Research and analysis

CEOI Evaluation - Final Report

Published 23 September 2025

Evaluation of the Centre for Earth Observation Instrumentation: Final report

Preface

The UK Space Agency commissioned RAND Europe, know.space, Luca Budello and Aravind Ravichandran to deliver an evaluation of the Centre for Earth Observation Instrumentation (CEOI) programme from May 2023 to March 2025. The evaluation provided an assessment of the effectiveness of the CEOI’s delivery (process), the extent to which it has achieved its objectives (perceived impact) and whether it represents value for money (economic).

Phase 1 of this study began with a deliverable scoping out this initial study phase, with a second deliverable presenting the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) literature review around space research and development (R&D), the initial baselining of the Earth Observation (EO) R&D sector when the CEOI programme launched in 2007, and the programme’s process and stakeholder mapping. This study’s third deliverable (the inception report) included all products presented in the second deliverable, with additional chapters developing the proposed approach to the evaluation.^{[footnote 1]}

Phase 2 of this study commenced in June 2023 and ran until March 2025. It included interviews and surveys with CEOI programme project leads, partners and wider cross-government stakeholders to gain a better understanding of the CEOI programme’s processes and impacts. The team also compiled a series of international case studies to provide insights into EO sectors in other countries, created and updated a baseline of the UK’s EO sector, and conducted several policy roundtables. The interim findings from this stage were reported in mid-2024.^{[footnote 2]}

This report constitutes the fifth and final deliverable, summarising the findings from Phase 2 of this study and synthesising overall findings.

For more information on this study, please contact the Project Lead, Billy Bryan (bbryan@randeurope.org).

Summary

Earth Observation (EO) science is fundamental to humanity’s understanding of our planet, its climate and its natural processes. Launched in 2007, the Earth Observation Instrumentation Programme (EOIP) aims to enhance the UK's capabilities in low Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Earth Observation (EO) instrumentation, with a focus on TRLs 3 and 4.^{[footnote 3]} The programme also aims to fortify the position of UK-led teams in international contracts and export opportunities, particularly in European Space Agency (ESA) EO missions. The Centre for Earth Observation Instrumentation (CEOI), established in conjunction with the EOIP, has played a crucial role in delivering the programme. Initially funded by the Natural Environment Research Council (NERC), the EOIP advances UK technical capabilities in EO instrumentation. The EOIP was later expanded into the EO Technology Programme (EOTP) with an additional £15m up to March 2025 to develop innovative EO instrumentation and maintain the UK’s position at the forefront of EO capability and expertise.

This final report presents the findings of the CEOI programme evaluation conducted by RAND Europe and know.space. It includes an overview of the UK EO sector and evaluates the programme’s economics, processes and perceived impacts, exploring potential alternative delivery models. This report presents findings assessing the CEOI’s perceived impacts, execution and value for money, aiming to understand how the programme has enhanced EO capabilities in the UK.

Contextualising the CEOI’s results, this report’s findings reveal the following about the UK EO sector today:

• The UK Space Agency has increased its overall spending on both national programmes and ESA contributions. In 2022, the UK increased investment in EO and climate programmes by 45% to counteract the impacts of the temporary withdrawal from EU components of the Copernicus programme.

• In 2021, EO satellite services supported industries, contributing £109bn of the UK's GDP (4.8%), demonstrating how EO can help underpin economic activity.

• By the financial year 2021/2022, the EO sector, including meteorology, contributed £784m to the UK space industry’s overall £18.9bn income, marking a significant increase from previous years.

• The UK has more than doubled its investment in the European Organisation for the Exploitation of Meteorological Satellites (EUMETSAT) and remains actively engaged in international EO organisations such as the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), the European Association of Remote Sensing Companies (EARSC), the European Space Sciences Committee (ESSC) and the Group on Earth Observations (GEO).

Key insights:

• The UK is a significant player in global EO technology development, and the CEOI plays a crucial role within the ecosystem.

• The CEOI programme funds innovative projects that lead to enhanced technological progression and promising mission concepts.

Interim programme impacts:

• The CEOI programme has been important in advancing the TRLs of UK-developed emerging EO capabilities by an average of 2.2 points, with many participants attributing significant project progress to the CEOI’s support.

• Approximately 46.2% of survey respondents reported enhancements in their skills through participation in CEOI events. In comparison, 73.1% gained valuable technical insights from technology showcases facilitated by the programme.

• Some 69.2% of respondents indicated that CEOI funding has increased their ability to commercialise their research, and 96.2% reported gaining reputational benefits as a result of their involvement with the CEOI. Overall, participants widely acknowledged that their involvement with the CEOI has either maintained or enhanced their technical skills in developing innovative EO instruments.

• CEOI-supported technologies have featured on four successful satellite launches between 2015 and 2023, with seven additional launches currently in progress, five projects selected for further study and eleven more planned for future launches.

• Most respondents stated that the CEOI has strengthened their capacity to participate in international missions, while two-thirds acknowledged that the programme has enhanced their export capabilities.

• In addition to directly enabling increased TRLs, project stakeholders appreciate the CEOI for fostering collaboration and establishing pioneering partnerships, particularly between universities and private sector entities. Survey data indicate that industry collaborations frequently involve a broad network of additional stakeholders.

• The CEOI’s strategic focus on supporting early-stage EO research and development (R&D) was identified as a key factor in maintaining the UK's EO capabilities.

Key insights:

• The CEOI fills an important gap in funding low-TRL UK EO projects and supporting their development to higher levels.

• The CEOI’s expertise and networks enable coordination and collaboration among the government, academia and industry, thereby strengthening the UK EO and space sectors.

• The progression pipeline in international missions from CEOI-funded projects to ESA funding or involvement is evident, contributing to the UK’s global standing.

Economic evaluation:

• The actual value for money of CEOI projects (the benefits relative to the costs) will only be realised in the long term, potentially years or even decades after the initial funding, due to the extended timelines required for incorporating early-stage technology development into EO missions. Nonetheless, there are some indications of potential for substantial future benefits, notably through several significant investment events.

• With the caveat that this economic evaluation of the CEOI programme only focuses on projects from roughly 2018 to 2025 (i.e. Calls 11–16) due to data limitations in earlier years, current estimates suggest that the real discounted Present Value (PV) of UK benefits from CEOI Calls 11–16 totals at least £30.2m to date. This value is primarily driven by three large ESA contracts. This PV benefit rises to at least £57.6m when expectations are included.

• The evaluation acknowledges that many significant benefits of CEOI, such as scientific progress, enhanced collaboration and spillover benefits to adjacent sectors, are non-monetisable, suggesting that quantitative estimates may underestimate the programme’s full impact.

Key insights:

• Increasing funding for the CEOI could deliver further value to UK EO. Although project participants advocate for expanding the CEOI programme, potential challenges and trade-offs must be considered.

• Future monitoring will be essential to fully capture the programme's value for money. Regular ongoing monitoring, concurrent with project delivery, will be key to capturing benefits as they arise.

Process evaluation:

• Applicants greatly valued the CEOI's support for early-stage technology development. This key aspect of the programme addresses a critical funding gap for low-TRL innovations in the space sector, which often face high risks and low profitability.

• Interviewed project participants found the application process to be clear, rigorous, and characterised by quick turnaround times. The transparency of funding call needs and objectives, along with CEOI's responsiveness, was appreciated.

• Generally, participants expressed satisfaction with the CEOI's project management and reporting structures, including its light-touch process approach and regular updates to keep projects on track. Although there have been some reports of management delays, particularly during the COVID-19 pandemic, interviewed project leads reported overcoming these.

• Participants greatly valued the CEOI's programme design, which incorporates flexible funding tied to milestones and responsive communication. Although some academic project participants found the payment milestones and reporting timelines challenging, these generally aligned well with the project leads’ needs and expectations.

• The CEOI funding and delivery model provides unique benefits to applicants and grant holders. It offers technical advice from the bid stage to the very end of the project, improving project designs and supporting ongoing R&D. This may not be the case with a traditional, centrally managed UK Space Agency programme, where there is less capacity to provide such embedded industry expertise. The trade-off between outsourcing costs and project quality currently favours quality. However, work is needed to ensure that the CEOI has sufficient administrative and Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) support to capture and share its benefits properly.

Key insights:

• The current CEOI model has advantages due to the level of stakeholder buy-in, programme transparency and support for international funding down the line.

• There is value in exploring alternative delivery models, such as an expanded, more centralised or fully centralised model delivered directly by the UK Space Agency. However, altering the programme’s delivery is likely to have trade-offs that require further study.

Introduction

The CEOI programme

The Earth Observation Instrumentation Programme (EOIP) was launched in 2007 to maintain and grow the UK’s capability in instrumentation for low-Technology Readiness Level (TRL) Earth Observation (EO) up to TRLs 3 or 4.^{[footnote 4]} The EOIP aims to strengthen the position of UK-led teams bidding for export opportunities and international contracts, particularly in ESA EO missions. The Centre for Earth Observation Instrumentation (CEOI) has overseen the EOIP since its inception in 2007. The Natural Environment Research Council (NERC) initiated the EOIP to help develop UK technical capability in innovative EO instrumentation and offer a strategic funding source to this end. The CEOI consortium, which has delivered the programme, is led by Airbus Defence and Space (DS) in partnership with QinetiQ, the University of Leicester, the Science and Technology Facilities Council’s (STFC’s) Rutherford Appleton Laboratory (RAL Space), and, more recently, know.space. The consortium aims to develop innovative technologies to observe Earth from space by teaming UK scientists with industrialists. Founded in 2010, the UK Space Agency assumed responsibility for EOIP funding from NERC.

To date, there have been two primary elements to the EOIP:

• The Technology Programme comprised 74 projects funded through 16 themed/open Research and Development (R&D) grant funding calls, funding a wide range of technologies.

• The Added Value Programme comprised knowledge-exchange and networking events to establish and strengthen academic-industry networks, providing advice to upskill and guide companies bidding for ESA projects alongside strategic/technical advice for the UK Space Agency, the DSIT and the wider government.

Announced in November 2022, the EO Technology Programme (EOTP)^{[footnote 5]} was designed to develop innovative EO satellite instrumentation, maintaining the UK’s position at the forefront of EO capability and expertise. By co-funding innovation with industry and academia, the programme aims to help mature technologies form part of satellite mission payloads or viable commercial applications. Figure 1 outlines a simple view of the CEOI’s governance structure.

Figure 1: The CEOI’s governance structure

Alt-text: A flowchart showcasing the governance structure of CEOI. DSIT oversees the UK Space Agency, which commissions and oversees CEOI. CEOI delivers the EOIP and the EOTP, which provide funding for industry and academia. Industry and academia then report back to CEOI, which reports back up to the UK Space Agency and DSIT.

Source: RAND Europe analysis of UK Space Agency documentation on CEOI.

The EOTP enabled the EOIP’s scale-up and delivery by expanding the existing CEOI contract. The EOTP aims to enable the development of select technologies beyond what was previously possible, potentially including airborne and/or in-orbit demonstrations to prove capability and provide additional support to lower-level TRL projects. The EOTP also expands on the EOIP’s objectives, focusing more on closer-to-market technologies and the ESA’s and other international space agencies’ adoption rate of EOTP/EOIP-supported projects. It also recognises the need to mitigate the economic impact of the period of non-association with Copernicus, the European Union (EU) EO programme, which the UK rejoined as an associate country in 2024.^{[footnote 6]}

In 2017, the CEOI prepared the UK EO technology strategy^{[footnote 7]} for the UK Space Agency, outlining the UK Space Agency’s EO vision over the next decade to help the UK become a world leader in new EO technologies. The strategy was updated in 2019 and outlined four key objectives underpinning EOIP/EOTP-funded activities:

• Economic Impact: Develop EO technologies that increase exports and economic growth.

• Innovation: Keep the UK at the forefront of EO technology development by supporting new and innovative ideas that offer tangible benefits to future missions.

• Capability: Strengthen capabilities in which the UK already leads, has the potential to lead or could overtake existing capability elsewhere.

• Return on UK Government Investment: Maximise the benefits derived from UK funding to ESA and other institutional bodies.

This report refers hereon to the CEOI programme as a combination of the EOIP, the EOTP and the CEOI delivery consortium.

Study objectives

This evaluation aimed to assess the CEOI’s impact, delivery and value for money, and to understand how both programmes contribute to improving the UK’s EO capabilities. The overall objective was to deliver an impact, process and economic evaluation across the CEOI to optimise the programme’s ongoing delivery.

Guided by His Majesty’s Government’s (HMG) Magenta, Green & Aqua Books’ best practices and Government Social Research (GSR) ethics guidelines, the monitoring and evaluation (M&E) activity funded through this project aims to help the UK Space Agency understand how effective funding from CEOI has been by establishing what tangible difference it has made and for whom (direct beneficiaries, associated or non-participating organisations and broader society). It also gathered lessons learned to support the design and implementation of future programmes and the CEOI’s next steps.

However, the methodology used for the impact evaluation is not sufficiently robust to be termed a proper impact evaluation in line with HMG guidance. An impact evaluation and assessment of concrete impacts typically involves the deployment of quasi-experimental methods and the identification of a proper counterfactual or control group, which are not utilised here due to data availability constraints and the absence of a well-defined control. Instead, this work employs a theory-based approach, identifying perceived or interim impacts. For simplicity, we continue to refer to ‘impacts’ throughout this report; however, this caveat should be kept in mind.

The evaluation involved extensive primary and secondary research, underpinned by a Theory of Change (ToC) and process map. A previous evaluation of CEOI was conducted in 2022, covering the period from the CEOI’s inception until 2021. Rather than duplicating that effort, this evaluation extended and tested those findings by revisiting the impact of CEOI projects to date. Our approach to assessing the impact of the programme was primarily centred around contribution analysis (CA) to test the claims set out in the ToC and evaluation framework. By employing CA, we aimed to develop a framework for understanding how the CEOI contributed to observed outcomes in the ToC. To build a strong basis for the evaluation, we implemented an impact indicator framework that detailed the metrics to be used in answering the evaluation questions. From this, indicators and evaluation questions were synthesised to underpin specific interview questions, data analysis and bibliometric analysis. We report results broadly against the original contribution claims, detailing the level of attribution to the CEOI intervention.

M&E and benefits management ensure the optimal allocation of public funds to benefit a wide range of UK stakeholders (e.g. industry, academia, and the general public) and contribute to achieving national and regional strategic objectives, especially those outlined in the National Space Strategy (NSS). The UK Space Agency’s North Star metric utilises the total investment level and contract revenue brought into the UK space sector to assess the sector’s overall value. Doing so effectively requires data collection from the outset to support and evidence the UK Space Agency’s evaluations in the coming decade, providing transparency on how the UK benefits from this investment and lessons for the future.

