Country policy and information note: internal relocation, Ethiopia, September 2025 (accessible)

Question 1

Executive summary

Accepted Answer

The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a federation comprising of 12 regional states and two self-governing cities (Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. Regions are divided into Zones, woredas (districts) and kebeles (smallest administrative unit). The country is culturally and ethnically diverse with a population estimated to be between 112 and 136 million in 2025. Amhara and Oromia regions account for more than half of the country’s population. An estimated 18% to 24% of the population lived in urban centres. Addis Ababa, the capital and largest city, has an estimated population of between 3.6 and 5 million, is ethnically diverse and has attracted migrants from different regions. Dire Dawa is the second largest city, is ethnically and culturally diverse, and is home to migrants from different regions.

Ethiopia has over 80 ethnic groups and over 100 languages are spoken. Under the constitution all languages enjoy official state recognition, however, Amharic is the working language of the federal government. 44% of the population are Ethiopian Orthodox, 34% are Muslims and 19 % are Protestants.

The country has one of the fastest growing economies in Africa but also has high levels of poverty. About 69% of the population is poor. The unemployment level was 8% in 2021 and was estimated at 3.4% in 2024. However, youth (ages 15 to 29 years) unemployment was higher at 10.1% for men and 24.9% for women.

Health, education and food are available, but access is adversely affected in the conflict affected regions. Climatic hazards also affected access. About 8% of the total population faced hunger and malnutrition and over 3 million people were internally displaced. Housing remains a challenge and living conditions are poor especially in urban areas.

Ethiopians can live anywhere in country. However, localised ethnic and social tensions may prevent this. The security situation in some regions such as Amhara, Oromia, some parts of Tigray, Gambella and the Afar/Somali border remains volatile. Ethiopia is a federal republic made up of ethnically defined regional states that exercise some degree of autonomy. In some regions, the non-native population faced discrimination in accessing basic services and employment. There is freedom of movement but movement by road in conflict areas is hampered by insecurity and checkpoints. A kebele ID (and in Addis Ababa city ID) is required to access services. In 2021 Ethiopia launched a national ID (Fayda) to replace the kebele ID but the card has not been widely rolled out.

A person fearing ‘rogue’ state actors and/or non-state actors is likely to be able to internally relocate to another area of Ethiopia, particularly to larger cities such as, but not limited to Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. This will depend on the nature of the threat and the person’s circumstances. Relocation may be more difficult for people who belong to an ethnic group that do not traditionally live in the area, unless they have access to support networks. However, official discrimination is less likely in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa which have multi-ethnic populations.

See Country Policy and Information Notes on the Amhara, Oromo and Tigrayans for discussion of internal relocation specifically for those groups

A claim for protection is unlikely to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts.

Question 2

Assessment

Accepted Answer

Section updated: 9 September 2025

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general those with a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from non-state actors can internally relocate within Ethiopia.

Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Internal relocation

2.1.1 A person fearing ‘rogue’ state actors and non-state actors is likely to be able to internally relocate to another area of Ethiopia, particularly to the larger cities such as, but not limited to, Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. This will depend on the nature of the threat and the person’s circumstances.

2.1.2 Relocation may be more difficult for non-native people - people from one ethnic group who relocate to another region in which they’re a minority or lack representation - without access to support networks. For guidance and information on Amhara, Oromo and Tigrayans specifically, see the relevant Country Policy and Information Notes on those groups.

2.1.3 While the onus is on the person to establish a well-founded fear of persecution or a real risk of serious harm, decision makers must give careful consideration to the relevance and reasonableness of internal relocation taking full account of the individual circumstances of the particular person.

2.1.4 Ethiopia is a culturally and ethnically diverse country with a population estimated to be between 112 and 136 million in 2025. Amhara and Oromia regions account for more than half of the total population. An estimated 24% of the population live in urban areas. Between 4 and 10 million live in Addis Ababa and around 500,000 in the next biggest city, Dire Dawa. Addis Ababa records the highest net gain of internal migrants, followed by Dire Dawa. However, when looking at more recent migration trends, Dire Dawa shows the highest net gain, with Addis Ababa coming second. Notably, internal migrants make up 42.2% of Addis Ababa’s total population (see Geography, Demography and Annexe A: City information).

2.1.5 There are around 3.3 million internally displaced persons, mostly as a result of conflict. IDPs are mostly concentrated in Oromia, Somali and Tigray regions (see Internally Displaced Persons).

2.1.6 Ethiopia has more than 80 ethnic groups, although 2 – Oromo and Amhara – account for the around 60% of the population (see Ethic groups). The country’s ethnic diversity is reflected in Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa (see Annexe A: City information). Over 100 languages are spoken. Under the constitution, all languages enjoy official state recognition. However, Amharic is the working language of the federal government and together with Oromo are the two most widely spoken languages in the country (see Languages). About 44% of the population are followers of the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, 34% are Muslims, 19% are Protestant and the rest are Catholics and members of Indigenous religions (see Religion).

2.1.7 Members of groups who live in areas where their ethnic group does not traditionally live – known as ‘settlers’ – may experience ethnic based violence, discrimination and marginalisation. However, sources do not indicate that ethnic based discrimination occurs in Addis Ababa (see Addis Ababa). Dire Dawa is governed under a 40:40:20 ethnic quota system that allocates political power to Oromo, Somali, and other groups respectively. While intended as a power-sharing mechanism, this arrangement has fostered exclusion and discontent: minority communities feel alienated, Oromo residents report marginalization in language use and representation, and Amhara residents have historically been excluded altogether under the formula, reinforcing perceptions of inequity and deepening ethnic polarization in the city (see Dire Dawa).

2.1.8 The World Bank noted that with an estimated 8.1% growth in 2023/24, Ethiopia is one of the fastest-growing economies in Africa but also remains one of the poorest. Persistent inflation worsened living standards, eroded real incomes, and pushed poverty to an estimated 37% of the population (earning less than US$2.15 a day (around £1.59)) as defined by the World Bank by 2024 (see Poverty). In 2024 total unemployment was 3.4% with female unemployment (4.7%) almost double that of males (2.4%). For context in Aug-Oct 2024 - UK unemployment was 4.3%, 4.6% for men and 4% for women. Youth (people aged 15 to 29 years) unemployment was 10% for males and 25% for females. Over 82% of employment was in the informal sector (see Unemployment). Women earn less than men. The adjusted gender pay gap is 13.9% compared to the raw gap of 30.3 per cent on an hourly basis (see Wages).

2.1.9 Many parts of the country face insecurity caused by varying degrees of conflict, with Amhara, Oromia, Tigray and the Afar/Somali border the most affected regions. Conflict has occurred between armed groups and government security forces and between different ethnic groups. Security remains volatile in Amhara and Oromia and to some extent Tigray (see Security). For guidance and information on Amhara, Oromo and Tigrayans specifically, see the relevant Country Policy and Information Notes on those groups. The situation in other regions and in particular Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa is better (see Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa).

2.1.10 Primary, secondary and tertiary level healthcare is available. The government has taken measures to improve health outcomes and strengthen the healthcare system including construction of health facilities provision of drugs, and improvement in treatment. However, healthcare is hampered by inaccessibility resulting from partial and/or complete destruction of health facilities in conflict-affected regions, insecurity due to conflict and uneven regional distribution of health facilities and workers. Communicable diseases remain a serious challenge (see Health).

2.1.11 Primary and secondary school education is free for all children in state schools. Recognised refugees and asylum seekers are granted access to pre-primary and primary education on par with Ethiopian nationals. Access to secondary, higher, technical and vocational education is also permitted, subject to available resources and national education policy (see Governance and structure). Enrolment rates are high for primary schools but reduce for middle school and secondary school and vary across the regions affected particularly by insecurity. Rates showed considerable variation across different regions. Enrolment is low in pastoralist areas (5.3%) compared non-pastoralist areas to 94.7% (see Access). About 8.3 million children are out of school due to insecurity and climatic factors especially drought, which led to the destruction and closure of schools (see [Enrolment]#basic-education) and Facilities). Higher education is available in both public and private institutions. Ethiopia has 47 public and 5 private universities (see Higher education).

2.1.12 Ethiopia faces a shortage of housing and widespread unaffordability. The formal housing market remains largely inaccessible for low-income households. Demand is increasing due to population growth, urbanisation, internal displacement due to conflict, and urban migration to new regional capitals (see Housing needs and availability). Housing remains broadly unaffordable for the vast majority. Even the most affordable formally built housing unit is out of reach for over 96% of urban households. Informal and kebele housing remain the only affordable options for most low-income residents (Affordability). As of 2024, Addis Ababa needed 1.5 million housing units.

2.1.13 Living conditions are variable but housing and sanitation are often poor, including limited access to clean water and basic infrastructure. Informal construction dominates urban areas but is of poor quality with houses often built with mud, straw, dung, or earth floors. 65 to 75% of urban populations live in slum-like conditions. Severe overcrowding is common, with an average of 3.5 people sharing only one sleeping room. Most rental and owner-occupied homes are also classified as substandard. Less than half (49.6%) of the population has access clean water and just 8.9% to basic sanitation. Ongoing conflict has severely damaged WASH infrastructure, further restricting access in affected regions. Electricity access is uneven: while 93% of urban residents have electricity, national coverage is only 26% to 55% (see Housing and living conditions).

2.1.14 Ethiopia has a comprehensive legal and policy framework for social protection (see Legal framework). The country has a compulsory contributory pension scheme that covers both the public and private sector. Benefits include regular pension, gratuity, invalidity, incapacity, and survivor pension benefits. However, coverage is very low. The monthly pension in public sector was Ethiopian birr (ETB) 1,258 (about £6.85) and ETB 2,218 (about 12,07) in the private sector (see Public pension scheme and Private pension scheme).

2.1.15 There are several social safety net programmes that support vulnerable populations suffering from chronic poverty and food insecurity. These include the Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) which provides conditional and unconditional cash or food to about 8 to 9 million rural people; the Urban Productive Safety Net Project (UPSNP) which focus on the urban poor, currently reaching 1.7 million people in 88 cities; the School Feeding Programme that provide meals to school children and the social health insurance scheme (see Social safety nets).

2.1.16 The law provides for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, migration, and repatriation, and the government generally respects these rights (see Entry and exit). However, sources document significant restrictions on freedom of movement internally mostly in conflict-affected regions. Insecurity, checkpoints and occasional ethnic profiling especially of the Amhara and Tigray affected internal movement on land routes. Ethiopian Airlines operates flights between Addis Ababa and several regional airports (see Internal movement).

2.1.17 An estimated 15.8 million people required emergency food assistance during the 2024 lean season. Persistent insecurity particularly in Afar, Amhara, Somali, and Tigray continues to disrupt agricultural production, markets, and humanitarian access. Inflation and loss of income have left 87% of households in these areas unable to afford basic food, and markets remain partially functional. Despite aid agencies reaching millions with food assistance access barriers, aid unavailability and insecurity hinder consistent coverage (see Food security and assistance).

2.1.18 Thousands of Ethiopians have been forcefully and voluntarily returned to the country in the last 5 years, mainly from Saudia Arabia but some from the European Union and the UK, including failed asylum seekers (FAS). In 2024 a total of 115 Ethiopians were returned from the UK and 180 from the European Union. In the first quarter of 2025, 59 people were returned from the UK (see Number of returnees). Returnees received post arrival and reintegration assistance (see Reception and assistance). Sources do not indicate that unsuccessful asylum seekers are targeted by the authorities but those suspected of opposition links may be informally monitored. Returnees generally, especially those with limited financial resources face societal stigmatisation. Sources referred to in the UK HO FFM indicate that Tigrayan returnees may face renewed persecution as the same government responsible for imprisonment of Tigrayans is still in power (see Treatment of failed asylum seekers). However, the country evidence does not indicate that there is consistent pattern of serious ill-treatment that unsuccessful asylum seekers returning by force or voluntarily faces a real risk of serious harm.

2.1.19 Any person born to at least one Ethiopian parent qualifies as a national (see Citizenship regime). Ethiopian nationals above 18 years are entitled to a kebele (the smallest administrative division) identity card which is issued locally by kebele administrations. The kebele card (a local identity document issued by the kebele administration, which is the smallest administrative unit in Ethiopia) remains essential for everyday life serving as the country’s primary identification mechanism and without the card it is difficult to access basic services. It is necessary to travel domestically, collect benefits, receive aid, and access banking and telecommunication services (see Kebele card). In 2021, Ethiopia introduced a biometric national identity card ID called Fayda cover the entire resident population, including children. Fayda is designed to prevent identity fraud and is used to access public services including healthcare, education, and social programs as well as private services such as banking. The government set a target of registering 90 million people by 2027, but progress has been slow. Fayda registration stood at 21.7 million individuals as of August 2025 (see National ID (Fayda ID).

2.1.20 Addis Ababa is Ethiopia’s political, economic, and administrative centre. It is a multi-ethnic city with an estimated population of between 3.6 and 5 million. 42.2% of the city’s population is comprised of internal migrants. The security in the city is stable, but the state may surveil and profile those it perceives as a threat. In 2021 it had an employment ratio of about 48%. It offers better access to services including education, health, water, sanitation and electricity than other regions. However, it suffers from high unemployment poverty, housing shortages and poor living conditions Settling in the city requires an Addis Ababa city identity card (kebele ID). (see Addis Ababa).

2.1.21 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status

3. Certification

3.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

3.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Question 3

Country information

Accepted Answer

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the About the assessment, is the guide to the current objective conditions.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 9 September 2025. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

4. Geography

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.

4.1 Location, capital and main cities

4.1.1 Ethiopia is located in Eastern Africa and shares borders with Djibouti, Eritrea, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan and Sudan. Ethiopia’s land area is approximately 1,104,300 square kilometres^{[footnote 1]}, more than 4.5 times the area of the United Kingdom.^{[footnote 2]}

4.1.2 The capital is Addis Ababa.^{[footnote 3]}

4.1.3 According to the editors of the Encyclopaedia Britannica updated 9 May 2025 (EoEB May 2025), Ethiopia’s principal urban centres include the capital city Addis Ababa and regional cities such as Dire Dawa in the east, Jima in the south, Nekemte in the west, Dese in the north-central area, Gonder in the northwest, and Mekele in the north.^{[footnote 4]}

4.2 Regions

4.2.1 The Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation (ACCORD), operated by the Austrian Red Cross, November 2019 Ethiopia country of origin compilation (ACCORD COI Report 2019), based on a range of sources, noted that the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a federation comprising of states. The federal system was established under the 1995 constitution, which grants ethnic groups the right to self-determination up to secession. While the constitution created ethnic-based states, these are not ethnically homogenous, as minorities exist within every regional state, leading to what Mahmood Mamdani, director of the Institute of Social Research at Makerere University, Uganda, and a professor at Columbia University, described as the “fiction of an ethnic homeland” that generates “endless minorities”.^{[footnote 5]}

4.2.2 The Government of Netherlands January 2024 country of origin information report on Ethiopia, covering December 2022 to December 2023, (GoN 2024 report) noted that two new regional states - Central Ethiopia and Southern Ethiopia - were created from the former Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples’ Region, with Southern Ethiopia formed after a February 2023 referendum and Central Ethiopia by federal parliamentary decision. The report also highlighted that the status of West Tigray (Welkait), disputed between Amhara and Tigray, is to be determined through a referendum.^{[footnote 6]}

4.2.3 The Permanent Committee on Geographic Names (PCGN), which advises the British government on policies and procedures for the proper writing of geographical names for places report updated September 2024 (PCGN 2024 report) noted that Ethiopia is organized into 12 regional states (kilil) and two self-governing cities (āstedader), Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa. The regions and their respective capitals are: Afar (Semera), Amhara (Bahir Dar), Benishangul-Gumuz (Asosa), South Ethiopia (Welayta Sodo), Gambella (Gambella), Harari (Harer), Central Ethiopia (Hosaina), Oromia (Addis Ababa), Sidama (Hawasa), Somali (Jijinga), Tigray (Mikelle), and Southwest Ethiopia Peoples (Bonga), with the self-governing cities having their own capitals of the same name. Southwest Ethiopia Peoples was formed in 2021 and South Ethiopia and Central Ethiopia in 2023 from the former Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP).^{[footnote 7]}

4.2.4 The United Nations Office for the Commissioner of Humanitarian Affairs (UN OCHA) has produced the map below^{[footnote 8]} of Ethiopia showing regions and zones as of January 2024:

4.2.5 Ethiopia’s administrative structure is organized hierarchically: regions are divided into zones, which are further subdivided into woredas (districts). Each woreda is then broken down into kebeles and sub-kebeles, which represent the smallest administrative units in the country.^{[footnote 9]}

4.2.6 For a detailed map of Ethiopian showing zones and woredas see Ethiopia: Administrative map (As of January 2024) - Ethiopia.

5. Demography

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.

5.1 Population

5.1.1 The most recent population census in Ethiopia, conducted in 2007 by the Central Statistical Agency, recorded a total population of 73.9 million of comprising of 37.3 million (50.5%) males and 36.6 million (49.5%) females. 12.0 (16.2%) of the population was in urban centres and 62.0 million (83.8%) lived in rural areas.^{[footnote 10]}

5.1.2 Estimates of Ethiopia’s population in 2025 varied. The Ethiopian Statistics Service (ESS), a government department which collects, compiles and analyses data from surveys, censuses and administrative records^{[footnote 11]} estimated it at 111.7 million of which 27.0 million (24.2%) was in urban areas and 84.7 million (75.8%) in rural regions^{[footnote 12]}, the US Census International Database at 121.4 million^{[footnote 13]} and the United Nations Population Division at 135.5 million.^{[footnote 14]}

5.1.3 CPIT has produced the table below showing population in each region, including in urban and rural areas as of July 2025 based on ESS population estimates.^{[footnote 15]}

Region	Total population(millions)	Urban population(millions)	Rural population(millions)	As % of total population
Tigray	6.04	2.06	3.98	5.4%
Afar	2.16	0.53	1.63	1.9%
Amhara	23.88	5.44	18.44	21.3%
Oromia	42.69	7.97	34.72	38.3%
Somali	6.96	1.07	5.89	6.2%
Benishangul-Gumuz	1.32	0.36	0.96	1.2%
Sidama	4.93	0.99	3.94	4.4%
Central Ethiopia Region	6.54	1.33	5.21	5.9%
Southern Ethiopia Region	7.93	1.61	6.32	7.1%
Southwest Ethiopia Region	3.52	0.67	2.85	3.2%
Gambella	0.56	0.23	0.33	0.5%
Harari	0.30	0.17	0.13	0.3%
Addis Ababa	4.11	4.11	-	3.7%
Dire Dawa	0.58	0.38	0.20	0.5%
Special Enumeration areas*	0.15	0.06	0.08	0.1%
Total	111.55	26.98	84.67	100.0%

*These include Moyale and Meda Welabu special census zone

5.1.4 MapAction, has produced below map^{[footnote 16]} of Ethiopia showing population density (people per km2 as of 2020):

5.2 Ethnic groups

5.2.1 The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC)/Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) Joint Investigation report on the Tigray conflict November 2021 (EHRC/OHCHR November 2021 report) noted:

‘The country is home to over 80 ethnic groups which makes it a mosaic of cultures and languages. According to the last national census (2007), the Oromo constitute the single largest ethnic group at 34.5 percent of the population, followed by the Amhara (26.9 percent), Somali (6.2%), Tigrayan (6.1%), Sidama (4 %), Gurage (2.5%), Welaita (2.3%), Hadiya (1.7%), Afar (1.7%) and Gamo (1.5%). The remaining over seventy (70) ethnic groups make up 19.8 percent of the total population.’^{[footnote 17]}

5.2.2 According to the CIA World Factbook, in 2022 the Oromo made up an estimated 35.8% of the population, followed by the Amhara at 24.1%, Somali at 7.2%, Tigray at 5.7%, Sidama at 4.1%, Guragie at 2.6%, Welaita at 2.3%, Afar at 2.2%, Silte at 1.3%, and Kefficho at 1.2%, with all other groups accounting for 13.5%.^{[footnote 18]}

5.3 Languages

5.3.1 The EoEB May 2025 noted that Ethiopia has about 100 languages, grouped mainly into the Semitic, Cushitic, and Omotic branches of the Afro-Asiatic family, with a smaller number belonging to the Nilotic branch of the Nilo-Saharan family. Semitic languages such as Amharic, Tigrinya, Gurage, and Hareri are spoken in the northern and central regions, with Geʿez now limited to religious use. Cushitic languages, including Oromo, Somali, and Afar, are widely spoken across the west, south, east, and the Denakil Plain. Omotic languages, particularly Walaita, are concentrated in the southwest, while Nilotic languages, notably Kunama, are native to the Western Lowlands.^{[footnote 19]}

5.3.2 The source also noted that, under the Ethiopian constitution, all languages have official recognition. Nevertheless, Amharic serves as the federal government’s ‘working language’ and along with Oromo, it is one of the two most widely spoken languages in the country.^{[footnote 20]}

5.3.3 The CIA Factbook provided an estimated percentage of the population speaking various languages in 2007: ‘Oromo (official regional working language) 33.8%, Amharic (official national language) 29.3%, Somali (official regional working language) 6.2%, Tigrigna (Tigrinya) (official regional working language) 5.9%, Sidamo 4%, Wolaytta 2.2%, Gurage 2%, Afar (official regional working language) 1.7%, Hadiyya 1.7%, Gamo 1.5%, Gedeo 1.3%, Opuuo 1.2%, Kafa 1.1%, other 8.1%, English.’^{[footnote 21]}

5.4 Religion

5.4.1 According to the EHRC/OHCHR November 2021 report, an estimated 43.5% of the population belonged to the Ethiopian Orthodox Tewahedo Church, 33% are Muslim, 18.6% Protestant and less than 5 % belong to smaller religious groups including Catholics, Jehovah’s Witnesses and indigenous religions.^{[footnote 22]}

5.4.2 According to the EoEB (May 2025), over 40% of Ethiopians follow the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, while about 20% adhere to other Christian denominations, mostly Protestant. Around 33% of the population is Muslim, with Islam particularly prevalent in the Eastern Lowlands, though Muslim communities exist throughout the country. The source also noted that Islam does not receive the same level of recognition as Christianity.^{[footnote 23]}

6. Economy

6.1 Growth

6.1.1 The CIA Factbook provided the following summary: ‘[L]ow-income, fast-growing Horn of Africa economy; widespread poverty and food insecurity worsened by conflict and environmental factors; landlocked with tensions over seaport access; development aid supporting reforms to boost private-sector growth and financial stability; challenge of creating jobs for growing labor force.’^{[footnote 24]}

6.1.2 The World Bank report ‘Ethiopia Macro-poverty outlook’, April 2025, (WB report April 2025) noted that Ethiopia is: ‘One of the fastest-growing economies in the region with an estimated 8.1% growth in FY2023/24.’^{[footnote 25]}

6.1.3 The WB April 2025 report noted that inflation (based on consumer price index) was 32.6% in 2022/23 financial year and was expected to fall to 26.7% in 2023/24 and to 20.7% in 2024/25.^{[footnote 26]}

6.1.4 On 14 April 2025 the Ethiopian Monitor, a digital news platform reporting on local and regional news reported that according to the Ethiopian Statistical Service’s March 2025 Consumer Price Index (CPI) update, annual inflation eased to 13.6% down from 26.2% in March 2024, marking a 12.6 percentage-point decline over the year, while month-on-month inflation stood at 2.7%, below the 4.0% recorded a year before.^{[footnote 27]}

6.2 Poverty

6.2.1 The WB noted that Ethiopia remains one of the poorest countries in the world with a per capita gross national income of US$1,020 (£754).^{[footnote 28]} GNI measures the average income earned by a country’s citizens, including income from abroad, divided by the total population.

6.2.2 The 2024 Africa Housing Yearbook was published by the Centre for the Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF), a South Africa-based independent think tank whose mission is to make Africa’s housing finance markets work^{[footnote 29]} (CAHF 2024). It observed:

‘Economic growth in Ethiopia has not alleviated poverty significantly. The latest available figure shows that an estimated 28 million people [about 25% of the population] are estimated to be living in poverty, living on less than US$2.15 [£1.61^{[footnote 30]}]a day. The country also ranks 175th out of 188 countries in terms of the Human Development Index (HDI), with a score of 0.49. The latest data on multidimensional poverty [Multi-dimensional poverty is a concept that extends beyond measuring low income or lack of money. It takes into account various factors affecting a person’s quality of life and well-being, including health, education, living standard^{[footnote 31]} also shows that 68.7% of the population are multidimensionally poor and another 18% are considered to be vulnerable to multidimensional poverty.’^{[footnote 32]}

6.2.3 According to the World Bank’s April 2025 report, poverty in Ethiopia rose from 27% in 2016 to 32% in 2021, based on the $2.15/day poverty line. Ongoing inflation has further reduced real incomes, raising poverty to an estimated 37%. In response, the government’s reform agenda seeks to expand private-sector jobs, link smallholder farmers to markets, and strengthen social safety nets for vulnerable group.^{[footnote 33]}

6.3 Employment

6.3.1 In August 2021 the Ethiopian Central Statistics Agency (now the Ethiopian Statistical Service) in conjunction with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) published a key finding report of the labour and migration survey (LMS) which was conducted between 25 January and 25 February 2021 (CSA/IOM 2021 LMS report). The report stated that as of February 2021 there 70 million economically active (10 years and above) people in Ethiopia excluding Tigray and 41.6 million people were employed, resulting in a national employment ratio (the percentage of employed persons to that of the working age population) of 59.5%.^{[footnote 34]}

6.3.2 A 2024 UN Women report, drawing on data from the 2021 LMS (UN Women 2024 report) noted that national employment rate for individuals aged 15 to 64 was 67.2%, with a slightly higher rate of 67.5% for those aged 15 and above.^{[footnote 35]}

6.3.3 The April 2025 World Bank Ethiopia outlook report (WB April 2025 report) noted that the employment rate for persons aged over 15 years was 77.6% in 2023 and was expected to rise slightly to 77.8% in 2023/24 and projected to reach 78% in 2024/25.^{[footnote 36]}

6.4 Rural and urban employment

6.4.1 In December 2021 the FDRE Ethiopia Statistics Service published the statistical report on the 2021 Labour Force and Migration Survey (ESS 2021 report). The report has provided the disaggregated employment data including by region, location (rural and urban areas), gender and age.

