Guidance

Country policy and information note: Falun Gong, China, November 2025 (accessible)

Updated 26 November 2025

Executive summary

Falun Gong is not considered a religion for the purposes of the refugee convention. It is a practice that uses meditation techniques and physical exercise for health and peace of mind. Those who practise Falun Gong do not necessarily see themselves as expressing a political opinion, but the Chinese state banned the movement in 1999, outlawing it as an ‘evil cult’ and they are viewed as a threat to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP).

Where decision makers find that a Falun Gong practitioner is at risk of persecution on return to China, then the Convention ground will be ‘political opinion’.

The reported current numbers of Falun Gong practitioners vary and are difficult to verify, with sources providing a range of between 7 million and 40 million out of a population of 1.4 billion. Falun Gong reportedly remains active throughout China.

Falun Gong practitioners face harassment, arrest and detention with members being sentenced to long prison terms. Detained practitioners are reportedly subjected to various methods of physical and psychological coercion, including torture in attempts to force them to renounce their beliefs and practice. Deaths in custody occur and forced organ harvesting (prior to or after execution) is reported on a significant scale, although denied by the state.

Those who engage in activities that are likely to bring them to the attention of the authorities are likely to be at risk of persecution or serious harm. This includes:

• the public practice of Falun Gong exercises

• recruitment of new members

• dissemination of Falun Gong information

• those who have previously come to the adverse attention of the authorities for their actual or perceived membership of Falun Gong.

In general, a person who practises Falun Gong in private and with discretion is unlikely to be at real risk of persecution or serious harm. In such cases the reasons for a person using such ‘discretion’ must be considered and if this is due to fear of persecution, they should also be considered as a refugee.

In Hong Kong, Falun Gong is not illegal and is practised openly. In general, a practitioner is unlikely to be at risk of treatment from state actors that amounts to persecution or serious harm.

Falun Gong practitioners outside of China who openly highlight the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners within China or who counter the CCP’s view are likely to attract adverse attention from the Chinese state.

All cases must be considered on their individual facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate they face persecution or serious harm.

Assessment

Section updated: 25 November 2025

About the assessment

This section considers the evidence relevant to this note – that is the country information, refugee/human rights laws and policies, and applicable caselaw – and provides an assessment of whether, in general:

• a person faces a real risk of persecution/serious harm by the state because they are a Falun Gong practitioner.
• the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection
• internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution/serious harm
• a claim, if refused, is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Decision makers must, however, consider all claims on an individual basis, taking into account each case’s specific facts.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks/referrals

1.1 Credibility

1.1.1 For information on assessing credibility, see the instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

1.1.2 Decision makers must also check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

1.1.3 Decision makers must also consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

1.1.4 In cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin, decision makers should also consider language analysis testing, where available (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis).

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1.2 Exclusion

1.2.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

1.2.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection (which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status).

1.2.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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2. Convention reason(s)

2.1.1 Actual or imputed political opinion.

2.1.2 Establishing a convention reason is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of an actual or imputed Refugee Convention reason.

2.1.3 Falun Gong is regarded as a practice rather than a religion (see Falun Gong). Decision makers should not therefore treat Falun Gong as a religion within the meaning of the Refugee Convention.

2.1.4 In the country guidance case of LL (Falun Gong, Convention Reason, Risk) China CG [2005] UKAIT 00122 (heard 29 July 2005 and promulgated 9 August 2005), the Upper Tribunal (UT) accepted that Falun Gong members do not constitute a PSG within the terms of the Refugee Convention for reasons described in the Court of Appeal judgment in L China v The Secretary Page 6 of 33 of State for the Home Department [2004] EWCA Civ 1441 (heard 21 September 2004 and promulgated 03 November 2004). The EWCA found that Falun Gong members do not form a PSG because they ‘… possessed no immutable characteristics. Membership is a matter of choice, and a person can become a member and then cease to be a member at any time. The fact that members of the Falun Gong were persecuted could not itself qualify them for this purpose as members of “a particular social group”, because it has been repeatedly stated that the particular social group must exist independently of the persecution’ (para 25).

2.1.5 Regarding political opinion, the UT in LL held that:

‘It may be that members of Falun Gong do not see themselves as expressing a political opinion, and would certainly reject the proposition that they were a violent cult. Many practitioners would ascribe a spiritual dimension to their activity… Nevertheless, it seems clear to us on the objective evidence that the Chinese government imputes political opinion to them because of concern for their ability to mobilise public opinion on a very substantial scale outside the established structure of the Communist party, and they see this as a threat to the Communist Party and hence the state’ (para 32).

2.1.6 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instruction, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3. Risk

3.1 Mainland China

3.1.1 Those who engage in Falun Gong activities that bring them to the attention of the authorities are likely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state.

3.1.2 Activities that may attract adverse attention include:

• the public practice of Falun Gong exercises

• recruitment of new members

• dissemination of Falun Gong information

• those who have previously come to the adverse attention of the authorities for their actual or perceived membership of Falun Gong.

3.1.3 In general, a person who practises Falun Gong in private and with discretion is unlikely to be at real risk of persecution or serious harm. However, in such cases the reasons for a person using such ‘discretion’ must be considered. If such behaviour is as a result of attempting to avoid persecution, it is likely that they would qualify for refugee status.

3.1.4 Each case, however, must be considered on its facts with the onus on the person to demonstrate that they are likely to be at risk.

3.1.5 Falun Gong uses meditation techniques and physical exercise to achieve good health and peace of mind. Falun Gong reportedly remains active throughout China. The number of those in China currently believed to be practising Falun Gong ranges from 7 to 40 million out of a population of over 1.4 billion. (see What is Falun Gong?, Prevalence and Practice and beliefs).

3.1.6 The government outlawed the Falun Gong movement in 1999. Falun Gong is regarded as an ‘evil cult’ by the Chinese government and is on the list of banned groups published on the China Anti-Cult (xie jiao) website. Criminal law provides for prosecution for persons belonging to groups considered ‘cult organisations’, with punishment of up to life in prison (see Legal context and Legal status).

3.1.7 The 6-10 office, a police task force responsible for carrying out the elimination of Falun Gong has reportedly been disbanded, however Falun Gong practitioners in China continue to face systematic harassment, arbitrary arrest, and prolonged detention. Many individuals have reportedly received lengthy prison sentences. While in custody, practitioners are allegedly subjected to various forms of physical and psychological abuse, such as forced labour, torture, sexual violence, and forced drug administration, aimed at coercing them into renouncing their beliefs (see The 6-10 Office, Arrests and harassment and Torture and detention).

3.1.8 According to Minghui, a pro Falun Gong website that documents human rights violations against Falun Gong practitioners, in 2024 there were 2,828 newly confirmed arrests. Within the context of estimated Falun Gong practitioners, between 7-40 million, this number is relatively low (0.04%- 0.007%). The same source also reported that in 2024 there were 764 prison sentences, and 164 deaths. Additionally, 2,864 incidents of harassment were recorded. Some of the reported incidences occurred prior to 2024 but were only confirmed in 2024. Due to the challenges in verifying such cases and the risks faced by those reporting them, the actual number of incidents is believed to be higher (see Arrests and harassment, Prosecutions and Torture and detention).

3.1.9 Falun Gong practitioners are subject to surveillance through tracking devices and facial recognition cameras, especially if they take part in peaceful protests or share information in public. The surveillance becomes more intense around politically sensitive dates or major government events. Between January 2022 and April 2024, at least 142 practitioners were detained after being identified by these cameras while practising or spreading information peacefully (see Surveillance).

3.1.10 There is evidence, including findings from the independent China Tribunal and reports by international organisations, that Falun Gong practitioners have been targeted for forced organ harvesting in China, with estimates suggesting tens of thousands of transplants annually since 2000. UN experts and human rights bodies have expressed alarm at credible reports of blood tests, organ examinations, and removals without consent, with Falun Gong detainees identified as a principal source for organs. Despite official denials by Chinese authorities, survivor testimony and ongoing investigations indicate that this practice is large-scale, systematic, and ongoing, with the China Tribunal’s 2020 judgement stating there is “no evidence of the practice having been stopped” (see Organ harvesting).

3.1.11 In the country guidance case of LL the Tribunal held that ‘… our first conclusion as to risk, from the objective evidence as a whole, is that, absent special factors, there will not normally be any risk sufficient to amount to “real risk” from the Chinese authorities for a person who practices Falun Gong in private and with discretion. On any assessment the number of Falun Gong practitioners in China is very large indeed. The figures quoted range from 2 million to some 100 million. So far as can be gathered from the evidence before us, the number of people who have faced detention or re-education by the Chinese authorities as a consequence of Falun Gong activity, whilst large in absolute terms, is a relatively small proportion of the overall number of practitioners. This indicates that the large majority of those who practice Falun Gong in China in privacy and with discretion do not experience material problems with the authorities’ (para 35).

3.1.12 The UT in LL held that ‘… risk of material ill-treatment escalates significantly when a practitioner does engage in activities that are reasonably likely to bring him to the notice of the authorities. Such activities include the public practice of Falun Gong exercises, recruitment of new members, and dissemination of Falun Gong information. The risk of escalating ill-treatment also increases when a person who has previously come to the adverse attention of the authorities and has been detained/re-educated and warned against continuing Falun Gong activity, ignores that warning’ (para 37). However, the UT went on to hold that ‘… absent special factors and credible motivation, a person displaying limited knowledge of Falun Gong or limited involvement with it, is unlikely to be committed to undertaking activities on return to China that would bring him to the adverse attention of the authorities and materially increase his risk’ (para 38).

3.1.13 The UT in LL specifically found that Falun Gong meditation and exercises can be carried out alone or with a few friends in private, and that there does not appear to be any duty or pressure on a Falun Gong practitioner to proselytise, even though some do. The UT endorsed the earlier view expressed by the EWCA in L China that ‘We are not prepared to accept that authoritarian pressure to cease the practice of Falun Gong in public would involve the renunciation of core human rights entitlements’ (Para 36).

3.1.14 Although LL considered country information ranging from 1999-2004 the current available information does not indicate very strong grounds supported by cogent evidence to justify a departure from these findings.

3.1.15 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3.2 Hong Kong

3.2.1 Falun Gong practitioners are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from state actors in Hong Kong. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.

3.2.2 Falun Gong is not illegal in Hong Kong and can be practised openly but has all but vanished since the National Security Law. Practitioners have been able to peacefully protest and set-up information booths with materials about the practice and the human rights situation in China, although some booths have periodically faced violent assaults from unknown attackers, reportedly with links to the Chinese Communist Party (see Falun Gong in Hong Kong).

3.2.3 On 30 June 2020 China introduced the National Security Law (NSL) in Hong Kong, criminalising secession, subversion, terrorism, and foreign collusion and applies to offences committed within and outside Hong Kong. The Hong Kong government did not comment on how the NSL would impact Falun Gong but said it preserves ‘the basic rights and freedom lawfully enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.’ The law makes no mention of religious or spiritual groups. On 23 March 2024, the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO) took effect replacing the colonial-era sedition law and expanding offences to include treason insurrection, sabotage, external interference, sedition, theft of state secrets and espionage. In sources consulted there are no reported cases where the NSL or SNSO have been used in relation to Hong Kong Falun Gong practitioners (see Falun Gong in Hong Kong).

3.2.4 Following the enactment of the NSL, media and online freedom has been severely restricted, leading to the closure of numerous independent outlets. Practitioners of Falun Gong who are employed in the media or online news industry in the region have also been impacted by the crackdown and physical attacks (See Falun Gong in Hong Kong and the Country Policy and Information Note, China: Hong Kong national security legislation).

3.2.5 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

3.3 Falun Gong practitioners outside of China

3.3.1 Falun Gong practitioners outside of China who openly highlight or criticise the treatment of Falun Gong practitioners within China are likely to attract adverse attention from the Chinese state.

