Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement in Iran: Quad statement to the IAEA Board of Governors, September 2026
Statement by France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States on the implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in Iran.
Chair,
France, Germany, the United Kingdom and the United States thank the Director General for his latest reports and commend the Agency’s continued efforts to ensure the implementation of safeguards by Iran and verify the implementation of relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We reiterate our full support for the Agency’s professional, independent, and impartial work which remains indispensable to upholding the integrity of the NPT’s global safeguards architecture.
Chair,
This Board comes at a critical time for the Iranian file.
In June, one year after Iran was found in non-compliance with its NPT Safeguards Agreement, this Board adopted a resolution that urged Iran to fulfil its legal obligations and restore full cooperation with the IAEA. In particular, that resolution insisted that Iran take steps without delay to remedy its non-compliance and grant the Agency all access it requires to verify the status of Iran’s nuclear programme.
Three months later, we can only regret that Iran has once again chosen to disregard the concerns of this Board. The Director General’s report documents precisely the extent of Iran’s violations of its obligations: throughout the reporting period, the Agency has received no information at all from Iran regarding the status of any of its declared nuclear facilities and nuclear material. Iran has continued to prevent Agency inspections – the IAEA has had no access to any declared nuclear facilities since June. We reiterate the DG’s deep concern about the Agency’s lack of access and about information regarding Iran’s fourth declared enrichment plant in Isfahan. The Agency hasn’t even been given its precise location, let alone gained access or been able to review design information.
As a result of Iran’s refusal to engage, the Agency has reported that it is not able to verify that there has been no diversion of nuclear material. It should be of concern to all Members of this Board that for over a year, the Agency has lost all visibility over Iran’s stockpile of High Enriched Uranium. To quote the DG’s report, the Agency’s lack of access to verify this material “is a matter of proliferation concern and of compliance with Iran’s NPT Safeguards Agreement, and needs to be addressed with the utmost urgency”.
This report also serves as a reminder of Iran’s long record of non-cooperation with the Agency. Iran has continued to refuse to engage the Agency regarding the unresolved safeguards issues. Iran is still failing to implement modified Code 3.1 to its NPT Safeguards Agreement, contrary to its legal obligations, while it continues developing new facilities. Iran continues to ignore Security Council and Board resolutions which call for the immediate implementation and ratification of its Additional Protocol.
Finally, a year ago, the Security Council decided to reinstate six resolutions which, amongst other provisions, require Iran to suspend all its activities related to uranium enrichment, reprocessing and heavy water projects, to be verified by the IAEA. Despite attempts by Iran to undermine their legitimacy, the provisions of these resolutions are a clear, legal and operational reality. We regret that the Agency has been unable to verify Iran’s compliance with these obligations.
Chair,
We recognise that the Agency’s verification activities in Iran have been impacted due to safety concerns. However, the Agency has repeatedly made clear that there is no current technical or nuclear safety reason preventing the inspectors from accessing Iran’s affected nuclear facilities, and the Agency is fully prepared to resume its safeguards activities in Iran at short notice. We reiterate that safeguards obligations are not negotiable and that the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement cannot be suspended under any circumstances.
Chair,
This Board cannot ignore the serious conclusions of the DG’s report. No State under the NPT should be allowed to stonewall the IAEA and to disregard the numerous resolutions adopted by this Board and the Security Council.
The draft resolution introduced by the US and the E3 aims to complete the procedural step that is required under the IAEA Statute following the non-compliance finding made by this Board in June 2025. The Board demonstrated patience and prudence in postponing this mandatory action for more than a year to provide Iran further opportunities to make progress and implement its safeguards obligations. We regret that Iran has not seized these opportunities, despite the considerable efforts by the Director General to engage Iran and address its concerns. Whilst we take this step to satisfy the Board’s obligation under the Statute and uphold the integrity of the safeguards regime, we remain hopeful that as we have seen elsewhere in the Board this week, Iran can choose a different path and work with the Agency in good faith to address the Board’s longstanding concerns and provide the transparency required to build confidence in the nature of its nuclear programme.
Finally chair,
In the event that the resolution we have proposed, GOV/2026/60 is adopted, we ask that it is de-restricted.
Thank you