6.4.2 The ESS 2021 report noted that as of 2021 the employment ratio for rural areas was 62.1% percent and for urban area was 51.1% percent.^{[footnote 37]} CPIT has collated data from the ESS 2021 report^{[footnote 38]} and produced below table showing proportion of employment between urban and rural areas:

Region	Urban area: Total population (millions)	Urban area: Employed (millions)	Urban area: Employment ratio	Rural areas: Total population (millions)	Rural areas: Employed (millions)	Rural areas: Employment ratio
Afar	0.3	0.1	46.6	1.0	0.6	54.4
Amhara	3.5	1.9	54.8	14.1	9.1	65
Oromia	4.8	2.4	50.4	22	13.8	62.6
Somali	0.7	0.3	39.4	3.7	1.7	46
Benishangul-Gumuz	0.2	0.1	57.6	0.6	0.5	80.3
SNNP*	2.1	1.1	53.3	9.5	5.9	62.5
Sidama	0.7	0.3	49	2.7	1.7	63.7
Gambella	0.1	0.06	43.3	0.4	0.1	49
Harari	0.1	0.07	53.3	0.08	0.05	61.4
Addis Ababa	3.1	1.5	48.1
Dire Dawa	0.3	0.2	44.9	0.1	0.08	65.4
National	15.9	8.03	50.7	54.2	33.53	62.1

*SNNP has since been divided into 3 states: Southwest Ethiopia Peoples’ region, Southern Ethiopia region and Central Ethiopia region.

6.5 Employment

6.5.1 The ESS 2021 report noted: ‘Employment to population ratio (EPR) provides information on the extent to which the population is engaged in productive activities. The value of the ratio has its own implication; high employment to population ratio implies a large proportion of the population is employed, while a low ratio reflects a large share of the population is not involved in productive activities due to unemployment or persons out of the labour force.’^{[footnote 39]}

6.5.2 The same source indicated that the employment-to-population ratio is 59.5%, meaning that approximately 60 percent of the population aged ten years and above are employed. However, There were regional variations in employment. Benishangul-Gumuz Region has the highest employment-to-population ratio at 74.0 percent, while Somali Region has the lowest at 45.0 percent. Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa reported ratios of 48.1 percent and 51.2 percent, respectively.^{[footnote 40]}

6.5.3 CPIT has collated the ESS/IOM data and produced table showing labour participation and employment ratio nationally, regionally and by gender:

Labour force participation rate (%)

Region	Male	Female	Total
Afar	71.2	46.9	59.3
Amhara	77.7	58.4	68.0
Oromia	72.4	57.3	64.8
Somali	57.3	44.7	51.2
Benishangul-Gumuz	81.2	73.5	77.3
SNNP*	73.2	57.7	65.4
Sidama	69.6	59.1	64.4
Gambella	55.4	47.7	51.5
Harari	70.3	58.0	64.0
Addis Ababa	70.0	55.2	61.8
Dire Dawa	68.8	53.5	60.9
Total	72.6	56.8	64.7

Employment to population ratio (%)

Region	Male	Female	Total
Afar	66.5	38.2	52.7
Amhara	74.0	51.9	62.9
Oromia	69.7	51.0	60.4
Somali	51.5	38.1	45.0
Benishangul-Gumuz	78.8	69.4	74.0
SNNP*	69.5	52.2	60.8
Sidama	67.2	54.5	60.8
Gambella	52.9	41.8	47.3
Harari	66.3	49.6	57.7
Addis Ababa	59.3	39.2	48.1
Dire Dawa	62.2	41.0	51.2
Total	68.0	50.2	59.5

6.6 Employment by gender

6.6.1 With respect to gender, under the Labour Proclamation No.1156/2019 it is unlawful to discriminate between workers on the grounds of sex (section 14 (f). Additionally Section 87(1) affirms that women shall not be discriminated against in any aspect on the basis of their sex.^{[footnote 41]}

6.6.2 However, the 2023 USSD HR report observed that women’s access to employment, credit, and business ownership or management was limited due to fewer educational opportunities and legal restrictions, including prohibitions on working in certain hazardous occupations and industries such as mining and agriculture. Despite these barriers, several initiatives were implemented to improve women’s access to employment and economic empowerment.^{[footnote 42]}

6.6.3 The ESS 2021 report noted that employment levels differed by sex, with males recording a higher ratio (68%) compared to females (50.2%).^{[footnote 43]}

6.6.4 The UN Women 2024 report noted gender disparities in employment with 56.4% of women aged 15–64 employed compared to 78.5% of men. Women’s wage employment was concentrated in a few sectors, notably household work (18.8%), education (18.7%), and health and social work (9.5%). Occupationally, significant shares of women work as technical professionals (19.5%), professionals (16.6%), and in services and sales (22.2%), while only a small proportion hold managerial positions (2.1%).^{[footnote 44]}

6.7 Employment of disabled persons

6.7.1 The Labour Proclamation No.1156/2019 prohibits discrimination against workers among other things based on ‘disability’ (section 14 (f).^{[footnote 45]} The Right to Employment of Persons with Disability Proclamation No. 568/2008 also prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability. Section 5(1) states: ‘Any law, practice, custom, attitude or other discriminatory situations that impair the equal opportunities of employment of a disabled person are illegal.’^{[footnote 46]}

6.7.2 The CSA/IOM 2021 report recorded 437,582 economically active persons with disabilities, of whom 397,926 were employed and 26,655 unemployed, resulting in an unemployment rate of 9.1%. The rate was significantly higher in urban areas (20.3%) than in rural areas (6.5%), with women with disabilities facing higher unemployment than men across all locations.^{[footnote 47]}

6.7.3 The 2023 USSD HR report noted that whereas employment law prohibited discrimination against those with physical and mental disabilities, it did not cover intellectual or sensory disabilities. The constitution also lacked a mandate for equal rights.^{[footnote 48]}

6.8 Youth employment

6.8.1 According to the ESS 2021 report the national youth employment-to-population ratio (ages 15–29) was 57.4%, with higher employment among males (64.9%) than females (50.6%). Youth employment was lower in urban areas at 46.7% (35.8% for males and 41.6 percent for females) compared to rural areas, where the ratio was 61.2 %p (68.3% for males and 54.3% for females).^{[footnote 49]} Regionally, Benishangul-Gumuz had the highest youth employment ratio (75.7%) while Gambella had the lowest (36.8%).^{[footnote 50]}

6.8.2 CPIT has collated the data from the ESS 2021 report and produced the below table showing youth employment by region, gender and location^{[footnote 51]}:

Urban

Region	Male	Female	Total
Afar	49.3	34.8	41.0
Amhara	59.5	45.6	51.2
Oromia	54.2	39.7	46.0
Somali	39.2	28.4	33.5
Benishangul-Gumuz	62.8	50.4	55.6
SNNP	58.5	44.7	50.9
Sidama	48.6	37.3	42.2
Gambella	41.5	34.6	37.6
Harari	54.8	44.7	49.1
Addis Ababa	47.6	41.7	44.0
Dire Dawa	46.2	32.1	38.6
National	53.8	41.6	46.7

Rural

Region	Rural	Male	Female
Afar	65.6	43.3	54.0
Amhara	71.8	57.6	65.0
Oromia	69.8	55.2	62.4
Somali	49.5	35.6	42.4
Benishangul-Gumuz	86.6	85.3	86.0
SNNP	67.8	53.7	60.5
Sidama	64.1	57.4	60.6
Gambella	39.5	32.9	36.3
Harari	69.3	59.0	63.9
Addis Ababa	-	-	-
Dire Dawa	76.0	55.1	64.4
National	68.3	54.3	61.2

Region	Male	Female	Total
Afar	62.1	41.2	51.0
Amhara	69.3	54.0	61.6
Oromia	66.8	51.6	58.8
Somali	47.8	34.3	40.9
Benishangul-Gumuz	79.5	72.3	75.7
SNNP	65.9	51.7	58.4
Sidama	61.1	52.7	56.7
Gambella	40.2	33.7	36.8
Harari	61.0	50.1	55.1
Addis Ababa	47.6	41.7	44.0
Dire Dawa	54.9	39.1	46.3
National	64.9	50.6	57.4

6.9 Employment by sector

6.9.1 According to CSA/IOM 2021 report agriculture dominated employed nationally, employing 65% of the workforce, particularly in rural areas, where it accounted for 77.3% of the jobs. In contrast, urban employment was concentrated in the service sector (73.4%). Nationally, 24% of the workforce was in services, 5.9% in trade, and 5.2% in manufacturing, mining, and construction. Of those in employment, 50% were self-employed, 37% worked as unpaid family labour, 6% were employed by the government with the rest engaged with NGOs, cooperatives, or private enterprises.^{[footnote 52]}

6.9.2 The ESS 2021 report indicated that, excluding subsistence farming and private household work, about 7.7 million out of 16.6 million workers were engaged in the informal sector, accounting for 46.3% of total national employment. Of those employed in the informal economy, 6.4 million (59.9%) were in rural areas and 1.3 million (21.4%) were in urban areas.^{[footnote 53]}

6.9.3 The USSD 2023 HR report noted that the informal sector employed more than 70% of urban workers.’^{[footnote 54]}

6.9.4 The Danish Trade Union Development Agency (DTDA), the development organisation of the Danish trade union movement, 2024 report on Ethiopia labour market noted that the informal economy was the largest source of employment and livelihood, with about 85% of workers engaged in informal employment in 2021. According to the report overall, employment was largely informal, driven mainly by subsistence farming in rural areas; however, informality was also prevalent in urban areas, where one in four formal employees worked informally and 69% of non-agricultural jobs were classified as informal.^{[footnote 55]}

6.9.5 The WB April 2025 report also noted that agriculture employed about 70% of the labour force.^{[footnote 56]}

6.10 Wages

6.10.1 According to Labour Proclamation No.1156/2019 it is unlawful to discriminate against female workers in matters of pay on the ground of their sex (Section 14 (b)). Additionally Section 87(1) affirms that women shall not be discriminated against in any aspect on the basis of their sex.^{[footnote 57]} Article 35(8) of the Constitution also supports women’s right to equal pay.^{[footnote 58]}

6.10.2 The International Labour Organization, ‘the UN Agency for the world of work’^{[footnote 59]} Statistics (ILOSTAT) country profiles noted that average monthly earnings in 2021 were 4,196 birr (ETB) (£22.66^{[footnote 60]}). Men earned ETB 4,617.4 (£24.93^{[footnote 61]}) while women earned ETB 3,439 (£18.57^{[footnote 62]}). The average weekly hours worked was 31.9, with men working 34.2 and women 28.7.^{[footnote 63]}

6.10.3 The USSD 2023 HR report observed that Ethiopia has no national minimum wage, though efforts were underway to establish one. Public-sector workers generally earn above the poverty line, but industrial park workers were paid below it and often worked excessive hours. Wage laws were poorly enforced, with weak penalties and limited oversight by the Labor Ministry’s inspection department’.^{[footnote 64]}

6.10.4 The UN Women 2024 report noted that the raw gender pay gap was 30.3% on an hourly basis, which suggested that women generally worked fewer hours than men. The gap persists across all education levels but is widest at the primary (49%) and tertiary (41.7%) levels, while narrowing significantly at the secondary level (16.4%). Marital status is also a key factor. The pay gap was much larger for single individuals (44.9%) compared married individuals (2.6%). More than half of the raw gap (16.4 percentage points) is explained by observable factors such as personal and job characteristics, while the remaining unexplained portion may reflect unobserved traits, self-selection, or discrimination. The adjusted gender pay gap was 13.9%. Wages rise with age until about 44, after which they decline, and education yields positive returns. Married individuals earn 19.3% more than single individuals. Sectoral differences reduce the gap further, as most sectors pay better than agriculture (the reference), though transport pays less. Occupations also affect the gap: professionals earn more than managers, while most other occupations pay the same or less. When personal traits, sectors, and occupations are considered together, the gap narrows to 13.3%. Finally, informal workers earned 12.5% less than formal workers.^{[footnote 65]}

6.11 Unemployment

6.11.1 According to the CSA/IOM 2021 report:

the national unemployment rate was 8.0%, with women (11.7%) experiencing higher unemployment than men (5.0%)
Urban areas faced a much higher unemployment rate (17.9%) compared to rural areas (5.2%). However, unemployment in urban areas had decline by 0.8% compared to January 2020 (18.7%)
women were disproportionately affected in both settings: 25.4% versus 11.2% in towns and cities, and 7.6% versus 5.2% in rural areas
youth (ages 15–29) unemployment in urban areas was notably high at 23.1% nationwide, with females (28.8%) almost twice as affected as males (15.9%)
youth unemployment rate in rural areas was 12%, again with a large gender gap, as 16.4% of young women were unemployed compared to 7.4% of young men.^{[footnote 66]}

6.11.2 The DTDA April 2024 report noted that Ethiopia’s unemployment rate concentrated mainly in urban areas where it stood at 19% since 2019. The report noted that the national rate was relatively lower than the sub-Saharan average. However, youth unemployment was severe, with the urban rate rising from 25% in 2018 to 27% in 2022, while the rural youth rate reached 8.1% in 2021. A significant gender gap persists, with urban youth unemployment at 16% for men compared to 29% for women in 2021.^{[footnote 67]}

6.11.3 According to the World Bank’s Ethiopia data page, based on ILO modelled estimates for 2024, the overall unemployment rate was 3.4%, with female unemployment at 4.7% compared to 2.4% for males. Youth unemployment showed a wider gap, with 10.1% of young men and 24.9% of young women unemployed, highlighting significant gender disparities in labour market.^{[footnote 68]}

6.11.4 The CAS/IOM 2021 report noted: ‘Regarding unemployment by region, the highest rate was recorded in Addis Ababa Administration (22.1 percent) followed by Dire Dawa (15.9 percent), while the lowest unemployment rate was registered in Benishangul-Gumuz Region (4.3 percent).’^{[footnote 69]}

6.11.5 The same source has produced below figure showing unemployment rate of regions in 2021:

Region	Unemployment Rate
Addis Ababa	22.1
Dire Dawa	15.9
Somali	12.1
Afar	11.3
Harari	9.9
Gambella	8.2
Amhara	7.5
S.N.N.P.	7.0
Oromia	6.9
Sidama	5.5
Benishangul-Gumuz	4.3
Country - Total	8.0

6.11.6 The same source produced below figure showing the unemployment rate of major towns and regional capitals^{[footnote 70]}:

7.1 Legal framework

7.1.1 The 2021 International Labour Organization mapping report of social protection systems in Ethiopia (ILO 2021 report) noted:

‘Article 41/5 of the Constitution states: “The State shall, within available means, allocate resources to provide rehabilitation and assistance to the physically and mentally disabled, the aged, and to children who are left without parents or guardian”. Furthermore, Article 41/6 states: “The state shall pursue policies which aim to expand job opportunities for the unemployed and the poor and shall accordingly undertake programmes and public work projects”. Article 90/1 stipulates: “as resource capacity of the government permits, policies shall aim to provide all Ethiopians access to public health and education, clean water, housing, food and social security” … The government has reinforced the Constitution by issuing a National Social Protection Policy (NSPP), which was adopted in 2014, paving the way for kick-starting and expanding a range of social protection interventions.’^{[footnote 71]}

7.1.2 The International Social Security Association (ISSA), an international organization for social security institutions, government departments and agencies^{[footnote 72]} country profile of Ethiopia (ISSA 2022 report), noted that the regulatory framework governing social protection in Ethiopia was the Public Servants Pension Proclamation, No. 1267/2022 and Private Organization Employees’ Pension Proclamation, No. 1268.^{[footnote 73]} The former regulates pension rights, benefits, and obligations for public service employees and the latter the establishment, administration, and regulation of pension contributions and benefits for employees working in private organizations.^{[footnote 74]}

7.1.3 The DTDA April 2024 observed: ‘Currently, there is no provision for unemployment benefits under Ethiopian labour legislation, and there is no functioning unemployment insurance scheme. Instead, many are entering casual or informal activities as a survival strategy to generate some earnings.’^{[footnote 75]}

7.1.4 An August 2024 EHRC policy brief which explored the current social protection landscape in Ethiopia, noted that ‘Both the Public Servant and Private Employees’ Pension Proclamations in Ethiopia are based on the contributory pension system.’^{[footnote 76]}

7.2 Public pension scheme

7.2.1 The main provisions of Proclamation No. 1267/2022 are summarised below:

Coverage: The scheme is mandatory for Ethiopian citizens employed in the public sector (Article 2(1))
Two separate pension funds a Civil Service Pension Fund for civil servants (article 8) and a Military and Police Pension Fund for security personnel (article 9)
Contributions: employees contribute 7% of their gross monthly salary and the Government 11% for civil servants and 33% for military and police personnel (articles 10 and 11)
Eligibility for Pension: normal retirement at age 60 with at least 10 years of service (Articles 18 and 19); early retirement from age 55 with at least 25 years of service (Article 19)
Types of Benefits:
- Regular retirement pension based on age and service (Article 19)
- Retirement gratuity for those with less 10 years of service (Article 21)
- Invalidity pension (Article 23)
- Survivors’ pension and gratuity(Article 40)
- Incapacity benefit and pension due to occupational injury(Articles 25 & 35).^{[footnote 77]}

7.2.2 With respect to coverage the ILO 2021 noted:

‘… [B]y the end of 2020 [Public Servants’ Social Security Agency] PSSSA [which manages the public social security scheme] had a total of 1,669,518 public workers (1.5 per cent of the total population) who are contributing to the scheme, out of whom 61 per cent are male and 39 per cent female. In terms of beneficiaries, a total of 31,386 persons benefits from the scheme, of whom 74 per cent are male and 26 per cent female. In terms of number of people covered by both schemes, altogether, contributors and beneficiaries represent around 2.7 of the total population.’^{[footnote 78]}

7.2.3 The ISSA 2022 report noted that the minimum benefit for public sector employees was 1,258 birr [£6.80^{[footnote 79]}] a month.^{[footnote 80]}

7.3 Private pension scheme

7.3.1 The private pension scheme is mandatory for private sector employees and voluntary for self-employed persons and foreign nationals covered by bilateral/multilateral agreements. It exclude household and seasonal workers and employees of international organisations and diplomatic missions. The scheme is similar to the civil servants’ pension scheme with respect to contributions ((article 10), eligibility for pension (Articles 18 and 19) and types of benefits and beneficiaries (articles 19, 20, 23, 25,35, 37 and 39), early retirement: From age 55 with at least 25 years of service’^{[footnote 81]}

7.3.2 With respect to coverage the ILO 2021 report observed:

‘The ten-year strategic plan issued by [ Private Organizations Employees’ Social Security Agency]POESSA [an agency that manages the private sector social security fund] indicates that, so far, the scheme has enrolled 1.67 million members out of a total of 203,458 private enterprises. Between 2016 and 2020, the scheme has managed to enrol around 460,000 workers from 76,000 private firms. The plan indicates that the increase is attributed to the fact that in recent years the scheme has accepted contractual and temporary workers. However, as an overall trend, the percentage of enterprises covered by the scheme compared with the total number of companies registered in the country is still very low … The agency plans to increase the scope of the scheme, envisaging to enrol a total of 3 million members out of the potential of more than 311,000 private enterprises operating in the country.^{[footnote 82]}

7.3.3 With respect to benefit payment the ISSA 2022 report noted that minimum benefit for private pension was 2,218 birr [£12]^{[footnote 83]} per month.^{[footnote 84]}

8.1 General

8.1.1 According to the ILO 2021 report the three largest conditional and non-conditional social protection programmes are the Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP), Humanitarian Food Assistance (HFA), and the Urban Productive Safety Net Project (UPSNP).^{[footnote 85]}

8.1.2 The 2024 Bertelsmann Stiftung Ethiopia Country Report covering 1 February 2021 to 31 January 2023 (BTI 2024 report), noted:

‘… the Ethiopian government has implemented several social safety net programs to support poor and vulnerable populations. These programs include the Productive Safety Net Program (PSNP), the Cash Transfer Program for Orphans and Vulnerable Children (CTP-OVC), the Rural Safety Net Program (RSNP), and the Urban Safety Net Program (USNP). These programs aim to provide a safety net for the most vulnerable populations and support their basic needs, reduce poverty and hunger, and improve overall well-being.^{[footnote 86]}

8.1.3 A November 2024 WB report noted that ‘Social assistance programs partly helped reduce the depth of poverty among beneficiaries.’^{[footnote 87]}

8.2 Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP)

8.2.1 The 2022 UNICEF report, Enhancing Maternal and Child Nutrition, (UNICEF 2022 report) noted that the PSNP:

‘… [I]s the largest social assistance programme in Ethiopia, currently targeting 8 million extremely poor rural households vulnerable to shocks and related food insecurity. Around 6.6 million households that meet poverty criteria are targeted with cash or food transfers in exchange for a stipulated number of days of public works (decided within each region). Around 1.2 million households with no members able to work receive unconditional transfers (permanent direct support). In addition, pregnant women, caregivers of children under 12 months and caregivers of wasted [sic] children can be temporarily excused from public works until the child’s first birthday or wasting is resolved (temporary direct support). Transfers can be either food … or where market systems are functioning well, cash equivalent to the value of food transfers.’^{[footnote 88]}

8.2.2 The December 2022 WFP report noted:

‘… Ethiopia’s flagship social assistance scheme is the … PSNP, a large national social safety net programme implemented by the ministry of agriculture, which is now in its 5th phase (PSNP5).