Methodology

This study phase involved multiple data collection and synthesis methods, as detailed in the section below.

Table 1: Methodologies across each evaluation stream

Method category	Methods used
Process evaluation	Surveys
	Interviews
	Policy round tables
Economic evaluation	Secondary data analysis
	Monitoring forms
Data science	Bibliometrics

Source: Internal document repository.

Process Evaluation

The process evaluation of the CEOI focuses on using contribution analysis (CA), based on theories of change (ToC) analysis, as part of a theory-based approach. This approach explores programme hypotheses and alternative hypotheses by creating a contribution story derived from key stakeholders and participatory methods, including surveys, interviews and policy roundtables. Stakeholder surveys, policy roundtables and CEOI participant interviews were utilised for impact analysis, with an interview with CEOI centred around process evaluation itself. The addition of contribution stories through qualitative data gathering enables the implementation of theory during design and provides strong evaluation outcomes based on actual stakeholder feedback. An overview of the methods used for the process evaluation follows below:

• Survey: Between November 2023 and February 2024, we circulated an online survey through SmartSurvey to project leads and partners from all projects funded by the CEOI since its inception. The questionnaire covered process and impact questions, asking respondents to indicate the level of support they received from CEOI for their projects and to identify their TRL progression rate, along with core questions around their experience with CEOI processes (See Annex B for survey questions). Of 68 project leads, 26 responded (38.2% response rate). This low response rate is attributable to the sector’s relatively high turnover, the project teams’ demanding workloads and ‘survey fatigue’, as stakeholders had already participated in surveys for previous and concurrent evaluations. We focused more on our interviews and document review to cover gaps.

• Interviews: Interviews were the primary data collection method for capturing the rich, qualitative data needed to answer the evaluation questions (EQs). Interviews were semi-structured, using clearly defined topic guides that reflected survey topics. We conducted a total of 26 online interviews via Teams across four stakeholder types: the wider programme team (e.g. CEOI and UK Space Agency EO policy leads, n=5), project leads (n=10), other beneficiaries (e.g. project partners, n=3) and wider policy stakeholders, e.g. the Defence Science and Technology Laboratory (DSTL) and ESA (n=7). We conducted the analysis in MAXQDA and grouped the results thematically by the indicator frameworks.

• Policy roundtables: The study team also held two policy roundtables with practitioners within the UK EO sector and government stakeholders working on EO policy, R&D and strategy. Organisations and departments attending the EO sector roundtables included the UK Space Agency, DSIT, DEFRA, the Met Office, National Physical Laboratory, the STFC’s RAL Space, Surrey Satellite Technology Ltd (SSTL), ESA and UKRI. We held the two roundtables on 23 October 2024 and 6 November 2024 via Teams. The sessions discussed the UK’s strengths and gaps in the EO market, key past trends in the UK’s domestic and international EO policy and programmes, opportunities for EO investment, future needs and strategies, job creation and the ideal delivery model for EO sector funding. The discussion from the roundtables helped validate findings and add qualitative strength to the evaluation.

Economic Evaluation

Our economic evaluation combined qualitative and quantitative evidence to assess the extent to which the CEOI has provided value for money. We collated data on costs and benefits, using cost data provided by the CEOI and data on benefits from monitoring forms, the survey, and, to a lesser extent, interviews. We made adjustments for additionality, attribution, deadweight, displacement and leakage, as well as appropriately discounting and deflating figures.

• Secondary data analysis: We analysed secondary data from various sources, reporting descriptive information about the projects and application numbers via the CEOI’s programme data and feeding this into a portfolio analysis to help contextualise the results. The CEOI-supplied documentation included project reports, quarterly reports and selection panel results. However, the documentation was unevenly distributed across the funding calls, with only 59% of projects having available reports. Table 2 below shows the documentation received across each funding round.

Table 2: CEOI documentation received

	Rounds 1–6	Round 7	Round 8	Round 9	Round 10	Round 11	Round 12
Number of projects	18	16	6	6	18	7	12
Number of projects with reports available	9	15	4	5	11	2	3
Share of projects with reports available	50%	94%	67%	83%	61%	29%	25%

Source: Internal document repository.

• Monitoring forms: The research team designed monitoring forms in consultation with the UK Space Agency and the CEOI to capture economic data among project participants. The forms collected project information, including the value of CEOI funding, match funding and the start and end TRLs. The forms were designed to be issued periodically to project stakeholders, enabling the CEOI to gather economic data on a rolling basis to fulfil North Star Metric reporting requirements.

Data Science

We employed data science methods as a quantitative mechanism for analysing the CEOI’s impact and adopted a bibliometrics methodology over alternatives, such as altmetrics, due to data scarcity and temporal constraints on the research team. Our rationale was that open-source data can be used to obtain information on key impact parameters, such as publication counts, FWCI, and the number of publications by year, as well as those in the top 1% of their respective fields. ^{[footnote 8]} We outline our specific method below:

• Bibliometrics: We conducted a bibliometric analysis to understand the UK’s contribution to international research on EO technologies. Due to challenges in attributing research outputs specifically to the CEOI programme, the focus was on the UK's overall position in EO research. We selected the OpenAlex database for its completeness.^{[footnote 9]} The process of filtering UK-related EO publications was iterative, focusing on papers from 2006 to 2023 and using specific search terms to identify relevant research. The research team manually reviewed results from different search term combinations, adjusting them to maximise the inclusion of relevant papers. The search, conducted on 19 November 2024, yielded 37,140 journal articles. We created additional datasets for the UK, France, Germany, Canada, Japan, Australia, South Korea, Norway and Finland based on this one to compare their presence in EO research. This approach benchmarks the UK's performance against these countries. We also selected publications from several UK institutions to assess their performance against scientometric indicators. Box 1 shows the search terms used in OpenAlex for this study.

Box 1. Search terms used in OpenAlex

Terms: "earth observation" AND ( "satellite" OR "ir radiometry" OR "optical imaging" OR "ir spectroscopy" OR "lidar" OR "optical spectroscopy" OR "passive microwave" OR "radiation detection" OR "gnss-r" OR "spatial resolution" OR "radar altimetry" OR "radar scatterometry")

Full OpenAlex query

Caveats and limitations

There were several challenges in conducting this evaluation that should be kept in mind when considering the results:

• Reporting gaps: The secondary data analysis in this research was limited by the availability of project reporting. Funding values for early calls (those made before the seventh call) were stored in secure commercial servers that have not yet been migrated to the new system due to the CEOI leadership’s transformation under the UK Space Agency. As such, we have aggregated figures for these projects.

• Low survey response: Since the initial survey achieved a response rate of only 38.2%, we pivoted to conducting interviews, which gathered more qualitative data. The interviews yielded a better response rate and enabled participants to tell the story of their project and the CEOI’s impact.

• Low monitoring form response: Less than a third of the total grantee population returned the monitoring forms, limiting the insights we could draw from across the portfolio, particularly for the economic evaluation. This low response was despite the mandatory requirement, since 2022, for projects to report data on the North Star Metrics, addressed within the monitoring form.

• Retrospective recall: Reaching stakeholders for projects awarded over 15 years ago has been challenging, which may have also impacted the response rate. Project leads were interviewed and surveyed as part of the CEOI evaluations. However, this report relies heavily on documentary and secondary data sources to minimise the need for questioning in surveys and interviews.

• Measuring impact: This involves considerable challenges linked to the nature of the funded innovation. Across many programmes, scientific impact is expected but has yet to materialise. Intellectual property (IP) products and publications may not yet have been generated in some cases.

• Self-reported TRL: There are certain limitations in this and previous methods of evaluating the CEOI, particularly regarding project leads self-assessing their projects’ TRL changes. Without a clear definition of TRLs, stakeholders might evaluate their projects’ TRLs differently, impacting reporting accuracy and hindering cross-comparability. Organisations may also feel compelled to report TRL increases to justify their CEOI funding. Future evaluations may benefit from employing a third party (e.g. a peer review panel) to compile and assess this data.

• Varied outputs: Outputs may vary depending on the project and lead type (e.g. commercial, academic or government). Some projects – particularly those with an academic lead – prioritise publications over generating IP. Others prioritise product commercialisation without releasing findings into the public domain.

• Evaluation timelines: The study team encountered challenges in gauging outputs at this evaluation stage, particularly for those that had not yet materialised. While some completed projects had already achieved their intended outputs or outcomes, others were slower to materialise due to longer causal pathways between the project’s output and national-scale impact. Other projects are ongoing, with further awards pending. Therefore, their expected outputs are unlikely to manifest until later in the evaluation.

• M&E was not in the CEOI’s original scope: Including M&E post-award has led to inconsistent responses and a lack of baseline data for each project. This issue is further complicated by the time constraints that CEOI staff face. The M&E reporting expectations outlined in the GFA should be expanded to include clear guidelines on data collection, storage and transfer to evaluators.

The UK EO sector today

Summary

EO remains a strategic priority for the UK, identified as a 'high growth area' in the National Space Strategy^{[footnote 10]} and reinforced in the National Space Strategy in Action (2023). The UK Space Agency has increased national and ESA spending, investing more in EO to mitigate impacts from the short-term exit from EU elements of Copernicus. The UK has re-engaged with the EU arm of Copernicus to ensure participation in key space initiatives and strengthen its position in European EO activities. The UK Space Agency primarily delivers through the ESA and contributes to several international EO missions. However, the UK EO sector faces challenges, such as skills shortages, and requires targeted strategies and long-term funding to enhance growth and innovation.

Box 2: Quick figures on the UK EO sector, past and present

• In 2021/2022, the EO sector, including meteorology, contributed £784m to the UK space industry's £18.9bn income.

• In 2021, EO satellite services supported industries that contribute £109bn to UK GDP (4.8%).

• The UK has more than doubled its investment in EUMETSAT and continues to participate in international EO organisations such as the Committee on Earth Observation Satellites (CEOS), EASRC, European Scientists on Spectrum for Earth Observation (ESSEO) and the Group on Earth Observations (GEO).

Context

Since 2007, the UK EO sector has grown through strategic investments, technological advancements and increased international collaboration. The British National Space Centre (BNSC) previously coordinated and funded UK space activities. However, the UK Space Agency was established in 2011 as the government's primary delivery agency for UK civil space programmes, including overseeing the CEOI programme.^{[footnote 11]} The Department for Science, Innovation and Technology (DSIT) sits above the UK Space Agency, setting civil space policy.^{[footnote 12]}

Government funding for the space sector has also increased since 2007, reflecting a growing commitment to enhancing the UK’s space capabilities. National spending rose from £21m in 2010/2011^{[footnote 13]} to £102m in 2023/2024.^{[footnote 14]} Over the same period, the UK's total contributions to ESA have more than doubled from £217m^{[footnote 15]} to £482m.^{[footnote 16]} In 2021/2022, EO satellite services supported industries that contribute £109bn to UK GDP (4.8%), demonstrating how EO can help underpin economic activities.^{[footnote 17]} It also highlights EO’s expanding role in decision-making, risk assessment and sustainability efforts, reinforcing its strategic importance to the UK economy.

Since 2007, EO has been a strategic priority for the UK Space Agency and the UK's space ambitions, with policies aimed at maintaining global leadership in EO capabilities. The 2010 Space Innovation and Growth Strategy^{[footnote 18]} identified EO as a major growth area, leading to the Strategy for Earth Observation from Space 2013–16.^{[footnote 19]} This strategy focused on enhancing international EO leadership through collaboration among academia, government and industry, improving EO technology and data accessibility. It aimed to maximise returns from UK membership in European programmes, including ESA and EU space subscriptions. In 2019, the UK EO Technology Strategy^{[footnote 20]} was published to guide investment in upstream technologies for future EO missions, emphasising returns from international programmes like ESA and Copernicus. It prioritised developing technologies relevant to future EO missions to strengthen the UK's position in national, European and global initiatives.

Published in 2021, the NSS,^{[footnote 21]} the UK’s first Space Strategy, identified EO as a key sector for capability development. The 2023 National Space Strategy in Action^{[footnote 22]} outlined steps to maintain leadership in EO technology, including creating a national EO strategy, enhancing government EO data use and integrating civil and defence activities. Priorities include advancements in EO technology, especially small satellites, and developing a robust EO data ecosystem. The UK aims to become a global hub for high-quality EO data and leverage EO for climate, weather and environmental challenges. International collaboration, particularly with ESA, EUMETSAT, the EU and Five Eyes, is essential to fulfilling these objectives.

The EO sector has faced significant challenges since 2007. The UK’s exit from the EU introduced uncertainty regarding the UK's access to the Copernicus programme, the EO component of the EU’s space programme, with the UK’s membership temporarily paused between 2021 and 2024. As a result, UK institutions were unable to participate in Copernicus projects or receive funding, and projects progressed without UK involvement. Meanwhile, funding fluctuations and a demand for specialised skills also impacted the sector’s growth.

Funding and spending

Since its inception in 2011, the UK Space Agency’s budget allocation has grown consistently, channelling most spending through the ESA. National expenditure increased from £21m in 2010/2011 to £102m in 2023/2024, while ESA contributions rose from £217m to £482m over the same period.^{[footnote 23]} The CEOI is a key EO-specific funding programme, complemented by broader funding opportunities, such as the UK Space Agency’s International Bilateral Fund (IBF) and the National Space Innovation Programme (NSIP), which support EO projects and foster innovation. Besides the UK Space Agency, other public bodies, such as UKRI and its subordinate STFC and NERC, play crucial roles in EO funding and collaboration, ^{[footnote 24]} in addition to the Met Office. The Dstl also contributes significantly to UK space research, focusing on space technology for defence and security.^{[footnote 25]}

The figure below illustrates the temporal trend in general the UK Space Agency’s expenditure, demonstrating its increasing national importance. A breakdown at the EO level is difficult to identify, not least due to a lack of data and the way EO activities are often integrated within non-EO-specific programmes.

Figure 2: UK Space Agency expenditure time series

[media\image5]

Source: UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2011/2012–2023/2024 (see References for the complete list).