3.3.2 Whether a Falun Gong practitioner is likely to be at risk of persecution and/or serious harm on return to China will depend on a number of factors such as a person’s level of involvement in Falun Gong practice, the nature and frequency of any public activities related to this in the UK, and any previous adverse interest. Each case must be considered on its own facts, with the onus on the person to demonstrate why they would be at risk.

3.3.3 Falun Gong is generally open about its beliefs outside China. Its teachings are public, and repression by the Chinese government is a central theme in its activities abroad (see Falun Gong diaspora).

3.3.4 The Chinese authorities engage in extensive transnational repression, targeting Falun Gong practitioners globally. The CCP spreads anti-Falun Gong propaganda, funds Chinese-language media to control narratives, and uses the Chinese diaspora to monitor and report on practitioners. The CCP use threats to pension fund access, property, and bank accounts located in China to pressure overseas practitioners of Falun Gong and discourage related activism (see Falun Gong diaspora).

3.3.5 Practitioners abroad have also been subject to digital and physical surveillance and harassment. The Falun Gong affiliated dance group Shen Yun have faced bomb and shooting threats, including at UK venues where they were to perform and the Falun Dafa Association reported Chinese government pressure on venues to cancel their performances (see Falun Gong diaspora).

4. Protection

4.1.1 Where the person has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state, they are unlikely to be able to obtain protection.

4.1.2 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

5. Internal relocation

5.1.1 A person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from the state is unlikely to be able to internally relocate to escape that risk.

5.1.2 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instruction on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

6. Certification

6.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

6.1.2 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

This section contains publicly available or disclosable country of origin information (COI) which has been gathered, collated and analysed in line with the research methodology. It provides the evidence base for the assessment which, as stated in the About the assessment, is the guide to the current objective conditions.

The structure and content follow a terms of reference which sets out the general and specific topics relevant to the scope of this note.

This document is intended to be comprehensive but not exhaustive. If a particular event, person or organisation is not mentioned this does not mean that the event did or did not take place or that the person or organisation does or does not exist.

Sources often refer to Falun Gong as being a religion and those detained are recorded as being detained due to their religious beliefs. However, Falun Gong is regarded as a practice rather than a religion for the purposes of the refugee convention (see the section above on Convention reason(s).

The COI included was published or made publicly available on or before 24 November 2025. Any event taking place or report published after this date will not be included.

Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

7. Legal context

7.1 Constitution

7.1.1 Article 35 of the Constitution states: ‘Citizens of the People’s Republic of China shall enjoy freedom of speech, the press, assembly, association, procession and demonstration.’^{[footnote 1]}

7.2 Criminal code

7.2.1 Article 300 of the Criminal Law notes that:

‘Organizing or exploiting mystic sects or cult organizations, or using superstition to undermine the implementation of the nation’s laws and administrative provisions is sentenced to between three and seven years imprisonment and a concurrent fine; where circumstances are especially serious the sentence is seven or more years imprisonment and a concurrent fine; where circumstances are relatively minor, the sentence is up to three years imprisonment, short-term detention or controlled release and/or a fine.’^{[footnote 2]}

7.2.2 The Australian Government’s Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) in their 2024 Country Information Report, based on their ‘knowledge and discussions with a range of sources in Australia and overseas, and taking into account open-source reports’ (DFAT 2024 report) noted that the provisions under Article 300:

‘… can be used in cases where “superstitious beliefs” are used to “deceive another person”, resulting in serious injuries or death. In some cases, being found in possession of literature of a xie jiao had been regarded as sufficient for the application of Article 300. According to research conducted by Dui Hua, an American human rights research foundation, there were 3,550 people tried for violating Article 300 in 2018 (the most recent information available).’^{[footnote 3]}

8. Falun Gong

8.1 What is Falun Gong?

8.1.1 The Falun Dafa Information Center, the official press office of the Falun Gong movement, noted in undated information that:

‘Falun Gong (also called Falun Dafa) is an ancient spiritual practice in the Buddhist tradition. Falun Gong combines meditation and gentle exercises (similar to yoga or tai chi) with a moral philosophy centered on the tenets of Truthfulness, Compassion, and Tolerance (or in Chinese, Zhen 真, Shan 善, Ren 忍). Falun Gong practitioners aspire to live by these principles in their daily lives.

‘In traditional Chinese culture, the process of perfecting and refining mind and body is called “cultivation.” Our modern language uses the word qigong to describe it. What differentiates Falun Gong from other forms of qigong is its emphasis on one’s morality, character, and the cultivation of virtue.’^{[footnote 4]}

8.1.2 The 2024 DFAT Report noted:

‘Falun Gong (Falun Dafa) is based on the practice of qigong, a generic term for a family of meditative breathing and stretching exercises with a long history in China. Qigong experienced a resurgence in popularity in the 1980s and 1990s, and Li Hongzhi (commonly referred to by followers as ‘Master Li’) established Falun Gong in 1992 at the same time as similar movements. Falun Gong is the most well-known qigong group outside China, however others exist and many of them are banned or monitored in China.^{[footnote 5]}

8.2 Legal status

8.2.1 Falun Gong was designated as a xie jiao (cult) in 1998 and formerly made illegal in 1999.^{[footnote 6]}

8.2.2 The US State Department 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom (USSD 2023 IRF report) published on 26 June 2024 noted: ‘The CCP maintains an extralegal [unregulated], party-run security apparatus to eliminate the Falun Gong religious group and other banned organizations. The government considers Falun Gong an “illegal organization.”’^{[footnote 7]}

8.3 Prevalence

8.3.1 The 2024 DFAT Report noted: ‘No official data exists on the number of practitioners because the religion was banned in China in 1999, remains illegal, and operates in secret to avoid detection by authorities. Unofficial estimates of Falun Gong practitioners in China vary up to tens of millions.’^{[footnote 8]}

8.3.2 The USSD 2023 IRF report noted: ‘Prior to the government’s 1999 ban on Falun Gong, the government estimated there were 70 million adherents. Falun Gong sources estimate that tens of millions continue to practice privately.’^{[footnote 9]}

8.3.3 According to Safeguard Defenders: ‘Between 7 and 40 million people inside China are thought to still practice Falun Gong despite the risks.’^{[footnote 10]}

8.4 History

8.4.1 Falun Gong was founded in north-east China in 1992 by Li Hongzhi.^{[footnote 11] [footnote 12]}

8.4.2 The Economist noted in 2018 that:

‘By the late 1990s millions of Chinese from all walks of life had taken up Falun Gong. Practitioners could be seen meditating in parks and public squares in every city.

‘Falun Gong’s growing appeal spooked the ruling Communist Party. The party wants the undivided loyalty of China’s people, and Mr Li, a living leader, competed for that loyalty. Officials would have felt threatened by what they saw as a powerful “competing ideology”, as one Falun Gong practitioner puts it, and by the incredible growth in the number of practitioners between 1992 and 1999. In 1996 the government banned public sales of “Zhuan Falun”, the spiritual movement’s main text. Soon afterwards newspaper editorials began attacking Falun Gong, claiming it drives adherents to commit suicide. In April 1999 more than 10,000 aggrieved Falun Gong practitioners protested outside Zhongnanhai, the party’s headquarters in Beijing. In response to the provocation Jiang Zemin, China’s then president, vowed to eradicate the sect. In June 1999 he set up Office 610 (named after the date of its creation) [see The 610 Office], a secretive extra-judicial party organisation tasked with suppressing Falun Gong, and the following month the government declared the sect illegal. Within months thousands of practitioners were rounded up, sent to jail or “re-education” centres.’^{[footnote 13]}

8.4.3 Safeguard Defenders, a human rights NGO founded in 2016^{[footnote 14]}, noted that: ‘On 22 July 1999, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) banned Falun Gong as “a threat to social and political stability” after 10,000 members staged a protest in Beijing urging for legal recognition. The number of followers – estimated to be in the tens of millions inside China back then – and their ability to stage large protests spooked the Party, prompting the ban.’^{[footnote 15]}

8.5 Practice and beliefs

8.5.1 The 2024 DFAT Report noted:

‘Core to Falun Gong beliefs is the reading and re-reading of the Zhuan Falun, their sacred text comprising a series of lectures made by Li Hongzhi. International academics told DFAT in 2021 that a thorough knowledge and constant re-reading of the Zhuan Falun was central to Falun Gong beliefs; one could not be Falun Gong without that practice. By performing exercises, following the moral teachings of the religion and reading and re-reading the sacred text Zhuan Falun, believers of Falun Gong hoped to ascend to a state of perfection or “cultivation”.

‘Practitioners may not see Falun Gong as a religion, instead viewing it as a method for “cultivation” or as a science. Unlike other qigong practices, Falun Gong has moral teachings and supernatural aspects. International academics told DFAT in 2021 that these teachings and aspects did not form a core part of Falun Gong belief or practice, at least for most members. The Government of China and some former members reported in 2021 that Falun Gong encouraged isolation from families or the refusal of medical treatment. Falun Gong denied these reports.

‘… there is no initiation ceremony. Unlike some other new religious movements, there are no “gradations” of knowledge where one has to be admitted or inducted into knowledge after perhaps being a believer for a certain time or paying a fee… While Falun Gong practitioners were generally able to practise privately in their homes in China in 2022, they often faced difficulty finding landlords who would rent them apartments.’^{[footnote 16]}

8.6 Proselytism

8.6.1 The 2024 DFAT Report noted: ‘Due to fear of arrest, members of Falun Gong do not openly proselytise in China …’^{[footnote 17]}

9. State treatment of Falun Gong practitioners

9.1 State attitude and treatment

9.1.1 The Congressional Executive Commission on China (CECC), an independent agency of the US government which monitors human rights in China^{[footnote 18]}, noted in their 2024 Annual Report published in December 2024:

‘[People’s Republic of China] PRC authorities continued to monitor, detain, and imprison Falun Gong adherents in connection with their practice of Falun Gong. Authorities often detain Falun Gong practitioners for violating Article 300 of the PRC Criminal Law, which criminalizes “organizing and using a cult to undermine implementation of the law.” The Falun Gong-affiliated website Minghui reported the deaths of dozens of Falun Gong practitioners due to mistreatment while in custody and more than a thousand cases of Falun Gong practitioners being harassed or sentenced by authorities. Falun Gong practitioners are often detained multiple times over the course of years.’^{[footnote 19]}

9.1.2 The 2024 DFAT Report noted:

‘Authorities actively search for and prosecute Falun Gong practitioners. Adherents have been imprisoned for between three and seven years under Article 300 of China’s Criminal Code (2020).

‘… Lawyers defending Falun Gong practitioners in China risk their careers, among other things, because challenging the government’s designation of a cult organisation has been deemed in breach of the Measures on the Administration of Lawyers’ Practice (2016) and could lead to their licence to practice being invalidated. According to ongoing reporting by Dui Hua, China’s Ministry of Justice, Domestic Security Bureau of the Public Security Ministry, and subordinate departments, pressure human rights lawyers representing Falun Gong practitioners to resign from these cases due to the “negative impact on society”.’^{[footnote 20]}

9.1.3 A written statement by Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a UK based human rights organisation^{[footnote 21]} submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in 2023 noted: ‘State media depict the group as evil and openly call for its “complete eradication”, and China established an extra-legal security agency called ‘610 Office’ for that purpose. Extensive evidence shows the authorities continue to repress and abuse Falun Gong followers across China on a large scale, subjecting them to arbitrary detention, imprisonment, forced labour and discriminatory treatment while in custody on account of their faith.’^{[footnote 22]}

9.1.4 The Epoch Times, a conservative newspaper associated with the Falun Gong movement and critical of the CCP^{[footnote 23]}, noted in July 2025 that: ‘The regime, initially supportive, took the practice’s popularity as a threat to its power. On July 20, 1999, it launched a national persecution, using forced labor, torture, and other forms of torment to force practitioners to give up the faith.’^{[footnote 24]}

9.1.5 The same source also noted in August 2025 that: ‘The Party often frames Falun Gong as “anti-China,” using it as an excuse to persecute its followers. In doing so, the Party conflates Falun Gong practitioners’ opposition to the brutalities of authoritarianism with hostility toward the nation and its people.’^{[footnote 25]}

9.1.6 Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, ‘an educational, research, and human rights nonprofit organization’^{[footnote 26]}, noted in July 2025 that: ‘Since the CCP banned Falun Gong, religious freedom conditions in China have only gone from bad to worse, with Falun Gong practitioners facing the brunt of the state’s persecution of religious groups. Chinese authorities have relentlessly harassed, surveilled, fined, detained, imprisoned, denied medical care, and tortured to death Falun Gong practitioners for their religious activities.’^{[footnote 27]}

9.2 The 610 Office

9.2.1 Falun Dafa Infocenter, in undated information, noted that:

‘The 610 Office, named for its creation date of June 10, 1999, is an extra legal police task force responsible for carrying out the mission of eliminating Falun Gong. It acts under the direction of high-level officials and the CCP’s Leading Group. Its formal name is the Office of the Leading Group for Prevention and Handling Xie jiao-related (heretic) Issues of the CCP Central Committee. This office has branches throughout the country and operates with significant autonomy and power, often bypassing regular legal and governmental procedures.

