Research and analysis

Understanding asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee vulnerabilities, needs, and support (2022)

Published 22 May 2025

Acknowledgements

This research was funded under the European Union’s (EU) Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and relates to a broader AMIF-funded project entitled, ‘Asylum policy evidence and evaluation’. It was commissioned by the UK Home Office’s Analysis and Insights (HOAI) team.

The research and present report were conducted and written by M&C Saatchi World Services in partnership with the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Europe.

Authors:

M&C Saatchi World Services:
Dr. Lucy Hovil, Independent Consultant
Nick Vant, Senior Research Executive
Nikita Yasmin Shah, Senior Research Manager
Dr. Gerry Power, Chief Research Officer

Migration Policy Institute (MPI) Europe:
Lucía Salgado, Associate Policy Analyst, MPI Europe
Susan Fratzke, Senior Policy Analyst, MPI
Dr. Meghan Benton, Director of the International Program, MPI

The authors would like to thank Mixed Migration Centre (MMC) for providing access to data from the 4Mi database, and would like to acknowledge Jane Linekar, 4Mi Global Coordinator and Fabio Catini, Data Analyst for their contribution to the research.

The authors acknowledge all the stakeholders that have contributed to the research in an advisory capacity, during data collection, and in the production of the final report:

Professor David Cantor, Director of the Refugee Law Initiative, Peer Reviewer
Ambassador David Donoghue, Peer Reviewer
Dr. Jessica Hagen-Zanker, Senior Research Fellow at Overseas Development Institute, Peer Reviewer
Dr. Hanne Beirens, Director of MPI Europe
Aibek Iliasov, Research Director, M&C Saatchi World Services
Anna Leapman, Studio and Resource Manager, M&C Saatchi World Services
Malene Igland, Designer, M&C Saatchi World Services
The Operations and Finance team at M&C Saatchi World Services
Melanie Bell, Copy Editor, Independent Consultant
Helen Kawagama, Proof-reader, TypeLab Ltd

The authors would like to thank colleagues in the Home Office’s Analysis and Insights (HOAI) team for their support in coordinating, managing, and contributing to the research design and for providing expertise throughout the project:

Rose Pycock, Senior Research Officer
Benjamin Jenkins, Principal Research Officer
Katherine Byrne, Senior Principal Operational Research Analyst
Oliver Brocklehurst, Research Officer

Glossary

Adults at risk (AAR): Policy that aims to safeguard individuals at risk against the harm of detention and sets out processes for making decisions on immigration detention of individuals who are considered at risk. The policy contains a non-exhaustive list of indicators of risk, such as physical disability, torture victims, and potential victims of human trafficking or modern slavery^{[footnote 1]}.

Asylum accommodation and support contracts (AASC): Contracts governing the relationship between the Home Office and the 3 service providers contracted to provide asylum accommodation in the UK.

Advice, issue reporting and eligibility (AIRE): Contract signed in 2019 between the Home Office and Migrant Help establishing a new helpline and support service for asylum seekers.

Compliant environment: A series of policy interventions and measures intended to make it difficult for irregular migrants to live, work, and access services in the UK. Previously known as the ‘Hostile Environment’.

English for speakers of other languages (ESOL): ESOL programmes teach students whose first language is not English, but who are living in an English-speaking country.

Human smuggling: The procurement in order to obtain, directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit, of the illegal entry of a person into a state party of which the person is not a national^{[footnote 2]}.

Human trafficking: The UN Protocol to prevent, supress and punish trafficking in persons defines human trafficking as “the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control of another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or removal of organs”^{[footnote 3]}.

Modern slavery: Refers to situations of exploitation for either personal or financial gains and often involves coercion, force, and control. The terms also encompasses other forms of exploitation including domestic servitude, human trafficking, child labour, forced labour, bonded labour, descent-based slavery, and early and forced marriage. Modern slavery is a criminal offence under the Modern Slavery Act 2015^{[footnote 4]}.

National Referral Mechanism (NRM): National framework for identifying and referring potential victims of modern slavery and ensuring they receive appropriate support^{[footnote 5]}.

Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD): A mental health condition caused by experiencing or witnessing traumatic, stressful, frightening, and/or distressing events.

Rule 32: Rule 32 of the Short-term Holding Facility Rules sets out the requirements for doctors working in short-term holding facilities to report on any detained person whose health is likely to be affected by continued detention, who is suspected to have suicidal ideations, or who might be a victim of torture.

Rule 35: Rule 35 of the Detention Centre Rules aims to ensure that vulnerable detainees are brought to the attention of those with direct responsibility for authorising, maintaining, and reviewing detention. The rule sets out requirements for doctors working in immigration removal centres to report on any detained person whose health is likely to be impacted by continued detention, who is suspected to have suicidal ideations, or who might be a victim of torture.

Section 95: Under Section 95 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, asylum seekers who are destitute or likely to become destitute can receive financial support, accommodation support, or both. This is often referred to as Section 95 support.

Section 98: Under Section 98 of the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their Section 95 application or awaiting transfer to dispersal accommodation can access short-term support. This is often referred to as Section 98 support or initial accommodation.

Unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASC): An unaccompanied asylum-seeking child can be defined as a person aged 17 and under, separated from both parents and not cared for by a guardian or other adult who is legally or customarily responsible for them^{[footnote 6]} who is seeking legal refugee status having “been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence”^{[footnote 7]}.

Executive summary

The UK Home Office is seeking to establish how asylum seeker and refugee vulnerabilities, needs, and support are understood and operationalised in the context of the UK asylum system. An evidence-based understanding of the challenges facing asylum seekers and refugees across their journey to the UK and within the UK asylum system, including pathways to integration, will enable the Home Office to better target support for those seeking asylum and those granted refugee status. The UK Home Office is seeking to establish how asylum seeker and refugee vulnerabilities, needs, and support are understood and operationalised in the context of the UK asylum system. An evidence-based understanding of the challenges facing asylum seekers and refugees across their journey to the UK and within the UK asylum system, including pathways to integration, will enable the Home Office to better target support for those seeking asylum and those granted refugee status.

Individuals who seek asylum in the United Kingdom (UK) have lost the legal and political protection of their state, along with a sense of safety and belonging. As a result, their journey to a country where they can seek asylum, their navigation of that asylum system, and the complex process of integrating into a new society, often form a time of intense precarity. Many of the challenges faced by asylum seekers and refugees are particularly prevalent for those who use irregular routes to reach the UK and who have often been exposed to additional risk, harm, and danger as a result.

Since 2015, the UK Home Office has invested significant resources in improving the safeguarding of vulnerable asylum seekers. With the aim of establishing clarity and uniformity in the institution’s understanding and approach, improvements have included:

• the establishment of safeguarding teams
• the formation of an Asylum Safeguarding Hub to centralise referrals
• the rollout of training on vulnerability and safeguarding to various units
• the formulation of the adults at risk (AAR) policy as an attempt to address wellbeing issues in detention
• the introduction of the Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy (2021 to 2015)

Despite this investment and policy commitment, and despite strong belief among frontline Home Office employees that safeguarding is imperative, this report presents widespread evidence that the asylum system, for many, still exacerbates and creates, rather than alleviates, vulnerabilities. Outdated Home Office platforms struggling to deal with increased asylum seeker intake, overstretched staff and resources, inconsistent and fragmented adherence to guidance, and the negative impact of a wider policy environment on asylum seeker wellbeing, have all led to inadequate identification of, and response to, addressing the vulnerabilities and subsequent needs of asylum seekers and refugees.

Drawing on an extensive review of the literature and secondary data, and 72 in-depth interviews with Home Office Staff, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), academics, service providers, and other frontline workers, this report identifies a set of interrelated factors that contribute to the vulnerability of asylum seekers and refugees arriving at the borders of the UK. While many of these factors manifest in operational challenges, the findings demonstrate that they are often symptomatic of structural concerns that demand wider policy review and recalibration. This means that well-intentioned, evidence-based guidance and a nuanced approach to vulnerability by the Home Office will have limited impact until deeper, structural challenges have been addressed, including strengthening frontline processes and resourcing.

As a result, a sophisticated understanding of vulnerability, particularly evident in the new Home Office Safeguarding Strategy, warrants more than simple guidance or straightforward operationalisation across the touchpoints of the asylum system, given the wealth of factors (for example, language challenges, the nature of trauma, or distrust of authorities) that may hamper ‘easy’ identification of vulnerabilities. While better guidance, training, or understanding of vulnerabilities remains important, it needs to sit alongside more robust engagement with the structural and policy factors that can drive vulnerability.

Further, backlogs and prolonged waiting periods pose a threat to asylum seeker wellbeing. Backlogs can have negative knock-on effects for many aspects of the asylum system and have a disproportionate effect on vulnerable asylum seekers by keeping them in emergency accommodation (for example, reception centres or hotels) that is overcrowded or inappropriate for their needs or requires them to move frequently, upending efforts to address mental health or education needs. More significantly, backlogs delay the formal starting point for integration processes in a way that can be especially detrimental for asylum-route refugees with vulnerabilities.

Additionally, there is a paradox for Home Office officials committed to addressing vulnerabilities of asylum seekers, where certain system design elements that aim to diagnose and support particular needs or groups have had unintended consequences that undermine their goals. For example, the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) process means that asylum seekers’ claims are often put on hold during the NRM determination, which can prolong the period between arrival and receiving status (with all the benefits of security, wellbeing, access to employment, for instance, that brings). Similarly, the decision to abandon the service standard that aimed to decide 98% of claims within 6 months, to prioritise vulnerable groups, among others, has been a factor driving swelling backlogs, which themselves may exacerbate vulnerabilities. Policy frameworks that prioritise asylum seekers with identified vulnerabilities over others may also create unintended effects including incentives to misrepresent particular characteristics or experiences.

Given these broader realities, this research lays the foundation for a framing of vulnerability (see below) that connects operational challenges to the structural factors that lie behind them. This approach goes beyond providing a fixed, implementable framework or set of indicators for identifying or defining vulnerability, which runs the risk of constituting yet another measurement tool premised on simplified factors divorced from structural contexts. Instead, it recognises that approaches to identify and measure vulnerability need to be situated within a broader understanding of the multiple factors that contribute to vulnerability, including existing mechanisms that either do not accurately address asylum seeker needs, or that might exacerbate or create vulnerabilities. Rather than focusing on what vulnerability is, therefore, it places a greater focus on what causes vulnerability^{[footnote 8]} and serves as a reference point for understanding how and why vulnerabilities may materialise and manifest, the factors that may exacerbate them, and the actions that can be taken to reduce or prevent them.

As such, the research points to 7 principles designed to provide the Home Office with the basis for reducing vulnerability among asylum seekers and refugees, including through comprehending and addressing the multiple structural factors that lead to, and exacerbate it:

1. Create systems that will work for all asylum seekers, without necessitating a potentially misleading distinction between the ‘vulnerable’ and the ‘not-vulnerable’: This approach avoids seeing vulnerability as a tool for separating the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving’, but as a lens for identifying an individual’s specific needs premised on their situation and experiences, their susceptibility to harm, and their capability to deal with adversity. In practice, this means thinking about individualised case management across the board, rather than just focusing on specific individual cases.
2. Focus on recalibrating the structural factors that create or exacerbate vulnerability (including the asylum system and the broader system): This approach points to a focus away from what vulnerability is, to what are the causes of vulnerability. It means ensuring a clear understanding of the impact of Home Office policies that underlie any asylum system both in terms of their potential to create or increase vulnerability, or to enhance resilience. For instance, current waiting times are serving neither individuals (since they contribute to exacerbating vulnerabilities and prolong integration) nor the legitimacy of the system (since by the time people are refused status, they may find it harder to return to their country of origin), so policies to shorten asylum processing times need to be urgently considered.
3. Leverage touchpoints and opportunities where the system has the potential to do more to foster resilience rather than create or exacerbate vulnerability: This approach puts the emphasis on creating a policy and operating environment that is supportive, and that provides a platform for asylum seekers to be agents of change in the society in which they are living, albeit sometimes temporarily. For example, through easing employment restrictions or alternatively providing voluntary work placement during the asylum period, especially if this is well designed to enable asylum seekers to complement their employment history with UK-based work experience.
4. Consider the short-term and long-term benefits of strengthening integration from the start of the asylum process, not only at the end: Regardless of the outcome, the asylum system should reduce rather than exacerbate vulnerability. If someone is granted permission to stay in the UK, this will enable them to integrate more easily; and if they are to return to their country of origin, it ensures a more rights-respecting process. In both cases, it builds resilience and acts as an antidote to vulnerability.
5. Adapt the system to empower (rather than disempower) asylum seekers to build resilience and agency (and, by implication, not to undermine it) – but without using ‘resilience’ as a reason for overlooking vulnerability: This approach requires a reframing of the way in which asylum is understood and defined, whereby there is a deliberate focus on strengthening protective factors and resilience at the earliest opportunity.
6. Recognise the importance of individual situations and experiences in understanding levels of vulnerability: This approach requires encouraging and enabling asylum seekers to describe themselves and their situation in a way that makes sense of their experience rather than expecting their experience to fit within a pre-ordained framework. It will demand increased awareness-raising amongst all frontline staff and service providers who interact with asylum seekers.
7. Recognise that visible, identifiable categories have a role to play and are necessary, but not sufficient in establishing vulnerability status: Guidance around categories of individuals that might be particularly vulnerable to certain types of harm is valid, but it needs to be viewed as part of a wider response to identifying and responding to vulnerabilities. Ultimately, and given the evidence of high levels of harm experienced on migrant journeys, there is a case to be made for assuming that any asylum seeker who arrives in the UK through irregular routes should be assumed to be vulnerable and offered support accordingly.

