Corporate report

Annual report on concurrency for 2025

Published 30 May 2025

This is the 11th annual concurrency report to be published by the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA) in accordance with the CMA’s statutory obligation since the enhanced concurrency arrangements came into effect on 1 April 2014^{[footnote 1]}.

Under the concurrency arrangements, competition law is applied in the regulated sectors not only by the CMA, the UK’s principal competition authority, but also by the relevant sector regulators.

Sector regulator	Areas of concurrent jurisdiction
Civil Aviation Authority (CAA)	Airport operation and air traffic services
Office of Communications (Ofcom)	Broadcasting, electronic communications and postal services
Gas and Electricity Markets Authority (Ofgem)	Electricity and gas in Great Britain
Financial Conduct Authority (FCA)	Financial services in the UK and the provision of claims management services in Great Britain
Payment Systems Regulator (PSR)[footnote 2]	Participation in payment systems
Office of Rail and Road (ORR)	Railway services
Water Services Regulation Authority (Ofwat)	Water and sewerage services in England and Wales
Northern Ireland Authority for Utility Regulation (NIAUR)	Electricity, gas, water and sewerage services in Northern Ireland

Like the CMA, in the sectors for which they are responsible, the sector regulators’ powers include:

• the power to apply the UK prohibitions on undertakings engaging in anti-competitive agreements or on the abuse of a dominant market position (respectively, the Chapters I and II prohibitions of the Competition Act 1998, which are referred to in this report as the ‘Chapter I prohibition’ and the ‘Chapter II prohibition’ respectively)

• the power to conduct market studies under Part 4 of the Enterprise Act 2002, and if appropriate, make a market investigation reference under which the CMA conducts an in-depth investigation into whether any feature, or combination of features, of a market in the UK for goods or services prevents, restricts, or distorts competition

The concurrency arrangements also provide for cooperation between the CMA and the sector regulators in relation to their concurrent competition powers.

The CMA is required by law^{[footnote 1]} to prepare and publish a report after the end of each financial year, containing an assessment of how the concurrency arrangements have operated during the year. This report assesses the operation of the concurrency arrangements over the period 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025.

Overview of the year

10-year concurrency review

In December 2024, the CMA concluded its broader review of the concurrency arrangements, 10 years on from the reforms to the arrangements introduced in 2014 (the ‘enhanced concurrency arrangements’).

As set out in the accompanying report, the review found that the sharing of certain competition powers under concurrency has some key advantages, but there is room for improvement. We are working to address the findings of the review, including:

Making the best use of resources

The sector regulators and the CMA have discussed how to use secondments more effectively to collectively make best use of our shared skills and address the resourcing challenges that some regulators face. We are using the senior directors’ meetings of the UK Competition Network (‘UKCN’) for more strategic discussions about resourcing needs, including to facilitate opportunities for secondments between regulators. Using this existing forum in this way was preferred to establishing a more formal ‘pool’ of shared resource, which would lack flexibility and would be costly to administer.

Improving development of the pipeline of potential enforcement cases

So that the CMA and regulators are making best use of the information available to detect potentially unlawful conduct, we will be holding a workshop through the UKCN to share best practice. This will cover how to identify potential breaches of competition law, including how sector regulators can best use the information they hold through their regulatory activity.

Cooperation on market studies and reviews

The CMA and the sector regulators are working on mechanisms to ensure that they cooperate as effectively as possible on their work to assess and address markets which are not working well. We aim to set clearer mutual expectations on cooperation on ‘markets work’ (meaning market studies or market investigations under the Enterprise Act 2002 and other projects with a similar scope and purposes) although the nature of cooperation may vary depending on the facts of the project.

Economic growth

Given the central importance of driving economic growth and investment to the new government, a key focus of the reporting period has been on the CMA and sector regulators’ contribution to supporting that growth mission. The government’s Action Plan on regulation sets out its vision for a regulatory system which supports economic growth while ensuring accountability for the quality of regulations introduced, as well as the way in which independent regulators implement and enforce them. As part of this, the Action Plan commits to reducing the complexity and burden of regulation, and increasing certainty and predictability for businesses. The sector regulators have set out in correspondence to the Prime Minister how they will individually contribute to the growth mission, including, where appropriate, through the promotion of competition^{[footnote 3]}.

For the CMA, the government has issued a new strategic steer, which reinforces the importance of an independent competition and consumer protection regime, whilst situating this squarely in the context of the growth mission. This provides a framework and clarity to guide the CMA as we independently carry out our statutory functions.

The themes of the strategic steer are reflected in the CMA’s programme of work. This includes changes we are making to key aspects of the way we work around the 4 key principles of pace, predictability, proportionality and process (by which we mean direct engagement with business). This is the CMA’s ‘4Ps framework’, which reflects not only the strategic steer but also feedback we have heard directly from businesses and investors. Through these changes, the CMA will become more efficient, deepen our expertise, and continue strengthening our engagement. They will help ensure we reach the right decisions as fast as possible, while minimising burden on businesses.

The government’s strategic steer also sets an expectation that the CMA should work with other relevant regulators in the UK to ensure regulatory action is coherent, timely and that it supports dynamic markets, growth and investment in the UK. The concurrency arrangements play a part in this.

Cooperation through the concurrency arrangements helps to ensure that the CMA and sector regulators discharge their concurrent functions as efficiently as possible, reducing overall burdens on businesses. The arrangements also promote consistency in how the CMA and sector regulators discharge their concurrent functions, supporting greater predictability for businesses in the regulated sectors.

Unnecessary duplication in the work of the CMA and sector regulators is avoided through sharing of know-how and expertise, and concurrency helps to harness the complementarity of skills and expertise between the CMA as the principal competition authority, and the sector regulators as experts on their sectors. To ensure the concurrency arrangements achieve these objectives as effectively as possible, it will be important to take forward the work highlighted in the previous section based on the findings of the 10-year review.

The concurrency arrangements are, however, clearly 1 part of a broader system. In some areas, such as fixed telecoms markets, competition is playing a central role in delivering outcomes to support economic growth. In other areas, the market structure means competition is not the principal means of driving good outcomes.