‘… The 610 Office was formed concurrently as the Leading Group and is named after the date of its creation: June 10, 1999. The office functions outside the state system without any official standing. At its core, the 610 Office is a plainclothes CCP-based extra-ministerial security force focused on suppressing the Falun Gong spiritual group. The Leading Group sets the policy direction, which the 610 Office executes.

‘…  In March 2018, the party-state underwent a restructuring and consolidation process, transferring the responsibilities of the Leading Group and its 610 Office to the Central Political and Legal Affairs Commission (PLAC) and the MPS.

‘… Following the 2018 consolidation, the responsibilities and functions of the former Central 610 Office have been absorbed by other agencies under the MPS and the PLAC. References to the 610 Office continue to appear on some local websites and in victim accounts, but much less frequently than in the past.’^{[footnote 28]}

9.2.2 Safeguard Defenders noted in July 2024 that: ‘In June 1999, before the ban, a Party organization, the 610 Office, was secretly set up to oversee the eradication of Falun Gong in China. The 610 Office was likely responsible for deciding on sentence lengths for those accused of Article 300 crimes. It appears to have been disbanded in 2018.’^{[footnote 29]}

9.2.3 For further background information on the 6-10 Office see the Falun Dafa Infocenter video Unmasking China’s Gestapo.

Unmasking China’s Gestapo.

9.3 Arrests and harassment

9.3.1 The 2024 DFAT Report noted: ‘Membership in a xie jiao is illegal in China, and the profile of a person who is a member – whether they are a leader or an ordinary believer – was not relevant in 2023 to the chances of arrest once detected. Even low-profile worshippers in a xie jiao were subject to arrest to in 2023.’^{[footnote 30]}

9.3.2 On 20 January 2025 Minghui, ‘a website dedicated to reporting on the Falun Gong community worldwide’^{[footnote 31]} reported that: ‘In 2024 … Minghui.org … confirmed the arrests of 2,828 practitioners and 2,864 incidents of harassment.’ ^{[footnote 32]} Minghui did not explain what instances were included in their definition of harassment and no information was available about the methodology or how they collected their data on the arrests and harassment events.

9.3.3 The same Minghui report noted ‘… China has 22 provinces, 4 centrally controlled municipalities (Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, and Chongqing), and 5 autonomous regions (Guangxi, Inner Mongolia, Tibet, Guangxi, Xinjiang, and Ningxia). Except for Tibet, all other 30 jurisdictions reported arrest and harassment cases in 2024.

‘Since the persecution of Falun Gong started 25 years ago, most of the northern provinces, including Hebei, Shandong, Liaoning, Jilin and Heilongjiang, have been consistently carrying out the most severe persecution. The year 2024 was no exception …

Province	Arrested	Harassed
Hebei	330	648
Shandong	303	384
Liaoning	389	266
Jilin	390	201
Sichuan	176	296
Heilongjiang	185	213
Hubei	192	140
Guangdong	125	87
Hunan	122	85
Beijing	89	87
Daqing	53	82
Shaanxi	74	55
Yunnan	56	40
Jiangxi	66	13
Shanghai	14	63
Inner Mongolia	33	41
Jiangsu	49	19
Tianjin	44	21
Gansu	19	30
Henan	31	12
Shanxi	16	21
Anhui	28	6
Ningxia	7	23
Guizhou	15	14
Fujian	9	7
Zhejiang	9	3
Hainan		6
Guangxi	2	1
Xinjiang	1
Qinghai	1
Total	2,828	2,864

‘… The reported 2,828 arrests and 2,864 incidents of harassment all took place in 2024. Except 82 arrests and 81 harassment cases with unknown occurrence months, the other combined 5,529 cases took place throughout the year. In particular, the persecution between March and September was much more severe than the rest of the year. The monthly average of 613 arrest and harassment cases during the seven months (March – September) was nearly 2.5 times the monthly average cases (248) in the other five months (January, February, October, November and December).

Month	Arrested	Harassed
Jan	182	118
Feb	92	110
Mar	287	296
Apr	467	300
May	402	352
Jun	286	369
Jul	312	304
Aug	216	204
Sep	175	320
Oct	113	137
Nov	92	143
Dec	122	130
Unknown	81	82
Total	2,825	2,865

‘The spiking of persecution cases in the middle of the year is related to several anniversaries about Falun Gong and the CCP’s annual political meetings. In March, the CCP held its two annual political meetings. “April 25” was the anniversary of a historic appeal by 10,000 practitioners outside of the central government compound in Beijing, demanding the release of a few arrested practitioners and a free environment to practice their faith. “May 13” was “World Falun Dafa Day” and also the anniversary of when Falun Gong was introduced to the public. “July 20” marked the 25th anniversary of the persecution. And “October 1” was the National Day holiday, when the CCP declared the establishment of the government.’ ^{[footnote 33]}

9.3.4 In relation to the profile of targeted practitioners in 2024, Minghui noted:

‘… Among the 5,692 …1,067 of them were 60 or older, including 365 in their 60s, 498 in their 70s, 194 in their 80s and 10 in their 90s. The oldest practitioner, Ms. Liu Xinlan, 99 and of Meizhou City, Guangdong Province, was harassed at home on March 31, 2024. The police seized a copy of Zhuan Falun, the main text of Falun Gong.

‘… The practitioners came from all walks of life, including college teachers, engineers, doctors, post office workers, bank employees, prosecutors and judges.’^{[footnote 34]}

9.3.5 Minghui reported in July 2025 that during the first half of 2025 there were a reported 2,003 cases of Falun Gong practitioners being arrested or harassed due to their practice of Falun Gong. The report noted:

‘These 2,003 cases break down to 948 arrests and 1,055 cases of harassment. Among them, 446 practitioners had their homes ransacked, 20 were taken to brainwashing centers, 17 were forced to live away from home to avoid further persecution, and at least 20 practitioners had their pensions suspended. … Most of the practitioners were arrested at home. The oldest was 88 years old at the time of arrest. … Among the 2,003 targeted practitioners, 397 were 60 or older, including 111 in their 60s, 186 in their 70s, 95 in their 80s, and 5 in their 90s.’^{[footnote 35]}

9.3.6 Bitter Winter, an online magazine on religious liberty and human rights in China, published by the Center for Studies on New Religions (CESNUR)^{[footnote 36]}, reported in July 2025 that an 81-year-old Falun Gong practitioner Wang Jianying, had been jailed in Jilin Province. Wang Jianying had previously been arrested in 2001 and spent 2 years in a detention center. In 2004 he was arrested again and detained for 2 and a half years. In August 2024 he was arrested again spent 15 days in detention and was then released pending trial. In June 2025 he was sentenced to 5 years in prison following a video trial at home and was subsequently rearrested in July and detained with a release date set for May 2030.^{[footnote 37]}

9.4 Prosecutions

9.4.1 Minghui reported in January 2025 that 764 Falun Gong practitioners were reported to have been sentenced in 2024, with terms ranging from 3 months to 13 years. Minghui stated that the delay in reporting was due to CCP’s strict information censorship.^{[footnote 38]} The report went on to note that: ‘The 764 newly-confirmed sentencing cases in 2024 included 2 that took place in 2017 and 2019 respectively, 6 in 2020, 5 in 2021, 20 in 2022, 185 in 2023, 448 in 2024, and 98 cases for which the dates of sentencing are unknown.’^{[footnote 39]}

9.4.2 The below chart is taken from the January 2025 Minghui article^{[footnote 40]} and shows the sentencing cases reported in 2024 by the year and month the sentence occurred.

Year/Month	Jan	Feb	Mar	Apr	May	Jun	Jul	Aug	Sep	Oct	Nov	Dec	Unknown	Grand Total
2017													1	1
2019													1	1
2020							1					1	4	6
2021							1				3		2	5
2022								1		4	3		8	20
2023	2	3	1	1	3	4	6	8	24	67	66			185
2024	64	6	39	48	35	20	32	16	29	25	17	14	103	448
Unknown													98	98
Grand Total	65	7	41	52	36	21	36	21	35	37	45	85	283	764

9.4.3 The below chart, taken from the January 2025 Minghui article^{[footnote 41]} shows the geographic distribution of the 764 sentencing cases of Falun Gong practitioners reported in 2024.

9.4.4 The same Minghui article noted:

‘The Chinese Supreme People’s Procuratorate announced in February 2024 that in recent years, 85% of convicted criminals received three years or less, compared to 55% in 1999. Yet for the 764 sentencing cases of Falun Gong practitioners reported in 2024, their terms ranged from 3 months to 13 years, with 378 (49.5%) receiving three years or more. In particular, 101 (13.2%) practitioners were sentenced to 5 years or longer. 

‘… A total of 263 practitioners were fined a total of 2,909,000 yuan [£305,742^{[footnote 42]}]. Two practitioners were fined 150,000 yuan [£15,764^{[footnote 43]}] each, 7 were fined between 50,000 [£5,254^{[footnote 44]}] and 90,000 yuan [£9,458^{[footnote 45]}], 116 received fines between 10,000 [£1,050^{[footnote 46]}] and 40,000 yuan [£4,203^{[footnote 47]}], and another 138 practitioners were fined between 1,000 [£105^{[footnote 48]}] and 8,000 yuan [£840^{[footnote 49]}].’^{[footnote 50]}

9.4.5 Minghui reported in July 2025 that during the first half of 2025, 430 Falun Gong practitioners had been sentenced due to their practise of Falun Gong. The source went on to note that: ‘The newly confirmed cases included 3 that from 2020, three from 2021, six from 2022, 14 from 2023, 151 from 2024, 249 from 2025, and four cases with unknown sentencing years. The delay in reporting was caused by the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) strict information censorship … for the 430 sentencing cases of Falun Gong practitioners reported in the first half of 2025, their terms ranged from several months to ten years, with 249 (57.9%) receiving three years or more.’^{[footnote 51]}

9.5 Torture and detention

9.5.1 Falun Dafa Infocenter, in an undated article noted:

‘For millions of people in China, the most basic reality of the campaign against Falun Gong has been living under constant risk of detention. Once detained, practitioners face sham trials and potentially years in prison, where they face torture and abuse. Others are held in makeshift detention centers or “black jails”—a network of extralegal detention centers in China …

‘… Since early 2000, the use of torture on Falun Gong detainees has been widely documented by major media, human rights organizations, and the United Nations. There are at least 100,000 cases of torture documented by Minghui.org, and reasons to believe the true number is several times higher.

