Research and analysis

Understanding pay discrimination: research to support improving equal pay law and ending pay discrimination

Published 14 July 2026

Understanding pay discrimination: research to support improving equal pay law and ending pay discrimination

University of Birmingham
Equal Rights Trust
Meghan Campbell and Jim Fitzgerald

Executive summary 

This research was commissioned by the Office for Equality and Opportunity (OEO) to inform the development of planned legislation. It seeks to explore pay discrimination on the grounds of race, disability and sex. This report is an independent piece of research and the findings and recommendations do not constitute official government guidance or policy.

The starting point for this report is that discrimination in all forms is wrong, and must be dealt with. While there are a range of perspectives that could be adopted on pay discrimination, the basis for this research is to understand the problem of pay discrimination from the perspective of those being discriminated against, or alleging discrimination, and explore potential solutions that could contribute to reducing discrimination and increase fairness when it comes to pay.

The research has 3 objectives:

1. To assess the prevalence, patterns and characteristics of pay discrimination on the basis of race, disability and sex, including differences between protected characteristics, sectors and contract types.
2. To analyse the avenues for redress for pay discrimination in the Equality Act 2010 and identify barriers that frustrate effectiveness.
3. To explore steps that could be taken to prevent pay discrimination and remove barriers to redress. 

The report is structured into parts:

• chapter 1 provides definitions of main terms and setting out the methodology 
• chapter 2 discusses patterns and prevalence of pay discrimination 
• chapter 3 examines avenues for, and access to, redress, and
• chapter 4 looks at prevention and enforcement 

The report is accompanied by 2 appendices: 

• a methodological note 
• a database of sources

Findings and insights

The goal of this report is not to arrive at a set of fixed recommendations, but to identify actionable insights on pay discrimination and how to redress and prevent it, based on a review of the available evidence. The findings and principal insights from this research are set out below.

Patterns and prevalence of pay discrimination 

There is a significant evidence gap in respect of pay discrimination. Fifty years after the introduction of the Equal Pay Act 1970, there is an established body of case law on sex pay discrimination, but the majority of the research on sex and pay focuses not on pay discrimination but on pay gaps.^{[footnote 1]} The same is true for race and disability, with the additional challenge of there being very limited case law. There are a number of potential reasons for the lack of evidence, including a lack of pay transparency.

Pay discrimination must be understood in context. Pay gaps occur for a number of reasons. These include pay discrimination (failure to pay equally for work of equal value) but also other forms of discrimination impacting on pay, including discrimination in hiring, promotion and career development opportunities, or the failure to make reasonable adjustments. The causes of portions of the pay gaps also remain unexplained.

Pay gaps exist on the basis of race, disability and sex. There is clear and compelling evidence of pay inequality arising on the basis of all 3 protected characteristics. 

There is not one pay gap, but many. The evidence on pay gaps on the basis of race, disability and sex is that there is no single broad pattern, but a series of intricate patterns. Pay gaps are non-uniform, intersectional, and complex – no characteristic is a monolithic category and there are distinct interactions between characteristics.

Discrimination is a main driver of pay gaps. While lack of data means it is not possible to assess the prevalence of pay discrimination, there is clear evidence that both pay discrimination, failing to pay equally for work of equal value, and other forms of discrimination are central factors in pay inequality. 

Attempts to address pay discrimination in isolation may be unsuccessful or even counter-productive. Individuals who believe they have experienced discrimination often understand “pay discrimination” to include not only failure to pay equally for work of equal value but also other forms of discrimination which have an effect on pay. Addressing pay discrimination alone may fail to meet the needs and expectations of these individuals.

Access to redress

The Equality Act 2010 establishes different ways for redress for pay discrimination arising on the basis of sex (through the equal pay provisions) and race and disability (through the direct and indirect discrimination provisions). They involve different legal tests and have different evidentiary requirements, though the procedure is largely the same.

There are justiciability gaps which prevent workers from challenging all forms of pay discrimination. While it has not been tested, it appears that claims for failure to provide equal pay for work of equal value on the basis of race or disability would not succeed if brought under the direct or indirect discrimination provisions. The requirement to identify a comparator under the equal pay provisions means that in most circumstances, outsourced workers are not protected and can make it impossible for those in small organisations to bring a complaint.

Beyond the justiciability gap, claimants face multiple barriers which prevent access to redress. The research identifies at least 10 barriers which can cause those who experience pay discrimination to refrain from filing a complaint, withdraw their complaint, or lose their case.

1. Lack of awareness that pay discrimination has occurred 
2. Limited knowledge of the law, procedure and required evidence 
3. Limited confidence and willingness to bring a case 
4. Lack of support from lawyers or other experts 
5. Lack of access to mechanisms for enforcement due to physical or other barriers 
6. Insufficient resources to bring and pursue a claim 
7. Insufficient time to bring a claim and resilience to pursue lengthy proceedings 
8. Difficulties in producing evidence to demonstrate pay discrimination 
9. Inadequate remedy to compensate for the harm experienced 
10. Lack of enforcement of the remedy to ensure that the compensation is received 

Lack of awareness is the biggest barrier to redress. The vast majority of those experiencing pay discrimination do not know it. They have no knowledge of their colleagues’ pay and so lack the information they need to identify whether pay discrimination has occurred.

Only 1 in 10 of all complaints brought under the equal pay provisions can be said with certainty to achieve redress.^{[footnote 2]} Analysis of data on employment tribunal cases between 2016 and 2021 reveals that only 1 in 10 claims can be said with certainty to result in redress – less than 0.1% of cases were successful at tribunal, while 10% resulted in conciliated settlement. More than 2 thirds – 69% – of equal pay complaints were withdrawn. There is no data on the proportion of these cases which were withdrawn due to settlement, those withdrawn due to the claimant concluding their claim had no solid basis, and those abandoned for other reasons.

Complaints of pay discrimination on the basis of race and disability under the direct or indirect discrimination provisions are extremely rare. While data on race and disability pay discrimination claims is not available, analysis of the 220 reported tribunal cases on “race discrimination” in the period from 2016 to 2021 identified one case concerning pay discrimination. The research identified no case reports on successful pay discrimination claims on these grounds.

The proportion of those experiencing pay discrimination on the basis of sex, race or disability who secure redress is very low. Most of those experiencing pay discrimination are denied access to pay data and so will never be aware of a pay disparity. For those experiencing sex-based pay discrimination who are aware and who bring a complaint, only a fraction achieves redress. For those who are aware that they are experiencing race- or disability-based pay discrimination, very few bring complaints.

Extending the equal pay provisions to include race and disability could increase parity under the law but may risk additional complexity too. Changing the law could address some of the justiciability barriers facing these workers and could increase workers’ knowledge of their rights, stimulating an increase in litigation. However, there may be disadvantages to this approach and some challenges may remain for outsourced workers. 

Increasing the number of workers who achieve redress for pay discrimination requires measures to reduce, remove or mitigate the barriers to justice. In light of the significant barriers to redress identified through the research, any extension of the equal pay regime should be accompanied by a review on access to redress and targeted measures to address the barriers identified above.

Pay transparency measures are needed to address the awareness gap. The introduction of a “right to know”, where workers were able to demand information about the pay of colleagues doing comparable work, could help address the lack of awareness that pay discrimination has occurred.

Prevention and enforcement

The individualised model of enforcement, which relies on workers to start legal action as a means to enforce compliance by employers, is severely limited. It assumes a level of awareness and knowledge which most workers lack, relies on individuals to enforce their rights against better-resourced and more powerful employers, and results in remedies which are individualised and retrospective, with limited sanction.

There is growing recognition of the need for proactive and preventative mechanisms of enforcement. Through placing duties on employers, these measures complement, but not replace, the existing pay discrimination regime. 

A variety of legal and policy tools have been developed to deal with pay discrimination and its drivers. Prominent examples of tools which have been developed and used in the UK and other jurisdictions include:

• pay transparency measures, such as the introduction of a right to know, pay gap reporting or duties to publish pay scales, which aim to increase the visibility of pay structures and practices

• duties to implement standardised job evaluation to assess the relative value of different roles within an organisation

• the introduction of mandatory pay audits which involve examining the pay and terms of different groups to identify, understand and address pay differences

• pay gap action plans which require employers to investigate the causes of pay differentials and address pay discrimination and other discrimination impacting on pay

Any system of proactive and preventative measures should include clear compliance obligations. A due diligence obligation or a proactive duty on pay discrimination could trigger a shift in the onus of addressing pay discrimination from workers to employers. Incentives and sanctions for non-compliance are necessary for the system to operate effectively. 

An effective institutional architecture is needed to support the implementation and enforcement of the law. Such an institution should have the independence, autonomy, resources and powers to ensure its effectiveness. It should be able to support access to redress, assist employers in implementing proactive measures and enforce compliance.

The evidence indicates there is a need for a whole system approach. Many proactive and preventative approaches are novel, and it is premature to give a definitive assessment, but the evidence indicates that these tools may work best in combination, and that an effective system would incorporate multiple elements.

The evidence indicates that further innovation is needed to design effective proactive measures. There have been significant legislative and policy developments in the field in recent years – as evidence of effectiveness is generated, further adaptation should be made.

Introduction 

The year 2025 marked the 50th anniversary of the entry into force of the Equal Pay Act 1970. This was the first piece of legislation in the UK to guarantee the right to equal pay between men and women. In the 2024 King’s Speech, the government made a commitment to make equal pay rights effective for people from ethnic minorities and disabled people.^{[footnote 3]}

OEO commissioned this research to address gaps in knowledge of these issues, and assess the options available for implementing this commitment. This report uses evidence from case law, literature and interviews from a range of stakeholders to examine the prevalence, patterns and characteristics of pay discrimination. 

From this evidence, this report analyses the ways for redress for pay discrimination, and explores steps that could be taken to prevent pay discrimination and remove barriers. The report aims to identify actionable insights for those involved in the development of law and policy in this area.

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to acknowledge the invaluable research contributions of Sam Barnes and Iulia Mirzac to this report. They would also like to thank the steering committee, Melanie Field, Sandra Fredman and Jeffrey Vogt for their insights and support, and to all members of the advisory group for their contributions.

Glossary

In this report, pay discrimination is defined as unequal pay for work of equal value. 

Academics, stakeholders and those with lived experience often use the term “pay discrimination” in a different way. In some of these sources, pay discrimination has been used to describe the unexplained portion of pay gaps. In other sources, it has been used to show how stigma, stereotypes, prejudices and negative cultural attitudes affect pay for those with a protected characteristic, or to describe other forms of discrimination which have an effect on pay. This variation in terminology can create confusion on evidence and findings. 

To provide clarity, this report defines important terms and phrases. The definitions are in line  with the Equality Act 2010 as well as other sources of law, academic and other literature, stakeholder consultations and international good practice. When definitions in this report diverge from the Act, that distinction is explicitly observed. 

• Pay inequalities: where differences in pay between individuals or groups are directly related to a protected characteristic

• Pay discrimination: although this term is not used in the Equality Act 2010, it is used in this report to refer to the failure to ensure equal pay for work of equal value on the basis of a protected characteristic. It is defined mirroring the language of the equal pay provisions of the Equality Act 2010 

• Work of equal value: as defined in the Equality Act 2010, work of equal value is work that might appear different but under a non-discriminatory, objective and neutral job evaluation is the same, similar or requires equivalent skills, effort and responsibility^{[footnote 4]} 

• Pay gaps: disparities in hourly basic pay between groups defined by a protected characteristic^{[footnote 5]}

• Pay: hourly basic pay

• Race: as defined in the Equality Act 2010, race is colour, race, nationality or national or ethnic origin^{[footnote 6]} 

• Disability: as defined in the Equality Act 2010, disability is physical or mental impairment that has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on the ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities^{[footnote 7]}

• Sex: the Equality Act 2010 defines sex as a person’s sex assigned at birth, as per the For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers judgment^{[footnote 8]}

• Outsourcing: obtaining routine services from individuals and organisations outside of the formal employment boundaries^{[footnote 9]} – note, there is no legal definition of outsourcing in UK employment law

• Pay secrecy: Any workplace practice, policy, or contractual requirement that prevents, restricts, or discourages employees from discussing, disclosing, or seeking information about their salaries and compensation, for example pay confidentiality clauses.

Methodology

Appendix I sets out the full methodology, including:

• search terms 
• inclusion and exclusion criteria 
• sampling 
• snowballing 
• expansion techniques 

It explains each of these different methods, together with a full description of review, verification and validation procedures. This brief description outlines the main sources that underpin the report as well as the procedures established to guide its analysis and findings. The report is informed by 3 sources: 

Literature review: The research team undertook an expansive narrative literature review of academic scholarship. The review also considered data, evidence and research produced by government, civil society, trade unions, business, UN treaty bodies and national human rights institutions. The review was interdisciplinary, cross-sectoral and comparative in that it examined jurisdictions beyond the UK.

Stakeholder engagement: a total of 29 interviews or engagement with lawyers and litigators, advice and enforcement bodies, civil society, trade unions, employers’ associations, and academics. None of the targeted employer stakeholders responded to our invitation, despite multiple follow-ups.

Insights from those with lived experience: drawing from research undertaken by the Public Service Consultants, the report includes the findings of interviews undertaken with individuals with experience of or believe they have experience of pay discrimination, and the lived experience of those who have received and responded to pay discrimination complaints.

The findings from these 3 sources are combined and presented thematically, rather than separately entities. 

To guarantee the quality of the report, 2 advisory bodies were established: 

• a steering committee consisting of internationally recognised experts – Sandra Fredman (Oxford University), Melanie Field (Independent Advisory Services) and Jeffrey Vogt (International Lawyers Assisting Workers) – met weekly through the data collection, analysis and writing of the report

• an advisory group consisting of representatives from OEO, the steering committee, the public service consultants, litigators, civil society and lived experience experts met 4 times to advise on all areas of the report^{[footnote 10]}

2. Patterns and prevalence of pay discrimination

2.1 Pay discrimination

This chapter focuses on pay gaps and patterns in labour force participation, rather than on pay discrimination. This is largely a result of the significant evidence gap in respect of pay discrimination. 

The vast majority of research and evidence in this area does not examine pay discrimination in the sense of unequal pay for work of equal value. This is true in respect of literature on pay discrimination on the basis of sex, despite the fact that equal pay legislation has been in force in the UK since the 1970s. Almost all the literature identified as part of this report focuses on the drivers and impacts of pay gaps. In respect of race and disability, where the law is not framed in terms of equal work of equal value, the evidence on pay discrimination is sparse to non-existent. 

It is not possible to explain fully why the focus in this field has been on pay gaps as opposed to pay discrimination. It may be partially explained by the fact that unequal pay is unlawful whereas pay gaps are not, but the literature examined and engagement undertaken for this report provide other potential explanations.

First, widespread lack of pay transparency makes it very difficult to access the data which is needed to establish that pay discrimination has occurred. As discussed in section 3.2.1, a 2019 survey conducted by the Fawcett Society found that only 1 in 3 women knew how much their male colleagues were paid.^{[footnote 11]} In the absence of comprehensive and systematic information on pay or on job evaluations, it is challenging to identify cases or patterns of pay discrimination beyond the comparatively small number which reach the Employment Tribunal and which are reported. For cases of pay discrimination arising on the basis of disability and race, where an incredibly small number of cases have reached the Employment Tribunal, this information does not exist. This lack of data has negatively impacted the study of pay discrimination.

Second, many individuals and employers do not conceptualise or express the relationship between pay and discrimination as equal pay for work of equal value (as set out in the glossary). When asked questions on pay discrimination, those interviewed for this research spoke, for example, of practices that impeded career progression and issues more commonly associated with pay gaps.^{[footnote 12]} This conceptual merging of pay discrimination and pay gaps may be a function of the definitional issues identified above, or it could simply reflect the fact that in ordinary life, pay gaps and pay discrimination are experienced more holistically. 

Despite these limitations, the report makes best use of the available evidence to enhance the understanding of pay discrimination in the context of the government’s commitment to make the right to equal pay effective for people from ethnic minorities and disabled people. 

Pay discrimination cannot be understood or addressed if it is approached in isolation. Understanding pay gaps can provide greater clarity on labour force patterns which in turn highlights potential barriers that might arise in making equal pay rights effective for ethnic minority and disabled people. For example, pay gap reporting identifies occupational segregation as a driver of ethnic pay gaps as certain identity groups cluster in temporary and self-employment. Disabled people cluster in small and medium workplaces. In both these scenarios, the effect of an extension of equal pay laws may be limited on race and disability pay discrimination as these individuals could struggle to identify a legally relevant comparator and may not be employed sufficiently long enough to be aware of pay discrimination. As another example, research on employment patterns in specific industries has indicated a relationship between ethnic pay gaps and outsourcing and litigation filed in 2025 alleges a relationship between outsourcing and pay gaps for ethnic minority workers.^{[footnote 13]} An outsourced worker who is performing work of equal value to an “insourced” worker would not be able to bring a claim. This is because the outsourced and insourced workers are not employed by the same employer. They are also not employed under common terms, legislative requirements for making the required comparison for a pay discrimination claim.^{[footnote 14]}

Although there is a commitment to not have outsourcing frustrate equal pay, understanding broader patterns with respect to pay, labour force participation and the protected characteristics of race, disability and sex helps illuminate how the provisions of the Equality Act 2010 function and the efficacy of potential mechanisms that might address barriers that prevent individuals from bringing a claim for pay discrimination. This can be important in a rapidly shifting world of work and working patterns. These relevant patterns are established here, and their effect on pay discrimination is explored further in chapters 3 and 4. 