While detailed EO-specific data is limited, increased national space expenditure and ESA contributions suggest a rise in EO-related spending. Recently, the UK government committed to supporting the EO sector in meeting NSS goals and addressing funding challenges resulting from the temporary Copernicus suspension. A £187.6m investment was announced in 2022, repurposing funds initially allocated for the Copernicus project. This investment included £65m to develop UK EO capabilities, fostering innovation and strengthening the domestic EO ecosystem, and £122.6m for ESA EO programmes, securing international collaboration.^{[footnote 26]} This strategic redistribution of funds underscores the UK’s commitment to maintaining its leadership in EO amid geopolitical uncertainties. A further £47m investment was announced in 2023, building on the 2022 deal, with £41.7m through ESA and £1.1m via the STFC and NERC, underscoring the UK's commitment to EO leadership.^{[footnote 27]}

Table 3 below showcases the UK Space Agency’s increased spending on national programmes from 2022/2023 onwards. The decrease in EO spending from 2022/2023 to 2023/2024 reflects lower ring-fenced funding for the Earth Observation investment package, which was announced to support the UK EO sector during the temporary pause in Copernicus membership. The EO investment package’s value was £123.1m in 2022/2023 and just £46.3m in 2023/2024. Of the ring-fenced EO budget, the UK Space Agency spent £4.7m on funding CEOI and £41.6m on ESA programmes in 2023/2024. The EO investment package spending for 2024/2025 has been further reduced, as the UK has now fully rejoined the Copernicus programme.^{[footnote 28]} EO remains the third largest programmatic expenditure in 2024/2025, underscoring its strategic importance and sustained investment focus within the UK Space Agency’s overall budget.

Table 3: Spend trends from 2022/2023 to 2024/2025

UK Space Agency Priorities	2022/2023 Actuals (£m)	2023/2024 Actuals (£m)	2024/2025 Allocation (£m)
EO	213.8	152.0	90
Discovery	217.4	247.3	233
Sustainability	44.4	48.0	41
Levelling up	N/A	15.0	54
Innovation	145.1	167.8	151
Low Earth orbit	N/A	N/A	N/A
Inspiration	N/A	N/A	N/A
Launch[footnote 29]	22	8	13

Source: UK Space Agency (2024a)

Capabilities

The UK’s space-related income was estimated at £11.3bn in 2009/2010. By 2021/2022, total industry income had increased to £18.9bn, including £733m from the EO sector and £51m from meteorology. Medium-term sector growth has been strong, with income increasing by 2.7% between 2018/2019 and 2021/2022.^{[footnote 30]}

Figure 3: Trends in UK space industry income (adjusted to 2021/2022 prices)

Year	Income (£m)
2009/10	11,337
2010/11	12,076
2011/12	13,971
2012/13	14,547
2013/14	16,016
2014/15	16,270
2015/16	16,604
2016/17	17,355
2017/18	17,392
2018/19	18,402
2019/20	18,129
2020/21	19,048
2021/22	18,906

Source: UK Space Agency (2023).

There has been a gradual increase in total employment in the UK space industry with 52,028 Full Time Equivalent (FTE) in 2021/2022, compared to 28,995 FTEs in 2009/2010. This figure includes 10,586 employees within the space manufacturing segment and 4,914 employees within the space operations segment during the 2021/2022 period. Employment grew approximately 5% in 2021/2022.^{[footnote 31]} There were 432 UK space organisations with some EO activities in 2020/2021, with an estimated 2,820 FTE jobs in EO.^{[footnote 32]}

Figure 4: Employment trends in the UK space industry

Year	FTE
2009/10	28,995
2010/11	28,942
2011/12	32,024
2012/13	33,882
2013/14	37,391
2014/15	38,522
2015/16	41,690
2016/17	41,929
2017/18	44,052
2018/19	44,040
2019/20	46,995
2020/21	48,772
2021/22	52,028

Source: UK Space Agency (2023).

Skills and Training

The UK space sector is characterised by a highly skilled workforce, although specific data on EO skills is more limited. Most space industry employees have a university education, with 80% holding at least a bachelor’s degree.^{[footnote 33]} The average qualification level in the space industry exceeds that of any sector reported in the Office for National Statistics (ONS) Census data. Still, the sector faces significant barriers in aligning workforce capabilities with demand, and skills shortages remain a key challenge. The Space Sector Skills Survey showed that 52% of organisations reported workforce skills gaps in 2023, highlighting the persistent nature of this challenge for the UK space industry.^{[footnote 34]} Whilst these challenges are not specific to CEOI-funded organisations, or even just the EO sector, CEOI-funded projects must operate within this broader context. In general, EO-funded organisations may face challenges expanding or recruiting due to these skills shortages.

Since 2007, several initiatives have been launched to help build a skilled workforce and support the sector's growth. In collaboration with the UK Space Agency, the Satellite Applications Catapult’s Space Placements in Industry (SPIN) programme has facilitated nearly 450 space-sector work placements over the past decade, with 75% of alumni entering space or tech fields.^{[footnote 35]} The Satellite Data in Environmental Science (SENSE) Centre for Doctoral Training (CDT), launched in 2020 by the Universities of Edinburgh and Leeds and funded by NERC and the UK Space Agency, is training 69 PhD students to tackle environmental challenges using satellite data and EO methods.^{[footnote 36]} Additionally, the Engineering and Physical Sciences Research Council (EPSRC) CDT for Geospatial Systems, in partnership with Newcastle University, the University of Nottingham, and UKRI, trains doctoral students to enhance the UK's economic benefits from open geospatial data.

National EO activities

Since 2007, the UK has funded national EO activities, including UK-led missions and grant schemes like the CEOI, enhancing core capabilities and fostering sector growth. These efforts have advanced satellite technology and improved data acquisition for environmental monitoring. Notable missions include the NovaSAR satellite, funded with £21m by the UK Space Agency in 2011, designed for flood, forest and disaster monitoring.^{[footnote 37]} Another key mission was UKube-1, the UK's first national CubeSat, built by AAC Clyde Space and launched in July 2014, which successfully demonstrated technology deployment and data collection.^{[footnote 38]}

Major UK industrial stakeholders have also played critical roles in supporting and delivering EO missions, reinforcing the private sector’s capacity for innovation. For example, Carbonite-1 (2015–2018) was a technology demonstration mission developed by SSTL designed to showcase low-cost, high-performance video imaging applications. The mission achieved its objective by demonstrating the viability of a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) imaging payload.^{[footnote 39]}

Since its establishment, the National Centre for Earth Observation (NCEO) has enabled the advancement of several UK EO capabilities. The NCEO was established in 2014 as part of NERC, dedicated to the long-term study and exploitation of EO data to generate new knowledge about Earth’s physical, chemical and biological systems.^{[footnote 40]} NCEO scientists are playing key roles in recently launched and upcoming satellite missions, such as ESA’s BIOMASS (launched April 2025), EarthCARE (launched May 2024), FORUM and TRUTHS missions and the joint UK Space Agency/CNES MicroCarb (launched July 2025), contributing to mission design, sensor development, system and data analysis, modelling, algorithm creation and validation.^{[footnote 41]}

International collaborations and partnerships

Since 2007, the UK has continued its membership in international organisations, including ESA, EUMETSAT, Copernicus (with a temporary pause), GEO and CEOS – of which the UK assumed the Chair in October 2024 for 12 months. The UK maintains a strong involvement in European EO activities through industry and policy engagement. Several UK companies are active members of the European Association of Remote Sensing Companies (EARSC), contributing to advancements in remote sensing and geo-information services.^{[footnote 42]} The UK also has representation at the European Scientists on Spectrum for Earth Observation (ESSEO), a group of senior scientists shaping the European science community’s views on frequency regulatory matters in Earth science, meteorology and climate,^{[footnote 43]} ensuring continued influence in continental initiatives. This participation underscores the UK's strategic commitment to remaining at the forefront of international EO.

ESA

As in 2007, the UK channels most of its EO activities through its subscription to ESA programmes. The UK Space Agency invests in ESA because its technical expertise, knowledge and test facilities offer opportunities to strengthen national capabilities and expand the UK space sector.^{[footnote 44]} Between 2010/2011 and 2023/2024, the UK Space Agency increased its expenditure on ESA subscriptions from £217m to £482m.^{[footnote 45]}

We estimated that the UK Space Agency’s subscription to ESA’s EO portfolio increased from approximately £41.014m in 2013 to £46.9m in 2016.^{[footnote 46]} During this time, the country’s EO subscription remained steady at around 16% of the UK Space Agency’s overall contribution to ESA programmes. In 2013, in addition to the EO subscription, other key EO-related activities include GMES (Global Monitoring for Environment and Security – the precursor to Copernicus), with an estimated contribution of £7.6m, and MetOP-SG with an estimated contribution of £20.1m. GMES included initiatives focused on environmental management, understanding and mitigating the effects of climate change and ensuring civil security.^{[footnote 47]} Furthermore, the MetOp-SG satellites serve as the second-generation meteorological satellites for EUMETSAT, providing detailed global observations for weather and climate.^{[footnote 48]}

Between 2017/2018 and 2023/2024, the UK consistently spent around 20–24.5% of its overall subscription on EO activities. We estimated that the UK Space Agency’s subscription to ESA’s EO portfolio rose from £64.4m in 2017/2018 to £111.4m in 2023/2024.^{[footnote 49]} Investments in ESA, including the Earth Observation Envelope Programme (EOEP), have provided the UK with the opportunity to contribute to, and in some cases play a leading role in, large-scale missions. One high-profile example is the UK-led Traceable Radiometry Underpinning Terrestrial- and Helio-Studies (TRUTHS) mission – the country’s first ESA EarthWatch mission, due to launch in 2030.^{[footnote 50]} It aims to establish a space-based observatory for climate and calibration, thereby enhancing the accuracy of climate measurements and supporting strategies for achieving net-zero emissions, as well as assessing their impact. Airbus UK is leading the implementation phase of the mission under an ESA contract, following the successful completion of the feasibility and pre-development phases in 2022. Along with other UK organisations, the National Physical Laboratory (NPL) and Teledyne e2v Space Imaging are contributing key technologies, calibration support and scientific expertise to optimise the mission’s data accuracy and overall performance.^{[footnote 51]} The CEOI directly contributed to this success, funding the early TRL-raising of the TRUTHS radiometer and calibration system.^{[footnote 52]}

The EU and Copernicus

Beyond ESA, the UK has had significant involvement in high-profile European programmes and missions over the past decade, notably the Copernicus programme. The UK was actively involved in the Copernicus (previously GMES) programme from its inception.^{[footnote 53]} However, the UK’s exit from the EU created uncertainty about whether UK organisations could bid for Copernicus contracts, given that it is an EU-funded programme. Whilst the UK continued to be associated with the ESA arm – the Copernicus Space Component (CSC-4) – there was ambiguity about whether UK organisations could bid for Copernicus contracts tendered through ECMWF^{[footnote 54]} and Mercator Ocean.^{[footnote 55]} The UK was also limited to using lower-resolution open-source Copernicus data, meaning these satellites were primarily useful for climate monitoring rather than sensitive security missions.^{[footnote 56]}

During this period of uncertainty about the UK’s future in the Copernicus programme, the UK government announced a £187.6m investment package in 2022 to support EO activities, followed by a further £47m in FY2023/2024.^{[footnote 57]} In 2023, three years after exiting the EU, the UK secured a revised agreement to rejoin the Copernicus programme. While we do not know the specifics for Copernicus only, the European Commission estimates that the UK will contribute almost £2.18bn (€2.6bn) per year on average for its participation in both Horizon Europe and the Copernicus component of the Space programme.^{[footnote 58]} This milestone reinstated UK organisations' eligibility to compete for Copernicus contracts. Additionally, the deal restored full access to the programme’s resources and high-impact projects, reinforcing the UK’s role in European EO initiatives.^{[footnote 59]}

EUMETSAT

The UK also enhances its EO capabilities through its continued investment in EUMETSAT, having been a Member State since its establishment in 1986. EUMETSAT operates satellites for meteorological data crucial to weather forecasting and climate monitoring. The Met Office represents UK interests in EUMETSAT, supporting research and operational needs.^{[footnote 60]} We estimate that UK contributions to EUMETSAT, including mandatory programmes such as Meteosat and the EUMETSAT Polar System, totalled £59.3m in 2023, compared to £23.4m in 2007. Since 2007, the UK has consistently been among the top contributors to EUMETSAT, averaging as the second or third-largest contributor.^{[footnote 61]}

In partnership with CNES, the UK Space Agency delivered the Infrared Atmospheric Sounding Interferometer New Generation (IASI-NG) instrument in 2019, which was successfully launched in August 2025 as part of the MetOp-SG-A series weather satellites, crucial for weather prediction, atmospheric studies and climate research.^{[footnote 62]} The EUMETSAT Polar System (EPS) MetOp mission series provides global meteorological and environmental data. In 2024, Airbus Defence and Space UK delivered the Ultraviolet Visible Near-infrared Short-wave Infrared Spectrometer (UVNS) instrument for MetOp-SG-A, thereby enhancing the monitoring of air quality, ozone changes and wildfire emissions.^{[footnote 63]} 

Bilateral collaboration

Following a bilateral agreement signed in 2014, the UK Space Agency and CNES have collaborated on three significant weather and climate missions: IASI-NG (see above), MicroCarb and SWOT (Surface Water and Ocean Topography). MicroCarb, launched in July 2025, is a joint UK Space Agency and CNES climate mission supported by a £13.9m UK Space Agency investment. The UK is involved in assembling, integrating and testing the satellite, as well as in designing and building key parts, data collection, algorithm development and scientific mission preparation.^{[footnote 64]} It will be the first European satellite designed to measure greenhouse gas fluxes on Earth by tracking how much carbon is being absorbed by the oceans and forests, the planet’s main ‘sinks’.^{[footnote 65]}

The UK also contributed to the NASA-led SWOT mission, launched in December 2022, which aims to conduct the first global survey of the world’s surface waters and oceans. The UK Space Agency provided £12.2m in funding for Honeywell UK^{[footnote 66]} to develop and build a duplexer for the mission, a vital component that routes radar signals around the satellite at a power of 1,500W – a level never seen in this kind of device.^{[footnote 67]}

The UK’s scientific output – publications

The UK leads among comparator countries in publishing papers in the EO domain, with a steady increase each year (Figure 5), only exceeded by Germany. The UK is also a leader in the influence of its EO papers (Figure 6), as measured by Field-Weighted Citation Impact (FWCI). These results demonstrate that the UK is a significant player in EO science and has surpassed the publication rates of many comparator countries since the CEOI commenced.

Figure 5: EO-related publications by comparator country

Alt text: A line graph showing EO-related publication counts between 2006 and 2023 for various countries: the UK, Germany, France, Japan, Canada, South Korea, Finland and Norway. The UK is the second most prolific source of publications, behind only Germany. The UK has seen steady growth since 2006, peaking in 2018 before decreasing slightly.

Source: OpenAlex. Publications were plotted by year for each of the comparator countries using fractional counting, where each country was assigned a fractional score for each publication corresponding to its share of the authorships.

Figure 6: EO-related publications’ FWCI by comparator country

Alt text: A scatter plot showing number of publications by average paper FWCI. The UK has the second highest number of publications (around 1900) and a FWCI just above 3. Germany has a higher number of publications (around 2350) and a higher FWCI (around 3.4). Australia and Norway have low publication counts but high FWCIs.