‘Common torture techniques include shocking with electric batons, burning with irons, tying the body in painful positions for days, force-feeding saline solutions through a plastic tube inserted up the nose, and prying out fingernails with bamboo shoots, to name a few. Rape and sexual torture of Falun Gong practitioners in detention are prevalent as well.’^{[footnote 52]}

9.5.2 An article from the Journal of Political Risk, a peer-reviewed journal covering political risk^{[footnote 53]}, dated 20 July 2022, reported:

‘Within labour camps, prisons, and reeducation centers, violence is used to “transform” the minds of Falun Gong believers. Transformation is described by the Congressional-Executive Commission on China as “a process of ideological reprogramming whereby practitioners are subjected to various methods of physical and psychological coercion until they recant their belief in Falun Gong” - in other words, forced religious conversion. Labour camps and prison officials receive compensation for every Falun Gong practitioner who is transformed, and are punished or denied promotions if they fail to meet transformation quotas.

‘Individuals are considered to have been successfully transformed when they sign statements promising to stop practicing Falun Gong, sever all connections with the group, condemn the doctrine and teachings of the practice, engage in self-criticism, and agree to cooperate with authorities. They may also be required to make videotaped statements denouncing Falun Gong, or to participate in the transformation of their former coreligionists, including by physically abusing them. Such methods are apparently seen as effective ways to test the sincerity of the newly converted. Former Falun Gong detainees describe the process of forced conversion as a source of extreme anguish …

‘For Falun Gong practitioners who do not willingly submit to the transformation process, authorities employ increasingly severe physical torture against them. Common forms of torture include beatings, shocks with electric truncheons, crude or violent forced-feedings, simulated drowning, sexual humiliation and rape with foreign objects, injections with unknown pharmacological or psychotropic substances, and suspension by the limbs or being forced into stress positions, sometimes for days or weeks at a time. In addition, detainees encounter sleep deprivation, lack of access to sanitation, insufficient food, and denial of medical treatment. As of 2008, Falun Gong sources had compiled over 63,000 individual reports of torture in custody, many of them specifying the precise circumstances of the torture and the names of the alleged perpetrators … The combination of psychological pressure and physical torture causes severe and lasting harm in its victims, a portion of whom suffer long-term physical disabilities, mental collapse, or death following their release from custody.’^{[footnote 54]}

9.5.3 The USSD 2023 IRF report noted: ‘Human rights advocates expressed concern about ongoing detention and in some cases reports of torture of Falun Gong practitioners, often for alleged activities related to Falun Gong practice.’^{[footnote 55]}

9.5.4 A written statement by Christian Solidarity Worldwide submitted to the UN Human Rights Council noted: ‘Falun Gong practitioners outside of China regularly report long lists of cases of Falun Gong practitioners subjected to torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment under police custody, causing serious bodily and mental harm. Although this group are not generally sentenced under the death penalty in China, thousands have reportedly died because of torture and abuse in custody, typically after they refused to recant their beliefs.’^{[footnote 56]}

9.5.5 In January 2025 Minghui reported that there were 164 newly reported deaths of Falun Gong practitioners in 2024. The article went on to note that: ‘As of December 31, 2024, a total of 5,167 death cases have been confirmed. Some of the practitioners were tortured to death, while others passed away after suffering years of mental distress or financial devastation. Due to strict information censorship and practitioners who were victimized in the live organ harvesting crime, the actual death toll is believed to be much higher.’^{[footnote 57]} CPIT note: not all the deaths occurred while the person was in detention. The recorded deaths included those who had been released from detention, previously arrested and those who had experienced harassment.

9.5.6 The Falun Dafa Info Center, in their address at the USCIRF Hearing: State-Controlled Religion in China, on October 16, 2025, mentioned that: ‘Among the 164 victims, nearly two-thirds were women, ranging in age from 40 to 91. The deaths occurred across 25 provinces, municipalities, and autonomous regions.’^{[footnote 58]}

9.5.7 Minghui reported in February 2025 that: ‘According to information collected by Minghui.org, as of November 20, 2023, at least 161 practitioners died from involuntary drug administration, including 39 who died in custody and another 122 who passed away after being released.’^{[footnote 59]}

9.5.8 Freedom House, in their annual Freedom in the World report, published on 26 February 2025 noted in relation to general prison conditions that:

‘Conditions in places of detention are harsh, with reports of inadequate food, regular beatings, and deprivation of medical care. In addition to their use to extract confessions, torture and other forms of coercion are widely employed in efforts to force political and religious dissidents to recant their beliefs. Impunity is the norm for police brutality and suspicious deaths in custody. Citizens and lawyers who seek redress for such abuse are often met with reprisals or imprisonment. Peaceful protesters are regularly beaten by police or hired aggressors.’^{[footnote 60]}

9.5.9 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF) produce the ‘Frank R Wolf Freedom of Religion or belief Victims List’, which records victims targeted due to their religion or belief and includes those currently detained, those released, those who have died in custody and those whose whereabouts are unknown. According to their website the list is compiled using USCIRF ongoing monitoring, communication with those affected and organisations that focus on religious freedom. USCIRF go on to note however that: ‘… due to the policies of foreign governments and the lack of independent news and human rights organizations in the countries represented in this database, it is difficult to obtain, confirm, and verify comprehensive information about all victims.’^{[footnote 61]}

9.5.10 At the time of writing, the USCIRF list recorded the details of 217 Falun Gong practitioners. The whereabouts of 101 people on the list were unknown, 21 people on the list were recorded as released. The remaining 95 were recorded as detained.^{[footnote 62]} See Annex A: Table of detained Falun Gong practitioners for further information.

9.5.11 See also Organ harvesting

9.6 Surveillance

9.6.1 Falun Dafa Infocenter’s report ‘Falun Gong: 25 years of persecution, 25 years too long’, published in July 2024 noted:

‘Intense monitoring and harassment of Falun Gong practitioners often accompanies sensitive dates and major political events when security forces increase surveillance under the pretext of pre-emptively restricting an expected source of dissent. This occurred, for example, in the run-up to the CCP’s five-year Communist Party Congress held in October 2022, at which Xi Jinping was anointed for an unprecedented third term as the CCP leader. As early as February 2022, local government websites were already announcing actions to closely monitor Falun Gong believers in preparation for the Party Congress. This also occurred in locations far from Beijing, where the Congress was taking place, including in Shanghai and Northeast China. Additional upticks occurred in March and April 2023, possibly triggered by two events deemed sensitive by the CCP—its annual political meetings in March and Falun Gong’s 24th anniversary of a peaceful demonstration by 10,000 practitioners that took place on April 25, 1999.

‘… Meanwhile, digital surveillance plays an increasingly significant role in monitoring Falun Gong believers across China. Advanced technologies, including comprehensive databases, are utilized by Chinese security forces to track and monitor practitioners. From January 2022 to April 2024, 142 Falun Gong practitioners are known to have been detained after being caught by cameras engaging in peaceful practice of their belief or information dissemination. According to independent researchers, these systems have been in use for years, initially targeting Falun Gong before expanding to encompass other groups.

‘Facial recognition technology is also employed to identify Falun Gong practitioners involved in activism or disseminating information in public spaces. The surveillance research firm, IPVM discovered in December 2022 that Hikvision’s smart policing software included features to alert authorities of Falun Gong practitioners’ activities and locations through surveillance camera footage.’^{[footnote 63]}

9.6.2 Minghui noted in July 2025 with regard to the arrests of Falun Gong practitioners that: ‘The police used various surveillance methods, such as installing location tracking devices on the practitioners’ private cars and electric bikes, and following them to monitor their daily activities, before conducting the arrests.’^{[footnote 64]}

9.7 Organ harvesting

9.7.1 The Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China, also referred to as The China Tribunal, was commissioned by The International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC). The Tribunal heard evidence between 8-10 December 2018 and 6-7 April 2019. The judgement was published on 1 March 2020 and the Tribunal concluded that: ‘In the long-term practice in the PRC of forced organ harvesting it was indeed Falun Gong practitioners who were used as a source – probably the principal source – of organs for forced organ harvesting.’^{[footnote 65]}

9.7.2 The New York Bar Association’s report on ‘Human Organ Supply: Report on Ethical Considerations and Breaches in Organ Harvesting Practices’, published in March 2023 noted:

‘In China, transplants of kidneys, hearts, lungs, and livers grew exponentially in the early 2000s. Many of the transplants were for transplant tourists and Chinese citizens, who were assured of organs with very short wait times. There is evidence that Chinese military hospitals engage in forced organ harvesting. Chinese officials admitted to killing prisoners to obtain organs and, in 2009, government officials stated that the prisoners were on death row and had consented to the organ donation. In 2010, China claimed it would initiate a voluntary organ donation system in 2011 and would end the use of executed prisoners’ organs by 2015. Yet investigations proved that the organs came from prisoners of conscience not on death row. (Regardless of being on death row, organ procurement from any prisoner violates ethical guidelines.) During this time, there was a noted increase in organs for transplant. An estimated 60,000 to 100,000 transplants took place from 2000 to 2014 during which time the primary victims were Falun Gong practitioners.’^{[footnote 66]}

9.7.3 Anne Zimmerman, the Editor-in-Chief of Voices in Bioethics Columbia University, in an article titled ‘Forced Organ Harvesting: Expanding the Dead Donor Rule’, noted in 2023 that:

‘In China, there is evidence that people incarcerated for religious beliefs and practices (Falun Gong) … have been subjects of forced organ harvesting. A tribunal (the China Tribunal) found beyond a reasonable doubt that China engaged in forced organ harvesting. … As early as 2006, investigators found evidence of forced organ harvesting from Falun Gong practitioners. …“China is the only country in the world to have an industrial-scale organ trafficking practice that harvests organs from executed prisoners of conscience.”^{[footnote 67]}

9.7.4 CECC noted in their 2024 Annual Report that: ‘In testimony provided at a Commission hearing in March 2024, experts expressed ongoing concerns about the possible forced removal of organs from religious and ethnic minorities in China, including Falun Gong practitioners.’^{[footnote 68]}

9.7.5 The 2024 DFAT Report noted:

‘Many publicly available sources report imprisoned Falun Gong practitioners and their lawyers have been subjected to psychiatric experimentation and organ harvesting. On 12 June 2021, 12 UN experts stated that they were “extremely alarmed by reports of alleged ‘organ harvesting’ targeting minorities, including Falun Gong practitioners’, … in detention in China”. These UN experts said they had received credible information that detainees from ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities may have been forcibly subjected to blood tests and organ examinations such as ultrasound and x-rays, without their informed consent; while other prisoners were not required to undergo such examinations. UN experts stated that the results of the examinations were reportedly registered in a database of living organ sources that facilitated organ allocation. The China Tribunal, initiated by the International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China, investigated organ harvesting in China. The China Tribunal concluded in 2019 that “forced organ harvesting has been committed for years throughout China on a significant scale and that Falun Gong practitioners have been one – and probably the main – source of organ supply”. DFAT was unable to verify these claims at the time of publication in 2024.’^{[footnote 69]}

9.7.6 According to background information in a prepared statement by Matthew Robertson, a Chinese studies research fellow in data sciences at the Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation, for the ‘Stopping the Crime of Organ Harvesting - What More Must Be Done?’ hearing before the CECC on 20 March 2024:

‘Chinese-language sources reveal that the two key shifts in China’s transplant sector beginning in 2000 were volume and waiting times: tens of thousands of transplants were performed annually, many on an on-demand basis, coinciding with a gradual and then sudden drop in judicial executions. The use of political prisoners as an organ source, particularly Falun Gong adherents incarcerated en masse from July 1999, is the only plausible explanation for this outcome.’^{[footnote 70]}

9.7.7 The Epoch Times reported in July 2025 that: ‘In March 2020, the [London-based independent China] tribunal stated in its final judgement that there was “no evidence of the practice [of forced organ harvesting] having been stopped.”’^{[footnote 71]}

9.7.8 The Diplomat, an international current-affairs magazine for the Asia-Pacific region^{[footnote 72]}, published an article in August 2024 of an interview with Mr Cheng Pei Ming, the first known survivor of forced organ harvesting. It noted:

‘David Matas, an international human rights lawyer and co-founder of the International Coalition to End Transplant Abuse in China (ETAC), commented on the significance of Cheng’s case: “This particular issue required intensive research, as there are no surviving victims, no bodies to autopsy, and no easily accessible crime scenes or documents … Till now, there has not been anybody who was able to get up and say they have been killed for their organs. The bodies are often cremated after organ harvesting, so there is nothing physically to look at. Mr. Cheng can say he has been organ harvested as there are parts of his liver and lung that are missing, and it’s incontestable. It provides a visual element, a speaking victim that we’ve never seen before with that type of abuse.”

