Country policy and information note: sufficiency of protection, Pakistan, September 2026 (accessible)

Question 1

Executive summary

Accepted Answer

In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a rogue state actor and/or a non-state actor is likely to be able to obtain protection from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.

In the reported case of AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011], the Upper Tribunal, having regard to the country guidance case AH (Sufficiency of Protection, Sunni Extremists) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 05862, found that ‘… it cannot be said that such a general insufficiency of state protection has been established.’

In general, Pakistan takes reasonable steps to prevent criminal acts by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts that could amount to persecution, and a person is largely able to access protection.

Pakistan has a legal framework that protects civil, political and economic rights, and domestic laws provide for the punishment of criminal acts. Federal and provincial police services have primary responsibility for law enforcement, supported by other agencies and paramilitary forces.

Police resources and accessibility vary by province. Estimated national police strength is about 624,390 against a population of around 241.5 million. Punjab province has the largest police force, and also the largest population.

Police effectiveness varies by region and can be affected by under-resourcing, a lack of equipment, low salaries and corruption. Pakistan has developed significant surveillance capabilities, including online, but these reportedly lack safeguards and have been used against critics of state institutions.

There are allegations of human rights violations involving law enforcement, security forces, intelligence agencies and other state actors. Reports refer to arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, and torture and ill-treatment.

While there is a functioning court system, sources raise concerns about judicial independence, fair trial rights and system effectiveness. Reported issues include political influence over senior judicial appointments and constitutional case management, extensive case backlogs, delays, low conviction rates, corruption, intimidation of judges and witnesses, under-resourced prosecution services and a shortage of judges.

Pakistan has federal and provincial witness protection laws and some legal aid provision. However, sources report limited implementation, ineffective protection, inadequate victim support, underfunded services, poor institutional capacity and witness intimidation. There are also several official oversight and complaint mechanisms, including human rights institutions, police complaint systems and the federal Ombudsman, but sources describe some bodies as dormant, limited or generally ineffective outside non-political or service-delivery matters.

Each case must be considered on its individual facts. The onus is on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

This CPIN does not specifically cover the self-administrative territory of Pakistan-administered Kashmir.

Question 2

Assessment

Accepted Answer

Section updated: 15 September 2026

About the assessment

This section considers relevant evidence – including country information, refugee and human rights law and policy, and case law – to assess whether, in general:

the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection
if refused, a claim is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

For details on how CPIT makes its assessments, gathers and presents country information, its research methodology and disclaimers and explainers on coverage, source selection, maps, translations and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in developing CPIT products, see About country policy and information notes.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks

1.1.1 Decision makers must:

assess credibility (see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.
check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).
consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).
consider language analysis testing, where available, in cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

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2. Exclusion

2.1.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

2.1.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection, which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status.

2.1.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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The information in this section has been removed as it is restricted for internal Home Office use.

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3. Protection

3.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection.

3.1.2 In general, a person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a rogue state actor and/or non-state actor is likely to be able to obtain protection from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.

3.1.3 In the country guidance case of AH (Sufficiency of Protection, Sunni Extremists) Pakistan CG [2002] UKIAT 05862, heard on 4 October 2002 and promulgated on 31 December 2002, the Upper Tribunal (UT) held that the state of Pakistan ‘… has a functioning system of criminal law and criminal acts are prosecuted albeit that there may be difficulties which will arise in individual cases in successfully doing so. The degree of protection which the state is required to provide to its subjects is clearly illustrated in the approach of the European Court in Strasbourg to the need to have regard to the difficulties involved in policing modern societies and resources’ (para 17).

3.1.4 In the reported case of AW (sufficiency of protection) Pakistan [2011] UKUT 31 (IAC), heard on 11 November 2010 and promulgated on 26 January 2011, the UT held that ‘The starting point in assessing whether the appellant would be given sufficient protection if returned to Pakistan is to consider whether there is systemic insufficiency of state protection’ (paragraph 34). Having regard to the case of AH and to the 2010 case of KA and Others (Domestic Violence – Risk on Return), the UT held that ‘… it cannot be said that such a general insufficiency of state protection has been established’ (paragraph 34).

3.1.5 In AW, the UT held that ‘Notwithstanding systemic sufficiency of state protection, a claimant may still have a well founded fear of persecution if authorities know or ought to know of circumstances particular to his/her case giving rise to the fear, but are unlikely to provide the additional protection the particular circumstances reasonably require…’ (Headnote 2).

3.1.6 The UT in AW also held that ‘In considering whether an appellant’s particular circumstances give rise to a need for additional protection, particular account must be taken of past persecution (if any) so as to ensure the question posed is whether there are good reasons to consider that such persecution (and past lack of sufficient protection) will not be repeated’ (Headnote 3).

3.1.7 The country evidence available since AW was heard indicates that state protection remains generally available. Pakistan takes reasonable steps to prevent criminal acts by operating an effective legal system for the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts that could amount to persecution, and a person is generally able to access protection. A person’s reluctance to seek protection does not necessarily mean that it is not available.

3.1.8 Corruption, sympathy or weakness of some individuals in the system of justice does not mean that the state is unwilling to afford protection, and there may be various sound reasons why criminals may not be brought to justice.

3.1.9 For information on protection of minority groups, including ethnic and religious minorities, LGBT+ persons and women, see the relevant Pakistan Country Policy and Information Note.

3.1.10 Pakistan is party to most major international instruments on human rights, and its constitution and legislature protect civil, political and economic rights. Domestic laws provide for the punishment of criminal acts (see Legal framework).

3.1.11 Pakistan’s federal and provincial police services have primary responsibility for law enforcement, supported by agencies such as the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA), Counter Terrorism Departments, and paramilitary forces. Police are organised at federal, provincial and territorial levels, while paramilitary forces, including the Pakistan Rangers, Frontier Corps and Federal Constabulary, support border security, internal law-and-order operations and action against criminal gangs and smugglers (see Police service and paramilitary groups).

3.1.12 Police resources and accessibility vary by province. Estimated national police strength is about 624,390 against a population of around 241.5 million, equating to approximately 2.6 police officers per 1,000 people. Punjab province has the largest police force (and the highest overall population), with over 200,000 personnel and 720 police stations, while Sindh, Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), Balochistan and Islamabad have smaller forces, although Balochistan’s police strength increased after the integration of Levies (paramilitary force) personnel. Women’s access to police services has been supported through women’s helpdesks, complaint cells, helplines, safe houses and women’s police stations in some provinces. Islamabad launched a women-only digital police station in July 2025. However, the Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) noted that, despite a 10% recruitment quota, women comprised only 3% of Pakistan’s police force in 2023, with institutional and societal barriers affecting recruitment and progression (see Resources and accessibility).

3.1.13 Police effectiveness in Pakistan is limited by resource and capacity constraints, including poor training, low salaries and lack of equipment, inconsistent police response and political influence. The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC) noted regional variation, with resource constraints affecting Islamabad, Karachi, Punjab and northwest Pakistan, although the Sindh Rangers had reduced the capacity of militant groups in the province and Punjab’s Safe City project expanded CCTV surveillance in Lahore. Pakistan has developed significant surveillance capabilities, including online and telecommunications monitoring, but these often lack safeguards and are reportedly used against activists, journalists and political opponents critical of state institutions, though information on the scale and extent of this monitoring is limited. DFAT noted there is no nationwide coordination, common training standard or centralised criminal records database (see Efficacy).

3.1.14 Corruption in policing is reported as widespread. A 2025 survey by Transparency International Pakistan found that the police were perceived as the most corrupt public institution. Sources reported bribery, bias, political influence and poor responsiveness in police processes including First Information Report (FIR) registration, investigations and arrests (see Corruption).

3.1.15 There have been allegations of human rights violations involving law enforcement, security forces, intelligence agencies and other state actors. Pakistani law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention but reports in 2025 referred to arbitrary arrests and detention of Afghan refugees (regardless of their documentation status), journalists, activists and minorities, although information on the scale and extent was limited (see Arbitrary arrest and detention).

3.1.16 Enforced disappearances were reported, particularly affecting Baloch, Pashtun and Sindhi activists and nationalists, human rights defenders and people working on missing-person cases. The Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED) registered nearly 10,600 cases between 2006 and August 2025, with over 1,800 unresolved as of August 2025, while a civil society organisation recorded 3,140 cases between 2006 and 2025. New cases were recorded in 2025, although numbers varied by source. Pakistan has not ratified the Convention on Enforced Disappearance and lacks specific domestic legislation criminalising the practice. The UN Committee Against Torture (UNCAT) raised concerns about impunity and the effectiveness of the COIED (see Enforced disappearances).

3.1.17 Extrajudicial killings, including alleged ‘kill and dump’ cases in Balochistan, police ‘encounters’ in Punjab and killings affecting Pashtuns and Sindhi nationalists, continued to be reported. The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) recorded 1,696 suspect deaths in police encounters in 2025, with most fatalities attributed to the Crime Control Department (CCD) in Punjab (see Extrajudicial killings).

3.1.18 Pakistan criminalised torture under the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act 2022, but torture and ill-treatment were described by civil society and UNCAT as widespread, particularly during arrest, interrogation and detention. Although sources noted gaps in the law and low prosecutions, the Government of Pakistan reported securing 57 convictions of public officials involved in custodial torture, death or rape between 2019 and 2025 (see Torture and ill-treatment).

3.1.19 There is a functioning judicial system, although sources reported concerns about judicial independence, fair trial rights and system effectiveness. The 26th and 27th Constitutional Amendments changed senior judicial appointments, bench formation and constitutional case management, increasing political influence over the judiciary. The justice system is affected by extensive case backlogs (over 2.4 million nationwide as of September 2025), delays, low conviction rates, corruption, intimidation of judges and witnesses, under-resourced prosecution services and a shortage of judges. Pakistan ranked 130 of 143 countries in the 2025 World Justice Project (WJP) Rule of Law Index, with low scores for civil and criminal justice. Successful prosecutions for politically motivated or sectarian violence are reported to be rare, partly due to weak investigations, limited forensic capability, poor prosecution and judicial capacity, and threats against criminal justice actors (see Independence and fair trial and Effectiveness and integrity).

3.1.20 Pakistan has federal and provincial witness protection laws, including legislation in all 4 provinces and the federal Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act 2017. Sources reported limited implementation, funding, victim support and effectiveness, and witness intimidation, particularly in trafficking and sexual violence cases. However, Balochistan approved amendments in 2026 to allow faceless courts and confidential testimony (see Witness protection and victim support).

