Official Statistics

DESNZ Public Attitudes Tracker: Energy infrastructure and energy security, Spring 2026, UK

Published 2 July 2026

The DESNZ Public Attitudes Tracker is a nationally representative annual survey of adults (aged 16+) in the UK that tracks public awareness, attitudes and behaviours relating to the policies of the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ), such as energy and climate change.

This report provides a summary of the headline findings relating to energy infrastructure and energy security from the Spring 2026 wave of the Tracker, which ran from 16 March to 21 April 2026.

Notes for interpretation of findings

Differences between groups are only reported where they are statistically significant at the 95% confidence interval level.

The annual personal income referred to in the report is a self-reported measure.

Line charts included in this report, based on a longer time series, use abbreviated season names in the x-axis (e.g. Spring 2026 = Spr 2026). 

The age-related findings are reported using six age groups (16-24, 25-34, 35-44, 45-54, 55-64, 65 and over). In some cases, findings across age groups have been combined to describe a general trend, for example, ‘between 78% and 88% of people aged 45 and above’ refers to the range of percentages for the three age groups 45-54, 55-64 and 65+.

Please note that some of the geographical findings have fluctuated over time. These variations may, in part, be due to the base sizes in specific areas and the wide geographic area covered by regions. This also applies to other subgroup findings that have low base sizes.

Two summary self-reported measures are used in this report:

• ‘Awareness’ encompasses all respondents who said they had heard of a particular concept or technology, including those who said they know ‘hardly anything but I’ve heard of this’, ‘a little’, ‘a fair amount’ or ‘a lot’.
• ‘Knowledge’ encompasses those who said that they know ‘a fair amount’ or ‘a lot’ about a topic.

Awareness and support for fusion energy

Respondents were provided with the following explanation before being presented with some questions on this topic ‘Fusion energy is an experimental technology that works by fusing together atoms in order to release energy. The UK is exploring whether this technology could be used to generate zero carbon electricity’.

Figure 3.1 displays both the longer-term trends in overall awareness (had at least heard of it) and knowledge (know a lot/a fair amount) of fusion energy (line chart) and the detailed awareness and knowledge data for the most recent two waves alongside the baseline (bar chart).

In Spring 2026, levels of awareness (65%) and knowledge (46%) both remained stable compared with Spring 2025 (Figure 3.1). Just 5% said they knew a lot about fusion energy and 46% said they knew a little or hardly anything about it.

Over the longer term, awareness of fusion energy has increased from 62% in Autumn 2021 to 65% in Spring 2026. Knowledge has increased over the same period, from 15% to 19%. Both awareness and knowledge have, however, levelled out since Spring 2023.

Figure 3.1: Awareness of fusion energy (% based on all people), Autumn 2021, Spring and Autumn 2022, Spring 2023 to 2026

FUSIONKNOW. Fusion energy is an experimental technology that works by fusing together atoms in order to release energy. The UK is exploring whether this technology could be used to generate zero carbon electricity. Before today, how much, if anything, did you know about fusion energy?

Base: All wave respondents – Autumn 2021 (5,558), Spring 2022 (4,378), Autumn 2022 (4,158), Spring 2023 (4,406), Spring 2024 (4,082), Spring 2025 (3,411), Spring 2026 (3,387).

Note: On the line chart, arrows denote a significant difference between one wave and the next. For the bar chart, significant differences are noted between Autumn 2021 and Spring 2025, and between Spring 2025 and Spring 2026.

Analysis by subgroups

Self-reported knowledge about fusion energy was higher among the following subgroups, with similar patterns for awareness:

• People in age groups 16 to 34: between 22% and 26% compared with 16% of those aged 65 and over.
• People with a degree: 27% compared with 9% of those with no qualifications.
• People living in Yorkshire and the Humber (26%), the North West (24%) and London (22%); in contrast levels of knowledge were lower in Wales (12%) and the East of England (14%).
• People who said they knew a lot or a fair amount about Net Zero: 32% compared with 2% of those unaware of Net Zero.