These 7 evidence-based principles provide the framing for a more granular set of recommendations at the end of this report that point to how the Home Office can implement them in practice to address vulnerability on the migratory journey, within the UK asylum system, and in processes and systems of integration.

1. Introduction

This report examines asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee vulnerabilities, needs, and support, and how each are met or unmet, understood, and operationalised in the context of the UK asylum journey. The notion of ‘vulnerability’ has become increasingly popular in global legal and policy discourse on forced migration in recent years^{[footnote 9]}. This reflects a recognition that while all asylum seekers are in need of protection, as recognised in a set of global standards^{[footnote 10]}, there are individuals and profiles of individuals who have additional or specific vulnerabilities that arise prior to, and whilst, seeking asylum, as well as during the ongoing process of integration.

The increased focus on vulnerability within global discussions has led to corresponding attention to vulnerability within national-level asylum systems. Asylum systems form an important component of the global legal and governance framework designed to protect those who have lost the protection of their home state – and, therefore, play an important role in creating processes, mechanisms, and systems that adequately take into consideration specific forms of vulnerability that confront asylum seekers. Yet, while the notion of vulnerability has become increasingly popularised, there is a need to better understand the multiple dimensions of the term and, most importantly, how this is – and can be – translated into both policy and practice in order to ensure the functioning of a rights- respecting asylum system.

As such, in early April 2022 the UK Home Office commissioned M&C Saatchi World Services in partnership with the Migration Policy Institute Europe (MPI)^{[footnote 11]} to conduct research to better understand the vulnerabilities, needs, and support of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK. Subsequently, this report investigates how their vulnerabilities are currently conceptualised, identified, and supported across their migratory and UK asylum journeys^{[footnote 12]}, and how these affect their ability to engage with the UK asylum process, access support, and integrate into UK society. Furthermore, it provides insights into how vulnerabilities can change and interact, and how they can be ameliorated or exacerbated by interactions with UK immigration, asylum, and refugee integration systems and processes; and provides a more detailed understanding of needs and support that are, or are not, currently available to asylum seekers and refugees, and how unmet needs can create vulnerabilities.

Accordingly, the purpose of this research study is 2-fold. First, to provide the UK Home Office with an up-to-date multi-stakeholder evidence-based understanding of how vulnerability can be understood across both migratory journeys and the UK asylum journey, and second, to support the Home Office in highlighting areas to improve the provision and targeting of support based on the understanding of needs and vulnerabilities through policy and operational practice. It was funded under the European Union’s (EU) Asylum Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF) and relates to a broader AMIF-funded project entitled ‘Asylum Policy Evidence and Evaluation’.

1.1 Research scope, aim, and objectives

The scope of the research includes both the migratory journey and the UK asylum journey. The former includes what takes place prior and up to arrival in the UK, starting in the country of origin. The latter refers to the period following arrival to the UK, from the initial claim for asylum protection, through the claim and/or appeal process(es), and, for those whose claims are granted, to integration in the UK. Thus, the UK asylum journey can be considered as 3 interlinked stages:

1. Arrival in the UK and initial claim.
2. Asylum claim process, including initial decision, granting, and refusal or appeal.
3. Integration over the short and long-term^{[footnote 13]}.

The overarching aim of the research is to provide a structured overview and understanding of asylum seeker vulnerabilities across the migratory and UK asylum journeys, and the needs and support – whether provided or absent – throughout the UK asylum journey.

To achieve this aim, 5 key research objectives were developed: ^{[footnote 14]}

1. To create a framing and definition of vulnerability that can be applied across the migratory journey, UK asylum system, and refugee integration services to improve understanding, inform policy and practice, and strengthen safeguarding. The framing covers both the migratory and UK asylum journeys.
2. To improve understanding of the needs and vulnerabilities experienced by asylum seekers specifically on their migratory journeys, what causes them, and what mitigates them.
3. To improve understanding of support received – including its perceived impact and effectiveness – and support needed but not received by asylum seekers and the perceived impact of (missing) support.
4. To improve understanding of the experiences of individuals with unmet needs and vulnerabilities and how these are ameliorated or exacerbated by the asylum claim process and integration process.
5. To improve understanding of the impact of increasing digitisation of the UK asylum system (such as the use of remote interviewing via videoconference (RIVC)) on asylum seekers and asylum seekers’ vulnerability, as well as (their) support organisations and legal advisers.

A total of 27 guiding research questions were designed and mapped against the research objectives to inform and guide the research process. The research matrix is included in Annex 1^{[footnote 15]}.

1.2 The wider context for the study

The political and legal landscape for asylum seekers in the UK is currently shifting. At the time this study was commissioned, the Nationality and Borders Bill was yet to be passed as an Act. The Bill was subsequently passed and became an Act of Law on 28 April 2022 as the research commenced. The timing, therefore, meant that many of the plans under the Home Office’s New Plan for Immigration (NPI) were yet to be fully actioned. For instance, one key change in the new legislation that is particularly relevant to this research is the proposal to distinguish how asylum cases are treated according to their mode of entry into the UK. For those that arrive via irregular routes – routes deemed illegal under the Act – their claim for asylum is now at risk of being deemed inadmissible. Consequently, while the passing of the Nationality and Borders Act was not part of the research scope, it was still an important factor to consider, particularly in the interviews where it was raised frequently by research participants. As a result, while the research was not designed specifically to address the changes brought about by the Act, some of these shifts have been captured in the data and the findings should be considered with these changes in mind.

Furthermore, the research took place against a wider institutional backdrop of the ‘compliant environment’^{[footnote 16]}, which has evolved out of the ‘hostile environment’. The latter refers to the then-Home Secretary Theresa May’s introduction of policies aimed to make it more difficult for irregular migrants to access support services such as private accommodation, employment opportunities, and bank accounts^{[footnote 17]}. The Immigration Acts of 2014^{[footnote 18]} and 2016^{[footnote 19]} took forward this policy approach and exposed irregular migrants to more restrictions in terms of accessing safe housing. In 2017, the ‘Windrush scandal’ brought to light the impact of the UK government’s ‘hostile environment’ policies, legislation, and rhetoric. Hundreds of Commonwealth citizens who had the right to live in the UK but lacked formal documentation were wrongly detained, denied legal rights, and deported and made liable to deportation to their country of origin. An independent review conducted by Wendy Williams highlighted significant concerns, including the detrimental impact UK government policy had on affected individuals, the challenges of navigating complex immigration law, and the need for organisational culture change within the Home Office^{[footnote 20]}.

In addition, at the time this research was carried out, the UK had extended its support to Ukrainian nationals and their family members fleeing the Russian invasion of Ukraine. While this study does not address or directly explore the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme^{[footnote 21]} due to entry to the UK being facilitated by the UK government itself, a number of stakeholders interviewed as part of this study shared insights, comparisons, and experiences, particularly in relation to long-term integration outcomes and safeguarding.

Furthermore, during the Autumn of 2022, public attention was drawn to asylum seekers and refugees in the media reporting of significant overcrowding at Manston processing centre^{[footnote 22]}, a former military base in Kent, as well as the petrol bombing by a far-right extremist of the Western Jet Foil Border Force centre in Dover^{[footnote 23]}. Many of the issues and challenges that were subsequently highlighted within the public domain are explored and discussed in this report.

Finally, this study was not itself impacted by the COVID-19 pandemic as it took place after regulations were eased in the UK. However, it is important to caveat that the effects of the pandemic were evident on multiple aspects of the asylum system, including trends on the numbers of asylum seekers arriving in the UK, delays in processing asylum applications, and changes to asylum interview protocols and accessibility to support provision.

1.3 Overview of the report

This report is structured in 7 further chapters and 3 annexes:

Chapter 2 outlines the methodology implemented to conduct the study. The chapter describes the protocols employed for the evidence review, interviews with 3 key categories of stakeholders working in or on the UK asylum system in some capacity, and analysis of MMC 4Mi data. An overview of the research matrix is presented in annex 1 and a detailed description of the methodology is presented in annex 2.
Chapter 3 provides an overview of how ‘vulnerability’ is, and has been, defined, understood, and operationalised in an asylum context both in the academic and grey literature and in stakeholder interviews. It highlights how vulnerabilities have traditionally been considered using a category-based approach premised on personal characteristics (internal factors). Shortcomings of this approach are increasingly being recognised – both within the literature, and by those interviewed for this research. It then outlines how the concept of vulnerability is increasingly understood as also encompassing external factors in the form of situations and wider contexts, with an understanding of how intersectionality impacts vulnerability, the importance of considering resilience, and the dynamic, cumulative nature of vulnerability over time. This broader, more nuanced and contextualised understanding is reflected in some recent Home Office guidance but the findings show this has yet to filter into practice in a substantive way.
Chapter 4 explores the vulnerabilities of asylum seekers on their migratory journeys to the UK. It considers structural factors that expose asylum seekers to harmful or potentially harmful situations, which include the limited number of legal routes to the UK, increased deterrence mechanisms, and more stringent border controls. It examines how structural factors have fuelled an increase in ‘irregular’ journeys by land and sea, and the role – both protective and harmful – of smugglers in facilitating these journeys. It then considers some specific harms that asylum seekers encounter on their journeys to the UK, before discussing the implications for arrival to the UK and entering the UK asylum system itself.
Chapter 5 reviews how vulnerabilities are accounted for and affected by the UK asylum process and asylum support system. First, the chapter reviews vulnerability – particularly Home Office mechanisms for identifying vulnerability and safeguarding protocols – within the asylum process, and subsequently considers various aspects of asylum support, including accommodation and financial support, health services, and education. The chapter then reviews support and safeguarding provided to unaccompanied asylum- seeking children (UASC), including age assessment processing, accommodation, and access to services such as healthcare, mental health provisions, and education. It then presents evidence on how vulnerabilities are treated in detention contexts, before outlining changes made to digitise the asylum system and the impact this has had on asylum seekers.
Chapter 6 analyses the support available to asylum-route refugees once their asylum journey comes to an end and the formal integration process begins. The chapter explores how experiences during the migratory journey and time spent in the asylum system can profoundly shape the process of integration. Based on the evidence, the chapter makes the case for integration to be considered from the very start of an asylum seeker’s UK asylum journey, rather than once asylum has been granted. The evidence substantiates the claim that addressing elements of the asylum system earlier on can have the potential to mitigate existing vulnerabilities and improve long-term integration.
Chapter 7 presents an overview of the research findings, identifies areas whereby increased investment in operational approaches are subsequently required, and presents a framing of vulnerability through 7 focused guiding principles premised on the results.
Chapter 8 presents specific recommendations to the Home Office to address vulnerabilities, needs, and support across the migratory journey, the UK asylum system, and integration. It also recommends areas for further research emerging from this research study.
Annex 1 presents the research matrix – the process by which the research team coded and classified evidence against the research objectives.
Annex 2 builds upon chapter 2 by outlining a detailed description of the evidence and data gathering methods and fieldwork employed in the research programme.
Annex 3 provides the bibliography.

2. Methodology

This study implemented a mixed-methods approach which included 3 data gathering workstreams:

• an evidence review of 313 documents from academic and policy sources
• analysis of 72 key informant interviews
• an analysis of survey interviews with 810 migrants from the Mixed Migration Centre’s (MMC) 4Mi database

A detailed description of all aspects of the methodology, the ethical protocols implemented, and the limitations of the study is presented in annex 2.

