Country bulletin: security situation in Gaza, Palestine, June 2026 (accessible)

Question 1

Summary

Accepted Answer

On 7 October 2023, Hamas launched a cross-border attack from Gaza into Israel, killing over 1,300 people and taking hostages, prompting Israel to begin a full-scale invasion of Gaza on 27 October 2023. A weeklong ceasefire in November 2023 led to exchanges of hostages and prisoners, but fighting soon resumed, with Israeli forces carrying out major offensives across Gaza through 2024 and 2025.

The conflict has resulted in upwards of 70,000 Palestinian deaths, widespread destruction, and a severe humanitarian crisis, with most of Gaza’s population displaced and facing acute food shortages. Despite mediated ceasefire efforts, hostilities continued until a new ceasefire agreement was announced in October 2025 as part of a broader plan to end the war and rebuild Gaza.

Despite the ceasefire, Israeli military operations and air strikes have continued in Gaza, leading to ongoing casualties and further damage to civilian infrastructure, particularly in areas under Israeli control. Sources indicate that, since the ceasefire, at least 800 Palestinians have been killed and a further 1,900 injured.

A severe security situation does not in itself give rise to a well-founded fear of persecution for a Refugee Convention reason.

Despite ongoing Israeli military presence and strikes in Gaza since the 10 October 2025 ceasefire, the scale and intensity of violence have decreased significantly compared to pre-ceasefire levels.

The security situation in Gaza is such that there are not substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict, as defined in paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

Even where there is not in general a real risk of serious harm by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of armed conflict, a person may still face a real risk of serious harm if they are able to show that there are specific reasons over and above simply being a civilian affected by indiscriminate violence. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

Paragraphs 339C and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules only apply to civilians who must be non-combatants. This could include former combatants who have genuinely and permanently renounced armed activity.

For guidance on considering serious harm where there is a situation of indiscriminate violence in an armed conflict, including consideration of enhanced risk factors, see the Asylum Instruction, Humanitarian Protection.

Decision makers must consult the Exclusion section in the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) Palestine: Security situation in Gaza and the Asylum Instruction on Article 1D of the Refugee Convention: Palestinian refugees assisted by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Decision makers must also consult the relevant CPIT Palestine: Humanitarian situation product(s).

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Question 2

Country information

Accepted Answer

About this bulletin

This bulletin contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the basis for the summary.

The topic, structure and content are designed to assesses whether there are substantial grounds for believing there is a real risk of serious harm because there exists a serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscriminate violence in a situation of international or internal armed conflict, as defined in paragraphs 339c and 339CA(iv) of the Immigration Rules.

This bulletin covers the time period between 10 October 2025 and 5 June 2026.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 10 June 2026. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

Decision makers must consult the Exclusion section in the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN) Palestine: Security situation in Gaza and the Asylum Instruction on Article 1D of the Refugee Convention: Palestinian refugees assisted by the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). Decision makers must also consult the relevant CPIT Palestine: Humanitarian situation product(s).

This bulletin has been developed with assistance from Artificial Intelligence (AI). Where AI has been used, it has been reviewed by a human editor.

NOTE: The use of any maps are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.

1. Geography and demography

1.1 Geography and maps

1.1.1 For information on geography, including maps, see the Country Policy and Information Note (CPIN), Palestine: Humanitarian situation in Gaza, published in November 2024.

1.2 Population density and demography

1.2.1 For information on the population density and demography, see the CPIN Palestine: Security situation in Gaza, published in November 2024.

2. Security situation

2.1 Main Actors

2.1.1 For information on the main actors involved in the conflict, see the CPIN Palestine: Security situation in Gaza, published in November 2024.

2.2 Overview of events between October 2023 and October 2025

2.2.1 The Center for Preventive Action^{[footnote 1]} (CPA) is a programme of the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR), an independent, non‑partisan US think tank, which provides analysis and information on current and potential conflicts worldwide.^{[footnote 2]} In an article entitled ‘Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’, updated on 14 April 2026, CPA provided an overview of events in Gaza between October 2023 and October 2025, which stated:

‘On October 7, 2023, Iran-backed Hamas fighters fired rockets into Israel and stormed southern Israeli communities across the border of the Gaza Strip in a surprise attack, killing more than 1,300 people, injuring 3,300, and taking hundreds of hostages. One day after the attack, the Israeli cabinet formally declared war against Hamas, followed by a directive from the defense minister to the IDF [Israel Defense Forces] to carry out a “complete siege” of Gaza. It has been the most significant escalation of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict in several decades.

‘Israel launched a full-scale invasion of the Gaza Strip on October 27 [2023] to return all the hostages and dismantle Hamas. A weeklong ceasefire agreement was reached in late November 2023, during which Israel and Hamas exchanged hostages and prisoners. Israeli forces then launched a ground offensive targeting Hamas in the city of Khan Younis, which ultimately became a siege. Israel launched an offensive in Rafah from May to July 2024 to gain control of the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border, further isolating Gaza. Israel’s next major offensive was in October 2024 in northern Gaza, specifically in the Jabalia refugee camp and Beit Lahiya, where Israel imposed a siege to establish a deeper security buffer along the northern border. Israeli forces expanded their operations to Beit Hanoun in November 2024.