For example, a system of private firms competing for passenger rail franchises in particular regions will be replaced by Great British Railways, bringing rail infrastructure and most rail operators together in 1 public sector company. Parts of the regulated sectors have operated as monopolies since privatisation, such as water networks or electricity transmission.

In these areas, although competition is not the main objective for provision of the core service, regulators may continue to promote competition in adjacent markets to support the growth mission.

For example, Ofwat will be using competitive procurement models to attract global investors to upgrade the UK’s water infrastructure. The CMA has provided advice to government on the role competition can continue to play in the rail sector, alongside the consolidation of most of the passenger rail market into a publicly owned operator.

Cooperation on digital markets

The start of the reporting period saw the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCCA) gain Royal Assent. The DMCCA amends the legislation underpinning the CMA’s and sector regulators’ concurrent competition functions. The reforms will support the CMA and sector regulators to carry out their functions with greater efficiency, including via a new duty of expedition applying to both the CMA and sector regulators when exercising the concurrent powers.

In respect of the CMA’s new digital markets functions, the CMA will give careful consideration to the interplay of digital markets issues with the actions of other regulators. The CMA is best placed to act where an intervention under the new digital markets competition regime is likely to be the most effective route to delivering the desired outcome, and the issue is not squarely within scope of another UK regulator.

As an example of the CMA’s cooperation with sector regulators in this area, the Payment Systems Regulator and Financial Conduct Authority have made a joint submission to the CMA’s investigations into Apple and Google’s mobile ecosystems, drawing from their work on competition issues in respect of digital wallets, and setting out their view that the CMA would be best positioned to investigate these issues further. In December 2024, the CMA entered into memoranda of understanding (MOU) with the FCA and Ofcom (alongside MOU with other relevant bodies), setting out working arrangements in relation to the digital markets competition regime.

Competition enforcement in the regulated sectors

Below we set out the competition enforcement work carried out by the CMA and the sector regulators during the current reporting period (1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025). We also highlight the use made of softer enforcement tools, such as advisory and warning letters.

Competition problems

Use of powers by the CMA and sector regulators under the Chapter I and Chapter II prohibitions in the Competition Act 1998 for the period 1 April 2024 to 31 March 2025 in the regulated sectors

	2024 to 2025	2023 to 2024	2022 to 2023	2021 to 2022	2020 to 2021
Number of cases ongoing at start of reporting period	10	9	7	8	9
Number of cases launched under the Competition Act 1998	1	4	5	4*	3
Number of those cases in the year to date in which information gathering powers and powers to enter premises/conduct dawn raids were used	4	10	11	5	3
Number of those cases in the year to date in which a statement of objections was issued	1	1	1	0	3
Number of those cases in the year to date that resulted in an infringement decision	2	1	1	1	2
Number of those cases in the year to date that resulted in the giving of commitments	0	2	1	3	0
Number of those cases in the year to date that resulted in an exemption or clearance decision (or equivalent)	0	0	0	0	0
Number of those cases in the year to date that resulted in case closure without full resolution	4	0	1	1	2
Number of cases that are ongoing	5	10	9	7	8
Number of cases in the year to date in which the decision was appealed to the Competition Appeal Tribunal	0	0	0	0	1
Decisions taken to use direct regulatory powers instead of competition prohibition powers where those competition prohibition powers could have been exercised	0	0	1	0	2

*Note: This figure includes an investigation opened by the FCA under Chapter I of the Competition Act 1998 in which formal powers were not exercised. The case has since been closed.

At the start of the reporting period, there were 10 open cases in which jurisdiction was shared between the CMA and 1 or more sector regulator:

• The CMA had a Chapter II investigation open in relation to Google’s practices in advertising technology intermediation services.

• The CMA had a Chapter II investigation open into Apple’s conduct in relation to the distribution of apps on iOS and iPadOS devices.

• The CMA had a Chapter II investigation open into the distribution of apps by Google.

• The CMA had a Chapter I investigation open into suspected anti-competitive arrangements in the financial services sector.

• The CMA had a Chapter I investigation open into the purchase of freelance services in the production and broadcasting of sports content.

• The CMA had a Chapter I investigation open into the purchase of freelance services in the production and broadcasting of television content, excluding sports.

• The FCA had a Chapter II investigation open in relation to conduct in the financial services sector.

• The FCA had a Chapter II investigation open into a suspected infringement of the Chapter II prohibition in the financial services sector.

• The FCA had a Chapter I investigation open into suspected anti-competitive conduct in the financial services sector.

• Ofgem had a Chapter II investigation open in the energy market.

During the reporting period, 1 new investigation was launched in a concurrent case^{[footnote 4]}: the FCA launched an investigation into a suspected infringement of the Chapter I prohibition in the financial services sector.

2 investigations resulted in an infringement decision:

• the CMA’s Chapter I investigation into anti-competitive arrangements in the financial services sector

• the CMA’s Chapter I investigation into the purchase of freelance services in the production and broadcasting of sports content

4 investigations were closed on the grounds of administrative priority:

• the CMA’s Chapter II investigation into Apple’s conduct in relation to the distribution of apps on iOS and iPadOS devices

• the CMA’s Chapter II investigation into the distribution of apps by Google

• the CMA’s Chapter I investigation relating to the purchase of freelance services and the employment of staff supporting the production, creation and/or broadcasting of television content in the UK, excluding sport content

• a Chapter II investigation by the FCA in the financial services sector.

Further details on the cases listed are included in the section below. As some of the investigations are ongoing, the information disclosed is limited to what is publicly available, but relevant updates have been provided where possible.

Digital

Chapter II investigation in relation to the Apple App Store

In March 2021, the CMA launched an investigation into Apple’s conduct in relation to the distribution of apps on iOS and iPadOS devices in the UK, in particular, the terms and conditions governing app developer’s access to Apple’s App Store.

