Policy paper

Automated Vehicles Bill: policy scoping notes

Updated 16 February 2024

Introduction

These policy scoping notes set out how the government intends to exercise the delegated powers in the Automated Vehicles Bill. To support proper scrutiny, these notes cover all the main statutory guidance and regulation-making powers in the bill.

In some instances, the delegated powers have been grouped where relevant to minimise duplication, as such there are 20 separate scoping notes.

Each scoping note:

• identifies the provisions in the bill that confer the power to make delegated legislation
• outlines the policy intent
• provides an indication of the possible content of the regulations

These policy scoping notes reflect potential policy approaches. They are subject to consultation and the final policy position may differ from that set out here. We intend for this to be a live document, which can be updated during bill passage if necessary, to provide further information and detail.

The Automated Vehicles Bill

The Automated Vehicles Bill implements the recommendations of the 4-year review of regulation for automated vehicles carried out jointly by the Law Commission of England and Wales and the Scottish Law Commission (the Law Commissions). It is intended to set the legal framework for the safe deployment of self-driving vehicles in Great Britain.

The Law Commissions’ review of the law relating to automated vehicles involved 3 rounds of consultation between November 2018 and March 2021, involving over 350 meetings with individuals and organisations, and analysis of over 400 written responses. The Law Commissions published their report Automated Vehicles: joint report, (PDF) with 75 recommendations in January 2022.

The government’s response to the recommendations was published in Connected and Automated Mobility 2025: Realising the benefits of self-driving vehicles in the UK (CAM 2025) in August 2022. Based on the Law Commissions’ recommendations, CAM 2025 committed to set out a legal and safety framework to provide clarity of responsibility for self-driving vehicles and to put in place new safety requirements. The framework applies to vehicle systems that are capable of driving a vehicle, for some or all of a journey, with no human input. Such systems are considered ‘self-driving’, and legal responsibilities associated with their use change. This technology is distinct from technology that supports a driver (driver assistance technology), where the driver remains responsible at all times. The Law Commissions recommended that it should be a criminal offence to market a vehicle as self-driving if it does not meet the legal definition.

As recommended by the Law Commissions, CAM 2025 identifies new legal entities responsible for the safety of self-driving systems and creates a new legal status for a driver who has handed control of a vehicle to a self-driving system. It also sets out details of a new safety framework for self-driving vehicles on roads in Great Britain.

A set of National Safety Principles, referred to as a Statement of Safety Principles in the bill, will set out further detail of the safety expectations for self-driving vehicles and will be used to inform safety assessment across the self-driving regulatory framework. The bill establishes our safety ambition that self-driving vehicles should be expected to achieve a level of safety equivalent to, or higher than, a careful and competent human driver as the minimum level of road safety that the Statement of Safety Principles should look to achieve.

Vehicles with automated systems will be subject to detailed technical assessment and approval for the purposes of safety and cyber-security using the well-established Vehicle type approval process. For example, UN Regulation 157 is the first regulatory step taken by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) in regulating driving automation technologies designed to be in primary control of the vehicle. Amendments to the approval process will be made where necessary to account for new automated technologies. A vehicle with automated technology may be put forward for authorisation, which is the process by which a system will be assessed as self-driving. If assessed as self-driving, authorisation will identify the organisation responsible for the system.

If the authorised vehicle is capable of operating without a responsible individual in the vehicle (and, therefore, does not need a driver), it will require a licensed operator to oversee the journey. If the service carries passengers, it will require an automated passenger services permit for automated passenger services or a licence under existing schemes.

An in-use regulatory scheme will hold those responsible for self-driving systems to account while the systems are in use, and new sanctions and penalties will apply if companies fail in their duty. No-blame investigations by inspectors of automated vehicle incidents will make recommendations to inform and shape the ongoing safe development and deployment of self-driving vehicles.

In addition to the Law Commission’s recommendations, the bill will make information about traffic regulation orders (TROs) available digitally and in a common format for use in self-driving vehicles and other systems that facilitate driving vehicles on a road. The data, which includes, for example, speed limits, road closures and restrictions, location and times of use of bus lanes and parking bays can then be used to create a digital map of the road network which will support the safe operation of self-driving vehicles. The proposal for digital traffic regulation orders was consulted on in 2022.

Delegated powers

The bill contains 35 delegated powers. The large number of delegated powers is required because the self-driving vehicle industry is innovative, highly technical and fast-changing and it is important to ensure that the legislation remains fit for purpose and keeps pace with the industry. The provision for delegated powers, subject to appropriate scrutiny and safeguards, is proposed to enable the government to adapt policy in light of practical experience, scientific advice and technological changes.  

The bill prescribes a new framework to enable the safe deployment of self-driving vehicles but the technical level of detail is more appropriately dealt with through secondary legislation. The main delegated powers are in relation to establishing a comprehensive safety assurance framework for self-driving vehicles:

• a requirement for the Secretary of State for Transport to publish a ‘Statement of Safety Principles’ [clause 2]
• setting authorisation requirements [clause 5]
• setting authorisation procedures [clause 11]
• establishing an operator licensing scheme [clause 12]
• seizure of items [clause 31]
• issuing monetary penalty notices [clause 36]
• power to require reports from police and local authorities [clause 40]
• protection of information [clause 42]
• changing or clarifying through regulations whether or how existing traffic legislation applies to a user-in-charge (a new concept introduced by the framework) [clause 50]
• detention following seizure of vehicles [clause 58]
• functions of an inspector of authorised automated vehicles incidents [clauses 60, 68, 72 and 75]
• powers of an inspector of authorised automate vehicle incidents [clauses 63, 69 and 70]
• application to police officers [clauses 67 and 71]
• protection and management of information, items and material that an inspector of authorised automate vehicle incidents collects [clauses 73 and 74]
• specifying words, expressions, symbols or marks that may only be used to describe authorised automated vehicles [clause 78]
• protection of information obtained further to automated passenger services permit conditions [clause 88]
• procedural and administrative matters in relation to automated passenger services permits [clause 89]
• civil sanctions for infringing automated passenger services permit scheme: maximum sums for monetary penalty notices [schedule 6]

There are also regulation-making powers in relation to the adaptation of existing regimes with respect to automated vehicles:

• amending type approval requirements in respect of automated vehicles [clause 91]
• providing information about the traffic regulation orders [clause 93]

Secondary legislation and guidance

Our intended general approach to the preparation and timing of secondary legislation is set out below. Where additional information is available, this is provided as part of the individual note. Overall, we expect that the delegated powers in the bill will be exercised through both statutory guidance and statutory instruments.

We currently intend to issue the Statement of Safety Principles as statutory guidance. This will be subject to the affirmative procedure for the first iteration. The first Statement of Safety Principles will be novel and so Parliament should be given sufficient opportunity for scrutiny. The negative procedure will apply for subsequent revisions.

The bill requires consultation with such representative organisations as the Secretary of State sees fit. Consultees are not set out on the face of the bill as the self-driving vehicle industry is developing and changing rapidly so any list of statutory consultees is likely to become out of date within a short time period.

However, following feedback, we have set out a specific obligation to consult the 3 groups with the greatest interest in the safe operation of the system on the Statement of Safety Principles. These groups are:

• organisations representing road users
• road safety groups
• businesses in the self-driving vehicle industry

The Statement of Safety Principles will be subject to public consultation and, therefore, open to all – we want to ensure anyone who feels they are affected can feed into the development of these principles.

We currently intend to exercise the other powers through multiple statutory instruments. These will cover:

• authorisation requirements, conditions, and procedures
• authorised self-divining entity (ASDE) registration requirements
• no-user-in-charge (NUiC) operator licensing
• in-use regulation
• incident investigation
• misleading marketing
• digitalising TROs (DTROs)
• type approval
• automated passenger services permitting

By grouping powers in this way, we hope to provide clarity for Parliamentarians and potential developers and operators on the regulatory requirements for each type of activity while minimising the amount of duplication between the various instruments.

All of these statutory instruments, except when the powers under clause 50 are used to amend primary legislation, and the powers under Clause 36 and Schedule 6 are used to set the maximum monetary penalties for regulated bodies, will be subject to the negative procedure and various consultation requirements have been applied.

To note, clause 50 includes power to amend primary legislation through secondary legislation, which is the power to change or clarify application of existing traffic legislation. It is proposed that statutory instruments made using the clause 50 power will be subject to the affirmative procedure where they change or clarify primary legislation, to help to mitigate concerns about the power’s use. Further detail is provided below.

We currently intend to develop, consult on and lay core statutory instruments and statutory guidance from 2024 through to 2026, subject to government priorities and Parliamentary time. We will continue to engage with Parliament, industry and other stakeholders throughout the development of the secondary legislation.

To support this process and provide proper scrutiny of the Automated Vehicles Bill, policy scoping notes covering all the main statutory guidance and regulation-making powers are detailed below.

Part 1: Regulatory scheme for automated vehicles

Clause 2: Statement of Safety Principles

Clause 2 requires the Secretary of State to publish a ‘Statement of Safety Principles’ that will be laid before Parliament. The principles must be framed with a view to securing the safety ambition that authorised automated vehicles will achieve a level of safety equivalent to, or higher than, that of a careful and competent human driver, and that road safety in Great Britain will be better as a result of the use of authorised automated vehicles than otherwise. The Secretary of State is required to have regard to these principles when deciding if an individual vehicle is capable of travelling autonomously and safely, and can be authorised for use. To travel autonomously means to travel without monitoring or control by an individual, and to travel safely means to travel to an acceptably safe standard. These definitions are set out in the ‘self-driving test’ in clause 1.

Clause 38 of the bill requires the Secretary of State to monitor and assess the general performance of self-driving vehicles, in particular, whether the performance is consistent with the Statement of Safety Principles, and to publish an annual report.

Outline of the policy intent

The intention of the Safety Principles is to set out the safety boundaries within which self-driving vehicles must perform in order to be and to remain authorised. They will set out what it means to travel to an ‘acceptably safe standard’. The Safety Principles will set out more detail in support of the government’s safety ambition for self-driving vehicles that they should provide an equivalent level of safety to a careful and competent human driver.

Laying the first Safety Principles in a statement to Parliament so that it takes effect if both Houses resolve that it should, will allow for effective scrutiny of this novel area.  These principles can be amended in response to the assessment of general performance, and to be adapted as the technologies mature and as societal expectations of performance evolve.

Any future changes to the Safety Principles are expected to be less substantial in nature and build on the initial iteration and so once laid would take effect after 40 days, subject to contrary resolution.

The bill provides that any action taken by a self-driving vehicle that would, if taken by a human, be considered an offence or would result in a penalty charge, is considered a ‘traffic infraction’. If a self-driving vehicle commits a traffic infraction the responsible ASDE may be subject to regulatory sanctions. This approach establishes that self-driving vehicles are expected to meet existing road traffic rules and, in doing so, will achieve an equivalent level of safety to, or higher than, that of a careful and competent driver. Government guidance on good driving, for example The Highway Code and The Official DVSA Guide to Driving – the Essential Skills, draws on legal requirements but also provides broader advice. So good driving is more than just following the rules.

The Safety Principles will also provide industry with guidance on the standard of behaviour self-driving vehicles are expected to achieve.

The Safety Principles will be used to shape the technical assessments, for example during vehicle approval and the self-driving test for authorisation. As already stated, they will also form the basis of the Secretary of State’s duty in clause 38 to monitor and assess the general performance of authorised self-driving vehicles.

Outline of the proposed content

Government will not be starting from scratch when developing the new Statement of Safety Principles. There are a number of areas where relevant thinking has been done and documents have been published. These include, but are not limited to:

• work done to support the application of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018
• evidence submitted as part of the Law Commissions’ first and third consultations on the question of how safe is safe enough
• recommendations made by the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation
• principles set out by government for the regulation of AI
• responses to the government’s consultation on a safety ambition for self-driving vehicles
• the principles for cyber security for connected and automated vehicles

The following sub-sections outline possible areas of content. All of these will be subject to consultation.

Principle relating to an overall improvement in road safety

The primary purpose of the Safety Principles, as set out in the bill, is to secure that authorised automated vehicles will achieve a level of safety equivalent to, or higher than, that of a careful and competent human driver, and that road safety in Great Britain will be better as a result of the use of authorised automated vehicles than otherwise. The principles might, therefore, include an over-arching principle that they should be designed and operated with a view to improving road safety.

Principles relating to self-driving vehicles ability to drive without monitoring

These Principles would aim to expand on what a vehicle must be capable of safely achieving in order that an individual does not need to monitor the vehicle or the road environment. For example, the monitoring test developed to support the implementation of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, states that:

“An individual does not need to monitor the vehicle when the Automated Driving System (ADS) is engaged if the vehicle can safely achieve the following without human monitoring when the ADS is engaged, operating within its Operational Design Domain (ODD), and can identify the boundaries of that domain:

• comply with road traffic rules that relate to the dynamic driving task
• avoid collisions which a competent and careful driver could avoid
• treat other road users with reasonable consideration
• avoid putting itself in a position where it would be the cause of a collision
• recognise when it is operating outside of its operational design domain”

The term ‘automated driving system’ in this test is the equivalent of a self-driving ‘feature’, as defined in the bill. The ‘dynamic driving task’ means the control and execution of longitudinal and lateral movements of the vehicle, monitoring the road and responding to events in road traffic. The ‘operational design domain’ is the specific operating conditions (such as environmental, geographic, time-of-day, traffic, infrastructure, speed range, weather and other conditions) under which a self-driving system is designed to operate without intervention by an individual.

Principles relating to self-driving vehicles ability to drive without human control

These Principles would aim to expand on what a vehicle must be capable of safely achieving in order that an individual does not need to control the vehicle. For example, the control test developed to support the implementation of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018, states that:

“An individual does not need to control the vehicle when the Automated Driving System (ADS) is engaged if the vehicle can safely achieve the following without human control when the ADS is engaged, operating within its Operational Design Domain (ODD), and can identify the boundaries of that domain:

Dynamic Driving Task, incorporating:

1. longitudinal dynamics (speed, acceleration, braking, gear selection)

2. lateral dynamics (steering)”

The definitions are the same as for the monitoring test above.