‘Israel has cited military successes, including the June 2024 rescue of four living hostages in central Gaza and the elimination of Hamas’s top leadership, including the group’s leaders Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar, military chief Mohammed Deif, and Deif’s deputy Marwan Issa. In January 2025, the United States, Egypt, and Qatar announced that they had mediated a ceasefire between Israel and Hamas. Israel later broke the ceasefire, citing Hamas’s refusal to release more hostages, and renewed its offensive in March 2025, launching a major military campaign across the territory, including in Gaza City, Khan Younis, and Rafah.

‘The war has led to more than seventy thousand Gazan deaths, according to the Hamas-controlled Gaza Health Ministry. Israel has argued in many cases that its actions were necessary because Hamas’s guerrilla warfare tactics often involve fighters embedding themselves in civilian areas. Since the start of Israeli operations in 2023, numerous reports have documented the targeting of journalists, schools, and Israeli-designated humanitarian zones. Israel maintains that Hamas continues to use civilian buildings, notably hospitals, for military purposes, including storing weapons and accessing its extensive, miles-long tunnel network. At least 94 percent of Gaza’s hospitals are damaged or destroyed, and there are only two thousand available hospital beds across the Gaza Strip. Similarly, Israel’s two-month total blockade of humanitarian aid, justified by Israeli officials as necessary to prevent Hamas from controlling its distribution, has led to famine-like conditions and a deepening humanitarian crisis in Gaza, according to the United Nations. In August 2025, 1.9 million Gazans - about 90 percent of Gaza’s population - were displaced and facing acute or catastrophic food shortages.

‘In October 2025, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that Israel and Hamas had agreed to a ceasefire agreement as part of a broader twenty-point peace framework that aims to end the war, disarm Hamas, and reconstruct Gaza under a new civilian government.’^{[footnote 3]}

2.2.2 For further information and timelines on events during the above period see: - Anera^{[footnote 4]}, The War on Gaza – A Timeline of Events and Anera’s Humanitarian Response, updated 29 October 2025 - Encyclopaedia Britannica, Israel-Hamas War, updated 30 April 2026 - Sky News, A timeline of events in more than a year of war in Gaza, 4 August 2025

2.3 Ceasefire conditions

2.3.1 An article entitled ‘A Guide to the Gaza Peace Deal’, published by CFR and updated on 24 February 2026 stated:

‘In the first phase of the peace plan, which took place between October 2025 and January 2026, Israel and Hamas agreed to the following set of parameters - the implementation of which often saw mixed success.

‘A ceasefire. Israel and Hamas agreed to halt fighting. This initial ceasefire went into effect on October 10 [2025] after Israel’s cabinet formally approved the agreement. Trump’s peace plan sketches this out as “all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen.” However, Israel’s military action in Gaza reportedly intensified until right up to the ceasefire deadline.

‘After the truce, many Palestinians returned to Gaza City after an Israeli military spokesperson declared it safe. Hamas reportedly began mobilizing thousands of security forces to reassert control over areas of Gaza recently vacated by Israeli troops and faced accusations of attacking and killing Israeli soldiers.

‘Meanwhile, Israel reportedly adopted a hardline approach to guarding the withdrawal line at the direction of Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz after two IDF soldiers were killed in Rafah on October 19 [2025]. There were multiple reports of Israel’s military striking “near or east” of the withdrawal line that have led to casualties, according to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs.

‘A military drawdown. In the first phase of the ceasefire, the IDF agreed to withdraw their troops up to a so-called yellow line that leaves it in control of 53 percent of the enclave, with very few Gazans living in that zone. The White House released a map of the Gaza Strip that showed the first of three stages of Israel’s withdrawal.

Israel Completes First Phase of Gaza Withdrawal

The plan states that two further withdrawal phases will follow.

On October 10, Israeli forces withdrew to an agreed upon line that kept them in control of 53% of Gaza. The White House plan includes two future Israeli withdrawals to around 40% and 15% of Gaza territory. The final stage keeps a security perimeter around the enclave.

Note: Withdrawal line is approximate and based on a post by the White House account on X on October 4, 2025.

‘Future stages indicated withdrawals to around 40 percent and 15 percent of Gaza’s territory. The final stage keeps a security perimeter around the enclave until it is “secure” from any “resurgent terror threat.” Some reports using satellite imagery show that the blocks laid out to demarcate the line have actually been moving deeper into the enclave, rather than further back. (The IDF has rejected this claim.)

‘A hostage and prisoner release. Hamas agreed to return the last hostages it had taken in October 2023 within seventy-two hours of the IDF withdrawal. In exchange, Israel agreed to release 250 Palestinian prisoners serving life sentences, 1,700 other Gazan detainees, and the bodies of 15 Palestinians for each deceased hostage it received. Several high-profile political figures at the top of Hamas’s release list were not included in the swap.

‘The twenty living hostages were released back to Israel on an October 13 deadline, and the remains of twenty-five hostages were also returned. Hamas missed the deadline to return the last of the deceased hostages, which had been a point of contention for Israel. The Israeli military also accused Hamas of falsifying some remains, which the International Committee of the Red Cross condemned. By January 26, Israel confirmed that all hostages and hostage remains have been returned to Israel.