Source: OpenAlex. FWCI, as implemented in OpenAlex, groups publicationsby year of publication and sub-field (e.g. 2020, Geophysics). Then, for each publication, it divides the received citations by the expected citations (the average citations for all publications) within its group. The outcome is a single number for each publication, where ‘0’ indicates that it has received exactly the expected number of citations, values above ‘0’ indicate above-average citations, and values below ‘0’ indicate below-average citations. The average FWCI was calculated for each comparator country, with publication counts for each country obtained using fractional counting.

When we compared the universities with the highest rates that also received CEOI funding (the University of Edinburgh, the University of Leicester, the University of Leeds and the University of Oxford), we found that their production and influence of EO publications also increased over the same time period. We also found that these universities were producing EO papers that perform largely in line with expectations compared to other publications in the same field and year, and belong to the top 1% most frequently cited (Figure 7). This achievement is partly attributable to these universities’ CEOI funding, as well as to the UK’s wider support of EO R&D.

Figure 7: Comparison of universities receiving CEOI funding, highly cited papers in EO

University	PP (top 1%)
University of Leeds	46
University of Oxford	41
University of Edinburgh	37
University of Leicester	36

Source: PP (top 1%) is defined as ‘The number and the proportion of a university’s publications that, compared with other publications in the same field and in the same year, belong to the top 1% most frequently cited.’^{[footnote 68]} This was achieved by using OpenAlex’s implementation of citation-normalised percentile and calculating the percentage of each institution’s publications in the dataset labelled as being in the top 1% of most frequently cited works.

Challenges the EO sector faces

Many of the challenges the UK EO sector faces today resemble those faced in 2007 when the CEOI launched. While some are specific to the EO sector, others are more broadly applicable to the space sector and should be considered accordingly. Some of these challenges include:

• Skills shortages: A significant skills shortage persists across the UK space industry (see Section 2.4.1). As the demand for EO services and data analytics has grown across industries such as agriculture, defence and climate science, the sector has struggled to recruit skilled professionals to meet these needs. Whilst significant efforts are already underway to address the skills gap, such as the Space Placements in Industry (SPIN) programme and the various Centre for Doctoral Training initiatives, further targeted educational programmes and apprenticeships focused on university courses and vocational training should help to alleviate skills shortages. Increased investment in Science, Technology, Engineering and Mathematics (STEM) education, enhanced cross-sector collaboration and stronger industry-academic partnerships may also help equip future generations with the necessary technical skills.

• The need for a targeted strategy: In the wake of the NSS, there is a recognised need within the UK EO sector for a more detailed strategy on EO (and other core capabilities), specifically to strengthen the vision on data acquisition, access and use. Making the case for early-stage technology development is challenging without a clear understanding of its potential end-use case. While there is general support for EO, funding is often spread thinly across multiple initiatives without a clear strategic direction. This situation limits the sector's ability to develop innovative solutions, fully mature and commercialise technologies and scale up operations, hindering the UK’s ability to capitalise on EO opportunities fully.

• Spending uncertainty: UK EO activities have experienced frequent uncertainty due to changes in government funding allocations, particularly given the Comprehensive Spending Review cycle. These reviews, which determine public sector spending, often result in fluctuating support for EO initiatives. There is a growing recognition within the UK EO sector that providing short-term funding for multiple projects and programmes without guaranteed long-term support could potentially disadvantage the UK compared to other nations.

Interim programme impacts

Summary

The CEOI programme is widely seen as fostering collaboration and enabling both emerging and established organisations to grow in the EO sector. It plays a key role in facilitating access to additional funding and ESA missions while enhancing participants' skills. Interviewees believed that CEOI strengthens the capacity of UK-led initiatives to compete and export, and helps elevate the UK's international EO reputation in the EO sector. The information provided in this section is an updated summary of the section on CEOI project outcomes published in the interim evaluation report.^{[footnote 69]}

Box 3: Quick figures on the CEOI interim impact assessment

• Projects funded by the CEOI have seen TRLs increase by an average of 2.2 points, with many grant recipients attributing this progress to the funding.

• 46.2% of respondents reported improvements in skills through CEOI events.

• 73.1% of project participants gained technical insights from CEOI showcases.

• 69.2% reported increased commercialisation ability due to CEOI funding; 96.2% gained reputational benefits.

• CEOI-backed technologies have featured on four launches (2015–2023), with seven more underway, five selected for study and eleven planned for future launches.

• 88.5% of respondents affirmed the CEOI's role in bolstering capacity for international missions; 65.4% acknowledged enhanced export capacity.

• Foreign investment in CEOI projects surpassed that of the UK, with strong support from ESA. Between FY2021/2022 and 2024/2025, projects received £23.4m in foreign public investment – 4.5 times the original total CEOI grant funding over that period.

• Job creation links are unclear, but some anticipate substantial annual revenue from CEOI-funded projects, with one estimate at an additional £10–20m in extra revenue per year.

Technology development

Across the projects reviewed, there is an increase in TRL levels attributed to the CEOI programme’s funding and support. Survey and monitoring form responses indicate an average increase of 2.2 TRL points from when projects began to the present. The programme and its funding had a particularly substantial impact on technologies in the early stages of development. This finding is especially critical for academic stakeholders, as such projects might otherwise lack the opportunity to advance rapidly. According to the survey responses, projects started at TRL 2.5 on average. As anticipated, projects exhibited considerable variation in TRLs. Some technologies reached levels as high as TRL 9, while others remained at TRL 3 – largely determined by the size and complexity of each project.

Many respondents indicated that their project would have stagnated or not existed without CEOI funding.^{[footnote 70]} One project lead reported that their technology stalled after an unsuccessful bid in the 15th call, yet found renewed momentum with a successful bid in the 16th call.^{[footnote 71]} Another interviewee suggested alternate funding might have led to slower development compared to CEOI’s shorter turnaround grants.^{[footnote 72]} It was also noted that the project work might not have been undertaken otherwise, creating a gap in the field and highlighting the CEOI’s significant role in advancing EO technology development in the UK. ^{[footnote 73]}

The CEOI's contributions to TRL progression include sharing knowledge within its extensive network. One project partner suggested that involvement in the CEOI programme indirectly enabled the team to study a larger satellite than they currently fly, providing a case study of the internal design that progressed their own technology.^{[footnote 74]} Such second-order effects are common in the portfolio and a product of the CEOI team’s longstanding role and dual roles in their own organisations, tapping into their networks to benefit project teams.

The CEOI's focus on low-TRL projects enhances the UK’s international competitiveness. Despite limited funding, the CEOI enables basic and advanced research at lower TRLs, where support is most needed due to a funding gap for otherwise high-risk and low-profitability early-stage technologies.^{[footnote 75]} As international funding often demands higher TRLs, the CEOI's role at these early stages is crucial. The progression of major projects from CEOI to ESA funding highlights the CEOI's foundational role.^{[footnote 76]}

The CEOI's funding of low TRL projects signals key EO technology areas to the government and facilitates the development of technologies in line with those signals. Some government stakeholders perceive the programme as highlighting emerging technologies.^{[footnote 77]} However, one UK Defence stakeholder noted that there is limited tracking of CEOI outputs within their organisation.^{[footnote 78]} Nonetheless, UK Defence's recent call for Subject Access Request (SAR) system innovations up to TRLs 4–5^{[footnote 79]} aligns with CEOI-supported work, suggesting potential for follow-on funding.

Collaborations and partnerships

The CEOI is recognised for its collaboration and partnerships, particularly between universities and the private sector. Survey data reveal that industry collaborations often involve a broad network of additional entities. Project leads commend the CEOI's role in uniting academia, industry and government, emphasising the significance of a cohesive space community. Some participants noted unexpected advancements from idea exchanges within this diverse network.^{[footnote 80]} The absence of CEOI support might have hindered the formation of these partnerships, potentially excluding participants from future competitions.^{[footnote 81]}

The CEOI programme also fortifies existing partnerships, with respondents most likely to enhance ties with universities and industry, and to a lesser extent, public sector stakeholders. Project leads confirmed that CEOI support bolstered pre-existing relationships. The programme's integration of industry and academia is particularly valued, since CEOI support helps de-risk critical technologies and facilitates industry-academia collaborations that might be challenging without financial backing, e.g. by enabling one company to access university facilities through collaboration on a CEOI project.^{[footnote 82]}

The CEOI's role in bringing together diverse stakeholders ensures that students gain practical experience within the broader space ecosystem. Leveraging university facilities is seen as a key enabler for innovation and cooperation, with the CEOI’s funding strengthening industry-university partnerships.^{[footnote 83]} Although these partnerships may not always endure, enhancing industry’s understanding of university capabilities is deemed crucial for future projects.^{[footnote 84]}

CEOI-facilitated events enhance inter-community connections and sector knowledge-sharing. Workshops that aggregate CEOI-supported projects contribute to sector growth by sharing knowledge, even if they do not directly result in new contracts.^{[footnote 85]}

Skills, jobs and knowledge

Many participants report the CEOI's impact on skills and employment due to its funding and initiatives. Participants widely acknowledged that CEOI involvement helped maintain or enhance their technical skills in developing innovative EO instruments. Some 69.2% of survey respondents reported a significantly increased ability to commercialise research, while 96.2% noted reputational benefits.^{[footnote 86]}

The CEOI is instrumental in helping projects secure additional funding, with 88.5% of survey participants finding CEOI support to be effective for international mission competitions. One highlighted a case where an SSTL-conducted CEOI project led to the development of an instrument subsequently flown on CYGNSS, a NASA constellation.^{[footnote 87]} Overall, CEOI-backed technologies featured on four launches between 2015 and 2023, with seven more underway, five selected for further study and eleven scheduled for future launches. For instance, the TRUTHS mission, which aims to provide highly accurate climate data, was backed by the CEOI during the proposal stage and chosen from 35 proposals.^{[footnote 88]} Several interview participants acknowledged the CEOI’s support for bidding on ESA projects, in particular. ^{[footnote 89]} One project lead commented that they were able to secure further funding from NERC to build on a CEOI-supported project that went on to win an ESA bid, expanding the project further.^{[footnote 90]}

Over 46.2% of respondents attributed skill improvement to CEOI events and workshops. Survey data suggested that full attendance was the norm at CEOI annual conferences, with many participants finding them valuable for developing skills and knowledge. Additionally, 73.1% attended technology showcases.

The CEOI programme enables knowledge sharing, with 38.5% of respondents noting increased exchange between academic and industrial EO communities. While measuring knowledge acquisition is inherently complex, interviews revealed a growing knowledge base among participants, facilitated by project collaboration and broader engagement within the CEOI network. This growth has deepened technical understanding and expanded awareness of advancements in the EO sector. For example, one project lead noted that the CEOI’s involvement enhanced their understanding of novel defence technologies, opening new opportunities in the defence sector.^{[footnote 91]}

International impact

Policy roundtable participants agreed that the UK has a strong heritage in the EO sector, with experience across academia and industry in highly specialised instrumentation.^{[footnote 92]} Legacy datasets generated from sensors constructed with UK expertise still have the potential for new applications, highlighting the durability of the UK Space Agency’s historical EO investments, including the CEOI.^{[footnote 93]}

The CEOI’s strategy to support predominantly early-stage EO R&D was considered key in maintaining the UK’s EO capabilities. However, it yielded few clear examples of new UK-led missions derived from that funding. The exception is TRUTHS, for which the CEOI’s calibration and coordination expertise was instrumental in it becoming a UK-led ESA mission, providing the technical expertise and rigour necessary to progress in the ESA landscape.^{[footnote 94]} A related threat is the impact of the UK’s withdrawal from the European Union on the UK’s ability to collaborate with EU and ESA entities. Participants emphasised the need to maintain and rebuild relationships to take advantage of internationally collaborative EO programmes into which projects supported by CEOI can expand their R&D.^{[footnote 95]}

A potential example of the issues caused by the UK’s brief period outside of Copernicus is from 2020, following ESA’s announcement of contractors developing the next generation of Sentinel spacecraft. All six missions’ primary contracts have been awarded to continental bids, despite UK efforts, resulting in roughly 30% less UK-based sub-contracted work than expected.^{[footnote 96]} The Copernicus Expansion is targeting a slate of six missions, including the Copernicus Hyperspectral Imaging Mission (CHIME), the Copernicus Polar Ice and Snow Topography Altimeter (CRISTAL) and the Copernicus Anthropogenic Carbon Dioxide Monitoring (CO2M) mission, none of which the UK holds a primary contract for.^{[footnote 97]}

The CEOI programme is key in enhancing UK companies' competitiveness for international funding, with 88.5% of respondents affirming its role in bolstering their capacity to lead or partake in international missions. Half of the respondents acknowledged a substantial increase in their competitiveness as a result of CEOI funding. The programme fulfils a need in the UK space sector by fostering industry-academic collaboration, thereby enhancing the UK's standing in comparison to European entities within the ESA. Notably, the CEOI's support has been instrumental in securing ESA bids and gaining visibility amongst member states and the Data Operations Scientific and Technical Advisory Group (DOSTAG)^{[footnote 98]} – as evidenced by a project lead who leveraged CEOI support to obtain NERC funding, subsequently winning an ESA bid.^{[footnote 99]}

Several projects with an export focus lauded the CEOI's early-stage support in technology development and EO service provision. Approximately 65.4% of survey respondents acknowledged that the CEOI programme enhanced their capacity to export products and services, and nearly one-third emphasised that the CEOI significantly enabled exports. One project lead noted that up to 98% of their services are now exported from the UK, facilitated by the CEOI's initial funding.^{[footnote 100]} Another respondent mentioned that although their project did not benefit from the UK network facilitated by the CEOI due to its focus on export markets, they did gain valuable data that was exported to international clients.^{[footnote 101]}

Some participants believed that the CEOI's impact was limited by insufficient funding and inadequate governmental support in international markets. One project lead refrained from bidding on another CEOI round due to limited opportunities in the UK market, opting instead for alternative funding to access international markets.^{[footnote 102]} Although beyond the CEOI's remit, the UK Space Agency might consider providing post-project support to help projects access larger international funding pools, alongside UK programmes like the National Space Innovation Programme and the Unlocking Space for Business programme.

