmed cases in both Bulgaria and Greece in 2025, whilst Spain has now been designated as SPGP-free after the initial outbreak of 17 cases in the southeast of the country in 2022. Cyprus had a suspected case in 2023. As of May 2025, there have been multiple ongoing outbreaks of SPGP in both Greece and Bulgaria. Greece has now reported 381 outbreaks since their initial incursion on 12 September 2024 (data correct up to 12 May 2025). These have occurred in flocks consisting mainly of sheep (289 outbreaks), mixed herds (91 outbreaks) and goat herds (1 outbreak). Twelve outbreaks have been reported in Bulgaria. These have occurred in flocks consisting mainly of sheep.
The following pathways were considered as part of the entry assessment:
- commercial trade in live sheep and goats
- commercial trade in sheep and goat germplasm
- commercial trade in sheep and goat products (meat and meat products, raw milk and milk products, untreated fresh hides and skins, untreated hair and wool)
- packaging fomites
- clothing and shoes
- transport vehicles and equipment
- commercial vehicles
- animal feed, bedding, and crops
- illegal imports of live sheep and goats and their products
- personal imports of sheep and goat products (legal and illegal)
Hazard
Sheep pox and goat pox viruses.
Risk questions
1) What is the annual likelihood of introduction of SPGP virus from EU and EFTA member states into Great Britain?
2) What are the subsequent exposure routes for sheep and goats?
3) What are the potential consequences of an incursion into Great Britain?
Main findings
Entry pathways
The annual likelihood of SPGP being introduced into Great Britain through most pathways ranged from low (rare but does occur) to very low (very rare but cannot be excluded).
The most likely way that SPGP would be introduced into Great Britain was considered illegal personal imports of sheep and goat products. The annual likelihood of introduction associated with this pathway was medium (event occurs regularly) with high uncertainty, which raised the overall likelihood of introduction.
In the absence of the illegal personal import pathway, the overall likelihood of introduction would be reduced to low risk with high uncertainty.
Exposure pathways
The overall likelihood of a sheep or goat being exposed to the virus should SPGP virus enter Great Britain was high (event occurs very often) with medium uncertainty, predominantly due to the high risk from commercial trade in live animals.
There is no published data available measuring virus survival on different matrices, nor is there available data confirming the viral load shed during clinical infection in sheep or goats.
This makes it difficult to accurately assess the level of viable virus that could be present on different commodities and fomites.
Infected live animals are likely to represent a greater viral load relative to other contaminated matrices such as clothing and packaging where fresh virus is not actively being produced and shed.
Contamination of products has the potential for virus degradation, lowering the viral load.
Additional biosecurity measures may serve to reduce the associated risk.
Consequence assessment
The consequences of a SPGP incursion were considered major (major impact for small population, systems significantly compromised and abnormal operation, if at all, high level of monitoring required) with medium uncertainty.
The sheep and goat population in Great Britain consists of just over 31 million animals (based on 2024 figures), with an estimated export of around 87,000 tonnes of lamb and mutton worth £599 million. The size of the impact would depend on the size of the outbreak, and the area of spread.
Due to the high mortality rate in susceptible native breeds, and in lambs in general, an outbreak of SPGP could cause large economic losses and welfare issues in affected herds.
Key uncertainties
Entry assessment
The uncertainties in this section were:
- lack of data around virus survival and viability in germplasm, meat, milk, skin, hides, wool and hair
- lack of data around personal imports of sheep and goat products
- lack of data around illegal live animal imports
Exposure assessment
The uncertainties in this section were:
- variability in biosecurity measures between farms including separation, quarantine, cleansing and disinfection measures, and record keeping
- survival of the virus on several matrices including common packaging materials
- procedures for handling and disposal of waste animal feed, bedding and crops
- rates of accidental or intentional release of domestic/farmed sheep and goats into or near to feral or semi-wild managed populations
- level of interaction between the general public and grazing populations of sheep and goats
- the length of time that the disease would be circulating undetected in sheep and goats, particularly in upland or mountain areas
Consequence assessment
The uncertainties in this section were:
- lack of previous outbreaks in Great Britain to provide data around spread and severity
- level of spread within and between herds, particularly considering differences in farming practices