2.2 Race

2.2.1 Pay discrimination 

This report found limited evidence on the pattern and prevalence of pay discrimination on the basis of race. Some evidence was found on pay discrimination resulting from outsourced work, with people from ethnic minorities being paid less as a result of outsourcing arrangements. For example, on 9 October 2025, it was reported that NHS hospital workers voted to strike in relation to unequal pay resulting from outsourced work.^{[footnote 15]} For several years, workers, who were predominantly from ethnic minority backgrounds, had been outsourced. Recently, they have been insourced to the NHS. They claim they have lost more than £36 million in pay and pension contributions in the years that they were outsourced workers and voted to strike in relation to this issue.

2.2.2 Pay gaps

There is evidence that ethnicity pay gaps exist in the UK.^{[footnote 16]} There is not one ethnic pay gap, but rather a range arising for different ethnic identities, at the intersection with different protected and non-protected characteristics. Sex, age, education and migration status all intersect with respect to ethnicity and pay, resulting in a picture that is intricate and varied.^{[footnote 17]} 

The available evidence also indicates that an individual’s specific racial or ethnic identity as well as their religious identity and relative position on the pay distribution scale have significant impacts on pay.^{[footnote 18]} The intersection of race and disability is considered below as the evidence is more complex.^{[footnote 19]}

The examples below are illustrative rather than comprehensive of these points. The evidence indicates that:  

• men from Indian ethnic backgrounds working at the top end of the pay distribution scale have a higher median pay than White men – men from Indian ethnic backgrounds working at the bottom end of the pay distribution scale make less than White men^{[footnote 20]}

• men from Black Caribbean ethnic backgrounds earn less than White men at every point of the pay distribution scale^{[footnote 21]}

• women from Pakistani ethnic backgrounds have different pay patterns than women from Black Caribbean ethnic backgrounds^{[footnote 22]}

• women from Indian, Chinese and Black Caribbean ethnic backgrounds have a higher median pay than White women^{[footnote 23]} 

• women from Pakistani, Bangladeshi and Black African ethnic backgrounds have a lower median pay than White women^{[footnote 24]}

• older women from Black Caribbean ethnic backgrounds at the bottom end of the pay distribution have higher average pay than White women, but men from Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds with the same characteristics are more likely to suffer a substantive pay gap in comparison to White men^{[footnote 25]}

2.2.3 Identifying drivers 

There are multiple drivers which explain patterns in pay. The relationship between drivers and patterns is complex, with any given driver explaining a different proportion of the diverse patterns with respect to race and pay. Discrimination, interpreted in the relevant literature as differential treatment arising from prejudice and stereotyping, is identified by several academic studies as a main cause of pay gaps.^{[footnote 26]} Discrimination can also refer to indirectly discriminatory practices and broader patterns of structural and institutional inequality driving pay gaps.^{[footnote 27]}

There is evidence of pay gaps within the workplaces which are linked to discrete employment practices.^{[footnote 28]} People from ethnic minority backgrounds report feeling over-skilled for their roles, isolated from social networks within the workplace, burdened by stereotypes with respect to their productivity and treated unfairly with respect to career development opportunities and promotion.^{[footnote 29]} 

Occupation is a main cause of wage gaps. The rising pay gaps for men from Black Caribbean ethnic backgrounds are attributed to occupational segregation.^{[footnote 30]} Men from Indian and Chinese ethnic backgrounds are more likely to be in professional and managerial roles in high-pay sectors.^{[footnote 31]} Men from Bangladeshi, Pakistani, Black African and Black Caribbean ethnic backgrounds concentrate in precarious and low-paid sectors of the economy, such as hospitality, public transport, social care, retail and security.^{[footnote 32]} These sectors of the economy have limited career progression opportunities, which may also explain why pay gaps are more pronounced for older men. These areas of the economy are marked with a high degree of outsourcing, which negatively impacts on ethnicity pay gaps and has implications for access to redress.

The general trend is that education plays a positive role in reducing race pay gaps, but education is not a cure-all.^{[footnote 33]} Men from Black African ethnic backgrounds have higher education levels than White men, but despite this, they have lower pay.^{[footnote 34]}

Broadly, migration status is a main factor – gaps are smaller for people born in the UK. It has been suggested that various factors may explain the role of migration status, including not recognising non-British occupation qualifications, knowledge of the English language, educational attainments and social networks.^{[footnote 35]} 

There are also aspects of ethnic pay gaps that are unexplained.^{[footnote 36]} This reflects that there is still much that remains unclear.

2.2.4 Labour force trends: participation and outsourcing 

There are broader labour force trends that place ethnicity pay gaps in greater context. Across all ethnic minority groups, there is a concentration in London which tends to raise wages.^{[footnote 37]} When looking at pay gaps on a national level, geography appears to make the gaps smaller than they would be without the London pay premium. Employment rates across almost all ethnic groups are rising, though there are notable outliers –  women from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds have low employment rates.^{[footnote 38]} However, people from ethnic minority backgrounds are, on average, more likely to be in part-time work, self-employment and temporary work.^{[footnote 39]} The working conditions of this type of work echo the occupational segregation driver, identified above, and are identified as drivers of pay gaps. In comparison to the population of England and Wales, people from Roma ethnic backgrounds are less likely to be in the labour market, and are more likely to be self-employed if they are.^{[footnote 40]} The prevalence of self-employment also has implications for any potential extensions of the equal pay regime as there will be no comparator to establish an unequal pay for work of equal value. The nature of temporary work may make it more challenging for people to gain the required knowledge of pay to bring forward a claim for pay discrimination.

The other important trend is with respect to outsourcing. The global data indicates that ethnic minority groups and women are overrepresented in outsourced work.^{[footnote 41]} This is understood in the context that people from ethnic minority backgrounds disproportionately work in many of the sectors of the economy dominated by outsourcing. For example, in the rail industry in Britain, approximately 58% of cleaning and catering employees working for train operating companies are from ethnic minority backgrounds.^{[footnote 42]} More specifically, employees from Black African ethnic backgrounds make up 22% of all outsourced cleaners, but only 4% of employees directly employed by train operating companies.^{[footnote 43]} Outsourced work may be marked by lower wages, fewer benefits, lack of career progression and inferior working conditions (for example, limited or no overtime pay or annual leave) when compared with workers who perform same, similar or equivalent work that is performed “in-house”.^{[footnote 44]} One study from the US found that the pay penalty for outsourced workers was as high as 24%.^{[footnote 45]} Another common feature of outsourced work may be lack of pay transparency and managerial discretion in setting pay.^{[footnote 46]} This is a growing area of study and international comparisons may not be applicable to the UK, but the empirical picture will become clearer in the future.

2.3 Disability

2.3.1 Pay discrimination 

There is no data available on the pattern and prevalence of disability pay discrimination.

2.3.2 Labour force trends: participation, unfair treatment and reasonable adjustments

With respect to disability, focusing on pay may give an incomplete picture. Multiple stakeholders emphasised that their concerns centred around labour force exclusion, the failure of employers to make reasonable adjustments to ensure equal participation in work, and more broadly unfair treatment at work.^{[footnote 47]}

According to Office for National Statistics (ONS) data, from 2023 to 2024, 65% of disabled people with one health condition were employed – this went down to 30% for disabled people with 5 or more health conditions.^{[footnote 48]} In 2024, the disability employment rate was 53%, compared with around 82% for non-disabled people.^{[footnote 49]} The evidence indicates that disabled people, in comparison with non-disabled people, are more likely to be self-employed and to be working in small workplaces with fewer than 50 employees.^{[footnote 50]} Between 2023 to 2024, 42.7% of all disabled people who were employed were employed in a small workplace.^{[footnote 51]}

These statistics provide the context and implications that should be considered when seeking to make equal pay rights effective for disabled people. They show that it is less likely that people employed in this manner will be able to identify a comparator to demonstrate pay discrimination.

There are a range of factors that explain employment rates for disabled people, such as educational attainment, transportation links, perceptions that disabled people are too costly to employ, a lack of flexible working opportunities in the labour market that accommodate health and disability requirements, and the failure by employers to make reasonable adjustments.^{[footnote 52]} When disabled people are in the labour force they are concentrated in the lower end of the pay distribution scale, in part-time work and work with fewer opportunities for career progression.^{[footnote 53]}

When disabled people do participate in the labour force, if their impairment is not visible, many express concerns about disclosing this to their employer.^{[footnote 54]} There are fears that disclosure will result in stigmas or stereotyping that will negatively affect their treatment at work – for example, misperceptions that disabled people inherently need significant time off work or are incapable of handling the demands of time sensitive tasks.^{[footnote 55]} For example, one of the findings in chapter 3 is that lack of knowledge makes it challenging to bring a claim for pay discrimination. Some have argued that pay gap reporting can be a measure to overcome knowledge asymmetries between employer and employee.^{[footnote 56]} However, in the context of disability pay discrimination, disability pay gap reporting may not effectively redress this barrier. Disabled people often do not report their disability to their employer as they are concerned of a chilling effect this will have on their employment.^{[footnote 57]} This means that disability gap reports may give an incomplete picture on the true extent of the pay gaps,^{[footnote 58]} and fail to provide knowledge that prompt questions that could be the basis for bringing forward a claim on disability pay discrimination.

Across the lived experience research and stakeholder engagement, participants reported a pattern of employers failing to offer and implement reasonable adjustments, with those provided often limited and inadequate.^{[footnote 59]} This resistance appears more pronounced in relation to non-visible disabilities.^{[footnote 60]}

2.3.3 Establishing the disability pay gap 

The national pay gap, on the basis of median hourly pay, between disabled and non-disabled people is close to 13%.^{[footnote 61]} There is a small increase in the gap when including other forms of pay such as bonuses, incentive or overtime pay.^{[footnote 62]}

Much like with race, disability pay gaps are intersectional. The gap is larger for disabled men than for disabled women.^{[footnote 63]} The type of disability matters for pay. Disabled people with autism, epilepsy or ‘severe or specific learning difficulties’ had larger pay gaps.^{[footnote 64]} Sex and the nature of the disability also intersect as men with learning difficulties have a very high pay gap (around 60%) but the intersection of these protected characteristics was not found to be statistically significant for women.^{[footnote 65]} Similarly, men with mental health conditions have a higher pay gap when compared with women with mental health conditions.^{[footnote 66]} The pay gap for disabled people with an activity and work limiting disability, is higher for men than for women.^{[footnote 67]}

Race is another important factor to account for when examining disability pay gaps. Disabled men from Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black African ethnic backgrounds have larger pay gaps than White disabled men, but this does not appear to be true for disabled women from Bangladeshi, Pakistani and Black African ethnic backgrounds when compared with White disabled women.^{[footnote 68]} 

Pay scale distribution is also related to pay. Pay gaps are larger at the higher end of the pay distribution scale and this is thought to be a function of greater pay discretion common at the higher end of the pay scale.^{[footnote 69]} The Trades Union Congress identified finance, insurance, scientific and technical industries, which they note are higher paid industries, as having notable disability pay gaps.^{[footnote 70]}

2.3.4 Drivers of disability pay gaps

Disability pay gaps are driven by several overlapping factors, creating complex patterns. Disabled people have lower educational attainment rates on average when compared with non-disabled people. For those who are disabled when they are young, they are less likely to obtain education qualifications.^{[footnote 71]} This lack, which may be a product of systemic inequalities in education,^{[footnote 72]} steers disabled people into low pay work, including part time work.^{[footnote 73]}

As outlined above, the nature of the disability can affect pay. There is some evidence from the US that reasonable adjustments are associated with a decline in pay suggesting that employers pass on the costs of the adjustment to the disabled person.^{[footnote 74]}

The sector of the economy also appears to be a driver, as the disability pay gaps are larger in the private sector than the public.^{[footnote 75]} One study found it was almost 6% higher in the private sector.^{[footnote 76]}

Furthermore, sector, sex and pay distribution scale also intersect. For disabled women working in the public sector at the lower end of the pay distribution scale, there is no significant pay gap.^{[footnote 77]} However, for men working in the private sector, the disability pay gap increases across the pay distribution scale. Some evidence theorises that these differences are a function of greater pay transparency in the public sector.^{[footnote 78]} 

Discrimination against disabled people is also an important driver and can manifest and affect pay in different ways.^{[footnote 79]} Disabled participants in the lived experience research felt employers would make assumptions about their fitness for tasks and would frustrate their agency over their employment, as employers would make decisions on what they believed would be in disabled people’s best interests.^{[footnote 80]} Related to this, discrimination in the application of promotion criteria and in career progression opportunities drives disability pay gaps.^{[footnote 81]} It is communicated, either implicitly or explicitly, that disabled people do not have the skills, experience, abilities or commitment to make progress within the workplace. As with ethnicity pay gaps, this is an evolving field. Over time, it can be anticipated that there will be a greater understanding of these drivers and what they reveal about pay discrimination.

2.4 Sex

2.4.1 Pay discrimination 

There is no widely available data on sex pay discrimination. Stakeholders did, however, observe patterns in the litigation on sex pay discrimination. Litigation, particularly high-profile litigation, has clustered around large-scale unionised workplaces, often within the public sector, that have structured organisation, where it is possible to access pay data and compare pay across jobs and grades.^{[footnote 82]} However, this is only an observable pattern with respect to accountability and does not reflect on-the-ground patterns or empirical realities of sex pay discrimination.

2.4.2 Pay gaps

Unlike race and disability pay gaps, sex pay gaps have long been the subject of study, with decades of research seeking to uncover patterns and drivers. Like race and disability pay gaps, sex pay gaps are similarly intersectional. As the evidence analysed above indicates, ethnicity, disability, age, and migration status intersect with sex, impacting on pay gaps. Similarly, an individual’s educational attainment, position on the pay distribution scale, and whether they work in the public or private sector all shape pay gaps. 

In 2024, ONS reported that the pay gap on the basis of hourly median pay between men and women working full-time was 7%.^{[footnote 83]} This figure shifts, however, when including part-time work – the sex pay gap on the basis of hourly median pay then rises to 13%.^{[footnote 84]} Women predominate in part-time work and part-time work is lower paid per hour in comparison to full-time work.^{[footnote 85]} The gap is also estimated to be larger when other forms of remuneration are included in the calculation of pay gaps such as overtime pay.^{[footnote 86]} As outlined above, it is important to put these figures in context. Disabled women, and women from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds have low rates of labour force participation,^{[footnote 87]} meaning that pay gap data in isolation can provide a distorted picture.

Although there are outliers, the pay gap widens as women get older.^{[footnote 88]} Pay gaps increase when women have children, with the Trades Union Congress finding that pay gaps between women with and without children was 11%.^{[footnote 89]} However, it is important to take an intersectional lens. Women from Chinese and Black Caribbean ethnic backgrounds with children have higher hourly pay than women of the same backgrounds without children.^{[footnote 90]}

Much like race and disability, position on the pay distribution scale matters. Sex pay gaps are larger at the higher end of the pay distribution scale. At the 90th percentile of the pay distribution scale, the sex pay gap is 15.5% – at the 10th percentile it is only 2.7%.^{[footnote 91]} 

There are certain sectors of the economy where pay gaps are more pronounced. Gaps are smaller in the public sector in comparison with the private sector for full-time workers. For part-time workers, the pay gap is ‘negligible’ in the private sector and ‘large’ in the public sector.^{[footnote 92]} For full-time employees, gaps are smallest in transportation and storage (1.3%) and administrative and services support (3.2%), and largest in the financial and insurance industries (25.2%).^{[footnote 93]} 

While geography appears to play a role, as gaps are higher in London and the south-east,^{[footnote 94]} this may be a function of higher earners congregating in that part of the country, and the larger pay gaps at the higher end of the pay distribution scale.^{[footnote 95]} 

2.4.2 Identifying drivers 

There are several drivers that may explain sex pay gaps. First, the structures of the labour market and caring responsibilities are primary drivers of pay gaps. The Institute of Fiscal Studies found that “women’s earnings fall sharply when they become parents”^{[footnote 96]} whereas “men are almost entirely unaffected by parenthood.”^{[footnote 97]} Due to their caring responsibilities, women’s working patterns change, which negatively impacts their pay. They shift from full-time to part-time employment, and some leave employment altogether.^{[footnote 98]} Leaving the labour market is more common for those with the lowest educational attainments.^{[footnote 99]} 

With respect to ethnicity, sex and parenting, the Fawcett Society concluded that these shifts in employment patterns and the effect on pay gaps was a function of the lack of affordable, appropriate and culturally sensitive early childhood education and care.^{[footnote 100]} They found that only 66% of parents from Pakistani and Bangladeshi ethnic backgrounds take up free early childhood education and care and concluded that this is because this type of care is not consistently given in a culturally sensitive manner.^{[footnote 101]} Using data from 2014 to 2022, ONS calculated that, on average, women in the UK lose over £65,000 in the initial 5 years after the birth of their first child.^{[footnote 102]}

Second, education matters for understanding pay gaps. Despite increases in educational attainments, there has been minimal change in pay gaps among employees ‘qualified to degree standard since the early 1990s.’^{[footnote 103]} However, pay gaps have gone down for those whose highest qualifications are a GCSE or A-levels.