‘Matas emphasized the unprecedented nature of Cheng’s survival, but also noted that “Mr. Cheng’s survival itself is chilling because it’s the first case I have seen where someone didn’t even know about it until he got to the U.S. and was examined. This case reinforces that Falun Gong practitioners are demonized to the point where they are not treated fairly, and that mistreatment extends to organ harvesting.”

‘Matas, who has done extensive research into organ harvesting in China, also provided a statement at the press conference that underscored the severity of the situation and sought accountability from the government of China. Matas believes there are over an estimated 100,000 people killed through organ harvesting in China per year.’^{[footnote 73]}

9.7.9 The Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation noted in July 2025 that: ‘In 2024, we learned of the first known survivor of China’s forced organ harvesting— Cheng Pei Ming, a Falun Gong practitioner who discovered that segments of his liver and a portion of his lung had been surgically removed while imprisoned. This confirms what has been documented for years: that the CCP operates one of the world’s largest organ transplant programs while having extremely low rates of voluntary organ donation.’^{[footnote 74]}

10. Falun Gong in Hong Kong

10.1.1 Although Falun Gong was banned in mainland China in 1999, its members have been allowed to practise the discipline in Hong Kong freely.^{[footnote 75]} However, in June 2020, Beijing inserted national security legislation directly into Hong Kong’s mini-constitution criminalising ‘subversion, secession, collusion with foreign forces and terrorist acts’.^{[footnote 76]} Reuters reported in an article dated 27 July 2020: ‘The Hong Kong government declined to comment on how the new law would impact Falun Gong, but said the law preserves “the basic rights and freedom lawfully enjoyed by law-abiding citizens.” The law makes no mention of religious or spiritual groups.’^{[footnote 77]}

10.1.2 Reuters added:

‘On Falun Gong generally, the [Hong Kong] ministry said in a statement: “Falun Gong is a cult organization banned by the Chinese government in accordance with the law, which has also been spurned by the Chinese people for a long time. Banning this cult organization is an act of justice by the Chinese government, made in response to the people’s demand and an effort to maintain social stability and to protect human rights. The alleged suppression is nonsense.”’^{[footnote 78]} See also the country policy and information note on China: Hong Kong national security legislation.

10.1.3 The USSD 2022 IRF report noted that:

‘The Falun Dafa Association stated the government used the [National Security Law] NSL to harass Falun Gong practitioners. For example, Falun Gong practitioners reported that in the period prior to General Secretary Xi Jinping’s July visit to Hong Kong for the 25th anniversary of the handover from Great Britain, several editors of the Falun Gong-affiliated publication Epoch Times received telephone calls from individuals claiming to be police officers and asking whether Falun Gong practitioners would protest during Xi’s visit. Falun Gong practitioners stated, however, that they still operated openly and engaged in behavior that remained prohibited in mainland China, including distributing literature, sharing information about the group on social media, and accessing and downloading online materials. Local officials, citing COVID-19 restrictions, denied the group permission to display banners and posters and to set up street kiosks. No Falun Gong rallies were permitted during the year due to COVID-19 health restrictions, but practitioners, adhering to COVID-19 protocols, continued to publicly gather in small groups.’^{[footnote 79]}

10.1.4 The USSD released their updated country report on international religious freedom on 26 June 2024. The reports have been reduced. The USSD 2023 IRF report stated:

‘The Falun Dafa Association estimates there are approximately 500 Falun Gong practitioners [in Hong Kong].

‘… The Falun Dafa Association is registered as a society rather than a religious group; as a society, it may establish offices, collect dues from members, and have legal status.

‘… According to the report, Falun Gong adherents were free to practice in public but faced counterdemonstrations and harassment by groups with ties to the Chinese Communist Party.’^{[footnote 80]}

10.1.5 BBC World Service noted in 2023 that: ‘Falun Gong believers once practiced and protested openly in Hong Kong. But since the introduction of a draconian national security law, Falun Gong’s presence in the territory has all but vanished.’^{[footnote 81]}

10.1.6 In April 2024 Minghui reported that Falun Gong practitioners in Hong Kong had held up banners and taken photos to commemorate the 25th anniversary of the April 25 Appeal. The appeal commemorates 25 April 1999 when 10,000 Falun Gong practitioners went to the Appeals office near Zhongnanhai in Beijing to peacefully petition the authorities to release practitioners who had been illegally arrested. Minghui noted that: ‘In the past, practitioners held a rally and parade in Hong Kong around April 25 every year. Although it is difficult to hold large-scale events in Hong Kong now, they continue calling for an end to the CCP’s persecution.’^{[footnote 82]}

10.1.7 Hong Kong Free Press, an impartial, non-profit English language newspaper^{[footnote 83]}, noted in September 2024 that:

‘The Epoch Times, a newspaper linked to a Chinese spiritual group, has announced it will cease printing and distribution in Hong Kong, 23 years after it launched in the city.

‘The newspaper made the announcement on its website on Friday afternoon, citing difficulties in securing a lease for a printing facility. Its final print edition will be distributed in Hong Kong on September 17 [2024], but its website will keep on covering the city’s news. … Falun Gong, however, maintains a presence in Hong Kong and its practitioners have long handed out The Epoch Times at street booths. … Following the enactment of the Beijing-imposed national security law in Hong Kong, the newspaper and Falun Gong have reportedly faced increasing pressure.

‘In April 2021, the newspaper said a gang of sledgehammer-wielding men damaged its printing presses. The Epoch Times said the assault, which was captured by surveillance cameras, knocked out its presses, but vowed to print again soon. Also in April 2021, the newspaper reported that multiple Falun Gong street booths had been harassed and attacked by unknown people.

‘In May 2021, Epoch Times reporter Leung Zhen was attacked by a man wielding a baseball bat from a passing vehicle, according to a witness who spoke to the newspaper. Leung, who is also head of the Hong Kong Association of Falun Dafa, accused the Chinese Communist Party of orchestrating the attack.’^{[footnote 84]}

10.1.8 Domino Theory, a media outlet based in Taiwan and covering East Asian geopolitics,^{[footnote 85]} reported:

‘Former Hong Kong Chief Executive Leung Chun-ying (梁振英), also known as CY Leung, was caught on camera harassing Falun Gong practitioners in Finland.

Leung, who was with his wife and two other people, took pictures of a group of Falun Gong practitioners at a park in Helsinki on August 13.

“Once we have your names, we can immediately look you up once we are back, one by one,” Leung said in a video published by Falun Gong media New Tang Dynasty Television.

 published

Leung, who was chief executive from 2012 to 2017, is now vice chairman of China’s top political advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference.’^{[footnote 86]}

10.1.9 Human Rights Watch reported in their World Report 2025 that: ‘In March [2024], the Hong Kong government introduced another national security law, the Safeguarding National Security Ordinance (SNSO), after the draconian 2020 National Security Law. The SNSO criminalizes peaceful activities, expands police powers, and replaces the colonial-era sedition law, raising the maximum sentence for “sedition” from two to seven years of imprisonment.’^{[footnote 87]} See also the country policy and information note on China: Hong Kong national security legislation.

10.1.10 In sources consulted (see Bibliography) there are no reported cases of prosecutions under the National Security Law of Hong Kong Falun Gong practitioners.

11. Falun Gong diaspora

11.1.1The 2024 DFAT Report noted: ‘Falun Gong, unlike some other xie jiao, is generally not secretive about its beliefs and practices outside of China. Most Falun Gong beliefs are published on the organisation’s websites. Repression of the religion has become a key theme of its teaching and practice abroad. Practitioners are often involved in anti-Chinese government activism, ….’^{[footnote 88]}

11.1.2 The USSD 2023 IRF report noted:

‘Transnational repression targeting members of banned religious groups continued, in particular against members of Falun Gong. In a May [2023] report, the Falun Dafa Information Center stated that PRC authorities conducted physical and digital surveillance on Falun Gong members who attended college in the United States. One student studying in Illinois reported PRC diplomats in the United States ordered the Chinese Student and Scholars Association at his university to expel him from the group for publishing information on Falun Gong on his personal website. Multiple students cited in the report said PRC authorities had harassed, detained, or otherwise persecuted their family members in China to discourage their Falun Gong-related activities in the United States, or to coerce the students to return to China.

‘… In October, the Falun Dafa Association of Canada reported the CCP used political infiltration, disinformation, manipulation, intimidation, assault, surveillance, and harassment to silence Falun Gong adherents and suppress Canadian public support for Falun Gong.

‘The Falun Dafa Association reported the PRC government pressured foreign entertainment venues in multiple countries to refuse to host or cancel already scheduled performances of the U.S.-based Falun Gong-affiliated dance troupe Shen Yun. Many of the performers are Falun Gong practitioners and, in addition to traditional Chinese dances, some dances portray present-day religious persecution of Falun Gong practitioners in China.^{[footnote 89]}

11.1.3 The Falun Dafa Infocenter noted in June 2024:

‘… Chinese security agencies clearly target individual Falun Gong practitioners living overseas, especially those active in exposing the persecution or countering the CCP’s propaganda. Leaked documents from Henan, Shaanxi, Hubei, Jiangxi, and Hunan provinces from 2015 to 2018 specifically cite efforts to conduct “in-depth investigations” of overseas practitioners from these provinces and to collect “intelligence” about them. This includes gathering extensive personal and biographical details, as well as information about relatives remaining in China, and orders to establish databases with these details. There are then references to actions that Chinese security agencies can take using this information. These include carrying out “cross-ocean calling” to harass and intimidate overseas practitioners, restricting their ability to return to China, and using a combination of “carrots and sticks”—including limiting access to pension funds, real estate, and bank accounts still in China—to pressure them to stop their activities and their Falun Gong practice. Some documents call for local agents to develop an “individually customized work plan” for targeting a specific overseas practitioner.’^{[footnote 90]}

11.1.4 Independent Catholic News, who provide news of interest to Catholics and the wider Christian community^{[footnote 91]}, reported in November 2024 that:

‘Outside of China, the Chinese Communist Party also targets Falun Gong. They use disinformation and propaganda, harassment, surveillance, cyber-attacks, diplomatic pressure, threats, physical attacks and have made efforts to extradite and even abduct Falun Gong practitioners living abroad. According to leaked CCP documents, congressional testimonies from former Chinese diplomats, and third-party investigations, the CCP has enacted operations around the world to silence, marginalize, and suppress Falun Gong since the launch of the persecution in 1999.

‘Mr. Chen Yonglin, the former first secretary of the Chinese Consulate in Sydney, Australia, who defected to Australia in 2005 was the first to reveal the full scope of the CCP’s actions abroad. He testified before US Congress that the top priority of every Chinese consulate and embassy around the world is to systematically “wage war” against Falun Gong outside of China. He said, “Each consulate and embassy has a ‘Special Anti-Falun Gong Working Group’ that works closely with the United Front Work Department, an organisation under the CCP. The United Front uses the overseas Chinese diaspora, including students, businesspeople, media, and so-called ‘Chinese community groups’ to influence, manipulate, and pressure foreign citizens, politicians, and business leaders to toe the party line on Falun Gong.”