Stakeholders acknowledged the CEOI's role in bolstering the UK's international reputation. Despite lower UK public R&D investment in EO compared to Germany and France, the UK has made significant scientific contributions, with the CEOI as a key driver.^{[footnote 103]} The survey revealed that 57.7% of respondents felt that CEOI-funded projects promoted UK EO capabilities. Thus, the programme's coordination is valued, enhancing the UK's credibility as a space entity. One stakeholder suggested that without the CEOI, the UK would be a 'platform' rather than a 'satellite and sensor' nation, diminishing its international leadership. One CEOI-funded project achieved success with NASA, illustrating the CEOI's ‘soft influence’ in spurring international innovation.^{[footnote 104]} However, one partner noted that international awareness is limited by the focus on mission launches over initial R&D, which affects the CEOI's international reputation, although its primary aim is to enable post-project successes.^{[footnote 105]}

North Star Metric outcomes

This evaluation encountered notable reporting gaps in North Star Metric data collection among project participants. The North Star Metric is designed to evaluate the investment and revenue stimulated by the UK Space Agency within the UK space sector, serving as the principal measure of its success. The key elements of the North Star Metric include match funding, private investment, internal investment and revenue. Despite the requirement for projects to report on the North Star Metric in grant funding agreements since 2022, the research team encountered reporting gaps that necessitate attention from the UK Space Agency and the CEOI to enhance ongoing monitoring activities.

Since Round 6, the CEOI has allocated over £31.8m to projects, and partners have contributed £10.6m.^{[footnote 106]} In addition to match funding, several of the reviewed projects allocated internal investment to progress the technologies. In general, this internal funding was highest among private companies than universities, some of whom were only able to allocate limited resources, and only where necessary, e.g. to enable a demonstration. The amounts of internal funding varied from a few tens of thousands for small projects to £3m of funding by a company over two years to progress their CEOI-funded Flagship project.

Based on available data, foreign public investment across reviewed projects exceeded UK public investment, indicating strong international interest, as well as TRL progression among CEOI-funded projects. For 2021/2022, reviewed projects secured £2m from foreign public funding, compared to £0.8m from UK public funding, with this gap increasing year on year (2022/2023: £2.8m foreign public vs £0.1m UK public; 2023/2024: £6.7m foreign public vs £1m UK public; 2024/2025: £11.9m foreign public vs £3.4m UK public). Most of the international public funding came from ESA, reflecting the progression of CEOI-funded projects to eventually supporting international missions.

Most of the recent CEOI projects we surveyed are in the pre-revenues stage, with technologies still under development. As such, there are few examples of realised revenues to date, but some organisations were buoyant in their future revenue expectations. Notably, one organisation anticipates selling 1–2 satellites or payloads annually from Year 2 to 5, generating £10–20m in revenue per year, which is a significant portion of the total £65m annual revenue. However, the wider benefits of their technology are difficult to quantify, as customers may gain more financially from the services enabled by the technology than from the contract value, and the CEOI-funded product is just one component of a complex spacecraft system.

Most project teams noted that jobs were protected by CEOI funding, although few project participants could link CEOI funding directly to job creation. While recruitment increased around the project start in a few cases, it was only directly attributed to CEOI funding in a minority of cases, and not linked to organisational growth more broadly – although this may suggest that CEOI funding had a more indirect impact on funding recipients’ ability to plan ahead and achieve growth, including through involvement in major missions.

Economic evaluation

Summary

This economic evaluation optimises limited data on the CEOI's economic outcomes, focusing on 39 projects with cost-benefit data. We assess CEOI Calls 11–16 (2018–2025) and smaller calls due to earlier data gaps. Despite these limitations, we estimate the real discounted (Present Value (PV), 2024/2025) and attribution-adjusted UK benefit of CEOI Calls 11–16 at £30.2m, driven by three large ESA contracts with a combined value of over £20m.

Box 4: Quick figures on the CEOI economic evaluation

• The real discounted and attribution-adjusted UK benefit of the CEOI (Calls 11–16) is at least £30.2m to date, excluding expectations.

• Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) stands at £28.9m in UK benefits (73% of total benefits).

• Internal investment contributes £4.1m (14%) to total UK benefits, and UK private external investment contributes a further £3.1m (9%). The economic value associated with Gross Value Added (GVA), job creation and publications is low, likely reflecting the early stage of this evaluation.

• The total nominal economic cost of CEOI Calls 11–16 and smaller projects over this period (roughly between 2018 and 2025) will be £20.8m, of which £14.9m comes from grant funding and £5.8m from matched funding.

Introduction

While the rest of this report has covered the CEOI since its inception, this economic evaluation focuses on Calls 11–16 of the CEOI, covering the period roughly between 2018 and 2025, due to earlier data limitations.^{[footnote 107]} Since economic data (e.g. investment, revenues and job creation) have not been routinely captured for funded projects, there is a trade-off between recent projects with complete data and older projects with developed impacts. We focus on newer projects (Calls 11–16) but include a case study of CEOI funding to the University of Leeds over a decade ago to illustrate the long timelines required for substantial impact.

Although our economic analysis focuses on the benefits to funded organisations, we expect that future benefits will extend to wider society, particularly in understanding climate change. Any quantitative estimates likely underestimate the ultimate benefit of CEOI funding, especially at this early stage. This challenge is common to public R&D funding, not just CEOI or space R&D funding. Some significant benefits of CEOI funding are challenging to monetise, such as knowledge, scientific progress and facilitated collaborations. Thus, our quantitative estimates should be considered as a lower bound on the economic benefit to date.

Approach to economic evaluation

Our economic evaluation aims to capture benefits from funding holistically, acknowledging that the benefits realisation journey is ongoing and the impacts data, particularly on monetisable outcomes, are sometimes incomplete. Given this, we limited our central economic evaluation to the 39 projects for which we have data on both costs and benefits. For more details, see the Evaluation Plan.^{[footnote 108]}

At a high level, we compare the costs of delivering each programme against the benefits delivered so far. Costs include grant funding (the public cost) and matched funding contributions (the private cost). The benefits we quantify include leveraged external investment,^{[footnote 109]} internal investment, Gross Value Added (GVA) and the value of job creation. Evidence on these impacts comes from two surveys of funded organisations, supplemented by targeted interviews and desk-based research.

Cost data was provided by the CEOI at the project level, outlining the grant funding allocated to each project, the associated matched funding contribution, and the project's start and end dates. We assumed that costs were spread evenly across project durations to estimate total costs by financial year.

We asked organisations to provide the amount and sources of external investment received to date, as well as expectations for external investment over the next five years (forecasts not included in our central analysis). We also asked for estimates of internal investment to date.

We estimate GVA using a space-industry-specific revenue-to-GVA ratio of 2.6.^{[footnote 110]} We leverage revenue estimates provided by funded organisations, including realised revenues and expected revenues over the next five years (forecasts not included in our central analysis).

We estimated the value of job creation using a wage premia approach,^{[footnote 111]} which assumes that, in the absence of CEOI funding, those in roles created through funding would instead be working in similar roles outside the sector and earning different salaries.^{[footnote 112]} A wage premia approach supposes that the economic value of job creation lies in creating new, better-paid roles rather than new jobs per se. We directly sourced job creation data from funded organisations, and took wage premia estimates from a recent study of wage premia in the space sector.^{[footnote 113]}

We also estimate the economic value of research publications, using an EO-specific estimate of the benefit of such publications,^{[footnote 114]} adjusted for the year of publication (£19,000 per paper). The methodology underpinning this estimate assumes that the social benefit of such publications will be at least as much as the private cost of writing (and publishing) an article. This methodology is conservative and generates a lower-bound estimate on the value of publications. Data on publications were provided directly by project teams.

Our economic evaluation encompasses 76 CEOI projects, spanning Call 11 to the most recent Call 16, aligned with the 2017/2018 to 2024/2025 period. Although our central analysis focused on benefits over this period, we also provided alternative numbers considering expectations for the 2025/2026 to 2029/2030 period. We asked project teams to provide expectations of external investment and income over the next five years. Although these indicate the expected medium-term benefits from CEOI funding, they still provide only a partial picture of potential future benefits, given the reporting gaps and limited time horizon. These estimates are also subject to significant uncertainty.

Caveats to economic evaluation

Below, we set out the key caveats specific to our economic evaluation:

• Data gaps: Our findings are based on 34 survey responses, multiple interviews and an earlier survey with 26 responses, covering 39 of the 76 projects in scope (51%). Since data gaps only affect the benefits side, our central analysis estimated value for money based on projects with available impact data, thereby avoiding artificially low returns by excluding projects without benefit evidence. This approach might have overestimated benefits due to selection bias, as successful projects may have been more likely to respond to our survey. To address this, we provide alternative estimates that include all projects, assuming zero benefits from non-respondents; these likely underestimate the CEOI's value for money.^{[footnote 115]} We also provide estimates that assume these non-respondents generated half the total benefits of respondent organisations.

• Non-monetisable benefits: Some significant benefits of CEOI funding are challenging to monetise, such as knowledge, scientific progress and facilitated collaborations. Thus, our quantitative estimates should be considered as a lower bound on the economic benefit to date.

• Long timelines to impact: Due to earlier data limitations, this evaluation only covers CEOI Calls 11–16, which roughly span the period from 2018 to 2025. Since we expect many of the key benefits to be realised with a substantial lag, our estimates underestimate the eventual expected benefits arising from funded projects.

• Attribution of benefits: This is a key challenge in any economic evaluation, with impacts stemming from multiple inputs that interact in complex ways. For example, CEOI projects often received funding from other sources, and many projects funded through Call 11 onwards had received earlier funding through the CEOI, which is outside the scope of our present analysis. This makes attribution particularly complex, with the most recent studies building on possibly years of prior research. Broadly, our approach has been to ask project teams directly for benefits which are linked to their CEOI projects, for example, ‘How much revenue has your organisation generated that can be attributed to CEOI?” We have also applied an attribution share (see below).

Key assumptions

Our analysis necessarily relied on several assumptions:

• Discounting: We discounted future benefits using the standard 3.5% discount rate recommended by the Green Book. We present all totals in discounted Present Value (PV) terms (2024/2025).

• Inflation-adjustment: We adjusted all costs and benefits to constant prices (2024/2025).

• Optimism bias adjustment: We made a 50% optimism bias adjustment^{[footnote 116]} to forecasted estimates to address the demonstrated systematic tendency for individuals to overestimate future benefits.

• Attribution shares: Where impacts were clearly the result of multiple inputs, we assigned attribution shares on a case-by-case basis. We discuss the extent to which benefits are attributable below, leveraging insights from our assessment of programme impacts.

• Leakage: We removed non-UK benefits to account for leakage, i.e. the extent to which benefits accrued outside the UK, such as non-UK jobs and external investment into non-UK arms of funded organisations.^{[footnote 117]}

• Additionality: We applied a 90% additionality assumption to all benefits to account for deadweight, i.e. a small proportion of economic activity generated would likely have occurred without CEOI funding.

The economic benefits of the CEOI

We estimate the real discounted and attribution-adjusted UK benefit of the CEOI (Calls 11–16) to be at least £30.2m to date, excluding expectations. This total is driven by foreign external investment, i.e. foreign investment into the UK, which accounts for £28.9m in UK benefit (73% of total benefits). ESA contracts are the most common source of foreign investment. Notable investment events driving this trend include two ESA contracts to Craft Prospect, worth £6.1m and £7m respectively, and a £7m ESA contract to RAL Space.^{[footnote 118]} This finding is in line with the objective of the most recent CEOI Business Case to ‘Prepare the UK EO community to win global market opportunities, including those resulting from CMin22’.^{[footnote 119]} Still, overall benefits are driven by a few significant events and are therefore sensitive to their inclusion.

Beyond foreign external investment, internal investment contributes £4.1m (14%) to total UK benefits and UK private external investment a further £3.1m (9%). The economic value associated with GVA, job creation and publications is currently low relative to investment impacts, with these benefits totalling just £1.3m. We view this as a reflection of the relatively early stage of projects. Most projects are still at the pre-revenue stage or are generating modest early revenues, which means GVA to date is low. At this stage, most of the CEOI’s employment benefits are concentrated in existing jobs supported through CEOI funding, rather than in wholly new positions being created. This is also a reflection of the early stage of impact generation. As projects progress towards commercialisation, we would expect greater job creation associated with more economic activity within funded organisations. Lastly, the low value of publications to date reflects the relatively low publication numbers from these recent projects, linked to long publication timelines and our conservative approach to modelling their economic value.

Figure 8: Real discounted benefits, excluding expectations, 2017/2018 to 2024/2025

Benefit type	Real, discounted benefit (£m)
GVA	0.3
Job creation	0.2
Value of publications	0.7
Internal investment	4.2
UK private external investment	2.8
Foreign external investment	21.9

Source: Interviews and surveys of CEOI project leads. know.space analysis.

Most reported benefits have accrued in the last two years, with a significant jump in 2021/2022. This partly reflects the long timelines to impact, but also largely demonstrates the bias in our sample towards more recent projects, which were more likely to respond to our survey. Of the 39 projects for which we have some impact data, 20 finished in 2024/2025. For every other year of project completion, we have 2–4 data points.

Table 4: Real discounted benefits by year, excluding expectations, from 2017 to 2025

	17/18	18/19	19/20	20/21	21/22	22/23	24/25
Total real discounted UK benefits	£0.1m	£0.1m	£0.1m	£2.2m	£3.9m	£10m	£13.9m

Source: Interviews and surveys of CEOI project leads. know.space analysis.

Given we are assessing impact at an early stage, we expect the most significant benefits to accrue in the future. Many project teams are targeting upcoming ESA-led missions and pointing to substantial future ESA funding they could potentially capture. Reflecting this, we also estimate monetisable benefit over the 2025/2026 to 2029/2030 period, including expectations in our totals.^{[footnote 120]} Provided by funded organisations, these forward-looking estimates should be considered indicative only, given the potential for optimism bias and gaps in our data. Notwithstanding these caveats, the real discounted and attribution-adjusted UK benefits of the CEOI (Calls 11-16), including expectations, total at least £57.6m.

Figure 9: Real discounted benefit, including expectations

Benefit type	Real, discounted benefit (£m)
GVA	20.4
Job creation	0.2
Value of publications	0.7
Internal investment	4.2
UK private external investment	3.1
Foreign external investment	28.9

Source: Interviews and surveys of CEOI project leads. know.space analysis.

When we include expectations, external foreign investment remains the most significant component of total benefits, accounting for 50% of all benefits. However, expected revenues are also sizeable, with expected GVA accounting for £20.4m in expected benefits (35%). Revenue, and therefore GVA, forecasts are driven by a small subset of projects’ expectations of future revenue. SSTL forecasts buoyant revenues of between £10–20m per annum over the next five years, as they expect to sell one to two satellites or payloads per year. If we exclude just these SSTL revenues, total benefits fall to £46.6m. Space Flow also projects notable revenues of £30m from their Glamis project across consortium members. Whilst it is normal that the most significant impacts of R&D funding concentrate in just a few projects, this increases the risk that the programme’s overall benefits could be far lower than expected if one or two projects do not deliver their expected benefits. We note that many organisations chose not to provide forecasts of any future revenue or investment.