‘Troop deployment. Israeli troops remain stationed at the Rafah border crossing with Egypt after reopening it in February 2026. The United States also sent two hundred troops to Israel in late 2025 to monitor the ceasefire and help with aid delivery, as well as determine next steps in governance and security inside Gaza. No U.S. troops will be deployed directly inside Gaza, officials have said. The European Union said in October that it was ready to deploy a long-standing humanitarian mission at the Rafah crossing “as soon as conditions allow.” As of Rafah’s February [2026] reopening, a European monitoring group is stationed at the corridor to facilitate the movement of residents into Gaza. …

‘Aid delivery increases. The plan said that “full aid” would be sent to Gaza “without interference,” which Trump later specified meant six hundred aid trucks per day. This was to include, per the UN Security Council resolution, “rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads.” Israel opened the Zikim border crossing for aid flow into northern Gaza in November [2025], a channel that had been closed for months.

‘The UN-backed global hunger monitor has previously said there is an “entirely man-made” famine in Gaza and emphasized the need for the resurgence of aid, with more than three-quarters of the population still struggling with acute food insecurity. Israel claims that Hamas has undermined aid efforts and has forcefully denied the famine determination, which it said is based on Hamas data and a manipulated process.’^{[footnote 5]}

2.3.2 For more information regarding the ceasefire, including the 20-point Gaza peace plan, the Board of Peace and future phases of the ceasefire see:

BBC, Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan in full, updated 10 October 2025
House of Commons Library, Gaza 2026: Board of Peace and National Transitional Committee, 17 February 2026
CFR, A Guide to the Gaza Peace Deal, updated 24 February 2026

2.4 Post ceasefire security events and fatalities

2.4.1 On 11 December 2025, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) published it’s thirty-sixth quarterly report on the implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016), covering the period from 20 September to 2 December 2025. The report stated:

‘On 9 October [2025], the parties and mediators agreed to and signed implementation steps for President Trump’s proposal for a comprehensive end of the Gaza war that outlined commitments to a partial withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces from nearly half of the Gaza Strip and a suspension of military operations in those areas, the full entry of humanitarian aid and relief, release of all hostages held in Gaza and release of an agreed list of Palestinian prisoners and detainees. Implementation commenced on 10 October [2025], including the phased withdrawal of Israel Defense Forces to a line of disengagement, with an estimated 53 to 58 per cent of the territory of Gaza remaining under Israel Defense Forces control.

‘On 13 October [2025], Hamas released all 20 living Israeli hostages remaining in Gaza. Released hostages described and exhibited signs of serious ill-treatment, including physical and psychological abuse. The same day, Israel released 250 Palestinian prisoners, most of them serving life or long-term sentences in Israel, and 1,718 Palestinians from Gaza who had been detained without charges or trial since 7 October 2023. Released prisoners described and exhibited signs of serious ill treatment and abuse. Between 13 October and 2 December [2025], Hamas returned the bodies and/or remains of 27 deceased hostages held in Gaza to Israel. In the same period, Israel returned the bodies of 345 Palestinians to Gaza. The remains of one deceased hostage have not yet been returned.

‘In the immediate wake of the partial disengagement by the Israel Defense Forces, the Gaza Ministry of Interior announced that it would deploy its forces to areas from which the Israel Defense Forces had pulled back “to restore order.” Clashes intensified between Hamas and various armed actors in Gaza with a series of high-profile reprisal killings taking place on all sides. On 13 October [2025], Hamas reportedly carried out public executions of people they accused of collaborating with Israel or being linked to ongoing internal fighting between Hamas and other armed actors.

‘The ceasefire remained fragile throughout the reporting period. Limited Israeli military operations and air strikes continued in Gaza, resulting in casualties and continued destruction of civilian infrastructure, with demolitions concentrated in Israel-controlled areas. Sporadic attacks by Palestinian armed groups against the Israel Defense Forces also continued, resulting in casualties.

‘On 17 October [2025], 11 members of one family, including 7 children and 2 women, were killed in eastern Gaza City when the Israel Defense Forces struck their vehicle. On 23 and 27 October [2025], at least three Palestinians, including a doctor, were killed in two Israeli air strikes in eastern Khan Yunis. Heavy bombings and the destruction of residential buildings were also reported throughout Gaza.

‘On 19 October [2025], two Israeli soldiers were killed when armed Palestinians reportedly fired an anti-tank missile and gunfire towards Israel Defense Forces troops operating in the Rafah area. Hamas denied responsibility for the attack. The Israel Defense Forces subsequently stated that it “struck the area … to eliminate the threat and dismantle tunnel shafts and military structures used for terrorist activity.” Further Israel Defense Forces air strikes took place, primarily striking central Gaza. According to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, 45 Palestinians were killed.

‘On 19 and 22 November [2025], the Israeli military launched two waves of intense attacks in Gaza, including air strikes, artillery shelling and tank fire, killing 53 Palestinians, including at least 12 children and 8 women, according to the Ministry of Health in Gaza, and injuring dozens of others. In one incident on 19 November [2025], the Israel Defense Forces reportedly struck the tents of internally displaced persons in Mawasi, western Khan Younis, killing at least nine Palestinians, including a woman and three children. In another incident, on 22 November [2025], the Israel Defense Forces struck residential buildings in Nuseirat, killing 11 Palestinians from the same family, including 6 women.’^{[footnote 6]}

2.4.2 On 16 January 2026, the BBC published an article entitled ‘Israel moves Yellow Line deeper into Gaza, satellite images show’, which stated:

‘Israel has moved the blocks which are supposed to mark its post-ceasefire line of control deeper into Gaza in several places, sowing confusion among Palestinians.

‘Satellite images reviewed by BBC Verify show that in at least three areas Israel placed blocks, before returning later and moving the positions further into the Strip.