‘Mr Chen notes that each Chinese consulate or embassy implements many tactics to block support for Falun Gong, including:

• Widely spreading anti-Falun Gong propaganda in host countries to demonise Falun Gong;

• Funding, and otherwise controlling, Chinese-language publications within the local Chinese community;

• Using Chinese immigrants and students to monitor and report on Falun Gong activities in local communities and on campuses;

• Pressuring local officials and subjecting them to economic threats or incentives.

‘Within the past two years, the CCP has launched more overt campaigns to suppress the Falun Gong diaspora around the world. This is apparent through street violence, attempts at soft power subversion, and attacks on media outlets and organisations founded by Falun Gong practitioners. These operations continue today.

‘Last year, the UK Intelligence and Security Committee of parliament published a damning report on China. The report says that China has penetrated “every sector” of the UK’s economy, while recognising that Falun Gong is perceived by the CCP as one of the greatest domestic threats to its rule.’^{[footnote 92]}

11.1.5 In a February 2025 written statement to the Joint Committee on Human Rights inquiry on Transnational repression in the UK, Falun Dafa noted:

‘The CCP, instead of ending the killing and persecution, have stated that their current policy is now to “fully eliminate Falun Gong worldwide”. Our experiences bear this out. In the past year, there have been over 60 bomb threats, threats of violence, death and rape of female Falun Gong practitioners that have been received by Falun Gong affiliated groups globally. They are just one part of a much larger, very aggressive transnational repression effort that we are currently experiencing. The recent bomb and shooting threats on British soil are an escalation that is both dangerous and unacceptable in a civilised society.’^{[footnote 93]}

11.1.6 The US Commission on International Religious Freedom 2025 annual report published in March 2025 noted: ‘In July [2024], federal prosecutors indicted U.S. citizen Ping Li for providing information to a Chinese state security official about U.S.-based Falun Gong practitioners. That same month, U.S. residents John Chen and Lin Feng pleaded guilty to charges in relation to similar Falun Gong targeting.’^{[footnote 94]}

11.1.7 In a written submission to the Tom Lantos Human Rights Commission Hearing, Executive Director of the Falun Dafa Information Center, Levi Browde mentioned:

‘In 2023, a small community of Falun Gong practitioners in the African nation of Togo celebrated the 10th anniversary of Falun Gong’s introduction to the country. These and other believers are nationals of countries other than China and locally integrated into everyday society. Nevertheless, because of their faith and identity as Falun Gong practitioners, the CCP sees them as a threat and targets them as well. Non-ethnic Chinese adherents have been barred from parades, been beaten by Chinese thugs in Latin America, or been detained and deported from European countries when trying to peacefully demonstrate against visiting Chinese leaders. In Russia, under CCP pressure, Falun Gong’s spiritual text was banned, a situation which the European Court of Human Rights ruled a violation of the charter.’^{[footnote 95]}

11.1.8 Executive Director, Levi Browde also noted:

‘Beginning in early 2024, a spate of anonymous death and other violent threats have been sent via email or website contact forms, threatening bombings, mass shootings, car accidents, arson, or sexual assault against Falun Gong practitioners, their families (including young children), elected officials and other supporters, and public venues such as theaters. This trend escalated beginning in December 2024. As of June 2025, the total number of such threats received had exceeded 140. To date, the threats appear to be false alarms, aiming to intimidate and deter Falun Gong practitioners or supporters, but nonetheless violate U.S. laws against sending such violent threats.’^{[footnote 96]}

11.1.9 In May 2025 the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), is a global network of reporters and media organisations that collaborates on in-depth investigative journalism projects to expose corruption, crime, and abuse of power across borders^{[footnote 97]}, reported that: ‘Two days before Chinese President Xi Jinping’s state visit to Malaysia in April [2025], police officers arrested more than 70 Falun Gong practitioners and allegedly held them until after Xi left the country …’^{[footnote 98]}

11.1.10 The Epoch Times reported in July 2025:

‘In recent years, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) also ramped up its transnational aggression against Falun Gong and its related organizations—in particular, Shen Yun Performing Arts, a New York-based arts group founded by Falun Gong practitioners.

‘The UK Falun Dafa Association said that three UK theaters received bomb and mass shooting threats in February [2025] via email just before Shen Yun performances were about to take place. “These incidents were reported to local police and additional security measures were implemented during the performances to assure everyone’s safety,” the association wrote, in a letter inviting British parliamentarians to attend an event calling for an end to the persecution.

‘The association stated that Falun Gong information booths in the UK have faced repeated harassment by Chinese individuals, including “verbal abuse, vandalism, theft, destruction, and even physical assault.” It also stated that UK practitioners were subject to harassing phone calls, malware, and surveillance and that Chinese state security officials had threatened their family members in China over their human rights advocacy in the UK.’^{[footnote 99]}

11.1.11 The Falun Dafa Infocenter Incident Tracker gives details on reported transnational repression and disinformation against Falun Gong performing arts group, Shen Yun.

Annex A: Table of detained Falun Gong practitioners

The below table, created by CPIT, shows the details of those recorded as detained, at the time of writing, in relation to Falun Gong on the USCIRF Frank R Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List.^{[footnote 100]} Due to difficulties with independent reporting the database may not contain the details of all those who are detained in relation to Falun Gong.

Name	Date of arrest	Date of sentence	Sentence length	Details
Jiang Wei	Nov 2015	unknown	12 years	Imprisoned for criticizing religious freedom conditions.
Bian Changxue	Jan 2016	Dec 2017	8 years	Practicing Falun Gong as well as for submitting a complaint against former President Jiang Zemin
Cui Fenglan	Jun 2016	Dec 2016	15 years	Practicing of Falun Gong
Jin Liyan	Jun 2016	May 2017	8 years	In relation to her production and dissemination of Falun Gong promotional materials
Zhuang Youbu	Jul 2016	May 2017	10 years	In relation to her production and dissemination of Falun Gong promotional materials
Zhu Ya	Apr 2017	Jul 2018	8 years	Accused of making and distributing Falun Gong materials between 2010 and 201
Wu Chunxiong	May 2017	May 2019	8 years 6 months	Arrested alongside other Falun Gong practitioners
Tang Jianqun	May 2017	May 2019	8 years	Accused of posting Falun Gong-related information on social media
Xu Xiujuan	Jun 2017	Dec 2018	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Zhang Shude	Jun 2017	Feb 2018	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Zuo Hongtao	Jun 2017	Jan 2019	13 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Wu Wenzhang	Jun 2017	Jan 2019	11 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Li Guo’ai	Jun 2017	Jan 2019	10 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Liu Changfu	Jun 2017	Jan 2019	8 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Wang Qihua	Jul 2017	May 2018	8 years	Practicing Falun Gong
Luan Ning	Aug 2017	Apr 2019	10 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Shi Fenglan	Aug 2017	Feb 2019	8 years	In relation to their practice of Falun Gong or association with Falun Gong practitioners
Zheng Yixiu	Sep 2017	May 2019	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Kuang Zhihua	Sep 2017	2019	7 years 6 months	Imprisoned for their religious belief and activity
Ma Yitao	Sep 2017	Dec 2018	7 years	Allegedly distributing Falun Gong materials
Wang Mingquan	Oct 2017	Jun 2018	7 years	Imprisoned for their religious belief and activity
Zhou Haiyan	Oct 2017	2018	8 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Hu Zhiqin	Oct 2017	2018	7 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Lai Guifang	Oct 2017	2018	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Yang Bo	Oct 2017	Aug 2019	8 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Ding Shumei	Oct 2017	Aug 2019	8 years	Police allegedly caught them distributing Falun Gong materials
Zhang Hongzhu	Oct 2017	Feb 2019	9 years	Imprisoned for his religious activity
Gao Jianling	Dec 2017	Dec 2018	7 years 6 months	Imprisoned for their religious belief and activity in relation to her practice of Falun Gong.
Li Yongquan	Dec 2017	2019	11 years	Arrested in relation to their practice of Falun Gong
Ma Yunhua	Feb 2018	Aug 2019	9 years	Sharing information about Falun Gong with passersby.
Chen Yulian	Apr 2018	Oct 2019	8 years	Studying Falun Gong at home
Chen Wen	Apr 2018	Oct 2019	9 years 6 months	Studying Falun Gong at home
Cao Genxiu	Apr 2018	Oct 2019	7 years	Studying Falun Gong at home
Pan Feng	Apr 2018	unknown	7 years	Accused of handing out Falun-Gong related materials
Rao Xiaoping	Apr 2018	Sep 2019	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Hong Weisheng	Apr 2018	Sep 2019	10 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Hou Mila	Apr 2018	Sep 2019	8 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Zhu Tonggui	May 2018	Mar 2020	9 years	Imprisoned for their religious belief and activity (remained detained for not renouncing Falun Gong)
Wang Baoyu	Jun 2018	Mar 2019	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Xiong Chengxia	Jun 2018	Mar 2019	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Sun Zhifen	Jun 2018	2019	10 years	Imprisoned for her religious activity
Wang Suping	Jun 2018	2019	10 years	Imprisoned for her religious activity
Zhang Qingxiang	Jun 2018	2019	6 years	Arrest coincided with the arrest of other Falun Gong practitioners in Taiyuan Municipality
Tian Yuqin	Jun 2018	2019	6 years	Arrest coincided with the arrest of other Falun Gong practitioners in Taiyuan Municipality
Zheng Quanhua	Jul 2018	Oct 2019	7 years	Arrested in relation to their practice of Falun Gong
Wang Ziming	Nov 2018	Dec 2019	7 years 6 months	Arrested for allegedly defacing a Chine Communist Party symbol in public.
Guan Xingtao	Nov 2018	Sep 2019	8 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Wu Yanhua	Nov 2018	Sep 2019	7 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Du Yecheng	Nov 2018	Sep 2019	7 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Fan Rong	Nov 2018	Aug 2019	3 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Li Yanchun	Nov 2018	Aug 2019	7 years 6 months	Distributing Falun Gong calendars in Lulong
Feng Peirong	Dec 2018	Dec 2019	12 years	Promoting Falun Gong in her classroom
Tan Quicheng	2019	Sep 2019	7 years	Practicing Falun Gong
Mu Min	Apr 2019	Dec 2019	7 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their belief and/or practice of Falun Gong.
Mu Pengjuan	Apr 2019	Dec 2019	7 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their belief and/or practice of Falun Gong.
Mu Xia	Apr 2019	Dec 2019	7 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their belief and/or practice of Falun Gong.
Mu Lifang	Apr 2019	Dec 2019	7 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their belief and/or practice of Falun Gong.
Li Chunhui	Apr 2019	Oct 2019	4 years	Talking to police about the arrest of a Falun Gong practitioner.
Hou Aila	Apr 2019	Sep 2019	8 years	Imprisoned for her religious activity.
Wang Weiqing	Jun 2019	Dec 2019	5 years	Distributing Falun Gong materials in Xunyang district
Zhao Jiyuan	Jul 2019	2019/ 2020	7.5 years	Arrested in relation to his Falun Gong activities
Zeng Jiageng	Jul 2019	Jul 2021	5 years	Accused of using her cell phone to spread information about Falun Gong
Chen Dicai	Jul 2019	2020	7 years	Accused of practicing Falun Gong
Liu Tao	Jul 2019	Aug 2020	4 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their practice of Falun Gong
Deng Chengkai	Jul 2019	Aug 2020	4 years 6 months	Arrested in relation to their practice of Falun Gong
Liu Qing	Aug 2019	Aug 2019	11 years	Arrested in relation to their Falun Gong activities
Zhou Qin	Sep 2019	Apr 2021	6 years	Arrested in relation to their practice of Falun Gong
Zhong Yifang	Nov 2019	Oct 2020	4 years 6 months	Accused of talking to people about Falun Gong
Gao Yuming	Feb 2020	Apr 2020	6 years	Imprisoned for their religious belief and activity in relation to her Falun Gong activities.
Liu Wansheng	Apr 2020	Sep 2020	6 years	Accused of publicly talking to people about Falun Gong.
Cao Qian	May 2020	Jan 2021	5 years	Being in possession of Falun Gong materials
Jang Baolian	May 2020	Jan 2021	5 years	Being in possession of Falun Gong materials
Xu Na	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	8 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Li Zongze	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	5 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Li Lixin	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	5 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Zheng Yanmei	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	5 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Zheng Yujie	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	5 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Deng Jingjing	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	4 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Liu Qiang	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	4 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Zhang Renfei	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	4 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Meng Qingxia	Jul 2020	Jan 2022	4 years	Allegedly sharing photos of Beijing street scenes, during the COVID-19 pandemic, with a publication associated with Falun Gong
Wang Jianmin	Sep 2020	Mar 2021	9 years	Distributing Falun Gong leaflets
Zhang Chunhe	Apr 2021	Jul 2022	4 years	In relation to her practice of Falun Gong
Zhou Deyong	Apr 2021	Apr 2023	8 years	Imprisoned for his religious activity
Wang Xinmin	Jun 2021	Oct 2021	4 years 6 months	In relation to his Falun Gong activity
Liu Lijie	Sep 2021	Nov 2021	3 years 6 months	Imprisoned for her religious belief and activity
Wang Jiafang	Sep 2021	Jul 2022	4 years	Practicing Falun Gong
He Binggang	Oct 2021	Jun 2023	6 years	In relation to his Falun Gong activities
Zhang Yibo	Oct 2021	Jun 2023	5 years	In relation to her Falun Gong activities
Liu Xing	Jun 2022	Apr 2023	1 year 9 months	In relation to their Falun Gong activities
Liu Aihua	Jul 2022	Mar 2023	4 years	Distributing Falun Gong materials
Liu Yuhong	Jul 2022	Apr 2023	2 years	In relation to their Falun Gong activities
Li Fangfang	Aug 2022	Not yet sentenced		Passing out Falun Gong materials
Pan Hongming	Aug 2022	Jul 2023	3 years	Studying Falun Gong
Yue Chunguang	Aug 2022	Jul 2023	2 years	Studying Falun Gong