In August 2024, the CMA closed its investigation on administrative priority grounds for reasons set out in the case closure statement. The CMA was conscious that this is a fast-moving area in which app store operators are adjusting their offerings in many jurisdictions to reflect product and technological developments, as well as regulatory interventions globally. In this context, a more holistic consideration of Apple’s rules in this area alongside the wider commercial terms in its App Store offering was likely to be most effective in achieving meaningful, timely impact where appropriate. The nature of the CMA’s powers under the DMCCA would enable a more holistic consideration of the issues than through specific Competition Act 1998 investigations.

Chapter II investigation into Google’s distribution of apps

In June 2022, the CMA launched an investigation into Google’s distribution of apps on Android devices in the UK. In particular, the CMA was investigating Google’s Play Store rules which oblige app developers offering digital content to use Google’s own payment system (Google Play Billing) for in-app purchases.

In April 2023, the CMA published a notice of intention to accept commitments offered by Google and invited representations from interested third parties on the proposed commitments. Having considered representations in response to this consultation, in August 2024, the CMA decided that it would not be appropriate to accept the commitments offered by Google. Feedback from app developers suggested Google’s proposals to allow app developers to use alternative payment methods for in-app payments did not go far enough and they would in practice remain tied to the Google payment system. In particular, app developers referred to the level of commission they would still be paying to Google, and to the proposed ‘pop-up screens’ that might put users off completing a transaction.

In August 2024, the CMA closed its investigation on administrative priority grounds for reasons set out in the case closure statement. As with the investigation in relation to the Apple App Store described above, these included the passage of the DMCCA which would enable a more holistic consideration of the issues.

Chapter II investigation into Google’s practices in advertising technology intermediation services

In May 2022, the CMA launched an investigation into Google’s conduct with regards to advertising technology intermediation services (also known as the ‘ad tech stack’) which facilitate the sale of online advertising space between sellers (like online newspapers and other content providers) and buyers (advertisers).

In March 2023, this investigation was combined with the CMA’s investigation into whether Google has abused its dominant position through its conduct in relation to header bidding services.

In September 2024, the CMA issued a Statement of Objections provisionally finding that Google has abused its dominant positions through the operation of both its publisher ad server and buying tools to restrict competition in the UK. The provisional findings relate to how Google ‘self-preferences’ its own ad exchange – harming competition and, as a result, advertisers and publishers. The CMA is currently considering written and oral representations on the Statement of Objections.

Communications

Chapter I investigation into the purchase of freelance services in the production and broadcasting of sports content

In July 2022, the CMA launched an investigation into suspected breaches of competition law by undertakings involved in the production and broadcasting of sports content. In March 2025: the CMA issued an infringement decision to 5 companies. 4 companies – BT, IMG, ITV and BBC – settled the case and agreed to pay fines totalling £4,240,356. The 5th company, Sky, was exempt from a financial penalty as it alerted the CMA to its involvement, before the investigation had been launched.

The CMA’s decision encompasses 15 separate bilateral infringements of competition law. The CMA found in each instance the disclosure and receipt, or the exchange, of competitively sensitive information about rates of pay for freelance workers that support the production and broadcasting of sports content in the UK.

Chapter I investigation into the purchase of freelance services in the production and broadcasting of television content, excluding sports

In October 2023, the CMA launched an investigation into suspected breaches of competition law in relation to the purchase of freelance services and the employment of staff supporting the production, creation and/or broadcasting of television content in the UK, excluding sport content.

In March 2025, the CMA closed the investigation on the grounds of administrative priority. The CMA considered a wide range of factors in making this decision, including the companies’ conduct, changes in industry practices and the deterrent effect from its sports broadcasting and production investigation (see above). The CMA considered that a more proportionate way of resolving the non-sports TV production and broadcasting case would be to highlight its concerns to the businesses under investigation so they can take appropriate action to ensure they are complying with the law and to publish further guidance to employers on how to avoid anti-competitive behaviour in labour markets as a way of increasing both general deterrence and compliance. The CMA therefore did not reach a decision as to whether competition law had been broken.

Financial services

Chapter I investigation in the financial services sector

In November 2018, the CMA launched an investigation into a suspected infringement of the Chapter I prohibition on anti-competitive arrangements by 5 major banks: Citi, Deutsche Bank, HSBC, Morgan Stanley, and Royal Bank of Canada. In February 2025, the CMA issued 5 separate infringement decisions finding that 5 pairs of banks broke competition law by unlawfully sharing competitively sensitive information. Individual traders at each of the banks took part in private one-to-one Bloomberg chatrooms in which they shared sensitive information relating to buying and selling gilts on specific dates.

4 banks – Citi, HSBC, Morgan Stanley and Royal Bank of Canada – settled and agreed to pay fines totalling £104,460,000^{[footnote 5]}. Deutsche Bank alerted the CMA to its participation in the unlawful conduct under the CMA’s leniency policy and benefitted from immunity from any fine.

Chapter I investigation in the financial services sector

In April 2024, the FCA launched an investigation into a suspected infringement of the Chapter I prohibition in the financial services sector. The investigation has involved the use of formal information gathering powers in the reporting period and is ongoing. No Statement of Objections has been issued.

Chapter II investigation in the financial services sector

In June 2023, the FCA launched an investigation into a suspected infringement of the Chapter II prohibition in the financial services sector. The investigation has involved the use of formal information gathering powers in the reporting period. No Statement of Objections has been issued. The investigation is ongoing.

Chapter I investigation in the financial services sector

In July 2023, the FCA launched an investigation into a suspected infringement of the Chapter I prohibition in the financial services sector. The investigation has involved the use of formal information gathering powers in the reporting period. No Statement of Objections has been issued. The investigation is ongoing.

Chapter II investigation in the financial services sector

In January 2023, the FCA launched an investigation into a suspected infringement of the Chapter II prohibition in the financial services sector. No formal powers were used during the reporting period and no Statement of Objections was issued. In May 2024, the FCA closed this investigation on the grounds of administrative priority.

Energy

Chapter II investigation in the energy market

In March 2024, Ofgem launched an investigation into a suspected infringement of the Chapter II prohibition in the biogas market. The investigation has involved the use of formal information gathering powers in the reporting period. No Statement of Objections has been issued. The investigation is ongoing.