‘Defence Minister Israel Katz warned in October that anyone crossing the Yellow Line would be “met with fire”.

‘Since these comments were made, there have been a series of deadly incidents around the line.

‘In Beit Lahia, Jabalia and al-Tuffah, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) placed blocks and later returned to move them deeper inside Gaza. In total, 16 positions were moved. In the al-Tuffah neighbourhood of Gaza City, satellite images show that IDF troops moved at least seven already placed blocks between 27 November and 25 December. The position of the markers were moved on average 295m (968ft) deeper inside the Strip.

‘… As well as the blocks that have been moved, BBC Verify mapped 205 other markers. More than half of those have been placed significantly deeper inside the Strip than the line marked on maps. An IDF spokesperson said it rejected “all claims that the Yellow Line has been moved or its crossing by IDF troops”.’^{[footnote 7]}

2.4.3 The same source additionally stated:

‘Since Katz’s warning in October [2025], troops have shot at people crossing the Yellow Line on at least 69 occasions, an analysis of IDF Telegram posts and statements to the BBC showed.

‘On 19 December [2025], the IDF conducted a strike on a school sheltering displaced people in the al-Tuffah neighbourhood of Gaza City - some 330m inside the Palestinian side of the line, according to the IDF maps - but just metres from a yellow block that was moved there.

‘Eyewitnesses said it happened while a wedding was taking place right by the school building. Five people, including children, were killed in the blast, Gaza’s Hamas-run Civil Defence agency said.

‘An IDF statement relating to that day said they fired at “suspicious individuals” west of the Yellow Line, adding that the incident remained under review and that it “regrets any harm to uninvolved individuals”.

‘In another deadly incident, 17-year-old Zaher Nasser Shamiya was killed near yellow blocks in Jabalia camp in northern Gaza. His father said IDF troops fired at him before running him over with a tank on 10 December [2025].

‘”The tank turned his body into pieces… it came into the safe area [west of the Yellow Line] and ran over him,” he said. BBC Verify has approached the IDF for comment on the incident.

‘And in November [2025], local media reported that two children - aged eight and 10 or 11 - were killed by Israeli forces. Their uncle said that the pair had been gathering firewood for their disabled father when they were killed.

‘Addressing the deaths, an IDF statement said it had eliminated two suspects who crossed the Yellow Line, conducted suspicious activities on the ground, and approached IDF troops. It did not offer details on how the pair were identified as suspects.

‘An IDF spokesperson accused Hamas fighters of firing on troops six times “beyond the Yellow Line” over the past week [9 January 2026 – 16 January 2026], in a statement to BBC Verify.’^{[footnote 8]}

2.4.4 On 23 March 2026, The Guardian published an article entitled ‘“There’s no ceasefire”: Gaza paramedic and father of two killed as civilian death toll since October passes 650’, which stated:

‘[Abed Elrahman] Hamdouna was a volunteer ambulance driver in northern Gaza, “risking his life to help people who were injured”, says his father, Hosny Hamdouna. They knew about the repeated Israeli attacks on Gaza’s health facilities which have claimed the lives of hundreds of healthcare workers.

‘So when a ceasefire was reached in October 2025, they were cautiously relieved. But that relief turned to shock after Hamdouna, a 31-year-old father of two, was killed in a reported drone strike west of Gaza City two weeks ago, as he was on his way to a family Ramadan iftar, to break fast with his brothers.

‘His death is a shocking reality check on the large numbers of civilians that continue to die in Gaza. Since the ceasefire was announced on 10 October last year [2025], Israel has killed 677 and injured a further 1,800 Palestinians, according to Gaza’s health ministry. Israeli strikes in Gaza have averaged about 10 a day across the territory over the past five months.

‘… Hamdouna is one of more than 1,500 healthcare workers killed in the war in Gaza, including ten killed during this latest ceasefire, according to Healthcare Workers Watch.’^{[footnote 9]}

2.4.5 On 10 April 2026, the United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOCHR) published a press release entitled ‘Palestinians across Gaza unsafe six months on from ceasefire announcement, says Türk’, which stated:

‘Six months since the announcement of a ceasefire in Gaza, Palestinians across the strip are still unsafe, as Israeli attacks continue routinely, said UN Human Rights Chief Volker Türk.

‘… At least 32 Palestinians have been killed by Israeli forces since early April [2026], as airstrikes, gunfire, and shelling persist daily across Gaza, bringing to 738 the number of Palestinians killed since a ceasefire came into effect on 10 October 2025, according to the Palestinian Ministry of Health.

‘“For the past 10 days, Palestinians are still being killed and injured in what is left of their homes, shelters and tents of displaced families, on the streets, in vehicles, at a medical facility and a classroom,” Türk said.

‘Victims include women, children, people with disabilities, a humanitarian contractor, and a journalist.

‘On 9 April [2026], Ritaj Rihan, a third grade schoolgirl, was killed as Israeli military forces opened fire on the crowded tent encampment housing her makeshift classroom, in Beit Lahiya, North Gaza.

‘On 8 April [2026], the Israeli military used a drone to target and kill Al Jazeera journalist Mohamed Washah in Gaza City, later issuing a statement claiming he had been a Hamas operative. This is the same basis Israel has invoked in many similar killings of journalists in Gaza, with no independently verifiable evidence to substantiate the claim. Washah is the 294th Palestinian journalist to be killed by Israeli forces since 7 October 2023 as verified by UN Human Rights Office. In the meantime, Israel continues to enforce a blanket ban on independent access to Gaza by international journalists.