Research methodology

The country of origin information (COI) in this note has been carefully selected in accordance with the general principles of COI research as set out in the Common EU [European Union] Guidelines for Processing Country of Origin Information (COI), April 2008, and the Austrian Centre for Country of Origin and Asylum Research and Documentation’s (ACCORD), Researching Country Origin Information – Training Manual, 2024. Namely, taking into account the COI’s relevance, reliability, accuracy, balance, currency, transparency and traceability.

Sources and the information they provide are carefully considered before inclusion. Factors relevant to the assessment of the reliability of sources and information include:

• the motivation, purpose, knowledge and experience of the source
• how the information was obtained, including specific methodologies used
• the currency and detail of information
• whether the COI is consistent with and/or corroborated by other sources

Commentary may be provided on source(s) and information to help readers understand the meaning and limits of the COI.

Wherever possible, multiple sourcing is used and the COI compared to ensure that it is accurate and balanced, and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date picture of the issues relevant to this note at the time of publication.

The inclusion of a source is not, however, an endorsement of it or any view(s) expressed.

Each piece of information is referenced in a footnote.

Full details of all sources cited and consulted in compiling the note are listed alphabetically in the bibliography.

Terms of reference

The ‘Terms of Reference’ (ToR) provides a broad outline of the issues relevant to the scope of this note and forms the basis for the country information.

The following topics were identified prior to drafting as relevant and on which research was undertaken:

• Constitution
• Falun Gong background
  • Legal context
  • What is Falun Gong?
  • History
  • Practice and beliefs
  • Falun Gong in Hong Kong
  • Proselytism
• State treatment of Falun Gong practitioners
  • State attitude and treatment
  • The 6-10 office
  • Arrests
  • Torture and detention
  • Surveillance
  • Organ harvesting
  • Freedom of movement

Falun Gong diaspora

Bibliography

Sources cited

All Sides

• The Epoch Times Media Bias, no date. Accessed: 7 October 2025

Anne Zimmerman- Voices in Bioethics Vol 9(2023)

• Forced Organ Harvesting: Expanding the Dead Donor Rule, 2023. Accessed: 1 October 2025

Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)

• Country Information Report China, 27 December 2024. Accessed: 30 September 2025

BBC World Service

• Heart and Soul, 3 November 2023. Accessed: 8 October 2025

Bitter Winter

• About, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2025

• The List of the Xie Jiao, a Main Tool of Religious Persecution, 6 November 2018. Accessed: 29 September 2025

• 81-Year-Old Falun Gong Practitioner Jailed in Jilin Province, 22 July 2025. Accessed: 15 October 2025

Britannica

• Falun Gong, Chinese spiritual movement, 30 October 2025. Accessed: 24 November 2025

Christian Solidarity Worldwide (CSW)

• About us, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2025

Congressional Executive Commission on China (CECC)

• About, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2025

• Stopping the crime of organ harvesting- what more must be done. Hearing before the Congressional Executive Commission on China 118 Congress, second session, 20 March 2024. Accessed: 6 October 2025

• 2024 Annual Report, 16 December 2024. Accessed: 1 October 2025

The Diplomat

• About Us, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2025

• First Known Survivor of China’s Forced Organ Harvesting Speaks Out, 10 August 2024. Accessed: 15 October 2025

Domino Theory

• About Us, no date

• Hong Kong & Human Rights, 21 August 2025. Accessed: 24 November 2025

The Economist

• What is Falun Gong? 5 September 2018. Accessed: 6 October 2025

The Epoch Times

• State Department Calls on CCP to End Campaign to Eradicate Falun Gong, 16 July 2025. Accessed: 6 October 2025

• UK Committed to Protecting Falun Gong Practitioners, Minister Says as Persecution by CCP Enters 27th Year, 22 July 2025. Accessed: 6 October 2025

• Why Is the CCP Persecuting the Peaceful Falun Gong Spiritual Practice?, 20 August 2025. Accessed: 6 October 2025

Falun Dafa

• Written evidence submitted to the Joint committee on Human Rights-  Transnational repression in the UK inquiry, February 2025

Falun Dafa Infocenter

• Violent Suppression of 100 Million People, no date. Accessed: 24 November 2025

Browde, L.

• The Chinese Communist Party’s Escalating Transnational Repression Targeting Falun Gong, 24 June 2025. Accessed 24 November 2025

• What is Falun Gong (Falun Dafa)?, no date. Accessed: 30 September 2025

• The 610 Office, no date. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Falun Gong: 25 Years of Persecution, 25 Years Too Long, 9 July 2024. Accessed: 13 October 2025

• Incident Tracker: Monitoring the CCP’s Latest Transnational Repression and Disinformation Campaign against Falun Gong, Shen Yun, Last updated 27 August 2025. Accessed: 20 October 2025

• Violent Suppression of 100 million People, no date. Accessed: 24 November 2025

Ford, C, Journal of Political Risk (JPR)

• Genocide in The People’s Republic of China, 20 July 2022. Accessed: 15 October 2025

Freedom House

• Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report, 26 February 2025. Accessed: 15 October 2025

Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP)

• About Hong Kong Free Press, no date. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Newspaper Epoch Times to stop printing, distributing Hong Kong edition, 6 September 2024. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Hong Kong Falun Gong condemns fake Facebook post which claimed it would quit the city, 12 August 2021. Accessed: 20 October 2025

Human Rights Watch

• World Report 2025: China, 16 January 2025. Accessed: 20 October 2025

Independent Catholic News (ICN)

• About this site, no date. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Lord Alton of Liverpool: Falun Gong - A Sickening Persecution, 6 November 2024. Accessed: 1 October 2025

The Independent Tribunal into Forced Organ Harvesting from Prisoners of Conscience in China (the China Tribunal)

• Final Judgment and summary- 2019, 17 June 2019. Accessed: 15 October 2025

• Judgement, 1 March 2020. Accessed: 14 October 2025

International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ)

• About the ICIJ, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2025

• Ahead of Xi Jinping’s state visit to Malaysia, police arrested dozens of Falun Gong followers, 15 May 2025. Accessed: 13 October 2025

Journal of Political Risk

• About, no date. Accessed: 5 November 2025

Minghui

• About Minghui, 1 January 2000. Accessed: 7 October 2025

• Reported in 2024: 164 Falun Gong Practitioners Die in the Persecution of Their Faith, 12 January 2025. Accessed: 15 October 2025

• Reported in 2024: 764 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their Faith, 14 January 2025. Accessed: 6 October 2025

• 5,692 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested or Harassed in 2024 for Their Faith, 20 January 2025. Accessed: 1 October 2025

• Healthy Falun Gong Practitioners Subjected to Involuntary Drug Administration and Other Torture in Psychiatric Hospitals, 3 February 2025. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Reported in the First Half of 2025: 430 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their Faith, 8 July 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

• Reported in the First Half of 2025: 2,003 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested or Harassed for Their Faith, 14 July 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

• Falun Gong Practitioners Throughout Hong Kong Commemorate the April 25 Appeal, 27 April 2024. Accessed: 20 October 2025

New York City Bar Association

• Human Organ Supply: Report on Ethical Considerations and Breaches in Organ Harvesting Practices, 21 March 2023. Accessed: 6 October 2025

People’s Republic of China

• Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 20 November 2019. Accessed: 30 September 2025

• Criminal Law, 14 March 1997. Accessed: 30 September 2025

Reuters

• Banned in China, some Falun Gong fear new Hong Kong national security law, 27 July 2020. Accessed: 20 October 2025

Safeguard Defenders

• about us, no date. Accessed: 6 October 2025

• 25 years on: China’s criminalization of Falun Gong in numbers, 22 July 2024. Accessed: 6 October 2025

UN Human Rights Council (UNHRC)

• Written statement* submitted by Christian Solidarity Worldwide, a non-governmental organization in special consultative status, 14 December 2023. Accessed: 1 October 2025

US Commission on International Religious Freedom (USCIRF)

• Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List, no date. Accessed: 7 October 2025

• 2025 Annual Report, 25 March 2025. Accessed: 1 October 2025

• Freedom Forsaken: Falun Gong and Beijing’s Playbook for Repression, 16 October 2025. Accessed: 24 November 2025

US State Department (USSD)

• 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Hong Kong, 15 May 2023. Accessed: 20 October 2025

• 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China, 26 June 2024. Accessed: 1 October 2025

• 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Hong Kong, 26 June 2024. Accessed: 1 October 2025

Victims of Communism Memorial Foundation

• About, no date. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Marking 26 Years of Falun Gong Persecution in Communist China, 18 July 2025. Accessed: 8 October 2025

XE.com

• 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025. Accessed: 13 October 2025

Sources consulted but not cited

ABC News

• Insiders reveal the opaque world of Falun Gong, 20 July 2020. Accessed: 6 October 2025

Amnesty International

• The State of the World’s Human Rights 2025, 25 April 2025. Accessed: 1 October 2025

BBC iPlayer

• Storyville- Eternal Spring: The Heist of China’s Airwaves, 11 March 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

Bertelsmann Stiftung, Transformation Index (BTI)

• BTI 2024 China Country Report, 2024. Accessed: 1 October 2025

Bitter Winter

• “Little Guardians”: China’s Campaign to Mold Children into Anti-Religious Crusaders, 29 August 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

• The Unyielding Silence: An 87-Year-Old Falun Gong Practitioner Was Imprisoned in Harbin, 26 August 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

• Falun Gong Repression Intensifies: Practitioner Yao Jiaxiu Sentenced to Five Years, 19 August 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

• China’s Ministry of Public Security Reports Increased Anti-Religious Repression in 2024, 25 February 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

• Transplant Facilities Greatly Expanded in Xinjiang—For More Organ Harvesting?, 4 July 2025. Accessed: 14 October 2025

• Cheng Peiming: Organ Harvesting Survivor Slandered in China and Threatened in the US, 8 November 2024. Accessed: 15 October 2025

The Epoch Times

• Rights Activist Urges FBI to Act Against CCP’s Transnational Repression of Falun Gong, 12 August 2025

• Ex-Hong Kong Chief Threatens Falun Gong Practitioners in Finland, Exposing Persecution Orders From Beijing, 1 September 2025. Accessed: 6 October 2025

Falun Dafa Information Center

• UK Officials Express Support for Falun Gong Practitioners on Anniversary of Historic Appeal, 29 April 2024. Accessed: 1 October 2025

• Statistics & Evidence, no date. Accessed: 15 October 2025

• Unmasking China’s Gestapo, 10 June 2021. Accessed: 15 October 2025.