Principles relating to equality and fairness

Government will include a safety principle relating to equality and fairness. For example, this could state that self-driving features should be designed and operated with a view to ensuring overall safety benefits do not come at the expense of any particular group of road users. For example, that improved safety for vehicle occupants is not at the expense of vulnerable road users. This could go into a further level of detail, for example, that data sets used to train systems should be representative of different sectors of society, with particular attention given to those with protected characteristics.

This would be in line with concerns raised in response to the consultation on a safety ambition for self-driving vehicles that the government published in 2022 in the policy paper Connected and Automated Mobility 2025: Realising the benefits of self-driving vehicles in the UK. A safety principle relating to fairness would also be in line with recommendations in the Centre for Data Ethics and Innovation (CDEI) policy paper Responsible Innovation in Self-Driving Vehicles, published in 2022, and the government’s policy paper A pro-innovation approach to AI regulation, published in March 2023.

Principles relating to ‘explainability’

‘Explainability’ is being able to understand why a self-driving system takes or took a particular course of action. It may be appropriate to include principles aimed at ensuring an appropriate degree of explainability of the artificial intelligence (AI) used in self-driving vehicles.

Both the CDEI recommendations and the AI cross-sectoral principles also cover explainability. As set out in the CDEI report, explainability can support improvements in safety and accountability, and provide evidence to evaluate the safety and fairness of systems. It can also support public understanding and acceptance of self-driving systems.

Some machine learning-based systems may be challenging to explain, but the explainability of AI systems is an active research field.

Principles relating to cyber resilience

Cyber resilience is another important issue for self-driving vehicles. The UK has previously published guidance (in the form of The key principles of vehicle cyber security for connected and automated vehicles, published in 2017) and co-chaired the development of new UNECE regulations on cybersecurity and software updates.

Detailed requirements for cyber security are likely to be set out in technical systems standards which would be assessed at vehicle approval. However, it may be appropriate for the Safety Principles to include overarching cyber resilience principles.

Approach to preparation and timing

Consultations have been held as part of the Law Commissions work and the government’s consultation on the safety ambition of appropriate safety standards. Both of these have demonstrated a lack of consensus from stakeholders in this area.  Discussions have also been held on this topic with the Expert Advisory Panel, which includes experts from industry, academia and the transport sector and provides independent advice on the government’s Connected and Automated Vehicles Process for Assuring Safety and Security (CAVPASS) and informal stakeholder groups associated with the government’s safety assurance programme for self-driving vehicles. The proposed approach is, therefore, to engage with stakeholders to develop the draft principles further and then consult on the statutory guidance in 2024 and lay it in 2024 to 2025.

Clause 5: Authorisation requirements and conditions

Authorisation is a fundamental part of the legislative framework. It will identify the vehicles that will be subject to the new framework on a public register and transfer accountability for the driving behaviour of a vehicle when it is operating in self-driving mode to the ASDE who is responsible for how the vehicle is driven. Authorisation is also a condition of enabling the user-in-charge to claim an immunity from offences relating to how that vehicle is driven. ‘Authorisation requirements’ must be met to obtain initial authorisation of a vehicle and to remain authorised on an ongoing basis.

In broad terms, the bill refers to 4 types of authorisation requirement:

1. Requirements for a vehicle, under clause 5(1).
2. Requirements for an ‘authorised self-driving entity’ (ASDE), under clause 6(3).
3. Requirements for transition demands, under clause 7(3).
4. Requirements relating to the collection and sharing of information (Clause 14(1)).

Here we look at each authorisation element in turn.

i. Authorisation requirements for a vehicle

Clause 5(1) gives the Secretary of State the power to establish initial and ongoing ‘authorisation requirements’ through regulations. Some provisions will be made by regulations and will apply to all vehicles. Others will be in ‘authorisation conditions’, which are specific to an individual authorisation (clause 5(2)).

Vehicle requirements: outline of the policy intent

At present, vehicle approval and driving behaviour are dealt with by separate legal schemes. Vehicle approval is done through the type-approval process, which largely implements mutual obligations under international agreements to comply with agreed technical standards. By contrast, driver liability and traffic management are largely a matter of domestic law. 

The bill preserves this dual system. To place an automated vehicle (AV) onto the market, a manufacturer will need to obtain a vehicle approval, which may be based on agreed international standards, such as UNECE Regulation No. 157 on automated lane keeping systems on motorway type roads or any future domestic AV technical standards. The majority of vehicles on our roads are approved via the assimilated type approval frameworks^{[footnote 1]}.

The authorisation stage is separate. At authorisation, the Secretary of State determines whether a vehicle meets the self-driving test under clause 1(2), asking whether the vehicle can drive safely and legally without human monitoring or control. This means that authorisation requirements are not primarily concerned with technical specifications for vehicle parts (such as the standard of sensors or headlights). That will remain an issue for the approval scheme and for construction and use regulations.

Instead, the purpose of the authorisation is to identify each self-driving ‘feature’ within the vehicle and decide whether it meets the self-driving test. Under clause 4(3), the authorisation must specify:

• whether it is a ‘user-in-charge’ or ‘no user-in-charge’ feature
• how the feature is engaged or disengaged
• the locations and circumstances in which the feature meets the self-driving test

In the initial stages of deployment, it is envisaged that each feature will be assessed on an individual basis. The putative ASDE will put forward a detailed safety case explaining each feature within the vehicle and how the feature meets the self-driving test, bearing in mind the safety principles. If the vehicle has more than one self-driving feature, the safety case should also include how the different features will work together. The details of how features are engaged and disengaged. When they can be used and how they work together will then be set out in individual authorisation conditions. As self-driving develops, more aspects of this process are likely to become standardised and form part of the regulations rather than individual conditions.  

Vehicle requirements: outline of the proposed content

Subject to consultation, the authorisation regulations will set out the detailed legal and safety requirements that must be satisfied for vehicles to be authorised. For initial authorisation, the main requirements would be that the vehicle:

• has been approved
• meets the self-driving test in respect of its operational domain, having regard to the Statement of Safety Principles, and can drive itself safely
• complies with road rules and can drive itself legally

The vehicle will need to maintain this capability on an ongoing basis. The putative ASDE will be expected to explain how the software will be updated and what maintenance will be required. Crucially, it will also need to explain how information about updates and maintenance will be communicated to users. The current expectation is that these issues will be included as ongoing authorisation requirements and conditions.

Clause 9(8) addresses one particular problem: how will users know that a vehicle’s authorisation has been varied, suspended or withdrawn. Clause 9(8) states that the Secretary of State must impose authorisation requirements to deal with this issue. The Driver and Vehicles Standard Agency (DVSA) has published a code of practice about how manufacturers should manage safety warnings and recalls. It is anticipated that the authorisation requirement will be informed by experience under this code.

If an ASDE fails to effectively communicate a variation, suspension or withdrawal of authorisation, and the user could not reasonably have known of this, the user-in-charge immunity will continue to be available (clause 51(5)).

ii. Authorisation requirements for an ASDE

Under clause 6(1), the Secretary of State must impose authorisation requirements to ensure that each authorised vehicle is backed by a designated ‘authorised self-driving entity’ (ASDE).

ASDE requirements: outline of the policy intent

The main objective of these authorisation requirements is set out in clause 6(4). The requirements must be designed to secure that:

• the ASDE is under a general responsibility to ensure that the vehicle continues to satisfy the self-driving test
• the ASDE is of:
  • good repute
  • good financial standing
  • competent to discharge its duties

ASDE requirements: outline of the proposed content – good repute, financial standing and competence

Good repute is a well-established concept within public service vehicle (PSV) and heavy goods vehicle (HGV) licensing. It is clear, for example, that a person is not of good repute if they have convictions for serious or relevant offences. For example, corporate liability arising from breaches of the Fraud Act 2006 or the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974.  However, good repute is wider than this. In the early stage of AV deployment, there should be flexibility about what amounts to good repute.

For financial standing, the objective subject to consultation might be to determine that the ASDE has sufficient resource to update the software, to respond to in-use regulation demands and (if necessary) to satisfy penalties and redress orders. However, financial standing requirements can be flexible. For example, rather than demonstrating cash reserves, an ASDE might be able to show that it has appropriate insurance in place.

An ASDE will also be required to demonstrate competence. One approach might be to require the ASDE to submit a documented safety management system, defining individual roles with clear responsibilities and competence requirements for each. Other provisions

The bill specifies other ASDE requirements. For example, under clause 15(1), authorisation requirements may require the ASDE to nominate an individual to be responsible for information. This is designed to ensure that one senior person is clearly responsible for ensuring that the ASDE provides full and accurate information about safety. Under clause 15(3), the requirements must include provisions to ensure that the nominated person has consented to the nomination and to deal with how they are replaced.

Furthermore, under clause 41(1), authorisation requirements must require the ASDE to provide a postal and electronic address for the service of notices and to keep the address up to date at all times. 

iii. Authorisation requirements for transition demands

It is envisaged that most user-in-charge features will issue transition demands. A transition demand is a demand issued by the vehicle to the user-in-charge to assume control of the vehicle within a set period (known as the ‘transition period’). Under clause 7(3), where vehicles rely on transition demands, the Secretary of State must impose authorisation requirements to ensure that transition demands operate safely.

Transition demands: outline of the policy intent

The objectives are set out in clause 7(3). In broad terms, the objectives are that the:

• transition demand can be perceived by all users-in-charge (including those with disabilities)
• transition period will be long enough for the user-in-charge to assume control of the vehicle
• vehicle will continue to travel autonomously, safely and legally during the transition period
• user-in-charge will be alerted when the transition period ends
• vehicle will deal safely with a situation where the user-in-charge fails to assume control by the end of the transition period

It is expected that all 5 requirements would be included in authorisation requirements. Here we focus on the first, second, fourth and last requirement.

The first requirement is that the transition demand can be perceived by all those who might legally act as users-in-charge. This is particularly relevant to those with hearing impairments. Hearing impairments are common, but do not interfere with a person’s ability to drive a car.

Subject to consultation, it is proposed that regulations may require multi-sensory alerts, including haptic signals such as vibrations in the chair or seat belt, in addition to visual and audio alerts.

The second requirement concerns the length of the transition period. In April 2021, the Department for Transport (DfT) published a literature review looking at how long people need to assume control of vehicle. It found that although some reviews have concluded that 10 seconds seems an adequate time budget, there is no single, accepted takeover time. However, the UNECE Regulation 157 on Automated Lane Keeping Systems specifies a minimum 10-second transition period.

The issue will need to be kept under review and determined in the light of individual authorisations. We would expect the ASDE to provide evidence for why the proposed period is safe.

The fourth requirement requires the vehicle to alert the user-in-charge to the end of the transition period. This is because the user-in-charge immunity for offences arising out of the way that the vehicle is driven in clause 47 only applies until the end of the transition period – see clause 48(1). Once the transition period has ended the user-in-charge is taken to be the driver and is responsible for the dynamic driving task.

The final requirement is the need to reach a minimal risk condition, should the user-in-charge fail to respond to the transition demand. The nature of the manoeuvre expected will depend on the deployment context. For example, it is expected that at a minimum the vehicle should come to a controlled stop in lane with its hazard lights flashing. However, in some circumstances, more may be required, including the ability to pull into the side of the road or to communicate with a control centre to close a motorway lane.

The current expectation is that ASDEs should provide full details of how a vehicle will respond following a failure by the user-in-charge to take control. The evidence will need careful evaluation at authorisation with regard to the circumstances of the deployment.

iv. Authorisation requirements for collecting and sharing information

Under clause 14(1), authorisation requirements may require ASDEs to collect and share information. This includes sharing both with the Secretary of State and with private businesses. Authorisation requirements that require an ASDE to share information must also state the purpose for which the information is to be shared.  

These provisions are in addition to the Secretary of State’s power to issue information notices under clause 16. Essentially, clause 16 information notices may be used for investigative purposes, to require information that the ASDE already holds. However, the requirements must be set out in advance in order to mandate what information an ASDE needs to collect.

Information requirements: outline of the policy intent

There are 3 main reasons for imposing information collection requirements on ASDEs.

The first is to enable the Secretary of State to discharge the general monitoring duty set out in clause 38. Under clause 38, the Secretary of State must publish a report each year that assesses whether the performance of AVs is consistent with the Statement of Safety Principles. This will require data which, among other things, establishes that a self-driving feature was engaged during an incident that resulted in death or injury. This is necessary so that the Secretary of State can compare incidents involving AVs and conventional vehicles to see if the overarching safety objective in clause 2(2) has been achieved, namely, that road safety in Great Britain will be better as a result of the use of authorised AVs than it would otherwise be.

The second reason is to enable the in-use regulatory scheme to identify any breaches of authorisation requirements or conditions and to decide on the appropriate sanction – for example, whether to issue a compliance notice or other sanction.

The third reason is to enable insurers to assess claims under section 2 of the Automated and Electric Vehicles Act 2018. Here, insurers will need to rely on vehicle-generated data to verify that the vehicle was in the alleged location, was driving itself, and to assist in identifying what party in the liability chain is responsible for any fault that caused or contributed to the incident.

Information requirements: outline of the proposed content

To fulfil the monitoring duty, the Secretary of State will need ASDEs to provide 2 types of data. The first is event data, when a harm takes place while a self-driving feature is engaged (such as a collision, which could lead to injury or death). The second is exposure data, such as the number of miles driven in specific environments, to interpret the event data. Subject to consultation, it is proposed that ASDEs may be required to collect both event data and exposure data, and to share it with the Secretary of State.

On data needed by the in-use regulatory scheme and insurers, the requirement is likely to include the date, time and location of each occasion when a:

• self-driving feature is activated or deactivated
• transition demand is issued
• collision is detected

The Law Commissions recommended that the data should be stored for 39 months from the date when it is recorded so that it is available for any claims brought near the end of the limitation period and this proposal is supported by the insurance industry.