‘PSNP provides cash (for 75 percent of recipients) and in-kind support (for 25 percent of recipients) to food insecure families living in most drought -prone areas in exchange for engagement in public works activities designed to improve communities’ climate resilience, with 6 months duration. For families that are labour constrained (approximately 20 percent), the social safety net scheme provides unconditional cash transfers for 12 months. The programme has a rural component , which’s main objective is to support rural households’ livelihoods while also enhancing resilience to shocks at both family and community level …

‘The scheme is financed by both external donors as well as government’s own budget allocation … In its 5th phase the government and its partners committed US$2.2 billion to finance the programme for five years aiming to cover up to 9 million people.’^{[footnote 89]}

8.2.3 A May 2025 research paper by Lind and others for the Institute of Development Studies, which was based on qualitative and quantitative approaches noted that average PSNP daily payment in 2022/23 was ETB 77 [£0.43^{[footnote 90]}] in Oromia and ETB 75 [£0.41^{[footnote 91]}] in Amhara. The PSNP daily wage lagged wages for shikela (daily labour) which in Amhara ranged from 100 birr [£0.55^{[footnote 92]}] (for a middle-aged person weeding the fields of wealthier farmers) to 250 birr [£1.38^{[footnote 93]}] (for a young person carrying out other hard labour).^{[footnote 94]}

8.3 Urban Productive Safety Net Project (UPSNP)

8.3.1 Regarding the Urban Productive Safety Net Project (UPSNP) the ILO 2021 report observed that UPSNP is part of a ten-year national strategy to improve the livelihoods of poor urban households and establish long-term safety net systems. Currently operating in 11 major cities, including Addis Ababa, it supports around 600,000 beneficiaries, with plans to expand to over 4.7 million people across 972 urban areas. The programme includes a public works component that employs vulnerable individuals in community infrastructure and environmental projects, and a direct support component offering unconditional cash transfers to households without able-bodied workers. Additionally, the destitute sub-programme provides financial and in-kind assistance such as shelter, healthcare, and vocational training to people living in extreme urban poverty. ^{[footnote 95]}

8.3.2 According to a 14 January 2025 WB feature story the UPSNJP operates in 88 cities across Ethiopia, reaching 1.7 million people with a range of support services aimed at promoting economic and social inclusion for the urban poor, including the destitute and internally displaced. A key feature is its apprenticeship programme, which has connected over 60,000 youth with paid jobs in private firms. Beneficiaries of the public works component are selected through community targeting and Poverty Means Testing, which assesses household economic status. Most participants are women with limited education and employment prospects, who receive temporary work for up to 36 months along with training in financial literacy, business, life skills, and technical areas aligned with their business plans. Upon completion, they are provided with a one-time startup grant and continued coaching to support their ventures.^{[footnote 96]}

8.4 School feeding programme

8.4.1 The ILO 2021 report noted:

‘The GoE is taking different initiatives aiming at supporting the most vulnerable segment of society. One of such initiatives is the promotion of school feeding and provision of scholastic materials, especially in urban areas such as Addis Ababa. The city administration school-feeding programme targets some 300,000 primary school students — up to grade eight — who are benefiting from the free school feeding programme. The programme has created jobs for a considerable number of mothers and parents of students in Addis Ababa.’^{[footnote 97]}

8.4.2 The FDRE MoE 2024 Education Abstract report noted:

‘School Feeding Program (SFP) has been officially launched in Ethiopia in 1994 with an initial pilot project covering 40 schools in Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Oromia regions. It was implemented as an important safety net for expanding children’s access to education and to ensure equity of Primary and Middle school children (Grades 1 to 8) in food insecure districts. Currently, Ethiopia is implementing a large-scale national school feeding program targeting all regions of the country. The program targets the government’s Pre-Primary and Primary schools. In 2022/2023 academic year, 6.9 million Pre-Primary and Primary school children have received school meal services. The number of students reached has almost tripled when compared with a year before due to the start of an extensive school feeding program in Oromia region in 2022 that reached over 5 million children.’^{[footnote 98]}

8.5 Social Health Insurance Schemes

8.5.1 For information on health insurance see section Health insurance.

9. Security situation

9.1 Political violence - incidents and fatalities

9.1.5 The German Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (BAMF), country report April 2024 noted:

‘While many ethnic groups remained excluded from decision-making processes due to the previous dominance of the EPRDF, Prime Minister Abiy’s political reforms led to more freedom of expression, with the result that while open discourse was increasingly possible, this was also used to fuel and polarise ethnic conflicts. In many parts of the country, this dynamic, together with a rapidly growing population, has led to conflicts and divisions over land ownership, boundary issues and political representation, which resulted in several ethnic groups demanding more autonomy.’^{[footnote 99]}

9.1.2 The Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), a US registered non-government organisation, is an independent, impartial global monitor that collects, analyses, and maps data on conflict and protest. ACLED provides detailed information to help identify, understand, and track patterns and trends in conflict and crisis situations around the world.’^{[footnote 100]}

9.1.3 With respect to methodology ACLED noted:

‘The fundamental unit of observation in ACLED is the event. Events involve designated actors — e.g., a named rebel group, a militia, or state forces. They occur at a specific named location (identified by name and geographic coordinates) and on a specific day … ACLED currently records six event types and 25 sub-event types, both violent and non-violent. Sub-event types are also categorized by three overarching disorder types to facilitate analysis: Political violence, Demonstrations, and Strategic developments …

‘Both event types and sub-event types are hierarchical to accommodate concurrent tactics within the same event, to avoid double-counting … This means that an airstrike (individually recorded as an Explosions/Remote violence event) occurring within the same context as a ground battle would be recorded as one Battles event. Likewise, an attack on a civilian (individually recorded as a Violence against civilians event) occurring within the same context as a remote explosive detonation (individually recorded as an Explosions/Remote violence event) would be recorded as one Explosions/Remote violence event. A similar structure holds for sub-event types. Ground shelling occurring simultaneously as an airstrike would be recorded as an Air/drone strike event, as it is higher on the hierarchy than the Shelling/artillery/missile attack sub-event type. Likewise, a civilian abducted and then killed would be recorded with the Attack sub-event type because it is higher on the hierarchy than the Abduction/forced disappearance sub-event type. [For information on the hierarchical order of event types and sub-event types see ACLED methodology (Table 2].’^{[footnote 101]}

9.1.4 ACLED has provided the following definitions:

Political violence events include battles, excessive force against protesters, mob violence, and explosions and remote violence
Protests include excessive force against civilians, protests with intervention and peaceful protests
Riots include violence demonstrations, mob violence
Violence against civilians include sexual violence, attack, and abductions/forced disappearance.^{[footnote 102]}

9.1.5 Between October 2024 and September 2025 ACLED recorded 2,088 political violence events consisting of 1, 432 (68.6%) battles, 532 (25.0%) violence against civilians, 117 (5.6%) explosions /remote violence and 17 (0.8%) riots and protests. During the same period ACLED documented 5,981 fatalities resulting from the political violence events which 4,138 (69.2%) resulted from battles, 1,247 (20.8%) from violence against civilians, 587 (9.8%) from explosions and remote violence and 9 (0.2%) from riots and protests were.^{[footnote 103]} The below table based on the ACLED data shows political violence event type and resulting fatalities for the period under review:

Event type	Events: count	Events: As % of total	Fatalities: count	Fatalities: As % of total
Battles	1,432	68.6%	4,138	69.2%
Violence against civilians	522	25.0%	1,247	20.8%
Explosions/Remote violence	117	5.6%	587	9.8%
Protests	9	0.4%	5	0.1%
Riots	8	0.4%	4	0.1%
Total	2,088	100.0%	5,981	100.0%

9.1.6 The ACLED data indicated that the vast majority of the events and fatalities occurred Amhara and Oromia. Of the total political violence events documented 1,331 (63.7%) were in Amhara and 570 (27.3%) in Oromia. And out of the 5,981 fatalities documented 4,317 (72.2%) were in Amhara and 1,284 (21.5%) in Oromia.^{[footnote 104]}

9.1.7 The below table based on the ACLED data shows political violence events and fatalities in each of Ethiopia’s regions between October 2024 and September 2025:

Political violence: October 2024 to September 2025

Region	Events	Fatalities
Amhara	1,331	4,317
Oromia	570	1,284
Tigray	49	90
South Ethiopia Region	43	84
Benishangul/Gumuz	32	61
Gambella	26	50
Somali	14	34
Afar	9	30
Central Ethiopia	8	18
Addis Ababa	3	10
South West	2	2
Dire Dawa	1	1
Total	2,088	5,981

9.1.8 Between 8 August and 5 September 2025 ACLED document 246 political violence events (184 battles, 57 violence against civilians) and 641 fatalities (525 from battles, 104 from violence against civilians, 13 from explosions and remote violence, 1 from protests) in 8 regions. However, the majority the events and fatalities occurred in Amhara (70.3% and 77.9%) respectively. Oromia was distant second with 20.3% of political violence events and 18.0% of fatalities. The remaining 6 regions contributed 9.4% of the political events and 4.1% of the fatalities.^{[footnote 105]}

9.1.9 The below table based on ACLED shows the regional distribution of political violence events and fatalities:

Political violence 8 August to 5 September 2025

Region	Events: count	Events: As %	Fatalities: count	Fatalities: As %
Amhara	173	70.3%	501	77.9%
Oromia	50	20.3%	116	18.0%
Tigray	11	4.5%	6	0.9%
Afar	3	1.2%	4	0.6%
Benishangul- Gumuz	3	1.2%	11	1.7%
South Ethiopia	3	1.2%	0
Somali	2	0.8%	4	0.6%
Addis Ababa	1	0.4%	1	0.2%
Total	246	100.0%	643	100.0%

9.1.10 A 30 July 2025 ACLED update noted that ACLED introduced five new conflict categories in July 2025 to provide clearer analysis of modern conflict dynamics by grouping thousands of incidents into broader patterns using consistent criteria, applied to events from 2020 onward. These categories are: repression (state violence against civilians and protesters), insurgency (sustained rebel activity such as battles, bombings, abductions, and looting), atrocities (deliberate large-scale civilian killings often linked to displacement and humanitarian crises), terrorism (defined by tactics and not ideology focused on groups that consistently target civilians more than others), and foreign military engagement (state violence across borders, including invasions, airstrikes, and cross-border clashes).^{[footnote 106]}

9.1.11 CPIT has collated the ACLED data using the new categories and produced the below table: o highlight attacks on civilians

Region	Repression: events	Repression: fatalities	Insurgency: events	Insurgency: fatalities	Terrorist activity: events	Terrorist activity: fatalities	Atrocities: events	Atrocities: fatalities
Amhara	117	795	7	21	33	17	31	556
Oromia	79	150	385	821	24	31	6	114
Tigray	6	13	10	9	5	3	1	18
Benishangul-Gumuz	-	-	14	52	1	-	2	28
South Ethiopia	5	5	12	18	-	-	-	-
Central Ethiopia	4	2	2	5	-	-	-	-
Dire Dawa	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Somali	5		3	-	1	6	-	-
Addis Ababa	1	1	8	1	1	-	-	-
Sidama	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
South West	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	20
Afar	-	-	2	8	-	-	-	-
Gambella	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-
Harari	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Total	219	967	445	935	65	57	41	736

9.5 Benishangul-Gumuz

9.5.1 A January 2025 report by the Rift Valley Institute, an independent, non-profit research and training^{[footnote 107]} which analysed conflict trends in Benishangul-Gumuz since 2018 (RVI 2025 report) noted:

‘Benishangul–Gumuz Regional State (BRGS) was created when the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia’s constitution was enacted in 1995. It is situated in western Ethiopia, bordered by Sudan to its west, Amhara region to the north and northeast, Oromia to the east and, according to its regional constitution, Gambella to the south. BGRS is an amalgamation of parts of the former provinces of Gojjam (forming Metekel zone; the rest became part of Amhara) and Wollega (Kamashi zone; the remainder went into Oromia). Administratively, the region is divided into three zones, Metekel, Assosa and Kamashi, and one special woreda, Mao Komo. Assosa town is the regional capital.

‘Officially, BGRS has five indigenous groups: Benishangul, Gumuz, Boro (formerly known as Shinasha), Mao and Komo. The regional constitution defines the Gumuz and Boro as indigenous to Metekel. They are early residents of the area, and were later joined by mainly Agew, Amhara and Oromo settlers, mostly from Gojjam and Wollega. The Benishangul, Mao and Komo people reside in Assosa zone although some live in Kamashi. The Gumuz also predominantly occupy Kamashi.’^{[footnote 108]}

9.5.2 The RVI 2025 report noted that since 2018 Benishangul-Gumuz has faced inter-ethnic and ethnonationalist violence, mainly between indigenous groups such as the Gumuz and settlers, particularly Amhara and Oromo, with armed groups including the Gumuz People’s Democratic Movement (GPDM), the Sudan-based Benishangul People’s Liberation Movement (BPLM), local Gumuz militias, the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA) in Kamashi, and the Fano militia in Metekel. While violence has decreased since mid-2022 due to peace and power-sharing efforts with groups like GPDM and BPLM, insecurity remains uneven: Metekel still experiences sporadic clashes and massacres, Kamashi is mostly stable except near Wollega and Mao Komo where the OLA is active, and some Gumuz insurgents continue attacks, looting, and armed resistance. In January 2024 a group of about 100 militants left a camp in Gilgel-Beles and returned to the forests with their weapons.^{[footnote 109]}

9.5.3 For details on political violence events and fatalities between October 2024 and September 2025 see section on Political violence- incidents and fatalities.

9.6 Gambella

9.6.1 Gambella is situated in southwestern Ethiopia and is bordered by South Sudan, Oromia, and the South West. It is administratively divided into four zones—Agnewak, Nuwer, Mezhenger, and Etang Special Zone—comprising 13 woredas. Its capital is also named Gambela. The region has five indigenous ethnic groups: Anywaa, Komo, Majanger, Nuer, and Opo, alongside other Ethiopian groups collectively referred to as ‘highlanders’ or Degenga. The Nuer and Anywaa are the largest ethnic communities. While Amharic is the official working language, Nuer, Anywaa, and Afaan Oromo are also commonly spoken.^{[footnote 110]}

9.6.2 On 28 February 2024, Addis Standard, an independent print and digital media outlet based in Addis Ababa that publishes in English, Afaan Oromoo, and Amharic^{[footnote 111]}, reported on findings from the Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC). According to the EHRC report (in Amharic), since May 2023, at least 138 people were killed and 113 injured in the Gambella region due to intercommunal clashes and attacks on refugees.^{[footnote 112]}

9.6.3 The EPO August 2024 observed that Gambella hosts an active anti-government insurgent group including the Gambella People’s Liberation Army (GPLA) which was founded in 2021 after Ethiopia’s national elections. Although the GPLA withdrawal from armed struggle in April 2023 and disarmed hundreds of its fighters, the region continues to face recurring violence driven by inter-ethnic, intra-ethnic, and indigenous–highlander tensions. Gambella is also affected by spillover conflict from South Sudan’s civil war, with Murle militias frequently carrying out cross-border raids and child abductions.^{[footnote 113]}

9.6.4 For details on political violence events and fatalities between October 2024 and September 2025 see section Political violence- incidents and fatalities.

9.7 Afar-Somali border conflict

9.7.1 The EPO 20 August 2024 report on the Afar–Somali border conflict noted that the dispute centres on three kebeles—Adaytu (Mille woreda), Undufo (Gewane woreda), and Gedamaytu (Amibara woreda) which are claimed by ethnic Somalis from the Issa clan but fall within Afar. Ethnic Somalis in these areas wish to join the Somali region, a move strongly opposed by Afar authorities. According to the report, since major clashes in 2021, violence has continued intermittently, with 31 armed clashes recorded between May 2022 and April 2024, often involving the regional special forces of both Afar and Somali. In March 2024, the Ethiopian Islamic Affairs Supreme Council launched new peace talks, which resulted in a ceasefire agreement on 18 April 2024, urging both regional governments to uphold the deal.^{[footnote 114]}

9.7.2 A 14 June 2024 press release stated that it had received reports of armed clashes, civilian casualties, and displacement along the Afar–Somali border. It noted that it had received multiple complaints detailing casualties, damage to property, and rising tensions that led to sporadic armed clashes. Regional administrative and security authorities in both Afar and Somali regions confirmed that these clashes involved regional security forces and resulted in civilian harm, including the displacement of local residents.^{[footnote 115]}

9.7.3 For information on political violence events and fatalities between October 2024 and September 2025 in Afar and Somali see section Political violence- incidents and fatalities.

9.8 Criminality

9.8.1 The ENACT Organised Crime Index assesses countries on a 1–10 scale for both criminality and resilience, drawing on over 200 expert assessments alongside quantitative and qualitative sources. Criminality scores are based on 15 illicit markets and 5 types of criminal actors, measuring factors such as scope, scale, value, reach, structure, and influence, with higher scores reflecting more severe criminality. Resilience scores are derived from 12 indicators across political, justice, economic, and social fields, with higher scores indicating stronger national capacity to counter organised crime.^{[footnote 116]} The 2023 (latest) Organised Crime Index scored Ethiopia 5.68 for criminality (including Criminal Markets: 6.07; Criminal Actors: 5.30) indicating moderate to high levels of organised crime. This was higher than the continental average of 5.25 which ranked 19th out of 54 African countries. On resilience Ethiopia scored 4.75 reflecting relatively limited capacity to counter organised crime effectively.^{[footnote 117]}

9.8.2 An October 2024 Danish Immigration Service (DIS) report on the security situation in Amhara, Oromia and Tigray region that was based on various sources including a fact-finding mission (DIS 2024 report) observed:

‘Since July 2023, the number of kidnappings for ransom has also increased in Oromia. According to the international researcher, the conflict has been going on for so long that many have become financially dependent on the conflict as a source of income, blurring the lines in Oromia between politically motivated armed struggle and financially motivated criminal activity, such as kidnappings for ransom …

‘Kidnapping for ransom has become a common tool by Fano members as a criminal activity to get financial support. They go from door to door and kidnap civilians and negotiate with relatives for their release, especially those who have business or wealthy relatives outside the country are targeted.’^{[footnote 118]}

9.8.3 For information of access to legal remedies and capacity of state to provide protection see Country policy and information note: actors of protection.

10. Food security

10.1 People in need

10.1.1 The October 2024 FAO Ethiopia country brief reported that about 15.8 million people were expected to need emergency food assistance during the July–September lean season, largely due to the effects of the 2023 drought in the north, as well as floods and intercommunal conflict that displaced communities and damaged livelihoods. While food security improved with the 2024 Meher (the main agricultural growing season from June to September) harvest, southern and southeastern pastoral areas were projected to experience worsening food insecurity between October and December because of forecasts of below-average rainfall^{[footnote 119]}’

10.1.2 According to Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWS NET), a US Agency for International Development (USAID) agency that provided early warning and analysis on acute food insecurity around the world^{[footnote 120]} September 2024 to January 2025 outlook, Ethiopia faced widespread acute food insecurity, with northern areas in Emergency (IPC Phase 4) or Crisis (IPC Phase 3), and much of the rest of the country in Crisis (Phase 3) or Stressed (Phase 2). The 2024 meher harvest was expected to ease conditions slightly, but Afar was projected to remain in Emergency due to low livestock holdings and poor rainfall prospects, while southern and southeastern pastoral areas were expected to stay in Crisis as livestock-based food and income remained inadequate.^{[footnote 121]}

10.1.3 On 22 April 2025 the WFP warned that more than 10 million people including 3 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) faced hunger and malnutrition. The report noted that 4.4 million pregnant and breastfeeding women and children were in need of treatment and that in parts of Somali, Oromia, Tigray and Afar child wasting had surpassed the 15% emergency threshold.^{[footnote 122]}

10.2 Cost of food

10.2.1 The Ethiopian Public Health Institute (EPHI), a national institution responsible for public health research, disease prevention, and health system strengthening in Ethiopia^{[footnote 123]}, publishes information on the Cost of a Healthy Diet (CoHD) defined as the least expensive combination of locally available items that meets Ethiopia’s Food-Based Dietary Guidelines based on ESS data.^{[footnote 124]} The January 2025 EPHI bulletin reported a 7% national increase in the Cost of a Healthy Diet (CoHD), rising from 88.4 ETB (£0.46^{[footnote 125]}) in Q3 2024 to 94.4 ETB (£0.50^{[footnote 126]}) in Q4 2024. All regions recorded increases, with Benishangul-Gumuz (+17%) and Afar (+10%) experiencing the sharpest rises. The Somali region had the highest CoHD at 118 ETB (£0.62^{[footnote 127]}), while SNNPR recorded the lowest at 84.8 ETB (£0.44^{[footnote 128]}). The source has produced below table showing cost of a healthy diet in different regions.

Region	(Q3 2024)	(Q4 2024)	% Change
Tigray	91.6	92.9	1.4
Afar	103.8	114.4	10.2
Amhara	89.2	97.0	8.8
Oromia	84.7	87.2	3.0
Somali	112.7	117.6	4.3
Ben-Gumuz	86.5	101.3	17.1
SNNPR	77.2	84.8	9.8
Gambella	106.4	115.5	8.5
Harari	96.0	97.5	1.5
Addis Ababa	97.1	102.6	5.7
Dire Dawa	97.6	104.1	6.6
National Average	88.4	94.4	7.0

^{[footnote 129]}

10.2.2 REACH is a humanitarian initiative that supports evidence-based planning and response in crisis-affected areas. In Ethiopia, REACH works in collaboration with international and national partners to collect and analyse data on displacement, vulnerability, and humanitarian needs.^{[footnote 130]} The March 2025 REACH humanitarian situation monitoring factsheet based on data collected in 27 zones 391 woredas and 781 Kebeles in Tigray, Amhara, Afar and Oromia found that poverty and violence were key stressors across contributing to food insecurity, loss of livelihoods, and reduced agricultural productivity. The report noted that the top 3 barriers to obtaining food mentioned by key informants (KIs) were affordability (87%), conflict (44%) and inadequate transportation or infrastructure (29%).^{[footnote 131]}

10.2.3 The May 2025 REACH Joint Market Monitoring Initiative (JMMI) factsheet (31 March–14 April) found that full basket prices fell in 8 of 10 regions, with the national average declining by 2% from March to April 2025, including a 2% drop in food basket prices. Nonetheless, sharp increases were recorded in Amhara (+15%), Afar (+11%), and Addis Ababa (+9%). Despite the monthly decline, the national median full basket price was still 17% higher than in April 2024.^{[footnote 132]}

10.2.4 On 14 April 2025 the Ethiopian Monitor, a digital news platform reporting on local and regional news reported that according to the Ethiopian Statistical Service’s March 2025 Consumer Price Index (CPI) update food inflation fell for the sixth consecutive month to 11.9% year-on-year from 29% a year earlier, though prices still rose 2.5% from February 2025, driven mainly by oils and fats (+7.5% monthly, +36.3% annually), non-alcoholic beverages and coffee (+6.4%), and milk, cheese, and eggs (+5.7%), with smaller rises in meat, fish, seafood, and other products.^{[footnote 133]}

10.2.5 For information on food security in Amhara and Tigray see Country policy and information note: Amhara and Amhara opposition groups and Country policy and information note: Tigrayans and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front

10.3 Assistance

10.3.1 The WFP Ethiopia annual report March 2025 highlighted a US$37.7 million [£28.1 million^{[footnote 134]}] gap critical food funding gap which significantly affected the ability to meet rising needs. According to the report assistance was prioritised to the most food-insecure populations, internally displaced persons (IDPs), returnees, and communities facing sudden shocks such as natural disasters and conflict. In the first quarter of 2025, 4.4 million people were targeted through food distributions and cash transfers.^{[footnote 135]}

10.3.2 The April 2025 WFP report noted that in the first quarter of 2025, WF provided food and nutrition assistance to over 3 million people in Ethiopia, delivering 80% rations to displaced and severely food-insecure populations and 60% rations to nearly one million refugees. During the same period, WFP treated 740,000 children and pregnant or breastfeeding women for malnutrition, distributed fresh food vouchers to 50,000 families, and supplied daily school meals to around 470,000 children each month, including 70,000 from refugee communities, with a focus on conflict-affected and food-insecure woredas in the north. In addition, WFP supported drought-prone areas in Oromia, Somali, and Southern regions by reaching more than 200,000 people with early warning messages and cash transfers to strengthen resilience and protect livelihoods.^{[footnote 136]}

10.3.3 The April 2025 WFP report identified key challenges in delivering food assistance in Ethiopia, including ongoing violence and insecurity in Amhara, rising criminality such as car hijackings, threats, and theft and funding shortfall.^{[footnote 137]}

11. Internally Displaced Persons

11.1.1 Between July and August 2024, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), through its Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM), carried out Site Assessment Round 37 and Village Assessment Survey Round 20 across ten regions and one contested area in Ethiopia. As of August 2024, around 1.9 million internally displaced persons (IDPs) were identified at 2,060 accessible sites—a 42% decrease since May 2024, mainly due to increased returns and the exclusion of Somali and Benishangul-Gumuz regions from the assessment. Conflict remained the main cause of displacement (82.1%), followed by social tension (8.6%) and drought (4.3%). The largest IDP populations were in Oromia and Tigray (each with about 39% of the total), followed by Amhara (8.7%). The Village Assessment Survey also recorded approximately 2.8 million returnees across 2,580 villages, with the highest numbers returning to Tigray (39.8%), Amhara (36.5%), Oromia (7.4%), and Afar (7.4%).^{[footnote 138]}

11.1.2 According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), there were an estimated 3.3 million IDPs and 2.5 million IDP returnees as of 31 January 2025. The main causes of internal displacement were conflict (69%), drought (16%), other climate factors (8%), social tensions (6%), and miscellaneous causes (less than 1%).^{[footnote 139]} The below table based on UNHCR data shows the regional distribution of IDPs and returnees:

Region	IDPs: numbers	IDPs: As %	IDP returnees: numbers	IDP: As % o
Tigray	878,325	26.6%	970,265	39.1%
Somali	1,093,745	33.1%	69,799	2.8%
Amhara	174,608	5.3%	951,931	38.3%
Oromia	881,984	26.7%	140,951	5.7%
Afar	81,791	2.5%	81,791	3.3%
Benishangul- Gumuz	74,697	2.3%	147,097	5.9%
Sidama	36,447	1.1%	20,937	0.8%
Central Ethiopia	49,262	1.5%	49,262	2.0%
Gambella	26,723	0.8%	23,307	0.9%
South West Ethiopia	6,891	0.1%	29,109	1.2%
Harari	2,220	0.1%	0	0.0%
Total	3,306,693	100.0%	2,484,449	100%

12. Health

12. Health care system

12.1.1 According to the April 2024 ILO report, Ethiopia’s health system is structured in three tiers: primary care through health centres, posts, and primary hospitals; secondary care through general hospitals that act as referral centres; and tertiary care through specialised hospitals. More than 40,000 health extension workers support community outreach. Most care is delivered by the public sector, though private facilities, currently 27% of the total are growing in demand. The system is decentralised, with the Ministry of Health coordinating at the federal level and providing support to Regional Health Bureaus and district (Woreda) Health Offices, which exercise significant autonomy.^{[footnote 140]}

12.1.2 The 2024 UNICEF report Ethiopia- National Health Budget Brief 2023/24 (UNICEF 2024 report) noted:

‘The primary health care units are at the first tier of the health service and are composed of health posts, health centres and primary hospitals. One health centre is connected to five satellite health posts and provides services to approximately 25,000 people, while primary hospitals offer inpatient and ambulatory services to about 100,000 people. Under the second tier of health care are general hospitals that serve as referral centres for primary hospitals and serve an average of 1 million people. They also serve as training centres for health officers, nurses and emergency surgeons. At the third tier are specialized hospitals, which provide services to populations of around 5 million and serve as referral centres for general hospitals.’^{[footnote 141]}

12.1.3 The July 2024 article by the Refugee Law Clinic, University of London, on access to mental health services noted (Refugee Law Clinic 2024):

‘Healthcare services in Ethiopia are provided by a mix of public and private providers. The private sector in Ethiopia also provides a broad array of health facilities and services, across all levels of care. This includes primary level facilities such as private pharmacies, health facilities, and primary healthcare clinics; secondary level facilities like private specialty clinics; and tertiary level facilities including private hospitals and specialty centres. The private for-profit sector primarily caters to wealthier income groups, suggesting cost is a barrier for many and private care is largely unaffordable for the poorest members of society. Overall, private sector healthcare in Ethiopia remains a relatively small part of the health sector as a whole and is not well integrated.’^{[footnote 142]}

12.2 Health insurance

12.2.1 The FDRE Ministry of Health (MoH) noted on its undated web page:

‘‘The Ethiopian Health Insurance Agency [EHIA] was established as an autonomous federal government organ through Regulation No. 191/2010 with the objective of implementing health insurance system in the country. The Agency has established 24 branch offices to implement the health insurance system all over the country.