The evidence review was designed to identify the most relevant and high-quality sources of academic and policy literature, and the process consisted of an initial scoping which informed the development and refinement of the research instruments, a systematic review of academic literature, a review of grey literature, and a review of relevant material shared by Home Office personnel (including the Home Office Analysis and Insights (HOAI) team) and by both Home Office and non-Home Office interview participants. In total, 313 documents were analysed from a pool of 1,899 documents (including both academic and non-academic literature). To filter to the final body of material for more detailed analysis, title screening, abstract screening, coding by research objective, application of a quality assessment tool, coding by research question, and full text reviews were conducted. Inclusion and exclusion criteria were adhered to relating to practical and conceptual topical breadth, location, and time period.

The evidence review process was approached iteratively and dynamically. For instance, where gaps in the evidence were initially identified, search terms were altered or widened to improve the capacity for covering topical grey areas. Furthermore, documents that arose either from stakeholder recommendations or third-party research were added and analysed throughout the duration of the research.

In addition, 72 interviews were conducted with key informants within the UK asylum sector. Interviewees consisted of those within, and outside, the Home Office across 3 groups: policy stakeholders (Home Office only), frontline workers (Home Office and non-Home Office), and ‘other’ stakeholders, including NGOs, academics, sector experts, and support providers (non-Home Office only).

Table 1: Interview participant breakdown

Stakeholder group	Stakeholder type	Number of participants
Home Office	Policy	22
	Frontline	15
External (non-Home Office)	Health	2
	Academia	2
	Education	1
	NGOs	23
	Legal	4
	Local authorities	3
Total number of participants		72

The sampling strategy was designed to capture the perspectives of those involved at different stages of the migratory journey and initial entry to the UK, asylum application and processing time, and refugee integration. Further, 10 areas of engagement relating to asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee needs and support were identified and integrated into the sampling strategy. These included processing, safeguarding, housing, interpreters, application process assistance, mental health, health, education, legal, and employment. Where possible, a spread of stakeholders with expertise and experience with particular population types were targeted in the sample of interviewees. This included those with expertise in gender, particular nationalities or ethnic groups, children and young people (CYP), unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASC), LGBTQI+ individuals, those with disabilities, and survivors of modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT).

It was not within the scope of this project to engage asylum seekers and/or refugees directly. This is recognised as a methodological limitation in this report. However, and while not a substitute, insights were gathered from both Home Office and non-Home Office frontline workers who engage directly with asylum seekers in their work on a day-to-day basis, in order to gain greater understanding of the realities of the lived experience in the UK asylum context.

Finally, the data gathering also drew upon Mixed Migration Centre’s 4Mi database. 4Mi is MMC’s primary data collection system, which helps fill knowledge gaps and inform policy and response regarding the nature of mixed migratory movements and the protection risks for refugees and migrants. As the scope of this research study focuses on the migratory journey to the UK, their dataset of 22,722 survey-based interviews conducted across North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Asia, and Europe, between December 2019 and March 2022, was filtered to only include responses where the respondent cited the UK as their country of destination. This filtering process resulted in a dataset of 810 survey interviews analysed as part of this study.

3. Conceptualising vulnerability

3.1 Key findings

‘Vulnerability’ has received increasing attention in global legal and policy discourse on forced migration in recent years. This reflects a recognition that while all asylum seekers are in need of protection, there are individuals and profiles of individuals who have additional or specific vulnerabilities that arise prior to, and while, seeking asylum, as well as during the ongoing process of integration.

This increased focus on vulnerability has led to corresponding attention to vulnerability within national-level asylum systems. Globally, the default position of states and international organisations has been to develop vulnerability measurement frameworks that use pre-defined lists of categories of individuals to identify specific groups that are seen to require particular protection measures.

Academic literature and many interviewees consulted in this research actively critique this framework approach, pointing to its one-dimensionality, its lack of nuance, and its over-reliance on visibility in order to identify those who fit within different classifications in order to be considered ‘vulnerable’. Instead, the research points to a strong emphasis on the multi-dimensional, context-specific, and dynamic nature of vulnerability. This understanding takes into consideration factors that span different times and geographies, and demonstrates that vulnerabilities can interact, overlap, and intersect with one another to generate possible ‘multi-profiles of disadvantage’^{[footnote 24]} that are neither universal nor exclusive to particular groups. Vulnerability, therefore, is as much about the context and situations that create specific kinds of vulnerabilities as it is about universal inherent characteristics.

The Home Office has invested significant effort in improving the safeguarding of vulnerable asylum seekers. However, in practice, the UK asylum system tends to focus on pre-defined categories of vulnerability indicators (with an emphasis on personal characteristics and specified situational experiences).

Home Office staff report that they over-rely on visible personal characteristics as indicators of vulnerability and less visible vulnerabilities are often missed. Furthermore, structural drivers of vulnerability are rarely taken into account. Asylum seekers consequently continue to be neglected and many remain unsupported as a result. A number of reasons were identified as contributing factors to this situation:

First, within the current system, vulnerability continues to be operationalised as something to be assessed, measured, and identified. While categories remain important, they need to be reconciled with more contextual understandings of vulnerability and risk. Most importantly, the impulse to recognise vulnerability should not be seen as separating out the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving’, but rather as a way to identify an individual’s specific needs based on their experiences and susceptibility to harm or discrimination.
Second, insufficient attention is paid to how systems and structures themselves can create vulnerability in both policy and operational approaches. Therefore, more attention needs to be paid to the tangible impact that higher level norms and policies have on the everyday, individual experience of asylum seekers. If asylum seekers are going to become less rather than more vulnerable to harm as they move through the asylum system, then policies need to be driven by a nuanced understanding of asylum seeker experiences and vulnerabilities.
Third, it is critical to consider the ways in which labels of ‘vulnerability’ can both mask and undermine asylum seeker and refugee autonomy, agency, and resilience. This suggests the need for an asylum system that asks whether any policy approach or operational decision is likely to enhance rather than undermine the resilience and agency of asylum seekers.

The chapter concludes that approaches to identify and measure vulnerability need to sit alongside a broader framing for understanding the multiple factors that contribute to vulnerability, including existing mechanisms that either do not accurately address asylum seeker needs, or that might exacerbate or create vulnerabilities. Rather than focusing primarily on what vulnerability is, therefore, there needs to be a greater focus on the contributing factors to vulnerability^{[footnote 25]}.

3.2 Introduction

There is a well-established global refugee system for identifying and protecting refugees that is rooted in a set of global standards, including the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol^{[footnote 26]}. This protection, which is inherently legal, is designed to provide asylum seekers with protection in the form of refugee status, which prevents them from being put at risk of forced return to their home state and provides them with access to specific sets of rights in the country in which they find themselves. In other words, there is a broader recognition of the fact that asylum seekers are in need of legal protection from the vulnerabilities arising from persecution in the country of origin and from the legal and practical vulnerabilities associated with being a non-national in another country lacking the protection of their government. Layered on top of this is a recognition that there are individuals and profiles of individuals who have additional or specific vulnerabilities that arise prior to and while seeking asylum, as well as during the ongoing process of integration. These vulnerabilities represent a more complex set of needs and risk factors that must be addressed in a myriad of ways.

The Refugee Convention is implemented and enforced by states, which therefore makes it critical for states to uphold their responsibilities. At a fundamental level, they alone ensure the existence of the refugee regime and set out the mechanisms for how refugee populations should be cared for. It is vital, therefore, for national asylum systems across the world to have a clear understanding of the specific vulnerabilities that asylum seekers and refugees face and experience – and how these subsequently affect how individuals navigate asylum systems and, eventually, settle in the country if granted asylum – as well as clear mechanisms for identifying and responding to them.

A nuanced understanding of vulnerability is critical for addressing the personal needs of individual asylum seekers and ensuring their protection, and it is an integral part of ensuring the functioning of a rights-respecting asylum system. It also ensures that asylum seekers can more fully engage with the asylum process by disclosing their experiences and grounds for seeking asylum in a safe and timely manner, and it helps facilitate their integration into society if granted asylum. Ultimately, an asylum system that is responsive to the vulnerabilities that asylum seekers face will not only ensure the immediate wellbeing of asylum seekers (regardless of the outcome of their claim) but be more protective in the long run by addressing health and mental health needs more effectively and efficiently, and ensuring that asylum seekers and refugees have the opportunity, where appropriate, to engage in the economic life of the country.

Yet, in practice, responding to the specific vulnerabilities of asylum seekers remains a significant challenge. In part, this is linked to the fact that national-level policies are a balancing act between the demands of border enforcement policies, refugee protection obligations, and safeguarding policies. While there should be no inherent contradiction between these, the differing contexts often lead to a multiplicity of policy approaches that sit behind any asylum process which can, in turn, create operational challenges.

The UK asylum system is no exception. On the one hand, since 2015 the Home Office has stepped up efforts to improve the safeguarding of vulnerable asylum seekers, including through the establishment of safeguarding teams, the creation of the Asylum Safeguarding Hub to centralise referrals, the rollout of training on vulnerability and safeguarding across different units, and the creation of the adults at risk (AAR) policy to reduce the harm caused by detention, among other initiatives. Most recently, the Home Office released its Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy (2021 to 2025) in an attempt to strengthen the Home Office’s understanding of vulnerability. These efforts aim to develop a culture of supporting asylum seekers and refugees, as acknowledged by the Strategy itself and the interviews conducted for this research.

On the other hand, however, evidence shows that the UK asylum system is still failing to address vulnerability for many of those who move through the system^{[footnote 27]}, Indeed, and as explored below, many of the stakeholders interviewed – both from within the Home Office and outside – believe that some become more vulnerable as a result of moving through the asylum system. Notably, there are a number of overarching factors that have impacted the ability of the UK asylum system to efficiently support asylum seekers in a way that safeguards and mitigates the multiple vulnerabilities they continue to face. While these factors are explored in detail in chapter 5, for the purpose of this chapter, it is clear that one of the main challenges lies in the fact that, in practice, there is no uniform understanding of an appropriate response to the vulnerability of asylum seekers across the multiple teams within the Home Office.

Indeed, in his role as Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, David Bolt’s 2018 inspection of Home Office processes for the identification and safeguarding of vulnerable adults pointed to a level of disorganisation and inconsistency in vulnerability assessments. His report built on a 2017 presentation by internal staff to the Borders, Immigration, and Citizenship System (BICS), which outlined that the Home Office had no set definition of what constituted vulnerability but suggested a working definition as “a set of negative outcomes resulting from a mix of personal characteristics and experiences”^{[footnote 28]}.

In response to David Bolt’s inspection and a recognition of the need to reach a common understanding of ‘vulnerability’, the Home Office released the Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy (2021 to 2025) in June 2022 which concluded that vulnerability was “the extent to which a person is likely to be at risk of, or come to, harm”^{[footnote 29]}. As explored further in chapter 5, the Home Office is considering a new vulnerability identification framework that would provide indicators that could be used by staff to assist with identifying individuals with vulnerabilities related to mental or physical health, gender and sexual orientation, basic needs, and other factors. While this new strategy presents a welcome step forward, the findings from this research reveal ongoing conceptual and operational confusion over the term ‘vulnerability’ and what it means in practice, despite recent efforts on paper to address this challenge.

This chapter, therefore, outlines ways in which vulnerability is understood and conceptualised in the broader context of asylum and within the UK asylum system specifically. Drawing on a review of literature and interviews with stakeholders conducted for this study, it forms the foundation for subsequent chapters that examine, in more detail, how this understanding of vulnerability is manifested in practice, including through understanding the balance between the needs of asylum seekers and the support they receive.

In order to frame the discussion, the term ‘vulnerability’ is referenced in this report both in relation to susceptibility to harm in its broadest sense (whether perpetrated or environmental), and the extent to which a person’s wellbeing has been depleted by past experience(s) of harm (whether perpetrated or environmental). Importantly, this is not a proposed working definition, but rather reflects some of the observable ways in which the term has been utilised in the wider literature on forced migration and by participants in this study. It also echoes the Home Office Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy definition (above) and is partly reflective of the preliminary definition outlined prior to this research by the Home Office Analysis and Insight (HOAI) team: “any aspect in a set of personal/ internal characteristics and external/situational factors that can cause an individual to be at particular risk of harm”^{[footnote 30]}.