Subject to consultation, it is proposed that requirements of this sort may be included as authorisation requirements and conditions. Under clause 14, the Secretary of State may make regulations requiring regulated bodies to share information with private bodies such as insurers.  Under clause 42(3) the Secretary of State can authorise the insurer to disclose information to the extent necessary, for example, to bring or defend claims in legal proceedings. Disclosure or use that is not authorised by the regulations is an offence under clause 42(4).

Approach to preparation and timing

Government intends to work with stakeholders to further develop its plans on authorisation. Following this, the government’s intention is to consult on the authorisation regulations during 2024/25 and lay them in 2025/26.

Clause 11: Regulations about authorisation procedure

Under clause 11, the Secretary of State may make regulations about the procedure to be followed when authorisation is granted, varied, suspended or withdrawn. In particular, the regulations may set out:

• the form and content of an application
• the fees payable for an application for authorisation
• the examination of vehicles
• the notification of decisions
• reviews and appeals against decisions

Outline of the policy intent

The policy intention of the procedural regulations about authorisation procedure is to provide clarity to those applying for authorisation of a vehicle, so that the process is fully informed and that all the required information is included. The regulations will, therefore, set out the form and content of the application to ensure consistency of approach. This will help to support effective and efficient processes and will set out the basis on which application fees are calculated and when they must be paid, so that the costs to government of authorisation can be recovered. Having the power to do this through regulations will allow the necessary flexibility to enable fees and procedures to be updated over time.  

Outline of the proposed content

An applicant for authorisation will likely have to include information relating to its corporate structure, history, the identity of its directors and details of any convictions in order to demonstrate good repute. It will also likely have to submit its accounts and financial details to satisfy financial standing requirements.

It is expected that a safety case will have to be submitted as part of the application for authorisation. The regulator could require that accepted technical standards must form part of the safety case. The benefit of a safety case approach is that the regulator can list the elements to be covered in a safety case but can be flexible over the tests used to gather evidence to satisfy the requirements.

Safety cases are widely used in high-risk industries such as nuclear, oil, gas and rail and are becoming increasingly common in the automotive industry. In brief, a safety case is a document, or a set of documents, that present a clear, comprehensive and defensible argument for the safety of a given system in a given context. The role of a safety case is a tool that encourages manufacturers to assess and mitigate risk before deployment. The benefit of a safety case is that the Secretary of State could set the levels of risk that AVs must achieve, in line with the Secretary of State’s published safety principles. A safety case also aids the Secretary of State’s assessment of whether a vehicle meets the requisite level of safety. 

In addition, the ASDE will likely also be expected to submit a documented safety management system to demonstrate its professional competence.

The authorisation process will be conducted by a public body and will, therefore, be subject to the public sector equality duty. The Secretary of State must have due regard to advancing equality of opportunity for those with protected characteristics (which includes race, sex, age and disability). 

There are several ways in which AVs could have an unequal impact on the basis of protected characteristics, both for their own users and for other road users. Subject to consultation, it is proposed that regulations will set out how information should be presented, which may include requirements for to a safety case and an equality impact assessment. The equality impact assessment could be used to demonstrate how the ASDE has taken account of the needs of vehicle users and others using the road, to ensure that people are not treated unequally on the basis of protected characteristics.

The regulations will also need to make provision regarding fees and the examination of vehicles.

Approach to preparation and timing

Government intends to work with stakeholders to further develop its plans on authorisation. Following this, the government’s intention is to consult on the authorisation regulations during 2024 to 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026.

Clause 12: Establishing an operator licensing scheme

Clauses 12 enables the Secretary of State to establish a licensing scheme for operators of AVs that travel without a user-in-charge. These operators are referred to as ‘no user-in-charge’ (NUIC) operators. The aim is to give effect to the recommendations set out in chapter 9 of the Law Commissions’ report.

Outline of the policy intent

The objectives of the scheme are set out in clause 12(5). In broad terms, the aim is to ensure that a licensed NUIC operator:

• detects and responds to problems that arise when an automated vehicle travels without an individual on board responsible for taking control of the vehicle
• is of good repute, good financial standing and is competent

As set out in clause 13, the regulations will also set out procedural matters concerning the scheme. These include the form and content of licence applications (clause 13(3)(a)), fees (clause 13(3)(b)), powers to vary, suspend or withdraw licences (clause 13(2)), and appeals (clause 13(3)(d)).

Clauses 12 and 13 provide considerable flexibility to develop the NUIC operator licensing scheme as the market develops. Various operating scenarios are anticipated. It is envisaged that, initially, the ASDE and NUIC operator may well be the same entity. Therefore, the regulations will allow a single combined application for both roles.

However, the scheme does not require the 2 roles to be combined, as this could reduce competition and innovation. For other use cases, one organisation (for example, a vehicle manufacturer or software developer) could act as ASDE for vehicle authorisation while another could be the licensed NUIC operator of the vehicles (for example, a fleet operator such as a supermarket delivery service or a bus operator). If an ASDE intends to supply its vehicles to NUIC operators who are separate entities, the ASDE will be required to specify what needs to be done to oversee and maintain the vehicle. The NUIC operator will then need to show how it intends to meet these requirements, together with more general vehicle-related duties in order to obtain a licence.

It is possible that automated vehicles with NUIC features could be privately owned. If so, the private owner will need to contract with a licensed NUIC operator for oversight services, though the private owner could remain liable for some ‘user’ duties, such as insuring the vehicle. An example of this could be a vehicle with automated vehicle parking (AVP), which is a NUIC feature that might only be engaged in a specific place such as in a particular car park. Where AVP is used in a public car park, a licensed NUIC operator would be needed to identify obstructions and manage incidents. Here, the NUIC operator’s role may be more limited compared to a NUIC feature that enables use on roads. In this example, the vehicle’s owner may remain responsible for insurance and roadworthiness in the usual way. The responsibilities of the NUIC operator will be set out in its licence and would need to be made clear to the owner of the vehicle.

Outline of the proposed content

Initially, the onus will be on the applicant for a NUIC operator licence to show how safety will be assured. Subject to consultation, it is proposed that regulations may require the applicant to set out its approach to a range of issues, including:

• how it will oversee vehicles. Where the NUIC operator intends to use a remote-control centre, it is expected that the applicant will need to establish that it can provide suitable connectivity and equipment. The applicant may also be required to give details of the ratio of staff to vehicles, how staff will be trained and supervised, and the rest breaks that will be provided
• incident management, including communication with passengers, road users and the emergency services, together with measures to remove vehicles causing an obstruction
• systems, expertise and equipment to maintain vehicles, install updates and ensure cybersecurity
• data management, including ensuring compliance with data protection laws and any data required by regulators is collected and shared according to those requirements
• ways to learn from mistakes, including links with local authorities, highway authorities and the police
• whether safety relies on any element of remote driving, and (if so) how this will be done safely

Where the NUIC operator relies on remote driving to, for example, recover a vehicle that has broken down, that journey will be defined as a ‘NUIC journey’ under clause 12(2). The requirements on licensed operators to use remote driving safely will still apply.

Where an ASDE and the NUIC operator are the same entity, the entity may submit a joint application covering both roles. In other cases, the regulations may require the NUIC operator to address the ASDE’s written specifications for what must be done to ensure safe operation.

Under clause 12(1)(b), the regulations may make provision for imposing requirements on NUIC operators. It is envisaged that the requirements will be tailored to the service in question. Different requirements, for example, may be imposed on a passenger service compared with AVP in a limited car park. Requirements that may be imposed include ones:

• to abide by the assurances given in the licensing application
• to insure the vehicle
• to maintain the vehicle (including software updates and cyber-security)
• to check that any load is safe and secure and ensure that the number of passengers does not overload the vehicle
• following an incident, to provide information to other road users, the police and the regulator
• not to impede traffic flow, by (for example) ensuring that vehicles are not left in inappropriate places
• to check the route and pay any tolls and charges

The Law Commissions also recommended that a NUIC operator should conduct its operations (with the necessary administrative and technical equipment) at an operating centre within Great Britain. This is because the regulator will need to be able to inspect the centre and enforce the terms of the licence. In some circumstances, the NUIC operator may also face criminal prosecution. It would be extremely difficult to ensure accountability or effective enforcement if operation centres were to be overseas. This is comparable to public service vehicle and heavy goods vehicle operator licensing schemes which require the operator to have “an effective and stable establishment in Great Britain”.

Under clauses 12(5)(b), the Secretary of State must design regulations to secure that the licensed operator is of good repute, good financial standing, and capable of competently discharging any requirements imposed on it.

Good repute is a well-established concept within transport licensing. For example, the Senior Traffic Commissioner for Great Britain issues guidance and directions for what good repute means under the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981. In particular, applicants should not have been convicted of serious or relevant criminal offences.

For financial standing, the objective is that the operator should have sufficient resource to maintain vehicles, to respond to the regulator’s demands to make improvements and (if necessary) to pay penalties or redress orders. However, the intention would be to set financial standing requirements flexibly, so that applicants could show their financial standing in a variety of ways, including through insurance. For example, in the United States, the California Autonomous Vehicle Regulations require manufacturers holding a testing permit to carry third-party liability insurance of at least $5 million. Furthermore, the intention is that requirements should be proportionate to the risk (for example, with lower requirements for operators with fewer vehicles or who operate in more restricted environments).

To demonstrate competence, the Law Commissions recommended that the applicant should submit a documented safety management system, defining individual roles with clear responsibilities and competence requirements for each.

The intention is that, at first, some of the details around these requirements will be contained in guidance. However, as learning develops further, more specific requirements may be placed into regulations.

Regulations will set out the duration of an operator’s licence. The Law Commissions recommended that initially, this should be 5 years. 

Regulations will also establish procedures for varying, suspending and withdrawing licences. Here the provisions for the variation, suspension and withdrawal of authorisation set out in clauses 8 and 9 may serve as a model. Similarly, the regulations will include provision for reviews of, and appeals against, the Secretary of State’s decisions. Again, the detailed appeal provisions in respect of authorisation contained in schedule 1, paragraph 3 may serve as a model. 

Regulations will set out how fees and charges relating to the granting, continuation, renewal and variation of licences are determined, in order to enable the regulator to recover relevant costs associated with these functions and with enforcement. This may include the actual values, which may relate to the complexity of the application and size of the fleet overseen, as well as provisions for updating them by reference to the inflation index or other means.

Finally, the regulations could confer functions on the Secretary of State or on the traffic commissioners. Again, this is designed to respond to a changing market. If, initially, NUIC vehicles are operated by combined ASDE/NUIC operator organisations, expertise will lie with those who exercise the power to authorise vehicles under clause 3. In time, as the use of NUIC vehicles grows, the process of granting licences may become more routine. If so, it may be advantageous to streamline NUIC operator licensing with other licensing schemes, such as those applying to public service vehicles and large goods vehicles.

Approach to preparation and timing

This area will require close monitoring of industry developments, to understand the emerging technology, the structure of the industry and the challenges of NUIC journeys. Developments in other jurisdictions with deployments of self-driving vehicles, such as San Francisco are likely to provide a useful guide, together with discussions within the Expert Advisory Panel for CAVPASS programme and informal stakeholder groups. 

It is anticipated that there may be several iterations of the regulations, as NUIC operation develops. Initially, the government’s intention is to develop and consult on regulations and guidance across 2024 and 2025 and lay the first regulations in 2025 to 2026.

Clause 31: Seizure of items

Clause 31 (5) gives the Secretary of State the power to make regulations providing for how to deal with seized items. Clause 31 (6) clarifies that the power extends to making provision to authorise the retention or use of the thing seized for purposes other than the investigatory purposes:   

1. Authorise the delivery of the thing seized to a person other than its owner.
2. Authorise the destruction of the thing seized.

Outline of the policy intent

As part of the in-use regulatory framework, provisions have been made to enable the Secretary of State to access the information needed for the investigatory purposes set out in clause 16. The bill gives the Secretary of State the power to request information from regulated bodies and, where this information is not provided, the Secretary of State may apply for a warrant to enter and search the premises of regulated bodies and seize relevant information and items. Clause 31 places certain obligations on those who are seizing or detaining information or items.

There is a need to make further provisions about what is to happen to items seized from regulated premises in order to provide clarity to regulated bodies and prescribe the Secretary of State’s powers. Clause 31(5), therefore, provides the Secretary of State with powers to make secondary regulations in this area.

Outline of the proposed content

Clause 31(6) gives some suggestions of what the proposed regulations may cover. 

One example is regulation authorising the retention or use of the seized information or item for purposes other than investigatory purposes. For example, subject to consultation, they may authorise the use of seized information in order to inform changes to approval or authorisation standards and testing with the aim of improving the safety of future self-driving vehicles.

A second example given is to authorise the delivery of the seized thing to a person other than its owner. Subject to consultation, the regulations could authorise the delivery of items to third parties contracted to assist with investigatory purposes. For example, the delivery of items to a data forensics expert contracted to assist in an incident investigation involving a suspected cyber attack. Alternatively, the regulations could authorise delivery of items to a third party for example a vehicle that was owned by a private individual but where a third party such as an ASDE has responsibility it could be delivered to the ASDE for safety-related repairs following an incident rather than back to the private owner.

The third potential area of regulation referred to in clause 31(6) relates to the destruction of seized items. Subject to consultation, regulations could allow the destruction of seized items where that item presents a further risk, for example, where seized computer hardware was found to contain hostile state malware. Another potential regulation might authorise the destruction of seized items by mutual agreement with a regulated body, for example, if information has been copied and then taken, the regulated body may not want it to be returned or if hostile state malware has been found on computer hardware.

These are just some examples of areas that these regulations might cover. Further areas of regulation could be identified as policy development continues.

Approach to preparation and timing

Further policy development of the regulations regarding handling of seized items is planned, including discussion with stakeholders such as potential ASDEs and NUIC operators. The government’s intention is to develop the statutory instruments across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026.

Clause 36: Issuing monetary penalty notices

Chapter 5 of Part 1 sets out the powers of the Secretary of State to issue civil sanctions against regulated bodies (ASDEs and NUIC Operators): compliance notices, redress notices and monetary penalties and includes provisions to ensure that the process for imposing sanctions is transparent and proportionate and subject to rights of appeal (as set out in Part 1 of Schedule 1).