Overall, our evidence suggests that the near-term benefits of CEOI funding are concentrated in external investment, with internal investment also being significant. Over the medium term, we expect GVA to form a more substantial component of the overall benefits as technologies developed through the CEOI are commercialised, generating revenues. Further ahead, we might expect spillover benefits to form a significant proportion of the overall benefits as consumers and society more broadly benefit from technologies developed, e.g. through improved climate monitoring. Our case study (see below) provides an example of a timeline of benefits realisation for a CEOI-funded project.

Attribution of benefits

We have adjusted all presented results for attribution. The appropriate level of attribution is considered for individual benefits, and our totals are also subject to a 90% additionality assumption to account for deadweight, as our survey results suggested that a small minority of projects may have proceeded similarly without CEOI funding. Our assumptions about the extent to which benefits are attributable to the CEOI are crucial to determining total monetisable benefits. In particular, given the extent to which a few significant foreign external investment events, notably ESA contracts, drive overall benefits, results are sensitive to our assumptions about the extent to which these external investments are attributable to the CEOI. Suppose we apply a further 50% attribution adjustment to the three large ESA investments generated by Craft Prospect and RAL Space, for example. In that case, the total real discounted realised benefits fall from £30.2m to £23.6m.

Evidence from funded organisations suggests that crowding-out associated with the CEOI is low. Crowding out is a phenomenon whereby increased government spending leads to a reduction in private investment. In our earlier survey, 88% of respondents reported that they did not consider any other funding programme when applying to the CEOI and those who did look elsewhere only considered public funding sources. One project lead noted that the ‘CEOI seems unique in funding projects at the tricky TRL levels of 2–4.’ Another team noted, ‘We are a university… relying on sources such as the UK Space Agency and CEOI for this type of development.’ Given the low TRL of supported technologies, private investors were unlikely to fund technology development without prior de-risking from the government.^{[footnote 121]}

We also considered displacement (i.e. the extent to which economic activity generated by CEOI displaces other activity in the economy). For revenues, external and internal investment, we assumed zero displacement, as the UK is presumed to be capturing a share of emerging global markets that bring new economic activity to the UK. For job creation, our DSIT-recommended wage premia methodology implicitly assumed 100% displacement, i.e. everyone in a job created as a result of CEOI funding would otherwise be working in a similar job outside the space sector. We believe this is a reasonable assumption, given that the economy was operating near full employment for much of the analysis period.

We also designed our approach to account for leakage (outflows of funds from the UK). We deliberately asked project teams for UK-specific benefits (e.g. ‘Were any UK-based jobs created as a result of CEOI funding?’) and researched individual investment events to ensure funds were going into UK-based companies.

Lastly, we believe that the deadweight associated with the CEOI is likely to be low, as most projects did not proceed at the planned scale in the absence of funding. Some 54% of project teams reported that they could not have undertaken their project at all without CEOI funding, and 35% stated that they could not have undertaken their projects at the same scale. Only 12% of project teams believed they could have carried out their projects at the same scale without CEOI funding. To reflect the small minority of projects that could have gone ahead without CEOI funding, we applied a 90% additionality adjustment to our totals.

Non-monetisable benefits

The evidence suggests that the non-monetisable benefits from the CEOI are significant and should be central to any evaluation of the extent to which the CEOI is delivering value for money. As detailed in the impact assessment, there are key benefits of the CEOI that we cannot monetise. Notably, the programme has facilitated an average TRL progression of 2.2 points, bolstered the UK’s international standing in EO and facilitated valuable collaboration across industry and academia. Moreover, the most significant benefits of funding will likely be realised once the technologies are commercialised or otherwise operationalised, thereby facilitating benefits to end-users and wider society. Notably, with several projects developing technologies intended to improve climate monitoring, a key societal benefit could lie in marginal improvements in the global response to climate change through a deeper understanding of how our planet is changing. Improved EO solutions will also likely generate efficiency savings in various downstream markets, including agriculture, mining and maritime activities. For these reasons, we must consider the value for money the CEOI offers holistically, looking beyond monetised estimates of benefit.

The economic cost of the CEOI

Overall, for economic modelling and using simplifying assumptions rather than an accurate breakdown of spending,^{[footnote 122]} we estimate the total nominal economic cost of CEOI Calls 11–16 and smaller projects over the same approximate period (2018–2025) at £20.8m, of which £14.9m comes from grant funding and £5.8m comes from matched funding.

In our central value-for-money analysis, we focus on the subset of these projects for which we have some impact data. We estimate that the total nominal economic cost of the 39 projects for which we have some impact data will be £10.9m, of which £7.9m comes from grant funding and £3.0m from matched funding. In real discounted terms, the cost of these projects is £12.2m, of which £8.9m is grant funding.^{[footnote 123]}

The full economic cost of these CEOI projects extends beyond total project costs. As the technologies developed through the CEOI continue evolving, additional private costs will accrue.

Value for money

It is too early to assess the total economic impact of these projects. Nonetheless, there are positive signs indicating potential future benefits. Notably, further investments catalysed by the CEOI are creating a pipeline for future benefits, concentrated in a few key projects. Additionally, we have not been able to quantify significant benefits; our estimates should be treated as lower bounds on potential benefits due to the likelihood of large, as yet unforeseen, future benefits and the importance of non-monetisable benefits in driving overall impact. Future evaluations will be crucial for tracking these developing benefits and providing more robust conclusions on the overall value for money.

Comparison with anticipated returns

A meaningful comparison of our results with anticipated returns is limited by differences in methodology and the dominance of a few large economic impacts. The 2022 CEOI Business Case projected an anticipated return on investment (RoI) of £3 for every £1 invested over the 2016–2021 period, leveraging the results of a previous (unpublished) CEOI evaluation. We do not estimate RoI. While the previous evaluation considered leveraged UK public funding as a benefit (which we do not), we consider a broader range of benefits (internal investment, jobs, revenue and publications) and adjust for additionality and inflation.

A £14m ESA investment (RAL Space’s ESA Scout mission) and a £15m private investment into SatVu drive the previous evaluation’s results, demonstrating that, like our findings, their estimates are sensitive to a few significant investment events. The previous evaluation did not adjust these impacts for additionality or attribution. If we removed these two investments for illustrative purposes, the RoI falls from 3 to 1. Whilst we cannot meaningfully compare the previously estimated RoI with our own due to differences in approach, it is clear that significant investment events concentrated in a few projects drive the overall value for money associated with the programme. This result is not unexpected for an R&D programme, especially a low-TRL programme, where we cannot expect all projects to succeed.

Case study: The University of Leeds

Our economic evaluation has focused primarily on the most recent CEOI projects from Call 11 onwards, noting that these projects are relatively early in their benefits realisation journeys, and on monetisable benefits. The following case study of the funding the University of Leeds received for terahertz (THz) quantum-cascade laser development demonstrates the potentially significant benefits that can arise from funding longer timelines than those covered in our primary economic analysis.

The University of Leeds and its partners at RAL Space have led eight CEOI projects, with a combined value of £2m. Over a decade later, the project team are on the cusp of potentially winning a large ESA contract for their Keystone mission. The idea for the Linking Observations of Climate, the Upper-Atmosphere and Space-Weather (LOCUS) ESA mission was first conceived in 2008 to fill a gap in capabilities for observing gases in the THz frequency range. The CEOI was chosen as a route for developing the technology to a point where the team could bring it to ESA as a potential mission, with the first CEOI technology funding received in 2014. CEOI funding enabled the University of Leeds and its partners to develop their capabilities in THz receivers over a period of more than a decade. Today, the THz lab at Leeds supports 20–25 researchers, with at least six to seven employees or postgraduate researchers working on a project originating from CEOI funding at any one time.

Figure 10: Funding timeline for the University of Leeds’ LOCUS concept

Alt text: A timeline for the University of Leeds’ LOCUS concept. Incepted in 2008. Awarded £270k in CEOI Call 7 in 2014. Awarded a further £50k in Call 9 in 2016. Followed by £175k in Call 10 and another £50k as part of a CEOI EE Support award in 2017. Awarded a further £225k in CEOI Call 14 in 2022. Awarded £500k in Call 15 and £160k in a CEOI TRL Raising and Facility Enhancement Award in 2023. Awarded £250k in an ESA Phase 0 study for EE12 and another £195k CEOI Small Project award in 2024. If selected, could received £800k in ESA’s Keystone Phase A in 2026.

Note: funding amounts for Keystone Phase A and the next ESA EE12 mission are uncertain at the time of writing.

Source: RAND Europe/know.space analysis

With CEOI support, LOCUS developed into a new mission concept, Keystone, to be delivered by a consortium comprising the University of Leeds, RAL Space, TK Instruments and University of Bern. ESA is funding a £250k Phase 0 study for Earth Explorer 12 (EE12) to develop a calibration system for THz receivers.^{[footnote 124]} Although the current ESA contract is relatively small, Keystone is one of four potential candidates for ESA’s EE12 mission. If selected in 2026, the contract for EE12 could be worth approximately £800,000 to the consortium; however, the most significant potential benefits will likely affect wider society through improved climate monitoring. If selected, Keystone would provide the first direct observations of atomic oxygen in the altitude range of 50–150 km, enabling scientists to understand better the processes driving variability in the atmosphere’s mesosphere-lower-thermosphere region. This understanding could inform models of the thermosphere, thereby enhancing the accuracy of climate change monitoring and facilitating better policymaking and supporting efforts to combat the climate crisis. This technology could also facilitate the earlier detection of space weather events through an enhanced ability to detect certain atmospheric gases. Early detection of these events can mitigate the worst impacts of space weather. These impacts are challenging to monetise, particularly at this early stage, but should be considered key benefits of CEOI funding.

Lastly, this technology has potential commercial applications in communications, as THz waves can be used in quantum key distribution, facilitating secure communications. Although this application has been demonstrated in the lab, it is at least five years away from commercialisation. Nonetheless, it could ultimately offer a further revenue stream from this technology, as well as better communication for end users.

CEOI funding is yielding potentially substantial economic and societal benefits more than a decade after funding was first received. Whilst monetisable benefits to the consortium will likely be substantial, the most significant benefits are likely to be social impacts, which are intrinsically difficult to monetise. Although value-for-money analysis provides a vital tool for assessing the extent to which funding has been effective, it cannot capture the full benefits of funding.

Case study: The University of Leeds:

• >£2m in CEOI investment to date (incl. matched funding contributions) across eight projects led by the University of Leeds and RAL Space.

• Development of leading UK capabilities in observing gases in the THz frequency range, including six to seven highly skilled roles supported at any one time.

• £250k ESA Phase 0 study for Earth Explorer 12 (EE12) won, with the potential for a \~£800k contract if chosen for EE12.

• Substantial societal benefit expected if chosen for EE12: improved climate monitoring, earlier detection of space weather events and more secure communications.

The true value of CEOI projects will be realised over the long term, potentially years or decades after initial funding. Projects often require years of research before technologies can be effectively incorporated into missions, followed by additional years before the benefits to end users are realised. As with any R&D programme, not all CEOI-developed technologies will be successfully utilised; the benefits will likely be concentrated in a few projects that were highly successful in developing and operationalising their technologies. At this relatively early stage, impacts concentrate in projects that have leveraged CEOI work for further investment and contracts, particularly ESA missions. These long timelines mean that only the early signs of future potential are measurable now. Ongoing monitoring is essential to capture emerging benefits for a comprehensive future assessment of value for money.

Process evaluation

Summary

The headline conclusion from the process evaluation is that the CEOI’s model and processes are broadly working well for grant holders. Consultees praised the technical expertise and support that the CEOI gave at each stage of their applications and projects, citing it as the key added value of the CEOI model. The current third-party consortium model is considered optimal for the CEOI going forward, as it retains those benefits. However, the one-year funding cycles limit projects’ and the CEOI’s abilities to achieve technical and scientific outcomes, and to support even more high-quality applications. Ensuring more uniform and comprehensive data collection will also help to evidence the CEOI’s success for future spending reviews.

Box 5: Process evaluation – key points

• The CEOI third-party consortium is designed to promote impartiality, preventing conflicts of interest and IP disputes.

• Outsourcing remains the preferred model for the UK Space Agency and the CEOI. The UK Space Agency would not be able to internally replicate the CEOI’s expertise, experience or heritage in EO to provide the same benefits to grant holders without significant investments in technical expertise.

• The CEOI’s current FY funding constraints limit their potential impact.

• Adopting a multi-year funding model could improve the CEOI and project outcomes.

• There is scope for improving current M&E practices and guidelines to ensure that the required data is recorded, maintained and transferred to evaluators.

The CEOI model

Before assessing the processes of the CEOI model, we first conducted interviews with the CEOI and the UK Space Agency to understand how the model works, why it was chosen and its general characteristics. We present this briefly before discussing the results of the wider process evaluation.

Generally, competitive public funding for R&D projects is awarded, overseen and administered by a government department or body, such as UKRI councils or agencies like the UK Space Agency, to ensure sufficient oversight of the spend, transparency and fairness in the selection processes. Non-governmental institutions and consortia may be contracted to distribute, manage or monitor such funding in cases where there is no capacity and/or capability to do so within the government. The CEOI fits into this latter model. A summary of how the model works and why it was selected follows below:

• The UK Space Agency used a third-party consortium funding and delivery model to deliver CEOI programmes. This model provides the UK Space Agency with funding oversight but also leverages EO expertise, as well as academic and industrial partners, to distribute competitive grant funding within the sector. At the same time, however, it presents risks, including insufficient oversight or engagement with grantees by the UK Space Agency.

• The CEOI programme is constructed to ensure neutrality. The CEOI uses organisational security system agreements and operating practices to avoid potential conflicts of interest and inadvertent IP sharing. The main roles within the CEOI are its director, co-directors, directors of technology and of science, as well as technology project support and operations (contracts and projects). Particularly in the most recent renewal contract, the CEOI includes a broad group of advisors, adding capabilities around developing business cases and links to ESA.

• The CEOI model provides impartial support to grant holders. A key benefit of the CEOI’s delivery model is that its experts can advise applicants at the bidding stage, helping to improve R&D concepts and ultimately enhance outcomes. The consortia’s technological expertise and successful working relationship with ESA were also cited as benefits that a grant distribution programme alone could not achieve on the same scale.^12^

• The CEOI’s model has had a positive effect since its inception in 2007. The model delivers a level of transparency that the UK Space Agency, a research council or another government agency could not achieve.^{[footnote 125]} Despite no explicit rationale for the UK Space Agency’s (originally NERC and the Department for Trade and Industry) initial choice to fund the CEOI in this way, the most recent evaluation assessed the value of outsourcing the CEOI, concluding that the CEOI offered a credible mechanism and platform for EO stakeholders to develop their technologies.