The chapter begins with an overview of the literature relating to understandings of vulnerability within the context of asylum at a global level, before presenting findings from the interviews outlining some of the ways in which vulnerability is understood by those working within the UK asylum system.

3.3 Vulnerability based on pre-defined vulnerability indicators: a default approach

The framing of vulnerability within humanitarian contexts generally, and national asylum systems more specifically, has traditionally been driven by the priority of states, institutions, and many humanitarian organisations to define who is vulnerable, in order to allocate and provide perceived necessary support – particularly in contexts of resource constraints^{[footnote 31]}. As a result, the default position for identifying and responding to vulnerability has been to rely on classifying individuals by particular indicators in order to designate specific groups as requiring particular and/or increased protection measures. Vulnerability, therefore, is viewed as something that can be measured and identified premised on the characteristics an individual possesses^{[footnote 32]}, which subsequently determines that particular social groups are more or less vulnerable than others^{[footnote 33]}. Some of the commonly identified categories include – but are by no means limited to:

• age
• gender
• sexual orientation
• specific health needs (mental and physical)
• victims of violence and abuse
• cultural factors (including ethnicity and culture of origin)

The UK’s 2005 Asylum Seekers Regulations (Reception Conditions)^{[footnote 34]}, for instance, outlined that in the provision of support the ‘special needs’ of vulnerable asylum seekers must be taken into account. Within this framing, a ‘vulnerable person’ was a minor, a disabled person, an elderly person, a pregnant woman, a lone parent with a minor child, or ‘a person who has been subjected to torture, rape or other serious forms of psychological, physical or sexual violence’^{[footnote 35]}.

These categories of individuals identified as being particularly vulnerable clearly play a role in identifying and understanding vulnerability. However, the literature has increasingly critiqued this approach, pointing to its one-dimensionality and lack of nuance in accurately reflecting what vulnerability is and how it arises. The most prevalent critiques are that such understandings and frameworks:

• fail to account for multiple, intersecting forms of discrimination and risk^{[footnote 36]}
• tend to lack consideration of context and structural drivers of vulnerability^{[footnote 37]}
• encourage asylum seekers to prove vulnerability in line with the preconceived notions, reducing vulnerability to a form of ‘currency’ that provides the potential for individuals to access particular support while simultaneously fostering a dependency on the asylum system^{[footnote 38]}
• risk veiling parallel individual vulnerabilities by presuming homogeneity and essentialising categories^{[footnote 39]}, and leave particular individual needs unmet^{[footnote 40]} thereby potentially causing or worsening vulnerability^{[footnote 41]}
• exclude from consideration those who do not fit in with pre-defined indicators, making others somewhat ‘invulnerable’^{[footnote 42]} – particularly young men^{[footnote 43]} – and, in turn, creating an implicit hierarchy of vulnerability^{[footnote 44]} that can disregard the idea that any individual, regardless of status or identity, may at some point be vulnerable^{[footnote 45]}
• mask or restrict elements of resilience^{[footnote 46]} and reduce a group’s agency by defining them in accordance with perceived norm deviation, depicting vulnerability as essentially passive^{[footnote 47]}
• have stigmatising qualities by labelling particular groups as vulnerable which also renders vulnerability as a fixed property^{[footnote 48]}, a tendency that is often emphasised specifically in the context of women and those with disabilities^{[footnote 49]}

The literature further argues that a personal characteristic or classification should not be understood as a vulnerability in and of itself, but rather something that may materialise into a vulnerability when it interacts with other factors that may be personal, situational, or contextual^{[footnote 50]}. Frameworks premised on categories of individuals that are seen as more or less vulnerable are criticised for being static and one-dimensional, for being over-reliant on visible characteristics, and for failing to account for the fluidity of vulnerability across time, geography, and situation^{[footnote 51]}. Yet, in practice, and often despite recognition of its limitations, this approach has largely continued to dominate in many approaches to assessing vulnerability, often precisely for the reasons for which it is criticised: namely, that it provides the basis for an approach that can be measured and quantified. However, as explored below, while pre-defined vulnerability indicators – often premised on personal characteristics – remain important, the literature points to the importance of reconciling such indicators with more contextual understandings of vulnerability and risk.

3.4 Vulnerability: wider conceptualisations

There is growing recognition both in the literature and, more recently, in relevant policy documents and guidelines, that a one-dimensional approach which relies on pre-defined categories of individuals is failing to capture the complexity of vulnerability and to adequately respond to the vulnerabilities of those it is designed to help. Instead, there has been a growing emphasis on the need for a more nuanced approach to identifying the specific vulnerabilities of asylum seekers beyond an interpretation premised on, or heavily influenced by, classifications. There are a number of key elements to this more contextual approach identified within the literature, which are outlined in turn.

3.4.1 Situational factors

First, multiple authors point to the significance of situational vulnerability factors^{[footnote 52]}, which relate to past (for instance, country of origin, migratory journey), present (for instance, arrival in the UK, during the UK asylum process), or future (for instance, UK asylum process, detention, removal, integration) temporary dangers, encounters, or experiences that have a detrimental impact on an individual at a specific juncture^{[footnote 53]}. Such considerations reflect realities of lived experience and the precariousness of particular circumstances in the context of forced migration, seeking asylum, and integration. These might include, for instance, being subject to modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT); living in, or migrating through, a dangerous environment; having been subjected to physical or sexual violence; or experiencing prolonged time in detention. Situational factors highlight the fact that vulnerabilities arise not only as a result of fixed, internally driven characteristics, but as a result of temporary circumstances (which can have long-lasting effects) that asylum seekers find themselves in^{[footnote 54]}.

For instance, in a trainers’ handbook designed to offer training to all those who work with vulnerable asylum seekers, Papadopoulos identifies vulnerability as directly connected with asylum seekers’ loss of supportive networks, social status, and loneliness; isolation and powerlessness; lack of meaningful engagement; racism and discrimination; and uncertainty about the future^{[footnote 55]}. Likewise, the Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT) outlines situational vulnerability factors as destitution, temporary illness, unemployment, and legal status^{[footnote 56]}. Other literature refers to factors such as poor objective health, poor subjective health, lack of shelter, not having a residence permit, and not having – or not having access to–education or employment.^{[footnote 57]} For instance, Sabates-Wheeler and Waite identify a number of situational determinants of vulnerability, including environmental hazards (particularly prominent for undocumented migrants); risks associated with dangerous conditions, including climate, geography, and remoteness; health risks on the migratory journey; relocation constraints including unfamiliarity with surroundings and problems with housing; those undocumented needing to remain hidden; exclusion from livelihood possibilities; hazardous work environments; health risks; and the ‘ghettoization’ of migrant communities in host countries. Along the migratory journey they outline the risk of exploitation, as well as social exclusion, harassment, or marginalisation based on an asylum seeker’s culture or language^{[footnote 58]}.

Recognition of situational vulnerability factors indicates that while individual characteristics might be important, they only become useful when situated within a wider context. While many existing processes do acknowledge some situational vulnerability factors – such as victims of MSHT and other human rights abuses – they are often intrinsically linked with internal factors. Therefore, any category-based approach needs to be reconciled with more contextual, individual, and situational understandings of vulnerability and risk.

3.4.2 Contextual factors: systems and structures

Second, there is a strong recognition that many of these situations are symptomatic of deeper structures, systems, and policies. This broader, contextual understanding of external vulnerability factors points to the wider external environment that influences an asylum seeker’s circumstances^{[footnote 59]}. Mendola and Pera, for instance, note that context-related conditions can be institutional, economic, and environmental, and can also compound the negative effects that arise from being in a detrimental situation^{[footnote 60]}.

The literature argues that the broader context is fundamental to understanding vulnerability because ‘vulnerable groups’ (that is, identified premised on personal characteristics) are, and should be, defined according to the context they are in. For instance, Orhon et al. argue that vulnerability implies both exposure and susceptibility to harm(s), including political, institutional, cultural, and historical factors that impinge upon their potential vulnerability^{[footnote 61]}. Likewise, Sabates-Wheeler and Waite outline socio-political structural determinants of vulnerability. During the migratory journey, this can include the lack of legal representation and protection. In the destination country, it can include the lack of legal representation; the lack of rights to access formal institutions due to restrictive legislation; the lack of access based on discrimination; the exploitation due to being more prone to injustice(s); the discrimination of some groups in regard to accessing services, education, or opportunities; the unequal distribution of resources; the lack of political participation; or the lack of rights due to (il)legal status^{[footnote 62]}.

This acknowledgment of structural determinants has been partly incorporated into the International Organisation for Migration’s (IOM’s) official approach to vulnerability. However, its framework is still premised on the assumption that some groups are more vulnerable than others, although the guidelines do acknowledge that this is ‘depending on the context’^{[footnote 63]}. In practice, there is still a heavy reliance on vulnerabilities that are visible^{[footnote 64]}. As a result, structural determinants – and external factors, more broadly – remain very much secondary to a personal characteristics-oriented approach despite the evidence that systems and structures can create and exacerbate vulnerabilities. Therefore, the significance of the wider systemic context in which asylum seekers are situated cannot be understated when considering vulnerability.

3.4.3 Cumulative, non-static, and heterogenous

Third, there is a recognition that vulnerability can be cumulative, that it changes over time, and that it is heterogenous: it impacts different people in different ways and at different points in their lives. For instance, a number of experts emphasise that vulnerabilities are often cumulative^{[footnote 65]}, arguing that asylum seekers who experience a particular aspect of vulnerability can have greater susceptibility to developing other vulnerabilities over time. This understanding also speaks to the idea of intersectional vulnerability (see below)^{[footnote 66]} by recognising an element of causality between susceptibility to risk and a multi-profile of disadvantage^{[footnote 67]} – in other words, the confluence of vulnerability factors.

The literature also emphasises a need to recognise that vulnerabilities are non-static^{[footnote 68]}. A person in a country of asylum, for instance, may be less or more vulnerable than they were before they left their country of origin or on their migratory journey. Likewise, it has been argued that in asylum determination policies, the term ‘vulnerability’ itself often assumes a degree of universality and homogeneity, and that an approach that relies primarily on a prescribed list of categories of individuals in order to identify vulnerability often misses – or ignores – the constantly changing nature of vulnerability^{[footnote 69]}. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the International Detention Coalition (IDC), for instance, have put forward a vulnerability screening tool that considers vulnerability as multi-faceted and dynamic, recognising that situations of vulnerability are accordingly not fixed and instead change over time with changing circumstances^{[footnote 70]}. Vulnerability is, however, still rooted in group-based domains in these frameworks, which is testament to the challenge of measuring and assessing vulnerability in a way that considers more dynamic factors.

The heterogeneity of vulnerability is also noted in the literature, highlighting that not all those with the same characteristics (internal factors) or in the same situations or contexts (external factors) will experience the same types, forms, or levels of vulnerability. For instance, a young woman and a middle-aged man (internal factors) may experience different levels of risk or susceptibility to different specific harms while being subject to MSHT (external factor) on a migratory journey (external factor). Furthermore, 2 LGBTQI+ individuals (internal factor) in temporary accommodation along the migratory journey or in the UK (external factors) may experience different levels of vulnerability if one is sharing a dormitory with homophobic individuals, and the other is with tolerant or other LGBTQI+ individuals. The first individual has a higher level of vulnerability due to their increased susceptibility to discrimination and harm in the situation they are in^{[footnote 71]}. Thus, the literature indicates that the vulnerability of asylum seekers and refugees is at once cumulative, non-static, and heterogenous.

3.4.4 Intersectionality

Fourth, alongside the recognition that vulnerability can span different times and geographies is the notion that different vulnerabilities can overlap, interact, and intersect with one another to generate potential ‘multi-profiles of disadvantage’^{[footnote 72]} that are not universal or exclusive to particular groups. For instance, personal characteristics can overlap and interact with one another to influence vulnerability. Additionally, personal characteristics, situational factors and experiences, and structural and systemic contexts interact and intersect to significantly influence an individual asylum seeker’s vulnerability through the convergence of internal and external factors. Therefore, the idea of ‘intersectionality’, coined in 1989 by Kimberlé Crenshaw^{[footnote 73]} to describe how race, class, gender, and other individual characteristics intersect with one another, has significant relevance for discussions on vulnerability in the context of asylum. Mendola and Pera, for example, put forward a multi-dimensional model of vulnerability premised on the “intersectional confluence of individual, contextual and institutional factors” creating a “multi-profile of disadvantage”^{[footnote 74]}.