Cases appealed to the Competition Appeal Tribunal

There have been no appeals to the Competition Appeal Tribunal in respect of the enforcement of the Competition Act 1998 in the regulated sectors, during the reporting period.

Use of advisory / warning letters

The CMA and sector regulators can issue advisory and warning letters in situations where there are concerns that certain practices may be restricting competition. Both advisory and warning letters are ‘softer’ enforcement tools that are designed to increase awareness of competition law and encourage compliance.

During this reporting period, the following warning and advisory letters were issued in respect of activities in the regulated sectors:

• Ofcom issued 2 advisory letters, both the result of the same facts

• the FCA issued 11 ‘on-notice’ letters (the FCA’s equivalent of the CMA’s warning letters) on 1 matter, and 1 advisory letter in relation to another matter (intended to increase awareness of competition law to achieve greater compliance by the relevant firms) during this reporting period

While not formally issuing ‘advisory letters’, the PSR has reminded firms and industry bodies of their obligations when coordination is needed. The PSR has taken the same approach to provide strategic leadership by reference to competition law principles to ensure the process of collaboration achieves the desired outcomes. For example, in the context of the PSR’s work on non-sweeping Variable Recurring Payments, the PSR provided some guidance to industry. Variable Recurring Payments are a more flexible way of paying regular payments – and the PSR sees them as a key stepping stone to enable wider use of open banking-initiated payments.

Decisions taken since April 2024 to use direct regulatory powers instead of competition prohibition powers

Under Schedule 4 to the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, the CMA has a duty to report on any decision taken by a regulator in which the regulator is satisfied that its functions under Part 1 of the Competition Act 1998 in a case are exercisable, but that it is more appropriate for it to proceed by exercising functions other than those that it has under Part 1 of the Competition Act 1998. There were no cases during the reporting period in which the reporting obligation was triggered.

In addition to the above, the sector regulators have a duty to consider whether, before exercising certain specified powers under their respective sector-specific legislation, it would be more appropriate to proceed under the Competition Act 1998 (referred to as the ‘primacy obligation’).

PSR

The PSR has twice used its powers under Part 5 of the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 rather than using its competition prohibition powers:

• in relation to the reimbursement of victims of Authorised Push Payment scams, the PSR decided that its regulatory powers were the most appropriate tool to address the harm (preventing scams and misdirection of funds and securing increased reimbursement for consumers)

• in making amendments to existing regulatory rules for the market for card acquiring services the PSR decided it was more appropriate to use regulatory powers rather than Competition Act 1998 to address the issues identified, given that the objective of the amendments was consistent with the original objectives of the rules

Ofwat

Ofwat has twice used its powers under the Water Industry Act 1991 rather than exercising its competition powers:

• in May 2024, Ofwat concluded an enforcement case into Welsh Water following an investigation into the accuracy of leakage and per capita consumption performance figures. As the findings of this case did not relate to breaches of UK competition law, and Ofwat’s investigation did not raise competition law concerns, it was satisfied that it was more appropriate to proceed under the Water Industry Act 1991, rather than the Competition Act 1998

• in March 2025, Ofwat concluded an enforcement case into Yorkshire Water, following an investigation into how the company was managing its wastewater treatment works and wider wastewater network. Ofwat identified failings amounting to a significant breach of Yorkshire Water’s legal obligations. Ofwat was satisfied that it was more appropriate to proceed under the Water Industry Act 1991 in this case, as the findings did not relate to breaches of UK competition law and because there were specific statutory and licence provisions closely related to the issues identified in the investigation which Ofwat can enforce under the Water Industry Act 1991

FCA

The FCA reported that in the cases where the primacy obligation was triggered during this reporting period, Competition Act 1998 powers could not have addressed the relevant concerns. Therefore, the FCA did not consider further whether it was more appropriate to proceed under the Competition Act 1998 than under its regulatory powers in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000.

Other sector regulators

The CAA, NIAUR, ORR, Ofgem and Ofcom reported that there were no cases in which the primacy obligation was triggered during the reporting period.

Market studies and market investigations

The CMA and the sector regulators also have powers to conduct market studies and to make market investigation references to the CMA under the Enterprise Act 2002. This section focuses on developments in market studies and market investigations under the Enterprise Act 2002 relating to the regulated sectors during the relevant period.

Market studies active during the reporting period:

• ORR: Railway station catering (completed June 2024)

Market investigations active during the reporting period:

• CMA: Mobile browsers and cloud gaming (launched November 2022)
• CMA: Cloud services (launched October 2023)

Market studies under the Enterprise Act 2002

Railway station catering

The ORR launched its railway station catering market study in June 2023 because of concerns about the rising cost of living affecting consumers. The market study focused on station retail catering, precisely all ‘ready-to-eat’ food and drink in Great Britain. This includes suppliers selling ‘ready-to-eat’ food and drinks alongside other products (for example, WH Smith) but excludes on-board catering and vending machines.

In June 2024, the ORR published its final report on the market study, setting out the issues which are adversely affecting the market in delivering value for money for passengers and taxpayers. The report outlined a series of recommendations intended to help ensure that these issues are appropriately addressed, including:

• requiring a greater focus on passengers’ satisfaction and requirements of catering by using more consumer research, to provide an offer at stations that meets customer needs

• a presumption in favour of competitive tendering of outlets for leases which are due to expire

• simplifying and standardising contracts to make it easier for new entrants to the market

• ensuring station operators contract out of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 for new leases of outlets at stations, whenever possible; and engaging with the Law Commission’s then forthcoming consultation on amendments to the Act to reform protected leases

• a greater degree of strategic direction and support to station operators by public funders

The final report sets out ORR’s decision not to refer the market to the CMA for a market investigation, on the basis that the most suitable solutions may not reside or exclusively reside within the CMA’s purview. ORR considered that extended and active engagement with industry stakeholders to address the distorting features it had identified would provide for more effective, proportionate and timely resolution of the issues.