‘On 6 April [2026], Israeli forces shot at a car transporting World Health Organisation workers, killing the driver. As of early April, 589 aid workers have been killed in Gaza since 7 October 2023, including 397 UN staff and team members.

‘“The number of journalists and humanitarian personnel killed in Gaza is unprecedented, and further compounds civilian harm as it makes reporting on the situation and responding to its humanitarian implications life-threatening,” Türk said. “Movement itself has become a life-threatening activity. Incidents of Palestinians killed by Israeli forces while walking, driving, or standing outside are recorded nearly every day.”

‘Israeli forces also continue to kill Palestinians apparently for their proximity to the so-called “yellow line” — the Israeli forces’ shifting and poorly marked deployment line which cuts through Gaza. “Targeting civilians not taking direct part in hostilities is a war crime, regardless of their proximity to deployment lines,” said the High Commissioner.’^{[footnote 10]}

2.4.6 On 10 April 2024, Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders) published an article entitled ‘“This is not a ceasefire”: Life in Gaza continues to be suffocated six months on’, which stated:

‘Six months since a fragile and ineffective ceasefire was implemented in Gaza, Palestine, on 10 October 2025, Israeli forces continue their violent attacks and expand their military control of the Strip.

‘… As of 8 April 2026, at least 733 people have been killed and 1,913 have been injured since the ceasefire on 10 October [2025], according to Gaza’s Ministry of Health. MSF teams have responded to multiple mass casualty incidents on a monthly basis, treating at least 244 patients for injuries caused by Israeli attacks, including many children.

‘Since the ceasefire, MSF teams have done over 40,000 dressings for patients with wounds from violent trauma, including gunshots, blasts or other kinds of weapons. Since 10 October 2025, medical teams have treated over 15,000 trauma cases in MSF’s two field hospitals alone, both from recent injuries and wounds requiring long-term care. In MSF’s clinic in Gaza City alone, over 18,000 dressings were done, with over 60 per cent for trauma wounds.

‘… The space where people are living is continuously shrinking and framed by violence. Since the ceasefire, the Gaza Strip has been effectively divided along the “yellow line”, which marks an area – currently 58 per cent of the territory – under full Israeli military control; this is pushing Palestinians into the remaining 42 per cent of largely destroyed territory.

‘The yellow line is not clearly marked, and is continuously shifting westwards to the sea, squeezing hundreds of thousands of people into a tiny, overcrowded patch of land. The perimeter of the yellow line has become a kill zone, with gunfire, airstrikes, and shelling from Israeli forces happening daily. Israeli warships are also firing inward from the sea, trapping people with active firing on all sides.

‘On 6 April [2026], at least 10 people were killed, and several others wounded, near Maghazi refugee camp in Gaza, following armed clashes and an Israeli strike. MSF teams at our field hospital in Deir Al-Balah treated 16 patients, half of them with critical injuries.

‘“Among the critical cases, there were two young girls of seven and eight years old,” says Dr Murad Saliha, an MSF doctor. “Both of them had life-threatening injuries and were rushed to emergency surgery. Fortunately, despite limited resources, our medical team was able to save both their lives.”’^{[footnote 11]}

2.4.7 On 7 May 2026, the BBC published an article entitled ‘Fears of renewed Gaza war as Hamas disarmament talks stall’, which stated:

‘Ceasefire talks between Israel and Hamas have stalled, and Gaza risks sliding back into war.

‘… Israeli media reports suggest Israel is preparing to resume fighting in the Gaza Strip because of the impasse and Hamas’s refusal to give up its weapons.

‘Citing unnamed security sources, Israel’s Channel 12 News has reported that Washington may give Israel the “green light” to resume “operations”. One of the main options it says Israel is considering is to expand the so-called “Yellow Line” marking some 60% of Gaza that has remained under full Israeli military control during the ceasefire. Locals say this is already happening.

‘On Wednesday [6 May 2026], a Hamas statement called on “the US administration and the guarantor states of the Sharm el-Sheikh [ceasefire] agreement” to “move immediately” to stop Israel’s “aggression against the innocent people in Gaza”.

‘This came after Israeli air strikes across the Palestinian territory killed at least six people – including a Hamas commander and Azzam al-Hayya, a son of Hamas’s top negotiator, Khalil al-Hayya, who has been leading the indirect talks with Israel.

‘At least 846 people – including many women and children – have been killed in Gaza since the ceasefire began, according to the Hamas-run health ministry. Israel says that five of its soldiers have been killed in the same period.’^{[footnote 12]}

2.4.8 On 20 May 2026, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) published a situation report covering events between 13 and 19 May 2026, which stated: ‘Strikes by Israeli forces continued across the Gaza Strip, resulting in civilian casualties and damage to critical facilities.’^{[footnote 13]}

2.4.9 In November 2025, Al Jazeera published an article entitled ‘How many times has Israel violated the Gaza ceasefire? Here are the numbers’ (the Al Jazeera article), which has been regularly updated since. The article, last updated on 5 June 2026 at the time of writing, stated:

‘Israel violated the ceasefire agreement at least 3,076 times from October 10, 2025 to May 31, 2026, through the continuation of attacks by air, artillery and direct shootings, the Government Media Office in Gaza reports. …

‘From October 10, 2025 to April 14, 2026, the office said Israel shot at civilians 921 times, raided residential areas beyond the “yellow line” 97 times, bombed and shelled Gaza 1109 times, and demolished people’s properties on 273 occasions.