‘The Agency is working on implementation of two types of health insurance systems in the country. The first type of health insurance system is Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI), which comprises the community engaged in the informal sectors of the economy.

‘The second type of health insurance system is Social Health Insurance (SHI), which comprises the population engaged in the formal sectors of the economy … preparatory activities are being finalized to commence implementation of SHI in Ethiopia …’^{[footnote 143]}

12.2.2 The April 2024 ILO report Protection in Action: Building Social Protection Floors for All (ILO April 2024 report) noted:

‘There are several social health protection schemes in Ethiopia aimed at facilitating access to health without financial hardship. In 2010, a proclamation to provide for social health insurance (N*690/2010) established the Ethiopia Health Insurance Service (EHIS, formerly known as the Ethiopia Health Insurance Agency or EHIA) to oversee and manage two types of public insurance schemes: the community-based health insurance (CBHI) scheme primarily for informal workers, and the social health insurance (SHI) scheme for public and formal sector workers. The CBHI was piloted in 13 woredas (districts) in 2011, and has been expanded since then, while preparatory activities are being finalized to commence the implementation of SHI, which has to date not been operational. Fee waivers exist for households identified living in extreme poverty, although these are being replaced by the CBHI contribution subsidy in the locations in which the scheme is being rolled out. Exemption schemes also exist for specific health conditions, covering HIV, maternity services, TB, and others. Finally, specific health services are also provided by the Refugee and Returnee Services and UNHCR for FDPs.’^{[footnote 144]}

12.2.3 The same source further observed:

‘As per the CBHI proclamation, the CBHI is targeted at “all sections of the society in the informal sector”, to complement the planned coverage of formal and public workers by the SHI. In practice, households with workers not registered with any other health insurance scheme are considered as eligible … By 2023, CBHI has been rolled out to 1004 woredas covering 43 percent of the total population of Ethiopia households, or 55 million individuals across 12.5 million households, representing some 43 percent of the population. Coverage has, however, varied significantly by region, with rapid progress being made in some while coverage continues to stagnate in others. Among those covered, some 80 percent are paying members, while the government subsidizes contributions for roughly a fifth of members, indicating that coverage of the subsidy is much higher than the official directive of the CBHI. Renewal rates stood at 90.5 percent in 2022 …^{[footnote 145]}

12.2.4 With respect to CBHI financing the ILO April 2024 report observed:

‘The scheme is financed by member contributions, along with subsidies from central and decentralized levels [of government]. Woredas have adapted the contribution rates to take account of local specificities, and the average contribution rate in 2020 stood at US$6.9 [£5.10^{[footnote 146]}] per household per year. In addition, the Federal Government provides a general subsidy covering a minimum of 25% of contributions for all contributing members, while the contributions of the targeted poorest households are fully subsidized.

‘In Addis Ababa, the contribution rate is set by the City Administration, currently at 1000 Ethiopian Birr [£5.40^{[footnote 147]}] per household, an additional 750 Ethiopian Birr [£4.05^{[footnote 148]}] for each dependent over age 18 in the household, while the Government contribution amounts to 1000 Ethiopian Birr [£5.40^{[footnote 149]}] per member household.’^{[footnote 150]}

12.2.5 According to the UNICEF 2024 report:

‘Around 87 per cent of woredas in the country had implemented CBHI by 2022/23. The number of woredas providing health care through CBHI increased from 894 in 2020/21 to 1,011 in 2022/23. In woredas that provide CBHI, around 12.1 million households (78 per cent of eligible households in the woredas) are enrolled in the scheme, of which 8 million are paying members. The remaining 2.08 million households (17.2 per cent) are indigents whose premiums are paid by the government. Although the number of woredas covered by CBHI is increasing, there is persisting disparity in membership among regions. The highest enrolment rates are observed in Harari, Amhara and Addis Ababa, and the lowest in Somali region. The enrolment for Tigray region is not reported due to data unavailability. HSDIP has a target of increasing the proportion of eligible households enrolled in CBHI from 81 per cent to 90 per cent by 2025/26.’^{[footnote 151]}

12.2.6 Regarding the CBHI benefits the ILO April 2024 report observed:

‘EHIS establishes at a federal level the minimum benefit package to be covered by CBHI, with minor amendments possible at the regional level. The benefit package offered under the CBHI … includes all curative and preventive care that are part of the essential health services package in Ethiopia … this includes outpatient medical service, admitted patient medical services, surgery, medical examination services ordered by medical professionals and generic drugs. The CBHI does not cover eye glass or contact lenses provision, plastic surgery for beautification purpose, transport expenses, organ transplants, substance withdrawal medications, dialysis treatment for chronic renal failure, non-generic medication treatments, or any medical treatment outside of Ethiopia.’^{[footnote 152]}

12.2.7 Regarding the impact of CBHI on health utilization, a 2024 article by Bayou and others of the School of Public Health, Wollo University, Ethiopia published BioMed Central (BMC), a UK-based open-access scientific publishing company that primarily publishes peer-reviewed journals in the fields of biology, medicine, and health sciences and that that was based on a systematic review and meta-analysis of 14 studies noted that:

health services utilization among CBHI members was 69.1%, compared to 50.9% for non-members
CBHI members were nearly three times more likely to use health services than their counterparts and
on average, CBHI users had 1.14 more visits to health facilities compared to non-insured individuals^{[footnote 153]}

12.3 Health facilities

12.3.1 According to a January 2024 US Government International Trade Administration report (USITA January 2024 report) Ethiopia had 17,534 health posts and 77 under construction, 3,597 health centres and 89 under construction, 3,643 hospitals and 57 under construction, 3,867 private clinics and 43 private hospitals.^{[footnote 154]}

12.3.2 The UNICEF 2024 report has produced a table reproduced below showing the number of functional health facilities in Ethiopia from 2020/21 to 2022/23

	2020/21	2021/22	2022/23
Health posts	17,699	17,457	17,569
Health centres	3,777	3,587	3,826
Public hospitals	367	343	431

^{[footnote 155]}

12.3.3 The March 2025 OCHA Humanitarian Data Exchange (OCHA HDX) data provided information on health facilities including names, location, type and ownership. Based on the OCHA HDX data.^{[footnote 156]}

12.3.4 CPIT has collated the OCHA HDX data produced the below tables showing both public and private health centres, health posts and hospitals in each region:

Public/Government

Region	Health Centres	Health Post	Hospital
Addis Ababa	98	1	10
Afar	93	332	10
Amhara	860	3,469	87
Benishangul -Gumuz	55	393	6
Dire Dawa	14	35	2
Gambella	22	104	2
Harari	10	28	5
Oromia	1,343	6,123	104
SNNP	478	2,454	54
Sidama	137	548	23
Somali	190	1,151	14
Southwest Ethiopia	128	778	12
Tigray	237	643	39
Total	3,665	16,059	368

Private for profit

Region	Health Centres	Health Post	Hospital
Addis Ababa	1	0	25
Afar	0	0	1
Amhara	1	0	13
Benishangul -Gumuz	0	0	0
Dire Dawa	0	0	7
Gambella	0	0	0
Harari	0	0	1
Oromia	4	0	21
SNNP	0	0	7
Sidama	0	0	9
Somali	0	1	1
Southwest Ethiopia	0	0	0
Tigray	1	0	15
Total	7	1	100

Private not for profit

Region	Health Centres	Health Post	Hospital
Addis Ababa	3	0	0
Afar	2	0	0
Amhara	0	0	0
Benishangul -Gumuz	2	0	0
Dire Dawa	0	0	0
Gambella	0	0	0
Harari	0	0	0
Oromia	3	1	1
SNNP	17	0	3
Sidama	0	0	0
Somali	0	0	0
Southwest Ethiopia	0	0	0
Tigray	1	0	1
Total	28	1	5

^{[footnote 157]}

12.3.5 Other health facilities in Ethiopia reported in by OCHA included 650 clinics, 1,491 pharmacies and 516 speciality clinics^{[footnote 158]} as shown in below table:

Ownership Category	Clinic	Pharmacy	Specialty Clinic
Government/Public	16	36	1
Private For-Profit	595	1450	514
Private Non-Profit	39	5	1
Total	650	1491	516

12.4 Accessibility

12.4.1 The USITA January 2024 report noted:

‘The Government of Ethiopia [GOE] is working to strengthen the healthcare system to align it with the Sustainable Development Goals. Ethiopia has a large, predominantly rural population with poor access to … health service. The government has made significant investments in the public health sector that have led to improvements in health outcomes. Nevertheless, communicable diseases like HIV/AIDS, TB, malaria, hepatitis B&C, respiratory infection, leprosy, and diarrhoea remain a serious challenge in Ethiopia. Premature death, suboptimal quality of life, and nutritional diseases constitute a major health challenge. With a growing middle class, the GOE is facing an increase in non-infectious diseases such as cancer, diabetes, heart diseases, and high blood pressure. Mental health and eye problems are also becoming major issues in Ethiopia.’^{[footnote 159]}

12.4.2 The 2024 UNICEF report stated:

‘The recent conflicts in the country, coupled with climate shocks, have created immense pressure on the health care system. Prior to these multiple shocks, the expansion of health facilities in both the rural and urban parts of the country had resulted in improved access to health services. However, the recent conflict has resulted in the complete or partial destruction of many health facilities in the conflict-affected regions. In addition to the conflict-affected regions of Tigray, Afar and Amhara, health facilities were also affected by internal conflicts in Oromia and Benishangul-Gumuz. Moreover, increased numbers of internally displaced people (IDPs) has severely affected the capacity of health facilities to provide needed services … As a result, the provision of basic health services, including primary health care services, immunization, nutrition interventions, as well as both preventive and curative hospital services, have been severely affected.’^{[footnote 160]}

12.4.3 A March 2024 report by Project Hope, a global health and humanitarian organization^{[footnote 161]}, noted:

‘Across conflict-affected areas in Ethiopia, the health system has been brought to a standstill. In Tigray, just 3% of all health facilities are fully functioning. In Amhara … more than 50% of the health facilities have been damaged and the area has been treating a surplus of patients. In Amhara and Oromia, violence has continued and caused significant strain on health facilities as hospital beds, medical equipment, pharmacies, and ambulances have been looted. Overcrowding among displaced communities and the lack of healthcare has led to measles, malaria, and cholera outbreaks.’^{[footnote 162]}

12.4.4 A study by researchers from Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia, the University of Queensland, Australia, and the International Institute for Primary Health Care, Ethiopia that reviewed 110 papers and was published in 2025 (Mengistu and others 2025) observed that while overall access to PHC has improved and may support progress toward universal health coverage (UHC), access to PHC services was still very limited in rural and regional areas leading to inequities in service readiness and availability. For example, in Somali region, up to 65% of the population lacked access to PHC centres with adequate health personnel. In addition, the distribution of PHC resources tended to favour wealthier and urban populations. Access to specialised services, such as palliative care, was also limited due to low prioritisation.^{[footnote 163]}

12.5 Therapeutic drugs

12.5.1 The USITA January 2024 report noted that Ethiopia is strengthening the Ethiopia Food and Drug Authority (EFDA) to enhance regulatory oversight of medicines, supplies, and equipment, with reforms aimed at eliminating registration backlogs, digitizing processes, and ensuring uninterrupted availability of essential drugs nationwide. Alongside this, the Ethiopia Pharmaceuticals Supplies Agency (EPSA), responsible for national procurement and distribution, has developed digital systems to improve inventory, fleet, and information management, expanded hub proximity to health facilities, and streamlined procurement to reduce lead times and improve commodity availability across the public health sector.^{[footnote 164]}

12.5.2 On 18 March 2025 WHO reported:

‘The Ethiopian Food and Drug Authority (EFDA) and the Ministry of Health, in collaboration with the World Health Organization Ethiopia country office and other key partners, has officially launched the 7th Edition of the Ethiopian Essential Medicines List (EML). This milestone underscores Ethiopia’s commitment to ensuring equitable access to safe, effective, and quality-assured medicines for all. The updated EML aligns with the 23rd WHO Model List of Essential Medicines and integrates the latest scientific evidence and global best practices to optimize medicine selection. It serves as a strategic tool for healthcare providers, policymakers, and procurement agencies, guiding the selection and rational use of medicines across the country.

‘This edition features an expansion of therapeutic categories, incorporating new medicines and dosage forms to meet Ethiopia’s evolving public health needs. It removes medicines with safety, efficacy, and cost concerns to enhance efficiency and effectiveness. Including WHO Access, Watch, Reserve (AWaRe) classification strengthens antimicrobial stewardship and combats antimicrobial resistance. Furthermore, the revision aligns with updated national and global clinical guidelines, ensuring evidence-based decision-making in medicine selection.’^{[footnote 165]}

12.5.3 For information on essential drugs list see EFDA Ethiopian Essential Medicines List 2024

12.6 Healthcare workers

12.6.1 The UNICEF 2024 report stated:

‘The number of health professionals is very low compared to the increasing population and the multiple health burdens in the country. The ratio of health workers to the population stands at only 22.2 per 10,000, which falls significantly short of the composite threshold ratio of 44.5 recommended by the World Health Organization (WHO) to ensure comprehensive coverage of essential health interventions and achieve [universal health care] UHC … Moreover, the count of physicians (comprising general practitioners and specialists) per 1,000 population remains alarmingly low at 0.17, behind the sub-Saharan average of 0.2 and lower than the average seen in lower middle-income countries, which stands at 0.7.’^{[footnote 166]}

12.6.2 The WHO data website has provided the following information in respect to density (per 10,000 population) of health care workers in Ethiopia:

Physicians: 1.4 in 2023 compared to 2.6 in Africa
Dentists: 0.3 in 2022 compared to 0.2 for Africa
Nursing and midwifery personnel: 12.2 in 2022 compared to 11.3 for Africa
Pharmaceutical personnel: 1.5 in 2023 compared to 0.4 for Africa^{[footnote 167]}

12.6.3 A study by researchers from Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia, the University of Queensland, Australia, and the International Institute for Primary Health Care, Ethiopia that reviewed 110 papers and was published in 2025 (Mengistu and others 2025) found that the distribution of the health workforce was highly uneven across regions, for instance, 95.4% of health centres in the Somali region were understaffed and especially lacked pharmacists and lab technicians. It also noted that health workers were concentrated in urban facilities`^{[footnote 168]}

12.7 Mental health

12.7.1 According to a June 2002 study by researchers from the University of Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the George Washington University, USA and Kings College London and published by the International Journal of Mental Health Systems (Girma and others, 2022) ‘There is widespread stigma and discrimination in Ethiopia which has contributed to under-utilization of available mental health services in the country.’^{[footnote 169]}

12.7.2 The Refugee Law Clinic article July 2024 noted:

‘When it comes to mental health, Ethiopia has made significant strides in recent years. The government has recognised the importance of mental health and has established a National Mental Health Strategy. The country has also trained many community-based mental health workers who provide basic services in rural areas. Unfortunately, access to care is still a problem. An estimated 90% of people with severe mental illnesses, such as schizophrenia and bipolar disorder, never received evidence-based care and less than 1% of those affected can access continuous care. … mental health services are largely provided by the government and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The government provides mental health services at the primary care level, as well as more specialised services at regional and national hospitals. There are also several NGOs and international organisations working to improve mental health provision in the country, such as the Ethiopian Psychiatric Association and the World Health Organization. WHO has commended Ethiopia’s efforts in implementing WHO Mental Health Gap Action Programme as well as WHO’s Comprehensive Mental Health Action Plan, citing it as a model for the region…

‘Some of the major mental health services provided in Ethiopia include counselling, psychotherapy, and medication management. The country also has several inpatient psychiatric facilities, as well as a national suicide prevention strategy. Notably, 11% of Ethiopia’s total disease burden is attributed to mental health disorders, affecting marginalised individuals often subject to stigma and discrimination. Aware of the importance of treatment for this group, the government has a plan to upscale integrated mental health care as crucial for enhancing health and development in the country.^{[footnote 170]}

12.7.3 However, the same source further noted:

‘Despite these advances, mental health provision in Ethiopia still faces many challenges. Stigma surrounding mental health remains a significant barrier to seeking treatment, particularly in rural areas. There are only 60 psychiatrists practicing in the public sector, with most located in the capital. Common beliefs about mental health conditions include that they are the result of the influence of malevolent spirits, perceived attacks by demonic forces, grief resulting from the loss of loved ones, economic hardship, excessive worrying, and substance abuse. Individuals with mental illness are often perceived as exhibiting aggressive and physically violent behaviour, thereby reinforcing fear and societal stigma.

‘Individuals encounter discrimination and social avoidance due to their mental health status …’^{[footnote 171]}

12.7.4 An August 2024 blog by the Borgen Project, a US based nonprofit organisation working to address poverty and hunger^{[footnote 172]} noted:

‘Ethiopia has been looking for ways to improve mental health for years. As recently as 2021, it had included mental health services in the health extension package but had not implemented any changes. The lack of any action was due to many factors. Some include “low political commitment, lack of resources, non-functional referral system, lack of interest from private health care organizations,” stigma within the culture and poor reporting…

‘One of the biggest factors is the stigma and discrimination of mental health issues in Ethiopia. A majority of the people in Ethiopia follow Ethiopian Orthodox Christianity. Some followers of this form of Christianity believe demonic possession is the cause of mental health issues, which could prevent people from speaking up on these issues …

‘The Federal Ministry of Health in Ethiopia along with the World Health Organization (WHO), European Union and Foundation have worked together to implement the Mental Health Gap Action Programme (mhGAP). This program aims to help low and middle-income countries scale up their mental health services …

‘The program has made some huge progress quickly. As of March 2023, a total of 1,230 general health care workers received training from mhGAP.’^{[footnote 173]}

12.7.5 Mengistu and others 2025 observed that while the quality and responsiveness of primary health care (PHC) services in Ethiopia have generally improved, especially in maternal and child health, mental health services declined.^{[footnote 174]}

13. Education

13.1 Structure and governance

13.1.1 According to UNICEF’s 2022 budget brief, Ethiopia Education Roadmap (2018–2030) which began full implementation in the 2022/23 academic year introduced a new structure of education consisting of 2 years of pre-primary education, followed by 6 years of primary school, 2 years of junior school, and 4 years of high school. Under this system, students are expected to sit for regional examinations at the end of grades 6 and 8, and a national higher education entrance exam at the end of grade 12.^{[footnote 175]}

13.1.2 UNICEF’s 2024 budget brief noted that Ethiopia’s education sector operates under a decentralized system, with regional governments responsible for managing general education. The Federal Ministry of Education is tasked with setting policies, issuing guidelines, and developing textbooks for both general and higher education. Meanwhile, the Ministry of Labour and Skills oversees Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET).^{[footnote 176]}

13.1.3 Under Article 24 of Ethiopia’s 2019 Refugee Proclamation, recognised refugees and asylum seekers are entitled to access pre-primary and primary education on equal terms with Ethiopian citizens. They may also access secondary, higher, technical, and vocational education, depending on the availability of resources and in accordance with national education policy.^{[footnote 177]}

13.1.4 The UNHCR’ help website for Ethiopia, no date noted that ‘refugees and asylum-seekers have the right to education according to the Ethiopian laws including pre-primary, primary, secondary education, higher education, technical and vocational training (TVET), adult education and non-formal education. According to the report ‘refugee and asylum-seeker children can approach RRS (Refugees and Returnees Service) or other education partners in their specific location for admission to schools.’^{[footnote 178]}

13.1.5 The EoEB noted that ‘Public education is free at primary, secondary, and tertiary levels.’^{[footnote 179]}

13.1.6 The UNICEF 2022 budget brief stated: ‘While children can attend public primary school without fees, households still spend about 1.1 per cent of their total household expenditure on the costs related to school attendance, while the cost of secondary school attendance can be four times higher. Indirect school costs, such as education materials and uniforms, become a heavy burden for poor households.’^{[footnote 180]}

13.1.7 A 2022 World Bank report highlighted that household out-of-pocket spending contributes approximately 15.3% of total education funding in Ethiopia. In public schools, households cover around 9% of costs, with a higher share at the primary level (14%). Nearly half of all household education spending goes to private schools, with pre-primary education accounting for 92% of that share. Education-related expenses represent about 6% of total household spending and 23% of per capita spending. While poorer households spend less overall, costs become a significant barrier as students advance to higher grades. Despite rising education costs, the main reasons children and youth remain out of school are concerns about education quality and perceptions that younger children are not yet ready to attend.^{[footnote 181]}

13.2 Facilities

13.2.1 The UNICEF Education report 2024 noted:

‘The number of primary and secondary schools has increased from 2021/22 onwards, but limited access to secondary schools remains a serious challenge. The decline in 2020/21 was due to the conflict that resulted in the closing down of schools in Tigray region. The Education Statistics Annual Abstract has not included information from Tigray region since 2020/21, due to the unavailability of data. In 2022/23, there were 37,051 primary and 3,733 secondary schools in the country, excluding Tigray. The number of primary and secondary schools has increased by 1.5 and 2.7 per cent, respectively, from 2022/23. The lower number of secondary schools is a challenge, as children finishing primary school are not able to continue their education due to limited access to secondary schools, especially in rural areas. [Education Strategic Development Plan] ESDP VI recognizes this need and has tried to address the issue in its five-year strategic plan by increasing the share of budget allocated for secondary education from 26 per cent to 35 per cent.’^{[footnote 182]}

13.2.2 According to the FDRE Ministry of Education 2024 Education Abstract (FDRE MoE 2024 Abstract), in Ethiopia in 2023/24 Ethiopia had 55.981 education facilities comprising of 14,909 pre-primary schools (kindergartens) of which 66% were government owned, 37,310 primary and middle schools (91.2% government owned) and 3,762 secondary schools (88% government owned).^{[footnote 183]} CPIT has collated the date from the FDRE 2024 Education Abstract and produced below table showing the total number of schools in each of Ethiopia’s regions:

Government schools

Region	Pre-primary	Primary and middle	Secondary
Afar	13	774	54
Amhara	60	9,357	664
Oromia	9,511	13,925	1,253
Somali	19	2,018	242
Benishangul-Gumuz	4	595	91
South Ethiopia	11	2,363	312
Gambella	0	274	71
Harari	4	70	10
Addis Ababa	223	252	78
Dire Dawa	0	87	14
Sidama	0	1,053	99
South West Ethiopia	1	1,499	178
Central Ethiopia	11	1,759	274
Total	9,857	34,026	3,340

Private schools

Region	Pre-primary	Primary and middle	Secondary
Afar	52	51	2
Amhara	504	247	21
Oromia	2,192	1,390	116
Somali	73	108	30
Benishangul-Gumuz	44	17	2
South Ethiopia	333	210	24
Gambella	44	37	4
Harari	55	19	8
Addis Ababa	910	540	148
Dire Dawa	64	58	19
Sidama	301	281	23
South West Ethiopia	119	52	4
Central Ethiopia	361	274	21
Total	5,052	3,284	422

Total

Region	Total
Afar	946
Amhara	10,853
Oromia	28,387
Somali	2490
Benishangul-Gumuz	753
South Ethiopia	3253
Gambella	430
Harari	166
Addis Ababa	2151
Dire Dawa	242
Sidama	1757
South West Ethiopia	1853
Central Ethiopia	2700
Total	55,981

^{[footnote 184]}

13.2.3 The Ethiopia Education Cluster, which is a coordination mechanism that brings together humanitarian and development partners to support education in emergencies (EiE) across the country^{[footnote 185]}, Ethiopia Education Cluster Monitoring Dashboard noted that some schools were damaged or closed due to conflict and climatic conditions. The same source has provided below data as of June 2025:

Impact	Conflict	Drought	Flooding	Landslide	Post-conflict	Windstorm	Total
Damaged	7,708	132	132	14	1,778	338	10,102
Closed	5,277	547	11	0	232	5	6,072
Used by armed forces	1.398	0	0	0	0	0	1.398
Used by IDP	29	0	0	0	82	6	117