In December 2024, ORR published an open letter to station operators and railway station catering providers, recording progress against its recommendations. In February 2025, ORR responded to the Law Commission’s consultation related to Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954 that it has identified as a barrier to competition in its market study into the railway station catering market.

Market investigations under the Enterprise Act 2002

Mobile browsers and cloud gaming

In March 2025, the CMA published its final report in its market investigation into cloud gaming and mobile browsers, finding that a number of markets relating to mobile browsers are not working well for consumers and businesses, which is holding back innovation and could be limiting growth in the UK. Most concerns identified relate to Apple’s policies that determine how mobile browsers work on Apple’s devices. The final report did not find concerns in cloud gaming.

Before the conclusion of the market investigation, the CMA opened investigations in January into whether to designate Apple and Google as having strategic market status (SMS) under the new digital markets competition regime. These investigations concern Apple and Google’s provision of their respective mobile ecosystem services, including in the areas related to mobile browsers which were the focus of this separate market investigation. These SMS investigations are ongoing and expected to conclude later this year.

The independent inquiry group leading the CMA’s market investigation recommended that, if Apple and/or Google are designated with SMS, then the CMA should consider imposing appropriate interventions. These include measures which could enhance the ability of other browsers to compete by offering new, innovative features to consumers, as well as enabling users actively to choose their preferred mobile browser which could drive competition.

Cloud services

In October 2023, Ofcom referred the supply of public cloud infrastructure services in the UK to the CMA for a market investigation, following its own market study under the Enterprise Act 2002.

In January 2025, the independent inquiry group leading the market investigation published its provisional findings, including that:

• cloud customers face a limited choice of providers and do not consider many providers are able to provide the range of services that they need. Amazon Web Services (AWS) and Microsoft are the 2 large providers of cloud services, each with a share of up to 40% of UK customer spend on cloud services. Google is the next largest provider with a much smaller share

• technical and commercial barriers make it difficult for cloud customers to switch between and use different cloud providers, locking them into their initial choices which may not reflect their evolving business needs

• there are significant barriers to entry and expansion due to the very large capital investment needed to supply cloud services, making it harder for alternative cloud suppliers to enter and grow in these markets

• Microsoft is using its strong position in software to make it harder for AWS and Google to compete effectively for cloud customers that wish to use Microsoft software on the cloud. This reduces the competitive challenge that AWS and Google can provide in cloud services and to Microsoft’s position

The independent inquiry group provisionally recommended that the CMA use its powers under the DMCCA to consider whether to designate the 2 largest providers, AWS and Microsoft, with SMS in relation to their respective digital activities in cloud services. The statutory deadline for the market investigation is in August 2025.

Market reviews and other markets work

As noted above, certain sector regulators have also used their sectoral powers – rather than their powers under the Enterprise Act 2002 – to carry out work to consider competition issues affecting their sectors. A summary of this type of work during the reporting period is included for each sector regulator.

Ofcom

Application to person SMS Termination Market Review

In January 2025, Ofcom published a consultation as part of a review of the ‘Application-to-Person Short Message Service Termination Market’. Application-to-Person Short Message Service (‘A2P SMS’) is the most common form of business messaging service. It enables businesses and public sector organisations to send text messages in bulk to customers and the wider public. Common examples of A2P SMS are 1-time passcodes used to log into online banking, medical appointment reminders and parcel delivery notifications.

Ofcom found that wholesale prices for the termination of these A2P SMS have increased significantly in recent years, in a range from 15% to 75% since 2021. Ofcom’s initial view as set out in the consultation is that mobile operators hold significant market power in these markets and, without intervention, would be likely to use this market power to increase their termination charges to an excessively high level. Ofcom therefore proposed to cap the A2P SMS termination prices charged by mobile operators. Subject to responses to its consultation, Ofcom will publish its final decision later in 2025.

Discussion paper on the connected TV market

In December 2024, Ofcom published an update on its work examining the role of connected TV platforms as digital content gateways, looking at whether content providers are able to make their content available and discoverable to UK audiences on connected TV platforms. Ofcom’s findings included that certain features of the connected TV platform market could raise barriers to entry or expansion for smaller platforms. For example, the market exhibits network effects, where content providers tend to be attracted to the platforms with the largest audiences and audiences are in turn attracted to the platforms with the widest range of content.

In its update, Ofcom explained that it would prioritise putting new rules under the Media Act 2024 into place, over considering the application of access-related conditions in the connected TV platform market. These include new rules to ensure that UK public service broadcasters’ players and public service content are available, prominent and easily accessible on a range of connected TV platforms.

Wholesale Voice Markets Review

During the reporting period, Ofcom started a Wholesale Voice Markets Reviews, in relation to the following markets:

• wholesale call termination
• mobile call termination
• 070 termination

Ofcom is focused on call termination rates for domestic and international calls, and is considering whether the number range holders in each of these markets continue to have significant market power, and therefore should continue to be subject to regulation (a price cap). Ofcom plans to publish a consultation in Q1 2025 to 2026.

Telecoms Access Review 2026   

In March 2024, Ofcom launched the Telecoms Access Review 2026, as the current regulatory framework set by Ofcom in 2021 for the main fixed telecoms market in the UK will end in March 2026. The Telecoms Access Review 2026 will review the regulations that will apply to the UK fixed telecoms markets from April 2026 until March 2031. In March 2025, Ofcom set out its proposals for the regulation of fixed telecoms.

Ofcom explained that it will set the regulatory framework considering not only the interests of consumers and businesses today, but also the investment, innovation and competition that is needed to deliver for them in the future. In relation to network competition, Ofcom explained that it wanted to see competition develop where this is sustainable and where it delivers benefits to consumers. In this market, an ‘altnet’ is a network provider, other than Openreach or Virgin Media O2, that operates within the UK and builds its own network infrastructure. Ofcom stated that it was important that regulation maintains an opportunity for reasonably efficient ‘altnets’ to compete.

Ofcom set out that it was proposing to find that BT has significant market power in a number of markets, and was therefore proposing a regulatory framework to address the resulting competition concerns. These include network access obligations, and price controls and quality of service requirements where appropriate. Ofcom invited responses to its consultation by 12 June 2025. Ofcom expects to publish its final decisions in early 2026.