Clause 36(1) enables the Secretary of State to issue a monetary penalty if satisfied that a relevant requirement is not, or has not been, met by the body, or if the body fails to comply with an information notice, interview notice, compliance notice or redress notice. A monetary penalty may also be issued to an ASDE if an authorised automated vehicle commits a traffic infraction while the ASDE is responsible for it and that was not the result of a NUIC operator failing to comply with a regulatory requirement (clauses 36(2) and 36(3)).

Under clauses 36(9) and (10) the Secretary of State is required to make regulations for the determination of maximum financial penalties applicable, which may take turnover into account.

Outline of the policy intent

The intent of the In-Use Regulatory Scheme will not be to adopt a rigid enforcement ladder. Instead, it will be a flexible approach that seeks to encourage compliance through notices of intent, right to appeal, and dialogue with regulated bodies. The In-Use Regulatory Scheme will issue the most appropriate enforcement action following an investigation into the traffic infraction or breach of regulatory requirement breach, depending on the seriousness of the breach and its implications for road safety. The enforcement model should give transparency about how such actions are applied, as per the Regulators’ code.

While many incidents may result in warnings or compliance notices, in more serious incidents and in situations where regulated bodies fail to comply with a notice, it is important to have powers to issue monetary penalties, which are aggravated through late payment and recoverable through the courts, to ensure there is an effective enforcement regime. These civil sanctions complement the regulatory powers given in Chapter 1 (variation, suspension and withdrawal of authorisation – the intention is to develop similar procedures for NUIC operator licensing in secondary legislation), in all providing the Secretary of State, via the In Use Regulatory Scheme, with sufficient powers to adopt a flexible and proportional approach for addressing safety concerns and non-compliance with regulatory requirements and road traffic rules.

Generally, compliance notices will be issued where the In-Use Regulatory Scheme deems the incident to be avoidable by the regulated body and represents a breach of an authorisation requirement. For avoidable incidents that sit outside of authorisation or licensing safety claims, the risk to public safety must be assessed and more restrictive enforcement actions are considered (such as suspensions or variations).

Redress notices and monetary penalties will generally be issued infrequently, and only in the event of egregious behaviour by the regulated body. For the most part, the framework is designed to understand what went wrong, issuing compliance notices to reduce the likelihood of a similar incident occurring in the future, especially where no harm has been caused.

The policy intention of clause 36(9) is for regulations to set out the maximum monetary penalty for when the notice is issued and then the maximum sum that is added as per clause 36(6).

Outline of the proposed content

It is proposed on the face of the bill that the regulations will set out the maximum sum that can be specified when a monetary penalty notice is issued (as per clause 36(9)) and then the maximum sum that can be added on a daily basis for non-payment (as per clause 36(6)).

The regulations may, subject to consultation, also set out how these sums for monetary penalties relate to the regulated body’s turnover (whether they are to be linked will be subject to consultation) and how turnover is to be calculated or assessed. This could, for example, be a percentage of the annual worldwide turnover of the regulated body or other entities or undertakings that are connected with the regulated body in a manner that will be set in the regulations. Considering other entities or undertakings connected to the regulated body ensures that the maximum monetary penalties are representative of the true financial backing that regulated bodies might have. For example, a regulated body may be a small company with little turnover, owned and funded by a much larger company with a greater turnover.

Government has been considering how maximum penalties have been set in other regulatory schemes, for example in the UK Data Protection Act 2018. This specified that a maximum penalty should be whichever is greater between a stated value or a certain percentage of annual turnover.

The in-use regulatory scheme will have the discretion to issue monetary fines below any stated maxima.

Approach to preparation and timing

Further policy development of the regulations regarding issuing monetary penalty notices, including discussion with stakeholders. The government’s intention is to develop the statutory instruments across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026.

Clause 40: Power to require reports from police and local authorities

Clause 40 enables the Secretary of State to make regulations that will require the police or specified local authorities to provide information on incidents involving self-driving vehicles occurring in their area. The regulations will limit the scope of these requests to information the authority has obtained in the performance of their existing functions.

Outline of the policy intent

In order to ensure effective in-use regulation of self-driving vehicles it is essential that the Secretary of State has access to information about incidents that involve self-driving vehicles in order to make decisions on whether to issue sanctions and, if so, which sanctions would be appropriate. The police and local authorities are likely to hold information relevant to the identification and investigation of incidents involving self-driving vehicles. For example, speed camera footage provides evidence that a self-driving vehicle was travelling above the speed limit.

Although it is anticipated that law enforcement and regulatory bodies would be willing to work closely together and share information where appropriate, the Data Protection Act 2018 prevents the use of personal data collected for law enforcement purposes from being used for other purposes unless specifically authorised in law. In so far as the data is not law enforcement data, the local authorities should have the clarity of a legal obligation to share, which will define the scope of the obligation. The proposed regulations aim to provide this legal clarity.

The regulations will aim to minimise the burden on police and local authorities.

Outline of the proposed content

As per clause 40(1)(b), the regulations should describe the incidents that authorities should report to the Secretary of State. Subsection (2) goes on to explain that the regulations may limit the requirement on authorities to only report incidents that are requested by the Secretary of State. Subsections (4) and (5) state that regulations made under this section must be drafted with the intention that only incidents with potential regulatory consequences must be reported. This aims to restrict the reporting requirement to only those reports necessary for investigating the need for regulatory sanctions and hence avoid an undue burden on police and local authorities.

Subsection (7) states that the regulations may contain provision about timing, form and contents of the report. This would describe what information should be routinely provided in those incident reports but may, subject to consultation, also provide for the Secretary of State to make case-by-case requests for information. For example, a local authority may routinely collect bus lane camera data for enforcement purposes, but the Secretary of State may only wish to request this for a particular time or location where a self-driving car was reported to have entered a bus lane.

Taken together, these regulation-making powers will set out the circumstances in which requests for information can be made, providing clarity to information holders on the types of reports they may be required to provide.

Approach to preparation and timing

The government’s intention is to develop and consult on regulations across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026. Development of these regulations would involve consultation with interested parties, such as the police and local authorities.

Clause 42: Protection of information

Clause 42 (3) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out the permitted use of information that has been shared with the Secretary of State or any other party pursuant to the authorisation or operator licensing requirements, as a result of the exercise of the Secretary of State’s investigative powers or his powers to require information relating to traffic incidents from the police and other authorities, as a result of any of the following: authorisation requirements or operator licensing regulations, as part of investigatory proceedings, or as a report from the police or local authorities. 

These regulations may authorise the disclosure of information to another person to the extent specified in those regulations, or the use of the information for purposes other than the purpose for which it was obtained.

Outline of the policy intent

Information provided to the Secretary of State for regulatory purposes may need to be disclosed to public or private actors to make the scheme effective. The regulations will provide a clear basis in law for sharing information or using it for new purposes. It is an offence to disclose or use information other than as authorised by the regulations. 

This is a novel policy area so it is not yet known exactly who information will need to be shared with. This power will provide flexibility to enable data to be shared for defined purposes as the need is identified through real-world experience, but subject to the criminal sanction for unauthorised sharing which is set out on the face of the bill.

Outline of the proposed content

As mentioned above, due to this being a novel policy area, it is not yet known exactly with whom information should be shared and, therefore, regulations may need to be revised over time. However, subject to consultation initial regulations could include:

• sharing of aggregated information on authorised vehicles with strategic or local highway authorities in order to inform future infrastructure planning
• sharing of detailed technical information with emergency services to aid in interactions with authorised vehicles related to their existing duties
• sharing of specific incident information with insurers in order to enable the processing of insurance claims
• sharing of aggregated information with strategic or local highway authorities to inform local traffic management decisions
• sharing of information on cyber attacks with security services
• use of information gathered as part of investigative proceedings to inform improvements to approval or authorisation processes for the purposes of improving the safety of future self-driving vehicles
• use of information gathered as part of investigative proceedings for broader road safety research.

Approach to preparation and timing

The government’s intention is to develop and consult on regulations across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026. Development of these regulations would involve consultation with interested parties such as potential regulated bodies, emergency services and strategic and local highway authorities.

Part 2: Criminal liability for vehicle use

Clause 50: Changing or clarifying through regulations whether or how existing traffic legislation applies to a user-in-charge

Clause 50 provides a power to make regulations in order to clarify whether existing traffic offences (that is, those that existed at the end of the session of Parliament where the bill is passed) apply to a user-in-charge of an authorised vehicle.

Outline of the policy intent

Authorisation for use of self-driving will determine if vehicles are capable of safely and lawfully driving themselves without the need for a human to exercise control or monitor the road. In vehicles with authorised user-in-charge features, a human is still required in the vehicle to respond to requests from the vehicle and to hold at all times driver responsibilities other than those relating to exerting control of the vehicle and monitoring the road environment. 

When an authorised user-in-charge feature is engaged, the human driver is not required to monitor the road and it would be unfair if they were to bear responsibility for the behaviour of the vehicle on the road. Responsibility for the manner of driving rests with the ASDE and an ASDE is responsible for its behaviour. To address this, Part 2, Chapter 1 of the bill creates the new concept of the ‘user-in-charge’. Under clause 46, an individual is a user-in-charge where they are in, and in a position to exercise control of, an authorised vehicle when a user-in-charge feature is engaged, but not controlling the vehicle. The user-in-charge has immunity from road traffic offences relating to how the vehicle behaves on the road as set out in clause 47.

Clauses 47 and 48 give some examples of offences to illustrate the scope of this immunity and the exceptions. However, due to the large number of offences and legal instruments creating them, and the variety of traffic offences, it is not possible to include an exhaustive list of offences on the face of the bill. If there is insufficient clarity on whether an offence is covered by the immunity, that will be a matter for the courts to decide but generates uncertainty for the user-in-charge regarding their responsibilities and for the ASDE regarding the required functionality of the system.

The Law Commissions published an annex to their final report with a list of 81 traffic offences placing them into categories to aid in interpreting the dynamic/non-dynamic categorisation but some offences can be committed in dynamic and non-dynamic ways. For example, as noted by the Law Commissions in their final report, dangerous driving can be committed in dynamic ways – for example, where the way a person drives falls far below what would be expected of a competent and careful driver – but can also be committed by driving a vehicle that is in a dangerous state. The Law Commissions recommended disaggregating the dynamic and non-dynamic elements of the offence and this is done on the face of the bill (in clause 54, which introduces new offences for a user-in-charge using an automated vehicle in a dangerous state into the Road Traffic Act 1988). Other examples may emerge.

Furthermore, the range of offences, the language they use to describe who they apply to and heterogeneity in TROs issued by local authorities mean that there will be instances where determination of whether they are covered by the immunity will be complex. As an example, it is a criminal offence to stop unnecessarily in an active motorway lane. The user-in-charge should not be responsible for this offence if their self-driving vehicle stops unnecessarily in a motorway lane. However, if the user-in-charge failed to move the vehicle after the end of the transition demand, or they voluntarily abandoned the vehicle on the motorway, then they would become responsible. The bill provides guidance to the courts on how such offences should be interpreted at clauses 48(1) and (3). However, if inconsistencies emerge or clarification is needed, the policy intent is for the power in clause 50 to provide the scope to do this.

Technological developments may also enable the self-driving feature to take on some non-dynamic responsibilities in the future. For example, users in charge are responsible for vehicle roadworthiness, but as the technology becomes more sophisticated, it may become more difficult for a human to detect a fault and they may have to rely on self-diagnosis by the vehicle. With time it may be appropriate to transfer this, or other responsibilities, from the human to the regulated body and the policy intent is for the power in clause 50 to provide an approach for doing so.

Outline of the proposed content

It is proposed that the regulations made under clause 50 will amend existing enactments relating to the driving or use of a vehicle to clarify whether and under what circumstances their offences apply to users in charge.

This may be achieved by listing types of offences that are within, or outside, the scope of the user-in-charge immunity, and under what circumstances.

It will not be possible to list and amend future enactments where relevant offences are created, as the power applies only to offences in enactments made by the end of the session of Parliament where this bill is passed. However, under clause 51(1) future enactments are to be read as subject to the immunity clauses unless they clearly state otherwise.

Approach to preparation and timing

At present, there are no plans to use this regulation-making power. Any future proposals to amend existing primary legislation will be subject to consultation with representative organisations before being laid before both Houses of Parliament (and/or the Senedd Cymru and Scottish Parliament, insofar as the regulations amend any act of the Senedd Cymru or the Scottish Parliament respectively).

Part 3: Policing and investigation

Clause 58: Detention following seizure of vehicles

Clause 58 gives authorised officers the power to seize and detain vehicles that do not have individuals in control or in a position to control them. This must be for one of the reasons specified in clause 58(3): to prevent traffic infractions or the risk of danger or inconvenience to the public, or to identify those responsible for the vehicle. Clause 58(8) specifies that an authorised officer means a constable or a vehicle examiner appointed under section 66A of the Road Traffic Act 1998.

Clause 58(4) gives the Secretary of State power to make provision about what should happen to the vehicle after it has been seized and states that the powers of seizure and detention may not be used until these regulations are in force.

Outline of the policy intent

The policy intent of the regulations under clause 58(5) is to ensure that the owner has a reasonable opportunity to find out that the vehicle has been detained and recover it and also to ensure that the vehicle is properly stored. In addition, the intention would be to use the powers in clauses 58(6) and (7) to:   

• require the owner to pay charges (clause 58(7)(a))
• provide for the disposal of vehicles that are not recovered by their owner (clause 58(7)(b) and (c))
• enable the vehicle to be retained pending enquiries (clause 58(6)(b)

Outline of the proposed content

Subject to consultation, it is expected that the regulations will broadly follow other regulations relating to seized vehicles. The powers in clause 58 are similar to those that apply to conventional vehicles in England and Wales under section 59 of the Police Reform Act 2002. This enables a constable to seize a vehicle that is driven carelessly or inconsiderately, and which is causing “alarm, distress or annoyance to members of the public”.