^{[footnote 186]}

13.3 Basic education

13.3.1 The FDRE MoE 2024 Abstract provided key enrolment indicators, including Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER), Net Enrolment Rate (NER), Net Intake Rate (NIR), and Gender Parity Index (GPI). GER measures total enrolment at a specific education level as a percentage of the official school-age population for that level, regardless of age. NER reflects the enrolment of children within the official age range for a given education level as a percentage of the corresponding population. AIR (Apparent Intake Rate) calculates the percentage of new entrants in Grade 1, regardless of age, against the population of the official school-entry age. NIR focuses on new entrants in Grade 1 who are of the official entry age. GPI compares female to male values for a given indicator, highlighting gender balance in education access.^{[footnote 187]}

13.3.2 According to the FDRE MoE 2024 Abstract the national Gross Enrolment Ratio (GER) for pre-primary education was 57.8%, indicating that just over half of children in the official age group were enrolled. However, enrolment rates varied significantly across regions. Afar and Somali recorded the lowest GERs at 24.8% and 12.4% respectively, while Harari and Addis Ababa had the highest rates at 92.9% and 146.8%, the latter suggesting enrolment of children outside the official age range.^{[footnote 188]}

13.3.3 CPIT Has collated the enrolment data and produced below table shows pre-primary in each region:

Region	School population (4 to 6 years) (millions)	Enrolled: total (millions)	Enrolled: as % of school population	GER%: Male	GER%: Female	GER%: GPI
Afar	0.14	0.03	24.8	25.5	24.0	0.94
Amhara	1.59	0.88	55.5	55.2	55.8	1.01
Oromia	3.25	1.96	60.3	62.3	58.4	0.94
Somali	0.56	0.07	12.4	13.3	11.4	0.85
Benishangul-Gumuz	0.09	0.03	33.7	37.7	29.5	0.78
South Ethiopia	0.57	0.39	68.5	70.7	66.3	0.94
Gambella	0.04	0.02	60	62.4	57.7	0.92
Harari	0.02	0.02	92.9	96.6	89.0	0.92
Addis Ababa	0.23	0.33	146.8	148.8	144.7	0.97
Dire Dawa	0.03	0.02	67.2	68.1	66.4	0.98
Sidama	0.43	0.23	54	50.7	57.8	1.14
South West Ethiopia	0.33	0.11	32.8	33.9	31.6	0.93
Central Ethiopia	0.48	0.37	77.7	80.1	75.2	0.94
Total	7.75	4.47	57.8	58.8	56.7	0.96

^{[footnote 189]}

13.3.4 At the primary and middle school level FDRE MoE 2024 abstract reported a GER of 106.1% at the primary level and 67.9% at middle school, indicating that many students did not transition smoothly to middle school due to dropout or grade repetition. Regional disparities were significant, with Gambella showing the highest GER and Afar the lowest. The NER was 95.7% at primary level but dropped to 46.9% at middle school. Harari had the highest primary NER (115%) and Afar the lowest (56%), while Addis Ababa led at middle school (83.5%) and Afar and Somali had the lowest rates (12.7% and 14.0%).^{[footnote 190]}

13.3.5 The same source noted that at secondary level, enrolment was even lower, with a GER of 36% and NER of 27%, reflecting weak progression from earlier levels. Addis Ababa and Gambella performed best, while Afar and South West Ethiopia recorded the poorest outcomes.^{[footnote 191]}

13.3.6 CPIT has collated the data from the MoE Education Abstract and produced below table showings regional GER and NER at primary and middle schools:

Region	GRE(%): Primary	GRE(%): Middle	GRE(%): Secondary	NER(%): Primary	NER(%): Middle	NER(%): Secondary
Afar	69	25	14.4	56	13	10.4
Amhara	91	68	50.4	81	46	38.6
Oromia	120	68	28.7	110	27	21.6
Somali	84	28	33.9	68	14	20.4
Benishangul-Gumuz	116	66	40.2	89	24	26.1
South Ethiopia	115	82	34.3	103	56	24.4
Gambella	154	136	95.9	81	43	42.5
Harari	136	98	51.9	115	51	36.2
Addis Ababa	119	109	109.6	108	84	85.1
Dire Dawa	119	91	50.9	96	53	36.9
Sidama	103	71	28.9	99	61	22.3
South West Ethiopia	78	55	23.3	70	40	18.2
Central Ethiopia	103	87	32.8	98	68	27.5
National	106	68	36.6	96	47	27.3

^{[footnote 192]}

13.3.7 A January 2025 UNICEF report noted that 8 million children of which 49% were girls were out of school, mainly in Amhara, Oromia and Tigray primarily due to conflict. The report noted, without giving exact numbers, that conflict left millions of children out of school Amhara and caused more than 1.1 million in Oromia to drop out of school.^{[footnote 193]} The June 2025 Ethiopia Education Cluster update 8.35 million children were out of school in Ethiopia as of June 2025.^{[footnote 194]}

13.3.8 The FDRE MoE 2024 Abstract reported that the Gender Parity Index (GPI) was as follows as at 2023/2024:

Pre-primary – 0.96 against a target of 0.99
Primary - 0.93 against a target of 0.85
Middle school 1.03 against a target of 1.00
Secondary school 1.04 against a target of 0.91^{[footnote 195]}

The data indicates that girls outnumbered boys in school enrolment at Middle and Secondary school enrolment.

13.3.9 The below table based on FDRE MoE 2024 Abstract data shows the regional GPI against targets at all levels of schooling in 2023/24:

Region	Pre-primary (target 0.99)	Primary (target 0.85)	Middle (target 1)	Secondary (target 0.91)
Afar	0.94	0.83	0.78	0.74
Amhara	1.01	1.01	1.18	1.27
Oromia	0.94	0.9	0.95	0.9
Somali	0.85	0.78	0.79	0.79
Benishangul-Gumuz	0.78	0.83	0.87	0.97
South Ethiopia	0.94	0.93	1.01	0.91
Gambella	0.92	0.89	0.92	0.86
Harari	0.92	0.88	0.96	0.93
Addis Ababa	0.97	1	1.05	1.13
Dire Dawa	0.98	0.9	0.89	0.91
Sidama	1.14	1.15	1.3	1.14
South West Ethiopia	0.93	0.93	1.02	1.08
Central Ethiopia	0.94	0.93	1.03	1
National	0.96	0.93	1.03	1.04

^{[footnote 196]}

13.4 Higher education

13.4.1 The FDRE MoE website noted that that there are 46 public universities: 8 research universities, 17 universities of applied sciences and 21 comprehensive universities. In addition, the private sector has established 659 colleges of private higher education and 5 private universities^{[footnote 197]}.

13.4.2 According to the FDRE MoE 2024 Abstract 765,930 students were enrolled in tertiary education in 2023/24. Of these 64% were enrolled in government institutions and 36% in private institutions. Of the total students enrolled, 39% were female and 61% were male. However, 51% of students enrolled in private institutions were female.^{[footnote 198]}

13.4.3 An April 2021 news article by Capital, a private English newspaper in Ethiopia^{[footnote 199]}, stated:

‘… Cost-sharing scheme in Ethiopia was implemented in 2003 with the objectives of generating non-governmental revenue, expanding access, and improving equity and quality in higher education. Students under the scheme are expected to pay 15 percent of their tuition fee while the remaining 85 percent is sponsored by the government.

‘Students upon graduating under the scheme will start making payment within six months after graduation if earning income or within a minimum of one year after graduation in the form of graduate tax which is at least 10 percent of the monthly income. In the agreement, students are expected to pay all of their cost within a maximum of 15 years. Also if the student does not fully provide cost sharing documents, companies are expected to cut of 33 percent of their monthly income to the scheme …

‘Due to the decline of repayment rates last year, the ministry of higher education was planning to increase the cost sharing tuition fee from 15 percent to 30 percent in the current academic year, however due to the current situation in the country; the ministry did not follow through with the proposed increase.’^{[footnote 200]}

14. Housing and living conditions

14.1 Ownership

14.1.1 The 2021 article Sustainable and Inclusive Housing in Ethiopia: A Policy Assessment by Tadashi Matsumoto, an urban policy expert at Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) and Jonathan Crook an emeritus Professor of Business Economics at the University of Edinburgh Business School assessed the impact of Ethiopia’s national housing policy on affordability and urban development, based on desk research and a fact-finding mission conducted in Addis Ababa in July 2019 (Matsumoto and Crook 2021) noted:

‘Ethiopia’s housing policy has been characterised by public ownership of land and a predominantly government-led supply of housing … Proclamation Number 47, “Government Ownership of Urban Lands and Extra Houses”, formally defined government ownership of urban land, as was later enshrined in the 1995 Constitution.

‘Proclamation Number 47 also introduced three new typologies for government-supported housing that are still in place today: i) government-owned units rented at monthly rates above 100 Ethiopian birr (ETB) [£0.55^{[footnote 201]}], primarily destined for government officials and administered by the Federal Housing Corporation (FHC) (formerly the Agency for the Administration of Rental Houses); ii) kebele housing, inexpensive and often poor-quality government-owned units rented at monthly rates below 100 ETB [£0.55^{[footnote 202]}], and managed by the lowest level of government; iii) cooperative housing, whereby small groups of individuals (typically 10 to 20) register together as a cooperative group for land allocation to independently construct communal housing …’^{[footnote 203]}

14.1.2 The Centre for Affordable Housing Finance in Africa (CAHF), an independent non-profit think tank based in Johannesburg, publishes the Africa Housing Yearbook which provides a comprehensive overview of housing finance markets across 55 African countries, with a particular focus on affordable housing and access to finance for lower-income households.^{[footnote 204]} The CAHF Africa Housing Year Book 2024 (CAHF 2024 Yearbook) highlighted the following regarding housing in Ethiopia:

the housing stock comprises owner-occupied and rental houses totalling 19.4 million units across the country.
over 80% of the total housing units are owner occupied whereas 15% constitute rental
disparity in ownership between rural and urban areas: 95% (13.9 million) of units in rural areas are owned compared to 39% (1.8 million) units in urban areas
gender disparities in ownership: 32.2% of men own homes individually, compared to 14.7% of women. Joint ownership is higher among women (33.9%) than men (17.3%).
the rental market, though serving 60% of urban households, has been largely neglected
a new law introduced a two year rent cap from the start of a lease agreement and clearly defined tenant and landlord rights and responsibilities^{[footnote 205]}

14.1.3 The same source further observed:

‘An estimated 72% of the housing units in urban areas are constructed informally. Affordable but poorly constructed kebele rental houses constitute 20% of all the rental units in the country and 40% of the rental units in the capital city. Backyard rental is also common: 19% of households in the cities of Adama [in Oromia], Addis Ababa and Mekele [Tigray] rent out a unit … From the estimated half a million rental units in urban areas, an estimated 70,000 units are estimated to stay vacant. Interest in cooperative schemes has been growing. In 2023, the Addis Ababa city administration organised willing individuals who had been waiting for IHDP houses into 54 housing cooperatives consisting of 4,500 members with a total capital raised of Br [ETB] 4 billion (US$69.2 million) [£ 21.6 million^{[footnote 206]}] and allocated 27ha [hectare] of land for the project.

‘Formal housing constructed by the private sector, including cooperatives, constitutes 18.3% of the overall housing in the country … Ethiopia allocates a minimum plot size for housing. In cities such as Addis Ababa, the minimum plot size is 75m2 whereas in Adama it is 105m2.’^{[footnote 207]}

14.2 Housing needs and availability

14.2.1 The CAHF 2024 Yearbook stated:

‘To scale up the supply of affordable housing, the government has recently reversed its approach to public private partnerships and aims to construct between 80,000 to 100,000 housing units at a cost of Br [ETB] 470.6 billion (US$8.2 billion) [£2.54 billion^{[footnote 208]}]. Another planned intervention is the construction of affordable housing units for public servants living in Addis Ababa, with prices as low as Br [ETB] 14,285/m2 [£77^{[footnote 209]}] (US$247).’^{[footnote 210]}

14.2.2 The EHRC June 2024 report highlighted ongoing housing shortages in conflict-affected areas, Addis Ababa, and regional capitals, driven by population growth and displacement due to conflict. In Afar, rental prices rose sharply in towns like Semera, Logia, and Awash Sebat Kilo during 2023/2024. Similarly, towns in Oromia are strained by inflows of displaced people. Additionally, newly designated regional capitals are experiencing housing pressure due to rapid population increases.^{[footnote 211]}

14.3 Affordability

14.3.1 Matsumoto and Crook 2021 observed:

‘Housing and food costs alone account for 65% of annual expenditures for the average urban household in Ethiopia – a figure that rises to 80% for urban households in the first consumption quintile and only goes as low as 60% for households in the fifth quintile. Even with housing finance, only 3.5% of urban households are estimated to be able to afford the cheapest new housing unit (20m2) built by a formal developer or contractor, which would cost around 600,000 ETB … [£3,240^{[footnote 212]}]’’^{[footnote 213]}

14.3.2 The CAHF 2024 Yearbook noted:

‘The socioeconomic condition of most households limits their ability to own or rent a house. The latest available figure shows an unemployment rate of 3.5%, but an estimated 85.2% of the population works in the informal economy and this has had the effect of curtailing access to mortgages. Despite economic growth, poverty has not been significantly reduced and inequality is rising. Income inequality as measured by the Gini coefficient is 35 (33.2 in 2010). The cost of living also limits investment in housing, with 80% of households spending 54% of their income on “food and non-alcoholic beverages”

‘Against the backdrop of poverty, high unemployment, rising expenses and inequality, housing has become increasingly unaffordable. The latest available figures show that the cheapest 20m2 house, priced at Br 600,000 … [£3,240^{[footnote 214]}], remains unaffordable for over 95% of urban households. Despite the impracticality of using a 30% threshold to assess the affordability of housing, studies show that more than 41.3% of IHDP beneficiaries use more than 30% of their income for mortgage payments. The effect is highly pronounced on women, the disabled, and people working in the informal sector with irregular income and weak connections with financially stable relatives or friends who could provide support.’^{[footnote 215]}

14.3.3 The same source further observed:

‘… Because of the unaffordability of owning a house many Ethiopians either rent (as observed in rental occupancy being at 60%) or squat illegally. However, the rental market has not been affordable. Tenants spend 65% of their average Br 8,883 (US$154.7) [£48^{[footnote 216]}] salary on housing. In light of this, the government has subsidised rentals for employers in public institutions and a number of universities. The government also provides kebele rental units which are intended for the lower end of the market, with the price hovering at approximately Br20 (US$0.34) [£0.11^{[footnote 217]}] a month.’^{[footnote 218]}

14.4 Land and cost of construction

14.4.1 Matsumoto and Crook 2021 observed:

‘… The increasing liberalisation of the housing market was marked by the removal of subsidies on the sale of building materials and the setting of interest rates for housing construction at market rates (Regulation Number 3/1994). Subsidised interest rates were also removed after 1991, which significantly increased lending rates, from 4.5% for cooperatives and 7.5% for individuals to 16% for both, presenting an obstacle for low-income households to secure a home loan…’^{[footnote 219]}

14.4.2 The CAHF 2023 Yearbook stated:

‘Land administration is divided between municipalities (for urban land) and regional governments (for rural land). The state also holds most of the land and is heavily involved in land production and housing development. It readily expropriates land, including in per-urban areas in cities and towns for urban development. Land is released to the private sector by the national government, city administrations and municipal government through auctions and administrative allotment. Leases are granted to new owners for as much as 99 years … Land is a key constraint to housing supply in the country. Its production for development is slow, inefficient and non-transparent and has stifled the development of a vibrant primary and secondary land and housing market because it does not meet demand … Informal land development is an inevitable consequence of this restricted supply with mushrooming peri-urban informal settlements. This high demand also means the cost of land in the informal market is up to four times the cost of land produced in the state housing scheme. ^{[footnote 220]}

14.4.3 The CAHF 2024 Yearbook observed:

‘Land is sold for a maximum price of Br470,000/m2 (US$8188) [£2,538^{[footnote 221]}] and a minimum price of Br20,000 (US$348.4) [£108^{[footnote 222]}] depending on location.

‘Building a house in Ethiopia costs on average Br35,000/m2 (US$606) [£189^{[footnote 223]}], excluding the price of land … A house constructed by a real estate developer cost between Br40,000/m2 … [£216^{[footnote 224]}] and Br60 000/m2 …[£324^{[footnote 225]}] while the selling price could go as high as three times the cost of construction. The median national housing price is Br15.3 million … [£82,620^{[footnote 226]}] … There is also a 40% demand gap in formal land production, leading to skyrocketing property prices. However, lack of credit, internal instability, and rise in inflation has resulted in the real estate property selling price declining from Br120,000/m2 … to Br75,000/m2 … [£648 to £405^{[footnote 227]}]. In some cases, prices dropped further, to Br58,000/m2 in 2023 [£313^{[footnote 228]}] in (US$1,005) in 2023.’^{[footnote 229]}

14.5 Evictions and demolitions

14.5.1 The EHRC July 2024 report observed:

‘With regard to the right to adequate housing, in addition to the problems associated with house demolitions in the cities of Addis Ababa and Sheger city during 2023/24, there were also problems associated with the destruction of property … in areas that are or have been in conflict … In June and July 2023, Sheger City Council announced that up to 100,000 residents would be forced to leave the area as a result of the eviction process.’^{[footnote 230]}

14.5.2 The Summary of stakeholders’ submissions to UN Human Rights Council (HRC) as part of the universal periodic review of Ethiopia dated 26 August 2024 noted:

‘JS19 [Ethiopian Human Rights Council and International Federation for Human Rights joint submission] stated that since 2022, there had been widespread housing demolition and forced evictions in the newly established Sheger City of Oromia Region. People had been evicted without proper notice and in some instances, homes had been demolished before the residents had removed their belongings.

‘LHR [Lawyers for Human Rights, Addis Ababa (Ethiopia)] state that the Legetafo Legedadi City Administration had demolished about 3000 houses in an informal settlement without a proper alternative settlement plan and compensation.’^{[footnote 231]}

14.5.3 An April 2025 report by Amnesty International, based on investigations conducted between 17 January and 10 February 2025 including satellite imagery analysis, a survey of 47 homeowners affected, and interviews with eight victims and community leaders, found that the forced evictions linked to the Corridor Development Project (CDP), a project that authorities stated would link different development initiatives from late 2022 onwards, displaced large numbers of people and left millions more in affected cities fearful of being next. The CDP, approved by Addis Ababa’s highest executive council on 23 February 2024, has since been rolled out in major towns such as Arba Minch, Hawassa, Dessie, Jimma, Adama, and Jigjiga. In January 2025, the Minister of Urban and Infrastructure Development confirmed in parliament that 58 cities and urban centers are implementing CDPs. Media reports also document forced evictions in Jigjiga, where residents said they were removed from their shops without prior notice.^{[footnote 232]}

14.6 Living conditions

14.6.1 The CAHF 2024 yearbook noted that most housing in Ethiopia, whether rented or owned, is of poor quality, often built with mud, straw, or earth floors mixed with dung. Over 65% of all housing units are classified as slums. While infrastructure is improving, it still fails to reach most people: only 49.6% have access to basic water, 8.9% to basic sanitation, and 55% to electricity (as of 2022). Overall, about two-thirds of households (65%) have access to improved drinking water, but just 6% use improved sanitation. The majority rely on shared (9%), unimproved (53%), or no facilities at all (32%). Urban households are more likely to use improved sanitation (16% compared to 4% in rural areas) and nearly all urban households (93%) have electricity, versus only 26% nationwide. Ethiopia’s limited access to improved sanitation reflects a broader regional trend in sub-Saharan Africa, where only about 20% of the population has safely managed sanitation and 25% has access to basic sanitation.^{[footnote 233]}

14.6.2 The WHO April 2024 report noted that Ethiopia ranks among the lowest in Sub-Saharan Africa for access to clean drinking water and has one of the weakest drinking water infrastructures globally. Nationwide, about 31% of the population relies on unimproved water sources. In cholera-affected woredas, roughly 60% of residents lack access to safe drinking water and depend on untreated rivers and ponds. Overall, between 60% and 80% of communicable diseases in Ethiopia are linked to inadequate access to safe water, sanitation, and hygiene services.^{[footnote 234]}

14.6.3 According to undated UNICEF Ethiopia webpage only 7% of Ethiopians have access to basic sanitation services, with coverage as low as 4% in rural areas compared to 20% in urban areas. Open defecation remains widespread, practiced by 38% of the rural population and 7% of the urban population. An estimated 60% to 80% of health problems are linked to communicable diseases caused by unsafe water, poor hygiene, and inadequate waste disposal. Overall, 49.6% of the population has access to basic water supply, while just 4.8% has access to basic hygiene services.^{[footnote 235]}

14.6.4 The WB Ethiopia Data webpage, January 2025 observed that 55.5% of the population, (94.7% of urban population and 43.6% of rural population) had access to electricity as of 2024.^{[footnote 236]} A January 2025 WB report noted that despite a 94% electrification rate in urban areas approximately 60 million people - primarily in rural areas - still lacked access to electricity.^{[footnote 237]}

15. Freedom of movement

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.

15.1 Legal provision

15.1.1 The United States Department of State human rights report covering events in 2023 (USSD 2023 HR report) noted: ‘The law provided for freedom of internal movement, foreign travel, migration, and repatriation, and the government generally respected these rights.’^{[footnote 238]}

15.1.2 The GoN 2024 COI report noted that ‘minors always needed the consent of a parent or guardian to apply for passports and travel abroad … According to confidential sources, if minors travelled abroad unaccompanied, permission had to be obtained from the ICS, formerly known as the Immigration, Nationality and Vital Events Agency (INVEA).’^{[footnote 239]}

15.2 Exit

15.2.1 The immigration procedures – entry and exit - in Ethiopia are governed by the Immigration Proclamation No. 354/2003 2023^{[footnote 240]} as amended by the Immigration (Amended) Proclamation No. 1339 /2024.^{[footnote 241]}

15.2.2 Article 6 of the Immigration Proclamation No. 354/2003 states: ‘A person departing from Ethiopia shall possess: (1) a valid travel document; (2) unless otherwise permitted an entry visa which will enable him to enter the country of destination; (3) a health certificate, as may be necessary.’^{[footnote 242]}

15.2.3 Under the amended Article 7, individuals may be prohibited from leaving Ethiopia if a court issues an order in accordance with the law. Additionally, the Director General of the service has the authority to impose a temporary travel ban based on credible information from security or law enforcement agencies, or from the service itself, if it is believed that the person’s departure poses a serious and irreversible threat to national security or interests. However, such a ban must be reviewed and upheld by a competent court within three working days; otherwise, it will be lifted automatically.^{[footnote 243]}

15.2.4 The USSD 2023 HR report observed: ‘There were reports government security officials without a court order occasionally banned individuals from leaving the country.’^{[footnote 244]} The report gave an example the former head of the Amhara Special Forces, Brigadier General Tefera Mamo who was prevented from leaving in November 2022 but no examples of ordinary people being prevented from leaving.

15.3 Internal movement

15.3.1 The USSD 2023 HR report stated that the Ethiopian government imposed movement restrictions in areas affected by violence, including parts of Tigray, Amhara, Benishangul-Gumuz, and western Oromia. Federal and regional authorities established checkpoints on roads connecting these regions to the capital, which at times delayed humanitarian access. Throughout the year, movement into Addis Ababa was restricted by federal and Oromia regional police during public holidays and similar events due to security concerns. Media reports cited specific incidents, including restrictions on Tigray residents aged 16 to 70 at Alula Aba Nega Airport, and youth from the Amhara Region being turned back at checkpoints while travelling through Oromia. These restrictions reportedly affected various passengers, including those seeking medical care and Addis Ababa residents returning from business trips.^{[footnote 245]}

15.3.2 The 2024 DIS report highlighted concerns over movement restrictions and surveillance in Ethiopia, particularly targeting individuals of Amhara and Tigrayan origin. According to the report, authorities reportedly set up checkpoints to prevent Amharas from travelling to Addis Ababa, raising fears of ethnic profiling. In airport areas, especially Bole International Airport, individuals travelling to or from Tigray were subject to heightened security checks, including ID verification and background scrutiny, with surveillance extending beyond travel to monitoring personal interactions. While travel to and from Tigray was not formally banned, high-profile individuals, especially those linked to TPLF, were closely watched. The report also noted a rise in kidnappings for ransom, particularly targeting individuals with relatives abroad, which has led to a sharp decline in road travel. As a result, domestic flights have increased, with many opting to fly due to insecurity and fear of abduction.^{[footnote 246]}

15.3.3 The January 2024 Country of Origin Information Report by the Government of the Netherlands, based on findings from December 2022 to December 2023 (GoN 2024 report), reported increased checkpoints and stricter controls on roads leading into Addis Ababa and at regional borders, particularly between Oromia and Amhara. These measures were reportedly intended to prevent armed groups such as OLA and Fano from entering the capital. The report noted that these controls, along with ongoing insecurity in Amhara and Oromia, made travel from Amhara to Addis Ababa more difficult. It also stated that Ethiopian authorities were unable to ensure security in several areas, which the UN classified as ‘difficult to reach’. Under the state of emergency, military command posts had the authority to impose movement restrictions, including curfews and checkpoints in Amhara and Oromia. Access to current and former conflict zones remained limited for journalists and human rights observers, with large parts of Tigray, Oromia, and Amhara inaccessible to independent monitoring, including by the African Union.^{[footnote 247]}

15.4 Transport network - air, road and rail

15.4.1 According to the CIA Factbook as of 2023 Ethiopia had 58 airports.^{[footnote 248]}

15.4.2 The July 2023 Logistics Cluster Assessment in Ethiopia noted that Addis Ababa Bole International Airport serves the city of Addis Ababa. It is the main hub of Ethiopian Airlines, the national airline that serves destinations in Ethiopia and throughout the African continent, as well as offering nonstop service to Asia, Europe, and North and South America. Ethiopia airlines serves a network of 80 passenger destinations —19 of them domestic— and 23 freighter ones.^{[footnote 249]} The same source has provided the map below showing the airport network in Ethiopia.