A third, important driver is occupational segregation. Women cluster in the lowest paid occupations and are less well represented in high pay occupations and professions. One stakeholder explained that occupational segregation must be understood against a backdrop both of women’s caring responsibilities and gendered socio-cultural norms that shape everything from school subject choice to perceptions of the skills, effort and responsibility of women.^{[footnote 104]} 

Discrimination against women, which interacts with the other drivers, is also itself an important driver. Understood narrowly as actions driven by prejudice, stigma, stereotypes and negative cultural attitudes, discrimination drives sex pay gaps. For example, there are studies that find that women are penalised with respect to their pay when they seek to negotiate higher salaries. There also continues to be a stigma against mothers returning to work, with employers making assumptions on women’s commitment to work after having children.^{[footnote 105]}

2.5 Insights: patterns of pay discrimination 

There is much about the patterns and prevalence of pay discrimination that remains unknown.  The vast majority of the research, data and literature in the field focuses not on pay discrimination but more broadly on pay gaps. These evidentiary gaps and trends, however, bring into focus systemic challenges in redressing pay discrimination and how the pay discrimination laws are conceptualised in everyday life.  

There are potential overlapping explanations for the lack of evidence on patterns and prevalence of pay discrimination.

First, the lack of pay transparency with respect to equal pay for work of equal value and the absence of any reporting requirements in relation to pay discrimination means obtaining comprehensive and systematic data on the patterns and prevalence of pay discrimination is difficult. In contrast, there are legal obligations to report on pay gaps and there is much more readily available public data on pay gaps. This makes unequal pay an opaque area of inquiry, limiting the evidential basis for potential reform.

Second, most individuals and employers do not conceptualise concerns on pay in the terms of the legal understanding of pay discrimination, possibly reflecting that in common vernacular ‘pay discrimination’ is an umbrella term for the relationship between pay and equality.

A holistic understanding of pay, discrimination, equal work for equal value, pay gaps and broader patterns of labour force participation, however, is essential for understanding how individuals seek and secure redress and how to prevent pay discrimination.

3. Access to redress 

3.1 Avenues for redress: law, procedure and process

In Great Britain, pay discrimination can be challenged under the Equality Act 2010. There are 2 main ways to make a claim Claims relating to sex discrimination in contractual pay must be brought under the act’s equal pay provisions.^{[footnote 106]} Claims based on other protected characteristics, such as race or disability, must proceed as cases of direct or indirect discrimination.^{[footnote 107]} The different approach taken to sex-based pay discrimination is historical rather than principled,^{[footnote 108]} but it has important implications, including in respect of the procedure a claim must follow, the evidentiary standards that apply and the remedies that may be awarded.

3.1.1 Equal pay claims

Chapter 3, Part 5 of the Equality Act 2010 provides the legal framework for ensuring that men and women in the same employment performing equal work receive equal pay, unless any difference in pay can be justified. The regime applies not only to a person’s basic salary, but also to other contractual terms of employment such as occupational pension benefits, non-discretionary bonuses and holiday entitlements.^{[footnote 109]} It does not extend to non-contractual matters, such as promotions or discretionary bonuses.^{[footnote 110]} 

The act operates by implying a “sex equality clause” into employment contracts, which modifies any less favourable terms in a person’s contract to match those of a comparator of the opposite sex, unless the difference can be justified. Differences between the terms of employees of different sexes can be justified where the difference is due to a “material factor.” A material factor is a factor which results in differences in pay between those of different sexes, but which does not involve treating a person differently because of their sex or – if the factor puts persons of one sex at a particular disadvantage – it is a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.^{[footnote 111]}

Work is considered equal under the act if it involves:

• like work – where tasks performed are broadly similar, without practically important differences

• work rated equivalent – where a job evaluation study assesses roles as being of equal value by reference to factors such as effort, skill and decision-making^{[footnote 112]}

• work of equal value – where work is neither “like”, or “rated as equivalent” to a comparator’s work but is nevertheless assessed by an employment tribunal as equal in terms of the demands made on the claimant by reference to factors such as skill, effort and decision-making responsibilities^{[footnote 113]}

To bring an equal pay case, a claimant must identify a suitable comparator of the opposite sex whose work is “like”, “rated equivalent” or “of equal value”. The comparator must be in the “same employment,” which generally means working for the same or an associated employer, either at the same establishment or at a different one where common terms and conditions apply or could be transposed.^{[footnote 114]} In limited circumstances, a comparator may be employed by a different employer if a single body is responsible for setting terms and is in a position to ensure equal treatment.^{[footnote 115]} A complex body of case law has developed around these conditions, and the majority of equal pay cases that have reached the UK Supreme Court have focused on this threshold question – whether the claimant is entitled to compare themselves to a colleague in a different part of the organisation or under a different contractual arrangement.^{[footnote 116]}

Comparison in equal pay cases is undertaken on a term-by-term basis, with each contractual provision considered individually rather than through a generalised assessment of the overall pay package.^{[footnote 117]} A claimant may rely on more than one comparator, and where different comparators have more favourable terms, those specific terms may be updated accordingly.^{[footnote 118]} However, where terms are closely linked – such as hourly pay and a related bonus scheme – the courts may construe them together.^{[footnote 119]} Importantly, a comparator must be real and identifiable. As a result, while it is possible to compare terms with a former employee, it is not generally possible to establish a claim based on the terms of a potential successor.^{[footnote 120]}

The need to identify a “real” comparator has been recognised as a significant limitation of equal pay legislation. As detailed further below, the general lack of transparency about pay can prevent individuals from discovering pay disparities and therefore from identifying a comparator and bringing a claim. In highly segregated workplaces, there may be no actual person of the opposite sex for an individual to compare themselves with.^{[footnote 121]} The same difficulty can arise in small organisations where there may be too few employees to identify a real comparator. In such cases, a claim of direct sex discrimination may be brought by virtue of section 71 of the Equality Act, which applies when the sex equality clause has no effect.^{[footnote 122]} While hypothetical comparators may be relied upon in such direct discrimination cases, there has been little judicial consideration of this provision^{[footnote 123]} and its full scope and effect remains uncertain.^{[footnote 124]} 

After passing these preliminary stages, it must be shown that the claimant’s work is “equal” to that of their chosen comparator.^{[footnote 125]} If a difference in pay is established, the employer may defend it by showing that the disparity is due to a material factor that is not related to sex.^{[footnote 126]} This defence is not available where the disparity is a consequence of direct sex discrimination.^{[footnote 127]} In addition, if the material factor puts women at a particular disadvantage compared to men, the employer must show that it is pursuing a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.^{[footnote 128]} The “long-term objective of reducing inequality between men’s and women’s terms of work” will always be considered legitimate under the Act.^{[footnote 129]} In practice, this means that transitional measures (such as pay protection schemes) aimed at addressing historical pay disparities may be justified. 

3.1.2 Direct and indirect discrimination

While equal pay claims are specifically concerned with sex-based disparities in contractual terms, protections against pay discrimination are found in other provisions of the Equality Act 2010. These apply to all protected characteristics, including disability and race, and cover both direct and indirect discrimination in all areas of employment (and in other areas of life).^{[footnote 130]} Claims in this context are typically brought under Sections 13 or 19 of the act and do not rely on the equality clause mechanism.^{[footnote 131]} These provisions also apply to sex discrimination claims that do not concern contractual terms.^{[footnote 132]}

Direct discrimination occurs where a person is treated less favourably than another because of a protected characteristic.^{[footnote 133]} The test is comparative and may be based on a real or hypothetical comparator, provided there is no material difference in circumstances.^{[footnote 134]} The motive or intention underpinning the differential treatment is irrelevant. Liability may arise even when a responsible actor is unaware that they acted on a discriminatory basis.^{[footnote 135]} Crucially, the protected characteristic must be the cause of the less favourable treatment.^{[footnote 136]} Direct discrimination cannot be justified, except in limited circumstances provided by the Act.^{[footnote 137]}

Indirect discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice (PCP) puts individuals who share a protected characteristic at a particular disadvantage compared to others. There is no need to explain the reasons why a PCP puts some at disadvantage. However, it is necessary to establish a causal link.^{[footnote 138]} In practice, the success of an indirect discrimination claim hinges on the identification of an appropriate pool for comparison. The pool selected can produce ‘startlingly different results.’^{[footnote 139]} It should include all workers that stand to be affected by a PCP, and must not be drawn so narrowly as to ‘incorporate the disputed condition.’^{[footnote 140]} This is not a fact-finding exercise, but rather a matter of logic – identifying the correct PCP will help to identify the pool for comparison.^{[footnote 141]} Indirect discrimination is a complex concept and the choice of pool is often a point of contention in legal proceedings.^{[footnote 142]} Once the relevant comparator pool and PCP have been identified, it must be shown that its application places the individual (and the group) at particular disadvantage.^{[footnote 143]} This is often, although not exclusively, proven by statistical information, which may create challenges for claimants.^{[footnote 144]} 

To further a claim of direct or indirect discrimination in respect of pay, a worker must present prima facie^{[footnote 145]} evidence that pay discrimination has occurred.^{[footnote 146]} The burden of proof then shifts to the employer. In the case of direct discrimination claims, the employer must demonstrate that the difference in pay was not based on an individual’s protected characteristic. In the case of indirect discrimination, the employer must demonstrate that the PCP was justified as a proportionate means of achieving a legitimate aim.^{[footnote 147]} 

Compared to equal pay claims, there is very limited case law on race and disability pay discrimination.^{[footnote 148]} The concept of “equal value” rarely fits within the direct or indirect discrimination provisions of the Equality Act. Section 39 prohibits discrimination in a person’s terms of employment but does not expressly guarantee equal pay for work of equal value. Practitioners have noted that the concept will rarely map onto direct and indirect discrimination provisions, which are governed by distinct legal and evidentiary standards.^{[footnote 149]} In direct and indirect discrimination claims, any comparator must be in materially similar circumstances.^{[footnote 150]} This may present a barrier in discrimination complaints concerning pay, because claimant groups and comparators may be in different departments or occupational roles. For example, where ethnic minority workers are in lower-paid cleaning positions and White workers in higher-paid maintenance work, it may be difficult to argue that they are in materially similar circumstances.^{[footnote 151]}

The discrimination model does offer at least one clear advantage over equal pay provisions: equal pay law cannot address situations where someone is paid disproportionately less for work which is not of equal value.^{[footnote 152]} No such restriction applies to indirect discrimination claims where the disproportionate differential will be relevant. However, where the claim is based on sex, this avenue is effectively closed. Pay is excluded from the general sex discrimination provisions, and section 71 permits only direct discrimination claims. As a result, a sex-based claim for disproportionately low pay cannot proceed under the Equality Act.

Reasonable adjustments and equal pay

Under the Equality Act, employers are required to make reasonable adjustments for disabled workers.^{[footnote 153]} A 2024 Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) study found that disagreements in this area were a common trigger for disability discrimination claims before employment tribunals.^{[footnote 154]} Employers and employees had different opinions on what is reasonable in light of job requirements. Some employees stated that employers were slow to implement changes, while others reported that measures previously agreed were withdrawn following a change of management. Conversely, employer participants in the study reported feeling that those seeking adjustments were “simply underperforming or incapable of doing their job” or that they had exhausted all available options in respect of reasonable adjustments. ^{[footnote 155]} 

There is limited evidence on how reasonable adjustments interact with pay.^{[footnote 156]} However, the issue has arisen in tribunal proceedings. While there is no automatic right to pay protection, maintaining an employee’s existing pay when transferring roles or responsibilities may constitute a reasonable adjustment.^{[footnote 157]} Much will depend on the circumstances of a case, including the needs and expectations of the employee and the resources of the employer.^{[footnote 158]} There may be a risk, if the equal pay regime is extended to disability, that workers whose pay is already protected as part of a reasonable adjustment package could see it reduced – for instance where a job evaluation study does not accommodate the difference in pay that is a function of reasonable adjustment. Guidance may be needed to ensure that higher pay linked to such adjustments is not subject to challenge as a result of any proposed change to the law.^{[footnote 159]}

3.1.3 Procedure, remedy and redress

The process for initiating an equal pay claim is broadly similar to that for challenging pay discrimination on other protected characteristics.^{[footnote 160]} In both cases, a claimant is required to notify the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS) before instituting legal proceedings.^{[footnote 161]} ACAS will attempt to mediate the dispute through its early conciliation process.

Previously, the time limit for bringing claims differed, depending on the avenue which is being pursued.^{[footnote 162]} In equal pay cases (based on sex), there is a 6 month time limit for bringing a claim, starting from the worker’s last day of employment.^{[footnote 163]} Claims brought under the direct or indirect discrimination provisions must be brought within 3 months of the last act complained of.^{[footnote 164]} However, the Employment Tribunals retain discretion to extend the time limit where it is just and equitable to do so.^{[footnote 165]} The Employment Rights Act 2025 increased the time limit for all claims before an employment tribunal to 6 months, eliminating the disparity between equal pay and discrimination claims.^{[footnote 166]} 

Remedies for pay discrimination differ, depending on whether a claim is brought on the basis of sex, or another protected characteristic. Where an equal pay claim succeeds, an “equality clause” is read into the terms of the claimant’s contract of employment, with the effect of modifying any terms which are discriminatory in effect.^{[footnote 167]} A person whose equal pay claim is successful is entitled to arrears of pay for a period of up to 6 years before the date the claim was brought (in England and Wales), or up to 5 years (in Scotland).^{[footnote 168]} Non-material damages for injury to feelings are not available. By contrast, in pay discrimination cases brought on other protected characteristics, a successful claimant is entitled to both material damages – including arrears in pay – and non-material damages for injury to feelings.^{[footnote 169]}

A remedy that is not available to claimants in direct and indirect discrimination cases is pay auditing. Where an employer is found liable for a breach of the equal pay provisions, the tribunal is required to order that they undertake a pay audit, unless a specific exception applies.^{[footnote 170]} According to the relevant regulations, the audit must include gender pay information. An employer is required to identify any differences in pay, and the reasons for those differences. The audit should include information on the reasons for the prior breach of equal pay provisions. Employers are required to develop an action plan to avoid future (or continuing) breaches.^{[footnote 171]} A failure to act can lead to fines.^{[footnote 172]} However, as the vast majority of cases are either settled or withdrawn before a tribunal reaches a final decision ‘the reality is that an equal pay claim will almost never reach the stage at which the tribunal has to consider whether or not to order an audit’.^{[footnote 173]}

Finally, a difference between the 2 avenues is that in discrimination cases, individuals can be named as respondents and held personally liable under the Act.^{[footnote 174]} By contrast, only the employer (the legal entity) can be named in equal pay claims.^{[footnote 175]} This has an important consequence. If a specific individual is named, a claimant may still recover compensation even if the employer is insolvent.^{[footnote 176]}

3.1.4 Justiciability 

In order for a person to secure redress for pay discrimination the claim must be justiciable – it must be possible to challenge the acts under law.^{[footnote 177]} There must be no gaps in the law or barriers embedded in the design of the law that make it impossible to bring a claim.

The provisions of the Equality Act 2010 discussed above provide individuals with mechanisms to challenge pay discrimination. However, as discussed, both the equal pay provisions and the direct and indirect discrimination provisions have limitations, meaning that in some instances claims of pay discrimination are not justiciable – they cannot be challenged under the law. 

Under the equal pay provisions, claims cannot be brought where there is no actual, real comparator. Where a claimant cannot identify a real comparator, a claim using a hypothetical comparator can be brought under section 71, but this only applies to cases of direct discrimination. In practice, few such cases have been brought.^{[footnote 178]} An academic expert interviewed for this report noted that the focus on comparators is one way in which the equal pay provisions ‘reflect specific assumptions about the workplace’ which no longer hold true: the changing nature of the workplace – with contracts which are more individualised and fragmented pay structures – increases the difficulties of comparing roles.^{[footnote 179]} As discussed in section 3.1.2 above, in addition to the challenges associated with comparison, the equal pay provisions cannot be used to challenge disproportionately low pay.

On the other hand, while it has not been tested,^{[footnote 180]} it appears highly unlikely that a claim for failure to provide equal pay for work of equal value would succeed if brought under the s13 and s19 direct or indirect discrimination provisions. As discussed, equal value claims presuppose that the claimant and comparator are undertaking different work, while the comparator in discrimination claims must be in materially similar circumstances,^{[footnote 181]} meaning that the concept of equal pay for work of equal value will rarely map onto the direct or indirect discrimination provisions.

More broadly, it is important to recognise that the act provides no mechanism for workers to challenge other causes of pay inequality, as discussed in chapter 2. This includes pay gaps arising as a result of: 

• occupational segregation 
• differences in career progression 
• disproportionate pay between those at different points in the pay scale 
• or the impacts of part-time working or career breaks – unless these causes are themselves discriminatory and open to challenge 

In this respect, the avenues available in law do not reflect the needs of individual workers: individuals interviewed for the lived‑experience research conducted alongside this study, understood pay discrimination more broadly. 