Vulnerability, from an intersectional standpoint, implies both exposure and susceptibility to harm(s) and derives from intersecting and co-existing personal, social, situational, and structural factors^{[footnote 75]}. ICAT expands this non-static understanding of vulnerability, viewing it as the intersection of vulnerability factors (personal, situational, and contextual) that can, for example, increase the risk of human trafficking^{[footnote 76]}. This provides a useful framing for vulnerability – one that does not reject the influence or existence of internal factors and personal characteristics of individuals, but that integrates the importance of situational and contextual factors that generate vulnerabilities, and acknowledges the intersection of these different aspects^{[footnote 77]}.

3.4.5 Resilience

Finally, there is a strong linkage between vulnerability and resilience in the literature. Resilience is understood as “the ability to recover from shocks and overcome adversity”^{[footnote 78]}, and is often connected to the wider context, environment, and/or structure in which an asylum seeker is positioned. For example, some have argued that whether or not an asylum seeker is resilient or vulnerable is often dependent on the support system available within the host country, and an individual’s degree of resilience is further reliant on the web of different characteristics, contexts, institutions, and other relationships in which an asylum seeker is situated or to which they have access^{[footnote 79]}. Therefore, the literature stresses that vulnerability needs to be understood in conjunction with resilience, and the capacity for an asylum seeker or refugee to be resilient is often reflective of the system and/or context in which they are situated. Papadopoulos, for instance, argues that asylum seekers are one of the most vulnerable and resilient groups in society and that these paradoxical states coexist in non-contradictory ways. Therefore, identifying both is central to the provision of comprehensive and effective support^{[footnote 80]}.

Others have argued that resilience is the opposite of ‘vulnerability’, just as ‘adaptability’ is the inverse of ‘dependency’^{[footnote 81]}. It is the “reverse process of vulnerability” and is linked to the “relational autonomy” of an individual^{[footnote 82]}. In this sense, it becomes the “general capacity to confront, absorb, withstand, accommodate, reconcile, and/or adjust to conditions of adversity, setback, and challenge”^{[footnote 83]}. Others have argued that labelling individuals as vulnerable can inhibit resilience due to the implied lack of agency^{[footnote 84]}, that a discriminatory system can reduce an individual’s resilience due to the lack of tools and support at their disposal, and, finally, that resilience can sometimes be a necessary and valuable attribute for autonomy in extreme cases of vulnerability, where there is no other way to express autonomy and agency^{[footnote 85]}.

Furthermore, although context is generally recognised as a major determinant of resilience, resilience varies according to the intersection of context and personal characteristics. For instance, the International Society for Social Paediatrics and Child Health (ISSOP) Migration Working Group found in the case of asylum-seeking children that resilience can be improved by social inclusion, a supportive family environment, good mental health of caregivers, and positive school experiences^{[footnote 86]}. Conversely, they found that resilience, particularly for children, can be undermined by prolonged asylum processes, multiple relocations, and lack of access to education – all of which are risk factors for mental health^{[footnote 87]}. Likewise, Sleijpen et al. found that (young) refugees can either be vulnerable or resilient, dependent on the current support system and how much control they have over their lives such as having a residence permit and receiving support from friends and family^{[footnote 88]}.

In sum, the literature presents a strong critique of the extent to which legal, policy, and organisational frameworks and practice have traditionally steered towards an approach that relies primarily on personal characteristics to measure, identify, and classify vulnerability. Instead, the literature points to the complexity, multi-dimensionality, and intersectionality of vulnerability. This retains an emphasis on the multiplicity of personal characteristics but does so in a way that takes into consideration the fact that vulnerability can change over time and space, arises from situations, and that structures, systems, and contexts play a strong role in creating and exacerbating vulnerability. It is important to note, however, that the literature also points to the fact that more work is needed globally on how to operationalise this more nuanced understanding of vulnerability in order for it to be of value in practice^{[footnote 89]} – on how to create systems that are both flexible and nuanced, and user-friendly for the multiple frontline workers involved in any asylum process.

This conceptual understanding, as illustrated in table 2, provides a foundation for mapping the ways in which vulnerability is understood and defined by those working within the UK asylum system, as well as an initial 3-layered framing of vulnerability through consideration of internal and external factors.

Table 2: An initial framing of vulnerability: internal and external vulnerability factors

External factors	Contexts: Structures, systems and policies Situations: Circumstances and individual experiences
Internal factors	Personal characteristics

3.5 Understanding vulnerability in the UK asylum system

In light of this framing, the following section draws on the interview data to outline how vulnerability is understood by those working within the UK asylum system, before drawing out several key implications from these findings.

3.5.1 Strong reliance on pre-defined vulnerability indicators

Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities within the asylum system and support processes has become a priority for the Home Office in recent years. One of the key approaches for doing so is through placing an emphasis on specific vulnerability indicators, which include mostly personal characteristics and some situational factors. The Safeguarding Hub, for instance, has a set list of cases that should be referred to and, more recently, the new Safeguarding Strategy outlines 26 key vulnerability indicators, although it also recognises that vulnerability should be assessed on a case-by-case basis^{[footnote 90]}.

Reflecting this approach, when asked how they understood the term ‘vulnerability’, the majority of those interviewed both within the Home Office and outside it pointed to a number of different personal and situational factors or indicators. There were commonly identified categories seen to indicate heightened vulnerability, or that constituted a characteristic that was seen to merit specific support. These included – but were not limited to – children, women, LGBTQI+ persons, victims of MSHT, victims of human rights abuses, and individuals with poor mental and/or physical health^{[footnote 91]}. As one Home Office frontline stakeholder working on resettlement said, “I think we’ve concentrated a lot, and rightly so, on certain groups and making sure that these certain groups are protected. Whether it’s religion, whether it’s gender, whether it’s sexuality, and I think rightfully so”^{[footnote 92]}. Likewise, a Home Office policy worker noted, “We often refer to vulnerability as discrete categories, as for example somebody’s age makes them vulnerable, or somebody’s mental health condition makes them vulnerable”^{[footnote 93]}.

There was recognition, therefore, of both internal characteristics of individuals that might make them more vulnerable to specific forms of harm, and of the need for any framing of vulnerability to sufficiently take into consideration the potential impact on individual asylum seekers of different experiences they have been through. For instance, interviewees typically not accepted to dangerous circumstances that many asylum seekers have experienced prior to arriving in the UK. Others referred to negative experiences they go through while in the UK and are at risk of being exposed to in the future – in part, as a result of the accumulation of vulnerable factors. In the context of migratory journeys, many interviewees pointed to the vulnerabilities created by experiences associated with MSHT, as explored further in chapter 4. Other situations that were seen as potential experiences that could increase vulnerability included sexual violence, labour exploitation, physical violence, poor living conditions, taking high-risk journeys to the UK and means of travel, and engaging with smugglers. Common throughout was an emphasis on the effect of negative past situations on an asylum seeker’s current mental and physical wellbeing, demonstrating the importance of considering situational factors when understanding and identifying the support they need.

There was also recognition amongst those interviewed of situations and experiences within the asylum system in the UK that can exacerbate or create vulnerability for asylum seekers. Having sufficient understanding of these external factors is critical for those working in the asylum system to safeguard asylum seekers as they move through the system. For instance, past situations were often linked to the potential for asylum seekers to be exposed further to harm and exploitation. As one academic explained: [Previous exploitation] makes them [asylum seekers] vulnerable to further [human] trafficking, vulnerable to forced prostitution, vulnerable to entering and remaining in abusive relationships, vulnerable to employers who know that they are illegal, and who will take advantage maybe financially by not paying […] I think that’s where the term vulnerability is useful. These are situations that generate vulnerability, rather than the vulnerable people^{[footnote 94]}.

This reinforces the idea that past experiences and an asylum seeker’s present situation both influence susceptibility to further high-risk situations in the future which, if left unaddressed, are a threat to their wellbeing. In sum, many of those interviewed placed a strong emphasis on the fact that multiple trauma-inducing situations – in countries of origin, along the migratory journey, and within the UK – can have significant influence on an asylum seeker’s vulnerability. Therefore, the use of indicators for specific groups of individuals as the basis for assessing vulnerability was seen to have some operational validity inasmuch as it allows for a focus on immediate and practical needs, and it allows, at least in theory, for a uniform approach to identifying vulnerabilities. However, while a focus on these defined categories made pragmatic sense, there was also concern that this approach, in isolation, is inadequate and that many of those who are in need of specific support are being neglected.

3.5.2 Limitations of reliance on pre-defined vulnerability indicators

There was an observable tension, therefore, between a recognition that pre-defined indicators are useful, and an awareness that vulnerability is far more complex than these identified categories. A number of areas of concern were raised by those interviewed. First, there was concern that the use of pre-determined indicators as the main determinant of vulnerability reduces vulnerability and safeguarding assessments to a ‘tick-box’ format to streamline something highly complex into a more simplified, practical identification mechanism. As one Home Office interviewee said: “I think that effectively we’re seeking to negotiate a system that isn’t the most helpful or welcoming, and which – whether it’s to advocate on their behalf or to place them into a system – tends to mute their personal voices. And as such, the person, the individual, becomes secondary to their characteristic as an asylum seeker, and they become badged, labelled, and the person themselves gets forgotten”^{[footnote 95]}.

Second, while guidance encourages interviewing officers to also look for hidden vulnerabilities, there was concern that, in practice, Home Office staff, especially when under pressure, rely on visibility to identify vulnerability. There was disquiet, in particular, that mental health issues are often less visible, meaning that they are unlikely to be accurately identified. As one Home Office frontline interviewee emphasised, “There are people out there that are exceptionally vulnerable and need support, but they get lost […] If it’s visible, it’s arguable I can prove my suffering and therefore it’s legitimate in some way”^{[footnote 96]}.

Therefore, while asylum seekers with mental health issues were a particular ‘category’ of individuals seen to be especially vulnerable by the vast majority of stakeholders interviewed, many also recognised that mental health issues are extremely difficult to identify accurately. This notion of invisible or less visible vulnerabilities, which was often referenced in the context of mental health and the psychological trauma from past experiences, presented a significant hurdle within a system that is strongly dependent on visible characteristics and/ or self-disclosure and evidence.

Third, while defined categories of vulnerability are important for signposting and referring asylum seekers and/or refugees to specific forms of support, there was concern that, in a context of limited resources, a ‘hierarchy of vulnerability’ is created, whereby only the ‘most vulnerable’ receive particular types of, or the most, support. On the part of frontline Home Office employees, this was referenced in a context of frustration and, to an extent, helplessness. As one interviewee said: “What we are really keen to try and do is help the vulnerable within that vulnerability category, as harsh as it is, and that’s one of the real challenges for my team because they want to help everybody – but we’ve only got such a limited amount of resource, we have to focus on those who need it most”^{[footnote 97]}.

The recognition that the current approach often creates hierarchies of vulnerability was commonplace among interviewees. Effectively, the system was seen to push Home Office staff to grade vulnerabilities in a way that was unhelpful and potentially damaging to the wellbeing of asylum seekers – and was clearly creating disquiet for many of those who were making the decisions. As one public sector stakeholder emphasised: “I think something I find a little bit frustrating with the Home Office approach is this almost obsession with categorising vulnerabilities, and the bar becoming so much higher in terms of who is perceived as vulnerable”^{[footnote 98]}. A Home Office frontline worker built on this point: “Part of our battle is pushing back on a lot of vulnerable [asylum seekers] because they’re not vulnerable enough. So, vulnerability isn’t always a helpful term because it’s really hard when you’re trying to help the vulnerable within the vulnerable to make sure you get those referrals”^{[footnote 99]}.

Fourth, and linked to the previous point, there was widespread concern that the reliance on particular profiles or categories of individuals means that other groups that are not listed can be overlooked or assumed to be somewhat ‘invulnerable’. The example of young men was one category that several interviewees put forward in this regard. As one interviewee working in the Home Office said, “We assume they’re not vulnerable. But you could argue a single male getting off a small boat has a different set of potential vulnerabilities, and then, there’s the hidden vulnerabilities too”^{[footnote 100]}.

Overall, therefore, the interviews substantiate that while vulnerabilities are often linked to specific profiles of asylum seekers, there was also a recognition of the flaws in this approach – not least as evidenced by the fact that many asylum seekers are neglected in the current system. Yet, given that assessments based on pre-defined categories are relatively easy for people to use in a complex and demanding operating environment, many still viewed this approach as their main frame of reference.