15.4.3 The July 2024 Logistics Cluster assessment reported that Ethiopia’s road network grew from an estimated 144,024 km of all-weather roads in 2020 (about 41% of the country’s needs) to 180,000 km in 2022/23. Over the past 15 years, the government has prioritized road expansion, with the Ethiopian Roads Authority planning to build an additional 10,000 km at a cost of 41 billion Birr (£221 million^{[footnote 250]}). The federal road network is estimated at 41,000 km, including 4,400 bridges and 40,600 culverts. In addition, the government is implementing a US$2 billion National Logistics Development strategy to which aims to increase the total road coverage to 245,942 km, upgrade and strengthen 28,099 km of federal and regional roads, expand road maintenance coverage from 131,596 km to 808,662 km, and construct 3,000 km of roads dedicated to walking and cycling.^{[footnote 251]} The below map shows the road network in the country^{[footnote 252]}:

15.4.4 With respect to rail, a 2022 US International Trade Administration (USITA) report noted:

‘Ethiopia is aggressively working to develop an extensive rail network … The Ethiopian Railways Corporation (ERC) under the Ministry of Transport is mandated to create a modern nationwide railway network … ERC completed a 656 kilometer railway network construction project that links the capital city Addis Ababa to the port of Djibouti … The new rail system began commercial operations in 2018. Two Chinese companies operate and manage the $3.4 billion railway line through 2024 as local employees are trained to takeover in due course.

‘… The new electric railway reduces transport time from Djibouti to Modjo (a dry port city 70 kilometers from Addis Ababa) from 84 hours to just 10 hours.’^{[footnote 253]}

15.4.5 The July 2023 Ethiopia logistic assessment report noted that Ethiopia’s railway infrastructure primarily comprises a 750-kilometre line connecting the Port of Djibouti to Addis Ababa, traversing key urban centres such as Dire Dawa. According to the report, the government had ongoing plans to expand the national railway network, with proposed extensions linking Awash (Afar) to Weldiya (Amhara), Weldiya to Mekelle (Tigray), Modjo (Oromia) to Hawassa (Sidama), and Sebeta (Oromo) to Ambo (Oromia).^{[footnote 254]}

16. Returnees

16.1 Numbers

16.1.1 UK Home Office data indicated that from 2022 to the March 2025 a total of 262 Ethiopians were returned from the UK. Of this 5 (1.9%) were forcefully returned, 74 (28.2%0 voluntarily returned and 183 (69.8%) were refused at the port of entry and subsequently returned.^{[footnote 255]} CPIT has collated the data and produced the below table showing returnees by type between 2022 and March 2025:

Type of Return	2022	2023	2024	2025 (Q1)	Total	As % of total
Enforced return	0	3	1	1	5	1.9%
Voluntary return	31	22	20	1	74	28.2%
Refused entry at port and departed	20	12	94	57	183	69.8%
Grand Total	51	37	115	59	262	100.0%

16.1.2 A June 2023 report by the Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), a global network focused on data collection, research, analysis, and policy on mixed migration^{[footnote 256]}, based on a January 2023 survey of 504 respondents in Ethiopia, highlighted large-scale returns of Ethiopians from the Middle East, North Africa, and Eastern and Southern Africa in 2022. According to the report the majority of the repatriations were from Saudi Arabia where an estimated 500,000 Ethiopians had been forcibly repatriated since 2017. In Following a March 2022 agreement between the Ethiopian and Saudi governments, 100,000 Ethiopians were repatriated by the end of the year. In April 2023 deportations from Saudi Arabia reportedly stood at over 131,000.^{[footnote 257]}

16.1.3 On 1 April 2024 Africanews, a pan-African multilingual news network that provides comprehensive coverage of African and global news^{[footnote 258]} reported that Ethiopia would begin repatriating around 70,000 nationals from Saudi Arabia, starting in early April. This marked the third such initiative since 2018. The repatriation package included flight tickets, temporary accommodation in transition centres in Addis Ababa, and financial assistance to help returnees restart their lives.^{[footnote 259]}

16.1.4 According to Eurostat data updated on 10 April 2025, approximately 180 Ethiopians were returned from nine EU+ countries in 2024. The majority of the repatriation were from Sweden (105). Others were from Norway (20), Romania (15), Germany (15) and Netherlands (5).^{[footnote 260]}

16.2 Reception and assistance

16.2.1 A 2023 IOM report that evaluated the impact of IOM’s integration assistance for migrants in the horn of Africa noted: ‘The dominant interventions in the economic dimension were microbusiness assistance, Kaizen training [business trainings aimed at enabling returnees to start viable businesses] and cash advances, although assistance related to the other dimensions of reintegration (social and psychosocial) were also provided (including medical referrals, psychosocial referrals, housing assistance and TVET).’^{[footnote 261]}

16.2.2 The MMC June 2023 report noted that most returnees to Ethiopia had not received support upon their return, with only 38% (189 out of 504) reporting they had received any assistance. When broken down by type of return, 64% of assisted returnees reported receiving support, while 79% of forced returnees said they had not. Among those who did receive help, 61% received it from the government, 44% from NGOs, 5% from UN agencies, 1% from family or friends, and 11% were unsure of the source.^{[footnote 262]}

16.2.3 The same source produced a chart reproduced below that showed type of assistance or support returnees received:

^{[footnote 263]}

16.2.4 In 2018 Ethiopia’s Refugees and Returnees Service (RRS) signed a grant agreement with the Delegation of the European Union to Ethiopia (DEUE) to facilitate the sustainable reintegration of returnees from EU countries. The program provides 2 key types of support: post-arrival assistance which includes airport reception, transportation, emergency medical referrals, health screenings, and temporary access to food and shelter at transit centres and reintegration assistance which provides continued healthcare support, education support, awareness programs, job counselling and referrals, vocational training, and startup support such as tools, materials, and business guidance for micro-enterprises.^{[footnote 264]}

16.2.5 As of January 2025, the DEUE reported on its webpage that its reintegration project had supported over 210 returnees from EU+ countries and more than 41,540 returnees from Saudi Arabia (KSA). The project also completed 23 infrastructure initiatives, generating employment for over 1,300 returnees and local youth. Additionally, it facilitated the establishment of a returnee reception service desk at Bole International Airport (BIA), supported the government in developing and managing a central database for return and reintegration data, and helped set up a dedicated permanent office for returnee reintegration.^{[footnote 265]}

16.2.6 In respect to minors GoN 2024 COI report noted that although Ethiopia had state shelters for unaccompanied children, these lacked capacity and conditions were poor. Access to education was limited by the need for a birth certificate, while healthcare and psychological care were available only through private providers, with psychological support generally scarce despite high demand due to drought and conflict. Responsibility for the reception of unaccompanied minors, including returnees, lay with the Ministry of Women and Social Affairs, which had guidelines for long-term shelter since 2009; however, enforcement was weak, no case management system existed, and shelter quality was often inadequate, particularly in urban centres that were frequently full. Most reception services were short-term and aimed at family reunification, but many minors received the same minimal support as adults and often ended up homeless. Government orphanages, transit centres, private shelters, and NGO drop-in centres in Addis Ababa provided limited assistance, but demand far exceeded supply. Bright Star, a private facility supported by the International Organisation for Migration, was the only known provider of longer-term alternatives for returnees and other at-risk youth up to age 25. It offered up to six months of accommodation, professional training, clothing, and medical and psychological care. During the reporting period, Bright Star ran five houses with capacity for 160 young people and limited emergency shelter, with an additional facility under construction to support small business activities.^{[footnote 266]}

16.3 Treatment of returnees including failed asylum seekers

16.3.1 The DIS October 2024 report noted that little information is available on how failed asylum seekers from Europe are treated upon return, as most Ethiopians returning from abroad are labor migrants, particularly from the Middle East. Bole International Airport, considered critical national infrastructure, has reliable electricity and staff capacity to operate an electronic system for recording passenger arrivals. The extent of monitoring by federal authorities varied. Rejected asylum seekers were generally not of direct interest unless suspected of opposition links. In such cases, individuals were usually not detained on arrival unless they were well-known figures, but may later face informal follow-up, including questions about their identity, residence, and household members, often conducted by uniformed police. The Ethiopian Human Rights Commission (EHRC) had no evidence on whether Tigrayan returnees faced special monitoring, though it was previously reported that authorities kept lists of Ethiopians—particularly Tigrayans—abroad under suspicion or surveillance. Most of those who had fled to neighbouring countries had since returned, and in earlier years the EHRC received complaints of authorities preventing Ethiopians, including Tigrayans, from leaving the country.^{[footnote 267]}

16.3.2 A 2025 IOM report observed that: ‘Returning migrants, especially returnees with limited financial resources or requiring psychosocial support, are often subjected to stigmatization and struggle to reintegrate into some communities. Migrants also often return to weak economies with limited resources to facilitate successful socio-economic reintegration. A sense of shame and fear of stigma prevents returnees from accessing services further delaying their rehabilitation and reintegration.’^{[footnote 268]}

16.3.3 The UK Home Office Fact Finding Mission (FFM) in 2024 gathered information on the situation of Tigrayan returnees. A consultant noted that returning might not be safe, as the same government responsible for imprisoning many Tigrayans during the conflict remains in power, posing risks of renewed persecution or imprisonment. Returnees who left illegally could also face arrest.^{[footnote 269]} Kaibram Berhe of the Baytona Party cited one case of a deportee from the EU who was given the choice between forced military service or imprisonment and noted that most returnees were from Saudi Arabia some of whom were detained during the war while others while those returned under government-Saudi agreements were not. The Executive Member of the Arena Party indicated that returnees were often perceived as a threat to society.^{[footnote 270]} Civil Society Organisations reported that Tigrayans returned to face arrest and harassment, with documents being taken at the airport.^{[footnote 271]} A civil society advocate added that returnees may face numerous challenges, including lack of housing, difficulties reintegrating, harassment, confiscation of documents, theft, and in some cases sexual violence, although no specific instances were detailed.^{[footnote 272]} An expert noted that ordinary returnees may generally be safe, but individuals with visible political profiles such as those involved in demonstrations abroad could face problems, as Ethiopia is a high-security state and monitors activities of its diaspora.^{[footnote 273]}

17. Citizenship and documentation

17.1 Nationality

17.1.1 According to Article 6 of the Constitution anyone born to one or both Ethiopian parents is an Ethiopian national and Article 33 guarantees that no Ethiopian shall be deprived of their nationality against their will, and that marriage to a foreign national does not affect an Ethiopian’s nationality. Article 36 ensures every child’s right to a name and nationality.^{[footnote 274]}

17.1.2 Proclamation No. 378/2003 on Ethiopian Nationality establishes the legal framework for acquiring Ethiopian citizenship. Under Article 3, nationality is granted by descent if at least one parent is Ethiopian, and abandoned infants found in Ethiopia are presumed Ethiopian unless proven otherwise. Article 4 allows foreigners to acquire nationality through naturalisation in accordance with the law. Article 6 permits a foreign spouse of an Ethiopian citizen to acquire nationality through marriage. Article 7 provides that adopted children can obtain Ethiopian nationality if they are minors, reside with their Ethiopian adoptive parent(s), and the foreign adoptive parent gives written consent.^{[footnote 275]}

17.1.3 Proclamation No. 378/2003 on Ethiopian Nationality also specifies specific legal conditions under which Ethiopian nationality can be lost. Article 17 states that no Ethiopian may be deprived of nationality except through renunciation (Article 19) or acquisition of another nationality (Article 20). Under Article 20, voluntary acquisition of another nationality is considered voluntary renunciation of Ethiopian nationality. However, a dual national is still regarded solely as an Ethiopian national until Ethiopian nationality is officially lost. Article 21 clarifies that an individual’s loss of nationality does not affect their spouse or children.^{[footnote 276]}

17.2 Identity Cards (IDs)

17.2.1 Article 13 of Proclamation No. 378/2003 on Ethiopian Nationality states that all Ethiopian nationals who have reached the age of majority are entitled to a national identity card. Minor children are recorded on the national identity cards of their parents.^{[footnote 277]}

17.2.2 The Definition of powers, duty and organizational structure of Immigration, Nationality and Vital Events Agency Council of Ministers Regulation No. 449/2019 established the Immigration, Nationality and Vital Events Agency (INVEA) as the specialized body responsible for matters related to immigration, nationality, and vital events in Ethiopia.^{[footnote 278]}

17.2.3 The Government of the Netherlands ‘Country of origin information report’ February 2021 (GoN 2021 COI report) noted:

‘In accordance with the law under the current government, the Main Department for Immigration and Nationality Affairs (MDINA) and the Vital Events Registration Agency (VERA) have merged into one organisation, called the Immigration, Nationality and Vital Events Agency (INVEA). The INVEA was established following Proclamation No. 1097/2018 …

‘The INVEA is part of the Ministry of Peace that was established in 2019 but is under the control of the Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) … The INVEA oversees all documentation and registration in Ethiopia…’^{[footnote 279]}

17.3 Kebele card

17.3.1 The GoN 2021 COI report noted:

‘Ethiopia uses the kebele card as an identity card. According to a confidential source, kebele cards are still being requested at the kebele level. These requests are not handled by employees of INVEA but by employees of the kebele. Since the kebele card is obtainable by means of witness statements and is no more than a piece of paper with no biometric or other fraud-prevention features, the risk of forgery and fraud is high. There are also differences between the kebele cards. For example, different materials are used. Most cards are made of paper, but the capital Addis Abeba is said to issue a kebele card in credit card format. The different regional languages can be used on the kebele card. There are also differences in terms of the colour and the data specified on the card. According to the Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the bearer’s ethnicity was no longer being listed on new kebele cards at the end of 2019. When asked, a confidential source could not confirm this and indicated that there may still be kebeles that still record such data on the card.’^{[footnote 280]}

17.3.2 A March 2024 World Bank report that was based on a study that employed mixed methods of data collection conducted between January and July 2022 in Ethiopia (WB March 2024 report) observed: ‘The kebele ID is a paper-based identity document issued by kebeles, the lowest administrative unit in Ethiopia. While these IDs vary in design and content across kebeles, they serve as a de facto national ID for Ethiopia and are required to access many services and rights that require proof of identity or residence.’^{[footnote 281]}

17.3.3 The WB April 2024 report noted that Ethiopians are eligible for the kebele card from the age of eighteen. The required documents for obtaining the card are a birth certificate with tenants requiring attestation from a landlord.^{[footnote 282]} The same source noted that as of 2022 total ownership of kebele ID was 87% (95% men and 79% female). The reasons for not having a kebele ID were too far (9% men, 9% women), no documents (9% men, 27% women), too expensive (16% men, 22% women) not comfortable (0% men and 18% women), has other ID (32% men, 8% women) and doesn’t need it (21% men and 25% women).^{[footnote 283]}

17.3.4 With respect to usage, the GoN 2021 COI report observed:

‘… an Ethiopian citizen can use a kebele card to register as a voter, apply for a driving licence, open a bank account, buy a SIM card, apply for a passport in Ethiopia, apply for a tax number and register property. The Australian Ministry of Foreign Affairs writes in its August 2020 report that the kebele card is required, among other things, when applying for a passport and a driving licence. According to the World Bank, the kebele card is not officially required by national law, but some regions make it compulsory to have a valid kebele card. A confidential source notes that without a kebele card it is difficult to access basic services.’^{[footnote 284]}

17.3.5 WB March 2024 report observed:

‘The kebele ID is widely considered the most important ID in Ethiopia, confirming its status as a de facto foundational ID (prior to the introduction of Fayda) [see National ID (Fayda ID)) . [Focused group discussions] FGD participants felt that owning one ensures mobility and identification. They offered many examples of situations where the kebele ID is currently necessary: traveling domestically (for security checkpoints), collecting PSNP benefits, receiving aid in case of emergencies, and accessing banking and telecommunication services. KII subjects, too, felt that the kebele ID is essential for civic participation and financial empowerment in Ethiopia …

‘Not having a kebele ID presents challenges for a person … living in Ethiopia. Specific examples given by respondents of things that one cannot do without a kebele ID include the following: open a bank account, apply for a loan, buy land or a house, access public health care, complete one’s education, vote, run for public office, and get a passport to travel abroad legally …’^{[footnote 285]}

17.4 National ID (Fayda)

17.4.1 In 2023 Ethiopia enacted the Digital Identification Proclamation No. 1284/2023 which provided the legal framework for the digital ID system. Article 7 of the Proclamation states that all residents are entitled to a digital ID card.^{[footnote 286]} The Ethiopia National ID Program (NIDP), which is under the office of the Prime Minister, is responsible for issuing the Fayda.^{[footnote 287]}

17.4.2 According to an October 2024 report by Aratek, a global biometric and security technology company^{[footnote 288]}, Ethiopia launched the Fayda Digital ID system in 2021 to provide every citizen and legal resident with a unique, biometric-based ID number. The system aims to prevent identity fraud, improve service delivery, and enable secure access to public services (such as healthcare, education, and social programs) and private sector services like banking. Once registered, individuals can immediately use their Fayda ID to access these services. Registration is designed to be simple and inclusive, including for rural residents, and involves four steps: (1) pre-registration online or at government offices, (2) biometric enrolment via registration centres or mobile units, capturing fingerprints, facial photos, and iris scans, (3) verification of identity documents such as a birth certificate or kebele ID, and (4) issuance of a 12-digit Fayda ID number via SMS, with an optional physical card containing the number and a 2D barcode for offline use.^{[footnote 289]}

17.4.3 The GoN 2024 report noted that although the law mentions only demographic data, applicants for a digital national ID are generally required to present a kebele ID and/or a birth certificate. Reports also note that the digital ID is not compulsory, and citizens may continue using the existing kebele-issued identity cards.^{[footnote 290]}

17.4.4 In December 2024, Capital Market Ethiopia reported that the National Bank of Ethiopia (NBE) has mandated the use of Fayda, for all banking activities nationwide. Starting 1 January 2025, customers in Addis Ababa were required to present a Fayda ID to access banking services. The requirement will expand to major cities by 1 July 2025, by 1 January 2026 it will apply across the country and by 31 December 2026, all existing account holders must link their accounts to their Fayda ID.^{[footnote 291]}

17.4.5 On 29 April 2025 Capital Market Ethiopia reported: ‘Starting June 1, 2025, the Fayda digital ID will become a prerequisite for all Ethiopian passport services. This move is part of a broader government strategy to unify and modernize service delivery through digital identity, making the Fayda ID the foundation for accessing a range of public services. Applicants without a Fayda ID will not be able to apply for new passports or renew existing ones from this date.’^{[footnote 292]}

17.4.6 According to a November 2023 IOM report, Ethiopia’s National Identification Program (NIDP) aims to provide digital IDs to 90 million citizens and residents by 2026.^{[footnote 293]} The WB March 2024 report noted that ‘Fayda’, which means ‘value’ in many local languages aims to register the entire resident population of Ethiopia by 2027.^{[footnote 294]} According to the National Identity (NID) online tracker as of 11 August 2025, a total of 21,677,555 people had registered for a Fayda.^{[footnote 295]}

17.5 Birth certificates

17.5.1 The GoN 2021 COI report observed:

‘In order to obtain a birth certificate, the birth of an Ethiopian citizen must be registered … a law passed in 2012 prescribes that all births must be registered. An amendment to the law confirmed this in 2017 and, like the 2012 law, obliges a child to be registered within ninety days of its birth. Events such as births, marriages and deaths that are not registered legally or in accordance with customary practices can be registered if supporting evidence is provided, the amendment states. … In this reporting period reference was also made to registrations after the fact, because they took place at least one year after the vital event, such as the birth of a child.’^{[footnote 296]}

17.5.2 The US Department of State human rights report covering events in 2023 (USSD 2023 HR report) noted:

‘A child’s citizenship derived from the child’s parents. The law required registration for children at birth. Children born in hospitals were registered; most of those born outside of hospitals were not. The overwhelming majority of children, particularly in rural areas, were born at home. The government continued a campaign initiated in 2017 to increase birth registrations by advising that failure to register would result in denial of public services. The African Report on Child Wellbeing 2020, published by the African Child Policy Forum, found birth registration was only 3 percent, making it difficult to determine girls’ ages, and therefore to initiate legal action against perpetrators of sexual abuse and child marriage.’^{[footnote 297]}

17.5.3 A September 2023 report by the Committee for the Rights of the Child (CRC) noted that the Ethiopian Proclamation No. 1049/2017 requires parents to register a child’s birth within 90 days. Registration is free, though most regional states charge a fee for issuing a certificate, with refugees exempt. Late registration may result in up to six months’ imprisonment or a fine of up to 5,000 Birr (£27.65^{[footnote 298]}). Registration is carried out by the parents, or if absent, by a guardian or caretaker. Required documents include the parents’ IDs, the child’s name, and usually the physical presence of both parents. The Civil Registration Office records details about the child as well as information on the mother and father. The report further noted that according to UNICEF Ethiopia had one of the lowest civil registration rates in 2019, with only 3% of children under five registered. However, between July 2022 and June 2023 birth registration for children under one increased to over 1 million (40% of estimated live births, excluding Tigray).^{[footnote 299]}

17.5.4 According to the U.S. Department of State (Visa: Reciprocity and Civil Documents by Country – Ethiopia, accessed 2 June 2025), birth certificates are available only to individuals born in Ethiopia and are issued by the Vital Events Statistics Registration Agency (VERA) for a fee of 200 Birr (about £1.11^{[footnote 300]}). Births are registered at the district level. For children under 18, parents may register the birth by presenting supporting documents such as a hospital birth certificate, baptismal certificate, or school record. For those over 18, one of these documents plus an identity card is required. Certified copies can be obtained. Individuals living abroad who have not changed citizenship may authorize a family member to obtain the certificate on their behalf with a Power of Attorney. Former Ethiopians who have acquired new citizenship must also provide a copy of their passport, visa, or residence permit in addition to the required documents.^{[footnote 301]}

17.6 Marriage certificates

17.6.1 The DIS 2018 report noted with respect to marriage certificates: ‘Regarding marriage certificates, VERA would issue a marriage certificate when married couples have celebrated the marriage at a sharia court or at church. A court can decide whether a person is/has been married, which is based on affidavits that would serve as proof.’^{[footnote 302]}

17.6.2 The U.S. Department of State (Visa: Reciprocity and Civil Documents by Country – Ethiopia, accessed June 2025) notes that marriage certificates are available only in Ethiopia and must be requested from the District where the marriage was registered. The fee is 50 Birr (£0.28^{[footnote 303]}) for Ethiopians and 300 Birr (£1.66^{[footnote 304]}) for foreigners. Certificates are issued by the VERA. Registration requires the bride and groom to appear in person with IDs and two witnesses each, and couples married in traditional or religious ceremonies may register to obtain a civil marriage certificate. Certified copies are available.^{[footnote 305]}

17.7 Passports

17.7.1 On 22 February 2025, Capital Market Ethiopia, which provides information about Ethiopian stock markets^{[footnote 306]}, reported that Ethiopia introduced its first domestically manufactured electronic passport (E-passport). The E-passport includes biometric data (fingerprints and facial recognition) securely stored on an embedded chip, with advanced encryption and tamper-proof features to enhance border security and prevent identity fraud. According to the report existing passports would remain valid until expiry and will be replaced with E-passports upon renewal. Ethiopian passport services have opened 14 new branches and prepared over 1.5 million E-passports for issuance.