As highlighted in chapter 2, the gap in legal protection is arguably at its most stark when considering the current position of outsourced workers. The current equal pay scheme does not allow someone working for one employer to compare their contractual terms, as part of an equal pay claim, with someone working for another employer. The identification of an employment relationship has been a central concern of labour legislation.^{[footnote 182]} Those that do not meet the legal definition of an employee can find themselves outside the scope of protection.^{[footnote 183]} This has had particularly troubling implications for equality law in general and pay discrimination cases in particular: both sex-based and race-based pay discrimination claims have failed where work has been outsourced to third-party providers.^{[footnote 184]} 

3.2 Access to redress

Ensuring redress for those who experience pay discrimination requires more than prohibiting it in law and establishing a procedure through which it can be challenged – it requires that justice can be accessed in practice.^{[footnote 185]} The evidence gathered for this report demonstrates that a range of barriers can prevent individuals who have experienced pay discrimination from asserting their rights and securing redress.

Our research finds that there are at least 10 preconditions for effective redress for employees experiencing pay discrimination:

1. Awareness that pay discrimination has occurred 
2. Knowledge of the law, procedure and required evidence 
3. Confidence and willingness to bring a case 
4. Support from lawyers or other experts 
5. Access to mechanisms for enforcement 
6. Resources to bring and pursue a claim 
7. Time to bring a claim within cut off periods and resilience to pursue lengthy proceedings 
8. Evidence to demonstrate that pay discrimination has occurred 
9. Remedy which is sufficient to compensate for the harm experienced 
10. Enforcement of the remedy to ensure that the compensation is received 

The absence of any one of these preconditions acts as a barrier. Each is a hurdle which must be overcome. Potential claimants can fall at every hurdle, with the effect that those who continue to the end of the process represent a minority of those who may consider bringing a claim. There is also evidence that these barriers operate synergistically, fuelling and reinforcing one another.

3.2.1 Awareness

Awareness is the first step in the process of achieving redress. For an individual to challenge pay discrimination, they must first be aware that they have been paid less than their colleagues. While it is unlawful to impose a contractual requirement of non-disclosure of pay,^{[footnote 186]} ‘there is no corresponding demand for pay transparency’.^{[footnote 187]} Together with social norms around discussing pay,^{[footnote 188]} this means that individuals often do not know how their pay relates to that of their colleagues.^{[footnote 189]} Most will never have access to the evidence which they need to determine whether they are paid less than their colleagues and establish that any pay difference is related to a protected characteristic.^{[footnote 190]} 

One expert consulted for this report stated that this lack of access to pay data is ‘the biggest hurdle’ to complaints.^{[footnote 191]} In 2019, the Fawcett Society surveyed 1,002 women, finding that just 33% knew how much all of their male colleagues working in the same or similar roles were paid.^{[footnote 192]} It is not possible to state with certainty how many potential claims have not been litigated because claimants were unaware of pay differences. Information shared by experts in the field^{[footnote 193]} indicates that the proportion of pay discrimination cases which result in a claim being filed is very low.

3.2.2 Knowledge and understanding

To bring a pay discrimination claim, individuals need sufficient knowledge of their rights and the procedure, together with sufficient understanding of the evidence which they need to produce, to start a claim. Many, however, do not know their rights.^{[footnote 194]} Others struggle to understand whether what they have experienced ‘would be classed as discrimination’^{[footnote 195]} or to articulate their experiences using abstract legal concepts such as “equal value”.^{[footnote 196]} The complexity of the law means that even those who know their rights may still lack the necessary understanding to develop and file their claim without support. As one stakeholder explained, ‘there’s no way an individual could bring an equal pay claim and understand what they’ve got to do.’^{[footnote 197]} Interviews with those with lived experience confirmed that many found it difficult to articulate their experiences in legal concepts, felt unable to prove that disparities were linked to their protected characteristics, or did not know the correct procedure to follow.^{[footnote 198]}

3.2.3 Confidence

Individuals who have the information and understanding needed to bring a claim may still refrain from filing a complaint or bringing a case to tribunal due to fear, lack of confidence or lack of faith in the system. In a 2023 survey of 2,000 women regarding pay undertaken by the law firm Stewarts, less than half (48.5%) of the respondents stated that they would raise an internal complaint if they discovered that they were paid less than their male colleagues, while only 37.6% stated that they would consider taking their employer to tribunal.^{[footnote 199]} Together with cost and complexity, reasons cited for not challenging pay discrimination included stress, the risk of losing, and fears of adverse effect on reputation and career.^{[footnote 200]}

There are indications that these factors can be an even more profound deterrent for other groups. Individuals who believed they had experience of race discrimination in the workplace reported peer pressure, lack of faith that a claim would be successful, and concerns about “burning bridges” as factors preventing them from bringing claims.^{[footnote 201]} Experts in the field cited various factors impacting on the willingness to bring a claim. Together with lack of faith in the system^{[footnote 202]} these include: 

• an expectation that they will not be believed^{[footnote 203]} 
• concerns over stigma and vilification^{[footnote 204]} 
• fear of losing a job^{[footnote 205]} 
• fear of reputational damage or reprisal^{[footnote 206]} 
• and concerns over loss of income^{[footnote 207]}

Interviews with individuals who had brought a complaint of pay discrimination also found evidence of attempts by employers to discourage or dissuade claimants, or of pressure to settle.^{[footnote 208]} A report from the Trades Union Congress found that only 19% of those subjected to racial harassment at work had reported the most recent incident to their employer.^{[footnote 209]} 

The emotional toll of challenging pay discrimination

Alongside this research, a team from the Public Service Consultants undertook 16 interviews with people of their experience of pay discrimination on the basis of race and 13 with people of their experience of  pay discrimination on the basis of their disability.^{[footnote 210]} These interviews corroborated many of the findings from the literature about barriers preventing access to justice. They also provided compelling evidence of the personal emotional toll which challenging pay discrimination can have. Individuals spoke of stress, anxiety, depression and other mental health challenges.^{[footnote 211]} Financial concerns were also raised, both about the costs of litigation and fears of lost income as a result of pursuing a claim.^{[footnote 212]} More broadly, respondents stated that the experience made them feel devalued and lose confidence,^{[footnote 213]} with some stating that they had taken lower paid roles after their experiences.^{[footnote 214]}

3.2.4 Availability of legal support and complexity

Complex laws and procedures have a direct negative effect on those seeking to use a court system.^{[footnote 215]} The stakeholder consultation repeatedly stressed the complexity of equal pay claims.^{[footnote 216]} As discussed in more detail below, equal pay claimants face severe evidentiary challenges, in particular in identifying a relevant comparator, demonstrating that jobs are rated equivalent or proving that 2 different roles are of “equal value”. Those bringing claims of direct or indirect discrimination face different – but also challenging – evidentiary requirements. Complexity acts as a “triple threat” to redress: it has a deterrent effect, impairing the confidence of potential claimants,^{[footnote 217]} it is an obstacle in proving claims, given the evidentiary challenges of equal pay violations,^{[footnote 218]} and it is a driver of both the length and the cost of proceedings.^{[footnote 219]} 

Given the complexity of the law in this area, legal support is seen as essential for potential claimants to succeed.^{[footnote 220]} Such support includes not only legal representation during the tribunal process, but also initial advice. Of the 29 individuals with experience of pay discrimination interviewed by the Public Service Consultants, 20 had sought advice from one or more support organisations.^{[footnote 221]} However, accessing legal support is increasingly challenging. Cuts at Law Centres and Citizens Advice Bureaus mean that it is very difficult for individuals to access frontline legal advice, creating a ‘critical barrier to justice.’^{[footnote 222]} While trade unions can play an important role, most people are not in unionised workplaces.^{[footnote 223]}

Beyond initial advice, legal representation is considered essential. As one expert told our researchers: ‘without representation, bringing a case is incredibly difficult.’^{[footnote 224]} This was reiterated by many experts, with one citing the ‘scary’ prospect of ‘adversarial and legalistic and complicated’ tribunal hearings,^{[footnote 225]} while others noted that those without representation ‘have poor success rates in hearings.’^{[footnote 226]} However, as explored below, the limited scope for accessing legal aid in discrimination cases^{[footnote 227]} together with the limited number of lawyers with the requisite expertise in equality law,^{[footnote 228]} means that professional legal support is inaccessible to many claimants.

3.2.5 Accessibility

For those bringing a claim, a range of practical barriers – geographical, physical, environmental, linguistic, communicative and technological^{[footnote 229]} – can impede access to justice. These barriers deter prospective claimants, with the most marginalised most affected. As one expert noted, ethnic minority and disabled people are ‘the least likely to bring claims because of all the other barriers they face.^{[footnote 230]} Groups exposed to discrimination can experience barriers to justice which do not affect others. Research on access to justice for disabled people, for example, identifies barriers before, during and after legal proceedings, including laws and practices which restrict or limit legal capacity and the geographical or physical inaccessibility of court buildings and procedures.^{[footnote 231]} Language and communication barriers can prevent effective access both for disabled people and those whose first language is not English.^{[footnote 232]} 

3.2.6 Cost

Cost is one of the most significant barriers preventing access to justice for those experiencing pay discrimination.^{[footnote 233]} Potential claimants face costs at 2 different levels – the costs of litigating a claim, in particular the costs of representation,^{[footnote 234]} and the cost of lost income.^{[footnote 235]}

As set out by an expert interviewed as part of this research, the net effect is that the ‘only people that can afford to bring an equal pay claim are either members of a trade union…or very highly paid women in the city.’^{[footnote 236]} In principle, the procedure for litigating a pay discrimination complaint is low cost. Employment tribunal fees were abolished in 2017^{[footnote 237]} and tribunals were ‘designed as a low-cost forum’, where individuals could bring claims without representation.^{[footnote 238]} Claimants can and do represent themselves, avoiding legal costs, but many feel unable to navigate the complexities of the law unaided. An individual with direct experience of challenging pay discrimination explained:

“I cannot fight with the big company who has the money or the best lawyer.”^{[footnote 239]} 

The reality for many claimants is that accessing the tribunal as a low-cost forum leaves them challenging an employer with vastly greater resources.

Access to Legal Aid

In principle, claimants in pay discrimination cases are able to access legal aid, but in practice, this is extremely challenging. Under the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (LASPO), matters concerning a contravention of the Equality Act are eligible for legal aid,^{[footnote 240]} though general employment disputes are not. However, 3 significant challenges must be overcome.

To qualify, claimants must meet financial criteria, with some exceptions, claimants must demonstrate either that they are in receipt of universal credit or another income-related benefit, or that they have disposable income of £733 or less a month.^{[footnote 241]} Second, claimants must find a lawyer to represent them – an enormous challenge in the “legal aid deserts”^{[footnote 242]} created by the fact that ‘[t]here is a big disparity between the hourly rate for legal aid work, and ordinary solicitor or barrister fees.’^{[footnote 243]} Third, claimants must be prepared to represent themselves, given that civil legal aid does not cover “advocacy”, including representation at the employment tribunal itself.

3.2.8 Time

Time is a critical factor in access to justice in pay discrimination claims, with claimants first facing strict time limits at the beginning of the process and then experiencing lengthy litigation. As noted in section 3.1, there are strict time limits for making a claim at the employment tribunal, something which ‘can impose barriers to justice,’^{[footnote 244]} particularly when claimants feel obligated to exhaust internal grievance procedures.^{[footnote 245]} ACAS acknowledges that ‘working out time limits can be complex’ particularly where multiple incidents or multiple issues are at play,^{[footnote 246]} and the Fawcett Society has called for time limits to be extended.^{[footnote 247]} The Employment Rights Act contains provisions to extend time limits for claims before the employment tribunal, such that there is a 6 month time limit for all types of claim.^{[footnote 248]}

Once a case is lodged with the Employment Tribunal, claimants can experience the opposite challenge: lengthy litigation.^{[footnote 249]} While discrimination complaints can last for ‘between 18 months and 2 years,’^{[footnote 250]} large equal pay cases can last much longer. Some of the cases against major supermarkets have been ‘running for over 10 years’ without judgment.^{[footnote 251]} This is largely a function of the evidentiary burden which claimants must discharge to prove that an equal pay violation has occurred, as explored further below. As one expert stated: “It can take 15 or 20 years to get a judgment. People will have joined the organisation, worked there, left, and died before they get justice.”^{[footnote 252]}

3.2.8 Evidence and proof

The process of gathering evidence to support a pay discrimination claim is demanding,^{[footnote 253]} and frequently complicated by limited access to pay information and a lack of transparency in pay structures.^{[footnote 254]} The Equality Act 2010 originally provided for a statutory questionnaire, which allowed a person to request information from their employer to help determine whether they had a valid discrimination or equal pay claim.^{[footnote 255]} This mechanism was abolished in 2014 and replaced by non-binding guidance.^{[footnote 256]} While a failure to respond may give rise to an adverse inference of discrimination, there is currently no legal right to pay transparency.^{[footnote 257]}

The burden of gathering evidence falls almost entirely on the individual claimant. In equal pay cases, these challenges are compounded by the requirement to identify a real comparator working in the same or an associated establishment.^{[footnote 258]} Several high-profile cases have been subject to prolonged litigation on this question, prior to any assessment of equal value.^{[footnote 259]} Even where a person is able to evidence their claim, differences in pay may still be justified by factors such as “market forces” under the material factor defence. One respondent expressed concern that courts are reluctant to scrutinise or challenge the justifications put forward by employers.^{[footnote 260]} Outsourcing, currently, can preclude the identification of a relevant comparator and may be adopted as a means to avoid liability under the act.^{[footnote 261]} 

3.2.9 Remedy

As described in section 3.1, different remedies are available to individuals who have experienced pay discrimination on the basis of their sex, race and disability. In equal pay claims, the only remedy available is back pay for lost earnings over a 5 or 6 year period, non-material damages are not available. Discrimination claims offer an advantage in this respect, as they allow for compensation for injury to feelings, which equal pay claims do not. Compensation for injury to feelings is – in principle – uncapped. The 2025 Employment Tribunal Presidential Guidance provides that compensation in the ‘most serious cases’ should be between £36,400 to £60,700, with the possibility to exceed this in ‘the most exceptional cases’.^{[footnote 262]} At the same time, it should be noted that damages in both types of claims do not take into account the size or resources of the employer.

In practice, most cases are settled. As one trade union representative explained, equal pay claims function less as a route to individual redress and more as a means of exerting pressure on employers to change practice.^{[footnote 263]} This reflects a broader disconnect between the individualised design of the law – with its narrow focus on contractual terms and individual pay discrepancies – and how it operates in reality. Settlements may also be accompanied by confidentiality clauses, which can prevent others from discovering similar pay disparities.^{[footnote 264]} The evidence indicates that the current system neither fully recognises the effect of pay discrimination on individuals, or act as a sufficient deterrent for employers.^{[footnote 265]}

3.2.10 Enforcement

Even if a claimant succeeds at tribunal, there is no guarantee of payment. Enforcing an award often requires additional steps – such as making an application to the county court in England and Wales, or the Sheriff Court in Scotland – increasing the financial and emotional burden on claimants.^{[footnote 266]}

A 2013 government review on the enforcement of all employment tribunal awards found that fewer than half (49%) of tribunal awards were paid in full, and 35% of claimants received nothing at all, though it should be noted that the review was not specific to equal pay claims.^{[footnote 267]}

Insolvency was the most common explanation for non-payment, though many claimants believed the employer continued to trade under a different name or location. Those with legal or union support were more likely to receive payment without enforcement, but barriers remained. Others simply gave up, deterred by the cost, time, and complexity of the process.^{[footnote 268]} 

A naming scheme, designed to support compliance with tribunal orders by publishing the details of non-compliant employers, was introduced in 2018.^{[footnote 269]} However, data released in response to a Freedom of Information request in 2023 revealed that no employers had been named. Moreover, more than half of employers had failed to make payment within 28 days of being instructed to do so.^{[footnote 270]}

3.3 Achieving redress

Analysis of data published by His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) reveals that 4,155 (10%) of the 40,523 equal pay complaints concluded in the period from 2016 to 2021^{[footnote 271]} resulted in conciliated settlements by ACAS, while 38 – 0.09% – were successful at hearing.^{[footnote 272]} In total, 20% of complaints were dismissed, struck out or discontinued, while 189 (0.47 per cent) were unsuccessful at hearing. More than 2 thirds (69%) of all complaints were withdrawn. Analysis of data for the preceding 3 year-period (2013 to 2016) found that more cases had resulted in conciliated settlements (19%) and fewer had been withdrawn (61%), but that levels of success and dismissal at tribunal were near identical.^{[footnote 273]} 

Equal pay complaints disposed of by the Employment Tribunal between 2016 and 2021, by outcome

Outcome	Number	Percentage
Acas conciliated settlements	4,155	10.25%
Successful at hearing	38	0.09%
Unsuccessful at hearing	189	0.47%
Dismissed, struck out or discontinued	8,192	20.22%
Withdrawn	27,949	68.97%
Total	40,523

Quantifying the proportion of equal pay complaints which result in redress is difficult, given the data available. It can be assumed that the small number of cases which are successful at hearing result in full redress – complainants in these cases will receive back pay in line with the statutory guidance. Cases which are settled by ACAS result in some form of redress for the complainant, but it is not possible to assess whether these individuals would feel that the settlement constituted full and effective remedy.