The details for what should happen to the vehicle following a seizure under section 59 of the Police Reform Act are set out in the Police (Retention and Disposal of Motor Vehicles) Regulations 2002 (the 2002 regulations). In broad terms, the 2002 regulations state that:

• The police must take the vehicle into custody, and “take such steps as are reasonably necessary for its safekeeping”.
• The authority must “take such steps as are practicable to give a seizure notice to the person who is or appears to be the owner of that vehicle”. This must include specified information including:
  • where the vehicle is kept
  • that the owner is required to reclaim it within 21 days
  • if the vehicle is not claimed the authority intends to dispose of it
  • that charges are payable
• The authority must release the vehicle if, before it is disposed of, “a person satisfies the authority that he is the owner of that vehicle” and pays the charges.
• The authority may dispose of unclaimed vehicles.
• The authority “shall pay the net proceeds of sale to any person who, before the end of the period of one year beginning with the date on which the vehicle is sold, satisfies the authority that at the time of the sale he was the owner of the vehicle”.

A similar power of seizure applies to vehicles that are kept without insurance, contrary to section 144A of the Road Traffic Act 1988. In this instance, the details of what should happen to the vehicle are set out in the Motor Vehicles (Insurance Requirements) (Immobilisation, Removal and Disposal) Regulations 2011 (the 2011 regulations). The 2011 regulations are similar but not identical. The main differences are that the vehicle must first be immobilised in a public place for 24 hours, the time for reclaiming the vehicle is shorter and that the claimant must prove that the vehicle is now insured.

Approach to preparation and timing

The government’s intention is to develop and consult on the statutory instruments across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026.

Clauses 60, 68, 72 and 75: Functions of an inspector of authorised automated vehicles

The clauses under the heading ‘Investigation of incidents by statutory inspectors’ allow for the creation of a capability within government to investigate road incidents involving authorised automated vehicles. These clauses give appointed inspectors the necessary powers to effectively investigate automated vehicle safety incidents and make safety recommendations to those best placed to implement positive change. Clauses 60(3), 68(3), 72(2), and 75(1) relate to regulation-making powers regarding the exercise of an inspector’s functions, particularly in relation to the way in which an inspector exercises their defined functions, creates and publishes safety reports, limits the way some powers may be exercised, and the recovery of expenses. DfT needs the power to create further regulations to specify how the functions of an inspector are to be exercised, such as standard operating procedures and other due process that must be followed. The government’s intention is to ensure that an inspector’s activities are regulated appropriately, rather than providing the Secretary of State with the power to instruct an inspector, which would contravene the fundamental principles of conducting a safety investigation.

Clause 60(3) provides a power to make regulations about how the functions of the statutory inspectors are to be exercised in relation to the investigation of authorised automated vehicle incidents.

Clause 68(3) provides a power to make regulations that relate to reports by statutory inspectors in relation to the investigation of authorised automated vehicle incidents. Regulations may make provision as to:

1. The form of a report.
2. The time by which a report must be made.
3. The circumstances in which a report must or must not make a recommendation.
4. Whether and how interested persons are to be given the opportunity to comment on a draft report.
5. Publication of reports.
6. The admissibility of reports in judicial proceedings.
7. How an inspector is to monitor and take action further to the recommendations in a report.

Clause 72(2) provides a power to make regulations that requires statutory inspectors to exercise a power in 72(1) and to make regulations limiting the manner in which any such power may be exercised. Regulations may require a statutory inspector to:

1. Produce and publish information about the safety of authorised automated vehicles or about investigations.
2. Support the functions of a person within subsection 72(3).
3. Assist any other person in or outside the United Kingdom, with or without charge, in doing anything that the inspector considers would contribute to: (i) the purpose in section 61, or (ii) an equivalent purpose outside Great Britain
4. Carry out such other functions as the inspector considers would contribute to such a purpose.

Clause 75(1) provides a power to make regulations that entitle the Secretary of State to recover expenses, costs or losses incurred in or connection with the exercise of a statutory inspector’s functions. The regulations may also make provision for the recovery of such expenses, costs, or losses by any other person, including the inspector, from the Secretary of State. 

Outline of the policy intent

The purpose of a statutory inspector is to identify, improve the understanding of, and reduce the risk of automated vehicle incidents through conducting a safety investigation. Therefore, the general policy intent is to grant the Secretary of State the power to make regulations about the functions of a statutory inspector and how these are to be exercised for the purposes of investigating an incident involving an automated vehicle. There are no existing powers that could be used by DfT to specify the way in which an inspector exercises their defined functions, creates safety reports, limits the way some powers may be exercised, and makes provision for the recovery of expenses.

The Secretary of State already has the power to investigate accidents in other transport modes, specifically through the air, rail and marine accident investigation branches. As there is no equivalent branch that covers Great Britain’s roads, it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be able to further refine and limit the way in which an inspector can exercise their powers. Even though safety investigation is a long-standing practice, both in the UK and internationally, DfT has and will continue to be guided by international standards and precedent (International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13 principles) that have been further refined in line with the maturing of safety-critical industries.

The Secretary of State cannot direct or instruct an inspector due to their investigatory independence, and while the policy intent of clause 60(3) is to enable an inspector to have an appropriate degree of flexibility, it would be unreasonable to allow an inspector to exercise their functions in any way they deem appropriate. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, the ability to specify and limit the way these functions are exercised to ensure that fair, transparent and effective investigations are undertaken. Such regulations will take into consideration developments across government, industry and other sectors, particularly following the conclusion of the automated vehicle trials.

For the Secretary of State to ensure safety learnings can be effectively fed back into the safety framework following the conclusion of an investigation, an inspector is required to report their findings if they are of value. The policy intent of clause 68(3) is to provide further provisions that specify how and when a report is to be complied, the use and management of recommendations, management of stakeholders and defining how and when a report may be admissible in judicial proceedings. A recent example of a similar report is from the Health Services Safety Investigation Branch (HSIB), which undertook an investigation into the harm caused by delays in transferring patients to the right place of care. These provisions will ensure reports are appropriately regulated due to their real-world impact, particularly regarding recommendations, as well as reinforcing the prescribed scope of reports, which must not express an opinion regarding blame or liability.

The market of automated vehicles is at an early stage of development, and it is not yet clear how much of a positive impact on road safety these vehicles will have. This means an inspector will need to have the power to work flexibly and proactively to ensure the safe development and deployment of automated vehicles. The policy intent of clause 72(2) is to require an inspector to create or publish safety critical information relating to the investigation of an incident involving an automated vehicle, support other investigatory bodies and persons, and carry out such other functions as the inspector considers would contribute to the purpose in clause 61 (purpose of inspectors).

An example of safety information that may be produced is the ’safety digests’ that the Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB) releases to prevent similar incidents from happening again. In this context, these would be tailored to the safety of automated vehicles. An example of supporting another investigatory body is where an inspector may be required to support the Air Accidents Investigation Branch (AAIB) during an investigation into an autonomous drone that is equipped with advanced technologies that enable it to operate without the need for constant human intervention. An example of where an inspector may carry out other functions deemed appropriate for the purpose of discovering, understanding or reducing the risks of harm arising from automated vehicles could relate to the immediate publication of life-saving safety information.

To ensure investigations are fair, transparent and effective, it is necessary for regulations to be created that ensure any individual or organisation who is involved in an investigation should not be unnecessarily disadvantaged. The policy intent of clause 75(1) is to enable the Secretary of State to recover expenses, costs or losses incurred in or in connection with the exercise of an inspector’s functions. It also enables the regulations to make provision for the recovery of such expenses, costs or losses by any other person, including the inspector, from the Secretary of State. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, provision enabling the Secretary of State and other persons (including the inspectors) to recover expenses incurred in connection with an investigation into an authorised automated vehicle.

Outline of the proposed content

Subject to consultation, DfT’s intention is to create regulations related to the functions of statutory inspectors. These regulations will specify the way in which an inspector exercises their defined functions, creates safety reports, limits the way some powers may be exercised and makes provision regarding the recovery of expenses.

For regulations relating to how an inspector exercises their functions (clause 60(3)), it is proposed that the regulations will enable an inspector (and the public) to understand how their functions are to be exercised for the purposes of investigating incidents involving automated vehicles. These regulations may specify the types of incidents the inspectors must investigate. For example, all incidents involving more than 2 fatalities or where 2 automated vehicles are involved. These regulations may further define certain types of incidents as out of scope. For example, all incidents considered a terrorist event or suicide. Equally, these regulations could stipulate that certain types of incidents are excluded only under specific circumstances. For example, in relation to terrorism, the intention is that a cyber-attack from a malicious actor that had the intent to take control of the vehicle and cause a multi-vehicle road traffic collision on a motorway would be in scope for an inspector to investigate. 

For regulations relating to the creation and publication of reports (clause 68(3)), it is proposed that the regulations will enable an inspector to report any findings to the Secretary of State upon completion of an investigation into an incident involving an automated vehicle. These regulations may define the circumstances where a safety recommendation should not be issued if the investigation concluded that the incident is one-of-a-kind, and the recommended actions would significantly hinder the organisation best placed to respond. Furthermore, the regulations could define that a ‘significant hinderance’ is defined as causing financial or organisation distress, as well as attempting to develop a technological solution where investment is never returned.

For regulations relating to ancillary functions (clause 72(2)), it is proposed that the regulations will enable an inspector to carry out further functions in addition to those in preceding clauses. These regulations may require an inspector to release safety critical information ahead of a report being published if there is immediate threat to life.

Conversely, these regulations could apply to other information an inspector may wish to publish, such as safety warnings pending further investigation, if there is a safety concern that has been identified across different investigations. Furthermore, these regulations may, for example, stipulate that an inspector must support the Air Accident Investigation Branch (AAIB) during an investigation into an autonomous drone that is equipped with advanced technologies that enable it to operate without the need for constant human intervention by sharing any safety learning to be applied in the automated vehicle industry, which could prevent an incident from occurring in the future. 

For regulations relating to expenses (clause 75(1)), it is proposed that the regulations will enable expenses, costs or losses to be recovered by the Secretary of State and any other person (including inspectors) in connection with the exercise of an inspector’s functions. These regulations may require receipts or other records to be created, maintained and produced upon requesting an expense claim. These regulations could also exclude certain types of expense claims being brought forward, such as from an inspector if the claim is not in line with DfT’s expense policy.

Approach to preparation and timing

As noted above, DfT has been extensively researching and developing policies that will enable the creation of a capability within government to investigate road incidents involving authorised automated vehicles. These have been developed and tested with other government departments, industry and other stakeholders to ensure the processes, procedures and policies can be operationalised.

Subject to consultation, DfT intends to appoint a small number of inspectors during the automated vehicle trials. These appointments will enable DfT to finalise standard operating procedures and policies that will inform the detailed provision in secondary legislation, ahead of the initial deployment of automated vehicles. The government’s intention is to officially consult on secondary legislation in 2024 to 2025.

The statutory instruments, for example, may list the types of incidents the inspectors must investigate and those incidents that should be considered out of scope, as well as list the process for creating and publishing safety reports, limits placed on inspectors in respect to supporting other organisations and the recovery of expenses.

The government’s intention is to develop the statutory instruments across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026. From then, DfT intends to have an operational investigatory capability that can respond to incidents involving automated vehicles accordingly and begin gathering safety learning that can be fed back into the safety framework.

Clauses 63, 69 and 70: Powers of an inspector of authorised automated vehicle incidents 

The proposed legislation contains clauses that allow for inspectors of authorised automated vehicle incidents to be given powers relating to the investigation of incidents, to enable the effective and independent investigation of these incidents. These clauses give appointed inspectors the necessary powers to effectively investigate automated vehicle safety incidents and make safety recommendations to those best placed to implement positive change. Clauses 63(2), 69(1), and 70(1) relate to regulation-making powers regarding the powers of an inspector, particularly in relation to the way in which an inspector exercises their powers in relation to persons, including requiring another person to assist with an investigation, appoint additional persons to exercise investigatory powers and require another person to provide an inspector with an item, material or information, or allow access, to that item, material or information. DfT needs the power to create further regulations to specify how an inspector may direct or require a person to provide assistance, evidence or access to such evidence.

Clause 63(2) provides a power to make regulations authorising an inspector to require a person to provide other forms of assistance for the purposes of an investigation.

Clause 69(1) provides a power to make regulations to appoint additional persons to exercise investigatory powers, particularly:

• requiring or permitting an inspector to appoint a person to conduct or participate in an investigation
• conferring on such a person a power of an inspector for the purposes of an investigation

Clause 70(1) provides a power to make regulations requiring a person to provide to an inspector, or allow an inspector access to, information, items, or material other than in response to a request made under section 63, in such manner as is specified in the regulations.

Outline of the policy intent

The purpose of a statutory inspector is to identify, improve the understanding of, and reduce the risk of automated vehicle incidents through conducting a safety investigation. Therefore, the general policy intent is to grant the Secretary of State the power to make regulations about the functions and powers of a statutory inspector, and how these are to be exercised for the purposes of investigating an incident involving an automated vehicle. There are no existing powers that could be used by DfT to give statutory inspectors the powers necessary for conducting effective and impartial safety investigations. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, the ability to specify and limit the way and the circumstances in which these powers are exercised to ensure that fair, transparent, and effective investigations are undertaken, and that no unnecessary burden is placed upon those who are subject to an inspector’s requests.

The Secretary of State already has the power to investigate accidents in other transport modes, specifically through the air, rail, and marine accident investigation branches. As there is no equivalent branch that covers Great Britain’s roads, it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be able to further refine and limit the way in which an inspector can exercise their powers. Even though safety investigation is a long-standing practice, both in the UK and internationally, DfT has and will continue to be guided by international standards and precedent (International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13 principles) that have been further refined in line with the maturing of safety-critical industries.