‘According to Ethiopian passport services, “Preparations to provide the service have been completed by opening 14 new branches, more than 1.5 million e-passports have been printed and prepared.”’^{[footnote 307]}

17.7.2 The same source reported details on Ethiopian passport application costs and procedures. A standard passport costs 5,000 ETB (£27.65^{[footnote 308]}) with a typical processing time of approximately 2 months and 10 days and is valid for 10 years. Expedited services are available at 20,000 ETB (£110.60^{[footnote 309]}) for 5-day processing and 25,000 ETB (£138.25^{[footnote 310]}) for 2-day processing. Replacement of lost or damaged passports ranges from 13,000 to 40,000 ETB (£71.89–£221.20^{[footnote 311]}), depending on circumstances. Applications are submitted online via the official website www.ethiopianpassportservices.gov.et The required documents are proof of citizenship (e.g. birth certificate), valid ID (e.g. kebele ID card), recent photographs and if renewing, previous passport details.^{[footnote 312]}

17.7.3 The Ethiopian Immigration and Citizenship Service (ICS) noted on its website that the requirements for applying for a new passport are a valid kebele identity card, an authenticated birth certificate, a fee of ETB 5000 [£28.25^{[footnote 313]}] and for applicants under 18 years, parents or guardians are required to attach valid kebele ID of his/her mother/father or copy of passport information page and if a guardian, legal document from court; and authenticated birth certificate of the applicant.^{[footnote 314]}

17.7.4 The Ethiopian Embassy in the UK stated that ‘passport applications can no longer be submitted in person at the Embassy. All applications must be made online via the Digital [Immigration Nationality and Vital Events Agency (INVEA) website: http://www.digitalinvea.com./’^{[footnote 315]}

17.7.5 For issuance of new passports INVEA covers Europe, North/South America, Asia and Australia. The process of applying for a new passport involves downloading the Digital INVEA app filling in personal information and uploading fingerprints. Supporting documents are required – a residence ID or green card and one of the following – a verified birth certificate, a family member’s Ethiopian educational certificate, a kebele ID, a recent photo and an address for delivery. New and renewal of passports cost US$350 (£259^{[footnote 316]}), and for replacing a lost passport or making correction is $550 (£407^{[footnote 317]})^{[footnote 318]}.

Question 4

Annex A: City information

Accepted Answer

18. Addis Ababa

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.

18.1 Addis Ababa: location and demography

18.1.1 A June 2021 study by Ezana Haddis Weldeghebrael, University of Manchester (Weldeghebrael 2021) noted:

‘Addis Ababa is Ethiopia’s capital, located in the geographic epicentre of the country, and surrounded by the regional state of Oromia. It is the largest city in the country and plays a central political, economic and symbolic role in Ethiopia. Constitutionally, Addis Ababa is a self-administered city, accountable to the federal government …

‘Addis Ababa’s population is almost ten times larger than Ethiopia’s second-largest city, Gondar. Most of Ethiopia’s administrative, diplomatic and commercial activities are concentrated in the city …

‘Addis Ababa …[had] 3.6 million [people] in 2020. According to the Central Statistical Agency, the population is estimated to surpass 5 million in 2036 … Demographically, Addis Ababa is a multi-ethnic city. Ethnic Amhara (47%), Oromo (19.5%), Guraghe (16.3%) and Tigray (6.2%) are the largest ethnic groups [figures based on 2007 Census].’^{[footnote 319]}

18.1.2 The PCGN 2024 report noted that Addis Ababa serves as the centre of Oromia region as well as being a self-governing city and the capital of Ethiopia.^{[footnote 320]}

18.1.3 According to the ILO report (March 2022), Addis Ababa, Ethiopia’s capital, had a population of over 3.6 million in 2020, largely due to net migration from other regions of the country. The city hosts the third largest migrant population nationally, accounting for an estimated 16.3 percent of its residents. In addition, irregular migrants from other Ethiopian regions often use Addis Ababa as a key transit hub en route to the Middle East or Europe.^{[footnote 321]}

18.1.4 Sources the UKHO 2024 FFM spoke to provided various estimates for of the Addis Ababa population. The APAAU estimated it to be between 4 and 7 million, the RHO at 10 million and the expert noted that although government estimates put it between 7 and 8 million, he thought it to be between 5 and 20 million with one source putting it even higher at between 15 and 20 million.^{[footnote 322]}

Migration to Addis Ababa

18.1.1 The ECSA 2021 report observed that Addis Ababa had the highest net gains of lifetime migrants (292 persons per 1,000 population) and second highest net recent migration (16.3 out of 1000 population. 42.2% of the population of Addis Ababa is comprised on internal migrants.^{[footnote 323]}

18.1.2 The GoN January 2024 report observed:

‘Individuals wishing to settle outside their own region had to submit a letter from the old kebele to the new kebele. Without such a letter, it was impossible to register. In practice, this procedure was complicated by the many conflicts, which often made it difficult or even impossible to obtain such a letter. In addition, ethnicity could affect freedom of movement and the ability to obtain documents in practice, even if this was not officially the case. ‘Although not all kebeles recorded ethnicity on the identity card, in practice, it was often possible to form an idea of an individual’s ethnicity based on name and accent.

‘For this reason, it was very difficult to settle outside one’s own community, especially for young people. According to a confidential source, it was almost impossible to build a new life without land to settle on, especially for individuals dependent on agriculture and animal husbandry.

‘According to confidential sources, checkpoints and strict controls increased on roads into Addis Ababa, as well as on borders between regions, especially those between Oromia and Amhara (people travelling from Amhara to Addis Ababa must pass through Oromia to do so). According to a confidential source, these measures were aimed at countering the infiltration of the capital by members of the armed groups OLA and Fano who might seek to carry out destabilising actions there. As reported by that source, many of the security forces in Addis Ababa and Oromia were deployed to prevent such a situation. Because of the intimidation that accompanied the controls, as well as the insecurity due to fighting in Amhara and possible attacks by the OLA in Oromia, it was certainly not easy for Amhara to reach Addis Ababa from the regions.’^{[footnote 324]}

18.1.3 The DIS October 2024 report observed:

‘According to a research institution, Addis Ababa is not a conflict zone and Oromos who are vocal about their political opinions would be relatively safe in the capital, especially if they are not engaged in mobilising their ‘constituencies’ for the so-called unlawful activities. A person’s safety depends on how prominent this person is and how dangerous the government perceives the person to be. The authorities perceive some journalists as dangerous. As previously mentioned, if a person is perceived to be affiliated with the OLA, e.g. via suggestive social media posts, they will be detained. As an example of this, the research institution also pointed to the recent event where the State Minister of Peace was fired on accusations of conspiring with the OLA. He was a member of the Prosperity Party, but rumours against him led to his arrest.

‘The academic researcher further elaborated that in a mixed neighbourhood in Addis Ababa, being a vocal supporter of the Oromo cause in itself would not put you at risk vis-à-vis your neighbours. However, the authorities would perceive talking openly in favour of the OLA as very provocative.’^{[footnote 325]}

18.1.4 On treatment of Oromo Liberation Front/ Army see Country policy and information note: Oromos, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Army, Ethiopia.

18.1.5 For information on treatment of Tigrayan in Addis Ababa see Country policy and information note: Tigrayans and the Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front, Ethiopia.

18.1.6 For information of treatment of Amhara in Addis Ababa see Country and information note: Amhara and Amhara opposition

18.1.7 For information on the housing situation in Addis Ababa including availability, affordability and living conditions see section on Housing and living conditions.

18.2 Economic activity, employment and poverty

18.2.1 Weldeghebrael 2021 noted:

‘… Addis Ababa has witnessed rapid state-led economic growth and large-scale infrastructural expansion in the last two decades. However, the city still faces complex and interrelated challenges surrounding housing, transport, infrastructure and services, youth unemployment, and displacement…

‘… Addis Ababa is strongly linked economically and through road infrastructure with other major urban centres of Ethiopia. It is also connected with Djibouti’s port, through a railway, and to Nairobi, with a recently upgraded highway. The city serves as a node for the flow of goods and services to other parts of the country. Addis Ababa has also led to rapid urbanisation in eight satellite towns surrounding the city, located within the Oromia region…’^{[footnote 326]}

18.2.2 The EoEB noted:

‘Addis Ababa is the educational and administrative centre of Ethiopia…

‘Addis Ababa’s manufactures include textiles, shoes, food, beverages, wood products, plastics, and chemical products. Most of Ethiopia’s service industries are also located in the city. Banking and insurance services are concentrated in Addis Ababa, and the nation’s major newspapers are published there.

‘The bulk of the export and import trade of Ethiopia is channelled through Addis Ababa on its way to or from the ports of Djibouti, on the Gulf of Aden, or Asseb, Eritrea, on the Red Sea. The city is also the collection and distribution centre for much of the country’s internal trade …

‘Addis Ababa is the hub of the nation’s transportation network. Several roads connect it to other major cities; the only railway runs to Djibouti. The city is served by an international airport.’^{[footnote 327]}

18.3 Employment

18.3.1 Weldeghebrael 2021 observed:

‘Addis Ababa is the economic powerhouse of Ethiopia. It generates 29% of Ethiopia’s urban GDP and 20% of national urban employment. The service sector (trade, repair and other) comprises 32.5% of the total city’s employment, followed by domestic personnel (11.2%) and construction (9.7%). Together, services (63%) and industry (36%) sectors account for almost all of the city’s GDP.

‘The share of informal sector employment in Addis Ababa has significantly declined from 37% in 2003 to 6.6% in 2020…Since early 2000, the government adopted a two-pronged approach towards informality. First, through strict enforcement of business registration and tax regulations, especially for small businesses. Second, the city government facilitated micro and small enterprises (MSEs) development by providing training, premises, market integration and microfinance. MSE operators are usually required to join the ruling party to secure government support.’^{[footnote 328]}

18.3.2 The CSA/IOM 2021 report noted that as of February 2021, the total economically active population in Addis Ababa was 1.9 million (0.96 million male and 0.94 6,663 female) of which 1.5 million (77.9%) were employed 59.9% male and 45.1% female).^{[footnote 329]} The same source further noted that among the young people (aged 15 to 29 years), the economically active population was 0.71 million ( 39.3% male and 60.7% female). Of those economically active, 0.52 million employed (41.3% male and 58.7% female).^{[footnote 330]}

18.4 Unemployment

18.4.1 A March 2022 ILO report noted: ‘Addis Ababa faces severe development challenges, notwithstanding strong economic growth trends. In Addis Ababa, for example, unemployment and poverty rates are still high, at 23.5% and 22%, respectively. It is estimated that 22% of the population is living below the poverty line and 29% of households have at least one unemployed adult (higher than the national urban average of 15%).’^{[footnote 331]}

18.4.2 The CSA/IOM 2021 report noted that regionally the highest rate was recorded in Addis Ababa Administration (22.1 percent).^{[footnote 332]} As of February 2021, out of an economically active population of 1,891,814, a total of 417,603 (22.1%) was unemployed. Of those unemployed 145,821 (34.9%) were male and 271,782 (65.1%) were female.^{[footnote 333]}

18.4.3 Youth unemployment is a major challenge; 26.2% (186,637 out of an economically active population of 711,376) of young people (aged 15 to 29) in Addis Ababa were unemployed in February 2021. The unemployment rate was higher for females (28.6%) than males (22.2%).^{[footnote 334]}

18.5 Security

18.5.1 The GoN January 2024 report noted:

‘Overall, the security situation in Addis Ababa was relatively good. Armed groups —like the OLA (Oromia) and the Fano (Amhara) — did not have the discipline or level of organisation needed to pose a threat to Addis Ababa, as had been the case with the TPLF.

‘During the reporting period, in the months after the state of emergency was declared, mass arrests of Amhara and Eritreans took place in the regions, as well as in Addis Ababa. At the end of the reporting period, the arrests became more targeted, but in early December 2023, large numbers of arrests were again made following a banned anti-war demonstration that had been planned for 10 December. According to an article in the local press, police went house-to-house in certain neighbourhoods looking for politically active youth. The youth were accused of being members of the OLA and Fano, and of planning terrorist activities. Some of the organisers, including opposition politicians and activists, were also arrested.’^{[footnote 335]}

18.5.2 The DIS 2024 report noted that the implementation of the State of Emergency (SoE) in 2023 posed a significant threat to people in human rights organisations including increased risks of detention and abductions in Addis Ababa.^{[footnote 336]}

18.5.3 The same source added: ‘Reportedly, the authorities established checkpoints across the region to prevent Amharas from travelling to Addis Ababa, raising concerns of ethnic profiling.’^{[footnote 337]}

18.6 Housing

18.6.1 The EHRC July 2024 report observed:

‘… [T]he city administration said in April 2024 that at least 1.5 million homes were needed to solve Addis Ababa’s housing shortage …

‘The housing need until 2025 is estimated to be 471,000 units a year on average. This number is expected to increase to 486,000 housing units a year until 2035, far exceeding the speed at which housing is supplied. In Addis Ababa alone one million houses were needed last year.

‘… Since 2006, the [Integrated Housing Development Programme] IHDP [which primarily focus on constructing low-cost, multi-story condominium housing, especially in Addis Ababa and was fully financed and managed by the government^{[footnote 338]}] was able to produce 383,000 housing units, with a maximum production capacity of 25 to 35,000 units a year. This figure is inadequate to meet the annual estimated demand, much less catch up the accumulated needs of past years. The contribution of the real estate sector to the supply is also minimal (30,000 units a year) and the sector targets high and middle income earners.’^{[footnote 339]}

18.6.2 The 21 April 2025 news article by the Addis Fortune, an independent weekly business newspaper^{[footnote 340]} noted in 2013 that Addis Ababa City Administration launched a low-cost housing scheme to ease the city’s severe housing shortage by supporting low-income residents with subsidised construction, free land, and long-term mortgage financing via state-owned banks. The program offered three financing models (10/90, 20/80, 40/60) [beneficiaries made a down payment of 10, 20 or 40 % and with the reminder financed by a government subsidized loan]. By 2021 the scheme had over 700,000 people registered. Though about 175,000 housing units were built, only a portion have been allocated or occupied. As of 2025, 59,000 units were allocated, and 73% were transferred to homeowners. The rest remained incomplete. The same source further noted that in 2023 a separate cooperative housing initiative by the Addis Ababa Housing Bureau to empower citizens to build their own homes through housing cooperatives stalled due to legal and administrative obstacles and lack of basic infrastructure despite.^{[footnote 341]}

18.6.3 According to the CAHF 2024 Yearbook, as part of a broader initiative to build 500,000 homes by 2026, the Addis Ababa Housing Development Corporation launched a project to construct 10,000 rental units in Kality sub-city. The first phase, comprising 5,000 units, began in 2022 and has since been completed and allocated to low-income residents of the city.’^{[footnote 342]}

18.6.4 With respect to affordability Matsumoto and Crook 2021 observed:

‘Housing and food costs alone account for 65% of annual expenditures for the average urban household in Ethiopia – a figure that rises to 80% for urban households in the first consumption quintile and only goes as low as 60% for households in the fifth quintile. Even with housing finance, only 3.5% of urban households are estimated to be able to afford the cheapest new housing unit (20m2) built by a formal developer or contractor, which would cost around 600,000 ETB … [£3,240^{[footnote 343]}].

‘For households in Addis Ababa, median rent shares as a proportion of household consumption are estimated to be much lower for those occupying informal housing (14.8%) than formal housing (45%), IHDP (52%) or cooperatives (56%); low-income households in Addis Ababa … can essentially only afford informal housing or kebele housing … ’^{[footnote 344]}

18.6.5 Regarding land the cost of land the CAHF 2024 Yearbook observed:

‘‘The city of Addis Ababa has also set its own property valuation for different housing typologies, indicative of the market price … The minimum property valuation for IHDP housing is between Br54 511.8/m2 … and Br72,377/m2 … [£306 and £407^{[footnote 345]}]; the valuation of apartments ranges between Br85,000/m2 … and 132,937.5/m2 … [£307 and £746.73^{[footnote 346]}]. Other houses are valued at Br30 000/m2 … [£165^{[footnote 347]}]. The property tax excludes houses 15m2 in size in inner cities and 30m2 in the periphery.’^{[footnote 348]}

18.6.6 The EHRC July 2024 report observed:

‘In particular, in March 2024, in Addis Ababa, the city administration reported that 5,400 houses had been demolished as part of a large-scale demolition, and that in this process the number of residents who had not been provided with alternative living space or property by mid-April 2024 was no more than 20 per cent of the total. In June and July 2023, Sheger City Council announced that up to 100,000 residents would be forced to leave the area as a result of the eviction process.’^{[footnote 349]}

18.6.7 The AI April 2025 report observed that its investigation:

‘… found that at least 872 people were forcibly evicted from Bole and Lemi Kura sub-cities in November 2024 by the Addis Ababa City Administration. These include 254 people evicted from homes they owned across 47 households, including 114 children and 13 older people, as well as 618 tenants …

‘Amnesty International’s Crisis Evidence Lab analyzed satellite imagery between early November 2024 and early February 2025. This confirmed that at least 29 hectares of densely built-up areas in Bole and Lemi Kura underwent structural clearing during this period, correlating with data provided by victims regarding the location and timeframe of the evictions …

‘Amnesty International has not been able to determine the total number of people affected by forced evictions in the Bole and Lemi Kura sub-cities as part of the evictions that occurred in November. However, it is highly likely that the number of forcibly evicted individuals in these two sub-cities could be much higher than the findings of this research …’^{[footnote 350]}

18.6.8 The AI April 2025 report further observed:

‘The CDP – a project that authorities stated would link different development initiatives from late 2022 onwards – was approved by Addis Ababa’s highest executive council on 23 February 2024. An advisor to Addis Ababa’s city administration described the CDP as “an urban transformation” project aiming to “improve infrastructure, housing, and public spaces to attract investment, create jobs, and enhance residents’ quality of life.”

‘The CDP’s first phase focuses on central parts of Addis Ababa, including the city’s old town, Piasa, a neighbourhood that has undergone similar projects since mid-2023. Development projects that preceded the CDP faced public outcry, particularly due to demolition of historic buildings and cultural heritage sites. As of October 2024, the second CDP phase was expected to double in geographic size. It involves the creation of eight corridors covering a total of 131.99 km …^{[footnote 351]}

18.6.9 An April 2025 Addis Fortune article reported that in one Addis Ababa compound, 11 kebele houses, each under 40 square metres, built from mud, and home to 2 to 5 people, shared a single water tap and lacked private showers and adequate sanitation. Just 2 communal latrines served about 40 residents. Citing a Habitat for Humanity survey, the article noted that 73% of Ethiopians lack access to safe drinking water, and 90% lack proper sanitation.^{[footnote 352]}

18.7 Health

18.7.1 A research article by researchers from Menelik II medical and health science college, Addis Ababa medical and business college, Blacklion hospital and Debre Markos university (Getahun and others 2024) which was carried out from September 1st to 30th, 2023 and involved 422 health care professions and that examined perceptions of health care professions on the effectiveness of emergency care in public health facilities in Addis Ababa noted:

‘Addis Ababa is the capital city and is divided into 11 sub-cities and 117 administrative districts. The current population of Addis Ababa is estimated to be 5,461,000, with a 4.46 % growth rate in 2023. The city [Addis Ababa] has 98 public health centers, 40 private hospitals, and 14 governmental hospitals. Health centers are the hub of primary health care services and community health systems in Addis Ababa in particular and in Ethiopia in general. The study was carried out from September 1st to 30th, 2023.’^{[footnote 353]}

18.7.2 The March 2025 OCHA Humanitarian Data Exchange (OCHA HDX) data provided information on public and private health facilities in Addis Ababa. The data indicated that Addis Ababa had the following health facilities:

Public health facilities - 10 hospitals, 99 health centres, 63 clinics, 46 pharmacies and 1 imaging laboratory
Private non-profit health facilities – 39 clinics, 3 health centres, 3 speciality clinics
Private for profit health facilities – 25 hospitals, 595 clinic, 583 speciality clinics and 30 imaging centres and laboratories.^{[footnote 354]}

18.7.3 A December 2023 research article the Journal of Water, Sanitation and Hygiene for Development based on a study that assessed the status of WASH services and barriers at public health facilities in Addis Ababa by researchers from the Ethiopian Institute of Water Resource at Addis Ababa university (Derso and others 2023) found that:

‘100% of healthcare facilities had limited access to sanitation service.
‘88.4%, and 3.5% of healthcare facilities had limited, and no service access for hand hygiene, respectively.
‘97.7% and 29% of healthcare facilities had not environmental cleaning service and waste management service respectively.
‘Lack of access to basic WASH services, combined with multiple existing challenges at healthcare facilities in Addis Ababa, hinders efforts towards pandemic and healthcare-acquired infection prevention and control.’^{[footnote 355]}

18.7.4 Getahun and others 2024 observed: ‘In this study, the perception of health care providers towards effectiveness of emergency health services among public health centers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, were investigated. Consequently, 76.3 % of the respondents reported that their institutions were effective in providing emergency health services.’^{[footnote 356]}

18.7.5 A 2025 institution-based cross-sectional study that interviewed 633 randomly sampled participants to investigate patient satisfaction with healthcare provision in Addis Ababa by researchers from the Ethiopian Public Health Institute, Addis Ababa and Addis Ababa Food and Drug Authority and published by Discover Social Science and Health journal stated:

‘The study findings revealed that overall patient satisfaction at public health centers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, was 77.4%. Among the participants, 59.4% were able to obtain essential drug supplies from health centers. A majority of the patients (77.6%) reported that health professionals were technically competent. Additionally, 68.1% of the respondents stated that they were able to access all necessary laboratory services at public health centers. Nearly all patients (95.3%) reported that health professionals maintained patient privacy. Furthermore, 85.3% of the patients felt that the public health centers had an adequate primary care workforce to treat patients. Regarding the quality of facilities, 84.8% of the participants reported that health centers had attractive compounds and green spaces.’^{[footnote 357]}

18.8 Addis Ababa city ID

18.8.1 According to the 2024 HO Fact Finding Mission report, the Addis Ababa city ID (sometimes referred to as a kebele or resident ID) is a key document required to formally reside and participate in many aspects of life in the capital.

18.8.2 Sources informed the UKHO FFM team that one needed a city ID to live in AA and that people without the ID risked arrest and detention from the police.^{[footnote 358]} ^{[footnote 359]} ^{[footnote 360]} According to various source, people can use any ID to access hospitals or education facilities in AA but need an AA city ID to rent a house, open a business, and to get employed in AA.^{[footnote 361]} Additionally, the city IDs are used for obtaining a birth certificate, a marriage certificate, a passport, opening or owning a business, buying a house and accessing hospital services amongst other things.’^{[footnote 362]}

18.8.3 APAAU noted that the Addis Ababa city ID is used to access:

‘… work. For example, the city/kebele issues licenses giving a person a right to run a stall on a street corner. Some jobs, though, can be done without a license, for example collecting rubbish. The FG/city government aim to support people to move from the informal to formal sector. A license allows people to save money which they can then use to access a micro-loan to open a formal business. But for most this never happens.

‘schooling, although any ID can be used to access public schools. People with residence IDs of another location/ city can access schools in AA.

‘healthcare, depends on the level you need (primary, secondary, tertiary) which gets more expensive the higher the level of treatment required. For primary healthcare the city ID is not required but the person may need city ID to get medical treatment provided under medical insurance schemes. APAAU gave the example of neighbourhood insurance schemes. Often despite having ID, a person may not get quality medical treatment as some laboratory tests or medications are simply not available.^{[footnote 363]}

18.8.4 The UKHO FFM 2024 report noted that according to UKHO FFM RHRO 2024 ‘A person can rent accommodation using any identification, not necessarily a kebele or city ID card.’^{[footnote 364]} UKHO FFM consultant 2024 ‘explained that it is not mandatory to have a kebele ID to register with a school in … AA. On accessing health, it depends on whether it is private or public but one need to be resident to access health. In AA a person needs a kebele [city] ID to access government health services.’^{[footnote 365]}

18.8.5 With regard to obtaining an Addis Ababa city ID, the UKHO FFM APAAU 2024 noted:

‘Formal housing is used to access ID. To get a (kebele or AA city) ID you need a formal address. Anyone can rent a house without ID, but to obtain an AA city ID a person must go back to their home area, give back their old kebele ID and get a letter confirming that they no longer live there and give the new address details.

‘In AA, people often rent informal housing, for example multiple people live in the same house to be able to afford rent. And usually, people do not disclose such living arrangements, so they are unable to get an ID. If the person cannot go back to their home area or official documents were destroyed because of the war it is difficult to get a city ID in AA.’^{[footnote 366]}

18.8.6 UKHO FFM RHRO 2024 noted:

‘Getting a kebele ID [this appears to be reference to the city ID card] (also referred to as a resident ID card) was a problem, but on an individual basis because of corruption and bureaucracy – it was not systematic discrimination against a particular group. Everyone – all ethnic groups - complain about getting these.