Cases can be withdrawn for a variety of reasons, including because a settlement is reached before a case is decided at tribunal. Data on the reasons for withdrawal of equal pay claims is not available, but withdrawn cases are categorised into 2 groups in the HMCTS data. Approximately 25% of the equal pay cases withdrawn in the period from 2016 to 2021 are listed as “withdrawn” while 75% (52% of all cases concluded in the period) are listed as “dismissed upon withdrawal”. Cases can only be dismissed upon withdrawal where the claimant has not reserved the right to bring a further claim.^{[footnote 274]} It is reasonable to assume that a proportion of these cases were settled. However, without further data, it is not possible to estimate what this proportion is, as cases can also be dismissed upon withdrawal where the claimant concludes that their case is not worth pursuing. Interviews with those involved in equal pay litigation indicate that many cases are withdrawn due to cost, complexity, time and other barriers, rather than because settlements have been reached.^{[footnote 275]}

Equal pay complaints constituted just under 10% of the complaints disposed of by Employment Tribunals in the period between 2016 and 2021 period. Analysis of HMCTS data for other complaints indicates that equal pay complaints were less likely to result in success at hearing or conciliation and more likely to be withdrawn than other complaints. In the period reviewed, the Employment Tribunals received a total of 473,290 of all types. Of these, 13% were successful at hearing and 25% led to conciliated settlements, while 41% were withdrawn. Examining discrimination complaints on the basis of disability, race and sex, all have significantly higher figures for success at hearing (disability 4%, race 3% sex 4%) and conciliation (disability 38%, race 32%, sex 24%) and lower figures for withdrawal (disability 39% race 36%, sex 51%) than those for equal pay claims. 

HMCTS does not provide a breakdown of data on the subject matter of discrimination complaints considered by Employment Tribunals, so it is not possible to determine how many of the 23,739 disability discrimination complaints or the 11,063 race discrimination complaints considered by the tribunals in the period from 2016 to 2021 concerned pay discrimination.

However, a review of legal databases^{[footnote 276]} and relevant literature^{[footnote 277]} identified very few reported cases. For example, of 220 case reports identified as concerning “race discrimination” in the Westlaw legal database in the period from 2016 to 2021, only one case concerning pay discrimination was identified^{[footnote 278]} the appeal in this case was denied on procedural grounds.^{[footnote 279]} While this is not definitive, the comparative rarity of pay discrimination cases on these grounds means that it can be theorised that cases would be reported. Experts consulted for this report agreed that very few – tens – of pay discrimination complaints have been made through the direct or indirect discrimination provisions of the Equality Act since its adoption.^{[footnote 280]} This compares with more than 70,000 equal pay complaints brought in the period from 2013 to 2021.

3.4 Insights

3.4.1 Extending the equal pay regime

The government has committed to making equal pay rights effective for people from ethnic minorities and disabled people. One of the aims of this research was to understand whether extending the equal pay provisions in the Equality Act 2010 to race and disability would achieve this, and improve ways to redress for those who experience pay discrimination on these grounds. This section considers the benefits and disadvantages of this approach.     

The first main insight from the research is that only a small proportion of pay discrimination claims achieve redress. As set out in section 3.3, while thousands of equal pay claims are brought every year, only a small portion – approximately 10% – can be said with certainty to result in some form of redress for claimants. Conversely, the available evidence indicates that pay discrimination claims on the basis of race or disability are incredibly rare. It is not possible to draw direct causal links between these outcomes and the evidence collected regarding barriers to redress. However, the critical question is whether extending the equal pay provisions to cover race and disability will increase access to redress, or whether the barriers to redress identified above will prevent potential claimants from succeeding even with a change in the law.

The evidence indicates that expanding the scope of the equal pay provisions to cover the characteristics of race and disability would have potentially 3 main benefits.

First, it would provide consistency in the law between sex and these characteristics (though leaving inconsistencies for those experiencing pay discrimination on the basis of age, religion or belief or other protected characteristics untouched).

Second, it could increase knowledge and understanding that the law prohibits pay discrimination on the basis of race and disability. In light of the very small number of pay discrimination claims brought under the direct and indirect discrimination provisions, it is reasonable to assume that increasing public awareness in this way could create an increase in those seeking redress. This change would help to address some of the knowledge barriers identified in section 3.2. However, without measures to increase pay transparency, it is likely that many would continue to lack access to data needed to start a claim.

The third – significant – benefit of this change would be to ensure that more forms of pay discrimination arising on the basis of race and disability would be justiciable. It is important to note that many of the cases which could be brought under the extended equal pay provisions could already be challenged under the Equality Act – it is already unlawful for an employer to pay an employee less on the basis of their race or disability (or any other protected characteristic), or to maintain a discriminatory pay policy, structure or practice which results in a pay disadvantage for employees sharing particular protected characteristics.^{[footnote 281]} 

Extending the equal pay provisions to the characteristics of race and disability would ensure that in cases where ethnic minority or disabled people are being paid less for work of equal value, there are means to secure redress. In so doing, it would address the justiciability barrier that some people experiencing race or disability-based pay discrimination face. The government’s commitment to take measures to ensure that outsourcing of services can no longer be used to avoid equal pay obligations would have a similar direct benefit in removing the justiciability barrier which currently prevents claims in many cases. 

The evidence gathered identified 4 potential risks associated with extending the equal pay provisions to ethnic minorities and disabled people:

First, there is the risk of extending complex legal protections which are often unworkable in practice. The challenges outlined above in respect of complexity of the equal pay provisions, the difficulties faced by claimants in meeting the evidentiary requirements, and the attendant problems in respect of the duration and cost of claims, would be replicated^{[footnote 282]} by extending the current equal pay regime without making other changes. The research shows that any move to extend the equal pay provisions to cover race and disability should be accompanied by efforts to reduce or remove the barriers to redress identified above.

Second, there is a risk of increasing, rather than decreasing – evidentiary threshold. Equal pay claims require claimants to identify a comparator who is being paid more, whereas direct and indirect discrimination claims can be brought using a hypothetical comparator.

Third, there are potential disadvantages in respect of reparation for claimants. As discussed above, in successful equal pay cases, claimants are entitled to receive up to 6 years back pay, conversely, successful claimants in discrimination proceedings receive compensation for injury to feelings in addition to material damages.

Fourth, changing the law without addressing the underlying causes of pay inequalities or removing many of the practical barriers facing claimants creates a risk of alienation and frustration with the law. As one expert explained: ‘assumptions about the law – that there is a problem, you can pass legislation, and the law will solve that problem – are not true’. ^{[footnote 283]} 

3.4.2 Removing barriers to justice

There is compelling evidence that multiple barriers frustrate and ultimately prevent those who experience pay discrimination from achieving redress. Extending an unchanged equal pay regime to the protected characteristics of race and disability would help to address some of these barriers – those connected with the justiciability of pay discrimination and the knowledge of rights – but would likely have no big effect on the others. If the data on the operation of the current equal pay regime is indicative, the result could be a substantial increase in the number of pay discrimination cases, but with a more modest effect on the numbers securing redress. 

Our research indicates that increasing the proportion of those experiencing pay discrimination – whether on the basis of race, disability or sex – who secure redress requires measures to reduce the barriers facing claimants which are identified in section 3.2. It is beyond the scope of this research to propose a complete set of measures, but the evidence gathered has identified some potential actions recommended by those working in the field. These include:

• pay transparency measures,^{[footnote 284]} which can be effective in addressing potential pay discrimination – they can also prevent claims being filed and reduce the complexity and evidentiary barriers experienced by those involved in litigation

• public awareness-raising and education programmes on rights and procedure for both individuals and employers^{[footnote 285]} could help to reduce knowledge barriers and overcome confidence barriers

• increasing access to frontline line legal advice through increased funding for Citizens Advice Bureaus and the Equality Advisory Service^{[footnote 286]}  would address the lack of access to legal support and help to address both knowledge and confidence barriers

• increasing access to legal aid,^{[footnote 287]} both through removing or reducing the income threshold and increasing the hourly rate for legal aid work to more closely reflect actual fees, would remove one of the most significant cost barriers facing claimants

• increasing the time-limits^{[footnote 288]} for equal pay and other discrimination complaints would address the time pressure felt by claimants

• re-introducing the statutory questionnaire^{[footnote 289]} through which individuals could request information from their employer – as part of a wider review of the evidentiary requirements for equal pay claims – would reduce evidentiary barriers

• enabling employment tribunals to award non-material damages in equal pay claims and to consider the need for effective deterrent when awarding damages could result in more effective remedies

This is a non-exhaustive list of measures recommended in the literature or through consultation with expert stakeholders. A more comprehensive review could identify other measures.

4. Enforcement and prevention

The different mechanisms established for ensuring equality in pay in the Equality Act 2010, whether on the basis of race, disability or sex, are heavily reliant on individuals initiating legal action. These models have several limitations:^{[footnote 290]}

1. It assumes a level of prior knowledge of the law and access to pay information that many employees lack, due to non-transparent pay structures.

2. The mechanisms rely on individuals to enforce their rights, often in the face of significant disparities in resources, limited access to legal aid, and risk of retaliation.^{[footnote 291]}

3. The remedies for pay discrimination are, for the most part, individualised and retrospective, and the individualised remedies are not designed to create organisational change or deter future rights violations.

In response to these limitations, there is growing momentum, in the UK and internationally, towards the adoption of proactive and preventative mechanisms to support and complement, but not replace, existing complaints-led models. 

A variety of proactive and preventative legal and policy tools have been developed and introduced in different countries to deal with pay discrimination and its drivers.^{[footnote 292]} These measures can serve different purposes. Some aim to reduce the burden on individuals seeking to bring a pay discrimination claim by establishing rights of access to information or shifting the onus onto employers to demonstrate that their pay systems are objective and free from bias. Others are designed to expose broader patterns of pay inequality and impose specific duties on employers to take action to address identified inequalities.

Research and consultation identified a wide range of proactive and preventative measures which could be used to address pay discrimination. This section examines a number of specific measures that have been developed largely in response to sex-based pay inequalities. It reflects on the strengths and limitations of each measure and considers how they might function in respect to race and disability pay discrimination. 

4.1 Transparency and pay information

Pay transparency is increasingly recognised in the academic literature, in trade unions and civil society advocacy and in regional law-making bodies as a necessary condition for the effective implementation of equal pay legislation. As outlined in chapter 3, without access to relevant information, individuals are unable to determine whether they have experienced pay discrimination or to gather the evidence needed to bring a case.^{[footnote 293]} Studies in Europe have attributed the low number of successful equal pay claims in part to a lack of pay transparency.^{[footnote 294]}

Under the Equality Act 2010, there are no established mechanisms through which employees can seek to share, or request pay information.^{[footnote 295]} This makes it difficult for individuals to access the data needed to evaluate whether they are being paid equally for work of equal value. Moreover, the use of non-disclosure agreements as part of equal pay settlements can prevent employees and employers from understanding whether discrimination has occurred and where it may occur in the future.^{[footnote 296]} The Employment Rights Act, however, prohibits the use of non-disclosure agreements that seek to restrict employees speaking on discrimination.^{[footnote 297]} 

Stakeholders interviewed for the report observe that legal duties requiring employers to share pay-related information could help to overcome this awareness and knowledge shortfall, while also promoting a broader culture of openness and accountability.^{[footnote 298]} Transparency initiatives have gained traction internationally, with a growing number of states legislating to make pay transparency an enforceable right. The EU Directive to Strengthen the Application of the Principle of Equal Pay for Equal Work or Work of Equal Value Between Men and Women Through Pay Transparency and Enforcement Mechanisms,^{[footnote 299]} adopted in 2023, draws a direct relationship between pay discrimination and pay transparency. It recognises that pay secrecy, such as contractual clauses which restrict workers from disclosing information about their pay, can frustrate redress and holds that greater pay transparency would assist in the ‘application of the right to equal pay for equal work and work of equal value.’^{[footnote 300]}

Pay transparency encompasses a wide range of measures that aim to increase the visibility of pay structures and practices within organisations.^{[footnote 301]} Several measures have been proposed to increase transparency.

Salary disclosure in job adverts: The mandatory inclusion of salary ranges in job adverts can mitigate negotiation-based pay disparities and result in more equitable starting salaries.^{[footnote 302]} In one study, women from ethnic minority backgrounds overwhelmingly supported pay transparency in job advertisements.^{[footnote 303]} 

Rights to pay information: A ‘right to know’ allows workers to request and receive information about the pay of colleagues doing comparable work.^{[footnote 304]} This is a core feature of the EU Pay Transparency Directive, which also includes safeguards to protect privacy.^{[footnote 305]} A right to pay information could also entail re-introducing the statutory questionnaire, discussed in chapter 3,^{[footnote 306]} through which individuals could request pay information from their employer. Several stakeholders interviewed for this report called for the reinstatement of the questionnaire.^{[footnote 307]}

Prohibiting pay history questions: Prohibiting questions on a candidate’s prior salary history in recruitment processes can prevent past inequalities from being replicated in future pay negotiations.^{[footnote 308]} 

Informing workers of pay scales and promotion criteria: Enhanced internal transparency – including clear criteria for pay and progression – is seen as essential to ensuring equality and mitigating structural bias, particularly in assessment processes.^{[footnote 309]} This information can also provide the requisite information to bring a potential pay discrimination claim.

Pay gap reporting: Pay gap reporting can serve several purposes, including exposing pay gaps and increasing pressure on employers to modify pay and other practices. In addition, through increasing information available to employees, pay gap reporting can raise awareness about pay gaps and so – potentially – stimulate employees to try to identify and challenge pay discrimination.^{[footnote 310]} 

In the UK, the most prominent pay transparency measure is gender pay gap reporting. Under the Equality Act (Gender Pay Gap Information) Regulations, employers with 250 or more employees are required to publish data on the mean and median pay gap between men and women, differences in bonus pay, and the proportion of men and women in each pay quartile.^{[footnote 311]} There have been critiques that the breadth and scope of pay gap reporting, particularly the definitions of pay and employee, mean there is an under reporting of the extent of pay gaps.^{[footnote 312]} On a purely mathematical basis, the evidence both from the UK and from other jurisdictions is that reporting plays a role in reducing the size of pay gaps.^{[footnote 313]} In the UK, this means the Gender Pay Gap Information Regulations had resulted in a reduction in the size of the difference between average hourly rate of pay paid between men and women.^{[footnote 314]} However, the evidence also suggests that these reductions are due to either a decrease or stagnation in men’s pay rather than an increase in women’s pay.^{[footnote 315]}

While the effectiveness of transparency measures in eliminating pay discrimination has not yet been comprehensively assessed, a 2023 academic study found that pay gap reporting as currently mandated in the UK only identifies broad trends and generates data which cannot be used to challenge pay discrimination.^{[footnote 316]} It should be acknowledged that pay gap reporting was not designed with the primary aim of removing the awareness barriers which prevent individuals from challenging pay discrimination. Nevertheless, lawyers interviewed for this report explained that in practice pay gap reporting does not provide the information needed to identify cases of unequal pay for work of equal value or to identify appropriate comparators for a claim.^{[footnote 317]} 

The available evidence indicates that information disclosed through transparency measures must be relevant. They must be of sufficient quality to have an effect on addressing pay discrimination, meaning that data should be comprehensive, accurate, and broadly comparable.^{[footnote 318]} A good example of a legal measure seeking to provide individuals with this quality of knowledge is the EU Transparency Directive. The Directive allows employees to request information on ‘their individual pay level, and the average pay levels, broken down by sex, for categories of workers performing the same work as them or work of equal value to others.’^{[footnote 319]} The effects of transparency measures should be monitored to avoid unintended consequences such, as mentioned above, the effect on men’s pay.^{[footnote 320]} Nevertheless, well-designed transparency initiatives can enable greater scrutiny of pay systems, reduce the risk of bias in discretionary decision-making, support potential litigants, and create organisation change.^{[footnote 321]}

4.2 Job evaluation

Job evaluation involves a systematic appraisal of the relative value of different roles within a particular organisation. Provisions relating to job evaluation are part of UK equal pay law. Section 65 of the Equality Act 2010 provides that 2 roles will be “rated as equivalent” if a job evaluation study determines that the roles are of equal value, based on the demands made on a worker. This is assessed on factors such as effort, skill and decision-making.^{[footnote 322]} In practice, many of the equal pay claims that have been brought against public sector bodies have resulted from job evaluation studies completed as part of a broader restructuring of compensation systems.^{[footnote 323]} One stakeholder observed that without first requiring employers to undertake job evaluation, extending the equal pay regime to cover additional protected characteristics would have limited impact.^{[footnote 324]}

By requiring employers to proactively assess and justify their pay structures, job evaluation can shift the burden of proving that work is of equal value from individuals to employers.^{[footnote 325]} There are, however, a number of challenges. While some minimum standards for job evaluation have been elaborated by the courts, and several bodies have developed guidance to support employers,^{[footnote 326]} the concept of “equal value” is often poorly understood.^{[footnote 327]} There is no universally accepted formula for rating the equivalence of effort, skill, decision-making and responsibility between jobs. In the context of sex pay discrimination, one stakeholder observed there can be resistance to recognising the value of work traditionally done by women.^{[footnote 328]} Evaluation criteria may unintentionally reflect gendered assumptions about skill, effort or responsibility.^{[footnote 329]} 

Stakeholders also observed that the lack of consensus on how to conduct a job evaluation meant that debates between employers and individuals claiming pay discrimination on job evaluations are often a lengthy and contentious process.^{[footnote 330]} Where a job evaluation study has been completed, a claimant may challenge its validity. However, if the study is found to be fundamentally flawed, they must still demonstrate that their work is of equal value to their chosen comparator. This process, one participant noted, can take years.^{[footnote 331]} To address these challenges, stakeholders identified a need for additional guidance, resources, training and support for those responsible for undertaking job evaluations.^{[footnote 332]} 

A further challenge arises as a result of changes in the world of work. Contracts are increasingly individualised and fragmented pay creates difficulties of comparing roles via a job evaluation study.^{[footnote 333]} 

Tackling disproportionate pay in Ontario, Canada

In the UK, the equal pay framework provides redress where a worker is paid less than an opposite-sex comparator for work of equal value. This means that where a man is paid disproportionately more for work that is not of equal value, no claim can be brought. Job evaluation schemes that assess proportional value, such as those adopted in Ontario, Canada, offer a potential solution for this aspect of pay inequality. 