In Spring 2026, overall support for fusion energy remained stable (49%) compared with Spring 2025, with strong support remaining at 18% (Figure 3.2). Levels of opposition remained low at 3%.

Over the longer term, following an increase at the start of the tracking series between Autumn 2021 and Spring 2022, levels of support for fusion energy have remained broadly stable.

Figure 3.2: Whether support fusion energy (% based on all people), Autumn 2021, Spring and Autumn 2022, Spring 2023 to 2026

FUSIONSUPPORT. From what you know, or have heard about fusion energy, do you support or oppose the UK developing this technology?

Base: All wave respondents – Autumn 2021 (5,555), Spring 2022 (4,368), Autumn 2022 (4,157), Spring 2023 (4,408), Spring 2024 (4,072), Spring 2025 (3,403), Spring 2026 (3,384).

Note: On the line chart, arrows denote a significant difference between one wave and the next. For the bar chart, significant differences are noted between Autumn 2021 and Spring 2025, and between Spring 2025 and Spring 2026.

Analysis by subgroups

The proportion reporting that they supported fusion energy overall was higher among the following subgroups:

• People in age groups from 16 to 54: between 50% and 55% compared with 43% of those aged 65 and over.
• People with a degree: 61% compared with 44% of those with another qualification and 40% of those with no qualifications.
• People living in the North East (56%), London (54%), the South East (53%); in contrast the lowest levels of support were reported in the East Midlands and Wales (both 42%).
• People who said they knew a lot or a fair amount about Fusion Energy: 85% compared with 26% of those unaware of it.

The total base size for respondents who reported that they opposed or strongly opposed fusion energy was very small (n=129). Thus, the reasons provided for opposing fusion energy are not included in this report in detail, although the key concerns appear to relate to safety and radioactive waste, as in previous waves.

Awareness of hydrogen

Respondents were introduced to the concept of hydrogen as a fuel through the following definition: ‘And now a question about hydrogen, which is used as a fuel in some industrial processes. Hydrogen is not naturally available. This means it needs to be produced from other sources to be used as a fuel. When produced in an environmentally friendly way, hydrogen can help reduce the carbon emissions in industries, power generation, lorries and shipping.’

Survey respondents were then asked about how much they knew about hydrogen already being used as a fuel in some industrial processes in the UK (Figure 3.3), and how much they knew about the potential future uses of hydrogen to reduce emissions in some industries (Figure 3.4).

In Spring 2026, 79% of people said they were aware of hydrogen as a fuel and there was no change compared with Spring 2025. However, self-reported knowledge fell from 20% to 17% over the same period (Figure 3.3). Just 4% said they knew a lot and 62% said they knew a little or hardly anything about it.

Over the longer term, the increase in awareness of hydrogen as a fuel, seen at the start of the tracking series between Spring 2022 and Spring 2024, has been maintained. A similar initial increase in knowledge levels (knowing a lot or a fair amount) has, however, been partially reversed in Spring 2026, falling to 17% from 20% in Spring 2025.

Figure 3.3: Awareness of hydrogen already used as fuel (% based on all people), Spring 2022 to 2026

HYDKNOW. Before today, how much would you say you knew about hydrogen already being used as a fuel in some industrial processes in the UK?

Base: All wave respondents – Spring 2022 (4,372), Spring 2023 (4,400), Spring 2024 (4,079), Spring 2025 (3,406), Spring 2026 (3,388).

Note: On the line chart, arrows denote a significant difference between one wave and the next. For the bar chart, significant differences are noted between Spring 2022 and Spring 2025, and between Spring 2025 and Spring 2026.

Analysis by subgroups

Self-reported knowledge (knowing a lot or a fair amount) about hydrogen already being used as a fuel was higher among the following subgroups:

• People with a degree: 22% compared with 11% of those with no qualifications. There was a similar pattern for awareness.
• People living in Northern Ireland (22%), compared with those in the East of England (13%).