An inspector is going to require varied forms of assistance during an investigation into an incident involving an authorised automated vehicle, if the inspector considers it necessary. The policy intent of clause 63(2) is to provide further provisions that enables an inspector to require forms of assistance other than that set out in clause 63(1) for the purposes of an investigation. For example, at a live scene of an incident, an inspector may require the assistance of a National Highways Traffic Officer to support the police in road closure activities. DfT acknowledges that the functions and powers of an inspector are wide-ranging and require limitations to be put in place to ensure that fair, transparent and effective investigations are undertaken. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, the ability to specify the forms of assistance an inspector will be able to require a person to provide, ensuring that an inspector’s functions and powers are regulated appropriately.

DfT acknowledges that investigating a road traffic incident is complex and there is a range of individuals, organisations and stakeholders involved throughout. This means that an inspector needs to have a clear understanding of what falls within the limits of their expertise while having the power and flexibility to investigate incidents by bringing in outside expertise that they consider appropriate for discovering, understanding or reducing the risks of harm arising from automated vehicles. The policy intent of clause 69(1) is to provide further provisions that enable an inspector to appoint additional persons to conduct or participate in an investigation and/or exercise investigatory powers during an investigation into a relevant incident concerning an authorised automated vehicle.

For example, in the case where an automated vehicle requires a forensic examination, an inspector could appoint a Forensic Collision Investigator to assume the role of an inspector to carry out a full examination of the vehicle. This person could also temporarily be provided with the same powers as a permanently appointed inspector of automated vehicles. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, an inspector the ability to potentially delegate an aspect of an investigation to a person with specific expertise while limiting or excluding certain powers from being transitioned to a person.

To ensure an inspector can operate and undertake comprehensive investigations, the collection of necessary evidence, information and physical evidence is key to unlocking safety learnings. The policy intent of clause 70(1) is to provide further provisions that enable an inspector to require a person to provide them, or allow them access to, information, items, or material, other than in response to a request under clause 63. This may include requiring a vehicle manufacturer to provide access to information that demonstrates where an automated vehicle has failed to respond to a rule of the road, such as a red traffic light, or to a user command in an unexpected way. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, an inspector the ability, flexibility and the power to require a person or organisation to provide access to information, items, or material, as without this, valuable safety learnings may not be realised for more thematic safety reports that do not focus on a single relevant incident.

Outline of the proposed content

Subject to consultation, the DfT’s intention is to create regulations related to the functions and powers of statutory inspectors. These regulations will specify how an inspector exercises their powers in relation to requiring assistance from a person, appointing additional persons to exercise investigatory powers, and requiring a person to provide an inspector with an item, material, or information, or allow access, to that item, material, or information.

For regulations relating to an inspector’s powers to require a person to provide assistance to them for the purposes of an investigation (clause 63(2)), it is proposed that the regulations will specify the circumstances where an inspector can require a person to provide additional assistance not set out in clause 63(1). These regulations may specify the circumstances where the driver of an authorised automated vehicle must provide various forms of assistance. For example, an inspector may require the driver of a vehicle that has been involved in an incident to provide them with information that enables the inspector to contact a key witness. These regulations may further define the limits on the forms of assistance that can be required. For example, an inspector is only to require assistance in the case where technical expertise or equipment is absent, or that assistance should not be required from an organisation where there is a commercial conflict of interest or would hinder marketplace competition.

For regulations relating to the appointment of an additional person to exercise investigatory powers (clause 69(1)), it is proposed that the regulations will specify the circumstances where an inspector can appoint a person to assist in an investigation, which includes being able to confer powers of an inspector. These regulations may include circumstances where an inspector may not have the required experience, expertise, or tools to undertake a specific task that is critical to undertaking a fair, transparent, and effective investigation.

For example, an inspector may need the support of an original equipment manufacturer to access a component of an automated vehicle, such as the solid-state drive, to retrieve vehicle data. It could be the case that the original equipment manufacturer is the only organisation with the necessary tools to undertake this task, which could be a common scenario considering proprietary design, software and data. On the other hand, these regulations may exclude certain circumstances where assistance cannot be provided. For example, prohibiting the appointment of a person or prohibiting the conferring of a discretionary function on a person, where doing so may present a commercial conflict of interest or hinder marketplace competition. These regulations may further define the powers that cannot be conferred onto a person who is not a statutory inspector, such as powers of entry.

For regulations relating to additional power in respect of information and material (clause 70(1)), it is proposed that the regulations will specify the circumstances where an inspector can require a person to provide to an inspector of incidents information, or allow access to, items, or material outside of a specific investigation. These requests must be in line with the purposes of an investigation or any other function of an inspector. These regulations may further limit some of the forms relating to obtaining material other than on request. For example, they could state that an inspector is only to require assistance in the case where technical expertise or equipment is absent, or that assistance should not be required from an organisation where there is a commercial conflict of interest or would hinder marketplace competition.

Approach to preparation and timing

As noted above, DfT has been extensively researching and developing policies that will enable the creation of a capability within government to investigate road incidents involving authorised automated vehicles. These have been developed and tested with other government departments, industry and other stakeholders to ensure the processes, procedures and policies can be operationalised.

Subject to consultation, DfT intends to appoint a small number of inspectors during the automated vehicle trials. These appointments will enable DfT to finalise standard operating procedures and policies that will inform the detailed provision in secondary legislation, ahead of the initial deployment of automated vehicles. The government’s intention is to officially consult on secondary legislation in 2024/25.

The statutory instruments, for example, may list the circumstances an inspector to require a person to provide other forms of assistance for the purposes of an investigation not provided for in clause 63(1), appoint additional persons to exercise investigatory powers, as well as exclude certain powers from being conferred on additional persons and circumstances where a person must not be required to provide assistance. 

The government’s intention is to develop the statutory instruments across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026. From then, DfT intends to have an operational investigatory capability that can respond to incidents involving automated vehicles accordingly and begin gathering safety learning that can be fed back into the safety framework.

Clauses 67 and 71: Application to police officers

The clauses under the heading ‘Investigation of incidents by statutory inspectors’ allow for the creation of a capability within government to investigate road incidents involving authorised automated vehicles. These clauses give appointed inspectors the necessary powers to effectively investigate automated vehicle safety incidents and make safety recommendations to those best placed to implement positive change. Clauses 67(3) and 71(1) relate to regulation-making powers regarding how these clauses apply to police officers and chief officers of police, and how an inspector appropriately exercises their functions. DfT needs the power to create further regulations to specify where the boundaries of compulsion lie between the police and a statutory inspector in the execution of their respective functions, as well as define the process where a chief officer is required to notify and share details of incidents of interest within their police force area. The government’s intention is to ensure that an inspector’s activities are regulated appropriately and an inspector, in exercising their functions, does not hinder a police investigation or a police officer exercising their functions.

Clause 67(3) provides a power to make regulations that specify how certain provisions relating to the investigation of automated vehicle incidents by statutory inspectors are to apply to the police. Regulations may make provision as to the circumstances in which:

• an inspector is not to exercise a power in relation to a constable
• a constable is not required to comply with a requirement of an inspector
• a constable does not commit an offence under clause 66

Clause 71(1) provides a power to make regulations that require a chief officer of police to reports incidents to statutory inspectors that:

• occur in the area of the chief officer’s police force
• are of a description set out in the regulations

Outline of the policy intent

The purpose of a statutory inspector is to identify, improve the understanding of, and reduce the risk of automated vehicle incidents through conducting a safety investigation. Therefore, the general policy intent is to grant the Secretary of State the power to make regulations about the functions of a statutory inspector and how these are to be exercised in relation to police officers for the purposes of investigating an incident involving an automated vehicle. There are no existing powers that could be used by DfT to make regulations that govern the relationship between statutory inspectors and the police, or that require a chief officer of police to report relevant incidents to inspectors.

The Secretary of State already has the power to investigate accidents in other transport modes, specifically through the air, rail, and marine accident investigation branches. As there is no equivalent branch that covers Great Britain’s roads, it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be able to further refine and limit the way in which an inspector can exercise their powers. Even though safety investigation is a long-standing practice, both in the UK and internationally, DfT has and will continue to be guided by international standards and precedent (International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13 principles) that have been further refined in line with the maturing of safety-critical industries.

Due to the nature of investigating road traffic incidents, it is inevitable that an inspector will require assistance from a police constable, particularly during the rollout of automated vehicle technology and during an investigation into an incident involving an automated vehicle. Given that a parallel criminal investigation will have first claim to evidence from an incident of interest, it is highly likely that the evidence relevant to an investigation being undertaken by an inspector will be in the possession of a police force. An inspector, through clause 67(2), will be able to require access to a place where the constable is investigating, and/or to information, items, or material under the control of the police. In addition, inspectors may require the constable to allow the inspector to interview a witness to the incident in advance of any other interview of that witness. The policy intent of clause 67(3) is to provide further provisions that specify the circumstances in which:

• an inspector is not to exercise a power in relation to a constable
• a constable is not required to comply with a requirement of an inspector
• a constable does not commit an offence under clause 66

DfT understands that that a police constable has the core duties to protect life and property, preserve order, prevent the commission of offences and bring offenders to justice. For a police constable to effectively undertake their functions and powers, there may be circumstances where they must refuse an instruction or request from an inspector undertaking a safety investigation. To ensure that a safety investigation does not hinder or unreasonably affect a police constable undertaking their lawful duties, DfT’s intention is to create regulations that specify the circumstances where a police constable does not commit an offence if they refuse to comply with a request of an inspector. The government’s intention in relation to this regulation-making power is to ensure that an inspector can reasonably direct requests to a police constable but also ensure that an inspector’s powers are suitably regulated. Furthermore, the regulations are intended to ensure that constables are protected from committing an offence under clause 66, which includes the offences of failing to comply with a traffic direction and failing to comply with a requirement.

For an inspector to achieve their primary objectives of identifying, improving the understanding of, and reducing the risk of automated vehicle incidents, they will need to be notified of such incidents in the first instance. The policy intent of clause 71(1) is to require a chief officer to notify and share details of incidents of interest within their police force area. An inspector is going to require ongoing reports and incident notifications from a chief officer of police during the continued development and rollout of automated vehicle technology and during an investigation into an incident involving an automated vehicle. DfT expects the first use of the power will involve a requirement for an inspector to be notified when an automated vehicle has been involved in an incident, regardless of whether there has been a serious injury or fatality. This will mean that an inspector has a full picture of the incident landscape, which will inform their individual and thematic investigations, as well as ensure an inspector makes the right decision regarding when to deploy to a live scene or respond on a non-urgent basis. An inspector will need to have the power and flexibility to work cooperatively with the police to ensure a safety investigation can be effectively conducted.

Similar to the above, DfT acknowledges that there are circumstances where a chief officer will not be able to provide the reports to an inspector due to operational reasons, and these could be set out in regulations. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, the requirement for a chief officer of police to report incidents to statutory inspectors, which may include the timing, form, and content of reports.

Outline of the proposed content

Subject to consultation, DfT’s intention is to create regulations related to the functions of statutory inspectors. These regulations will govern the relationship between statutory inspectors and the police and require a chief officer of police to report incidents of interest to inspectors.

For regulations relating to the relationship between statutory inspectors and the police (clause 67(3)), it is proposed that the regulations will enable a constable to refuse a request made by an inspector. These regulations may specify the circumstances where a police constable could refuse a request. For example, in the judgment of the constable, a circumstance where complying with the request would adversely affect an investigation the constable is conducting or would put them, a member of the public, or the inspector in danger. These regulations may further define conditions, which if unfulfilled would absolve a police constable of an obligation to comply with a request. For example, a police constable would not be required to provide assistance to an inspector until the inspector had provided proof of their authority, for example, to enable the police to comply with their data protection obligations.

For regulations relating to the requirement of a chief officer of police to report incidents of interest to inspectors (clause 71(1)), it is proposed that these regulations could limit the requirement to cases in which a statutory inspector requests a report (clause 71(2), as distinct from reporting all incidents which are of the description set out in regulations as per 71(1)). The regulations will be framed with the intention that only relevant incidents, or incidents that have the potential to be relevant incidents will be reported. These regulations may define the types of incidents a chief officer of police must report on. For example, all incidents involving an authorised automated vehicle or just those incidents where there has been a serious or fatal injury. These regulations may further define how a report must be delivered to an inspector (the form, timing and proposed content). For example, the report must be in a particular digital format, delivered within five working days and include essential investigative information (such as details of the location, vehicles involved and police officer in charge of the police investigation). In addition, these regulations could define the circumstances where an inspector is not to request a report from a chief officer or when a chief officer can refuse a request. For example, if the incident relates to matters of national security and/or a terrorist event. Finally, regulations could specify the circumstances where a chief officer is not required to provide reports to an inspector until the inspector has satisfied a condition. For example, providing proof of their authority and/or identity.

Approach to preparation and timing

As noted above, DfT has been extensively researching and developing policies that will enable the creation of a capability within government to investigate road incidents involving authorised automated vehicles. These have been developed and tested with other government departments, industry and other stakeholders to ensure the processes, procedures and policies can be operationalised.

Subject to consultation, DfT intends to appoint a small number of inspectors during the automated vehicle trials. These appointments will enable DfT to finalise standard operating procedures and policies that will inform the detailed provision in secondary legislation, ahead of the initial deployment of automated vehicles. The government’s intention is to officially consult on secondary legislation in 2024 to 2025.

The statutory instruments, for example, may list the circumstances where an inspector is not to exercise their functions in relation to a police constable, or where a constable is not required to comply with a request and/or commit an offence. Equally, the statutory instrument may specify the operating procedure for chief officers to provide reports of incidents involving authorised automated vehicles to a statutory inspector.

The government’s intention is to develop the statutory instruments across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026. From then, DfT intends to have an operational investigatory capability that can respond to incidents involving automated vehicles accordingly and begin gathering safety learning that can be fed back into the safety framework.