The framework in Ontario requires an evaluation of the relationship between the value of work and the compensation it attracts across male job classes, and the application of that ratio consistently to female job classes. In doing so, job evaluations can identify and rectify cases where women’s work is systematically undervalued in relative terms, even where the work does not meet the threshold of equal value. In this way, the evaluation exercise can help to address structural inequalities in pay.^{[footnote 334]}

4.3 Equal pay audits

Under current regulations, an equal pay audit involves examining the pay and contractual terms of men and women performing equal work, with the aim of identifying and addressing relevant disparities.^{[footnote 335]} Once a disparity in pay is identified, an employer should act to correct, or else justify, the difference. Although a tribunal may order an organisation found to have breached equal pay provisions to carry out an audit, the low number of equal pay claims which reach the final stages of consideration at tribunal means that, in practice, they remain a largely voluntary measure.^{[footnote 336]} 

The Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC) has published guidance for employers on conducting an equal pay audit, structured around 5 steps:^{[footnote 337]} 

1. Deciding the scope of the audit, considering whether to adopt a full or staged approach, identifying stakeholders for engagement and determining data requirements 
2. Identifying areas where women and men are performing equal work 
3. Collecting information and comparing it to identify gaps based on an average of both basic and total pay 
4. Investigating the causes of any pay disparities, with a direction that any identified pay disparity of 5% or more should “merit further investigation” and 
5. Developing an action plan to address any unjustified differences in pay

Although pay auditing is often presented as a tool to mitigate the risk of pay discrimination^{[footnote 338]} – the third step of the audit process – which focuses on average differences in pay, is not designed to identify individual pay differences. Consequently, the data generated may not enable individual workers to bring an equal pay claim.^{[footnote 339]} However, the requirement at steps 4 and 5 to identify and act upon the causes of pay disparities can shift the onus for identifying and challenging pay discrimination from individuals to employers.

Equal pay certification in Iceland

Since 2018, companies in Iceland with 25 or more employees have been required to obtain an equal pay certificate, verifying that men and women receive equal pay and contractual terms for work of equal value.^{[footnote 340]} The certification process is carried out by an accredited third party, which audits the company’s pay system to ensure compliance with national legislation. This certificate must be renewed annually. According to the government, the certification scheme covers around 1180 employers and 147,000 employees – the equivalent of 80% of Iceland’s active workforce.^{[footnote 341]}

The system was rolled out in phases: large employers (with 250 or more employees) and government ministries were required to obtain certification by 31 December 2019, while small to medium-sized businesses (those with 25 to 89 employees) were given an extended deadline of 31 December 2022.^{[footnote 342]}

4.4 Action planning

The Employment Rights Act introduced an obligation on private sector employers with 250 or over employees in Great Britain, as well as all public bodies in England, and some cross-border public bodies to develop equality action plans setting out the steps which they are taking ‘in relation to their employees with regard to prescribed matters related to gender equality,’ including in addressing the gender pay gap. While this duty mainly focuses on pay gaps rather than pay discrimination, the action plans could be a mechanism to address pay discrimination. 

As noted in section 4.1, pay gap reporting is limited as a tool to deal with pay discrimination, although reporting identifies disparities it does not provide data on the causes of such disparities. Action plans, which could prompt an employer to analyse and audit pay gap data to identify the causes of disparities – including unequal pay for work of equal value – shift the work of identifying and challenging pay discrimination from the individual to the employer, addressing many of the barriers identified in chapter 3. 

As experts have noted, to be effective, transparency measures like pay gap reporting ‘must be accompanied by binding obligations on employers to analyse and address unjustified pay gaps.’^{[footnote 343]} Evidence from other jurisdictions indicates that action plans can be effective when pay reporting is accompanied by ‘duties to assess pay structures, justify disparities, and implement corrective actions.’^{[footnote 344]} Countries that mandate such requirements ‘tend to have more robust responses to identified inequalities’ than those relying only on reporting.^{[footnote 345]}

A range of organisations have called for the adoption of mandatory action plans.^{[footnote 346]} To be effective, action planning should be treated as a process, rather than a compliance exercise, plans should include specific and measurable targets,^{[footnote 347]} and duty-bearers should be required to report “evidence of impact”, rather than simply listing measures adopted.^{[footnote 348]} Action plans should be embedded in wider organisational strategies, and connect to a broader understanding of inequality in work.^{[footnote 349]} 

4.5 Compliance and enforcement

Measures to identify and deal with pay discrimination and other forms of discrimination impacting on pay will only be effective if they are properly enforced and implemented, as evidenced in chapter 3. Any system of proactive and preventative measures must include clear compliance obligations, with a mix of incentives and sanctions for non-compliance, and support to equip and enable employers to take effective action.

4.5.1 Duties

In view of the emerging evidence on some of the limitations of transparency-focused models, outlined above, there are growing calls for positive duties on employers to address pay discrimination. More broadly, there has been increased attention to positive duties on equality in the workplace. For example, in a 2022 survey conducted by the Trades Union Congress, 28% of respondents stated that imposing a ‘new duty on employers to stop racism in the workplace’ was one of the most important measures that could be taken to improve work outcomes.^{[footnote 350]} A number of stakeholders interviewed for this report cited the duty on employers to take reasonable steps to prevent sexual harassment in the workplace – introduced in the Worker Protection Act 2023^{[footnote 351]} and updated in the Employment Rights Act 2025 – as a good practice model which could be adapted for pay discrimination.^{[footnote 352]} 

In recent years, the International Lawyers Assisting Workers initiative has undertaken an extensive global survey of best practice approaches to addressing pay discrimination. Drawing on extensive research into global best practices, they have developed a Model Law. Building upon legislative developments in Australia, Norway and the UK and guidance from the International Labour Organization, Article 2 of the Model Law sets out a positive duty on employers to correct unequal pay. The duty has several components, including the development of an annual pay equity plan, incorporating job evaluation studies, with a requirement on employers to act on the findings to ‘remediate any pay gaps.’^{[footnote 353]} 

4.5.2 Incentives and sanctions

In interviews for this report, both legal experts and individuals with lived experience emphasised the need for employers to be subject to incentives to support compliance^{[footnote 354]} and sanctions in the event of failures to address pay discrimination and to act on pay disparities.^{[footnote 355]} As one expert noted: ‘employers have to want to act and be made to want to act, otherwise measures will have limited uptake’.^{[footnote 356]} 

Those consulted – lawyers, civil society organisations, academics, trade unions – proposed a variety of possible approaches. There were a number of calls for significant fines for infringement,^{[footnote 357]} with one expert calling for a similar approach to that in place under the data protection regime, where the higher maximum fine is £17.5 million.^{[footnote 358]} 

Other proposals included: 

• a register of employers who fail to meet their obligations,^{[footnote 359]} similar to that in place for the National Minimum Wage^{[footnote 360]} 
• a public rating and ranking system similar to that operated by the Office for Standards in Education^{[footnote 361]} 
• limiting government procurement contracts to those organisations that have complied with the law^{[footnote 362]} 

In a submission which looked at a comparative review of practice across the EU, the approach in Portugal – where significant financial penalties are applied not only for failing to report but also for failing to justify or correct unjustified pay disparities – was highlighted as a good practice.^{[footnote 363]}

4.5.3 Implementation and enforcement 

Alongside legal duties on employers, with incentives and sanctions to support compliance, an effective proactive and preventative system necessitates an institutional framework to both support employers with implementation and enforce compliance. The government has committed to improve the enforcement of equal pay rights by establishing an equal pay regulatory and enforcement unit.^{[footnote 364]} It is beyond the scope of this research to make specific recommendations in relation to structure, form and powers of the unit, but research identifies relevant good practice that could inform proposals.

For example, in 2024 the EU adopted 2 new directives on standards for equality bodies^{[footnote 365]} which provide some current international best practice in respect of statutory equality institutions.^{[footnote 366]} The directives say that equality institutions must be institutionally and functionally independent and that they must be fully empowered, in both law and practice, to fulfil their mandate.^{[footnote 367]} This in turn requires that equality institutions have the agency and autonomy to determine the courses of action required to address and prevent pay discrimination, have the powers and competencies necessary to take these actions, and have the resources needed to discharge these powers effectively.^{[footnote 368]}As with sanctions, those interviewed for this report made a variety of proposals for how the planned equal pay unit could support the implementation and enforcement of the law in this area. One stakeholder proposed that it “could be given powers to compel disclosure [and require] equal pay audits”,^{[footnote 369]} while another proposed the use of “spot checks, audits and inspections.” ^{[footnote 370]} 

Alongside investigatory and enforcement powers, a number of stakeholders pointed to the need for institutional support to employers to enable them to undertake job evaluations, pay reporting and audits and to develop and implement action plans.^{[footnote 371]} 

4.6 Insights: a holistic approach

This report found evidence that there is an emerging but clear expert consensus that if pay discrimination – and other forms of discrimination impacting on pay – is to be addressed, a proactive and preventative approach to enforcement is needed,^{[footnote 372]} alongside targeted measures to reduce and remove barriers to redress for individuals. As the above discussion sets out, governments across Europe and beyond are increasingly engaged on this question, with a variety of tools, measures and approaches being developed and used. There is much innovation, and it would be premature to give a definitive assessment on the effectiveness of some of these different approaches. The evidence indicates there is a need for a whole system approach, in which different measures are used in combination.

There are a number of reasons why a holistic approach is needed. The available evidence indicates that none of these approaches in isolation will be effective. For example, while standardised job evaluation is essential for identifying cases of pay discrimination, but without a corresponding duty on the part of employers to eliminate differences, the burden of enforcement will remain on the individual. Equally, job evaluation as a method may not be fit for purpose in increasingly fragmented, fractured workplaces.

These tools can support one another. Disparities identified through pay gap reporting can trigger requirements to undertake pay audits, while standardised job evaluation is essential if a pay audit is to identify pay discrimination, as opposed to other forms of discrimination impacting on pay. An effective proactive and preventative system would integrate these individual tools, establishing a regime in which employers identify pay gaps, investigate the causes of these gaps, eliminate pay discrimination and take positive measures to address other forms of discrimination impacting on pay.

European Union pay transparency directive

The EU directive to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms provides a model for proactive approaches to addressing pay discrimination and discrimination impacting on pay. It takes the whole system or holistic approach to pay. It requires transparency from the beginning as individuals have rights to receive information prior to employment. This includes information on ‘the initial pay or its range, based on an objective gender-neutral criteria.’^{[footnote 373]} This requirement presupposes that employers have conducted a gender-neutral, objective pay evaluation which would have positive spillovers on eliminating pay discrimination. Information on pay and pay range is to be provided in a transparent manner ‘such as in published job vacancy notice.’^{[footnote 374]}

Employers are prohibited from asking potential employees about their salary history. The criteria used to establish pay, pay levels and pay progression need to be accessible and that criteria must also be free of gender bias.^{[footnote 375]} As mentioned above, it allows individuals to ask for information on pay levels broken down by categories of workers performing the same work or work of equal value. To address privacy concerns, where disclosure of pay information would ‘disclose, either directly or indirectly, of the pay of an identifiable worker, only the workers’ representatives, the labour inspectorate or the equality body shall have access to that information.’^{[footnote 376]} 

Properly designed, an integrated reporting, audit, job evaluation and action plan system would be sensitive to the interaction between pay discrimination and other forms of discrimination impacting on pay. Ultimately, a holistic approach would shift the onus from individuals to employers. This would require employers to demonstrate that pay disparities are not the result of discrimination.

As currently used in the UK, pay gap reporting, pay audits and job evaluation each have documented shortcomings. A further insight which can be taken from the evidence is that further study, innovation and monitoring is needed to design effective measures.

5. Conclusion

This research was commissioned by the OEO to inform the development of the Equality (Race and Disability) Bill, now the Equality (Race and Disability) Act.

Through a literature review, stakeholder engagement and insights from those with lived experience, the report identifies actionable insights into pay discrimination and how to redress and prevent it.

The main findings are that there is a significant gap in the evidence on the patterns and prevalence of pay discrimination. The hypothesis is that this gap could be a function of the lack of pay transparency. People face multiple barriers when seeking to redress alleged instances of pay discrimination on the basis of sex, race and disability, with lack of knowledge being identified as a significant barrier. The individual model of enforcement for pay discrimination is limited as an exclusive model of redress and could be complimented by a range of potential proactive and preventative measures that seek to holistically deal with pay discrimination.

1. See 2.1 Pay discrimination for more detailed discussion. ↩

2. Analysis of data published by His Majesty’s Courts and Tribunals Service (HMCTS) reveals that 4155 (10%) of the 40,523 equal pay complaints concluded in the period 2016-2021 resulted in conciliated settlements by ACAS, while 38 – 0.09% – were successful at hearing: https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/tribunals-statistics. Data tables for the period in question are held on file with the Equal Rights Trust and can be provided on request.  ↩

3. The Kings Speech 2024 ↩

4. S65 of the Equality Act 2010, Article 3(1) of the Council Directive 2023/970/EC of 10 May 2023 to strengthen the application of the principle of equal pay for equal work or work of equal value between men and women through pay transparency and enforcement mechanisms [2023] OJ L132/21 ↩

5. Brigid Francis-Devine, ‘The Gender Pay Gap’ (2024) Research Briefing House of Commons Library. ↩

6. Equality Act 2010, section 9. ↩

7. Equality Act 2010, section 6. ↩

8. For Women Scotland v Scottish Ministers [2025] UKSC 16. ↩

9. Alison-Davis-Blake and Joseph Broschak, ‘Outsourcing and the Changing Nature of Work’ (2009) 35(1) Annual Review of Sociology. ↩

10. Committee and group not responsible for content. ↩

11. Fawcett Society, ‘Why Women Need a Right to Know: Shining a Light on Pay Discrimination’ (2019). ↩

12. Public Service Consultants, ‘Lived Experience of Pay Discrimination on the Basis of Race and Disability’ (2025) section 3.1.1. ↩

13. RMT, ‘Outsourcing and Racial Inequality in Rail’ (2025), Diane Taylor, ‘NHS Hospital Group’s Facilities Staff Vote to Strike Over £30m Pay Discrimination Claim’ (9 October 2026, The Guardian), Llezlie Green, Outsourcing Discrimination’ (2020) 55 Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 916. ↩

14. Section 79 of the Equality Act 2010, Asda Stored Ltd v Brierley [2021] UKSC 10. ↩

15. Taylor (n 13). ↩

16. Van Phan and others, ‘Accounting for Firms in Gender Ethnicity Wage Gaps Throughout Earnings Distribution’ (2023) University of Reading, Department of Economics Discussion Paper No 2023-16. ↩

17. Van Phan (n 16), Heidi Safia Mirza and Ross Warwick, ‘Race and Ethnic Inequalities’ (2024) 3 Oxford Open Economics i365 ↩

18. Van Phan (n 16) 23, 24, Simonette Longhi and Malcolm Brynin, ‘The Ethnicity Pay Gap’ (2017) Equality and Human Rights Commission: Research Report 1089, Simonette Longhi and others, ‘Explained and Unexplained Wage Gaps across the Main Ethno-Religious Groups in Great Britain’ (2013) 65 Oxford Economic Papers 47. ↩

19. Mirza and Warwick (n 17) i411. ↩

20. Van Phan (n 16) 24. ↩

21. ibid 23. ↩

22. Longhi and Brynin (n 18) 36, 55, 67 and 68. ↩

23. Mirza and Warwick (n 17) i407. ↩

24. Longhi and Brynin (n 18) 36. ↩

25. ibid 48, Van Phan and others (n 16) 27. ↩

26. Sandra Fredman, Discrimination Law (3rd ed, Clarendon 2023) chapter 6, Wal-Mart v Dukes 564 US 338 (2011) (dissenting opinion of Justice Ginsberg). ↩

27. Fredman (n 26), Nitisha v Union of India (2021) 15 SCC 125. ↩

28. John Forth and others, ‘The Role of the Workplace in Ethnic Wage Differentials’ (2022) British Journal of Industrial Relations 1, Public Service Consultants (n 12) section 3.1.2. ↩

29. Forth and others (n 28) 4. ↩

30. ibid i410. ↩

31. ibid i403. ↩

32. Mirza and Warwick (n 17) i403, i409-i410 ↩

33. ibid i411. ↩

34. Van Phen and others (n 16) 23-4. ↩

35. ibid i404, Longhi and Brynin (n 18) 1.  ↩

36. Longhi and Brynin (n 18) 10. ↩

37. Mirza and Warwick (n 17) i409. ↩

38. ibid i398. ↩

39. ibid i403-06. ↩

40. Office of National Statistics, ‘Roma Populations, England and Wales: Census 2021’ (2023). ↩

41. Green (n 13), Marta Fana and others, ‘The Outsourcing Wage Gap: Exploring the Interplay of Gender and Tasks Along the Job Distribution’ (2024) 10 Italian Economic Journal 683, Gustav Egede Hansen and others, ‘The Unequal Distribution of Consequences of Contracting Out: Female, Low-Skilled and Young Workers Pay the Highest Price’ (2023) Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 434. ↩