3.1.21 Legal aid is available through the Legal Aid and Justice Authority and Sindh Legal Advisory Call Centre, with some state-funded initiatives for litigants without the means to pay. Equality Now reported that legal aid provisions under the Anti-Rape Act 2021 remain largely unimplemented (see Legal aid).

3.1.22 There are several official oversight and complaint mechanisms, including the Ministry of Human Rights helpline, national and provincial human rights institutions, parliamentary committees, the Supreme Court human rights cell, police internal accountability bodies, complaint cells, helplines, digital feedback systems and the federal Ombudsman. The National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR) can investigate human rights complaints and review legislation, while provincial commissions mainly make recommendations. However, DFAT reported that some commissions are dormant or do not meet international standards, and sources stated that federal and provincial bodies are generally less effective in handling complaints that are politically sensitive or go beyond service-delivery matters (see Oversight and complaint mechanisms).

3.1.23 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

Question 3

Country information

Accepted Answer

About the country information

The COI provides the basis for the assessment and the executive summary. Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

The cut-off date for COI included in this note is 31 July 2026.

For details on how CPIT gathers and presents country information, its research methodology and disclaimers and explainers on coverage, source selection, maps, translations and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in developing CPIT products, see About country policy and information notes.

4. Legal framework

4.1 Constitution

4.1.1 Pakistan’s constitution provides for state protection, subject to law, of people’s lives (Article 9), property (Articles 23 to 24), places of worship and religious beliefs (subject to law, order and morality – Article 20), and equal protection of law for each person (Article 25, including non-discrimination as per Articles 26 to 27). The constitution also provides for fair trial and due process (Article 10A and, with reference to protection against retrospective punishment, double punishment, and self-incrimination, Articles 12 to 13).^{[footnote 1]}

4.1.2 The constitution prohibits torture during the extraction of evidence (Article 14), and provides for freedom of movement, assembly, and association (Articles 15 to 17, subject to law and other limitations tied to public order/national security, or, in the case of association, morality), and freedom of speech (Article 19, subject to limitations associated with incitement/public order/national security/defence, morality, contempt of court, and/or ‘the glory of Islam’).^{[footnote 2]}

4.2 Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure

4.2.1 The Pakistan Penal Code (PPC) of 1860 is the main criminal code of Pakistan and provides for the punishment of offences prescribed in the PPC.^{[footnote 3]} It has been amended several times since its inception.^{[footnote 4]} ^{[footnote 5]}

4.2.2 The Code of Criminal Procedure (CrCP), 1898, is the main legislation on criminal procedures in Pakistan. It sets out the processes for criminal investigations, arrests, collection of evidence, determination of guilt or innocence and the conduct of proceedings.^{[footnote 6]} It has been amended several times.^{[footnote 7]}

4.2.3 In January 2025, news agency Associated Press of Pakistan (APP)^{[footnote 8]} reported that the National Assembly introduced the Criminal Procedure Code (Amendment) Bill 2025, with approximately 108 proposed amendments intended to improve efficiency and transparency in the criminal justice system.^{[footnote 9]}

4.3 National human rights legislation

4.3.1 The National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) provided a list of Pakistan’s federal and provincial ‘pro-women laws’, although the list was broader than women’s rights and included legislation relevant to children, disabled people, trans people, older people, and minorities.^{[footnote 10]}

4.3.2 The Aurat Foundation, a women’s rights organisation^{[footnote 11]}, also listed some of the main federal and provincial legislation, constitutional amendments and court judgements relating to human rights since 2002.^{[footnote 12]}

4.4 International covenants

4.4.1 There are 9 core international human rights instruments^{[footnote 13]}, of which Pakistan is a state party to 7:^{[footnote 14]}

International human rights instrument	Ratification/ Accession
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD)	1966
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)	2010
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR)	2008
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW)	1996
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT)	2010
Convention on the Rights of the Child	1990
Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)	2011

5. Organisations responsible for law enforcement

5.1 Police service and paramilitary groups

5.1.1 The April 2025 Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) COI report on Pakistan, based on a range of sources, noted that, ‘Federal and provincial police services have primary responsibility for law enforcement, supported by other law enforcement agencies, including the FIA [Federal Investigation Agency] and National Counter Terrorism Authority (NACTA). Provincial and autonomous regional authorities are directly responsible for law and order, with the federal government having jurisdiction over police in Islamabad.’^{[footnote 15]}

5.1.2 The European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), which aims to ‘Support the national authorities of EU countries to implement the Common European Asylum System by providing operational and technical assistance’^{[footnote 16]}, noted in their country report on Pakistan (EUAA Pakistan Country Focus), dated May 2026, compiled using multiple sources, that:

‘Police organisations in Pakistan are divided into those operating under federal control and those controlled by the administrations of their respective provinces and territories … A CTD [Counter Terrorism Department] is found in each of the country’s four provincial police organisations and the Islamabad Capital Territory Police. Efforts were ongoing to also establish CTDs in AJK [Azad Jammu and Kashmir (Pakistan-Administered Kashmir)] and GB [Gilgit Baltistan]. The Frontier Constabulary, a federal paramilitary force mainly recruited from KP [Khyber Pakhtunkhwa] and initially tasked to maintain law and order in border and frontier zones, is now present across multiple areas of the country, with its duties including operations against criminal gangs and smugglers. In mid-2025, the government decided to convert the Frontier Constabulary into a nationwide force named the Federal Constabulary, with recruitment efforts, offices and jurisdiction to be expanded across Pakistan.’^{[footnote 17]}

5.1.3 The April 2025 DFAT report stated that:

‘Several paramilitary forces operate in Pakistan, including the Pakistan Rangers, which mainly operate in Punjab and Sindh provinces. The Rangers are notionally under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior but are headed by an army general and are, in practice, under military control. The Rangers undertake border security operations along the Indian border, as well as internal law-and-order operations. The Frontier Corps perform a similar role to the Rangers in western border regions, including in Balochistan and KP.’^{[footnote 18]}

5.1.4 For more information on the law enforcement agencies, including the Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI – Pakistan’s principal intelligence agency), Frontier Corps, Pakistan Rangers and the former traditional paramilitary forces known as Levies and Khasadars, see section 3.1 of the May 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus.^{[footnote 19]}

5.2 Resources and accessibility

5.2.1 The estimated number of police officers, drawn from academic sources dated 2023 and 2025, cited in the May 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus, was about 624,390.^{[footnote 20]} The total population of Pakistan was estimated to be around 241.5 million in 2023^{[footnote 21]} [equating to approximately 2.6 police officers per 1,000 people]. As of 31 March 2026, there were 2.36 officers per 1,000 resident population in England and Wales.^{[footnote 22]}

5.2.2 The Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), ‘a public-private partnership between security professionals from global US organisations and the US Department of State’s Diplomatic Security Service’^{[footnote 23]}, noted in January 2026 that the Punjab Police was the largest police force in Pakistan, with over 200,000 active members.^{[footnote 24]} In 2023, the population of Punjab was estimated to be around 127.68 million.^{[footnote 25]} A July 2025 report by Dr. Abdul Rauf Iqbal, Senior Research Fellow at the Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA^{[footnote 26]}) at the National Defence University, Islamabad, noted that ‘Punjab allocates the largest police budget … and operates 720 police stations covering 53% of Pakistan’s population.’^{[footnote 27]} Iqbal’s report noted that Punjab has ‘a police-to-population ratio of 1:583.’^{[footnote 28]}

5.2.3 In 2023, the total population of Sindh province was estimated to be about 55.69 million.^{[footnote 29]} According to digital news platform, Bol News^{[footnote 30]}, reporting in February 2023, there were 120,000 police officials in Sindh, though the number of personnel posted in police stations was only 36,000. The report noted that over 67% of police officers were posted on security for VIPs.^{[footnote 31]} Dr Iqbal of the ISSRA noted that ‘Sindh’s 555 police stations serve 23% of the country’s population. It has the second-highest per capita police spending and a 1:436 police-to-population ratio.’^{[footnote 32]}

5.2.4 A 2023 academic article noted that the police force of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province (KP) numbered 70,000.^{[footnote 33]} In the same year, the population of KP was estimated to be 40.85 million.^{[footnote 34]} Dr Iqbal reported that ‘Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s 297 police stations cover 17% of the country’s population. Although the per capita spending is relatively high, the police-to-population ratio is similar to that of Punjab.’^{[footnote 35]}

5.2.5 A June 2026 article by Pakistan news channel Hum news^{[footnote 36]}, on the merger of the Balochistan Levies [a provincial paramilitary force^{[footnote 37]}] into the police, stated that 32,942 Levies personnel were integrated into the Balochistan Police. The Inspector General of the Balochistan Police noted that this would increase the overall strength of the police force^{[footnote 38]}, but the article did not provide the resulting total number of police personnel. The estimated population of Balochistan was 14.89 million in 2023.^{[footnote 39]} According to Dr Iqbal, Balochistan’s 130 police stations covered 6% of the country’s population and the province had a police-to-population ratio of 1:391.^{[footnote 40]}

5.2.6 There were 12,625 police personnel^{[footnote 41]}, and 27 police stations across 5 zones (City, Saddar, Rural, Industrial Area, and Soan), administered by the Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) Police^{[footnote 42]}, for an estimated population in 2023 of 2.36 million.^{[footnote 43]} The population of the capital city, Islamabad, was 1.11 million.^{[footnote 44]}

5.2.7 The Government of Pakistan (GoP) commented in its second periodic report to the UN Committee against Torture (UNCAT), published 19 December 2022, that:

‘Women friendly helpdesks have been established at 98% of all Police Stations across Punjab and there are three women police stations (at Lahore, Rawalpindi, and Faisalabad). All Islamabad police stations have women’s helpdesks. Human rights and women rights desks have also been established in police stations in over 15 districts in KP. The KP Integrated Victim Support Network has also been set up to link up a network of relevant services providers (police, hospital, social welfare shelters, etc) which is to be introduced in five districts – Swat, Peshawar, Mardan, Charsadda, Abbottabad. Meanwhile in Sindh and Baluchistan, District Complaint Cells, Women Complaint Cells, Safe Houses, Police Helplines and Police Stations have mechanisms to deal exclusively with women related issues. Sindh also has a helpline (0800-70806) and the Sindh Legal Advisory Call Centre to provide legal advice to women and victims of gender-based violence. Meanwhile, in January 2021, the Baluchistan government launched ‘Baluchistan Women Helpline: 1089’ for registration of complaints against women harassment at home and work place. The women could register their complaints on the helpline regarding harassment, domestic violence, harassment at work place and property issues.’^{[footnote 45]}