In Spring 2026, 76% of people said they were aware of potential future uses of hydrogen, stable compared with Spring 2025, while self-reported knowledge fell from 17% to 15% (Figure 3.4). Just 3% said they knew a lot and 61% said they knew a little or hardly anything about it.

Over the longer term, the increase in awareness about potential future uses of hydrogen, seen at the start of the tracking series between Spring 2022 (73%) and Spring 2023 (77%), has been maintained. A similar initial increase in knowledge levels (knowing a lot or a fair amount) has since decreased in Spring 2026, returning to Spring 2022 levels (15%).

Figure 3.4: Awareness of potential future uses of hydrogen (% based on all people), Spring 2022 to 2026

HYDREDKNOW. Before today, how much would you say you knew about the potential future uses of hydrogen to reduce emissions in some industries?

Base: All wave respondents – Spring 2022 (4,372), Spring 2023 (4,402), Spring 2024 (4,084), Spring 2025 (3,413), Spring 2026 (3,389).

Note: On the line chart, arrows denote a significant difference between one wave and the next. For the bar chart, significant differences are noted between Spring 2022 and Spring 2025, and between Spring 2025 and Spring 2026.

Analysis by subgroups

Self-reported knowledge about potential future uses of hydrogen was higher among the following subgroups:

• People with a degree: 19% compared with 14% of those with another kind of qualification and 7% of those with no qualifications. There was a similar pattern for awareness.
• People living in Northern Ireland (23%); in contrast the lowest levels of knowledge were reported in the West Midlands and East of England (both 11%), Wales (12%) and Scotland (13%).

Awareness of small modular reactors

Respondents were provided with the following explanation before being presented with some questions on this topic: ‘These are new types of nuclear reactors, similar to the ones in existing nuclear power stations, but on a smaller scale. They can be used for electricity generation, to provide industry with heat and power, or to provide energy to UK communities not connected to the national gas grid’.  

In Spring 2026, overall awareness of small modular reactors compared with Spring 2025 was stable at 39%^{[footnote 1]}. Self-reported knowledge (knowing a fair amount or a lot) recovered to 11% from 9% in Spring 2025 (Figure 3.5). A stable 29% said they knew a little or hardly anything about them.

Following an increase in awareness of small modular reactors at the start of the tracking series, from 46% in Autumn 2021 to 51% in Autumn 2022, awareness has since dropped back to 39% in Spring 2026. Self-reported knowledge has fluctuated but remains above the Autumn 2021 baseline level of 7%.

Figure 3.5: Awareness of small modular reactors (% based on all people), Autumn 2021 to 2022, Spring 2024 to 2026

SMRKNOW. The next question is about Small Modular Reactors. These are new types of nuclear reactors, similar to existing nuclear power stations, but on a smaller scale. They can be used for electricity generation, to provide industry with heat and power, or to provide energy to UK communities not connected to the national gas grid. Before today, how much, if anything, did you know about Small Modular Reactors?

Base: All wave respondents – Autumn 2021 (5,548), Autumn 2022 (4,158), Spring 2024 (4,086), Spring 2025 (3,410), Spring 2026 (3,388).

Note: On the line chart, arrows denote a significant difference between one wave and the next. For the bar chart, significant differences are noted between Autumn 2021 and Spring 2025, and between Spring 2025 and Spring 2026.

Analysis by subgroups

Self-reported knowledge about small modular reactors was higher among the following subgroups:

• People with a degree: 15% compared with 5% of those with no qualifications. There was a similar pattern for awareness.
• People living in the North West (14%); in contrast the lowest levels of knowledge were reported in the West Midlands (7%).

Support for local nuclear power stations

In Spring 2026, 24% of people said they supported construction of a nuclear power station in their local area. There was no significant change from Spring 2025, but there has been an increase from 21% in Spring 2024. Overall, 35% of people opposed local construction, down steadily from 41% in Spring 2024 and 37% in Spring 2025 (Figure 3.6).