Ofgem

Non-domestic market review  

In November 2022, Ofgem initiated a review of the retail energy market for non-domestic customers. Non-domestic customers vary considerably, and range from small business with relatively low energy usage, who may have limited knowledge of the energy market, to large industrial customers. In April 2024, Ofgem published its decision on new and updated rules for energy suppliers to address issues identified through the review. The rule changes aim to increase protections to small businesses, and provide greater clarity and transparency to all businesses.

As part of its review of the non-domestic energy market, Ofgem recommended that government explores the regulation of ‘third party intermediaries’ or ‘TPIs’^{[footnote 6]}. In September 2024, the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero consulted on proposals for the regulation of TPIs in the retail energy market, and the government is considering the feedback received.

Updated guidance on the Transmission Constraint Licence Condition

‘Transmission constraints’ are limits on the ability of the electricity transmission system to transmit power from where it is supplied to where it is needed. They are managed via the ‘Balancing Mechanism’, through which generators offer a price for managing excess or deficit in capacity through reducing or increasing their generation. Choices can then be made by the systems operator based on these prices, to balance the supply and demand from the electricity grid.

Where transmission constraints occur, then individual electricity generators, or groups of generators in particular areas, can hold a position of market power. The ‘Transmission Constraint Licence Condition’ in generators’ licences means that generators must not submit bid prices in the balancing mechanism at a level which would result in them obtaining an excessive benefit where a transmission constraint occurs.

In June 2024, Ofgem updated its guidance on the interpretation and enforcement of the Transmission Constraint Licence Condition to reflect developments in the market since the guidance was last updated in 2017, and to address concerns in relation to the approach some licensees were taking to compliance with the licence condition. These concerns had come to light in the context of recent Ofgem compliance work which was carried out in light of the increasing cost of constraint management and evidence of potentially excessive bid prices.

FCA

Premium finance market study

In October 2024, the FCA launched a market study using its powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 into premium finance for motor and home insurance. Premium finance is a form of credit sold to insurance customers that enables them to spread the annual upfront cost of the premium over the year, typically in monthly instalments.

The FCA launched the market study as it was concerned that premium finance may not represent fair value for some customers and that competition may not be functioning effectively. The market study is exploring the extent to which the premium finance market is leading to poor customer outcomes and the factors that could be driving this, namely: a lack of competitive constraints; obstacles to effective customer decision making; and incentives created by commercial arrangements between different providers in the supply chain. The FCA expects to publish a progress update and proposed next steps in the first half of 2025.

Pure protection market study

In March 2025, the FCA launched a market study, using its powers under the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000, into the distribution of ‘pure protection’ insurance products. Pure protection products are designed to help an individual, and/or their dependents, with existing financial commitments or lifestyle adaptations if the policyholder dies or becomes incapacitated, injured or infirm. In 2023, approximately £4.85 billion was paid out in pure protection claims on individual policies, aiding those affected by bereavement, illness, and injury.

The FCA launched the study as there are indications that some areas of pure protection distribution may not be working well. The study is primarily focusing on 4 specific types of retail products:

• term assurance (a policy which pays a lump sum to beneficiaries if the policy holder dies in a specified period)

• critical illness cover

• income protection insurance

• whole of life insurance

The FCA expects to publish an interim report with initial findings and proposed next steps around the end of 2025.

Big Tech entry into retail financial services

In April 2024, the FCA published a ‘feedback statement’ setting out the FCA’s analysis of the responses received to a call for inputs published in 2023 seeking evidence on how any data asymmetry between Big Tech firms and financial services firms could influence how effectively competition evolves. Overall, the FCA reported that its call for inputs did not identify significant current effects from the data asymmetry between Big Tech firms and financial services firms. However, it did highlight 3 key issues that could adversely affect how competition evolves in retail financial markets, and which may become more significant over time:

• the risk that data asymmetry between Big Tech firms and their rivals increases barriers to entry and expansion in financial markets over time

• the risk that Big Tech firms’ platforms become the primary access channel (gatekeeper) for retail financial services in the future

• the risk of financial services firms’ upstream partnerships with Big Tech firms being concentrated and limiting bargaining power of financial services firms

The FCA identified next steps, including continued monitoring and the identification of ‘use cases’ on whether Big Tech’s data from their core digital activities would be valuable in retail financial markets. This work also led onto the work on digital wallets.

Credit information market study

The FCA published a final report on its Credit Information Market Study (CIMS) in December 2023, including a package of proposed remedies aimed at addressing concerns identified in the market. The remedy package will be delivered through a combination of FCA rules and industry-led efforts. The FCA is planning to publish an initial consultation paper on FCA requirements in 2025, including a cost benefits analysis, competition assessments and details of its proposed rules. Work on the proposed industry-led remedies will be taken forward through a new industry governance body. An industry working group was launched in January 2024 to produce recommendations to the FCA on the new governance body, and is expected to produce its final report in Q2 2025.

PSR

Cross border interchange fees market review

Every time people use Mastercard or Visa debit or credit cards issued in the EEA for online retail transactions with UK businesses, UK businesses pay cross-border interchange fees. After Mastercard and Visa significantly raised some of these fees in 2021 and 2022, the PSR examined the level of these fees through its market review into cross border interchange fees to understand whether they, or other factors, indicate the market is not working well.

In December 2024, in its final report, the PSR found evidence that outbound interchange fees paid when purchasers in the EEA brought products online from UK merchants have increased to an unduly high level, at the expense of UK businesses. The PSR estimated that since 2022, UK businesses paid an extra £150-200 million a year due to the fee increases. The PSR found that in increasing these fees, Mastercard and Visa were not subject to effective competitive constraints on the acquiring side of the network. The PSR recently consulted stakeholders on its plans in terms of remedies; following consideration of the consultation responses, the PSR will decide next steps to address the harms identified.