CEOI Processes

The results presented below summarise those reported in the interim report.

Application processes

Applicants cited several reasons for seeking CEOI funding, with the scope of funding being the primary factor: 96.2% applied due to the targeted technology areas or challenges.^{[footnote 126]} The variety of project types – 'Flagship,’ 'Fast Track’ and 'Pathfinder’ – was the second-most influential factor, highlighted by 61.5% of respondents in their decision to apply. Collaborative opportunities with industry and academia motivated 50% of applicants, and 46.2% were motivated by the expert advice from CEOI staff.

Figure 11: Rationale for applying for the CEOI programme funding

Reason	% of receipients
Other (please specify)	3.85
The funding was sponsored by the UK Space Agency	23.08
No other source of funding was available for this project	26.92
Ease of application (e.g. due to CEOI support, application requirements)	26.92
Amount of funding available	38.46
Expert advice of CEOI staff	46.15
The focus on collaborative working with industry/academia and others	50.00
Variety of project types (e.g. flagship, fast-track, pathfinder)	61.54
Scope of the funding (e.g. technology areas, specific challenges targeted)	96.15

Source: RAND Europe. Project lead survey analysis.

Applicants valued the CEOI's support for early-stage technology development, a key feature of the programme. Low-TRL grant funding in the space sector involves significant risks, with returns potentially realised over long timescales. The CEOI fills a gap by investing in critical low-TRL innovations, deemed 'essential' by stakeholders, where other funding sources may hesitate due to the high risk and low profitability associated with early-stage investments. Stakeholders view this approach favourably and appreciate its opportunities for individuals with non-traditional backgrounds in the EO community.^{[footnote 127]}

Project participants found the application process to be clear, rigorous and characterised by quick turnaround times, appreciating the clarity of the funding calls’ needs and objectives as well as the CEOI's responsiveness.^{[footnote 128]} The process’s transparency, constructive feedback and independent expert review panel were considered strengths.^{[footnote 129]} Participants also appreciated that the cadence and notification of funding calls enabled them to plan ahead,^{[footnote 130]} although short tender cycles posed challenges for some. They suggested extending the turnaround time to three months and enhancing the transparency of application requirements to address these issues.^{[footnote 131]}

Project management and delivery

Most project participants valued the CEOI's project management and reporting structures, which include a light process approach and regular updates to keep projects on track. Clear guidelines for monthly reports and update meetings balanced reporting with technology development.^{[footnote 132]} While similar to industrial project management, which some prefer, this approach may put pressure on academic settings that are unused to frequent reviews.^{[footnote 133]} Participants appreciated the CEOI's flexible funding, which is tied to milestones, as well as its responsive communication.^{[footnote 134]}

Project participants valued the knowledge, expertise and credibility of the CEOI team, which enhanced their projects through consistent engagement. Early CEOI engagement was beneficial for project success, as it aligned participants with key technological areas and ensured timely and responsive support.^{[footnote 135]} Technical CEOI officers with engineering backgrounds also provided valuable feedback, strengthening project quality.^{[footnote 136]} Participants also appreciated the roadmap for future technologies and investments.^{[footnote 137]} However, one stakeholder noted potential challenges in scaling the CEOI to larger projects, including the need for adequate funding at higher TRLs and specialised support for organisations with limited space technology knowledge, which need addressing if the CEOI expands.^{[footnote 138]}

Project participants reported delays in isolated cases, but they largely overcame these with minimal longer-term impacts on project delivery. One lead mentioned that staff changes at the CEOI caused delays in project starts,^{[footnote 139]} while another noted lengthy startup timelines due to funding constraints from their company.^{[footnote 140]} Participants also mentioned legal challenges, although the CEOI was cooperative after initial delays.^{[footnote 141]} A few interviewees suggested improving email responsiveness and project closure, which could be addressed with additional resources, given the CEOI's budget constraints and inability to carry funds over from one financial year to the next.^{[footnote 142]}

Although the COVID-19 pandemic caused disruptions, the CEOI overcame these challenges. However, UK-wide lockdowns during the 2020–2021 period notably affected research projects, hindering experimental work and in-person collaboration. Participants suggested that six-week review intervals might have been unnecessary during this time.^{[footnote 143]} COVID-related delays in physical testing contributed to delays in project completion.^{[footnote 144]}

Overall, project delivery was smooth, with most projects delivered on time and within budget. One project lead faced challenges with rapid spending due to the CEOI's March 2025 contract end date, which affected smaller academic projects.^{[footnote 145]} Another had to change project goals after underestimating the costs of custom optics, but appreciated the CEOI's accommodating nature and its understanding of technological innovation needs.^{[footnote 146]}

Part of this process evaluation involved conceptualising potential delivery models for future CEOI funding rounds, as outlined below.

Alternative delivery models

We consider the CEOI delivery model on a spectrum, ranging from an expanded version of the current model to a centralised in-house model run by the UK Space Agency, and include the pros and cons.

Table 5: Comparison of CEOI governance and delivery models

Governance/delivery model	Pros	Cons
Current model: External to the UK Space Agency, built from a consortium of EO companies and academics. Designs, delivers, and administers the funding.	Independent from the UK Space Agency but retains oversight and accounting, led by sector experts plugged into UK and global EO needs.	Less UK Space Agency control over design and delivery; the CEOI does not benefit from the UK Space Agency’s capacity in monitoring and evaluating projects, leading to workload issues. Full-time program managers do not discharge grants.
Enhanced/expanded model: Enhanced resources to buy out more of the current CEOI leads’ and administrators’ time.	Capacity issues for rapid grant distribution addressed, including M&E.	Cost implications.
More centralised model: Pulling back the administration of CEOI funding to the UK Space Agency but retaining CEOI to help choose projects.	The UK Space Agency may better handle M&E and grant distribution due to its heritage, including in M&E.	Less ability to take advantage of the technical knowledge and relationships built by the CEOI. The UK Space Agency is less tuned into the EO community than the consortium.
Fully centralised model: Funding is completely under UK Space Agency design and delivery; no external involvement beyond peer review and consultations.	Operational oversight is more direct (e.g. for M&E and grant distribution). The costs would be lower overall.	The benefits cited by previous evaluations of the outsourced model would be lost unless the UK Space Agency builds up the capability to match them.

Source: RAND Europe/know.space analysis

We presented these options in our consultations with the CEOI, the UK Space Agency and wider stakeholders and summarise the responses below:

• The UK Space Agency would not be able to match the CEOI’s EO expertise in-house: Although the UK Space Agency employs staff experienced in EO science and engineering, it does not have the in-house capacity to devote the same amount of specialised support that the CEOI currently provide to applicants and grant holders.

• Internal financial deadlines create limits on project progression: The UK Space Agency’s current budgetary restraints do not currently allow funds to be carried over from one financial year to another. This situation poses risks to project teams, as they have limited flexibility around delays towards the end of the financial year.

• The lack of a long-term budget leads to a more challenging bidding process for applicants: The short turnaround (three months) by which CEOI can give notice of upcoming calls is a challenge for applicants, particularly for businesses that need time to build an internal business case before they can start bid writing.^{[footnote 147]}

• The recent frequent restriction to one-year funding cycles reduces the CEOI’s agility: Much of the CEOI staff time is devoted to administration, exacerbated by squeezing additional calls per year into the schedule due to wider UK Space Agency underspends.^{[footnote 148]} This situation reduces the CEOI’s capacity to plan strategically, identify potential disruptive technologies or be proactive about upcoming EO trends.^{[footnote 149]}

• Adopting a longer-term plan with a consistent call cycle can reduce bottlenecks. Pivoting to a two- to three-year funding period could reduce bottlenecks by increasing the time in the FY cycle that the CEOI can support R&D projects and offer a greater level of project coverage and competitiveness.^{[footnote 150]} Furthermore, two to three calls could be planned at regular intervals over the five-year cycle to support industry, academic and organisational planning.^{[footnote 151]}

Future opportunities and challenges

Future trends in the wider EO sector and the CEOI’s role in it were discussed during the policy roundtables and interviews with the UK Space Agency and the CEOI. This sub-section presents these results, triangulating and substantiating the findings with other sources to provide suggested paths forward.

The UK’s current contribution to EO focuses heavily on improving interconnectedness and breadth.^{[footnote 152]} The CEOI’s consortium approach is a testament to that strategy. However, it is an uncommon one for the UK Space Agency, which has brought up some issues regarding how best to govern and financially manage this model. A future opportunity for developing a centre of data exploitation, built in a format similar to CEOI (e.g. based on ESA Φ-lab^{[footnote 153]}), could help ensure the UK remains at the forefront of EO data exploitation as well as instrumentation.

The CEOI and other UK Space Agency and ESA programmes have enabled technologies to reach mid-TRLs, but more work is needed to continue that development upstream and downstream. In practice, the UK has leveraged capabilities across the EO value chain, from conception to instrumentation, manufacturing, data processing and exploitation, excluding launch at present. Current expertise outside the CEOI and UK subsidiaries, such as Airbus UK, remains heavily focused on data exploitation through organisations like the Met Office, ESA Climate Office and Lloyd’s insurance. Our consultees recommended that the UK Space Agency could invest more in higher-risk, potentially disruptive technologies, acknowledging that leadership in a sector is often derived through first-mover advantage. A national drive to invest in prospective or low-TRL technologies that the UK aims to lead in was suggested, including long-term investments in facilities and infrastructure. Part of this can and should be achieved via the CEOI mechanism.

A 2023 market analysis of UK-based EO companies showed major strengths in the quantity of EO companies operating in the product and analysis markets (\~90% of all UK-EO companies as of 2023), highlighting UK heritage in that area.^{[footnote 154]} Conversely, many of these are small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) or spinouts from academia (with <10 staff), which could be seen as oversaturating the market at the SME level. This oversaturation may contribute to a bottleneck, with an overly competitive micro and small firm EO ecosystem that reduces accessibility to UK Space Agency/ESA funding and increases the risk of failing to spin out. Such a bottleneck could prevent advancements in the market and horizontal integration of capabilities across the EO value chain.

The UK’s current goals to further commercialise the EO sector were highlighted, along with key challenges, including an overemphasis on open data, public-focused EO programmes, market fragmentation, and uncertainty surrounding raw data. These were underlined by views that low-TRL development should continue to be supported without undermining higher-level mission-based or higher-TRL operationalisation. Roundtable discussions, followed by comments from the CEOI, recommended that the UK Space Agency adopt a new EO strategy to promote a more EO-specific approach to innovating and growing the UK space ecosystem.

Conclusions

The CEOI programme is a key feature of the overall UK EO landscape, funding innovative projects that lead to enhanced technological progression and promising mission concepts. The programme is well-liked by grant recipients, with many calling for the CEOI’s budget to be expanded and its funding extended across more than one financial year. The programme is largely well-run, though delivery partners have struggled to administer the funding within one financial year when additional calls are added, leading to difficulties in collecting and monitoring data.

Conclusions

The following conclusions summarise findings from the preceding chapters, organised by the CEOI’s 2019 objectives:

• Economic Impact: Develop EO technologies that increase exports and economic growth.

• Return on UK Government Investment: Maximise the benefits derived from UK funding to ESA and other institutional bodies.

• It is too soon to determine whether the CEOI will deliver good value for taxpayers’ money, though there are early signs of potential for substantial future benefits. Since our economic evaluation is subject to notable data gaps, we chose to focus on 39 recent projects (Calls 11–16) for which we have some data on economic impacts. This decision may have introduced selection bias into our results, since projects that did not respond to our surveys may have realised minimal benefits.

• The real discounted (Present Value (PV), 2024/2025) and attribution-adjusted UK benefit of the CEOI (Calls 11–16) stands at least £30.2m to date. Three large ESA contracts drive this total; thus, the results hinge on the success of a small subset of projects. If we include expectations, the PV benefit of the CEOI (Calls 11–16) rises to at least £57.6m. Furthermore, many benefits of the CEOI are intrinsically challenging to monetise, so that any quantified estimates will likely underestimate the programme’s full benefits.

• Innovation: Keep the UK at the forefront of EO technology development by supporting new and innovative ideas that offer tangible benefits to future missions.

• The CEOI fills an important gap in funding low-TRL UK EO projects and supporting their development to higher levels. With an average project TRL progression rate of 2.2 points, the CEOI is delivering value by supporting project teams to progress their EO technologies. Due to their focus on low-TRL projects, the CEOI is also enabling wider access to the EO market among smaller organisations, diversifying the UK EO sector and promoting innovation.

• Coordination among government, academia and industry strengthens the UK EO and space sector, with the CEOI enabling such collaboration. The programme’s funding model, as well as the events and networks that the CEOI facilitates, are recognised for encouraging collaboration and the cross-pollination of ideas.

• Capability: Strengthen capabilities in which the UK already leads, has the potential to lead or could overtake existing capability elsewhere.

• The UK is a key player in global EO technology development, and the CEOI plays a crucial role within the ecosystem. The progression pipeline from CEOI-funded projects to ESA funding or involvement in international missions is evident, contributing to the UK’s international standing. The UK’s contribution to international EO scholarship and academic publications is also significant, partly facilitated by programmes such as the CEOI.

• The current CEOI model has advantages due to the level of stakeholder buy-in, programme transparency and support for international funding down the line. The CEOI’s match-funding model and collaborative approach ensure ownership among stakeholders. At the same time, the team’s technological expertise and successful working relationship with ESA are key to promoting access to future funding and involvement in international missions.

• However, the current CEOI model also has drawbacks that merit exploring alternative delivery models. This report presents three examples of alternative delivery models. While an enhanced/expanded model could enhance the CEOI’s offer, there are cost implications. For example, a more centralised model could improve grant distribution but would miss out on the CEOI’s knowledge and networks. A fully centralised model would enhance operational oversight, but would struggle to generate the same benefits as the CEOI.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are intended to help improve CEOI’s delivery, outcomes for projects and overall value that the programme brings to UK EO and the taxpayer:

• The CEOI’s funding support for low-TRL EO technology is vital for UK EO, and support at these development stages should be maintained. Adapting the CEOI model or expanding the programme to support higher TRL projects should not neglect this earlier development stage. However, there are also arguments for the CEOI to focus on supporting disruptive technologies and longer-term projects to prevent innovation bottlenecks in the UK EO ecosystem.

• The CEOI model can build on its strength in connecting partners, sharing knowledge and enabling collaboration. The CEOI team’s expertise and networks are significant advantages of the current programme model, bolstering the UK’s ability to bring together space industry, academia and government. The benefits and disadvantages of alternative delivery models must be carefully weighed against the current CEOI model and its strengths in facilitating collaboration.