3.6 Recognising the importance of structural factors

Part of the limitation in the current approach is that Home Office guidance fails to sufficiently acknowledge the role that the asylum and immigration system itself plays in exacerbating or creating vulnerability. For instance, the Safeguarding Strategy only mentions that vulnerability “can potentially be affected by their stage in the claims process” [emphasis added], which is relevant but somewhat imprecise^{[footnote 101]}. Therefore, many of those interviewed recognised that the role of structures in creating or exacerbating vulnerability is not adequately reflected in responses designed to address vulnerability.

For instance, many pointed to the multiple structural and contextual conditions that have driven asylum seekers to leave their homes in the first place, including armed conflict, widespread violence, human rights abuses, unjust policies, and systematic persecution. In particular, the inability to return to their home was seen as a fundamental source of vulnerability for asylum seekers who are left exposed as a result of having lost a sense of safety and belonging. Yet, there was also recognition that this sense of loss is not sufficiently recognised by current UK asylum policy, which does not foster integration into the UK from the start of the asylum process. This point is further explored in chapter 6.

In addition, many interviewees pointed to the fact that once individuals are in the UK, those who enter the asylum system are faced with a new set of structural challenges that can exacerbate or create new sources of vulnerability. A number of structural factors were identified in this regard:

Prolonged asylum decision waiting times: The length of time spent waiting for asylum claims to be processed was referred to as a key source of vulnerability^{[footnote 102]}. One Home Office interviewee working in detention safeguarding, for example, linked this directly to mental health challenges and expressed concern over the absence of a comprehensive framework that takes account of how mental health, and vulnerabilities associated with it, can change or be exacerbated during the asylum process. They concluded that there is nothing within the system that sufficiently captures the vulnerability of people who have been in the system for a long time^{[footnote 103]}. Another interviewee, also working within the Home Office in a safeguarding capacity, took this further:

I believe the whole process would bring any sort of mental illness on anyone. I can’t imagine someone who is feeling totally mentally well to then have to go to interviews and relive trauma and then, unfortunately, the wait can be years […] you can have someone who is mentally well, and then by the end of the process would be absolutely exhausted, and I can see why^{[footnote 104]}.

Prohibition of employment: The inability to work for most asylum seekers while awaiting asylum claim decisions was frequently identified as a key structural challenge that creates vulnerability and insecurity for asylum seekers. One interviewee, working in refugee employment support, noted: “There are lots of highly skilled asylum seekers, and many don’t get a response for years. During that time their skills are atrophying; they’re not able to make a living for themselves. The economy is missing out on their skills and experience. But most importantly, it must be extremely frustrating for them”^{[footnote 105]}.

A number of interviewees stressed, therefore, that the inability to work during the lengthy asylum process was creating and enhancing vulnerabilities – not only in its immediate negative impact, but in its potential to expose asylum seekers to further harms. In the case of the latter, one interviewee directly linked this to susceptibility to MSHT within the UK: “[lack of work] exposes you to greater vulnerability. At the extreme end, you’re exposed to being coerced into county lines, delivering drugs, prostitution. Then you’re brought into a very dark world where you may be subject to control, isolation, debt bondage, and physical and sexual violence”^{[footnote 106]}.

No independent source of income: Linked to the inability to work was the fact that asylum seekers do not have an independent source of income beyond the money provided by the state, which many saw as insufficient. This prohibition on employment and subsequent inability to earn money independently was linked to the creation or exacerbation of vulnerability for asylum seekers. And not only was it seen to create a precarious economic situation for many, but it was also seen to serve as a blockage to recovery and to impede integration. As another interviewee, working to improve employment outcomes for refugees, said, “We tend to focus on vulnerability as if it raises physical challenges and physical problems. But I think what we’ve missed is the long-term consequences on the ability to rebuild a life”^{[footnote 107]}.

Difficulty in navigating the asylum system from a technical and cultural perspective: A further source of structural vulnerability in the UK is that many asylum seekers do not know how to navigate the asylum system, including the cultural norms that lie behind it. This was seen to be due to a lack of information, language services, diverging cultural norms, and distrust of authority.

Perceived Home Office ‘culture of disbelief’: Many also referred to an institutional ‘culture of disbelief’ on the part of Home Office staff when considering asylum claims. For instance, one public sector stakeholder linked a culture of disbelief and waiting times to re-traumatisation: “There’s something about the asylum system that makes people who could have recovered from a traumatic episode end with compound trauma. People are being retraumatised by the system by the way it leaves them in limbo and the way it disbelieves them”^{[footnote 108]}.

A sense of powerlessness: Finally, another theme that was identified was the sense of powerlessness as a result of the impact of the multiple negative structural factors asylum seekers are faced with. As a psychologist said: “I think it’s the position of powerlessness where there are powers within the external society that they don’t have. They have a massive impact on their lives, but they have very little means of agency and autonomy to do much about that”^{[footnote 109]}.

Chapter 5 provides a more detailed account of the impact of a number of these dimensions within the UK asylum system. However, the key point here is that the way in which some aspects of the system are currently operated undermines the autonomy and wellbeing of asylum seekers, which then limits recovery from past harm and/or creates new forms of vulnerability. In a context in which the system itself can exacerbate or create vulnerability, there was widespread agreement – and palpable frustration – that failures to address and alleviate vulnerabilities mean that they can accumulate over time, either as a result of previous vulnerabilities prior to entering the UK asylum system not being addressed once in the system, or as a result of further vulnerabilities created by the asylum system itself. As one Home Office employee said: “You’ve got no real choice about where you live or how you live, all that kind of stuff. It disempowers you; it really limits the decisions that you’re able to make. It limits the amount of agency that you’ve got. That snowballs and has quite a strong cumulative impact on your personal resilience, I think”^{[footnote 110]}.

This accumulation of vulnerability was often linked to failures to create a supportive environment for asylum seekers that would allow them to recover from past harms. As a result, there was a strong emphasis from Home Office and non-Home Office stakeholders alike on the extent to which the asylum system not only fails to create a protective environment for asylum seekers but also potentially exacerbates or creates vulnerabilities. As one public sector stakeholder said, “people are being damaged by the process itself”^{[footnote 111]}. Or, in the words of another interviewee, the process “crushes” people^{[footnote 112]}. This was echoed by 2 stakeholders working to support detained individuals and advocating for human rights abuse survivors respectively: “I think it’s important to acknowledge that the asylum system, and the immigration system generally, makes people vulnerable”^{[footnote 113]}; “The whole asylum system is really set up to make people vulnerable, so it’s hard for anyone to really move through asylum procedures in this country and not be made vulnerable, nor not be exposed to situations which make them vulnerable at points”^{[footnote 114]}.

It is clear, therefore, that a significant emphasis needs to be placed on addressing the asylum system itself, including the policies that underlie it, in order to address the vulnerability of asylum seekers. As one frontline worker concluded, “Only when we consider the system can we really start to address what the problems are, because the problems aren’t all located in the individual”^{[footnote 115]}. This points to the imperative that in order to reduce vulnerability to harm, there needs to be a focus on the system, not just the individual. After all, asylum seekers have minimal influence on the structural environment around them, even though it is key to their wellbeing.

As identified by Hamilton in his conceptualisation of vulnerability in the context of asylum, therefore, the findings suggest that rather than focusing exclusively on what vulnerability is, more attention needs to be paid to what causes vulnerability^{[footnote 116]}. While categories of vulnerable individuals can be useful and play an important role in identifying specific needs, there needs to be more recognition in policy and practice of the role played by the wider context in driving the wellbeing and, therefore, the (potential) vulnerability of asylum seekers. Conversely, asylum seekers’ vulnerability to multiple different harms can decrease if there is a supportive environment to address and reduce them. But this places a much stronger emphasis on changing the structures that exacerbate or create vulnerability, rather than focusing primarily on the individual only whose vulnerabilities are often symptoms of the negative impact of those structures.

3.7 Recognising resilience

Sitting alongside a recognition that the system is currently failing to adequately identify and address vulnerabilities, a significant number of those interviewed emphasised the importance of focusing on resilience in conjunction with any understanding of vulnerability. In particular, there was an emphasis on the need for the asylum system to not only focus on reducing vulnerability, but on increasing resilience – and recognising the 2 as mutually dependent. For instance, a stakeholder working on safeguarding within the Home Office spoke of the need to shift the focus from vulnerability to resilience when assessing asylum seekers’ needs: “I think we would redesign the asylum system in a way that actually sets people up for success and addresses many of those complex needs” ^{[footnote 117]}.

Some participants went as far as to question the usefulness of the term ‘vulnerability’ altogether as a means of capturing the needs of asylum seekers, arguing that it fundamentally undermines resilience. As one Home Office policy stakeholder said, “It often gets used as an excuse to take somebody’s voice away from them, by people who are perfectly well- meaning”^{[footnote 118]}. Resilience, therefore, was put forward as a critical framing for supporting asylum seekers – and, more importantly, for creating an environment in which asylum seekers can support themselves.

A note of caution needs to be sounded here, however. Resilience is important – and potentially empowering – but it should not become an excuse or smokescreen for not offering support. It needs to be nurtured and supported in order to act as an antidote to the multiple challenges that asylum seekers face; but it must be viewed as something that can exist alongside vulnerabilities, as something that is dynamic and context dependent. This suggests, therefore, that the objective should be to promote resilience among asylum seekers and refugees while safeguarding against the negative impacts of past harms and the susceptibility to new ones.

3.8 Conclusion

As outlined at the beginning of this chapter, the increased focus on vulnerability at a policy level has reinforced the overall protection needs faced by many asylum seekers. Yet, there are multiple challenges in translating this into a fair and rights-respecting national asylum system which, in many respects, operates at the coalface of protection. Based on the wider literature and stakeholder interviews, this chapter has demonstrated the multiple and multi- dimensional ways in which vulnerability is conceptualised and utilised – both in formalised frameworks and in the ways in which individuals understand the term in their work. Several conclusions can be observed that have implications for policy and practice.

First, in the current UK asylum system, vulnerability continues to be operationalised as something primarily to be assessed, measured, and identified. While ‘measuring’ vulnerability plays a part in the asylum process, the findings point to a recognised tension between the notion of vulnerability as an objective measurement criterion, and vulnerability as a complex, multi-dimensional concept. While many stakeholders saw the role of pre-defined categories of individuals based on both internal characteristics and experiences as being a useful operational tool, there was also an awareness that it only becomes useful, arguably, when situated within a wider context. Therefore, while pre-defined vulnerability indicators – often premised on personal characteristics – remain important, they need to be reconciled with more contextual understandings of vulnerability and risk. Most importantly, the impulse to recognise vulnerability should not be seen as separating out the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving’, but rather as a way to identify an individual’s specific needs premised on their experiences and susceptibility to harm or discrimination.

Second, in order to focus on what causes vulnerability, as opposed to primarily focusing on what vulnerability is, significant attention needs to be paid to how systems and structures themselves can create vulnerability in both policy and operational approaches within the asylum system. Whether passing through a violence-affected geography or being part of an asylum system with particular policies affecting an individual’s ability to work, the literature and stakeholders interviewed consistently pointed to macro-level factors affecting an individual’s vulnerability. The evidence points to the fact that asylum seekers’ vulnerability can only truly be understood by considering the broader context in which they are situated. As Papadopoulos asserts, “Vulnerability should not be understood as a single entity or characteristic that belongs to one dimension of human functioning ‘within’ one individual, but essentially as a relational and contextual phenomenon that can only have meaning in the context of the interaction between asylum seekers and the services available”^{[footnote 119]}. This suggests that any asylum system needs to consider the tangible impact that higher level norms and policies can have on the everyday, individual experience of asylum seekers. Policies need to be driven by a nuanced understanding of asylum seeker experiences and vulnerabilities if asylum seekers are going to become less rather than more vulnerable to harm as they move through the asylum system.

Third, it is critical to consider the ways in which labels of ‘vulnerability’ can both mask and undermine asylum seeker and refugee autonomy, agency, and resilience. In conjunction, the findings demonstrate a need to recognise that there is a protection versus empowerment dimension intrinsic to any vulnerability assessment – if somebody is considered vulnerable, the extent to which support is protective or agency-enhancing becomes important. This builds on the previous point: policy environments need to be supportive to provide a platform for asylum seekers to not only become less vulnerable, but to build their resilience to future shocks. As explored in chapter 8, this will reduce the vulnerabilities of asylum seekers, have positive impacts for integration, and benefit local communities. This demands a system that asks whether any policy approach or operational decision is likely to enhance rather than undermine the resilience and agency of asylum seekers. It requires a redesign of the way in which the asylum system functions, including the policies that underlie the asylum system, in such a way that accounts for vulnerabilities and resilience in its day-to-day operations, and not just in response to identified needs.