Figure 3.6: Support for construction of nuclear power station in local area (% based on all people), Spring 2024 to 2026

NUCLOCALSUPP. Now imagine that there are plans for a nuclear power station to be constructed in your local area. To what extent would you support or oppose this? If you already have this in your local area, answer on the basis of how you feel about this now.

Base: All wave respondents – Spring 2024 (4,067), Spring 2025 (3,405), Spring 2026 (3,383).

Analysis by subgroups

• Support for a local nuclear power station was higher than average (24%) in the North East (31%) and North West (29%).
• Opposition was higher than average in Northern Ireland: 47% vs 35% for all people.

Respondents who said they supported the construction of a nuclear power station in their local area (24%) were prompted to choose their reasons for support from a list of possible reasons (Figure 3.7).

In Spring 2026, the most reported reason remained to provide a sustainable source of power (77%). This was followed by reducing dependence on foreign energy sources (64%, up from 57% in Spring 2025) and creating jobs (62%).

There was also an increase since Spring 2025 in those who said it was important for reducing emissions (59% up from 55%). Just over half of those who supported construction said this was because of potential benefits to the economy both nationally (54%) and locally (53% up from 47%).

Figure 3.7: Reasons for supporting construction of nuclear power station in local area (% based on all who support it), Spring 2024 to 2026

NUCWHYSUPP. You said you would support the construction of a nuclear power station to be built in your local area. Why is this? Please select all that apply. 

Base: All wave respondents who support local construction – Spring 2024 (853), Spring 2025 (749), Spring 2026 (841).

Respondents who said they opposed the construction of a nuclear power station in their local area (35%) were prompted to choose their reasons from a list of possible reasons (Figure 3.8).

In Spring 2026, the reasons for opposition were broadly in line with those given in Spring 2025. The most reported reasons for opposing construction were concerns about safety and security (77%), followed by concerns about disposal of nuclear waste (67%)^{[footnote 2]} and concern about the impact on local plant and animal life (61%).

The next most commonly selected reasons for opposition in Spring 2026 included concerns about the impact on house prices (39%, up from 34% in Spring 2025) and impacts on the view (32%).

Figure 3.8: Reasons for opposing construction of nuclear power station in local area (% based on all who oppose it), Spring 2024 to 2026

NUCWHYNO. You said you would be opposed to the construction of a nuclear power station being built in your local area. Why is this? Please select all that apply. 

Base: All wave respondents who oppose local construction – Spring 2024 (1,697), Spring 2025 (1,306), Spring 2026 (1,181).  

Awareness and support for carbon capture and storage

Respondents were provided with the following explanation before being presented with some questions on this topic: ‘Carbon capture and storage is a technology that stops greenhouse gases entering the atmosphere. It typically involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power stations or industrial facilities where emissions are high. The CO2 is then piped to offshore underground storage sites, where it can be safely and permanently stored.’.

In Spring 2026, awareness (70%) and knowledge about carbon capture (knowing a lot or a fair amount, 21%) had remained stable since Spring 2025 (Figure 3.9). Just 5% said they knew a lot and 48% said they knew a little or hardly anything about it.

Over the longer term, awareness of carbon capture and storage has increased: from 62% in Spring 2022 to 70% in Spring 2026, with a corresponding increase in knowledge from 15% to 21%. The rate of increase has slowed since Spring 2023.

Figure 3.9: Awareness of carbon capture and storage (% based on all people), Spring and Autumn 2022, Spring 2023 to 2026

CCSKNOW. Carbon capture and storage is a technology that stops greenhouse gases entering the atmosphere. It typically involves capturing carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from power stations or industrial facilities where emissions are high. The CO2 is then piped to offshore underground storage sites, where it can be safely and permanently stored. Before today, how much, if anything, did you know about carbon capture and storage?

Base: All wave respondents – Spring 2022 (4,375), Autumn 2022 (4,155), Spring 2023 (4,406), Spring 2024 (4,082), Spring 2025 (3,410), Spring 2026 (3,388).         

Note: On the line chart, arrows denote a significant difference between one wave and the next. For the bar chart, significant differences are noted between Spring 2022 and Spring 2025, and between Spring 2025 and Spring 2026.