‘… According to an analysis by Al Jazeera, Israel has attacked Gaza on 215 out of the past 239 days of the ceasefire, meaning there were only 24 days during which no violent attacks, deaths or injuries were reported.’^{[footnote 14]}

2.4.10 The same source also published the below infographic which shows the dates that attacks on Gaza have taken place between 10 October 2025 and 5 June 2026:

Israel has attacked Gaza on most days during the ‘ceasefire’

Israel has carried out attacks on Gaza on 215 of the 239 days since the October 10, 2025 “ceasefire”, according to an Al Jazeera analysis of news reports.

^{[footnote 15]}

2.4.11 The Al Jazeera article, last updated 5 June 2026, additionally stated: ‘Since the ceasefire took effect at noon on October 10 [2025], Israel has killed at least 947 Palestinians and injured 2,935, according to the latest figures from the Palestinian Ministry of Health.’

2.4.12 The same source published the following infographic:

Israel has killed at least 947 Palestinians despite the ‘ceasefire’

Since the “ceasefire” took effect at noon on October 10, near-daily Israeli attacks have killed at least 947 Palestinians and injured 2,935.

January 31

Israeli bombardment kills at least 31 Palestinians, two days before the Rafah border crossing reopens

November 22

At least 21 people killed in a spate of Israeli drone and missile attacks throughout northern and central Gaza

October 19

Israel launches air raids across Gaza, killing 45 people, after Hamas was accused of killing two Israeli soldiers

Source: Palestinian Ministry of Health, Gaza Government Media Office, June 5, 2026

^{[footnote 16]}

3. Key statistics

3.1 Sources and definitions

3.1.1 The majority of the data included in this section is obtained using the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) Data Export Tool. The fundamental unit of observation used by ACLED is the ‘event’, of which there are 6 event types and 25 sub-event types, both violent and non-violent.^{[footnote 17]} The ACLED codebook provided the following definitions for each of the different security events (see the ACLED codebook for more information):

Battles – a violent interaction between two organized armed groups at a particular time and location. Battles can occur between armed and organized state, non-state, and external groups, and in any combination thereof.
Explosions/Remote violence – incidents in which one side uses weapon types that, by their nature, are at range and widely destructive. The weapons used in Explosions/Remote violence events are explosive devices, including but not limited to: bombs, grenades, IEDs, artillery fire or shelling, missile attacks, air or drone strikes, and other widely destructive heavy weapons or chemical weapons
Protests – an in-person public demonstration of three or more participants in which the participants do not engage in violence, though violence may be used against them. Events include individuals and groups who peacefully demonstrate against a political entity, government institution, policy, group, tradition, business, or other private institution
Riots – violent events where demonstrators or mobs of three or more engage in violent or destructive acts, including but not limited to physical fights, rock throwing, property destruction, etc. They may engage individuals, property, businesses, other rioting groups, or armed actors
Strategic developments – captures contextually important information regarding incidents and activities of groups that are not recorded as Political violence or Demonstrations events, yet may trigger future events or contribute to political dynamics within and across states. The inclusion of such events is limited, as their purpose is to capture pivotal events within the broader political landscape
Violence against civilians – violent events where an organized armed group inflicts violence upon unarmed non-combatants. By definition, civilians are unarmed and cannot engage in political violence. Therefore, the violence is understood to be asymmetric as the perpetrator is assumed to be the only actor capable of using violence in the event. The perpetrators of such acts include state forces and their affiliates, rebels, militias, and external/other forces.^{[footnote 18]}

3.2 Number of types of security events (October 2025–April 2026)

3.2.1 The below table was produced by CPIT using data collected by ACLED and extracted using their Data Export Tool. According to this dataset (based on analysis of battles, explosions/remote violence, protests, riots, strategic developments, and violence against civilians in the Gaza Strip, referred to here collectively as ‘security events’) there was an estimated total of 2,675 security events between 10 October 2025 (when the ceasefire went into effect) and 30 April 2026 (the latest complete month of ACLED data at the time of writing).^{[footnote 19]}

	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26	Apr-26	TOTAL
Battles	16	12	7	5	16	10	9	75
Explosions/Remote violence	173	315	359	340	265	187	247	1,886
Protests	0	0	2	1	1	2	17	23
Riots	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strategic developments	58	108	83	77	66	9	39	440
Violence against civilians	23	9	22	52	49	37	59	251
Total	270	444	473	475	397	245	371	2675

3.3 Locations of security events (October 2025–April 2026)

3.3.1 The below table, produced by CPIT using ACLED data, shows the location, by governorate, of the security events that have taken place between 10 October 2025 and 30 April. The highest overall numbers were reported in Gaza City (785) and Khan Younis (731), followed by Deir al-Balah (422), North Gaza (391) and Rafah (346).^{[footnote 20]}

	North Gaza	Gaza City	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis	Rafah
Oct. 2025 (270)	15	96	44	95	20
Nov. 2025 (444)	53	122	60	137	72
Dec. 2025 (473)	67	137	69	115	85
Jan. 2026 (475)	85	114	74	132	70
Feb. 2026 (397)	66	116	52	108	55
Mar. 2026 (245)	32	83	53	58	19
Apr. 2026 (371)	73	117	70	86	25
Total (2,675)	391	785	422	731	346