Overall, therefore, the findings demonstrate that it is important to have tools to identify and capture vulnerability and, as such, approaches based on pre-defined categories are useful operationally, even if they also have negative consequences; but at the same time, and in order to address the factors that lie behind some of these negative consequences, it is also important to acknowledge that the UK asylum system can also exacerbate or create vulnerabilities. Therefore, while creating systems to identify and measure vulnerability has some salience, this approach needs to be nested within a broader framing for understanding the multiple factors that contribute to vulnerability, including through reflecting on existing mechanisms that are currently in place that may not accurately address asylum seeker needs, that might exacerbate negative situations, or that might even create vulnerabilities. This broader framing, which is outlined in chapter 7, reflects an approach that does not just measure and assess vulnerability, but also grapples with the root causes that can create or exacerbate vulnerabilities. Only then can asylum processes and support provision engage meaningfully and effectively to safeguard asylum seekers, meet their needs, and empower them.

4. Migratory journeys

4.1 Key findings

Structural factors have a direct impact on levels of vulnerability of asylum seekers and refugees as they journey to the UK, including factors that led them to flee their homes, lack of legal routes to the UK, and securitised policy environments that control or limit their movement as they search for safety.

These structural factors have led to an increase in people moving ‘irregularly’, often using smugglers. Irregular movement can subject asylum seekers and refugees to a range of physical and non-physical dangers including physical deprivation, physical violence, lack of shelter, sexual violence, and dangerous travel conditions.

Evidence suggests that most asylum seekers and refugees know the risks they are taking in travelling through irregular routes – certainly in a general sense, if not specifically. This indicates that the dangers are not a sufficient disincentive and that those taking these potentially dangerous journeys do not see a viable alternative.

While the criminality of smuggling needs to be addressed, the use of smugglers by asylum seekers should be recognised primarily as a symptom of failures in the wider policy environment that limits safe movement. Addressing smuggling, therefore, demands addressing the systemic factors that lead people to make use of their services. Though engagement with smugglers is commonplace and does not always lead to harm or exploitation, it can open up the risk of exposure to dangerous routes, exploitation, and dangers relating to MSHT. Those who are victims of MSHT are consistently recognised as being particularly vulnerable due to their experiences.

Some locations are particular sites of danger, but ultimately these ‘hotspots’ are constantly changing as a result of shifts in the broader context in which people are moving. Efforts to stop boats leaving Libya, for instance, simply displace routes elsewhere. Therefore, in order to reduce vulnerability of those moving, it is necessary to address the drivers of irregular movement rather than just addressing the symptoms through displacing routes. Likewise, while particular categories of individuals might be more susceptible to harm in particular circumstances, overwhelmingly the findings point to the fact that it is situations and structures that primarily create vulnerability on journeys.

The nature of different journeys impacts levels of vulnerability for asylum seekers as they arrive at the UK border. Irregular routes leave many asylum seekers physically, mentally, and financially destitute; there is potential to exacerbate vulnerability through re-traumatisation as part of UK asylum processing; there is a risk of further exploitation within the UK due to connections with actors who facilitated their journey; many asylum seekers have an intrinsic fear of those in positions of authority as a result of their experiences; and there is evidence that negative experiences on journeys, where not addressed, can have long-term repercussions for integration outcomes.

4.2 Introduction

This chapter explores the needs and vulnerabilities of asylum seekers on their migratory journeys^{[footnote 120]} to the UK border. It considers some of the factors that create vulnerability to physical and non-physical harm along their journeys, and the impact of the journey on their arrival into the UK and the UK asylum system.

Understanding the journeys of those who come to the UK to seek asylum is critical to ensuring an appropriate response to their specific needs in light of potential harms that they may have encountered prior to leaving their countries of origin, and during their subsequent journeys. It is also important to understand the resilience demonstrated by many who undertake these journeys, albeit often through lack of choice. Migratory journeys can differ vastly – by length, means of travel, and routes taken. They can be unpredictable, long, and dangerous, and while some asylum seekers may have a clear idea of where they are heading, and how, others have no clear destination or pre-determined method of travel. Such journeys therefore differ from individual to individual, as do the situations and experiences they encounter – for many, these journeys are volatile, and expose asylum seekers to significant levels of risk, harm, and danger. As will be addressed throughout this chapter, many asylum seekers take routes and means that are ‘irregular’ – meaning that they do not arrive at the UK border through officially sanctioned routes – and might use smugglers to help facilitate their journey.

Multiple factors impinge upon an individual’s journey – and thus their vulnerability – and features of the journey and the dangers asylum seekers may face are sometimes influenced by personal characteristics such as age, gender, nationality, or economic circumstance (internal factors). However, the findings demonstrate that it is the situations and different structural factors that primarily determine features of the journey and levels of danger encountered (external factors). These factors can include the context from which refugees have fled; the policy environment that limits the routes they can take in order to find safety, whether parts of the journey are facilitated by third parties and how long the journey lasts; the number of borders crossed; physical environments and terrains they pass through; policy contexts of jurisdictions they move through; who they travel with; and living conditions en route. All of these structural and situational aspects have an impact on levels of harm that asylum seekers are exposed to, and, subsequently, their mental and physical health at the point of arrival to the UK, and as they enter the asylum system. Having a nuanced understanding of journeys, therefore, is a key component to understanding how best to ensure appropriate support to asylum seekers as they arrive in the UK and enter the asylum system.

This chapter begins by considering some of the structural factors that lead to situations in which refugees are exposed to harm or potential harm. In particular, it focuses on how these structural factors have created ‘irregular’ journeys by land and sea and the role – both protective and harmful – of smugglers in facilitating these journeys. It then looks at the specific nature of some of these harms before discussing the implications for arrival in the UK and entering the asylum system.

4.3 Structural determinants of vulnerability on journeys

A number of structural factors have a direct impact on levels of vulnerability of refugees as they journey to the UK. These include factors that led them to flee their homes in the first place, including persecution, conflict, violence and human rights violations, and policies that then control or limit their movement as they search for safety, and that can force them to move through irregular routes.

4.3.1 Forced migration

Many of those who travel to the UK do so as a result of multiple systemic factors that forced them into exile from their home country, including political persecution and conflict. When they flee, many lose not only their material possessions, but also a sense of belonging, which leaves them mentally and physically vulnerable. Furthermore, by definition, return is not an option for asylum seekers. These circumstances inevitably impact their levels of vulnerability to different forms of harm during the journey, upon arrival to the UK, and as they navigate the UK asylum system. As one academic interviewed as part of this research said: When we ask people what should be different to stop [irregular movement] happening, the first thing they say is, “Address the problem in my country; I don’t want to leave”… Then the next thing they’ll say is, “We need somewhere safe to go if we’re in danger.” But the big thing they always say is, “Try to find a way we don’t have to do these journeys,” and the final thing would be, “Please believe us when we tell you our terrible stories”^{[footnote 121]}.

Therefore, until the deep-rooted systemic factors that force an individual to flee are resolved, ‘turning back’ is not an option and refugees and asylum seekers will be compelled to keep moving until they find a place of safety. Yet the presence of significant numbers of refugees is, itself, indicative of past failures to address structural drivers of conflict and injustice.

At the same time, the specific reason for flight has an impact on levels of vulnerability to multiple different harms. For instance, those who have fled conflicts with high levels of violence against civilians, including sexual violence, have often lived through traumatic experiences prior to flight and carry that trauma with them, often with little opportunity to recover^{[footnote 122]}. Others are fleeing political persecution and do not feel safe in neighbouring countries, which compels them to move elsewhere in search of safety. Others have had to use a smuggler just to escape their country^{[footnote 123]}. Therefore, perceptions of security within neighbouring countries are heightened in certain cases by the proximity to the conflict or oppression from which a refugee has fled, and historical ethnic or cultural tensions with hosting communities. At the same time, broader failures in asylum and refugee policies have placed significant limitations on asylum seekers’ ability to move freely and seek safety and have forced many to move elsewhere.

In addition, the fact that many asylum seekers looking to reach and enter the UK use irregular routes that cost significant amounts of money for lack of alternatives often creates additional vulnerabilities. The financial investment made by families or communities to enable them to move means they are compelled to keep moving forward or they risk their families becoming destitute as a result^{[footnote 124]}. Consequently, many asylum seekers continue moving in search of safety despite the risks they have to take and often because moving is less risky than staying. Thus, what might look like bad decision-making or high-risk behaviour is often individuals making hugely difficult choices in a context of limited options.^{[footnote 125]} This presents an understanding of movement in which many migrants have agency and understand the risks of movement but make complex choices and decisions, and in which not moving is often the least safe option. The impact of the forced nature of their movement, therefore, remains significant throughout the journey to the UK and throughout the UK asylum process.

4.3.2 Control of movement and the creation of irregularity

Having fled their homes, asylum seekers are then confronted with additional structural factors that play a key role in their levels of exposure to harm as they seek safety. A major component to this is the wider policy environment that seeks to control movement, particularly movement from the Global South to the Global North.

Both the literature and interviews pointed to the fact that a lack of legal routes for migration, including a significant reduction in the number of resettlement places globally, have led to many finding their own routes for asylum^{[footnote 126]}. As one Home Office frontline worker said: ^{[footnote 127]}

“…on a system level, what makes people more vulnerable is not having a way to come to the UK safely, without having to go through illegal channels. Obviously, if there was a way for people to claim asylum from their home country, they wouldn’t have to take those routes”

The lack of legal routes sits alongside an imbalanced global refugee policy context in which the vast majority of refugees continue to be hosted in the Global South with inconsistent support from wealthier states. Failures to find durable solutions for the majority of refugees and asylum seekers have led to millions around the world living in ongoing exile for years, sometimes decades. This broader failure in refugee policies has led to many people moving onwards in search of safety and livelihoods, a relatively small number of whom have travelled ‘irregularly’ to the UK; yet irregular movement then exposes them to potential levels of harm as explored below.

4.3.3 Increased border controls

The narrowing of regular migration pathways exists alongside a wider set of deterrence, interdiction, and penalisation measures intended to prevent or control movement (regular or otherwise) to the UK and elsewhere in Europe. In recent years, there has been a significant increase in investment in the securitisation of borders along migratory routes, which has exacerbated dangers for asylum seekers, and journeys tend to get increasingly dangerous for migrants as they get closer to the border with Europe. There is a growing body of literature that emphasises the systemic and structural drivers of harms to asylum seekers along the migratory journey as a result of these increased and intensified border controls^{[footnote 128]}.

The literature also suggests that this increase in risk along the route partially reflects the fact that the closer migrants get to Europe, the higher the levels of securitisation^{[footnote 129]}. It has been well established that increased security investment put in place by the EU and other actors (for instance through the Khartoum Process – the joint EU–Africa policy on migration from Eritrea and the Horn of Africa) without corresponding investment in alternative routes and in protection for those who move has led to a significant increase in levels of danger for migrants^{[footnote 130]}. As a result, research has shown that those for whom Europe is their destination are more likely to experience a protection incident compared to those who stay in North Africa as a refugee or have sought refuge in a third non-European country^{[footnote 131]}.

As explored below, asylum seekers have also increasingly been forced to rely on criminal actors rather than state structures to ‘protect’ them – which increases the incidence of vulnerability. As one public sector interviewee outlined, “Legal routes to travel in, and claim asylum, have gone. Basically, the more barriers that the government puts up, the more money the people smugglers make, because that is increasingly the only way that people can travel”^{[footnote 132]}. Smuggling networks, therefore, are often a symptom of deeper structural challenges that point to broader failures in refugee and asylum policies. A primary focus on addressing the criminality that lies behind smuggling, therefore, will always be palliative without sufficient investment in addressing the structural factors that lead to irregular routes and protect those who move along them.

However, reaching Europe does not necessarily signal an end to harm. A common theme across the literature is that significant protection incidents continue to occur once in Europe. For instance, migration to or through countries in the Balkans and Central Europe led to rates of violence per person over time which were the highest over the entire migratory journey according to Bouhenia et al.^{[footnote 133]}, while Calais has been widely identified as a dangerous place for asylum seekers, with poor living conditions and susceptibility to physical violence^{[footnote 134]}.