Scheme and processing fees market review

Every time people use a Mastercard or Visa debit or credit card for transactions with UK businesses, UK businesses pay scheme and processing fees, some of which are mandatory or core and some of which are optional. Following increases in these fees, the PSR launched its market review to examine the level of these fees to understand whether they, or other factors, indicate the market is not working well.

In March 2025, the PSR published its final report following the market review. It found that Mastercard and Visa increased their core scheme and processing fees to acquirers by at least 25% since 2017, costing businesses at least £170 million extra per year, and that the lack of easy-to-understand fee information resulted in costs for acquirers and merchants. As a next step, the PSR is seeking views on a number of remedies to address the issues identified in the final report.

FCA and PSR

Digital Wallets

In July 2024, the FCA and the PSR jointly published a call for information on digital wallets. In February 2025, the FCA and the PSR published a joint ‘feedback statement’ outlining what they heard from stakeholders and setting out their next steps. The FCA and the PSR found that digital wallets represent a significant opportunity for innovation and growth, and for non-card forms of payment as they become available, particularly for retail transactions. The FCA and the PSR also set out feedback received raising potential competition issues.

The competition issues raised included Apple historically restricting access to their ‘near-field communication’ (NFC) technology for competing digital wallets, reserving this access for Apple Pay only. The FCA and the PSR also recorded that some stakeholders were concerned that Apple and Google benefit from being able to control their own mobile ecosystem, and that they may be able to steer consumers to use their own digital wallets (for example, through pre-installation of their own digital wallet on the mobile device). The FCA and the PSR decided that the CMA was best placed to consider these under its powers under the DMCCA, and said they would work closely with the CMA as it investigates digital wallets within its Apple and Google mobile ecosystems SMS investigations.

Stakeholders also suggested that card schemes’ position in UK retail payments could be entrenched unless consumers are able to access alternative forms of payment as they come to market. The FCA and the PSR said that they would work closely with the CMA to understand how any interventions to address competition between digital wallets could impact competition between payments systems within digital wallets, and that this would inform whether additional future regulatory interventions are needed.

Ofwat

Ofwat’s annual business retail market update 

Since April 2017, around 1.2 million eligible non-household (NHH) customers (that is, business customers) in England and Wales have been able to choose the retailer that provides their water, wastewater and other retail services. This is the business retail water market.

Ofwat publishes an annual update on the business retail market. Its analysis of market developments forms an important part of its understanding of the extent to which competition may be delivering for business customers and more widely, including in respect of environmental and water scarcity issues. Ofwat’s Business retail market update 2023-24 was published in October 2024, and provides an overview of developments in the market’s 7th year of operation. Ofwat found that new entrants had grown their market share by 1.6% in 2023 to 2024 and are now serving 8.5% of all supply points in the market.

Market for new appointments and variations (NAVs)

New appointments and variations (NAVs) are limited companies which provide a water and/or sewerage service to customers in an area which was previously provided by the incumbent monopoly provider. As of 31 March 2025, there were 12 of these new entrant companies, 3 of which were established in 2024 to 2025. During 2024 to 2025, Ofwat approved new appointments and variations at around 500 sites – typically housing developments of more than 50 properties. In September 2024, Ofwat consulted on greater use of insights from its monitoring of NAV performance, and the use of these insights in its licensing decisions.

Use of competition for the delivery of major projects

Direct procurement for customers (DPC) involves a water or wastewater company competitively tendering for services in relation to the delivery of certain large infrastructure projects, resulting in the selection of a third-party competitively appointed provider.

For the 2024 price review (‘PR24’) (covering the 2025 to 2030 price review period for the water sector), DPC applies by default for all discrete projects above a threshold size of £200 million whole life totex. The first project to be delivered using the DPC model is progressing through the final stages of the competitive procurement process. The procurement for the Haweswater Aqueduct Resilience Programme (sponsored by United Utilities) attracted international bidders. The preferred bidder was recently announced, and the project is moving towards financial close which Ofwat expects in the first quarter of 2025 to 2026.

ORR

In March 2025, ORR launched a review of the competition remedies in the rolling stock leasing market. The objective of the review is to determine whether there has been a material change in the market since a review by the Competition Commission in 2009 which found competition concerns, and whether the remedies put in place at the time remain appropriate or should be varied or removed. If ORR finds that the market has changed, it will make a recommendation to the CMA to review the appropriateness of the remedies. ORR will consult on findings by late summer 2025, and publish conclusions by the end of 2025.

General cooperation

The CMA and sector regulators have continued to cooperate more generally, in line with the practical arrangements set out in the Concurrency Regulations, the Concurrency Guidance and the bilateral Memoranda of Understanding agreed between the CMA and each of the sector regulators.

Information-sharing

The CMA and the sector regulators have continued during the reporting period to exchange key information about the particular cases that they have been investigating. This includes the authority investigating a particular case sharing emerging thinking and draft decisions of key documents, as provided for in Regulation 9 of the Concurrency Regulations and the Memoranda of Understanding, and the supporting authority (that is, any authority that has jurisdiction but to which the case has not been allocated) providing comments on those key documents. Additionally, and as in previous years, the CMA and the sector regulators have augmented the prescribed information-sharing process with more informal discussions and the sharing of know-how and relevant expertise.

Case allocation

During the relevant reporting period, 1 new Competition Act 1998 case was allocated to the FCA.

Assistance on casework

The CMA and sector regulators continue to provide each other with assistance on casework. Assistance is provided in a range of ways, including by sharing practical experience and expertise (for example, regulators have shared their sector-specific knowledge on cases and the CMA has shared relevant substantive and procedural expertise on competition cases) and through involvement of officials at key stages of an investigation (such as the provision of digital forensics support). There is also sharing of relevant policy, such as internal guidance and template documents.

Assistance on competition enforcement work

The CMA and the regulators continue to provide each other with assistance on their respective Competition Act 1998 investigations in the regulated sectors. For example, the CMA has assisted Ofgem through arrangements for technical support on the processing of documents. Ofcom has supported the CMA through regular discussions on the CMA’s 2 investigations in the broadcasting sector. The CMA has provided advice to the FCA on issues arising in its ongoing enforcement cases.