Analysis by subgroups

Self-reported knowledge of carbon capture and storage was higher among the following subgroups:

• People with a degree: 29% compared with 12% of those with no qualifications.
• People living in London, Yorkshire and the Humber, and the South West (all 25%), and in Scotland (24%) and the South East (22%); in contrast, the lowest levels of knowledge were reported in the East of England (15%), the North East and Northern Ireland (both 16%).

In Spring 2026, the pattern of support for carbon capture and storage remained in line with Spring 2025, with 44% overall support, and 10% expressing strong support (Figure 3.10). A substantial minority were not able to give an opinion either way: 33% said they neither supported nor opposed this technology and 12% said they did not know.

Over the longer term, overall support for the use of carbon capture and storage to reduce greenhouse gas emissions has remained stable. Opposition, however, has increased steadily from 7% in Spring 2022 to 12% in Spring 2026.

Figure 3.10: Whether support or oppose carbon capture and storage (% based on all people), Spring and Autumn 2022, Spring 2023 to 2026

CCSUPPORT. From what you know, or have heard about it, do you support or oppose the use of carbon capture and storage to reduce greenhouse gas emissions?

Base: All wave respondents – Spring 2022 (4,366), Autumn 2022 (4,145), Spring 2023 (4,397), Spring 2024 (4,080), Spring 2025 (3,406), Spring 2026 (3,386).              

Note: On the line chart, vertical scale has been reduced to 0-80%, and arrows denote a significant difference between one wave and the next. For the bar chart, significant differences are noted between Spring 2022 and Spring 2025, and between Spring 2025 and Spring 2026.

Analysis by subgroups

People with self-reported knowledge (a lot/fair amount) about carbon capture and storage were more likely to both support (63%) and oppose it (21%) compared to those with no awareness (26% support and 9% oppose).

Reasons for supporting or opposing carbon capture and storage

As shown above, in Spring 2026, 44% of people supported the use of carbon capture and storage, and 12% opposed it. Respondents were asked to select their reasons for support or opposition from lists of possible reasons. These were unchanged since Spring 2025.

In Spring 2026, the main reason for supporting carbon capture and storage was a perception that it would help combat climate change and reduce carbon emissions (84%). Secondary reasons included job creation (35%), benefit to the UK economy (33%), providing an opportunity for the UK to be a world leader in this (30%), and re-use of existing infrastructure (30%).

When asked about reasons for opposing carbon capture and storage, a number of reasons were selected less frequently in Spring 2026 compared with Spring 2025. The most reported reason in Spring 2026 was still that this would not be a long-term solution (50%, down from 58% in Spring 2025). This was followed closely by a preference for more natural strategies (48%). The proportion who said it would not tackle the cause of climate change or stop emissions (38%) had dropped sharply from 49% in Spring 2025, to the lowest level recorded so far. There was a similar decline in the belief that it would not be effective in reducing emissions (33%, back down from 38% in Spring 2025).

Around a third of those opposed to carbon capture and storage felt it would be too expensive (34%), remaining above the baseline Spring 2022 level (21%). Concerns about safety have declined steadily over time, from 41% in Spring 2022 to 25% in Spring 2026.

Trust in information about energy sources

Trust in various sources to provide accurate information about new and emerging energy sources such as fusion energy and hydrogen was first asked in Spring 2024 (Figure 3.11).

In Spring 2026, the overall pattern of trust remained in line with Spring 2025, with scientists (82%) and TV/radio documentaries (69%) the most trusted in this context, followed by charities and TV news (both 62%), the UK government (54%, remaining up from 47% in Spring 2024), and newspapers (40%). Only 17% trusted social media to provide accurate information on new energy sources, although this remained higher than in Spring 2024 (15%).

Over a third trusted scientists a great deal (36%) compared with a maximum of 12% for any of the other information sources.