42. RMT (n 13). ↩

43. ibid. ↩

44. The Smith Institute and UNISON, ‘Outsourcing the Cuts: Pay and Employment Effects of Contracting Out’ (2012), Maarten Goos and others, ‘Domestic Outsourcing and Worker Outcomes: Evidence from Staffing Firms’ (2025) Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper Series No 18228, Anna Mori, ‘Outsourcing Public Services: Local Government in Italy, England and Denmark’ in Jan Drahokoupil (ed), The Outsourcing Challenge: Organizing Workers Across Fragmented Productions Networks (European Trade Union Institute 2015). ↩

45. Arindrajit Dube and Ethan Kaplan, ‘Does Outsourcing Reduce Wages in the Low-Wage Service Occupations? Evidence from Janitors and Guards’ (2010) 63(2) Industrial and Labour Relations Review 287. ↩

46. The Smith Institute and UNISON (n 44) 7. ↩

47. Stakeholder Interviews AD395, ED382, ED383 and CD386. ↩

48. Department of Works and Pensions, ‘The Employment of Disabled People 2024’. ↩

49. ibid. ↩

50. Department of Works and Pensions, ‘The Employment of Disabled People 2024’. ↩

51. ibid. ↩

52. ibid citing Tania Burchardt, The Education and Employment of Disabled Young People: Frustrated Ambition (Bristol University Press 2005), Stakeholder Interviews ED382, AD397, and CD388, Catherine Hale, Kim Hoque and Ben Baumberg Geiger, ‘The 39 Steps: Realising the Potential of Flex Plus Working for Disability Inclusion’ (2025) Centre for Society and Mental Health, Kings College London R012, Silvia Bonaccio and others, ‘The Participation of People With Disabilities in the Workplace Across the Employment Cycle: Employer Concerns and Research Evidence (2020) 35 Journal of Business and Psychology 135. ↩

53. John Forth and Melanie Jones, ‘The Disability Pay Gap Within and Across Firms’ (2025) Institute of Labor Economics Discussion Paper No 17679, 11. ↩

54. Stakeholder Interview CD386, Office for Equality and Opportunity (UK), ‘Disabled People’s Employment in the UK: A Thematic Review of the Literature’ (2025), citing Ben Baumberg, ‘From Impairment to Incapacity-Educational Inequalities in Disabled People’s Ability to Work’ (2015) New Perspectives on Health, Disability, Welfare and the Labour Market 47, Disability Rights, ‘Sharing Information on Disability’. ↩

55. Stakeholder Interviews CD386, ED382, CD388 and AD398. ↩

56. See section 4 ‘Enforcement and prevention’ for details of this argument.  ↩

57. Stakeholder Interviews CD386, ED382, CD388 and AD398. ↩

58. Melanie Jones, ‘The Disability Pay Gap in the UK: What is the Role of the Public Sector?’ (2024) 91 Labour Economics 102642. ↩

59. ibid, Public Service Consultants (n 12) section 3.1.3, Trades Union Congress, ‘Disabled Workers’ Access to Reasonable Adjustment’ (2025). ↩

60. Public Service Consultants (n 12), section 3.1.3 ↩

61. Office for National Statistics, ‘Disability Pay Gaps in the UK: 2014 to 2023’ (2024). ↩

62. Forth and Jones (n 53) 10. ↩

63. Office for National Statistics (n 61). ↩

64. ibid.  ↩

65. Simonetta Longhi, ‘The Disability Pay Gap’ (2017) Equality and Human Rights Commission Research Report 107, ix. ↩

66. ibid. ↩

67. ibid. ↩

68. ibid. ↩

69. Jones (n 58). ↩

70. Trades Union Congress, ‘Disability Pay and Employment Gaps’ (2024). ↩

71. Longhi (n 65) 10. ↩

72. Burchardt ↩

73. Longhi (n 65) 29. ↩

74. Melanie Jones and Paul Latreille, ‘Disability and Earnings: Are Employer Characteristics Important? (2010) 106 Economic Letters 191, 193 citing Marjorie Baldwin and William Johnson ‘Dispelling the Myths about Work Disability’ (2001) Prepared for the 1998 IRRA Research Volume New Approaches to Disability in the Workplace, accessed 23 March 2026. ↩

75. Jones (n 58), but see Jack Blundell, ‘Wage Responses to Gender Pay Gap Reporting Requirements’ (2021) Centre for Economic Performance Discussion Paper 1750, accessed 24 March 2026. ↩

76. ibid. ↩

77. ibid. ↩

78. ibid. ↩

79. Kevin Hallock, ‘The Total Compensation Gap, Wage Gap and Benefit Gap Between Workers With and Without a Disability’ (2022) 60(1) British Journal of Industrial Relations 3. ↩

80. Public Service Consultants (n 12) 3.1.3. ↩

81. ibid. ↩

82. Stakeholder interview AD394. ↩

83. Office for National Statistics, ‘Gender Pay Gap in the UK: 2024’. ↩

84. ibid. ↩

85. ibid. ↩

86. Francis-Devine (n 5). ↩

87. See sections 2.2.4 and 2.3.1. ↩

88. Francis-Devine (n 5) 14. ↩

89. Trades Union Congress, ‘The Motherhood Pay Penalty’ (2016) ↩

90. Fawcett Society, ‘The Ethnicity Motherhood Pay Penalty’ (2023) ↩

91. Francis-Devine (n 5) 31. ↩

92. Ibid 5. ↩

93. ibid 24. ↩

94. Office for National Statistics, ‘Gender Pay Gap’ (n 83). ↩

95. ibid. ↩

96. Francis-Devine (n 5) 15. ↩

97. Institute for Fiscal Studies, ‘Women and Men at Work’ (2021) 16. ↩

98. Francis-Devine (n 5) 16. ↩

99. ibid. ↩

100. Fawcett Society, ‘The Ethnicity Motherhood Pay Penalty’ (n 90). ↩

101. ibid. ↩

102. Office for National Statistics, ‘The Impact of Motherhood on Monthly Employee Earnings and Employment Status, England: April 2014 to December 2022’ (2025). ↩

103. Fawcett Society, ‘The Ethnicity Motherhood Pay Penalty’ (n 90). ↩

104. Stakeholder interview AD398. ↩

105. Stephanie Bornstein and others, ‘Discrimination Against Mothers is the Strongest Form of Workplace Gender Discrimination: Lessons from US Caregiver Discrimination Law’ (2012) International Journal of Comparative Labour Law 45, Hannah Bowles, ‘Why Women Don’t Negotiate Their Job Offers’ (2014) Harvard Business Review, Deborah Eisenberg, ‘Money, Sex and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination’ (2011) 43 Arizona State Law Journal 95. ↩

106. Equality Act 2010, part 5, chapter 3,.see however, section 71 of the Act. ↩

107. Equality Act 2010, Sections 13, 19 and 39. As regards disability, a claim may also be brought under section 15, which covers discrimination “arising from” disability.” Slightly different rules apply in respect of pregnancy and maternity. ↩

108. When the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 was passed, contractual equal pay was excluded from its scope, as this was already covered by the Equal Pay Act 1970, which was due to enter into force. The distinction was maintained under the Equality Act 2010, but it does not apply to other protected characteristics. See Incomes Data Research, ‘Discrimination Law and Pay Systems’ (2018) 14, accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

109. Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Equal Pay Statutory Code of Practice’ (2016) [33]. ↩

110. Discrimination in these – and related – areas can be challenged through the direct and indirect discrimination provisions of the Equality Act, Equality Act 2010, Sections 11, 13, 19 and 39. ↩

111. Equality Act 2010, section 69. ↩

112. Assessment of whether work is rated equivalent is undertaken by means of a job evaluation study which assesses “in terms of the demands made on a person by reference to factors such as effort, skill and decision-making, the jobs to be done”. See Equality Act, section 65(4) and section 80(5) ↩

113. Equality Act 2010, section 65. ↩

114. Equality Act 2010, section 79(3)(4) and (9). Asda (n 14) [5]-[6], [19]-[33]. ↩

115. Lawrence & Others v Regent Office Care, Case C-320/00, (2002) [17]-[18]. In the Tesco case (C-624/19), the Court of Justice of the European Union held that the single source test in equal pay claims under Article 157 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union has direct effect and may be relied on in domestic legal proceedings. Following the UK’s departure from the European Union, the single source test was codified in section 79(4A) of the Equality Act 2010 by the Equality Act 2010 (Amendment) Regulations 2023. ↩

116. Fredman (n 26) 293 and 331. ↩

117. Equality and Human Rights Commission (n 109) [61].  ↩

118. This may not be the case in pay discrimination claims based on other protected characteristics, Margaret Downie, ’Preferential pay protection: does UK law provide poorer protection to those discriminated against on grounds of protected characteristics other than gender?’ (2019) 19(1) International Journal of Discrimination and the Law 4, 20. ↩

119. Incomes Data Research (n 108) 24 citing Degnan v Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council, [2005] IRLR 615. ↩

120. No such limitation would apply in pay discrimination claims brought through the direct and indirect discrimination provisions of the Equality Act, where hypothetical comparators are permitted, ibid 31-32. In such cases s 71 permits reliance on s 13 and 39(2) of the Act and hence hypothetical comparators. However, as discussed further below, such cases would not have access to equal value procedures. ↩

121. Fredman (n 26) 326-350. ↩

122. Equality Act 2010, Sections 71 and 13. ↩

123. James Hand and Victoria Hooton, ‘Equal Pay and the Equality Act 2010: An Accidental Paradox in Need of Change?’ (2024) 45 Liverpool Law Review 105 noting the limited number of cases in which section 71 has been raised. ↩

124. ibid. section 71 only covers direct discrimination. If a pay policy or practice has an indirectly discriminatory effect, but no opposite-sex comparator is available (for instance, due to occupational segregation), a claimant may be unable in practice to challenge the disparity. See City of London Police v Geldart [2021] EWCA Civ 611 [89]. ↩

125. The UK Supreme Court has emphasised this point in recent cases. The common terms requirement is intended to be a low-threshold, preliminary test, and is not to be conflated with the substantive evaluation of whether work is equal, Asda (n 14) 71. ↩

126. Equality Act 2010, section 69. ↩

127. Equality Act 2010, section 69(1)(a). ↩

128. Equality Act 2010, section 69(1)(b) and (2). In other words, the material factor must not be tainted by sex discrimination of either sort. ↩

129. Equality Act 2010, section 69(3). ↩

130. Equality Act 2010, Sections 4-12, and 39. As detailed below, specific rules apply to contract workers (section 41) and in respect of pregnancy and maternity. On the latter, see Equality and Human Rights Commission (n 109) [93]-[103]. ↩

131. Sections 15 (discrimination arising from disability) and 19A (indirect discrimination: same disadvantage). ↩

132. Sex is listed as a protected characteristic under section 11 of the Equality Act 2010. ↩

133. Equality Act 2010, section 13. ↩

134. This is implied by section 13(1) which refers to a person who “treats or would treat” others less favourably. ↩

135. See for example, on unconscious bias, Nagarajan v London Regional Transport [2000] 1 AC 501. See further, Essop and Others v Home Office (UK Border Agency) [2017] UKSC 27 [17]. ↩

136. Equality Act 2010, section 13(1). ↩

137. Age is treated differently from other protected characteristics, as both direct and indirect age discrimination can be justified. The same is true for discrimination arising from disability under section 15, which does not require a comparator. A further exception arises where a genuine occupational requirement applies. See Equality Act 2010, Sections 13(2), 15 and schedule 9, part 1. ↩

138. Essop (n 135) [24]-[25]. ↩

139. Secretary of State for Trade and Industry v. Rutherford, [2006] UKHL 19 [38]. ↩

140. Essop (n 135) [40]-[41]. ↩

141. ibid [40]. ↩

142. ibid [11]. ↩

143. Equality Act 2010, section 19. ↩

144. It has been observed that pay data is collected less consistently for protected characteristics other than sex, meaning that those seeking to challenge indirect pay discrimination can face difficulties in collecting the necessary evidence, chapter 2 and Fredman (n 26). 291 and 294. ↩

145. Prima facie is a term used to describe evidence that is required to proceed with a case unless or until disproven by further evidence. ↩

146. Equality Act 2010, section 136. ↩

147. Ibid. The model of justification used in section 19 is also used for discrimination arising from disability (section 15(1)(b)). However, a narrower concept of legitimate aim is used for direct age discrimination cases (see Equality Act 2010, section 13(2) and Seldon v Clarkson Wright and Jakes (A Partnership) [2012] UKSC 16 (requiring public social policy aims to be pursued rather than the purely private aims of the employer)). ↩

148. On disability- and race-based pay discrimination cases, see section 3.3 of this chapter. ↩

149. Stakeholder Interview ED380. ↩

150. Equality Act 2010, section 23. ↩

151. In a recent case, the Employment Appeals Tribunal was asked to consider whether the “single source principle can apply outside of EU equal pay law, to pay discrimination claims”. Ultimately, the issue was not resolved – the case involved outsourced workers, who – following the Boohene judgment – could not fulfil the single source test. On the specific issue, counsel “were agreed that this is a novel question on which there is no authority.” See further, Djalo v. Secretary of State for Justice, Case No: EA-2022-001276-RS, 2025, para. 228. See also Downie (n 118) 12. ↩

152. Fredman (n 26) 341-342. ↩

153. Equality Act 2010, Sections 20, 21 and 39(5). It should be noted that reasonable adjustments are linked to the individual claimant’s situation, and this requires consideration of the individual’s situation before a case can succeed. ↩

154. ACAS, ‘Characteristics And Drivers of Disability Discrimination Employment Tribunal Claims’ (2024), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

155. ibid. ↩

156. Stakeholder Interview AD397. See also above, section 2.3. The Equality and Human Rights Commission (n 109)  envisaged that temporary pay adjustments might be reasonable adjustments, where these involve the disabled person being treated more favourably than a non-disabled person would have been in the same circumstances. If the adjustment required was to bring the disabled person’s pay up to the same level as someone doing the same work, this would be brought as a direct discrimination claim or a claim of discrimination arising from disability. ↩

157. G4S Cash Solutions (UK) Ltd v Powell [2016] 8 WLUK 343 (EAT) [44], [47], [54]. ↩

158. ibid, Aleem v E-Act Academy Trust Ltd [2021] 7 WLUK 538 (EAT). ↩

159. Inspiration could be drawn from section 65(3) of the Equality Act: “Pay protection, negotiated as part of a reasonable adjustment with the objective of reducing inequality does not constitute discrimination.” There is already protection for the employer against complaints of direct discrimination for more favourable treatment of disabled persons under section 13(3), whereas if a complaint of indirect discrimination were raised, the employer would be able to justify the action as pursuant to a legitimate aim. ↩

160. Both cases are regulated by the Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024. For further information on the legal procedure followed in equal pay cases, see LexisNexis, ‘Equal Pay Claims: Tribunal Procedure’ (2025). ↩

161. Employment Tribunals Act 1996, section 18A. ↩

162. In both cases, the time limit can be extended to account for ACAS conciliation. See Equality Act 2010, Section 140B. ↩

163. Equality Act 2010, section 129. Because equal pay claims are rooted in contract, a separate avenue also exists to the civil courts, where a 6-year time limit applies (Birmingham City Council v Abdulla and others [2012] UKSC 47). ↩

164. Equality Act 2010, section 123(1)(a). ↩

165. Equality Act 2010, section 123(1)(b). There are also, in equal pay claims based on sex, specific extension rules relating to stable work situations, concealment and capacity cases (section 129). These specific provisions do not apply to pay discrimination claims arising in connection with other protected characteristics. ↩

166. Employment Rights Act 2025, section 152 and schedule 12. ↩

167. Equality Act 2010, section 66. ↩

168. Equality Act 2010, section 132. ↩

169. Injury to feelings is determined in line with the Vento bands, currently established with upper limits between £12,100 (less serious cases) and £60,700 (exceptional cases) (Eighth Addendum to the Presidential Guidance on employment tribunal awards for injury to feelings, April 2025). ↩

170. On exceptions, see the Equality Act 2010 (Equal Pay Audits) Regulations 2014, Regulation 3. ↩

171. The Equality Act 2010 (Equal Pay Audits) Regulations 2014, Regulation 6. ↩

172. The Equality Act 2010 (Equal Pay Audits) Regulations 2014, Regulation 11. ↩

173. Incomes Data Research (n 108) 75. For an example of a pay audit being ordered see Macken v BNP Paribas Case No 2208142/2017. In this case, the audit was ordered due (among other things) to a lack of transparency in pay. ↩

174. Equality Act 2010, Sections 109 and 110. ↩

175. This reflects the difference drawn between the 2 sets of provisions: the former (anti-discrimination provisions) cover unlawful acts, while the latter (equal pay provisions) cover breach of contractual terms. ↩

176. Stakeholder Interview ED383. This point is considered further below. ↩

177. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, ‘General Recommendation No. 33 on access to justice’ (2015) CEDAW/C/GC/35 [14].  ↩