• Sustaining or increasing funding for the CEOI is likely to deliver further value to UK EO. Project participants throughout this evaluation overwhelmingly argued for the expansion of the CEOI programme, although such upscaling is likely to come with challenges and trade-offs. The recent increase in CEOI funding has led to an increase in projects and innovation in the EO sector, but also to a significant administrative burden, coupled with annual budgets. Extending the budget horizon to two years would enable the CEOI to deliver more value to the UK Space Agency by enhancing the quality of project bids and M&E reporting.

• Beyond additional funding, the CEOI can benefit from strategic guidance from the UK Space Agency and the broader UK government. Roundtable participants suggested creating a UK department for EO, akin to those in the US and New Zealand, to enhance strategy and capability building. A new UK EO strategy was recommended to enhance connections between the UK Space Agency, developers, and end-users, thereby boosting competitiveness in EO missions. This strategy involves a more risk-taking approach to funding, which fosters innovation.^{[footnote 155]}

• Clear prioritisation of EO market areas is needed for the CEOI to support the UK's leading data analysis capabilities and fill other niches. For example, roundtable participants suggested focusing on UK sensor manufacturing and extending remote sensing from space-based to aerial and UAV technologies, aligning with synergies between UAVs and satellites. ^{[footnote 156]}

• Our evaluation, particularly the economic evaluation, has been limited by incomplete data on project team impacts. Capturing this data retrospectively, once projects have finished, is challenging, given that project teams have little incentive to respond to surveys and requests for information. Regular ongoing monitoring, concurrent with project delivery, will be key to capturing benefits as they arise in future. Regular quarterly monitoring should be implemented to capture the impacts of North Star Metrics on project teams, in line with mandatory UK Space Agency reporting requirements. Additionally, capturing expected North Star Metric impacts at the application stage, in line with other UK Space Agency programmes, could provide a valuable source of forecast data to compare against realised impacts.

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———. 2016c. UK space industry: size and health report 2016. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-industry-size-and-health-report-2016

———. 2017a. UK Earth Observation Technology Strategy. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-earth-observation-technology-strategy

———. 2017b. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2016 to 2017. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2016-to-2017

———. 2018. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2017 to 2018. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2017-to-2018

———. 2019a. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2018 to 2019. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2018-to-2019

———. 2019b. UK space industry: size and health report 2018. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-industry-size-and-health-report-2018

———. 2019c. Living Planet Symposium 2019: UK Collaboration in global Earth Observation. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/5cd5a52bed915d5c827651f3/EO_BROCHURE.pdf

———. 2020. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2019 – 2020. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2019-2020

———. 2021a. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2020 – 2021. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2020-2021

———. 2021b. UK space industry: size and health report 2020. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-industry-size-and-health-report-2020

———. 2021c. Space Sector Skills Survey 2020: Research Report. UK Government. As of 2 September 2024: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/space-sector-skills-survey-2020-research-report

———. 2021d. ‘Biomass.’ UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/biomass

———. 2021e. ‘TRUTHS.’ UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/truths

———. 2022a. ‘Low value business case for the centre of earth observation instrumentation (CEOI).’

———. 2022b. Size and Health of the UK Space Industry 2021.’ UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-size-and-health-of-the-uk-space-industry-2021/size-and-health-of-the-uk-space-industry-2021

———. 2022c. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2021 – 2022. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2021-2022

———. 2022d. ‘World-first satellite to measure Earth’s water levels launches.’ UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/world-first-satellite-to-measure-earths-water-levels-launches

———. 2023a. The Size and Health of the UK Space Industry 2022. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-size-and-health-of-the-uk-space-industry-2022

———. 2023b. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2022–2023. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2022-2023

———. 2023c. Space Sector Skills Survey 2023 Report. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/space-sector-skills-survey-2023/space-sector-skills-survey-2023-report

———. 2024a. Size and Health of the UK Space Industry 2023. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-size-and-health-of-the-uk-space-industry-2023/size-and-health-of-the-uk-space-industry-2023

———. 2024b. UK Space Agency Annual Report and Accounts 2023–2024. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/uk-space-agency-annual-report-and-accounts-2023-2024/uk-space-agency-annual-report-2023-2024

———. 2024c. Size and Health of the UK Space Industry 2023. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/the-size-and-health-of-the-uk-space-industry-2023/size-and-health-of-the-uk-space-industry-2023

———. 2024d. ‘MicroCarb.’ UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/case-studies/microcarb

UK Space Agency, et. al. 2021. National space strategy. UK Government. As of 2 September 2025: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/national-space-strategy

WECD (Warwick Economics and Development). 2022. ‘Evaluation of the CEOI programme.’

1. Khelifi et al. (2024). ↩

2. Ogden et al. (2024). ↩

3. The TRL measures a technology's maturity, ranging from concept (TRL 1) to full operational capability (TRL 9), thereby aiding investment and decision-making. ↩

4. ‘Low-TRL’ technologies are those in the early stage of development, i.e. concepts or models that may not yet have been tested or prototyped. ↩

5. HMG (2022). ↩

6. HMG (2023). ↩

7. UK Space Agency (2017a). ↩

8. Altmetrics is a form of more inclusive bibliometrics that relies on scraping data from social media, patent submissions, non-scholarly forums, mainstream media, policy documents and social networks. However, it is incredibly time-intensive and requires advanced data scraping methods to replace normalised bibliometrics meaningfully. For more detail, see Pavlović (2020). ↩

9. For analyses of OpenAlex’s completeness relative to other bibliographic databases, see Culbert et al (2024). ↩

10. HMG (2021). ↩

11. UK Space Agency (2012c). ↩

12. NAO (2024a). ↩

13. UK Space Agency (2012b). Value in current price. ↩

14. UK Space Agency (2024b). Value in current price. ↩

15. UK Space Agency (2012b). Value in current price. ↩

16. UK Space Agency (2024b). Value in current price. ↩

17. UK Space Agency (2024c). ↩

18. Space IGS (2010). ↩

19. UK Space Agency (2013). ↩

20. CEOI (2019). ↩

21. UK Space Agency et al. (2021). ↩

22. DSIT & MoD (2023). ↩

23. UK Space Agency (2012b); UK Space Agency (2024b). Values are in current prices. ↩

24. UKRI (2025a). ↩

25. DSIT & MoD (2023). ↩

26. BEIS et al. (2022). ↩

27. DSIT et al.. (2022). ↩

28. UK Space Agency (2024b). ↩

29. UK Space Agency (2023b). ↩

30. UK Space Agency (2024c). Values in current prices. ↩

31. UK Space Agency (2024c). ↩

32. know.space estimates using proprietary know.space databases. ↩

33. UK Space Agency (2024c). ↩

34. UK Space Agency (2021c); UK Space Agency (2023c). ↩

35. UKRI (2025b). ↩

36. SENSE (2025a). ↩

37. UK Space Agency (2012c). ↩

38. UK Space Agency (2015b). ↩

39. eoPortal (2018). ↩

40. NCEO (2025d). ↩

41. NCEO (2025a). ↩

42. EASRC (2025a). ↩

43. ESA (2025a). ↩

44. NAO (2024b). ↩

45. See all UK Space Agency resources for data in the References (values in current prices). ↩

46. know.space analysis. UK Space Agency (2014b, 2015, 2016a) - calendar years used to reflect UK Space Agency annual reports reporting (values in current prices). ↩

47. ESA (2012). ↩

48. EUMETSAT (2025a). ↩

49. See all UK Space Agency resources for data in the References (values in current prices). ↩

50. UK Space Agency (2020). ↩

51. UK Space Agency (2021e). ↩

52. CEOI (2025a). ↩

53. Centre for Strategy & Evaluation Services (2013). ↩

54. The European Centre for Medium-Range Weather Forecasts (ECMWF) is both a research institute and an operational service that produces global numerical weather predictions and maintains one of the largest meteorological data archives. It operates a world-class supercomputer for forecasting, provides advanced training, and supports the WMO’s programmes. As a key player in the EU’s Copernicus programme, ECMWF delivers quality-assured climate and atmospheric data while also developing digital twins of the Earth through the Destination Earth initiative. ↩

55. DSIT & BEIS (2020); Mercator Ocean International is a non-profit organisation transitioning into an intergovernmental entity, providing ocean science-based services for conservation and sustainable use, backed by ten major operational oceanography institutions. ↩

56. UK in a Changing Europe (2023a). ↩

57. UK Parliament (2023). ↩

58. European Commission (2023). ↩

59. UK in a Changing Europe (2023b). ↩

60. Met Office (2025). ↩

61. know.space estimates of UK contributions to EUMETSAT, using historical exchange rates (in current prices). See all EUMETSAT resources in References. ↩

62. CNES (2025). ↩

63. Airbus (2024). ↩

64. UK Space Agency (2024d). ↩

65. Space4Climate (2025). ↩

66. UK Space Agency (2022b). ↩

67. UK Space Agency (2019c). ↩

68. CWTS (2024). ↩

69. See Ogden et al. (2024). ↩

70. INT_6B. ↩

71. INT_7B. ↩

72. INT_9B. ↩

73. INT_10B. ↩

74. INT_13B. ↩

75. INT_6A. ↩

76. INT_7A. ↩

77. INT_3A. ↩

78. INT_5A. ↩

79. DASA & DSTL (2023). ↩

80. INT_10B. ↩

81. INT_1B; INT_5B. ↩

82. INT_9B. ↩

83. INT_12B. ↩

84. INT_10B. ↩

85. INT_9B. ↩

86. INT_4B; INT_9B. ↩

87. SSTL (2016). ↩

88. WECD (2022). ↩

89. INT_6B; INT_8B. ↩

90. INT_8B. ↩

91. INT_4B. ↩

92. Findings from Roundtable 1: the state of UK EO, with wider stakeholders / CEOI-adjacent stakeholders. ↩

93. Findings from Roundtable 1: the state of UK EO, with wider stakeholders / CEOI-adjacent stakeholders. ↩

94. Findings from Roundtable 2: CEOI adjacent. ↩

95. Findings from Roundtable 2: CEOI adjacent. ↩

96. Amos (2020). ↩

97. Amos (2020). ↩

98. INT_10B; INT_6B; INT_8B. ↩

99. INT_8B. ↩

100. INT_4B. ↩

101. INT_1B. ↩

102. INT_4B. ↩

103. INT_3A; INT_6A; INT_7A; INT_1A. ↩

104. INT_2A. ↩

105. INT_6B; INT_13B. ↩

106. There are missing match funding figures for 9 of 118 projects recorded from the 6th call onwards. ↩

107. In our analysis, we cover CEOI Calls 11–16, along with any smaller ad hoc calls during the same period. These include EE11 and EE12 (Earth Explorer) Mission Proposal Development Support projects, TRL Raising and Facility Enhancement Fast Tracks, Special Projects, Strategic Projects and 2024 Small Projects. Overall, our analysis covers a total of 76 CEOI projects. ↩

108. The evaluation plan is available from Khelifi et al (2024) ↩

109. Throughout our analysis, we treat external and internal investment as benefits to society, reflecting the positive role of investment in creating a pipeline for future economic benefit and the central role of investment in the UK Space Agency’s North Star Metric. However, we note that DSIT appraisal advice focuses on quantifying the benefits that stem from investment, which are likely to accrue over the longer term. UK external and internal investment is therefore counted as a cost by DSIT, reflecting the opportunity cost of investment. Foreign investment is not factored into the cost-benefit analysis. This methodology will capture the long-term benefits of investment. However, for the CEOI, it is too early to meaningfully calculate the net present social value (NPSV) using this approach. We include private external investment and foreign public external investment (including ESA funding) in our totals. ↩

110. These are sourced from the UK Space Agency’s underlying economic model (UK Space Agency, 2022). ↩

111. See know.space (2023). ↩

112. Using contextual information, job creation is divided into sub-categories of role type and seniority. The wage premia associated with each job type is then taken from know.space (2023). Estimates of wage premia are adjusted to current prices. For a fuller description of the methodology employed, see know.space (2023). ↩

113. See know.space (2023).. ↩

114. Morretta et al. (2022) estimate that the average value of researcher and publisher activity in 2018 was between €4,500 and €22,000. We calculated the average of these two values, converted it to GBP, and then adjusted for inflation to arrive at £19,000 per publication. ↩

115. We have not extrapolated the impacts for projects on which we have impact data to all funded projects. This is because there was likely to be selection bias among respondents, i.e. those whose projects have had the most favourable impacts were more likely to respond to our requests. ↩

116. Note that 50% is necessarily a somewhat arbitrary number without concrete evidence on the extent to which optimism bias is prevalent. We chose 50% to reflect HM Treasury (2013): Supplementary Green Book Guidance: Optimism Bias. ↩

117. Due to limited information provided in survey responses, we were not always able to verify that economic activity occurred in the UK. ↩

118. Due to the limited detail provided in survey responses, we were unable to independently verify these contracts. We have assumed 100% attribution, as survey questions were framed to capture only those benefits attributable to the CEOI. ↩

119. ESA (2022). ↩

120. We asked project teams to estimate future investments and revenues as part of our recent survey and applied a 50% optimism bias (see Section 4.3.2, ‘Key assumptions’). ↩

121. This finding has been demonstrated elsewhere in the space industry. See European Space Policy Institute (2024). ↩

122. As noted above, in the absence of data on CEOI funding and matched funding contributions by financial year, we assume costs are spread evenly over the duration of funded projects. ↩

123. These are the cost totals we use in our central analysis. ↩

124. This case study leverages insights from an interview with the University of Leeds. ↩

125. UK Space Agency (2016a). ↩

126. INT_8B. ↩

127. INT_7B; INT_3B. ↩

128. INT_6B; INT_9B. ↩

129. INT_6B; INT_7B. ↩

130. INT_12B; INT_7B. ↩

131. INT_4B. ↩

132. INT_7B; INT_9B. ↩

133. INT_2B; INT_3B. ↩

134. INT_7B. ↩

135. INT_4B. ↩

136. INT_9B; INT_7B. ↩

137. INT_9B; INT_7B. ↩

138. INT_10B. ↩

139. INT_10B. ↩

140. INT_12B. ↩

141. INT_10B. ↩

142. INT_12B; INT_9B. ↩

143. INT_3B. ↩

144. INT_9B. ↩

145. INT_7B. ↩

146. INT_3B. ↩

147. CEOI_UKSA_Group_Interview (2025). ↩

148. CEOI_UKSA_Group_Interview (2025). ↩

149. CEOI_UKSA_Group_Interview (2025). ↩

150. CEOI_UKSA_Group_Interview (2025). ↩

151. CEOI_UKSA_Group_Interview (2025). ↩

152. Findings from Roundtable 2: CEOI adjacent. ↩

153. ESA Φ-lab (2025). ↩

154. Red Kite (2023). ↩

155. ESA (2020). ↩

156. Alvarez-Vanhard et al. (2021). ↩