‘The RHRO said that to get a Kebele ID card, a person needs:

to be resident for 6 months or more in AA
accommodation or a sponsor
3 witnesses
If moving from another part of Ethiopia to AA, a person needs a letter of authority from the kebele where they were previously resident.’^{[footnote 367]}

18.8.7 UKHO FFM RIAA 2024 noted that, ‘Even when a person has all the correct information and documents, the process can take a long time and they may be refused.’^{[footnote 368]} UKHO FFM CSA3 2024 noted: ‘It can be difficult to obtain [an] AA city ID.’^{[footnote 369]}

18.8.8 UKHO FFM REC 2024 noted: ‘People pay a bribe to get fake or genuine [city] ID. A fake ID may cost between 2 and 5,000 Birr [around £27 and £68[footnote 275]]; a real ID may cost between 10 to 20,000 Birr [around £137 to £264].’^{[footnote 370]} UKHO FFM RIAA 2024 noted that people mostly ‘buy’ (pay a bribe) to get AA city IDs. It used to cost about 10,000 Birr [around £137], now 20,000 Birr (around £274)’^{[footnote 371]} UKHO FFM EMAP 2024 noted that: ‘A person needs to pay between 10 to 20,000 birr [approximately £137 and £274] bribe to get the ID. Corruption affects everyone. Tigrayans buy fake city IDs. There are high levels of corruption so one can buy documents.’^{[footnote 372]}

18.9.1 According to the ILO 2021 report, Addis Ababa is one of the beneficiaries of the Urban Productive Safety Net Project (UPSNP), a ten-year national initiative aimed at improving the livelihoods of poor urban households and creating sustainable safety net systems. The programme combines public works jobs for vulnerable individuals in community and environmental projects, unconditional cash transfers for households without able-bodied workers, and a destitution programme that provides shelter, healthcare, vocational training, and other support to those living in extreme urban poverty.^{[footnote 373]}

18.9.2 For further information on social protection see section on Social safety nets.

18.9.3 The Ethiopian Community Based Health Insurance (CBHI) Scheme extends coverage to informal workers and vulnerable households and individuals. For more information see Health insurance

19. Dire Dawa

NOTE: The maps in this section are not intended to reflect the UK Government’s views of any boundaries.

19.1 Location and demography

19.1.1 A 2025 Rift Valley Institute report on urban conflict in Dire Dawa that was based on primary and secondary data sources (RVI) (RVI 2025 report) noted that Dire Dawa is situated just over 500 km east of Addis Ababa and is one of only two chartered cities in Ethiopia. It shares borders with the Oromia and Somali regional states and is made up of nine kebeles in its main urban area and 38 kebeles in the surrounding rural areas.^{[footnote 374]}

19.1.2 Map showing Dire Dawa^{[footnote 375]}

19.2 Population size

19.2.1 The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) undated Dire Dawa webpage noted: ‘The total population of the Dire Dawa Administration is 521,000. Rural Dire Dawa has a population of 188,000 spread over 38 rural kebeles (smallest administrative unit) and is mainly inhabited by Oromo (73.5 per cent) and Somali (26 per cent). The population of Dire Dawa city is 333,000, which is subdivided into 9 urban kebeles.’^{[footnote 376]}

19.2.2 The January 2025 RVI reported noted that: Dire Dawa is ‘the second-most populous city in the country. According to the 2007 census (the most recent), the population was 341,834 people. Estimates indicate that it is now nearly half a million people.’^{[footnote 377]}

19.3 Dire Dawa: ethnic composition and inter-regional migration

19.3.1 The ECSA 2021 report noted that regarding movement of people from one region to another Dire Dawa had the highest (31 persons per 1000 population) net gain in recent migrants and the second highest second highest net lifetime migrants 192.1 out of 1000 population) after Addis Ababa.^{[footnote 378]}

19.3.2 The FDRE undated webpage on Dire Dawa noted: ‘The city is composed of members of the following ethnic groups: Oromo (33 per cent), Amhara (29.5 per cent), Somali (23.5 per cent), Gurage (6.7 per cent), Tigrayan (1.8 per cent), Harari (1.6 per cent) and people from southern Ethiopia, who have a history and culture of migration.’^{[footnote 379]}

19.3.3 The January 2025 RVI observed:

… the city has … a reputation for being a cultural melting pot, bringing together diverse Ethiopian ethnic, religious and linguistic groups, along with foreigners. Residents in the rural kebeles (roughly a third of the population) that are located outside of the city’s built-up core are almost exclusively ethnic Oromos and Somalis, accounting for 73.5 per cent and 26 per cent of the total rural population, respectively. According to the 2007 census, 99.5 per cent of these rural residents are Muslims. The smaller urban area of Dire Dawa is much more diverse, including: Oromos (33 per cent); Amharas (29.5 per cent); Somalis (23.5 per cent); Gurages (6.7 per cent); Tigrayans (1.8 per cent); Hararis (1.6 per cent) and others.’^{[footnote 380]}

19.4 Religion

19.4.1 The January 2025 RVI observed: In terms of religious composition, urban Dire Dawa comprises mainly Muslims (57.4 per cent), Orthodox Christians (25.6 per cent), Protestants (2.8 per cent) and Catholics (0.4 per cent). ^{[footnote 381]}

19.4.2 The FDRE Dire Dawa webpage noted: ‘In terms of religion, Dire Dawa is a Muslim majority city (70.9 per cent), followed by Orthodox Christians (25.6 per cent), Protestants (2.8 per cent), Catholics (0.4 per cent) and others (0.3 per cent). In urban Dire Dawa, Muslims constitute 57.4 per cent of the population and Orthodox Christians constitute 37.4 per cent, while in rural Dire Dawa, the population is almost entirely Muslim at 99.5 per cent.’^{[footnote 382]}

19.5 Language

19.5.1 The RVI 2025 report noted that the official working language is Amharic, even though much of the population speaks Afaan Oromo. Afaan Oromo is not used for official government activities, meaning Oromo speakers often need translators to access services or submit documents. Government job postings, including those for kebele offices, are also issued in Amharic, which restricts Oromo residents’ access to information.^{[footnote 383]}

19.5.2 The FDRE Dire Dawa webpage noted: ‘Dire Dawa is known for its cosmopolitan character due to its high level of cultural diversity. The Amharic, Oromiffa and Somali languages are spoken by many residents of Dire Dawa, allowing a greater degree of social blending that typifies Dire Dawa as a melting pot.’ ^{[footnote 384]}

19.6 Economic activity, employment and poverty

19.6.1 As of February 2021, the ESS/IOM report indicated that Dire Dawa had a labour force participation rate of 60.9%, with higher male participation (68.8%) compared to female (53.5%). The employment-to-population ratio stood at 51.2%, again with a gender disparity (62.2% male, 41.0% female). The overall unemployment rate was 15.9%, with male unemployment at 9.6% and female unemployment significantly higher at 23.5%. Dire Dawa was reported to have the second highest unemployment rate nationally, following Addis Ababa. The economically active population totalled 246,886 (54.4% male, 45.6% female), of whom 207,600 were employed (58.5% male, 41.5% female) and 39,286 were unemployed (32.8% male, 67.2% female). Labour force participation varied by location, with urban areas at 56.7% (65.1% male, 49.1% female) and rural areas at 74.4% (76.5% male, 64.2% female).^{[footnote 385]}

19.6.2 The same sour further stated that among young people (aged 15 to 29) in Dire Dawa, 94,027 were classified as economically active, with a slightly higher proportion of females (51.9%) than males (48.2%). Of these, 72,947 were employed (53.7% male, 46.3% female), while 21,090 were unemployed, with a notable gender disparity: 30.3% male and 69.7% female. The unemployment rate for this age group was 22.4%, with male unemployment at 14.0% and female unemployment at 30.3%.^{[footnote 386]}

19.6.3 The RVI 2025 report noted that Dire Dawa had regained its role as a key economic centre in eastern Ethiopia following a slowdown in the 1990s. This resurgence was supported by the establishment of the Dire Dawa Free Trade Zone and increased foreign investment in the textile and cement industries. 7 manufacturing firms have set up operations in the Dire Dawa Industrial Park, employing over 2,500 people. Local investment has also grown, particularly in the mineral water packaging sector. The Dire Dawa investment office reported steady growth in capital inflows, with 1,526 investment licences issued over the past four years for projects valued at more than USD 1.8 billion(about £1.3 billion).^{[footnote 387]} In addition to formal employment, many urban residents engage in small-scale informal businesses and contraband trade, while in rural areas, khat cultivation and trade remain significant sources of income.^{[footnote 388]}

19.7 Education

19.7.1 For information on education in Dire Dawa including facilities, enrolment and Gender Parity Index see section Education.

19.8 Health

19.8.1 According to a March 2024 research article by researchers from Haramaya University, Ethiopia, conducted in the public health facilities in Dire Dawa city administration from 7 April to 7 May 2019 and published by Front Digital Health:

‘There were 15 health centers (8 urban and 7 rural), 2 hospitals, and 32 health posts under the city administration. These public health facilities served a population of 480,000 in reproductive, maternal, neonatal, child and adolescent health, major communicable diseases, non-communicable diseases, surgical and injury care, emergency and critical care, neglected tropical diseases, hygiene and environmental health services, health education and behavior change communication services, and multisectoral nutrition interventions.’^{[footnote 389]}

19.8.2 The FDRE Ministry of Health Web noted Dire Dawa has 2 hospitals, 15 health centres and 36 health posts.^{[footnote 390]}

19.8.3 The March 2025 OCHA HDX has provided data on health facilities in Ethiopia^{[footnote 391]}. CPIT has collated the data and produced below table showing the number, type and location of public and private health facilities in Dire Dawa:

	Location	Hospital	Clinic	Health Centre	Health Posts
Public	Urban	2	3	9	32
Public	Rural	0	0	6	3
Sub total		2	3	15	35
Private for profit	Urban	7	37	0	0
Private for profit	Rural	0	0	0	0
Sub total	7	37	0	0
Private not for profit	Urban	0	8	0	0
Private not for profit	Rural	0	0	0	0
Sub total		0	8	0	0
Grant total		9	48	15	35

19.9 Housing

19.9.1 A 2018 report by the Rift Valley Institute noted:

‘Since its inception, spontaneous urban development has been a primary attribute of Dire Dawa. As a result, most of the city’s settlements are considered to be slums. In fact, only two city quarters—Kezira (including Greek Camp) and Number One—are not regarded as slums. The remainder of Dire Dawa largely consists of informal settlements, most of which have insufficient social services, such as education, health and recreation (parks and sports) facilities.

‘In Dire Dawa city, an estimated 182,000 people live in sub-standard housing … at least half of these people live in simple mud-houses or shacks. Many of these housing structures are located on hills and flood plains, rendering a significant proportion of the inhabitants … vulnerable to natural hazards and disasters, such as landslides and floods. Floods are common during the rainy season in June to September …

‘There is a backlog of demand for an estimated 24,000 houses, with demand expected to grow annually by an additional 2,900 houses. The huge gap between supply and demand is leading to a substantial increase in informal settlements … Cognizant of this critical problem, the federal government of Ethiopia and the Dire Dawa Administration have prioritized housing development. In 2010, the Dire Dawa Administration allocated ETB 300 million (USD 13.5 million) to build low cost apartments for 3,500 households. This number, however, has since been reduced by more than half—to only 1,050 households.’^{[footnote 392]}

19.10 WASH

19.10.1 According to a 2020 research article by researchers from Bahir Dar University, Ethiopia published by Heliyon, 75.9% of households in Dire Dawa had access to improved water source compared to 49.6%. Dire Dawa had also the highest proportion of households with access to improved sanitation 24.0 % compared to 6.3% nationally.^{[footnote 393]}

19.10.2 An August 2023 research article by researchers from the University of Addis Ababa and Dire Dawa based on various sources and published by Environmental Challenges noted:

‘Dire Dawa has 24.0% … of households had access to improved sanitation services where as 76% of households uses access to unimproved sanitation services. According to WHO, improved sanitation facilities are those that are used by only one family and can include toilets connected to sewers or septic systems, water-based toilets that flush into pits, simple pit latrines with slabs, and ventilated improved pit latrines. Unimproved sanitation facilities include those shared by more than one household, flush/pour flush to elsewhere in the environment without proper waste water treatment, the use of buckets, hanging latrines, or pit latrines without slab coverings and open defecation.’^{[footnote 394]}

19.11.1 Like the rest of the country, Dire Dawa participates in the Urban Productive Safety Net Programme (UPSNP)^{[footnote 395]} and the national Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) which supports poor urban and rural households respectively^{[footnote 396]} (see Urban Productive Safety Net Project (UPSNP) and Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP)).

19.12 Insecurity

19.12.1 A 2023 RVI report noted:

‘In 2004, Dire Dawa was declared a chartered city by FDRE proclamation No. 416/2004, making it directly accountable to the federal government and setting out the city’s democratic and administrative structures. This move arose from unresolved claims by the Oromo and Somali, with both sides clashing repeatedly in the 1990s over territorial ownership of the city, making it impossible to integrate Dire Dawa into either Oromia or Somali Regional State. Accordingly, part of the 2004 conflict resolution package was an agreement to administer the city through ethnic quotas, using a 40:40:20 formula applied to the respective power-sharing ratios of Oromo, Somali and other ethnic groups. Over time, the political dominance of these two ethnic groups has created a sense of alienation among other ethnic groups, with the 40:40:20 formula remaining a hotly contested topic when it comes to the city’s administration.’^{[footnote 397]}

19.12.2 The RVI 2025 report noted that Dire Dawa is currently experiencing relative peace following ethnic and religious conflicts in 2019 and 2020 but the underlying tensions remain among ethnic groups particularly Oromo, Somali, and Amhara due to unresolved power-sharing disputes, administrative boundary ambiguities, and competition over informal settlements. Oromo residents face marginalization in language use and political representation, while Somali groups maintain significant influence through traditional institutions. Amhara residents have historically been excluded under the 40:40:20 power-sharing arrangement. Youth unemployment, drug abuse, and crime especially in migrant-heavy areas pose growing security challenges. Settlement patterns are increasingly ethnically homogeneous, exacerbating intergroup mistrust. Conflicts in surrounding regions and neighbouring countries further influence intergroup relations in Dire Dawa.^{[footnote 398]}

19.13 Travel

19.13.1 Ethiopian Airlines operates several daily flights from Addis Ababa to Dire Dawa International Airport, with an average travel time of just over one hour. There are no direct international flights to Dire Dawa; passengers arriving from abroad must first transit through Addis Ababa.^{[footnote 399]}

19.13.2 Road access is available through existing routes, and a new 144km Mieso to Dire Dawa expressway connecting Oromia and Somali regions to the city of Dire Dawa is under construction and is expected to significantly improve travel times and reliability along the Ethio-Djibouti Corridor.^{[footnote 400]} CPIT could not find any reporting of attacks, kidnappings or checkpoints on the Addis Ababa – Dire Dawa road since 2024 (see Bibliography).

19.13.3 The Addis Ababa–Djibouti railway, a 753 km electrified single-track standard gauge line, also serves Dire Dawa. The line was opened for freight in October 2015 and was formally inaugurated for passenger services in October 2016. It became officially commercially operational as of 1 January 2018.^{[footnote 401]}

Question 5

Research methodology

Accepted Answer

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
the currency and detail of information
whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Question 6

Terms of reference

Accepted Answer

The ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

Geography and demography
Economy
- Employment and unemployment
- Poverty
Insecurity and crime
Food security
Access to services
- Health
- Education
- Housing
Social protection
- Pension schemes
- Social protection network
Documentation
- Kebele ID
- National ID (fayda)
- Passport
- Birth, marriage certificates
Freedom of movement
- Entry and exit
- Internal movement
Internal displacement

Question 7

Bibliography

Accepted Answer

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Amnesty International (AI):

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Health Cluster Ethiopia (HCE):

Health Cluster Bulletin, March 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia, no date. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Immigration and Citizenship Service (ICS), How to apply for regular passport, no date. Accessed: 6 June 2025

IMPACT Ethiopia:

REACH Humanitarian Situation Monitoring (HSM) March 2025, Ethiopia, March 2025, 9 May 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
REACH Joint Marketing Initiative Factsheet April 2025, 6 May 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

International Labour Organization (ILO):

Approach to inclusive market systems assessment in Ethiopia, March 2022. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Mapping of the National Social Protection System in Ethiopia, including Social Health Protection, 2021. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Protection in Action: Building Social Protection Floors for All, April 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025
ILOSTAT Country profiles – Ethiopia, no date. Accessed: 6 June 2025

International Organization for Migration (IOM):

Ethiopia Partnership Eases Vulnerable Returnee Access to Legal Identity Documents, 15 November 2023. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Impact study Report #1: Returning Home - Evaluating the Impact of IOM’s Reintegration Assistance for Migrants in the Horn of Africa, 2023. Accessed: 6 June 2025
National Communication Strategy on Irregular Migration and Promotion of Safe Migration Options, 26 March 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

International Organization for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM DTM):

National Displacement Report 19 (November 2023 - May 2024), 26 July 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025
DTM Ethiopia — National Displacement Report 20 (July – August 2024), 20 January 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

International Social Security Association (ISSA), Country profile – Ethiopia, July 2022. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Kasse, M G, and Woldemariam, G A, The Matrix of Ethnic Federalism in Ethiopia in Protecting Internal Minority Rights: Examining Perceptions in Oromia Regional State. Journal of Ethnic and Cultural Studies, 2022. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Kebede, D N and Kelil, H K, Finance Driven Reforms in Ethiopian Public Universities: The Cost Sharing Policy and its Implication for Equity, International Journal of Progressive Sciences and Technologies, 2 September 2019. Accessed: 6 June 2025

IPUMS International, The 2007 Population and Housing Census of Ethiopia

Enumerator’s Instructional Manual, no date. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Lind, J, Holland-Szyp, C, Sabates-Wheeler, R, Teshome, Y, and Naesshe, L O, Can Social Protection Programmes Promote Livelihoods and Climate Resilience in Conflict-Affected Settings? Evidence from Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Net Programme, Institute of Development Studies, May 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Logistics Cluster Assessment (LCA):

Ethiopia - 2 Ethiopia Logistics Infrastructure, June 2023. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia Bole International Airport, June 2023
Ethiopia road network July 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Matsumoto, T. and Crook, J. Sustainable and inclusive housing in Ethiopia: a policy assessment, Coalition for Urban Transitions, 2021. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Map Action, Baseline population distribution, 2022. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Mengistu, T. S.; Endalamaw, A.; Zewdie, A.; Wolka, E.; Assefa, Y. Strengthening primary health care in Ethiopia: A scoping review of successes, challenges, and pathways towards universal health coverage using the WHO monitoring framework. Plos Glob Public health, 17 April 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Mixed Migration Centre (MMC), Mind the information gap - Access to information and assistance of Ethiopian returnees throughout their migration journey, June 2023. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Mohammad, S and Legese, H, Impact of urban productive safety net programme on poverty reduction and food security: Evidence from major cities of Eastern Ethiopia (Dire Dawa, Harar and Jigjiga, March 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

National ID (NID), Fayda for Ethiopia, updated 30 May 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Overseas Security Advisory Council (OSAC), Ethiopia Country Security Report 2024 (Personal Identity), 20 March 2024

Project Hope, Ethiopia: Health System Has Collapsed in Conflict-Affected Areas, 5 March 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Refugee Law Clinic, Access to mental health services in Eritrea, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and the Greater Horn of Africa region, University of London, 8 July 2024

Rift Valley Institute (RVI):

Expectations and belonging in Dire Dawa Drivers, dynamics and challenges of rural to urban mobility, February 2018. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Religion and conflict in Dire Dawa, 2023. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Rough Guides, Getting around Ethiopia: Transportation Tips. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Scholars Strategy Network, The Integrated Housing Development Program: Identifying Strengths and Gaps, 12 November 2020. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Tolera A, Firdisa D, Roba H S, Motuma A, Kitesa M, Abaerei A, Barriers to healthcare data quality and recommendations in public health facilities in Dire Dawa city administration, eastern Ethiopia: a qualitative study, 14 March 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Tollera, G, Retta, M T, Girmay, A M, Patient satisfaction with healthcare services and associated factors at public health centers in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, March 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

United Kingdom Home Office Fact Finding Mission (UKHO FFM), Report of a fact-finding mission, Ethiopia: situation of the Tigrayans, December 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UK Home Office, Immigration system Statistics data tables, 22 May 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF):

UN Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC, Children’s right to identity in Ethiopia CRC/C/ETH/6-7, September 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN, Data Portal Population Division, accessed August 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division, World Population Prospects 2024: Summary of Results, 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN Habitat, Ethiopia: Addis Ababa Urban Profile, 2008. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR):

Refugees and Internally Displaced persons as of 31 January 2025, 25 February 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Help Ethiopia, no date. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN Human Rights Council (HRC), Summary of stakeholders’ submissions on Ethiopia Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, August 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA):

Ethiopia Reference Map: Regions and Zones, January 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia situation report 13 December 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs Humanitarian Data Exchange (OCHA HDX), Ethiopia - Health Facilities, 4 March 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025

UN Women, Gender pay gap and labour-market inequalities in Ethiopia, 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

US Central Intelligence Agency Factbook:

Real GDP growth rate, 1 May 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia, last updated 17 April 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
United Kingdom, 17 April 2012. Accessed: 6 June 2025

US Department of State (USSD), 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Ethiopia, 23 April 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025

US Census, International Database (Ethiopia), 2025. Accessed August 2025

US International Trade Administration (USITA):

Ethiopia Country Commercial Guide, 18 January 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia- Roads, Railways and Logistics, 21 July 2022. Accessed: 6 June 2025

Xinhua Chinese-contracted expressway starts construction in eastern Ethiopia 19 August 2025

Weldeghebrael, E, H, Addis Ababa city scoping study, June 2021. Accessed: 6 June 2025

World Atlas, Biggest cities in Ethiopia, no date

World Bank (WB):

Ethiopia Education Sector Public Expenditure and Institutional Review (PEIR), June 2022. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia Outlook, 10 April 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
WB Data Ethiopia, no date. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Closing the Gender Gap in ID Ownership in Ethiopia: Findings and Recommendations (English), 19 March 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia Poverty and Equity Assessment, November 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Lighting Up Eastern Africa: How Greater Access to Energy is Creating Jobs and Improving Public Services in Rural Ethiopia, 24 January 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Urban Productive Safety Net and Jobs Project Enables Economic Inclusion for Women, 14 January 2025. Accessed: 6 June 2025
Ethiopia’s Rural Safety Net Enables Mother to Invest in Children’s Education, 11 November 2024. Accessed: 6 June 2025
World Bank Data Ethiopia Access to electricity, no date. Accessed: 9 June 2025

World Food Programme (WFP):

‘Ethiopia priority humanitarian response and critical funding gaps February -April 2025, 6 March 2025. Accessed: 9 June 2025
Ethiopia Country Brief March 2025, 2 May 2025. Accessed: 9 June 2025
Microinsurance and social protection Ethiopia country case study, December 2022. Accessed: 9 June 2025
WFP Warns of Rising Hunger and Malnutrition in Ethiopia as Humanitarian Needs Outpace Resources, April 2024. Accessed: 9 June 2025

World Health Organisation (WHO):

Data- Ethiopia, updated 20 May 2024. Accessed: 9 June 2025
Public Health Situation Analysis (PHSA), 11 April 2024. Accessed: 9 June 2025
Ethiopia Health at a glance, 11 December 2024. Accessed: 9 June 2025
Ethiopia launches 7th edition of the essential medicines list to strengthen Universal Health Coverage, 18 March 2025. Accessed: 9 June 2025

World Inequality Database (WID), Ethiopia, no date. Accessed: 9 June 2025

Xe.com Currency converter, 10 June 2025

Zarepour, Z, Mebratie A, Shamebo D, Shigute, Z, Alemu, G, and Bedi J S, Social Health Insurance and Healthcare Seeking Behavior in Urban Ethiopia, Annals Global Health, 28 November 2023. Accessed: 9 June 2025

Question 8

Version control and feedback

Accepted Answer

Clearance

Below is information on when this note was cleared:

version 1.0
valid from 9 September 2025

Official – sensitive: Not for disclosure – Start of section

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Executive summary

Assessment

About the assessment

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.2 Exclusion

2. Internal relocation

3. Certification

Country information

4. Geography

4.1 Location, capital and main cities

4.2 Regions

5. Demography

5.1 Population

5.2 Ethnic groups

5.3 Languages

5.4 Religion

6. Economy

6.1 Growth

6.2 Poverty

6.3 Employment

6.4 Rural and urban employment

6.5 Employment

Labour force participation rate (%)

Employment to population ratio (%)

6.6 Employment by gender

6.7 Employment of disabled persons

6.8 Youth employment

Urban

Rural

6.9 Employment by sector

6.10 Wages

6.11 Unemployment

7. Social protection

7.1 Legal framework

7.2 Public pension scheme

7.3 Private pension scheme

8.Social safety nets

8.1 General

8.2 Productive Safety Net Project (PSNP)

8.3 Urban Productive Safety Net Project (UPSNP)

8.4 School feeding programme

8.5 Social Health Insurance Schemes

9. Security situation

9.1 Political violence - incidents and fatalities

Political violence: October 2024 to September 2025

Political violence 8 August to 5 September 2025

9.2 Amhara

9.3 Tigray

9.4 Oromia

9.5 Benishangul-Gumuz

9.6 Gambella

9.7 Afar-Somali border conflict

9.8 Criminality

10. Food security

10.1 People in need

10.2 Cost of food

10.3 Assistance

11. Internally Displaced Persons

12. Health

12. Health care system

12.2 Health insurance

12.3 Health facilities

Public/Government

Private for profit

Private not for profit

12.4 Accessibility

12.5 Therapeutic drugs

12.6 Healthcare workers

12.7 Mental health

13. Education

13.1 Structure and governance

13.2 Facilities

Government schools

Private schools

Total

13.3 Basic education

13.4 Higher education

14. Housing and living conditions