Unmasking China’s Gestapo

Freedom House

• Beijing’s impact on AI-generated content, COVID-19 deaths, Alibaba “golden shares”, February 2023. Accessed: 6 October 2025

• Freedom in the World 2025, 26 February 2025. Accessed: 1 October 2025

Hong Kong Free Press (HKFP)

• Epoch Times says it will ‘never back down’ after Hong Kong printing press attacked by thugs, 14 April 2021. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• US warns China will use Olympics to gloss over abuses,13 May 2021. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Hong Kong Falun Gong condemns fake Facebook post which claimed it would quit the city, 12 August 2021. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Zero prosecutions: Hong Kong police close investigation into the sixth attack against Epoch Times or its staff, 6 November 2021. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Chinese man jailed for 20 months in US over plot targeting Falun Gong, 20 November 2024. Accessed: 8 October 2025

Human Rights Watch (HRW)

• World Report 2025: China, 16 January 2025. Accessed: 1 October 2025

• International Consortium of Investigative Journalists (ICIJ), As President Xi Jinping traveled the world, police swept peaceful protesters off the streets, 29 April 2025. Accessed: 13 October 2025

Minghui

• Reported in 2024: 164 Falun Gong Practitioners Die in the Persecution of Their Faith, 12 January 2025. Accessed: 13 October 2025

• Falun Dafa Practitioners Call on Malaysia’s Chief Secretary to Investigate Mass Arrest, 21 July 2025. Accessed: 1 October 2025

Pew Research Center

• Measuring Religion in China, 30 August 2023. Accessed: 1 October 2025

Raoul Wallenberg

• Statement Marking 26 Years of Brutal Persecution of Falun Gong Practitioners by the Chinese Communist Party, 21 July 2025. Accessed: 13 October 2025

Safeguard Defenders

• For China, human rights is disturbing social order, 8 October 2024. Accessed: 1 October 2025

Scandasia

• Finland condemns threatening behavior by former Hong Kong chief against Falun Gong, 28 August 2025. Accessed: 20 October 2025

South China Morning Post (SCMP)

• Our Company, no date. Accessed: 8 October 2025

• Outlawed, branded a cult in mainland China, Falun Gong faces calls to be banned under Hong Kong’s national security law, 12 July 2021. Accessed: 8 October 2025

Swoop Films

• The Persecution of Falun Gong, 2016. Accessed: 15 October 2025.

TRP

• Police Operation On 70 Falun Gong Members During Chinese President’s Malaysia Visit Draws Attention, 10 May 2025. Accessed: 13 October 2025

University of Alabama at Birmingham- Institute for Human Rights Blog

• The Religious Persecution of Falun Gong Practitioners in China, 22 February 2022. Accessed: 8 October 2025

US State Department (USSD)

• 25 Years of PRC Government Repression and Abuse of Falun Gong, 20 July 2024

US Mission to International Organizations in Geneva

• U.S. Statement at the UPR of the PRC, 23 January 2024. Accessed: 6 October 2025

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1. Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, 20 November 2019 ↩

2. Peoples Republic of China, Criminal law ↩

3. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.97), 27 December 2024 ↩

4. Falun Dafa Infocenter, What is Falun Gong (Falun Dafa)? no date ↩

5. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.109), 27 December 2024 ↩

6. Bitter Winter, The List of the Xie Jiao, a Main Tool of Religious Persecution, 6 November 2018 ↩

7. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China, 26 June 2024 ↩

8. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.109), 27 December 2024 ↩

9. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China, 26 June 2024 ↩

10. Safeguard Defenders, 25 years on: China’s criminalization of Falun Gong in numbers, 22 July 2024 ↩

11. Britannica, Falun Gong, Leader, Controversy, Religion, 30 October 2025 ↩

12. The Economist, What is Falun Gong? 5 September 2018 ↩

13. The Economist, What is Falun Gong? 5 September 2018 ↩

14. Safeguard Defenders, about us, no date ↩

15. Safeguard Defenders, 25 years on: China’s criminalization of Falun Gong in numbers, 22 July 2024 ↩

16. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.109- 3.111 and 3.113), 27 December 2024 ↩

17. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.113), 27 December 2024 ↩

18. CECC, About, no date ↩

19. CECC, 2024 Annual Report (page 87), 16 December 2024 ↩

20. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.112 and 3.115), 27 December 2024 ↩

21. CSW, About us, no date ↩

22. UNHRC, Written statement* submitted by Christian Solidarity Worldwide…, 14 December 2023 ↩

23. All Sides, The Epoch Times Media Bias, no date ↩

24. The Epoch Times, State Department Calls on CCP to End Campaign to Eradicate …, 16 July 2025 ↩

25. The Epoch Times, Why Is the CCP Persecuting the Peaceful Falun Gong …, 20 August 2025 ↩

26. VOC Memorial Foundation, About, no date ↩

27. VOC Memorial Foundation, Marking 26 Years of Falun Gong Persecution in …, 18 July 2025 ↩

28. Falun Dafa Information Center, The 610 Office, no date ↩

29. Safeguard Defenders, 25 years on: China’s criminalization of Falun Gong in numbers, 22 July 2024 ↩

30. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.99), 27 December 2024 ↩

31. Minghui, About Minghui, 1 January 2000 ↩

32. Minghui, 5,692 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested or Harassed in 2024 for …, 20 January 2025 ↩

33. Minghui, 5,692 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested or Harassed in 2024 for …, 20 January 2025 ↩

34. Minghui, 5,692 Falun Gong Practitioners Arrested or Harassed in 2024 for …, 20 January 2025 ↩

35. Minghui, Reported in the First Half of 2025: 2,003 Falun Gong Practitioners …, 14 July 2025 ↩

36. Bitter Winter, About, no date ↩

37. Bitter Winter, 81-Year-Old Falun Gong Practitioner Jailed in Jilin Province, 22 July 2025 ↩

38. Minghui, Reported in 2024: 764 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their…, 14 January 2025 ↩

39. Minghui, Reported in 2024: 764 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their…, 14 January 2025 ↩

40. Minghui, Reported in 2024: 764 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their…, 14 January 2025 ↩

41. Minghui, Reported in 2024: 764 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their…, 14 January 2025 ↩

42. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

43. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

44. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

45. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

46. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

47. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

48. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

49. XE.com, 1 CNY to GBP, 13 October 2025 ↩

50. Minghui, Reported in 2024: 764 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced for Their…, 14 January 2025 ↩

51. Minghui, Reported in the First Half of 2025: 430 Falun Gong Practitioners Sentenced…, 8 July 2025 ↩

52. Falun Dafa Infocenter, Violent Suppression of 100 million People, no date ↩

53. Journal of Political Risk, About, no date ↩

54. Ford, C, JPR, Genocide in The People’s Republic of China, 20 July 2022 ↩

55. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China, 26 June 2024 ↩

56. UNHRC, Written statement* submitted by Christian Solidarity Worldwide…, 14 December 2023 ↩

57. Minghui, Reported in 2024: 164 Falun Gong Practitioners Die in the …, 12 January 2025 ↩

58. USCIRF, Freedom Forsaken: Falun Gong and Beijing’s Playbook for Repression, 16 October 2025 ↩

59. Minghui, Healthy Falun Gong Practitioners Subjected to Involuntary Drug …, 3 February 2025 ↩

60. Freedom House, Freedom in the World 2025 Country Report, 26 February 2025 ↩

61. USCIRF, About USCIRF’s Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List, no date ↩

62. USCIRF, Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List, no date ↩

63. Falun Dafa Infocenter, Falun Gong: 25 Years of Persecution, 25  …, (page 28 & 30) 9 July 2024 ↩

64. Minghui, Reported in the First Half of 2025: 2,003 Falun Gong Practitioners …, 14 July 2025 ↩

65. The China Tribunal, Judgement, 1 March 2020 ↩

66. New York City Bar Association, Human Organ Supply: Report on Ethical …, 21 March 2023 ↩

67. Anne Zimmerman, Forced Organ Harvesting: Expanding the Dead Donor Rule, 2023 ↩

68. CECC, 2024 Annual Report (page 88), 16 December 2024 ↩

69. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.116), 27 December 2024 ↩

70. CECC, Stopping the crime of organ harvesting- what more must be done…, 20 March 2024 ↩

71. The Epoch Times, UK Committed to Protecting Falun Gong Practitioners…, 22 July 2025 ↩

72. The Diplomat, About Us, no date ↩

73. The Diplomat, First Known Survivor of China’s Forced Organ Harvesting …, 10 August 2024 ↩

74. VOC Memorial Foundation, Marking 26 Years of Falun Gong Persecution in …, 18 July 2025 ↩

75. Reuters, Banned in China, some Falun Gong fear new Hong Kong national security…, 27 July 2020 ↩

76. HKFP, Hong Kong Falun Gong condemns fake Facebook post which claimed it…, 12 August 2021 ↩

77. Reuters, Banned in China, some Falun Gong fear new Hong Kong national security…, 27 July 2020 ↩

78. Reuters, Banned in China, some Falun Gong fear new Hong Kong national security…, 27 July 2020 ↩

79. USSD, 2022 Report on International Religious Freedom: Hong Kong, 15 May 2023 ↩

80. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: Hong Kong, 26 June 2024 ↩

81. BBC World Service, Heart and Soul, 3 November 2023 ↩

82. Minghui, Falun Gong Practitioners Throughout Hong Kong Commemorate the …, 27 April 2024 ↩

83. HKFP, About Hong Kong Free Press, no date ↩

84. HKFP, Newspaper Epoch Times to stop printing, distributing Hong Kong edition, 6 September 2024 ↩

85. Domino Theory, About Us, no date ↩

86. Domino Theory, Hong Kong & Human Rights, 21 August 2025 ↩

87. Human Rights Watch,  World Report 2025: China, 16 January 2025 ↩

88. DFAT, Country Information Report China (paragraph 3.114), 27 December 2024 ↩

89. USSD, 2023 Report on International Religious Freedom: China, 26 June 2024 ↩

90. Falun Dafa Infocenter, Falun Gong: 25 Years of Persecution, 25 Years … (page 11), 9 July 2024 ↩

91. ICN, About this site, no date ↩

92. ICN, Lord Alton of Liverpool: Falun Gong - A Sickening Persecution, 6 November 2024 ↩

93. Falun Dafa, Written evidence submitted to the Transnational repression in the UK…, February 2025 ↩

94. USCIRF, 2025 Annual Report, 25 March 2025 ↩

95. Browde, L., Falun Dafa Infocentre, The Chinese Communist Party’s…, (page 4) 24 June 2025 ↩

96. Browde, L., Falun Dafa Infocentre, The Chinese Communist Party’s…, (page 6) 24 June 2025 ↩

97. ICIJ, About the ICIJ, no date ↩

98. ICIJ, Ahead of Xi Jinping’s state visit to Malaysia, police arrested dozens of Falun…, 15 May 2025 ↩

99. The Epoch Times, UK Committed to Protecting Falun Gong Practitioners…, 22 July 2025 ↩

100. USCIRF, Frank R. Wolf Freedom of Religion or Belief Victims List, no date ↩