Clauses 73 and 74: Protection and management of information, items and material that an inspector of an authorised automated vehicle incidents collects

The clauses under the heading ‘Investigation of incidents by statutory inspectors’ allow for the creation of a capability within government to investigate road incidents involving authorised automated vehicles. These clauses give appointed inspectors the necessary powers to effectively investigate automated vehicle incidents and make safety recommendations to those best placed to implement positive change. This includes the power to require access to premises and to compel the provision of information and physical materials that are relevant to their investigations. While these clauses provide inspectors with the necessary powers to investigate relevant incidents for the purposes of public safety and making recommendations, protections are required for that information to ensure the confidence of witnesses is maintained. Clauses 73(2) and 74(5) relate to regulation-making powers to ensure that the information or materials collected by an inspector in the conduct of their investigations are dealt with appropriately. DfT needs the power to create further regulations to specify how an inspector may disclose or otherwise deal with the protected information they have collected as part of their investigation, and how physical items or materials may be dealt with respectively.

Clause 73(2) provides a power to make regulations that authorise an inspector to disclose the information to another person specified in the regulations, and other provisions about how the information is to be dealt with. Regulations may:

• permit or require the retention or destruction of the information
• disapply any power under an enactment that might otherwise be used to obtain the information
• make provision about the admissibility in judicial proceedings of the information
• confer jurisdiction on a court or tribunal

Clause 74(5) provides a power to make regulations that make further provision about how items or material obtained by an inspector in connection with the inspector’s functions are to be dealt with. Regulations may:

• authorise the retention or use of an item or material for purposes other than those for which it was obtained
• authorise the delivery of an item or material to a person other than its owner
• authorise the destruction of an item or material
• make provision about the admissibility in judicial proceedings of evidence relating to an item or material
• create an offence (see section 76)
• confer jurisdiction on a court or tribunal

Outline of the policy intent

The purpose of a statutory inspector is to identify, improve the understanding of, and reduce the risk of automated vehicle incidents through conducting a safety investigation. Therefore, the general policy intent is to grant the Secretary of State the power to make regulations about how a statutory inspector may otherwise disclose the protected information they have collected from an investigation and how this information and materials are to be dealt with either during or after an investigation. There are no existing powers that could be used by DfT to specify the way in which an inspector may disclose this protected information or deal with the information and materials they have collected.

The Secretary of State already has the power to investigate accidents and deal with the information and materials collected for other transport modes, specifically through the air, rail and marine accident investigation branches. As there is no equivalent branch that covers Great Britain’s roads, it is necessary for the Secretary of State to be able to further refine the way an inspector may disclose or deal with the information and materials collected. Even though safety investigation is a long-standing practice, both in the UK and internationally, DfT has and will continue to be guided by international standards and precedent (International Civil Aviation Organization Annex 13 principles) that have been further refined in line with the maturing of safety-critical industries.

There is a clear precedent set by the UK accident investigation branches that protects sensitive personal information and physical material that a safety investigation authority has obtained during its investigations from wider disclosure. This applies not only to the most sensitive personal information, but also can include physical material, to ensure it is not used unnecessarily. The circumstances in which an inspector should retain or destroy information and physical material collected during their investigation may change over time, as may other policies around evidence, for example, the period for which evidence must be retained, a time limit by which evidence must be returned or destroyed or the circumstances in which evidence may be admissible in judicial proceedings.

The policy intent of clause 73(2) and 74(5) is to provide further provisions that specify how an inspector is to handle the information and physical material obtained during and at the conclusion of an investigation. This could include records that reveal the identity of persons who have given evidence in the context of the safety investigation, including third-party experts, or all information collected by an inspector that is of a particularly sensitive nature. A real-world example of this type of regulation is in the Crown Prosecution Service Memoranda of Understanding between the existing accident investigation branches.

To ensure an inspector can operate and undertake comprehensive investigations, such as collecting the required evidence, information and physical evidence, clause 66 creates offences to penalise individuals and organisations who fail to comply with an inspector exercising their powers. While the government expects most persons to cooperate with a safety investigation, offences are necessary to ensure those who are involved in an investigation are deterred from committing an offence. The policy intent of clause 74(5) and 74(6)(e) is to create in regulations further offences that are not listed in clause 66, with the content bound by clause 76. The impact of automated vehicles on Great Britian’s roads is not known, meaning it is unknown as to what future offences may be required. DfT believes it is necessary to have the ability to create further offences during the continued development and deployment of automated vehicles.

The market of automated vehicles is at an early stage of development, and it is not yet clear how much further development of the technology will occur, meaning inspectors may begin collecting various types of information and physical evidence. The policy intent of clauses 73(3)(d) and 74(6)(f) is to provide further provisions that enable a court to determine disputes relating to how information and physical evidence obtained by an inspector is to be dealt with. This is important considering the key principle of safety investigation, ensuring that an inspector does not identify blame or liability.  

Any individual or organisation who is involved in an investigation should not be unnecessarily disadvantaged or tolerate mismanagement of information or material provided to an inspector. For example, if organisation provides an inspector with information or physical material, these items should be appropriately preserved, which includes their safe return or destruction. The government’s intention is to provide, by regulations, will enable an inspector to manage evidence while providing individuals and organisations with the confidence their physical material is not being mismanaged and they are being treated fairly.

Outline of the proposed content

Subject to consultation, DfT’s intention is to create regulations related to the functions of statutory inspectors. These regulations will govern how information and physical material collected by statutory inspectors are to be dealt with or may be disclosed.

For regulations relating to how an inspector may disclose or otherwise deal with the protected information they have collected as part of their investigation, and how physical items or materials may be dealt with (clauses 73(2) and 74(5), respectively), it is proposed that the regulations will enable an inspector to appropriately manage evidence. These regulations may specify certain types of information as ‘protected’, meaning it cannot be disclosed to any other person who is not an inspector. For example, information that is self-incriminating or details related to children. These regulations may further define the conditions where information and physical material can be disclosed to persons other than an inspector. For example, as relevant incidents occur, inspectors will likely be assisted by support staff, such as technicians. An inspector should be able to lawfully disclose this information to these person for the purposes of the safety investigation. Equally, these regulations may set out the circumstances where an application to a competent court for disclosure of otherwise protected information or physical material could be permitted under a strict public interest test. For example, this would allow for the adjudication of applications by private persons, the police or other bodies for the lawful disclosure of relevant information or materials which could be lifesaving.  

For regulations relating to the creating of further offences (clauses 74(5) and 74(6)(e)), it is proposed that the regulations will enable an inspector to effectively undertake a safety investigation and reduce the risk of a person maliciously impacting an investigation. These regulations may define new circumstances where a person commits an offence. For example, where a person places an inspector, or another person, in danger or intentionally creates a safety risk.

For regulations relating to the Secretary of State being able to confer jurisdiction on a court or tribunal (clause 73(3)(d) and 74(6)(f)), it is proposed that these regulations will enable a competent court to determine disputes relating to how information and physical material obtained by an inspector is to be dealt with. These regulations may define the circumstances where an issue should be referred to a court. For example, there may be a situation where an inspector is under pressure to provide specific information in the form of an update on a high-profile incident, particularly if the incident relates to an immediate threat to the safety of members of the public using an automated vehicle. An inspector may refuse to publish such information until their investigation has concluded, and the Secretary of State cannot overrule or instruct otherwise. In this case, a competent court would be able to decide when this information should be published.

It would not be practicable to create new primary legislation every time the parameters within these clauses were changed, nor would it be proportionate to include a power to amend primary legislation for administrative matters such as these. Therefore, the government considers these regulation-making powers appropriate.

Approach to preparation and timing

As noted above, DfT has been extensively researching and developing policies that will enable the creation of a capability within government to investigate road incidents involving authorised automated vehicles. These have been developed and tested with other government departments, industry and other stakeholders to ensure the processes, procedures and policies can be operationalised.

Subject to consultation, DfT intends to appoint a small number of inspectors during the automated vehicle trials. These appointments will enable DfT to finalise standard operating procedures and policies that will inform the detailed provision in secondary legislation, ahead of the initial deployment of automated vehicles. The government’s intention is to officially consult on secondary legislation in 2024 to 2025.

The statutory instruments, for example, may list persons an inspector may disclose otherwise protected information to, or after what time that information collected by an inspector may be destroyed or in what form it may be retained. Equally, the statutory instrument may specify the operating procedure for the destruction and return of physical materials collected for the purpose of an investigation.

The government’s intention is to develop the statutory instruments across 2024 and 2025 and lay them in 2025 to 2026. From then, DfT intends to have an operational investigatory capability that can respond to incidents involving automated vehicles accordingly and begin gathering safety learning that can be fed back into the safety framework

Part 4: Marketing restrictions

Clause 78: Specifying terms, symbols that may only be used to describe authorised automated vehicles

This clause introduces restricted terms offences to prevent the misleading marketing of automated vehicle technology. Clause 78(1) gives the Secretary of State the power to specify by regulation terms, symbols or marks that may only be used to describe authorised automated vehicles.

Clause 78(2) makes it an offence for a person acting in the course of business to use a restricted term in connection with the promotion or supply of a vehicle that has not been authorised as self-driving.

Clause 78(3) makes it an offence for a person acting in the course of business to use a restricted term in connection with the promotion or supply of a product intended to be used as equipment of a vehicle that has not been authorised.

Outline of the policy intent

The policy intent of the regulations is to set out words, expressions, symbols or marks that may only be used to describe authorised automated vehicles in order to prevent end-users in Great Britain from being misled into thinking that vehicles that are not authorised automated vehicles can safely and lawfully drive themselves.

Many modern vehicles offer driver support features that are ‘hands off, eyes on’. Here, drivers can take their hands off the wheel, but must pay attention to the road at all times. The Law Commissions’ review referred to evidence that drivers were often confused by such features, especially if the feature was marketed as ‘self-driving’. There is a risk that drivers may fail to pay attention and appropriately engage in the driving task when using a support feature, because they wrongly think that the vehicle is capable of travelling autonomously. This risk persists even if the manufacturer adds legalistic disclaimers and warnings to pay attention.

The Law Commissions discussed calls in several jurisdictions, including Germany and the US, to prevent misleading marketing of this type. They also reviewed the existing law in this area. Several terms are subject to specific advertising restrictions: for example, in London, it is a specific offence for an advertisement for private hire vehicles to use the word ‘taxi’. The Law Commissions recommended that it should also be an offence for terms associated with self-driving technologies to be applied to vehicles that are not authorised to drive themselves. 

Outline of the proposed content

Subject to consultation, it is proposed that the regulations will initially specify the terms identified by the Law Commissions in their final report: ‘self-drive’, ‘self-driving’, ‘drive itself’, ‘driverless’ and ‘automated vehicle’.

The Commissions acknowledged that the language of automated driving is still developing. Therefore, subject to consultation, other terms might need to be added to this list, for example, ‘automated driving’ and ‘autonomous vehicle’.

Some people within the industry have suggested the use of a kitemark or equivalent symbol to indicate that a vehicle has been authorised. If a kitemark is developed, clause 78(1) would allow its use to be restricted to authorised vehicles.

It is acknowledged that some terms, such as a ‘self-drive van hire’, may be used without the possibility of confusion with autonomous driving. Clause 78(4) therefore includes a specific defence where the use of a restricted term could not reasonably have been understood as conveying any meaning to do with driving automation.

Approach to preparation and timing

The marketing offences are likely to be the first provisions of the act to be brought into effect. They can apply before the Statement of Safety Principles has been developed, and before any vehicles have been authorised. The government’s intention is, therefore, to consult on the statutory instrument following Royal Assent in order to lay the instrument in 2024 to 2025.

Part 5: Permits for automated passenger services

Clause 88: Protection of information obtained further to automated passenger services permit conditions

Clause 88(5) enables the Secretary of State to make regulations setting out the purposes for which information that a person obtains further to automated passenger services permit conditions can be used. The regulations may authorise the disclosure of this information to another person for a purpose specified in the regulations, or the use of the information for a purpose other than the purpose for which it was obtained.

Outline of the policy intent

Conditions attached to automated passenger services permits may include conditions as to the collection and sharing of information, including sharing information with the appropriate national authority, other public authorities, and private businesses such as vehicle manufacturers and insurers. For example, a condition attached to a permit could require the permit holder to provide journey data to the appropriate national authority.

In some circumstances, to make the permitting scheme effective and so as to learn and develop guidelines for provision of passenger services using vehicles with no user in charge, the information obtained further to permit conditions may need to be used for a purpose other than that for which it was obtained, or disclosed to public or private actors beyond those specified in the relevant condition. The policy intent is for regulations made under clause 88(5) to provide a clear basis in law for processing information for new purposes and sharing with other actors for specified purposes. It is an offence to disclose or use information other than as permitted by the regulations. This is a novel policy area so it is not yet known exactly how information obtained further to permit conditions may need to be used in future, or who it should be shared with. This power will provide flexibility to enable data to be shared for defined purposes as the need is identified through real-world experience but subject to the criminal sanction for unauthorised sharing which is set out on the face of the bill (clause 88(6)).

Outline of the proposed content

As mentioned above, due to this being a novel policy area it is not yet known exactly with whom information should be shared, or for which purposes it should be used. However, subject to consultation these could include:

• sharing of information with the Secretary of State, and agencies designated to act on the Secretary of State’s behalf, for the purposes of informing the development of authorisation requirements and conditions under clause 5 and operator licensing regulations and conditions under clause 12 in order to ensure the safety of passengers and effective provision of services
• sharing of detailed information with emergency services and enforcement officers to aid their interaction with vehicles in scope of the permit in relation to their existing duties
• sharing of information with local and strategic highway authorities to inform traffic management and infrastructure planning
• sharing of aggregated and detailed information with licensing authorities for taxis, private hire and bus services to assist them in the performance of their functions in public transport and public functions more generally
• sharing of information on cyber-attacks with security services
• use of information obtained under permit conditions to inform improvements to passenger licensing and permitting processes, including the development of guidance on accessibility, for the purposes of improving the safety and accessibility of these services to passengers, and safety of other road users generally, and for automated passenger services permits in particular
• use of information obtained under permit conditions for broader road safety research
• sharing of information received further to permit conditions relating to meeting the needs of older and disabled passengers with manufacturers and disabled people’s organisations to develop best practice guidance for vehicle and services design, and user guides
• sharing of information received in connection with conditions of permits about steps to safeguard passengers with regulated bodies, manufacturers and charities to improve safeguarding outcomes as well as more general purposes of improving service provision

Approach to preparation and timing

The government’s intention is to develop and consult on regulations between 2025 and 2026 and lay them in 2026 to 2027. Development of these regulations would involve consultation with interested parties such as passenger groups, disabled people’s organisations, passenger service providers and licensing authorities.