Figure 3.11: Level of trust in each source to provide accurate information about new energy sources (% based on all people), Spring 2024 to 2026

NEWTECHTRUST. How much do you trust each of the following to provide accurate information about new and emerging energy sources such as fusion energy and hydrogen energy? *change to social media examples to include YouTube and to update ‘Twitter’ to ‘X (formerly Twitter)’.

Base: All wave respondents – Spring 2024 / Spring 2025 / Spring 2026: Scientists/scientific organisations (4,070/3,388/3,360), TV & radio documentaries (4,065/3,391/3,359), Charities, environmental or campaign groups (4,067/3,389/3,360), TV news (4,072/3,392/3,361), UK government (4,069/3,386/3,357), Newspapers (4,067/3,389/3,355), Social media (4,057/3,382/3,357).

Analysis by subgroups

The following groups were more or less likely to trust different sources to provide reliable information on new and emerging energy sources.

By age:

• Older people were more likely to trust newspapers (46% of people aged 65 and over vs between 36% and 38% of people in age groups 25 to 54).
• Conversely, older people aged 65 and over were less likely to trust scientists/scientific organisations (76% vs between 83% and 88% of people in age groups 16 to 64), charities (50% vs between 61% and 70% in age groups 16 to 64) and UK government (50% vs 57% of those in age groups 16 to 54).
• Younger people were more likely than older people to trust social media, ranging from 31% of those aged 16 to 24, to 9% of those aged 65 and over.

By education:

• For all sources other than social media, trust was higher among those with a degree and lowest for those with no qualifications. For example, 61% of those with a degree vs 40% of those with no qualifications said they trusted the UK government and 48% of those with a degree said they trusted newspapers vs 34% of people with no qualifications.
• There were also differences between those with a degree and those with other qualifications; for example, 93% of those with a degree said they trusted scientists, compared with 80% of those with other non-degree qualifications (and 64% of those with no qualifications).

Further findings on energy infrastructure and energy security

In previous waves, questions were included on other topics relating to energy infrastructure and energy security. The latest findings relating to these topics can be found as follows:

• Awareness of the need for new electricity network infrastructure and what information people would find most useful to know about during the planning stage, see Winter 2025 report on energy infrastructure and energy sources – section on ‘Awareness of new electricity network infrastructure’
• Attitudes towards nuclear energy, see Winter 2025 report on Energy Infrastructure – section on ‘Nuclear Energy’
• Levels of happiness with electricity network infrastructure being built in the local area and reasons for happiness and unhappiness, see Summer 2025 report on Energy Infrastructure – section on ‘Awareness and support for new electricity network infrastructure’
• Levels of concern regarding a range of issues relating to energy security in the next 10-20 years, see Summer 2025 report on Energy Infrastructure – section on ‘Concerns about energy security’
• Support for reducing domestic production of oil and gas, even if that means buying more from other countries, see Summer 2025 report on Energy Infrastructure – section on ‘Support for domestic production of oil and gas’
• The perceived importance of various aspects of energy policy, see Summer 2025 report on Energy Infrastructure – section on ‘Perceived importance of different aspects of energy policy’
• Awareness of greenhouse gas removals (GGRs), see Summer 2025 report on Energy Infrastructure – section on ‘Awareness of greenhouse gas removals’
• Attitudes towards fusion energy, see Summer 2023 report on energy infrastructure and energy sources - section on ‘Attitudes towards fusion energy’

1. In June 2025, between the Spring 2025 and Spring 2026 waves, Rolls Royce were announced to have been selected to construct the UK’s first Small Modular Reactors: Rolls-Royce SMR selected to build small modular nuclear reactors - GOV.UK. A further announcement on a contract with Rolls Royce to commence technology design activities was made towards the end of fieldwork in Spring 2026: Great British Energy - Nuclear and Rolls-Royce SMR sign contract - GOV.UK. ↩

2. A new response option was added in Spring 2025 based on open text data collected in ‘Other reason’ for the question NUCWHYNO in Spring 2024 ‘I’m concerned about the disposal of radioactive nuclear waste’. ↩