5.2.8 In July 2025, Pakistan launched its first women-only digital police station in Islamabad, offering 24/7 support via a dedicated helpline 1815 to address domestic abuse, gender-based violence, and other crimes predominantly affecting women and children. The digital station, staffed by female police officers, allowed complainants to file First Information Reports (FIRs) via video calls and online chat, removing the need to visit a police station.^{[footnote 46]} ^{[footnote 47]}

5.2.9 The April 2025 DFAT report noted, regarding female police officers, that:

‘Police forces have a mandatory 10 percent quota for females to ensure all police departments actively recruit women. However, institutional barriers and societal prejudices impact the recruitment and career progression of females in the police force. Recruitment quotas are negated by restrictive screening processes (including height and physical fitness requirements) and written exams that can act as unofficial barriers to female recruitment. In 2023, women comprised only 3 per cent of Pakistan’s police force. The inherent security risks faced by police officers in Pakistan are also a barrier to female employment.’^{[footnote 48]}

6. Capabilities of law enforcement agencies

6.1 First Information Reports (FIRs)

6.1.1 The May 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus report stated:

‘Lodging a First Information Report (FIR) has been described as the initial step in the investigation of a possible violation/criminal offence. The CrCP, 1898, stipulates in section 154 that “information relating to the commission of a cognizable offence”, when given orally to a police officer, “shall be reduced to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the informant”. Subsequently, the FIR “shall be signed by the person giving it” and recorded by the police officer. The informant lodging a FIR may be any individual who has knowledge of the commission of the cognizable offence and does not necessarily have to be the victim. In cases where police refuse to register a FIR, victims can, amongst others, take legal action by submitting a written complaint to the Superintendent of Police (SP) or refer to a magistrate to seek directions on registering the FIR. The law further provides for penal and civil remedies for individuals against whom a false FIR has been filed.’^{[footnote 49]}

6.1.2 For more information on FIRs, including the requirements and procedures for registering a FIR and obstacles to registration, see the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB) Response to Information Request, covering the period 2012 to December 2025.^{[footnote 50]}

6.1.3 For information on obstacles relating to the filing of FIRs, see Corruption.

6.2 Crime rates

6.2.1 The April 2025 DFAT report noted that ‘Violent crime occurs across Pakistan, including armed robbery, assault, carjacking and kidnapping. Pakistan had a homicide rate of 4.2 murders per 100,000 population in 2022, which was about average for the region of South Asia, and lower than the global average of 6.1 murders per 100,000 population.’^{[footnote 51]} The UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) cited similar homicide rates in 2023 and 2024 for Pakistan, citing 4.3 murders per 100,000 population.^{[footnote 52]}

6.2.2 The Global Organized Crime Index is a project of the Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC) that assesses the level of criminality and resilience to organised crime in 193 countries.^{[footnote 53]} Its 2025 iteration, covering 2024, scored Pakistan 6.32 out of 10 (with a higher score indicating higher levels of criminality), and ranked it 45th out of 193 countries when assessing overall organised crime levels (with first indicating the highest level of criminality).^{[footnote 54]} ^{[footnote 55]}

6.2.3 The April 2025 DFAT report stated that:

‘In-country sources told DFAT the rate of violent and organised crime was lower than it had been in years, although crime rates were increasing in Lahore and Karachi due to rising unemployment and the poor state of the economy. As at the time of writing, Islamabad had a lower crime rate than other major cities due to its large security presence, high socio-economic status and relatively modest population size. In-country sources told DFAT the crime rate was increasing in Balochistan, but had not received much domestic media attention because of the media blackout in the province.’^{[footnote 56]}

6.3 Efficacy

6.3.1 The April 2025 DFAT report noted that:

‘Police capacity and effectiveness in Pakistan are limited by a lack of resources, poor training, cultural attitudes … and under-resourcing, as well as competing pressures from superiors, political actors, security forces and the judiciary. Provincial police forces operate independently. There is no nationwide coordination or training standards. There are no centralised or national law enforcement databases or criminal records, which makes it hard to track or locate offenders.’^{[footnote 57]}

6.3.2 The same report added:

‘Despite the release of the Revised National Action Plan for Countering Terrorism and Extremism in 2021 and increased measures introduced to curb violence across the country, successful prosecution for politically motivated or sectarian violence was rare. Local media reports this was due primarily to ineffective police investigations, a lack of forensic capabilities and prosecution and judicial legal understanding and threats against judges, lawyers, witnesses and their families.’^{[footnote 58]}

6.3.3 Regarding policing in specific cities and regions, the January 2026 OSAC report noted that:

‘While Islamabad has a large police force, resource constraints affect the efficacy of police operations. Low salaries and a lack of equipment are pervasive issues throughout the country. Despite these challenges, authorities devote significant resources to government buildings in Islamabad …

‘The efficacy of police services in Karachi is diminished by a lack of training and resources; police also receive relatively low salaries. As a result, political influence and bribery may impact the conduct of investigations, arrests, and prosecutions. Nonetheless, the Sindh force of the Pakistan Rangers has significantly diminished the capabilities of militant groups in the province …

‘The Punjab Police clearly lack funds, resources, and training along with the rest of the Pakistani Police Services … As of 2026, approximately 8,000 surveillance cameras monitor Lahore under the Punjab “Safe City” Project, to include a recent addition of 30 drone cameras, all part of a nationwide project. The system features a 24-hour command center where police officials monitor various areas of the city, looking for criminal or terrorist activities. These cameras also monitor traffic, with violators receiving mailed violations based on license plate numbers …

‘The security agencies in northwest Pakistan comprise civilian and military forces. Security forces are largely professional but lack equipment, communications technology, and training. In general, police response to criminal incidents is inconsistent … The local threat environment requires authorities to prioritize counterterrorism, force protection, and infrastructure security over routine law enforcement … Resource constraints, including low salaries and lack of equipment, affect the efficacy of police operations throughout the province.’^{[footnote 59]}

6.3.4 According to the Global Organized Crime Index 2025, ‘Pakistan has made limited progress in crime prevention, with law enforcement agencies continuing to prioritize reactive measures over proactive strategies. Initiatives, such as the establishment of a national referral mechanism and the FIA’s integrated digital data collection system have been introduced.’^{[footnote 60]}

6.3.5 The May 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus outlined the authorities’ surveillance capabilities:

‘The Pakistani authorities have built up considerable surveillance capabilities in recent years and their degree of control of online/social media content continued to expand. The state’s surveillance operations have been enhanced by advanced foreign-made surveillance and censorship tools and lacked or often ignored legal safeguards. According to a digital rights activist quoted by the Islamabad-based journalist Osama Ahmad, the lack of comprehensive legislation on data protection and rules regulating surveillance technologies hampers the effectiveness of existing laws protecting citizens’ rights.

‘Against this backdrop, state authorities have repeatedly used the 2016 Prevention of Electronic Crimes Act (PECA) (amended in 2025), which contains vague wording on “hate speech”, defamation and “cyber terrorism”, as a means of targeting activists, journalists and the political opposition. PECA gave the Pakistan Telecommunication Authority (PTA) “unchecked” discretionary powers to remove and block online material and obliged telecommunications providers to store traffic data for periods of one year or more upon request by the PTA. According to testimony given by the PTA, telecommunications providers are obliged to ensure that up to 2 % of their customers (i.e., over 4 million users across the country) can be surveilled at any given time through LIMS, a system used by the ISI and the armed forces to track calls, text messages and internet activity. Journalists interviewed by Amnesty International pointed to actual or attempted instances of hacking of their email, WhatsApp and X accounts and interceptions of phone calls and messages.’^{[footnote 61]}

6.3.6 Arab News reported on 10 September 2025 that over 1,200 cases were registered under the PECA by the National Cybercrime Investigation Agency (NCCIA), including against 10 journalists for criticism of state institutions.^{[footnote 62]} As of September 2025, at least 9 journalists had been prosecuted under the PECA, according to the Ministry of Information and Broadcasting and the Ministry of Interior.^{[footnote 63]} In January 2026, 2 prominent human rights lawyers were sentenced to 17 years imprisonment under the PECA for reportedly highlighting human rights violations in Pakistan.^{[footnote 64]} ^{[footnote 65]}

6.4 Corruption

6.4.1 The National Corruption Perception Survey 2025 (NCPS 2025), conducted by anti-corruption NGO Transparency International Pakistan (TI Pakistan)^{[footnote 66]} through its partner organizations, was carried out from 22 to 29 September 2025 in 20 districts of Pakistan’s 4 provinces among nearly 4,000 people. It measured how people perceive and experience corruption in their daily interactions with public institutions and services.^{[footnote 67]} The NCPS 2025 found that ‘… the police is perceived as the most corrupt sector in Pakistan (24%). At provincial level, the highest perception of corruption in police is in Punjab (34%), followed by Balochistan (22%), Sindh (21%) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (20%).’^{[footnote 68]} The perception that police were the most corrupt sector has persisted almost continually since 2002.^{[footnote 69]}

6.4.2 According to the January 2026 OSAC report, ‘Police corruption is an issue throughout Pakistan, but is significantly less of a problem in Islamabad.’^{[footnote 70]} The April 2025 DFAT report noted that ‘Police are poorly paid and individual officers often augment their salaries with bribes.’^{[footnote 71]}

6.4.3 The Freedom House report, Freedom in the World 2025, covering 2024 events, noted that ‘Police have long been accused of biased or arbitrary handling of initial criminal complaints.’^{[footnote 72]}

6.4.4 An April 2025 report by Pakistani English-language newspaper, Dawn, referred to a ‘recent report’ by the Punjab Chief Minister’s Special Monitoring Unit (SMU), a provincial monitoring body, which indicated that there was ‘inefficiency and corruption at the police station level.’^{[footnote 73]} An analysis by the SMU of 3,216 complaints to police station officials found that ‘The primary issues highlighted included delays in service delivery, lack of responsiveness from concerned authorities/police officials, bribery and inadequate resolution of complaints …’^{[footnote 74]}

6.4.5 According to the Global Organized Crime Index 2025, ‘State-embedded actors in Pakistan exploit their official positions to facilitate organized crime. Corrupt law enforcement officials are involved in human trafficking, drug smuggling and illicit trade often providing protection to criminal networks in exchange for bribes.’^{[footnote 75]}

6.4.6 In July 2026, the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH), a network of human rights organisations in over 115 countries^{[footnote 76]}, and its member organisation in Pakistan, the NGO Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP)^{[footnote 77]}, published a report on corruption in the justice system. The report, based on interviews conducted in February and March 2026 with 30 interlocutors including lawyers, former/retired judges, journalists and civil society organisations (CSOs), alongside other supplementary research^{[footnote 78]}, found that:

‘Corruption in the form of bribery or extortion starts in the majority of cases at the police level. As one journalist told FIDH and HRCP: “Corruption in police has become a way of life and corruption is not reported as an exclusive story.” Interviewees reported that it was often, if not always, necessary to bribe police officers in order to file First Information Reports (FIRs), which are a necessary and preliminary step to any police investigation. Interviewees also told FIDH and HRCP that in many cases, people were reluctant, if not completely unwilling, to report such cases of corruption, because of the perception that there would be reprisals by the police, which would negatively harm the investigation.’^{[footnote 79]}

6.4.7 The same report noted:

‘While corruption at the police level is often limited to the payment of bribes to file FIRs or advance the investigation in other ways, such as the fabrication or alteration of evidence, corruption can also be a cause and consequence of much more acute situations. In the context of police encounters and raids, for example, there have been reports of police officers requesting bribes to avoid arrests, manipulating reports and criminal records and seizing private property.’^{[footnote 80]}

6.4.8 See also First Information Reports (FIRs).

7. Human rights violations

7.1 Arbitrary arrest and detention

7.1.1 The US State Department (USSD)’s Country Report on Human Rights Practices, published in 2025 and covering events of 2024 (USSD HR Report 2024), noted that ‘The law prohibited arbitrary arrest and detention and provided for the right of any person to challenge the lawfulness of their arrest or detention in court, but authorities did not always observe these requirements. Corruption and impunity compounded this problem.’^{[footnote 81]} Comparable assertions were made in earlier USSD HR reports dating back to at least 2014.^{[footnote 82]}

7.1.2 There were reports in 2025 of arbitrary arrests and detention, especially of Afghan refugees, regardless of documentation status^{[footnote 83]}, journalists^{[footnote 84]}, activists^{[footnote 85]}, and ethnic and religious minorities^{[footnote 86]} ^{[footnote 87]} ^{[footnote 88]}, but CPIT was unable to locate any sources that quantified the number of such cases (see Bibliography).

7.2 Enforced disappearances

7.2.1 The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances provided a definition of an enforced disappearance.^{[footnote 89]} At the time of writing, Pakistan was not a signatory to the International Convention for the Protection of all Persons from Enforced Disappearance.^{[footnote 90]} Neither was there any domestic legislation specifically criminalising enforced disappearances.^{[footnote 91]} ^{[footnote 92]}

7.2.2 The USSD HR Report 2024 noted that:

‘There were widespread reports of enforced disappearances by or on behalf of government authorities across the country. Some officials from the intelligence agencies, police, and security forces reportedly held prisoners incommunicado and refused to disclose their location. In response to widespread protests against enforced disappearances, on August 2 [2024], Federal Law Minister Azam Nazeer Tarar announced a support package of five million rupees [around £13,395^{[footnote 93]}] per family of missing persons. The package aimed to provide legal and financial assistance to the affected families.’^{[footnote 94]}

7.2.3 The same report stated that ‘Human rights organizations reported authorities arrested and caused the disappearance of Pashtun, Sindhi, and Baloch human rights activists, as well as Sindhi and Baloch nationalists, without cause or warrant. They also alleged children were detained to pressure their parents … State agencies routinely harassed activists working on missing-person issues, with some activists becoming victims of enforced disappearances themselves.’^{[footnote 95]}

7.2.4 The April 2025 DFAT report stated that:

‘Enforced disappearances have occurred in Pakistan for decades. Pakistan’s government previously acknowledged and defended the practice of enforced disappearances by authorities as necessary to counter threats to national integrity and security. In-country sources told DFAT enforced disappearances were more common in 2018 under former Prime Minister Imran Khan’s leadership, although the practice has gained increased domestic and international attention since 2023.’^{[footnote 96]}

7.2.5 A joint statement by Amnesty International and 7 other rights groups, dated 30 August 2025, said that enforced disappearances continued to be used ‘routinely’ to target dissidents and human rights defenders in Pakistan.^{[footnote 97]} One of the signatories of the statement, civil society organisation the Defence of Human Rights (DHR), documented 3,140 cases of enforced disappearance since 2006, with 1,362 victims remaining forcibly disappeared, and 32 new DHR cases in 2025. The statement also reported Baloch Yakjehti Committee (BYC) documentation of 546 cases between January [2025] and July 2025, Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) documentation of 133 cases, and Voice for Missing Persons of Sindh documentation of 40 cases in the same period.’^{[footnote 98]}

7.2.6 The same statement cited data from the government-formed Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances (COIED), which recorded 10,592 registered cases from 2010 to August 2025 and 1,837 unresolved cases as of August 2025.^{[footnote 99]} However, the statement added that the COIED:

‘… has consistently failed to provide meaningful remedy to victims and their families. While the commission is empowered to issue production orders as formal directives instructing relevant state authorities to produce the individual before a court of law, these orders have rarely been enforced. Although over 700 production orders have been issued to date, only a handful have been complied with. In many cases, families have waited for years, some for as long as six years without any action taken to implement these orders. While the commission does not have powers to prosecute, it can direct the relevant authorities to file case against suspects. There have been no prosecutions in any of the cases reported to the commission, underscoring systemic impunity.’^{[footnote 100]}

7.2.7 The UN Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID) report, covering the period 11 May 2024 to 2 May 2025, noted that:

‘The Working Group remains concerned at the continued reports received through its humanitarian procedure of abductions and enforced disappearances of civilians, particularly in Balochistan. Together with other special procedures, the Working Group has raised concerns over alleged human rights violations, including enforced disappearances, in Balochistan, as well as the use of force against peaceful demonstrators and the misuse of certain administrative and legal counter-terrorism measures against Baloch activists and organizations. The Working Group has also transmitted communications concerning the reported targeting of woman human rights defenders representing families of disappeared persons in Balochistan.

‘While the Working Group continues to appreciate the cooperation of the Government in providing updates on outstanding cases, it regrets that the information received, which is conveyed by the Commission of Inquiry on Enforced Disappearances, is often insufficient to clarify the cases. The Working Group has expressed concerns about the reported shortcomings in the functioning of the Commission of Inquiry through a general allegation transmitted to the Government on 6 June 2025. The Working Group hopes that the Government will reply to that and the other general allegations transmitted previously, and reiterates its readiness to continue its positive engagement with the State.’^{[footnote 101]}

7.2.8 The HRCP noted in their ‘State of Human Rights in 2025’ report that the COIED ‘… received 273 new cases, with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa reporting the highest number. The COIED traced 32 missing persons to prisons and 13 to internment centres. Additionally, 230 individuals returned home, and 16 dead bodies were found. However, HRCP maintains that these figures are vastly underreported and has continued to criticise the COIED for failing to hold perpetrators accountable.’^{[footnote 102]}

7.2.9 In August 2025, after a fact-finding mission to Balochistan, the HRCP reported a pattern of ‘… continued enforced disappearances, shrinking civic space, erosion of provincial autonomy and unchecked impunity …’.^{[footnote 103]} The HRCP stated that state representatives acknowledged the existence of enforced disappearances but framed them within a security narrative. HRCP also called for independent investigations into alleged reprisals against those who speak out about enforced disappearances.^{[footnote 104]}

7.2.10 Paank, the human rights department of the Baloch National Movement (BNM), a political organisation dedicated to the rights and freedoms of the Baloch people in Balochistan^{[footnote 105]}, verified and documented 1,355 enforced disappearances in Balochistan in 2025, 785 of which occurred in the first 6 months of the year, while 407 were released from detention during the same period.^{[footnote 106]} The report also noted that 225 bodies of previously disappeared people were discovered in 2025, described as a ‘kill and dump’ policy.^{[footnote 107]}

7.3 Extrajudicial killings

7.3.1 The USSD’s 2023 Country Report on Human Rights practices, published in 2024 and covering 2023 events, stated that:

‘There were numerous reports the government or its agents committed arbitrary or unlawful killings during the year.

‘According to human rights organizations, security forces continued the policy of “kill and dump” in Balochistan, where dissidents were kidnapped, tortured, and killed. There were reports members of marginalized racial and ethnic communities were overrepresented among the victims of some abuses. Security forces reportedly committed extrajudicial killings in connection with conflicts throughout the country. Government entities generally investigated whether security force killings were justifiable and whether to pursue prosecutions via an order either from the inspector general of police or through the NCHR [National Commission for Human Rights].’^{[footnote 112]}

7.3.2 A fact-finding report by HRCP found that Punjab’s Crime Control Department (CCD), a specialist police unit formally established in April 2025 to combat serious and organised crime, had adopted a deliberate policy of staged encounters, in many cases resulting in extrajudicial killings of suspected criminals.^{[footnote 113]} From data obtained from media reports, HRCP documented at least 670 CCD-led encounters between 15 April and 15 December 2025, resulting in 924 suspect deaths and 2 police deaths.^{[footnote 114]} It stated that the casualty imbalance, frequency and similar operational patterns indicated a systemic pattern rather than isolated incidents.^{[footnote 115]}

7.3.3 The HRCP described an encounter as ‘… a euphemism for extrajudicial killings, where the deaths of citizens during clashes with the police and other security forces are viewed with suspicion.’^{[footnote 116]}

7.3.4 HRCP noted in their State of Human Rights in 2025 report that:

‘According to HRCP’s media monitoring, a total of 1,696 suspects were killed in 1,155 police encounters throughout the country. The Crime Control Department in Punjab accounted for most of these fatalities, conducting 707 encounters that resulted in the deaths of 977 suspects out of a tracked total of 1,128 deaths in 826 incidents. Additionally, 289 suspects were killed in 162 police encounters and CTD operations in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, while 205 suspects were killed in 137 encounters in Sindh.’^{[footnote 117]}

7.3.5 English and Urdu news channel, Dunya News, reported in January 2026 that Punjab Police submitted a report to the Lahore High Court denying allegations of fake encounters by the CCD. The police report reportedly described the allegations as false and stated that CCD operations were conducted according to law. It also reported police claims of reductions in certain crime categories after the CCD was established.^{[footnote 118]}

7.3.6 Paank recorded 225 extrajudicial killings in Balochistan in 2025, of individuals who had been forcibly disappeared. Paank described the discovery as the ‘… ongoing and brutal reality of the “kill and dump” policy’, which ‘… involves the execution of detainees in custody, followed by the abandonment of their mutilated remains in desolate areas, often accompanied by labels designating them as “terrorists” or “insurgents” to retroactively justify their deaths.’^{[footnote 119]}

7.3.7 Paank continued to document extrajudicial killings in Balochistan in their monthly reports, as did the Human Rights Council of Balochistan in their periodical reports.