Clause 89: Procedural and administrative matters in relation to automated passenger services permits

Clauses 89(1), (2), (6) and (7) provide that the appropriate national authority may make regulations providing for procedural and administrative matters in relation to automated passenger services permits. The regulations may, in particular, provide for:

• the circumstances in which a permit may be varied, renewed, suspended or withdrawn (clause 89(1))
• the procedure to be followed in connection with the grant, retention, renewal, expiry, variation, suspension or withdrawal of a permit (clause 89(2))
• the maximum period of validity for a permit (clause 89(6))
• the functions of the appropriate national authority under any provision made by or under Part 5 (Permits for automated passenger services) to be exercised by a Traffic Commissioner, instead of or in addition to the appropriate national authority (clause 89(7))

Outline of the policy intent

These powers provide for administrative and procedural matters relating to automated passenger services. The general policy intent is for the regulations to set out the procedural and administrative matters in detail in order to provide further clarity to permit holders and applicants, ensure consistency of approach by the appropriate national authority and support effective and efficient administrative processes. Insofar as the regulations will set out the fees payable in respect of applications, this will ensure that the costs to government of the permit scheme can be recovered. Having the power to set out these procedural and administrative matters in regulations will allow necessary flexibility to update them over time, as automated technology and services develop.

The policy intent of the power in clause 89(7) is to enable the appropriate national authority to delegate functions under the permit scheme to Traffic Commissioners, who already exercise similar functions in relation to vehicles used for passenger services, including buses and coaches. Traffic Commissioners have expertise and experience in this field and the ability to delegate functions under the automated passenger services permit scheme is intended to enable the consistent and efficient regulation of operators of both conventional and automated passenger services. Having the power to provide for functions to be exercised by Traffic Commissioners in regulations allows for flexibility, so that the functions delegated can be changed over time, if needed, as experience of operating the automated passenger services scheme develops.

Outline of the proposed content

The Secretary of State is the appropriate national authority in relation to all automated passenger services permits issued in England, as well as in relation to permits for automated passenger services resembling public service vehicles in Scotland and Wales. The Scottish and Welsh ministers are the appropriate national authority for automated passenger services permits issued in Scotland and Wales other than for public service vehicles and will make their own regulations under clauses 89(1), (2), (6) and (7). This section sets out the proposed content of regulations made under clauses 89(1), (2), (6) and (7) insofar as these regulations will be made by the Secretary of State.

Circumstances in which a permit may be varied, renewed, suspended or withdrawn

It is proposed that the regulations will set out, in detail, the circumstances in which an automated passenger services permit may be varied, renewed, suspended or withdrawn. For example, tolerances that may be applied in respect of the area of operation or modifications to vehicles used under the permit.

Procedure to be followed in connection with the grant, retention, renewal, expiry, variation, suspension or withdrawal of a permit

It is proposed that the regulations will set out detailed procedures for permit applications and for the grant, retention, renewal, expiry, variation, suspension or withdrawal of permits. It is proposed to set out in regulations in particular details of:

• the form and content of an application for a permit, or an application for renewal of a permit
• the fees payable in respect of permit applications or the grant, retention or renewal of permits
• the procedure for notifications of decisions
• the procedure for reviews of, or appeals against, decisions whether to grant, renew, vary, suspend or withdraw a permit

Maximum period of validity for a permit

The regulations will specify the maximum period for which a permit may be valid. The Law Commissions indicated a maximum of 3 years with no automatic right to renewal would be appropriate.

Functions to be exercised by Traffic Commissioners

Subject to consultation, the regulations may provide for Traffic Commissioners to exercise the Secretary of State’s powers as national authority in relation to the grant of automated passenger services permits under clause 82, as well as functions in relation to the retention, renewal, expiry, variation, suspension or withdrawal of permits. At this stage, and again subject to consultation, it is not proposed that the regulations will provide for Traffic Commissioners to exercise functions in relation to the civil sanctions scheme under clause 84 and Schedule 6.

Approach to preparation and timing

Insofar as the Secretary of State is the appropriate national authority, government’s intention is to develop and consult on regulations across 2025 and 2026 and lay them in 2026 to 2027. Development of these regulations would involve consultation with interested parties such as road safety groups, disabled people’s organisations, passenger groups and passenger service providers. The Scottish and Welsh ministers will be the appropriate national authority for automated passenger services permits issued in Wales and Scotland other than for public service vehicles and will prepare their own regulations under clause 89(1), (2), (6) and (7).

Part 6: Adaptation of existing regimes

Clause 91: Amending type approval requirements in respect of automated vehicles

Clause 91 provides that the Secretary of State may by regulations amend the assimilated type approval legislation^{[footnote 2]} so as to impose new type approval requirements or alter or remove existing type approval requirements in respect of automated vehicles. There are a number of type approval frameworks in assimilated law, which require substantial amendments to enable the approval of automated vehicles.

Outline of the policy intent

The policy intention is for automated vehicles to be appropriately considered in type approval regulations. The type approval frameworks and their associated legislation run to several thousand pages. The type approval framework for cars, vans, trucks and buses alone contains over 80 technical subjects (covering safety, security and environmental performance of new vehicles), which will require consideration and modification to accommodate the differing designs of automated vehicles. For example, the existing subjects (such as braking or steering) often assume a vehicle with a driver, driver’s controls and driver’s seating position, or assume that a human will be performing a specific test procedure. Automated vehicles challenge these assumptions and each subject needs to be treated, interpreted and amended on a case-by-case basis.

Further, new subjects will need to be introduced which cover the automated technologies on the vehicle, cyber-security, software updating and other aspects of the vehicle taking into account the design of the automated vehicle. Some of these subjects will include ongoing obligations to ensure that vehicles continue to remain safe, cybersecure, and in compliance with type approval requirements not simply at the point of type approval, but once the vehicle is in use. For instance, changes to traffic rules or the emergence of new cyber-security vulnerabilities may require the manufacturer to take action such as issuing software updates.

The power will also enable the Secretary of State to set requirements for manufacturers to have in place appropriate management systems covering safety, security and software updates of their vehicles. Management systems are frameworks consisting of the manufacturer’s policies, processes, documentation, standards, toolsets and competencies of personnel that cover the activities around the safety and cyber-security of a vehicle throughout its life.

Outline of proposed content 

There are 3 vehicle type approval frameworks and their associated legislation that we are looking to amend to accommodate automated vehicles:

• REUL 2013/167 (agricultural and forestry vehicles)
• REUL 2013/168 (2- and 3-wheeled vehicles and quadricycles)
• REUL 2018/858 (motor vehicles and trailers)

We expect to prioritise cars, vans, trucks, buses, and tricycles and quadricycles for goods delivery as a first step before considering agricultural and forestry vehicles, which can operate on roads at a later stage. Therefore, much of our focus will be on amendments to REUL 2018/858 in the first instance.

Subject to consultation and further policy development, amendments and additions to REUL 2018/858 may include:

• an amendment to Article 2 and Article 3 to accommodate low-speed automated vehicles within the framework
• an amendment to Article 3 to insert new definitions around automated vehicles
• an amendment to Article 4 to create new categories of vehicles, amend definitions of existing vehicle categories and creation of new sub-categories (for example, current vehicle category definitions for passenger vehicles reference the driver’s seat, which may not be present in an automated vehicle)
• amendment to Annex I to include new vehicle categories and sub-categories
• addition of new parts of Annex II to set technical requirements for new vehicle categories and sub-categories, including new technical subjects for cyber-security, software updating and automated driving systems (the hardware and software responsible for performing the driving task)

Approach to preparation and timing

We are running a project to identify the precise amendments that need to be made to approval regulations. This work is due to complete in early 2024, and we will continue to develop the necessary amendments for the first step throughout 2024. We anticipate laying a statutory instrument in 2026.

Clause 93: Providing information about Traffic Regulation Orders

This clause provides a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations to require traffic regulation authorities in England to send all the Traffic Regulation Orders (TROs) they make in a digital format to a central digital publication platform.  The data they send must be in line with a data model and standards that the DfT will publish in regulations and update from time to time.

The main use of the data will be for autonomous vehicles (AVs).  However, once it is available, the data can be used for other electronic equipment designed to undertake or facilitate the driving of vehicles on a road, for example, in satnavs, parking apps, other vehicles or by map makers.

Outline of policy intent

This clause will create digital TROs so that the valuable transport data contained in them can be collected and shared by one digital platform. TROs are made under the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984.  Data includes, for example, speed limits, location of parking bays, location and times of use for bus and cycle lanes, road closures, width and height restrictions and loading/unloading times. AVs will need to know the rules of the roads they are navigating. 

Requiring publication in a common format will standardise the data and ensure it is supplied in a consistent, open format that can then be used by AVs via the systems and maps that will be built into them. 

This requirement means that authorities will need to ensure the TROs they make are produced in a common digital format by using software systems that are currently available but not in use by all authorities, or which create TROs in different formats and include different information.

We know from experience with other digital service development that requiring submission of the data by all authorities is the only way to ensure data is sent by every authority and for each public road that is part of their network. Linking it to a data model and standards is the only way to ensure consistency. 

DfT has been developing a TRO data model and standards since 2019. The model identifies the data fields that should be collected/produced, the standards that should apply to those fields and the data format. The data model means that software developers can then develop products that produce digital TROs in the required format. Data will be shared between systems and with AVs through advanced programming interfaces (APIs). The model will be updated from time to time.

The DfT has also been designing and developing the publication platform via user research with authorities, software developers and other key stakeholders including map makers. Research has recommended that DfT should build and manage a central publication platform/data store as it would be a trusted, consistent, single source of all TROs.

Outline of proposed content

The clause provides a power for the Secretary of State to make regulations requiring a traffic regulation authority (including National Highways) to provide prescribed information about TROs (orders and notices).  The regulations can:

• state to whom the information is to be provided
• when the data is to be provided
• the manner and form in which it is to be provided

Traffic regulation authorities are defined as any person who has the power to make a traffic regulation measure for an area in England, including county councils and unitary authorities (see the definition in section 121A of the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984). The definition also includes any TROs made by other authorities, such as district councils, using delegated powers. The requirement to submit TROs will also apply to them.

The requirement applies to England, as powers to make the type of TROs specified in Clause 93 are devolved. The devolved administrations will be able to use the publication platform if they would like to, either on a voluntary basis and if, following consultation, they make similar legislation for Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

Approach to preparation and timing

As noted above, we have been preparing the data model and standards since 2019.  Versions have been tested with some local authorities, as well as all the main software companies that provide the products local authorities use to process and make TROs. The model/standards have been updated as a result and will form the basis of the statutory instrument (SI). 

The SI will list, for example, the mandatory data that must be sent to the publication platform, when (we are aiming for it to be as near to real-time as possible), where (it will be to a central publication platform managed on DfT’s behalf by contractors) and that local authorities must comply with the most recent version of the more detailed data model and standard. The model/standards will include information, for example, on the format of the data, any parameters and the relationship between the data sets and will be updated from time to time.

DfT is procuring contractors to carry out the beta build and testing of the publication platform (subject to ministerial agreement on funding). The platform has been designed as part of an alpha design project that was carried out during 2023.

The SI will be drafted during 2024 and we hope to consult formally following Royal Assent of this bill.  We are aiming to lay the SI in early 2025 and to allow a transition period for local authorities to comply with the regulations before it becomes mandatory to submit the data towards the end of 2025 or early 2026.

Schedule 6: Civil sanctions for infringing automated passenger services permit scheme

Schedule 6: Civil sanctions for infringing automated passenger services permit scheme – maximum sums for monetary penalty notices

Paragraph 2(7) of Schedule 6 requires the appropriate national authority to make regulations determining the maximum sums for monetary penalty notices issued in relation to infringements of the automated passenger services permit scheme. The appropriate national authority may issue a monetary penalty notice to a permit holder under paragraph 2(1) of Schedule 6 if satisfied that the permit holder has committed an infringement of the permit scheme or failed to comply with a compliance notice.

Outline of the policy intent

The policy intention for paragraph 2(7) of Schedule 6 is for regulations to set out the maximum monetary penalty, which can be specified in a monetary penalty notice, as well as the maximum sum that can be added per day where a permit holder’s failure is continuing (paragraph 2(4)).

Outline of the proposed content

It is proposed that the regulations will set out the maximum sum that can be specified when a penalty notice is issued and then the maximum sum that can be added as per paragraph 2(4). Subject to consultation, the regulations may also set out how these sums for monetary penalties relate to the permit holder’s turnover or the turnover of any entities or undertakings that are connected with the permit holder, and how turnover is to be calculated or assessed.

Approach to preparation and timing

The Secretary of State will be the appropriate national authority in relation to all automated passenger services permits issued in England, as well as for permits for automated passenger services resembling public service vehicles in Scotland and Wales. Insofar as the Secretary of State is the appropriate national authority, government’s intention is to develop and consult on regulations across 2025 and 2026 and lay them in 2026 to 2027. Development of these regulations would involve consultation with interested parties such as passenger services providers, passenger groups, disabled people’s organisations and licensing authorities. The Scottish and Welsh ministers will be the appropriate national authority for automated passenger services permits issued in Wales and Scotland other than for public service vehicles and will make their own regulations under paragraph 2(7).

1. That is, type approval legislation contained in what is (at the time of writing) referred to as ‘retained EU law’. To note that after 2023 ‘retained EU law’ will be known as ‘assimilated law’ (see the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, s. 5). ↩

2. That is, type approval legislation contained in what is (at the time of writing) referred to as ‘retained EU law’. To note that after 2023 ‘retained EU law’ will be known as ‘assimilated law’ (see the Retained EU Law (Revocation and Reform) Act 2023, s. 5). ↩