3.4 Number of types of events (10 October 2023–30 June 2024 and 9 April 2025–9 October 2025)

3.4.1 The ACLED Data Export Tool was also used to examine the number of security events in the 6 months leading up to the October 2025 ceasefire (9 April 2025 to 9 October 2025). Within this 6-month period, there was a total of 6,582 security events across Gaza, broken down as follows^{[footnote 21]}:

178 Battles
5,019 Explosions/Remote violence
12 Protests
1 Riot
925 Strategic developments
447 incidents of violence against civilians

3.4.2 The CPIN Palestine: Security situation in Gaza, published in November 2024, provides data (also originally obtained via the ACLED Data Export Tool) on the number of security events between 7 October 2023 and 30 June 2024. Within this period, there was a total of 10,400 security events, broken down as follows:

1,061 Battles
8,752 Explosions/Remote violence
6 Protests
1 Riot
404 Strategic developments
176 incidents of violence against civilians

3.4.3 The below table was produced by CPIT based on the data set out above. Although the time periods covered are not directly comparable (265, 184 and 203 days respectively), the data indicates a decline in the number of security incidents over time, particularly in the 6 month period following the introduction of the ceasefire.

	10 Oct. 2023 – 30 Jun. 2024	9 Apr. 2025 – 9 Oct. 2025	10 Oct. 2025 – 30 Apr. 2026
Battles	1,061	178	75
Explosions/Remote Violence	8,752	5,019	1,886
Protests	6	12	23
Riots	1	1	0
Strategic developments	404	925	440
Violence against civilians	176	447	251

3.5 Fatalities

3.5.1 In January 2026, The Guardian published an article entitled ‘Israel accepts health authorities’ Gaza death toll is broadly accurate, saying 70,000 have died’, which stated:

‘Israel’s military has accepted the death toll compiled by health authorities in Gaza is broadly accurate, marking a U-turn after years of official attacks on the data. A senior security official briefed Israeli journalists, saying about 70,000 Palestinians had been killed by Israeli attacks on the territory since October 2023, excluding those missing.

‘It is the first time Israel has publicly estimated the toll from the war in Gaza. Previously the government and military had only provided figures for militants Israel claimed to have killed. Gaza health authorities said the direct toll from Israeli attacks had exceeded 71,660 people, with at least 10,000 presumed buried in the rubble of bombed buildings.

‘For more than two years, Israeli officials and media had attacked the Palestinian figures as “Hamas propaganda” and dismissed them as “not accurate”.’^{[footnote 22]}

3.5.2 In April 2026, The Lancet, an independent, international medical journal that publishes peer‑reviewed research and analysis^{[footnote 23]}, published a research article by Michael Spagat, PhD, Jon Pedersen, MA, Khalil Shikaki, PhD, Michael Robbins, PhD, Eran Bendavid, MD MS, Håvard Hegre, PhD and Prof Debarati Guha-Sapir, PhD, entitled ‘Violent and non-violent death tolls for the Gaza conflict: new primary evidence from a population-representative field survey’. Regarding the methodology of the study the article stated that ‘We [the researchers] conducted a population-representative household survey, the Gaza Mortality Survey, between Dec 30, 2024, and Jan 5, 2025 … [and] surveyed 2000 households across 200 primary sampling units, documenting the vital status of 9729 household members as of Oct 6, 2023, plus newborns.’^{[footnote 24]}

3.5.3 The study’s findings stated:

‘We estimated 75,200 violent deaths (95% CI [Confidence Interval] 63,600–86,800) between Oct 7, 2023, and Jan 5, 2025, representing approximately 3.4% of the Gaza Strip’s pre-conflict population. Women, children (ie, younger than 18 years), and older people (ie, older than 64 years) comprised 56.2% (95% CI 50.4–61.9) of violent deaths, totalling 42,200 deaths (95% CI 33,100–51,300). We also estimated 16,300 non-violent deaths (12,300–20,200), of which 8540 (4,540–12,500) represent excess deaths above pre-conflict projections. The MoH [Ministry of Health] figure for this period (49,090 violent deaths) was 34.7% below our central estimate.’^{[footnote 25]}

3.5.4 The table and graph below, which shows the number of fatalities caused by security events between 10 October 2025 and 30 April 2026, was produced by CPIT using data collected by ACLED and extracted using their Data Export Tool. According to this dataset there was an estimated total of 1,184 security event-caused fatalities between 10 October 2025 and 30 April 2026.^{[footnote 26]} The figures refer to all fatalities and therefore include combatants as well as civilians – for more information on ACLED’s methodology surrounding fatalities, see FAQs: ACLED Fatality Methodology.

	Oct-25	Nov-25	Dec-25	Jan-26	Feb-26	Mar-26	Apr-26	TOTAL
Battles	49	20	12	12	35	23	20	171
Explosions/Remote violence	214	152	56	133	95	106	126	882
Protests	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Riots	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Strategic developments	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0
Violence against civilians	26	5	16	30	18	17	19	131
Total	289	177	84	175	148	146	165	1184

Number of fatalities caused by security events between 10 October 2025 and 30 April 2026:

3.5.5 The following table, which shows the number of fatalities caused by security events across the Gaza Strip between 10 October 2025 and 30 April 2026, was produced by CPIT using data collected by ACLED and extracted using their Data Export Tool. According to this dataset there was an estimated total of 1,184 security event-caused fatalities between 10 October 2025 and 30 April 2026.^{[footnote 27]} As above, these figures refer to all fatalities and therefore include combatants as well as civilians.