7.3.8 The May 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus noted ‘Pashtuns have continued to be subjected to enforced disappearance in the country, and human rights organisations documented a significant rise in extrajudicial killings in KP over the past six years, including more than 600 targeted killings by the state and its proxies.’^{[footnote 120]}

7.3.9 The April 2025 DFAT report noted that ‘In Sindh, in-country sources told DFAT several civilians and Sindhi nationalists had been extrajudicially killed for their anti-establishment political views and opposition to the government.’^{[footnote 121]} The EUAA also noted that ‘In September 2025, the Unrepresented Nations & Peoples Organization (UNPO) denounced the wide range of human rights abuses faced by Sindhis in Pakistan, including arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, political repression, and religious based targeting, including Hindu Sindhis.’^{[footnote 122]}

7.4 Torture and ill-treatment

7.4.1 A civil society submission to the UNCAT, dated January 2025, stated that torture by law enforcement in Pakistan was ‘… so common that it is largely an endemic practice, with police officials regularly accused of abusing their powers with impunity, including against vulnerable groups such as women, children and religious/ethnic minorities.’^{[footnote 123]}

7.4.2 The World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT), a network of 200 member organisations working to end torture and ill-treatment^{[footnote 124]}, compiled the Global Torture Index, which assessed the risk of torture and ill-treatment across several countries.^{[footnote 125]} Its 2025 iteration classified Pakistan as ‘high risk’ for torture and ill-treatment, based on 2023 and 2024 data. It stated that torture was widespread and systemic, especially within law enforcement and detention facilities, and that police regularly employed torture during arrests and interrogations.^{[footnote 126]} The Global Torture Index 2026 noted that torture and ill-treatment continued, and that this was ‘… driven by confession-led investigations, excessive use of force in policing, and the lack of independent oversight.’^{[footnote 127]}

7.4.3 In December 2025, it was reported that the Sindh High Court’s Constitutional Bench ordered the provincial police chief to close, with immediate effect, ‘all torture cells in police stations working under the garb of “investigation” [cells].’^{[footnote 128]}

7.4.4 In its reply to the list of issues raised in relation to its second periodic report to the UNCAT, received 26 September 2025, the Government of Pakistan (GoP) stated that:

‘The Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022 criminalizes torture, custodial death and custodial rape by public officials. It bans the use of evidence obtained through torture. These crimes are non-bailable and non-compoundable. Investigations are carried out by the FIA under the oversight of the NCHR. The Act sets strict penalties, including imprisonment and fines payable to victims or their families. It holds officials accountable for committing torture and for failing to prevent it.’^{[footnote 129]}

7.4.5 The OMCT noted in its 2025 Global Torture Index that the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention and Punishment) Act, 2022, had ‘… critical deficiencies, falling short of international standards’^{[footnote 130]}, and the UNCAT noted in its June 2026 Concluding Observations that the Act omitted severe mental pain and suffering from the definition of torture.^{[footnote 131]}

7.4.6 The GoP stated in its September 2025 reply, regarding mental suffering, that ‘Section 337-L of the PPC provides punishment for causing hurt not specifically categorized elsewhere in the Code to cover instances of severe mental pain and suffering inflicted unlawfully.’^{[footnote 132]} The report added:

‘Courts have consistently interpreted the prohibition of torture broadly, encompassing both physical and psychological harm. Article 14(2) of the Constitution, which expressly prohibits torture for the purpose of extracting evidence, has been read to cover severe mental pain and suffering as well as physical abuse. As a common law country, decisions of the superior judiciary are binding on lower courts, thereby reinforcing the recognition of mental torture as equivalent to physical torture. This approach reflects Pakistan’s commitment to implementing the definition of torture holistically and in line with the Convention against Torture.’^{[footnote 133]}

7.4.7 In its June 2026 Concluding Observations, the UNCAT expressed its concern about:

‘Consistent reports indicating that persons in custody are subjected to torture or ill-treatment by law enforcement officers, prison guards, military personnel, paramilitary forces and staff of intelligence agencies in police stations, prisons, national security detention centres and military bases and internment centres, in particular during the arrest, interrogation and investigation phases, often as a method of coercion to extract confessions or to punish or intimidate persons accused of terrorism or real or perceived political opponents and critics of the Government.’^{[footnote 134]}

7.4.8 According to the GoP, 57 convictions of public officials involved in custodial torture, death or rape were secured between 2019 and 2025.^{[footnote 135]} The UNCAT remained concerned at the low number of prosecutions since the adoption of the Torture and Custodial Death Act 2022 and the lack of detailed information about any convictions and penalties.^{[footnote 136]}

7.4.9 In its June 2026 Concluding Observations, the UNCAT also noted its concern about:

‘… reports according to which human rights defenders, journalists, lawyers, political opponents, civil society activists, protesters and other critics of the Government, as well as their family members, have been subjected to torture and ill-treatment and other forms of retaliation, such as intimidation, threats, harassment, physical attacks, excessive use of force, arbitrary arrest and detention, prosecution on trumped-up and politically motivated charges, including before military courts, enforced disappearance and extrajudicial execution. It is also concerned about the State Party’s inadequate efforts to provide such persons with the protection they need, to conduct prompt, effective and impartial investigations and to punish the perpetrators appropriately.’^{[footnote 137]}

8. Rule of law and the judiciary

8.1 Organisation

8.1.1 The April 2025 DFAT report described the judiciary:

‘The Supreme Court of Pakistan sits at the apex the judicial system, followed by five provincial and regional high courts and numerous district courts. There are a variety of specialist courts, including banking courts, drug courts, GBV [gender-based violence] courts and children’s courts. Judicial proceedings are usually conducted in Urdu, which stenographers transcribe into English. Supreme Court judgements are published in English …

‘Although technically subordinate to the Supreme Court, the Federal Shariat Court (FSC) is a parallel court responsible for ensuring laws are consistent with Islamic principles. The Council on Islamic Ideology is also influential, with the power to make recommendations for legislative reform.’^{[footnote 138]}

8.1.2 The May 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus stated that:

‘… the Federal Constitutional Court, established in 2025, has exclusive jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional matters as well as inter-provincial disputes and disputes between a province and the federal government. The Supreme Court, until 2025 competent for constitutional matters, is currently the country’s highest appellate court in civil and criminal cases; its jurisdiction has been largely limited to appeal cases that do not touch upon constitutional issues …

‘The provincial High Courts hear appeals from civil and criminal cases that have been adjudicated by the courts in their respective province. Under the oversight of the provincial High Courts, there are district-level courts handling civil cases (‘District Courts’) and criminal matters (“Sessions Courts”, adjudicating particularly serious crimes). Cities and towns have magistrates’ courts for criminal cases relating to offences that do not carry the death penalty and thus serve as first-instance courts for all but the most serious criminal cases …

‘… there are various specialised administrative courts and tribunals at both federal level (handling federal matters) and provincial level. These include Anti-Corruption Courts, Anti-Terrorism Courts (ATCs) and Anti-Narcotics Courts, as well as courts dealing with customs, taxation and matters relating to civil servants.’^{[footnote 139]}

8.1.3 The July 2026 FIDH report noted the gender imbalance within the judiciary: ‘As of early 2024, only 40,000 (or 17%) of the 230,879 lawyers enrolled in Provincial Bars were women … women remain drastically underrepresented in the superior judiciary. Only seven (or 5%) of 126 judges in the upper judiciary (including the Supreme Court, the Federal Shariat Court and the five High Courts) are women.’^{[footnote 140]} The same report noted that there were only 2 female Supreme Court judges.^{[footnote 141]}

8.2 Independence and fair trial

8.2.1 The April 2025 DFAT report noted that

‘In October 2024, Pakistan’s government passed the 26th Constitutional Amendment, changing the process of senior judicial appointments and granting the federal government the power to select the Chief Justice, often the final arbiter in significant cases. The changes also allow parliament to appoint “constitutional” benches to hear certain cases. The International Commission of Jurists stated the 26th Constitutional Amendment was a “blow to judicial independence, the rule of law, and human rights protection”.’^{[footnote 142]}

8.2.2 The July 2026 FIDH report noted that:

‘Against a backdrop of longstanding systemic issues, two recent Constitutional amendments have had a significant negative impact on judicial independence and the protection of fair trial rights in Pakistan. In October 2024, the 26th Constitutional Amendment fundamentally changed the composition of the Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP), which appoints judges to the Supreme Court and provincial High Courts, by adding Members of Parliament (MPs) to the JCP. It also empowered the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC) to remove judges on grounds of “inefficiency in the performance of duties” as well as for failing to accept a transfer.

‘In November 2025, the 27th Constitutional Amendment created the Federal Constitutional Court (replacing a Constitutional Bench at the Supreme Court created under the 26th Amendment), granting the Prime Minister the authority to nominate its Chief Justice and judges.

‘These developments mark a regressive shift in Pakistan’s legal and constitutional order, by completely stripping the limited independence previously enjoyed by the judiciary. Judicial appointments, bench formation and high-level case management are now subject to political influence in ways that contradict international standards for judicial independence. Moreover, these structural distortions at the top impact the lower judiciary, where judges are influenced by higher courts regarding their own conduct and decision-making, and where the potential to be influenced by external pressures is greater.’^{[footnote 143]}

8.3 Effectiveness and integrity

8.3.1 The World Justice Project (WJP)’s Rule of Law Index measures the rule of law based on the experiences and perceptions of the general public and in-country legal practitioners and experts worldwide.^{[footnote 144]} For its 2025 iteration relating to Pakistan, experts were surveyed in 2025 and a nationally representative sample of 1,000 members of the public was surveyed in 2019.^{[footnote 145]} Overall, Pakistan ranked 130 out of 143 countries (where position 143 indicates the weakest adherence to the rule of law) and scored 0.37 out of 1, where 1 signifies the strongest adherence to the rule of law and 0 signifies the least.^{[footnote 146]}

8.3.2 The WJP Rule of Law Index also measured the country’s civil and criminal justice systems, including perceptions of their effectiveness, accessibility, impartiality and level of corruption. In 2025, WJP ranked Pakistan 129 out of 143 countries with a score of 0.38 for civil justice, and 101 out of 143 countries with a score of 0.35 for criminal justice.^{[footnote 147]}

8.3.3 The July 2026 FIDH report noted that corruption was addressed under Articles 161 to 165 of the PPC, supplemented by the Prevention of Corruption Act (PCA) 1947, which was complemented by provincial-level laws. The National Accountability Ordinance (NAO) 1999 builds upon the PPC and PCA.^{[footnote 148]} The FIDH report added that ‘In practice, the PPC and the PCA are typically used in petty bribery cases and those involving low level officials, whereas the NAO tends to be used in cases of grand corruption and/or cases involving high-level officials or politicians.’^{[footnote 149]}

