Nuclear safeguards: AUKUS statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, June 2025
Statement by Australia, the UK and the US to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Board of Governors on IAEA safeguards and AUKUS
Thank you, Chair.
I take the floor on behalf of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to respond to continued false claims that purposefully mischaracterize AUKUS partners’ intentions and attempt to undermine the independence, integrity, and authority of the IAEA.
We reiterate that this item has not been adopted as a standing agenda item by the Board and does not have consensus support among Board members. It is a distraction from the Board’s important work on other pressing issues. We support discussion of naval nuclear propulsion at the appropriate time, such as when the Director General releases reports on the topic. As we have always said, Australia’s arrangement will be referred to the Board for appropriate action guided by the DG’s technical assessment of the arrangement’s nonproliferation provisions when the time is right.
AUKUS partners remain committed to transparency as we work to set the highest nonproliferation standard, and Director General Grossi has repeatedly expressed satisfaction with AUKUS partners’ engagement and transparency. As a demonstration of our commitment to transparency, I would like to highlight the side event held at the NPT Preparatory Committee in New York on 1 May. AUKUS partners value sessions such as these to openly offer clarity on how we are developing the non-proliferation approach for Australia’s program, consistent with our respective international obligations.
As we have said, when we discuss setting the highest nonproliferation standard, we are not seeking to establish a model arrangement for others. Australia’s arrangement, once finalized, will demonstrate that it is possible to apply the highest non-proliferation standard to naval nuclear propulsion under an Article 14 arrangement in a way that will allow the IAEA to fulfill its technical objectives: verifying there has been no diversion of nuclear material, no misuse of nuclear facilities, and no undeclared nuclear material or activities in Australia. For other Member States seeking naval nuclear propulsion programs, it will be up to them to negotiate directly with the IAEA on appropriate verification arrangements based on the unique nature of the program. Although, we trust that other such Member States likewise will support a high standard and respect the integrity and independence of the IAEA.
The commitment to a robust Article 14 arrangement was included in our countries’ legal obligations in the AUKUS Naval Nuclear Propulsion Agreement (ANNPA), including through the requirement that the United States and UK not transfer any nuclear material to Australia for naval nuclear propulsion until Australia and the IAEA have such an arrangement in place. As we have prioritized since the start of the AUKUS partnership in 2021, ANNPA, which entered into force in January, is yet another way that we are demonstrating our commitment to setting the highest standard of nonproliferation in an open and transparent manner.
Chair,
Some countries continue to make the same false claims about the AUKUS partnership. We have spent considerable time addressing these in the past, both here at the Board and in other venues. To be clear, AUKUS in no way involves cooperation on nuclear weapons. The AUKUS partnership is fully consistent with partners’ respective international obligations under the NPT and safeguards agreements. Again, the transfer of nuclear material under the AUKUS partnership will only proceed once we can ensure it is done in a manner consistent with the highest nonproliferation standard.
We will continue our open and transparent approach, including by providing an update under Any Other Business, and will engage in good faith with Member States on genuine questions as we continue to develop our partnership.
Thank you, Chair.