	North Gaza	Gaza City	Deir al-Balah	Khan Younis	Rafah
Oct. 2025 (289)	14	128	80	58	9
Nov. 2025 (177)	14	38	35	40	50
Dec. 2025 (84)	20	33	6	14	11
Jan. 2026 (175)	13	59	34	53	16
Feb. 2026 (148)	28	48	14	45	13
Mar. 2026 (146)	19	37	48	30	12
Apr. 2026 (165)	35	48	35	38	9
Total (1,184)	143	391	252	278	120

3.5.6 The ACLED Data Export Tool was also used to examine the number of fatalities in the 6 months leading up to the October 2025 ceasefire (9 April 2025 to 9 October 2025). Within this 6-month period, there was a total of 13,081 fatalities across Gaza.^{[footnote 28]} The CPIN Palestine: Security situation in Gaza, published in November 2024, based on data originally obtained via the ACLED Data Export Tool stated that there were 39,276 fatalities between 7 October 2023 and 30 June 2024.

3.5.7 The below table was produced by CPIT based on the data set out above. Although the time periods covered are not directly comparable (265, 184 and 203 days respectively), the data indicates lower fatality numbers over time, particularly in the 6-month period following the introduction of the ceasefire.

	10 Oct. 2023 – 30 Jun. 2024	9 Apr. 2025 – 9 Oct. 2025	10 Oct. 2025 – 30 Apr. 2026
Fatalities	39,276	13,081	1,184

Question 3

Bibliography

Accepted Answer

Sources cited

Al Jazeera, How many times has Israel violated the Gaza ceasefire? Here are the numbers, updated 5 June 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED):

BBC:

Fears of renewed Gaza war as Hamas disarmament talks stall, 7 May 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026
Israel moves Yellow Line deeper into Gaza, satellite images show, 19 January 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026

Council on Foreign Relations:

Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) (Doctors Without Borders), “This is not a ceasefire”: Life in Gaza continues to be suffocated six months on, 10 April 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026

Spagat, M, Pedersen, J, Shikaki K et al, Violent and non-violent death tolls for the Gaza conflict: new primary evidence from a population-representative field survey, The Lancet Global Health, Volume 14, Issue 4, April 2026. Accessed: 29 May 2025

The Guardian:

Israel accepts health authorities’ Gaza death toll is broadly accurate, saying 70,000 have died, 30 January 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026
‘There’s no ceasefire’: Gaza paramedic and father of two killed as civilian death toll since October passes 650, 23 March 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026

The Lancet, About us, no date. Accessed: 29 May 2025

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNOHCR), Palestinians across Gaza unsafe six months on from ceasefire announcement, says Türk, 10 April 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026

UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), UNRWA Situation Report #222 on the Humanitarian Crisis in the occupied Palestinian Territory (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including East Jerusalem), 20 May 2026. Accessed: 10 June 2026

UN Security Council (UNSC), Implementation of Security Council resolution 2334 (2016) – Report of the Secretary-General, 11 December 2025. Accessed: 10 June 2026

Sources consulted but not cited

Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED), Who are the Israel-backed armed groups fighting Hamas in Gaza?, 27 April 2026. Accessed: 21 May 2026

BBC:

British Red Cross, The Gaza Crisis: a timeline of the humanitarian impact and response, no date. Accessed: 21 May 2026

Council on Foreign Relations, Israeli-Palestinian Conflict Timeline, updated 24 June 2025. Accessed: 21 May 2026

Euronews, From 7 October 2023 to 7 October 2025: A timeline of two years of war in the Gaza Strip, 7 October 2025. Accessed: 21 May 2026

Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Iran War Deepens Gaza Crisis, 20 March 2026. Accessed: 21 May 2026

International Crisis Group, Israel/Palestine – On the Horizon, February 2026. Accessed: 21 May 2026

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Country bulletin: security situation in Gaza, Palestine, June 2026 (accessible)

Summary

Country information

About this bulletin

1. Geography and demography

1.1 Geography and maps

1.2 Population density and demography

2. Security situation

2.1 Main Actors

2.2 Overview of events between October 2023 and October 2025

2.3 Ceasefire conditions

Israel Completes First Phase of Gaza Withdrawal

2.4 Post ceasefire security events and fatalities

3. Key statistics

3.1 Sources and definitions

3.2 Number of types of security events (October 2025–April 2026)

3.3 Locations of security events (October 2025–April 2026)

3.4 Number of types of events (10 October 2023–30 June 2024 and 9 April 2025–9 October 2025)

3.5 Fatalities

Bibliography

Sources cited

Sources consulted but not cited

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Summary

Country information

About this bulletin

1. Geography and demography

1.1 Geography and maps

1.2 Population density and demography

2. Security situation

2.1 Main Actors

2.2 Overview of events between October 2023 and October 2025

2.3 Ceasefire conditions

Israel Completes First Phase of Gaza Withdrawal

2.4 Post ceasefire security events and fatalities

3. Key statistics

3.1 Sources and definitions

3.2 Number of types of security events (October 2025–April 2026)

3.3 Locations of security events (October 2025–April 2026)

3.4 Number of types of events (10 October 2023–30 June 2024 and 9 April 2025–9 October 2025)

3.5 Fatalities

Bibliography

Sources cited

Sources consulted but not cited

Version control and feedback

Clearance

Feedback to the Home Office

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

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