8.3.4 Various agencies, including the National Accountability Bureau (NAB), FIA, Anti-Corruption Establishments (ACEs) and Member Inspection Teams (MITs), and the Supreme Judicial Council (SJC), were legally mandated to address corruption.^{[footnote 150]} Despite enacted legislation, agencies and initiatives, the FIDH report stated that corruption was ‘… widespread and normalised at all levels of the Pakistani judiciary.’^{[footnote 151]}

8.3.5 The FIDH report noted that:

‘Due process and fair trial rights violations are compounded by the backlog in the Pakistani justice system, which remains immense. In September 2025, the Minister for Law and Justice, Azam Nazeer Tarar, stated that there were 2.4 million cases pending in courts nationwide, including over 300,000 before the High Courts and 1.8 million before the District Courts. Although measures have been put in place to reduce the backlog at the Supreme Court level, there were 56,169 pending cases before the Supreme Court, as of October 2025.’^{[footnote 152]}

8.3.6 The HRCP State of Human Rights in 2025 report noted that ‘According to the Law and Justice Commission of Pakistan, pending cases in the Supreme Court decreased to 33,787 by the end of 2025 – a 40.7 percent reduction from over 57,000 in 2024. Similarly, high court case pendency fell to 212,537 cases – a 39.1 percent decrease from 348,987 in 2024.’^{[footnote 153]} As of June 2025, there was a shortage of nearly 1,200 judges against sanctioned strength.^{[footnote 154]}

8.3.7 As noted in the April 2025 DFAT report:

‘The judicial system suffers from a backlog of cases. The timeline between a police FIR being filed at the local level and the case going to court can take approximately two years. Criminal cases sometimes take between five to ten years to reach conclusion. More complex cases can take decades before a sentence is handed down, with the accused confined to pre-trial detention during this time. In-country sources told DFAT conviction rates were very low, around four to five per cent, and as low as two per cent in sexual assault cases. According to in-country sources, media pressure was often required to resolve pending cases in a timely manner. In-country sources reported corruption was common in the judicial system, as was intimidation of judges, particularly in religiously sensitive cases such as those involving blasphemy.’^{[footnote 155]}

8.3.8 The May 2026 EUAA Country Focus Pakistan noted regarding the effectiveness and integrity of the judiciary that ‘In broad terms, the court system was “marred” by endemic corruption, intimidation, lack of security, low rates of conviction for serious offences, as well as lengthy trials coupled with significant backlogs of cases. Moreover, the prosecution system was reported to have limited authority and independence, being under-financed, undertrained, and subject to political pressure.’^{[footnote 156]}

8.3.9 The Pakistan NCPS 2025 found that ‘… the Judiciary ranks third nationally in perceived corruption (14%). Provincially, in Sindh and Balochistan, public perception of corruption in judiciary is relatively lower at 12% each, whereas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa it is (18%) and Punjab (17%).’^{[footnote 157]}

8.4 Double jeopardy

8.4.1 The principles of double jeopardy are dealt with under Article 13 of the Constitution^{[footnote 158]} and Section 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.^{[footnote 159]}

8.4.2 In correspondence with the Country Policy and Information Team, dated April 2019, an advisor on criminal justice at the British High Commission (BHC), Islamabad, indicated, whilst stressing that their research was not exhaustive, that ‘… the double jeopardy principles are upheld where a decision has been reached in a foreign jurisdiction (as long as the court reaching the decision is considered to be one of competent jurisdiction – we have not found an example of a court in Pakistan concluding that a foreign court was not of competent jurisdiction for these purposes).’^{[footnote 160]} The adviser from the BHC confirmed via email on 3 September 2026 that the principles on double jeopardy remained unchanged.^{[footnote 161]}

8.4.3 When considering whether a UK court is deemed to be one of competent jurisdiction, the BHC advisor gave regard to a case in which the Supreme Court of Pakistan upheld the validity of a sentence passed in a UK Crown Court and reiterated the principle of comity [where one jurisdiction recognises the validity and effect of an order / act of another jurisdiction.^{[footnote 162]} ^{[footnote 163]}

8.4.4 Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides for offences committed outside the jurisdiction of Pakistan and provides that the Federal Government must sanction such cases.^{[footnote 164]} The BHC advisor referred to a UK extradition case, noting that ‘… the Islamabad High Court held that where the Federal Government had not granted permission under s.188 (and no such permission had been granted in that case) there could be no proceedings in Pakistan for an offence committed in the UK.’^{[footnote 165]}

8.4.5 For more detail, see the BHC correspondence.

8.5 Death penalty

8.5.1 According to UN reporting, as of January 2026, Pakistan retained the death penalty for 29 criminal offences.^{[footnote 166]} In 2021, the Supreme Court ruled against the execution of prisoners with a mental illness.^{[footnote 167]}

8.5.2 The HRCP State of Human Rights in 2025 report noted that press reports monitored by HRCP ‘… indicated a significant increase in death sentences in 2025, with at least 225 handed down (primarily by the lower courts), compared to 174 in 2024. At least 15 individuals received the death penalty for blasphemy-related offences.’^{[footnote 168]} The report added that ‘… no executions were reportedly carried out during the year, with the de facto moratorium in place since 2020 continuing through 2025.’^{[footnote 169]}

8.5.3 According to a report by Justice Project Pakistan (JPP), an NGO representing vulnerable prisoners^{[footnote 170]}, and NCHR, there were 3,394 prisoners on death row as of July 2025, down from 3,646 in 2024.^{[footnote 171]} Nearly 68% (2,307) of death row prisoners were in Punjab, which has a larger population and higher volume of criminal cases.^{[footnote 172]} Most death sentences were handed down for murder.^{[footnote 173]}

8.6 Information justice systems and alternative dispute resolution

8.6.1 A 2025 research report on the informal justice system, written by academics including Muhammad Faiq Butt, a lecturer at the University of Okara in Pakistan^{[footnote 174]}, noted that:

‘… Informal justice in Pakistan is typified by various forms of community-based dispute resolution that are outside the formal legal system, mostly addressing civil litigation and minor crimes. These are the jirgas in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Baluchistan and the panchayats in Punjab and Sindh as well as local councils or elders’ forums in Gilgit-Baltistan and Azad Jammu & Kashmir. Even though these forums differ regionally, they are similar in terms of construction, processes, and normative trappings.’^{[footnote 175]}

8.6.2 The May 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus reported that, ‘Community-based forms of dispute resolution such as jirgas and panchayats are frequently sought by residents of rural and peri-urban areas as an alternative to the formal justice system. While controversial due to their disregard of constitutional provisions and patriarchal structures, they are valued for their accessibility and the swiftness and cultural acceptability of their decisions in disputes linked to family, honour, and land.’^{[footnote 176]}

8.6.3 The 2025 research report by Butt added that:

‘One of the most contentious aspects of Pakistan’s informal justice system is its treatment of gender and human rights. While jirgas and panchayats are often praised for resolving disputes efficiently, they have repeatedly been condemned for perpetuating patriarchal norms, excluding women from decision-making, and issuing rulings that violate national and international human rights standards …

‘Women are almost universally excluded from participation in informal justice forums, either as adjudicators or as active parties. In most jirgas and panchayats, only male elders deliberate and decide cases, regardless of whether the dispute involves female complainants. This structural exclusion is rooted in conservative interpretations of sharī‘ah, tribal codes, and customary practices that conflate justice with patriarchal authority. As a result, decisions involving women often reflect regressive gender norms, such as the prioritization of family honor over individual rights, or the use of women as instruments of reconciliation.’^{[footnote 177]}

8.6.4 International human rights group, Equality Now^{[footnote 178]}, reported in March 2026 that:

‘In 2019, the Supreme Court of Pakistan declared the assumption of judicial functions by jirga and panchayats to settle criminal or civil disputes as amounting to a violation of the constitutional guarantees of due process of law and of Pakistan’s international obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and CEDAW.

‘Following the Supreme Court’s decision in 2019, reports on panchayat/jirga-directed compromises in rape cases are rare. However, given the general underreporting in sexual violence cases, the possibility of such occurrences cannot entirely be ruled out.’^{[footnote 179]}

8.6.5 For more information on women in the informal justice system, see the Country Policy and Information Note on Pakistan: Women fearing gender-based violence.

8.6.6 As noted in the 2026 EUAA Pakistan Country Focus:

‘While jirgas in the former tribal districts were officially abolished in 2018 together with the Frontier Crimes Regulation (FCR) that regulated them, they continue to operate in some of these areas where formal courts have difficulties exercising their authority. To overcome the respective limitations of formal and informal justice systems, the State has sought to formalise community dispute resolution through government-led Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) initiatives, but their implementation has been reported to be slow.’^{[footnote 180]}

8.6.7 Online newspaper The Pakistan Observer reported on 11 May 2026 that Supreme Court Justice, Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb, said mediation could help reduce the backlog of court cases and that a court-annexed mediation centre was being established at the Supreme Court with UN Development Programme (UNDP) support. The article stated that judges and court officials were being trained as mediators and that parties unable to afford mediation services would be referred to the Supreme Court mediation centre for free dispute resolution. It also reported that the law ministry had prepared a draft bill on mandatory mediation.^{[footnote 181]}

8.6.8 In June 2026, Dunya News reported that the Research Society of International Law (RSIL) and the Legal Aid Society (LAS) launched a reform package proposing legal and institutional reforms to strengthen implementation of the Alternative Dispute Resolution Act 2017. The report stated that Supreme Court Justice Miangul Hassan Aurangzeb called for a “mediation before litigation” approach, while the Minister of State for Law and Justice supported the concept and referred to the more than 2.26 million pending cases.^{[footnote 182]}

8.7 Witness protection and victim support

8.7.1 All 4 provinces of Pakistan have dedicated witness protection legislation, enacted between 2013 and 2021, in addition to the federal Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act 2017:

Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013^{[footnote 183]}
Balochistan Witness Protection Act, 2016^{[footnote 184]}
Punjab Witness Protection Act, 2018^{[footnote 185]}
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Witness Protection Act, 2021^{[footnote 186]}
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017^{[footnote 187]}

8.7.2 In January 2026, the provincial government of Balochistan approved the Balochistan Witness Protection (Amendment) Bill, 2025.^{[footnote 188]} Dawn news reported that ‘Under the new reforms, witnesses will testify through faceless courts, with their identities kept fully confidential, a measure expected to significantly improve convictions.’^{[footnote 189]}