178. Hand and Hooton (n 123). ↩

179. Stakeholder Interview AD394. However, these same factors may increase the need for objective job evaluation. In this connection, a separate participant observed the need for clearer pay grading structures, Stakeholder Interview DD391. ↩

180. Patka v BBC [2018] 4 WLUK 128. ↩

181. Equality Act 2010, section 23. ↩

182. Equal Rights Trust and the Solidarity Center International Lawyers Assisting Workers Network, ‘A Promise not Realised: The Right to Non-Discrimination in Work and Employment’ (2024) 33. ↩

183. ibid. ↩

184. Boohene v Royal Parks [2024] EWCA Civ 583 (CA), Allonby v Accrington and Rossendale College [2004] IRLR 224 (ECJ). ↩

185. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Protecting Minority Rights: A Practical Guide to Developing Comprehensive Anti-Discrimination Legislation’ (2022) 76. ↩

186. Equality Act 2010, section 77. ↩

187. Stakeholder Interview CD385. ↩

188. Deborah Thompson Eisenberg, ‘Money, Sex, and Sunshine: A Market-Based Approach to Pay Discrimination’ (2011) 43 Arizona State Law Journal 951, Lived experience interviews 09 and 23 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

189. Lived experience interviews 009 and 023 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

190. Stakeholder Interview CD388: “Prior to a person (…) pursuing a claim, it’s very difficult for [them] to even realise that they’re being discriminated in this way.” ↩

191. Stakeholder interview ID440. ↩

192. Fawcett Society, ‘A Right to Know’ (n 11). ↩

193. Stakeholder Interview CD385. ↩

194. Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Closing the Gender Pay Gap’ (2019), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

195. Lived experience interview 012 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

196. Stakeholder Interview ED381. ↩

197. Stakeholder Interview ED380. ↩

198. Lived experience research interviews 011, 012, 028, 077 and 083 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

199. Stewarts Law, ‘Equal Pay in the Workplace Today’ (2023), accessed 13 March 2026. The survey found that younger workers and those with higher salaries would be more willing to challenge pay discrimination, though even among the highest paid, only 58% stated that they would raise an internal complaint. ↩

200. ibid. ↩

201. Lived experience research interviews 083 and 088 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

202. Stakeholder Interview ED382, Lived experience research interviews 074, 088 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

203. Ibid ↩

204. Stakeholder Interviews DD389 and AD398. ↩

205. Stakeholder Interview CD386. ↩

206. Stakeholder Interview CD388. Lived experience interviews 009, 011, 023, 039, 047, 060, 063, 071, 083 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

207. ibid. Lived experience research interviews 028 and 030 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

208. Lived experience research interviews 018, 026, 030 048, 060, 070 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

209. Trades Union Congress, ‘Still Rigged: Racism in the UK Labour Market’ (2022), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

210. Public Service Consultants (n 12) 11. ↩

211. Lived experience research interviews 011, 012, 030, 047, 048, 070, 072, 077, 102 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

212. Lived experience research interviews 028, 030 in in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

213. Lived experience research interviews 012, 071, 083 in in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

214. Lived experience research interviews 028, 036, 088, 100 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

215. Grieshofer née Tkacukova, Tatiana, Matt Gee, and Ralph Morton, ‘The Journey to Comprehensibility: Court Forms as the First Barrier to Accessing Justice’ (2022) 35(5) International Journal for the Semiotics of Law 1733. ↩

216. Stakeholder interviews ED380, ED381 and ED382. ↩

217. Stewarts Law (n 200). ↩

218. Stakeholder interview DD389. ↩

219. Stakeholder interview DD391. ↩

220. Stakeholder interviews CD385 and DD389. ↩

221. Public Service Consultants (n 12) 11. ↩

222. Stakeholder interview CD387. ↩

223. Department for Business and Trade, ‘Trade union membership UK, 1995 to 2024: statistical bulletin’, accessed 24 March 2026 ↩

224. Stakeholder interview CD386. ↩

225. Stakeholder interview ED383. ↩

226. Written submission AC401. ↩

227. Stakeholder interview CD385. Legal aid in discrimination cases is “basically extinct”. ↩

228. Stakeholder interview AD398. ↩

229. Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (n 177). ↩

230. Stakeholder Interview CD385. ↩

231. Anna Lawson, ‘Disabled People and Access to Justice: From disablement to enablement?’ in Peter Blanck and Eilionóir Flynn (eds), Routledge Handbook of Disability Law and Human Rights (Routledge 2017). ↩

232. Stakeholder Interview CD387. Lived experience research interviews 028, 060, 074 in Public Service Consultants (n 12) ↩

233. Public Service Consultants (n 12)19. Cost was the “most common barrier” identified by interviewees. ↩

234. Citizens Advice Scotland, ‘Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in advance of its 77th Session review of the UK’ (2025), accessed 13 March 2026  ↩

235. Lived experience research interviews 028, 030 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

236. Stakeholder Interview ED380. ↩

237. UNISON v Lord Chancellor [2017] UKSC 51. ↩

238. Stakeholder Interview ED380. ↩

239. Lived experience research interview 048 in Public Service Consultants (n12). ↩

240. Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, schedule 1, part 1, section 43. ↩

241. The Civil Legal Aid (Financial Resources and Payment for Services) Regulations 2013, sections 5 and 8. ↩

242. Scottish Human Rights Commission, ‘Submission to the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in advance of its 77th Session review of the UK’ (2025), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

243. Stakeholder interview ED383. ↩

244. Stakeholder Interview ED382. ↩

245. Lived experience research interviews 070, 102 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

246. Barcan and Kirby Solicitors, ‘The Strict Time Limits for Employment Claims’ (2023), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

247. Fawcett Society, ‘A Right to Know’ (n 11). ↩

248. Employment Rights Act 2025, section 152 and schedule 12. ↩

249. Lived experience research interviews 026, 048 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

250. Stakeholder interview ED383. ↩

251. Stakeholder interview ED380. ↩

252. Stakeholder interview ED380. ↩

253. Lived experience interviews 009, 012, 071, 083, 100 in Public Service Consultants (n 12) ↩

254. Fawcett Society, ‘A Right to Know (n 11). ↩

255. Equality Act 2010, section 138 (repealed). ↩

256. See further, LexisNexis, ‘Employment Tribunal Equality Claims – Overview’ (2025). ↩

257. See chapter 4, Lewis Silkin, ‘Equal Pay’ (2024), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

258. As described above, in some cases, a real comparator might not exist. ↩

259. Fredman (n 26) 326-350. ↩

260. Stakeholder interview AD394. ↩

261. Stakeholder interview DD389. The challenges of outsourcing are discussed further in chapter 2 of this report. For an example in the context of race, see Boohene (n 184). ↩

262. Tribunals Judiciary, ‘Eighth Addendum to the Presidential Guidance on Employment Tribunal Awards for Injury to Feelings’ (2025), 13 March 2026. ↩

263. Stakeholder Interview DD392. ↩

264. Written submission, AC401. ↩

265. Katalin Adamis-Csazar and others, ‘How Can Sanctions Effectively Prevent and Combat Discrimination?’ (2025) European Commission, accessed 13 March 2026, European Network of Equality Bodies, ‘Preventing and Reacting to Discrimination through Sanctions and Remedies’ (2022), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

266. Stakeholder interview ED383. ↩

267. Department of Business, Innovation and Skills, ‘Payment of Employment Tribunal Awards’ (2013). ↩

268. ibid. ↩

269. Department for Business and Trade, ‘Employment Tribunal Naming Scheme’ (2018), accessed 13 March 2026. ↩

270. Daniel Lavelle, ‘UK’s rogue boss name and shame register still blank after four years’ (23 April 2023. The Guardian), accessed 24 March 2026. ↩

271. There have been changes to the collection, management and publication of Employment Tribunal data in recent years (see HMCTS (n 2). As a result, the last full year for which comparable data is available is 2020 to 2021. As such, this data does not include, for example, the successful Equal Pay claim brought against the fashion retailer Next, which covered approximately 3,500 workers, Employment Tribunal, Case No. 1302019/18 and others. ↩

272. Tribunal statistics are published quarterly and can be accessed at the HMCTS (n 2) Data tables for the period in question are held on file with the authors and can be provided on request. ↩

273. ibid. ↩

274. Employment Tribunal Procedure Rules 2024, Rule 5 ↩

275. See the discussion in section 3.2 of this chapter. Responses have been recorded in an accompanying workbook. ↩

276. For example, a search for the term “pay discrimination” in the Discrimination Law Association’s, ‘Briefings Index’, accessed 13 March 2026, returned 14 results. Of these, only one result (the Royal Parks case, discussed above) was directly relevant. ↩

277. A majority of the cases challenging pay discrimination on characteristics other than sex have concerned age discrimination and occupational pensions. See illustratively, Incomes Data Research (n 108), Downie (118). ↩

278. Data on file with the authors. ↩

279. Patka v BBC & Anor UKEAT/0190/17/DM. ↩

280. Incomes Data Research (n 108) 6 found ‘vastly more case law concerning equal pay than discrimination claims.’ ↩

281. Equality Act 2010, sections 13 and 19. ↩

282. Stakeholder Interview ED380: “I don’t think [the equal pay regime] is working at all. So it worries me a little bit that we’re about to bring race and disability into it” ↩

283. Stakeholder interview AD396. ↩

284. For further discussion of pay transparency measures, see section 4.1.1. ↩

285. For further discussion on state obligations on education, awareness-raising and training and sensitisation on the right to non-discrimination, see UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 185) 199. ↩

286. Stakeholder interview CD387 ↩

287. See, for example, Amnesty International and the Runnymede Trust, ‘Submission to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination in advance of its 113th Session review of the UK’ (2024), Citizens Advice Scotland (n 235). ↩

288. Fawcett Society, ‘A Right to Know’ (n 11). ↩

289. Stakeholder Interviews ED380, CD385, and written submission AC401. ↩

290. Equal Rights Trust and the Solidarity Centre International Lawyers Assisting Workers Network (n 182). ↩

291. See chapter 3. ↩

292. Morten Bennedsen, Birthe Larsen and Jiayi Wei, ‘Gender Wage Transparency and the Gender Pay Gap: A Survey’ (2021) 37(5) Journal of Economic Surveys 1743. ↩

293. Stakeholder interview DD393. ↩

294. European Network of Equality Bodies, ‘National Cases and Good Practices on Equal Pay’ (2019). ↩

295. Equality Act 2010, section 77. ↩

296. Stakeholder Interviews CD388 and DD392, Lizzie Barmes, ‘Silencing at Work: Sexual Harassment, Workplace Misconduct and NDAs’ (2022) 52(1) Industrial Law Journal 68. ↩

297. The Employment Rights Act, sections 23 and 24. ↩

298. Stakeholder interview AD398. ↩

299. Directive (EU) 2023/970. ↩

300. Ibid, Preamble [11]. ↩

301. Alex Patrick, ’The Role of Equal Pay Auditing in Resolving Unequal Pay: More Hindrance than Help? in Frances Hamilton and Elisabeth Griffiths (ed), The Evolution of the Gender Pay Gap: A Comparative Perspective (Routledge 2023), Bennedsen, Larsen and Wei (n 293). ↩

302. OECD, ‘Pay Transparency Tools to Close the Gender Wage Gap’ (2021) 13, accessed 26 March 2026. ↩

303. Fawcett Society and the Runnymede Trust, ‘Broken Ladders: The Myth of Meritocracy for Women of Colour in the Workplace’ (2022). ↩

304. Fawcett Society, ‘A Right to Know’ (n 11). ↩

305. Directive (EU) 2023/970, Article 7. ↩

306. Stakeholder interviews ED380, CD385, and written submission AC401. ↩

307. Stakeholder interviews ED380, CD385, and written submission AC401. ↩

308. Blundell (n 75) 37-8, Peter Bamberger, Exposing Pay: Pay Transparency What it Means for Employees, Employers and Public Policy (OUP 2023) chapter 8. ↩

309. Stakeholder interview AD398.  ↩

310. Sara Benedi Lahuerta, Peter Rejchrt and Alex Patrick, ‘The UK Pay Transparency Regulations: Apparent Transparency Without Accountability?’ (2023) 44(1) Legal Studies 21. ↩

311. While private sector employers across Great Britain follow a common set of rules, different requirements apply to public sector employers. Specific equality duties in Wales and Scotland impose different obligations on devolved public bodies. These include, inter alia, lower reporting thresholds, additional data collection and action planning requirements. ↩

312. Benedi Lahuerta, Rejchrt and Patrick (n 311) ↩

313. Morten Bennedsen and others, ‘Gender Wage Transparency and the Gender Pay Gap: A Survey’ (2023) 37(5) Journal of Economic Survey 1743. ↩

314. ibid, Jack Blundell and others, ‘Pay Transparency and Gender Equality’ (2025) 17(2) American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 418. ↩

315. Bennedsen and others (n 314). ↩

316. Benedi Lahuerta, Rejchrt and Patrick (n 311). ↩

317. Stakeholder Interview ID440. The lived experience research supports this conclusion – see Public Service Consultants (n 12) section 3.4.1. ↩

318. Benedi Lahuerta, Rejchrt and Patrick (n 311). ↩

319. Directive (EU) 2023/970, Article 7. ↩

320. See Zoe Cullen and Bobak Pakzad-Hurson, ‘Equilibrium Effects of Pay Transparency’ (2022) National Bureau of Economic Research, Working Paper 28903. ↩

321. Susan Fiorentino and Sandra Tomkowicz, ‘Can Millennials Deliver on Equal Pay? Why the Time Is Finally Right for Pay Transparency’ (2021) 38 Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal 253. ↩

322. Equality Act 2010, section 65(6) and 80(5). ↩

323. Incomes Data Research (n 108) 36. ↩

324. Stakeholder interview ED380 ↩

325. Stakeholder interview ED380. ↩

326. See ACAS, ‘Job Evaluation: Considerations and Risks’ (2021). ↩

327. See section 4.1.4 on pay audits. ↩

328. Stakeholder interview DD389. ↩

329. Stakeholder interviews DD393 and AD398. ↩

330. See Stakeholder Interview DD389, Incomes Data Research (n 108). ↩

331. ibid. ↩

332. Stakeholder interview ED380. ↩

333. Stakeholder interview AD394, Stakeholder Interview DD391. ↩

334. (Ontario) Pay Equity Act RSO 1990 c P7, Fredman (n 26) 342. ↩

335. Silkin (n 258). ↩

336. See the discussion in chapter 3.1 of this report. ↩

337. Equality and Human Rights Commission, ‘Equal Pay Audit for Larger Organisations’. ↩

338. Lewis Silkin (n 258). ↩

339. Patrick (n 302). ↩

340. Government of Iceland, Equal Pay Certification. ↩

341. ibid. ↩

342. ibid. ↩

343. Written submission AC401. ↩

344. Written submission AC401. ↩

345. Written submission AC401. ↩

346. Francis-Devine (n 5) 10-12. ↩

347. Stakeholder interview DD393. ↩

348. Engender, ‘Response to the Scottish Government’s Consultation on the Operation of the Public Sector Equality Duty in Scotland’ (2022) 2-3. ↩

349. Stakeholder interview CD387. ↩

350. Trades Union Congress (n 210) 37-8. ↩

351. Worker Protection (Amendment of Equality Act 2010) Act 2023, section 1. ↩

352. Stakeholder interview ED383 and HD399. ↩

353. Written submission DC400. ↩

354. Stakeholder interviews DD393 ↩

355. Lived experience interviews 002, 009, 006, 010, 015, 022, 027, 051, 082, 084, 086, 091 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). Stakeholder interviews ED386 and ED387. ↩

356. Stakeholder interview CD387. ↩

357. Stakeholder interview CD385. ↩

358. Information Commissioner’s Office, ‘Penalties’. ↩

359. Lived experience interview 084 in Public Service Consultants (n 12). ↩

360. Department for Business and Trade and HM Revenue and Customs, ‘National Minimum Wage’ (2024). ↩

361. Stakeholder interview CD388 ↩

362. Stakeholder interviews CD387 and DD390. ↩

363. Written submission AC401. ↩

364. Department for Business and Trade, ‘Next steps to Make Work Pay’ (2024) [34], accessed 24 March 2026. ↩

365. See Directive (EU) 2024/1500 of the European Parliament and of the Council on standards for Equality Bodies in the field of equal treatment and equal opportunities between women and men in matters of employment and occupation, and Council Directive (EU) 2024/1499 on standards for Equality Bodies in the field of equal treatment between persons irrespective of their racial or ethnic origin, equal treatment in the field of employment and occupation between persons irrespective of their religion or belief, disability, age or sexual orientation, equal treatment between women and men in matters of social security and in the access to and supply of goods and services. ↩

366. UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (n 185). ↩

367. Directive (EU) 2024/1500 and Directive (EU) 2024/1500, Articles 1, 3 and 4. ↩

368. See, European Network of Equality Bodies and Equal Rights Trust, ‘Understanding the New EU Directives on Standards for Equality Bodies: Key principles derived from the Legal Digest on Standards for Equality Bodies’ (2024). ↩

369. Stakeholder interviews DD391 and CD385. ↩

370. Stakeholder interview CD388. ↩

371. Stakeholder interview CD387. ↩

372. Written submission AC401. ↩

373. EU Directive 2023/970 Article 5(1). ↩

374. ibid ↩

375. ibid Article 6. ↩

376. ibid Article 12(3). ↩