Assistance on markets work

The CMA and sector regulators have continued to cooperate on markets work. For example, the CMA has engaged regularly with Ofcom in carrying out the market investigation into cloud services. The CMA has engaged with the FCA on its work on motor insurance, with both the CMA and FCA forming part of the government’s taskforce on motor insurance costs.

Assistance on mergers work

Although mergers do not fall within the scope of concurrency, where the CMA is investigating a merger involving a regulated sector, it often receives valuable input and assistance from the sector regulators. The CMA is also in frequent contact with sectoral regulators when monitoring merger activity in the UK.

Communications

The CMA has benefited from Ofcom’s assistance in its investigation of the Vodafone / Three merger. Ofcom has shared expertise, relevant research and, in some permitted circumstances, data which Ofcom holds where the parties have provided their consent. As part of the CMA’s decision to clear this merger, it accepted legally binding commitments from Vodafone and Three including the delivery of a joint network plan. This network commitment will be overseen by both Ofcom and the CMA. The CAA also engaged with the CMA on this merger.

Financial services

The FCA assisted the CMA in 13 transactions considered by the CMA’s merger intelligence unit. During this reporting period the FCA also provided substantive comments into the Spreadex / Sporting Index merger inquiry.

Energy

Ofgem has assisted the CMA in understanding the market context, regulatory framework and other relevant issues in 3 mergers.

Ofgem also provided an opinion to the CMA on the Iberdrola / NWEN merger. This is in accordance with its duties under the new special merger regime introduced under the Energy Act 2023.

Payment systems

The CMA mergers intelligence unit has worked closely with the PSR sharing intelligence and knowledge, on several deals in the payments sector.

Rail

ORR provided advice and assistance to CMA’s merger intelligence unit in relation to the FirstGroup plc’s acquisitions of Grand Union Trains WCML Holdings Limited in August 2024 and Grand Union Trains GWML Holdings Limited in December.

Water

Ofwat provided support to the CMA in the Pennon / Sumisho Osaka Gas Water UK merger inquiry, in line with Ofwat and the CMA’s respective statutory roles in the water merger regime under Water Industry Act 1991, in particular by providing an opinion on the proposed undertakings.

Ofwat provided support to the CMA in its Macquarie Asset Management / Last Mile Infrastructure merger inquiry.

Multilateral cooperation

UK Competition Network

In addition to the regular bilateral meetings that the CMA holds with the sector regulators, cooperation occurs multi-laterally through the UKCN. The UKCN seeks to facilitate the use of competition powers and the development of pro-competitive regulatory frameworks. This cooperation has the function of ensuring consistency in the application of the competition regime but also in facilitating the sharing of best practice and knowledge. As part of this function, the CMA and sector regulators hold regular discussions on current topics of interest and give presentations based on their experiences of specific issues from their competition work.

Some examples of topics covered this year include a presentation from Ofcom on its competition assessment of changes made by the BBC to its radio services, a presentation from ORR on its railway station catering market study, discussions of proposed changes to the CMA’s policies on settlement and leniency, and the CMA’s 10-year review of the concurrency arrangements.

Digital Regulation Cooperation Forum (DRCF)

In response to the wide-ranging nature of digital markets and the regulators that could be involved, the DRCF was launched in July 2020 to support the coordinated regulation of digital markets. Membership of the DRCF is comprised of the CMA, FCA and Ofcom, and the Information Commissioner’s Office.

The DRCF allows for enhanced cooperation between the different regulators seeking to address the unique challenges posed by the regulation of online platforms in a joined-up fashion. For example, in April 2024, the DRCF launched an AI and Digital Hub to help provide free and informal advice for innovators on cross-regulatory queries. The hub was launched as a 12-month pilot, and is now closed for inquiries. The DRCF has published case studies on the type of advice provided, and an evaluation of the hub pilot will help build on learnings.

Secondments

Secondments continue to be an important way of sharing expertise and transferring knowledge between the CMA and the sector regulators. During the period of this report, there were approximately 11^{[footnote 7]} active secondments between the sector regulators and the CMA. In addition to secondments to and from the CMA, there were also secondments between the concurrent regulators.

1. The report is published in accordance with the CMA’s statutory obligation (set out in section 25(4) of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, read together with paragraph 16 of Schedule 4).  The concurrency arrangements were introduced in their current form by the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013 and took effect from 1 April 2014. They created a framework within which the CMA and sector regulators might more effectively work together to improve competition and competition law enforcement in the regulated sectors. The CMA is required under section 25(4) and paragraph 16 of Schedule 4 of ERRA13 to publish an annual report on the operation of the concurrency arrangements. ↩ ↩²

2. In March 2025, the UK government announced plans to consolidate the PSR, mainly within the FCA. The announcement does not result in any immediate changes to the PSR’s remit or ongoing programme of work. The regulator will continue to have access to its statutory powers until legislation is passed by Parliament to enact these changes. The government has said it will consult on the details of the proposal over the course of the summer. ↩

3. See the Prime Minister’s 31 March 2025 letter to the House of Commons Liaison Committee, enclosing the responses from sector regulators. ↩

4. A concurrent case is one where the CMA and 1 or more sector regulators all had jurisdiction. ↩

5. The individual fines were as follows: Citi: £17,160,000 – this includes a 35% leniency discount and a 20% reduction for settling in advance of the CMA issuing the Statement of Objections. HSBC: £23,400,000 – this includes a 10% reduction for settling after the CMA issued the Statement of Objections. Morgan Stanley: £29,700,000 – this includes a 10% reduction for settling after the CMA issued the Statement of Objections. Royal Bank of Canada: £34,200,000 – this includes a 10% reduction for settling after the CMA issued the Statement of Objections. ↩

6. TPIs act as an interface between consumers and energy suppliers. They range from energy brokers and consultants (which are most prominent in the non-domestic energy market) to price comparison websites, aggregators and auto-switching services. ↩

7. Numbers reflect formal secondments and may not capture additional, informal secondments that may have taken place during the period. ↩