8.7.3 The Global Organized Crime Index 2025 noted that:

‘Victim support services in Pakistan are inadequate, particularly for people who use drugs and survivors of human trafficking. Shelters for trafficking victims are underfunded, and witness protection programmes remain largely ineffective due to security concerns. Victims often refuse to testify against traffickers for fear of retaliation. The limited availability of protection services leaves many at risk of re-victimization, and, in some cases, drives them back into their exploitative situations.’^{[footnote 190]}

8.7.4 An academic article on victim-centred justice, published in 2026 and written by 2 academics from universities in Pakistan, and the deputy director of Pakistan’s water and sanitation agency and a prosecutor based in Punjab^{[footnote 191]}, noted that:

‘One of the most important obstacles to the implementation of the victim-centered justice in Pakistan is its institutional deficiencies. The police agencies, judicial systems, prosecution and correction agencies do not have special training on procedures sensitive to victims. To illustrate, police officers simply do not offer the victims the necessary help at the reporting stage, which leads to delays, evidence mishandling, and even intimidation of complainants … In the same manner, the judiciary is congested and delays in trials are normal thus demotivating the victims to seek the services of the law. The absence of proper witness protection programs and victim assistance services makes the situation worse, as now the victims are vulnerable to threats and social pressures of the perpetrators or their families.’^{[footnote 192]}

8.7.5 LexForm, a cross-border law firm operating in Pakistan, the UK, Poland and the US^{[footnote 193]}, published a blog on the gaps in witness protection law in Pakistan. Referring to the Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017, which applies to the Islamabad Capital Territory, and noting similar laws were enacted in some provinces, the blog noted that: ‘On paper, the [legal] framework is reasonable. In practice, implementation is almost non-existent. There is no dedicated witness protection unit. The police lack the resources and training to provide effective protection. Relocation programmes are underfunded. And the cultural reality is that witnesses in small communities cannot simply disappear. Everyone knows where they live, who their family is, and where they work.’^{[footnote 194]}

8.7.6 A series of workshops in 2025, led by the UNODC with European Union (EU) support, trained criminal justice stakeholders on witness protection laws and practices for counter-terrorism officials in Punjab, Sindh, Balochistan and KP, aiming to support victims of terrorism.^{[footnote 195]} ^{[footnote 196]} ^{[footnote 197]} ^{[footnote 198]} Further workshops on identifying, protecting and supporting victims of trafficking and smuggled migrants took place, which aimed to ‘enhance the capacity of law enforcement officers and victim support professionals, particularly the Victim Support Officers (VSOs) of Punjab Police’ to recognise and protect victims of trafficking and smuggling.^{[footnote 199]}

8.7.7 In October 2025, senior prosecution officials met at the 23rd Pakistan Prosecution Forum in Lahore. One theme of discussion was enhancing witness protection measures, with provinces sharing progress, challenges and next steps for safer environments for witnesses and victims participating in criminal proceedings.^{[footnote 200]} The session also reviewed the Anti-Rape Act (2021) and emphasized how the law was improving survivor protection.^{[footnote 201]}

8.7.8 Equality Now reported in March 2026 that:

‘The Anti-Rape (Investigation and Trial) Act, 2021 empowers the State to institute a mechanism for victim/witness protection through measures including concealment of the victim’s identity, relocation and provision of special security, shelter and financial assistance. Although earlier legislation already criminalised the disclosure of the identity of the rape victim, such disclosures are often made. The provincial governments have, from 2013–2021, passed witness protection legislation, none of which has been effectively implemented. The absence of witness protection measures leaves victims/witnesses vulnerable to intimidation and threats, leading to out-of-court settlements and witness/victim recanting.’^{[footnote 202]}

8.8 Legal aid

8.8.1 The Legal Aid and Justice Authority (LAJA), a statutory body under the Ministry of Law and Justice, provided legal assistance to ‘… any applicant including minors and persons of unsound mind who is charged with a criminal offense and lacks the means to afford legal help. In all our operations, the Authority grants special preference to disadvantaged women and children, particularly those involved in cases related to sexual offenses.’^{[footnote 203]}

8.8.2 The Sindh Legal Advisory Call Centre (SLACC), an initiative of the Legal Aid Society (LAS), ‘… operates five days a week via a toll-free number (0800-70806), providing advice on civil, criminal, and public service matters from 9 a.m. to 5 p.m., with recorded assistance available after hours. Since its inception [in 2018^{[footnote 204]}], SLACC has received over 500,000 calls and registered more than 295,000 legal queries from individuals in over 600 cities across the country.’^{[footnote 205]}

8.8.3 In July 2025, it was reported that the Chief Justice launched a legal aid initiative to assist poor litigants in hiring legal representation at state expense. It stated that assistance would apply at all judicial levels and that remuneration of up to Rs50,000m [£132^{[footnote 206]}] would be provided through District Legal Empowerment Committees.^{[footnote 207]} ^{[footnote 208]}

8.8.4 Equality Now noted that the Anti-Rape Act 2021:

‘… provides for the establishment of a fund to, in part, finance the provision of legal aid to victims of sexual violence. No such fund has been formed thus far. Neither has any panel of pro bono lawyers been approved or notified for each district as provided for in the law. Legislation for the provision of legal aid exists at the provincial and federal levels, but remains unimplemented. In fact, funds dedicated by the state to provide legal aid to women in the past remained unutilised. Some lawyers provide pro bono assistance on an ad hoc basis, but no comprehensive database of lawyers or organisations providing such services exists.’^{[footnote 209]}

9. Oversight and complaint mechanisms

9.1.1 The Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR) noted that it was the focal point for ensuring the protection of rights^{[footnote 210]}, and that it provided a free national ‘Helpline for Legal Advice on Human Rights Violations’, which had received nearly 1.5 million calls from November 2015 up to May 2025.^{[footnote 211]}

9.1.2 In their ‘National Policy Framework on Human Rights 2022 to 2027’ the MoHR noted that functioning National Human Rights Institutions (NHRls) included:

National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR)
National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW)
National Commission on the Rights of Children (NCRC)
National Commission for Minorities (NCM)
Council of Rights of Person with Disabilities (CRPD)
Directorate General of Special Education (DGSE)
Human Rights Directorates in the provinces^{[footnote 212]}

9.1.3 The April 2025 DFAT report noted that there were several official human rights commissions but ‘… some are dormant or do not meet international standards.’^{[footnote 213]} The report added, ‘The NCHR’s primary functions are to conduct investigations into allegations of human rights abuses, review existing and proposed legislation in relation to human rights principles, and act as a court when required. Other specialised human rights commissions at the federal level include the National Commission for the Status of Women (NCSW), the Commission on Minority Rights and the National Commission on the Rights of the Child.’^{[footnote 214]}

9.1.4 Regarding the mandate of human rights commissions, the DFAT report noted that:

‘Provincial governments fund local human rights commissions with ostensibly independent mandates. Similar to federal commissions (except for the NCHR), provincial commissions are recommendary bodies that are able to raise human rights concerns reported to them but must rely primarily on influencing authorities to achieve outcomes due to procedural limitations on enforcement actions. For example, under the Sindh Protection of Human Rights Act (2011), the Sindh Human Rights Commission is responsible for monitoring human rights violations, and although it could investigate complaints, it was limited to recommending remedial measures to Sindh’s government.

‘In-country sources from across Pakistan told DFAT government-funded human rights commissions at both the federal and provincial levels were ineffective at handling human rights complaints outside of matters related to working conditions. In-country sources told DFAT provincial human rights commissions pragmatically tended to focus on “non-political issues” relating to service delivery at the municipal level.’^{[footnote 215]}

9.1.5 The MoHR noted in its 2022-2027 policy framework that:

‘The Supreme Court of Pakistan has also established a vibrant human rights cell that addresses the complaints relating to human rights violations. Similarly, Parliamentary Standing Committees are functioning as over-sight bodies. This initiative and drive is encouraging for the rights holders and demonstrate the state’s commitment to fulfill, protect and respect human rights in the country. Human rights are becoming more central to the Government’s agenda and finding good share in public debate as well as political manifestos.’^{[footnote 216]}

9.1.6 In their October 2025 replies to the UNCAT, the GoP stated that:

‘At the operational level, all police departments maintain Internal Accountability Bureaus and disciplinary units to investigate complaints of torture, custodial violence and abuse of authority. District-level complaint redressal cells, the Helpline 8787, Police Access Service, digital feedback platforms and the Central Monitoring and Complaint Cell provide accessible avenues for citizens to file complaints. Oversight is further strengthened through inspections by senior officers, judicial officers and Home Department representatives, while complaints are monitored through hotlines, digital systems and CCTV surveillance.’^{[footnote 217]}

9.1.7 The Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) provided a free service to carry out ‘… independent investigations into complaints about “maladministration” in any Federal Government agency.’^{[footnote 218]}

Question 4

Annex A

Accepted Answer

Correspondence from British High Commission dated 12 April 2019, updated 3 September 2026

Diplomatic Enclave
Ramna 5
P.O. Box 1122
Islamabad

Dear Country Policy & Information Team,

You have included the following enquiries:

Are there any facts and figures related to the willingness of the Pakistan authorities to pursue overseas offences? You have made it clear that this is to be considered in the context of cases where there has already been a conviction in the UK. You ask whether the UK courts are considered to be courts of ‘competent jurisdiction’. You have also asked about whether there is any information as to the range of sentence passed with respect to rape cases.

Double jeopardy

Principles of double jeopardy are dealt with under Article 13 of the Constitution and s.403 of the Criminal Procedure Code. I am not aware of any equivalent to China’s Article 10 CL. Such research as we have been in a position to conduct would suggest that the double jeopardy principles are upheld where a decision has been reached in a foreign jurisdiction (as long as the court reaching the decision is considered to be one of competent jurisdiction – we have not found an example of a court in Pakistan concluding that a foreign court was not of competent jurisdiction for these purposes). In the case of Rashid Hassan v The State 2010 Pr.CR.L J. 1902 the Sindh High Court examined and upheld an acquittal rendered by the Royal Court of Jersey. Article 13 and s.403 were specifically addressed. Further, with respect to consideration of the question whether a UK court is considered to be one of competent jurisdiction, regard can be had to the case of Javed Akhtar v The State 2017 SCMR 1514. In that matter the Supreme Court upheld the validity of a sentence passed in a UK Crown Court and reiterated the principle of Comity.

Offences committed outside of Pakistan

s.188 Criminal Procedure Code provides for the jurisdiction of criminal courts and tribunals to extend to offences committed by a citizen of Pakistan abroad. Most of the case-law concerning this provision deals with offences committed in the tribal and administered territories which do not otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of the Pakistani courts. In Abdul Qadir Shah v Muhammad Qasim PLD 2014 Balochistan 28, the High Court held that in an instance where an offence of murder was committed outside of the territorial restrictions of Pakistan (in a border town in Afghanistan) by Pakistani citizens, the court did have the jurisdiction to proceed in trying the case so long as the procedural requirement of s.188 was fulfilled by the Federal Government authorising the courts to do so. This was allowed in this instance because evidence was available in the territory of Pakistan and not Afghanistan. In Muhammad Zubair v Government of Pakistan 2014 PLD 31 Islamabad (a UK extradition application) it was argued on behalf of the Requested Person that he had a right to be tried in Pakistan where he would have certain rights not provided for in UK law. The Islamabad High Court held that where the Federal Government had not granted permission under s.188 (and no such permission had been granted in that case) there could be no proceedings in Pakistan for an offence committed in the UK.

Practical considerations & opinion

From the above it could be taken that the ‘appetite’ to reconvict for offences committed outside of Pakistan and subject to proceedings elsewhere does not appear to be high and would in any event be severely constrained by the provisions referred to. As I have previously indicated, I do not have access to any facts or figures and would not claim that the above in any way amounted to anything approaching exhaustive research. Over and above the legal restraints which would need to be overcome, there are clearly also practical considerations which would be relevant to the viability of any renewed proceedings. This is a system in which rape convictions (for example) are difficult to achieve. There is significant emphasis on a contemporaneously given ocular account (hence in part my query about where the victim may reside) and there is also an expectation of forensic evidence. Where that evidence has been acquired in the UK, it seems improbable in the extreme that it would be supplied to the Pakistan for proceedings here – both because the individual had already been convicted and because of death penalty concerns.

Sentence

There is no information available as to the actual sentences passed in these types of cases. However, it [is] worthy of note that strict conditions are required to be fulfilled before a court could take the view that a death sentence could be considered. Section 375 of the Pakistan Penal Code defines the constituent elements of rape and Section 376 provides for sentencing possibilities, which includes imprisonment of not less than 10 years up and up to 25 years and the death penalty. Under Section 376, the death penalty is applicable in aggravated cases falling under any of the following descriptions:

When rape is committed by two or more persons in furtherance of common intention of all.
When the rape is committed of a minor or a person with mental or physical disability.
When the rape is committed by a public servant including a police officer, medical officer or jailor, taking advantage of his official position.
Where the rape is committed resulting in grievous bodily harm that involves loss of any part of the victim’s body or impairment or disfigurement of such part as defined under sections 333, 335 and 337 of the Pakistan Penal Code.

It may also be worthy of note that, although we have no data to support this, it is our observation that courts are extremely reluctant to consider a death penalty in the absence of a judicial confession.

Regards

CPS CJA Pakistan

Question 5

Terms of Reference

Accepted Answer

The ‘Terms of Reference’ are the main topics and issues relevant to the scope of this note and provides the framework for the country information. In this note, they were:

Legal framework
- constitution, penal code, code of criminal procedure
Security apparatus (police and paramilitary)
- size, structure, crime statistics, efficiency, corruption
Human rights violations
- arbitrary arrest and detention, enforced disappearances, extrajudicial killings, torture and ill-treatment
Judiciary, including size, structure, corruption
- organisation, fair trial, independence
- juvenile justice
- alternative dispute resolution and informal justice systems
- double jeopardy
- witness protection
Oversight bodies, remit, power and effectiveness
- avenues of redress

Question 6

Bibliography

Accepted Answer

Unless otherwise stated, all sources were accessed between 15 July and 15 September 2026

Sources cited

Amnesty International:

Arrests, detention and harassment of Afghan refugees must stop, 8 January 2025
Pakistan: Failure to address enforced disappearance perpetuates injustice against victims, 30 August 2025
Pakistan: Supreme Court judgement bans executions of prisoners with mental disabilities, 10 February 2021
The State of the World’s Human Rights: Pakistan 2025, 21 April 2026

Asian Development Bank (ADB), Punjab Witness Protection Act, 2018, 21 May 2018

ANI News, HRCP raises alarm over arbitrary arrests, enforced disappearances in Pakistan, 30 December 2025

Arab News:

Associated Press of Pakistan (APP):

Aurat Foundation:

Bol News:

Butt, M.F and others, Parallel Paths to Justice: Evaluating the Informal Justice System in Pakistan, 2025

CIVICUS, Pakistan: Lawyers and activists criminalised, protests disrupted and journalists harassed, 4 May 2026

Dawn:

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT), Australian Government, Country Information Report Pakistan, April 2025

Dunya News:

Equality Now:

Legal response to sexual violence in Pakistan: Challenges in enforcement and access to justice, March 2026
What we do, no date

European Union Agency for Asylum (EUAA), COI Report: Pakistan Country Focus, May 2026

Express Tribune, State-funded legal aid for poor launched, 15 July 2025

Front Line Defenders, Pakistan: Imaan Zainab Mazari and Hadi Ali Chattha sentenced to 17 years imprisonment, 30 January 2026

Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025: Pakistan, 2025

Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime (GI-TOC):

Gulf News, Helpline 1815: Pakistan launches first women only digital police station, 24 July 2025

HUM News:

Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP):

The CCD’s role in Punjab, February 2026
Political dialogue, human rights in Balochistan to restore trust, resolve conflict, 6 August 2025
State of Human Rights in 2018, March 2019
State of Human Rights in 2025, 2026

Human Rights Watch (HRW), World Report 2026, 2026

Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (IRB), Pakistan: First Information Reports, December 2025

Institute for Strategic Studies, Research and Analysis (ISSRA), Team ISSRA, no date

International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH):

Iqbal A R, Conviction Rate in Pakistan: Challenges and Way Forward, 8 July 2025

Islamabad Capital Territory (ICT) Police:

Justice Project Pakistan (JPP), About, no date

Justice Project Pakistan and The Advocates, Civil Society Submission in Advance of the Adoption of the List of Issues for the Second Periodic Report of Pakistan in the 82nd Session of the UN Committee Against Torture, 13 January 2025

Justice Project Pakistan (JPP) and National Commission for Human Rights (NCHR), The Death Penalty in Pakistan 2025, 10 October 2025

Khan M.S. and others, Victim-Centered Justice in Pakistan: Legal Gaps, Institutional Challenges, and Policy Reform, 2026

Legal Aid and Justice Authority (LAJA), About us, no date

Legal Aid Society (LAS), Sindh Legal Advisory Call Center Annual Progress Report 2024 to 2025, 2025, no date

LexForm:

Ministry of Human Rights (MoHR), Government of Pakistan:

National Assembly of Pakistan, Acts of Parliament, various dates

National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW), List of Federal and Provincial Pro-Women Laws, no date

The News International, State to fund legal representation for the poor under LJCP initiative: CJP, 15 July 2025

Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR):

The Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman), What we do, no date

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC):

About Us, no date
Pakistan Country Security Report, 27 January 2026

Paank:

Pakistan Bureau of Statistics (PBS), National Census Report 2023, 2024

Pakistan Code:

Code of Criminal Procedure, no date
The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973
Pakistan Penal Code, no date
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act, 2017, 2 June 2017

Pakistan Observer:

Provincial Assembly Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (PAKP), The Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Witness Protection Act, 2021, 3 September 2021

Provincial Assembly Sindh, Sindh Witness Protection Act, 2013, 30 October 2013

Reporters Sans Frontieres (RSF), Pakistan: multiple journalists and a dozen YouTube channels targeted under PECA in less than a year, 3 October 2025

Senate of Pakistan, Acts of Parliament (search ‘Code of Criminal Procedure’), various dates

Transparency International (TI) Pakistan:

UK Home Office, Police workforce, England and Wales: 31 March 2026, 22 July 2026

Ullah W and others, Reforming Khyber Pakhtunkhwa’s Police and Law Enforcement Infrastructure, March 2023

United Nations Committee against Torture (UNCAT):

Concluding observations on the second periodic report of Pakistan (CAT/C/PAK/CO/2), 15 June 2026
Replies of Pakistan to the list of issues in relation to its 2nd periodic report (CAT/C/PAK/RQ/2), 15 October 2026
Second periodic report submitted by Pakistan under article 19 of the Convention (CAT/C/PAK/2), 19 December 2022

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC):

United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances (WGEID), Report of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, 21 July 2025

US Department of State (USSD):

World Justice Project (WJP):

Methodology, no date
WJP Rule of Law Index: Pakistan, 2025

World Organisation Against Torture (OMCT):

WOW360, Pakistan Launches First Women-Only Digital Police Station with 24/7 Helpline 1815, 25 July 2025

Sources consulted but not cited

Amnesty International;

Chishti M and others, Addressing the Public Trust Deficit in Pakistan’s Police: Challenges, Causes, and Pathways to Reform, 2025

The Nation, Frontier Constabulary renamed Federal Constabulary with nationwide role, 14 July 2025

Pakistan Today, Pakistan Prison Reform: CJP Afridi Leads Overhaul Push, 3 July 2026Together Against the Death Penalty (ECPM), The death penalty in law and in practice Pakistan, June 2026

Question 7

Version control and feedback

Accepted Answer

Clearance

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Changes from last version of this note

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Executive summary

Assessment

About the assessment

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks

2. Exclusion

3. Protection

Country information

About the country information

4. Legal framework

4.1 Constitution

4.2 Penal Code and Code of Criminal Procedure

4.3 National human rights legislation

4.4 International covenants

5. Organisations responsible for law enforcement

5.1 Police service and paramilitary groups

5.2 Resources and accessibility

6. Capabilities of law enforcement agencies

6.1 First Information Reports (FIRs)

6.2 Crime rates

6.3 Efficacy

6.4 Corruption

7. Human rights violations

7.1 Arbitrary arrest and detention

7.2 Enforced disappearances

7.3 Extrajudicial killings

7.4 Torture and ill-treatment

8. Rule of law and the judiciary

8.1 Organisation

8.2 Independence and fair trial

8.3 Effectiveness and integrity

8.4 Double jeopardy

8.5 Death penalty

8.6 Information justice systems and alternative dispute resolution

8.7 Witness protection and victim support

8.8 Legal aid

9. Oversight and complaint mechanisms

Annex A

Correspondence from British High Commission dated 12 April 2019, updated 3 September 2026

Double jeopardy

Offences committed outside of Pakistan

Practical considerations & opinion

Sentence

Terms of Reference

Bibliography

Sources cited

Sources consulted but not cited

Version control and feedback

Clearance

Changes from last version of this note

Feedback to the Home Office

Independent Advisory Group on Country Information

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