Combined, these 2 key factors – the limited numbers of legal routes and increased investment in deterrence mechanisms – effectively criminalises certain types or forms of movement for refugees as they seek safety. This has increased the number of people travelling through ‘irregular’ routes which, as demonstrated below, potentially exposes them to harm. The main beneficiaries are the smugglers for whom the increased challenges of crossing borders have pushed prices up and led to ever-higher profits, and the human traffickers who prey on the increased vulnerability of those who are moving – or trying to move. Having an understanding of these structural sources of vulnerability is, therefore, critical to addressing the harms that are brought about by criminal actors who take advantage of people’s need to move.

The new Nationality and Borders Act formalises in law that refugees arriving through irregular routes might receive shorter leave to remain and fewer rights, and those entering unlawfully will additionally need to “show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence”^{[footnote 135]}. Irregularity of movement, subsequently, is a key factor in understanding the vulnerabilities that asylum seekers face during their journey and as they enter the UK asylum system.

4.4 Risks and dangers along migratory routes

As a result of these broader structural factors, journeys to the UK often place individuals in dangerous situations. The literature and interviews with stakeholders alike point to multiple dangers, risks, and susceptibilities to harm along asylum seekers’ migratory journeys, particularly for those who travel through irregular routes. This precarity pertains most directly to the specific circumstance migrants find themselves in, as well as the impact of the broader structural context through which they move, and influence the overall vulnerability of asylum seekers by exposing them to trauma and/or physical injury^{[footnote 136]}. Many are also unable or unwilling to stop or pause their journey in order to seek medical care, either as a result of barriers to accessing healthcare, fear of separating from their families, or, as previously outlined, general compulsion to keep moving^{[footnote 137]}.

Alongside wider physical deprivation, many asylum seekers are exposed to significant levels of physical harm, including physical violence, lack of shelter, sexual violence, and dangerous travel conditions^{[footnote 138]}. For instance, research by Bouhenia et al. found that 66% of 402 asylum seekers interviewed in Calais had experienced at least one violent event on their migratory journey^{[footnote 139]}. The Mixed Migration Centre’s (MMC’s) 4Mi database corroborates this finding. Of 403 respondents interviewed in various locations en route who identified experiencing a protection incident on their journey and cited the UK as their destination, 65% had personally experienced physical violence during their migratory journey, 51% cited being victims of bribery or extortion, 46% being detained, and 43% being victims of robbery. In addition to this, 37% had witnessed death, a further 37% had been exposed to non-physical violence (such as harassment), and 23% had experienced kidnapping. It is important to note, however, that this data does not include those who died en route.

Figure 1: Percentage who identified personally experiencing a protection incident on their journey

Incident type	Percentage
Physical violence	65%
Bribery/extortion	51%
Detention	46%
Robbery	43%
Witnessed death	37%
Non-physical violence (for example, harassment)	37%
Kidnapping	23%
Sexual violence	16%
None	12%
Refused	2%

Source: Mixed migration Centre 4Mi survey of 403 migrants who identified the UK as their country of destination between 2019 and 2022

The dangers of routes were well recognised by many of those interviewed. As an academic expert interviewed for this project said:^{[footnote 140]}

“It might be being subject to abuse, being threatened, risk factors, the length of the journey, the fear factor, how long the journey took, whether people were in a supportive group, or whether they were alone […] the kind of couriers they were in, the route they came, if you’ve travelled over land, walking just at night for many weeks […] and possibly without enough to eat.”

Some data suggests that vulnerability is not monolithic, but rather differentiated by varying types of harm. For instance, the 4Mi data shows that 70% of men reported experiencing physical violence along their migratory journey compared to 48% of women; and of respondents who reported experiencing a protection incident, 55% of men experienced bribery/extortion compared to 37% of women, 51% of men had been in detention compared to 27% of women, 46% had been victims of robbery compared to 30% of women, and 41% had witnessed death compared to 20% of women.

While this list of negative experiences is helpful to a degree, the wider point here is that when trying to understand susceptibility to harm on the journey, categories premised on personal characteristics are likely to be less relevant than the specific context or situation that individuals find themselves in.

4.4.1 Sexual violence

A particular source of harm that was mentioned in many of the interviews, as well as in the literature, was vulnerability to sexual violence throughout the journey. It is clear that in certain locations any asylum seeker regardless of age, gender, or nationality can be subject to sexual violence. There is a strong emphasis in the literature and in perceptions of those interviewed on the exposure of women and girls to the risk of sexual violence. For instance, stakeholders consistently pointed to the vulnerability of women in situations of sexual exploitation and violence, sometimes in the form of ‘transactional sex’ for ‘safe’ passage or as part of MSHT, and other times as victims of rape or sexual violence at particular points along the journey by authorities, traffickers, smugglers, or other asylum seekers.

High levels of risk to sexual violence were recognised by many of those interviewed. As one Home Office frontline worker reported: “I suspect that many of the women who reach the UK will have been raped en route.”^{[footnote 141]} While the data makes clear that levels of sexual violence against women and girls are high, it remains unclear the extent to which similar is true of boys and men. A lack of conclusive research in this area, along with significant challenges around under-reporting and non-disclosure among men and boys, suggest that lack of data on sexual violence against boys and men is not an indicator that it does not take place, but that it has not been recorded. It would be unwise, therefore, to assume that sexual violence is a challenge faced only by women and girls and reinforces the idea that categories are of limited utility in understanding vulnerability to harm. These findings, however, serve as an indicator of the types of exploitation and abuse that those who move through irregular routes often face.

4.4.2 Children, young people, and unaccompanied minors

Significant attention in the literature and among expert stakeholders has also been given to the idea that children and young people (CYP) and, in particular, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASC) are vulnerable to exploitation on the journey due to their lack of protection and guardianship. As one interviewee, focusing on education, said:^{[footnote 142]}

“I’ve heard about children being beaten up by traffickers, beaten up by law enforcement in other countries. Horrible stories, the sleeping out in the rough, the lack of access to food and water and sanitation, all of those things. I just think they’re not journeys I would ever want to do […] the time it takes to get over that and understand hopefully that once they’re here that they are safe I think must be significant”.

An unaccompanied asylum-seeking child can be defined as a person aged 17 and under, separated from both parents and not cared for by a guardian or other adult who is legally or customarily responsible for them^{[footnote 143]} who is seeking legal refugee status having “been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence”^{[footnote 144]}. In the case of UASC, multiple studies consider being unaccompanied to constitute an inherent risk factor^{[footnote 145]} as they are overwhelmingly dependent on others for, and during, migration. This heightens the risk of being exposed to MSHT, sexual abuse, physical violence, forced labour, forced participation in criminal activities, poor living conditions, and lack of access to resources^{[footnote 146]}. Exposure to traumatic incidents then negatively affects UASC’s psychosocial and mental health on the journey and in destination countries, and increases the likelihood of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), anxiety, depression, pervasive refusal syndrome^{[footnote 147]}, and poor physical health^{[footnote 148]}. This has been shown to lead to significantly poorer health compared to young people who arrive in the UK with a family^{[footnote 149]}.

Use of smugglers: 85% of the total UK-destination sample (n=809) reported using a smuggler along their migratory journeys.

Source: Mixed Migration Centre 4Mi survey based on 809 migrants who identified the UK as their country of destination between 2019 and 2022, interviewed across North Africa (n=453), West Africa (n-101), Italy (CMR, n=70), and Italy-Greece-Turkey (EMR, n=112).

However, the extent to which a focus on age is useful in creating a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability has been questioned. First, some studies have argued that while the automatic categorisation of unaccompanied minors as vulnerable means they receive attention from adults/support which can, in fact, take away their agency and voice^{[footnote 150]}. While this is not to suggest that the needs of UASC should be neglected, it reinforces the fact that UASC are expected to present themselves in a particular way when engaging with authorities – taking on the role of passive victims. Lems et al., for instance, find that UASC are expected to show signs of trauma, vulnerability, or victimhood in order to gain access to resources^{[footnote 151]}.

Second, a number of studies point to the stigmatisation of UASC as soon as they pass the age of 18, or have been assessed to be over 18, particularly in the case of young males. They are seen as going from being children in need of support, to young men who are a potential security threat. When they turn 18, they lose the specialised legal protections and material support designated for (unaccompanied) minors, creating new risks to their health and wellbeing for these individuals and leaving their needs unmet. Consequently, as argued by Heidbrink, individuals must document their age as legal minors and “perform” their vulnerability in order to be seen to qualify^{[footnote 152]}.

That is not to say that age does not matter. Conversely, it has significant implications for the point of arrival, not least to ensure that those who are underage receive appropriate protection. However, the point is that while categories premised on personal characteristics (in this case, age) can be integral for understanding and indicating vulnerability, they are often secondary to the context in which individuals find themselves – situations in which levels of exploitation are high for everyone regardless of means of transport, resources, nationality, gender or age, for example. Categories premised upon personal characteristics play a role, therefore, but on their own they are inadequate for ascertaining the needs and support that asylum seekers have when they arrive in the UK.

4.5 Engagement with smugglers

The use of smugglers, which is effectively a symptom of the structural drivers that limit safe movement, is another contextual factor that can determine a refugee’s exposure to, or protection from, harm. Many asylum seekers turn to smugglers for facilitation of all, or part, of their journey. For instance, the 4Mi data from survey interviews conducted in Italy among those who took the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR) (n=70) shows that 99% of respondents used a smuggler either for their entire journey (21%), for several parts of their journey (63%), or for one part of their journey (14%). Similarly, for those interviewed across Italy, Greece, and Turkey who took the Eastern Mediterranean Route (EMR) (n=112), only 4% reported not using a smuggler for their migratory journey up until the point of interview. It is important to note that the closer the individual is to Europe and/or the UK, the higher the likelihood the individual has engaged with smugglers. Smugglers are widely viewed as playing an enabling or even protective role, being facilitators of movement, and offering services^{[footnote 153]}. One of the key services they offer is to help people to cross borders without the necessary documentation, helping them to navigate a site of potential harm from authorities^{[footnote 154]}. One Home Office immigration officer said:^{[footnote 155]}

“There are a lot of cases where [smugglers] are straightforward – they [asylum seekers] pay an agent, the agent moves them from A to B, then they load them on the lorry, and bring them here safe and sound. But even the crossing, I wouldn’t necessarily want to be bobbing about in a boat in the middle of winter”.

Asylum seekers often start their journey with smugglers who are based within their communities and with whom they have a degree of trust. As their journey progresses, they typically get passed to other smugglers with whom they have less contact and less trust^{[footnote 156]}. As a result, the further an individual gets from their country of origin, the greater the risk and levels of exploitation – meaning that the closer they get to Europe (and indeed the UK) the higher the risk and, therefore, the need to keep moving. Therefore, while research has shown that many move within their regions of origin with the use of smugglers without coming to harm^{[footnote 157]}, those who move outside of their region, particularly with the aim of reaching mainland Europe, often experience significant levels of deprivation which subjects them to various illnesses and non-violent physical harms^{[footnote 158]}.

At the same time as facilitating movement, therefore, smugglers can also expose individuals to risk of harm or exploitation. Other research by MMC^{[footnote 159]}, for example, outlines a number of factors that increase the risk of protection incidents on the migratory journey. These include engaging with a smuggler, which can imply a riskier route will be taken and opens up the risk of exploitation and modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT), and stopping for work on the migratory journey which can increase individuals’ vulnerability to sexual abuse, physical abuse, or labour exploitation. Furthermore, particular locations can be more dangerous than others. For example, MMC found individuals moving through Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso with the intention of reaching Europe were more likely to experience robbery, kidnapping, and physical abuse compared to those with non-European destinations^{[footnote 160]}.

However, evidence also suggests that most migrants know the risks they are taking – certainly in a general sense, even if not specifically^{[footnote 161]}. This indicates that the dangers associated with smuggling are not a disincentive to many who use smugglers – which, in turn, reinforces the notion that those taking potentially dangerous journeys do not see a viable alternative to taking such risks. This was also recognised in some of the interviews. As one interviewee said:^{[footnote 162]}

I’ve rarely heard of a smuggler who has treated the people that they have assisted or smuggled in a very positive way. They tend in my experience to be in it for commercial reasons and to make money, and people are targets […] but often refugees, asylum seekers have no choice. There isn’t really a legal way of fleeing

4.5.1 Vulnerability to human trafficking

Using a smuggler does not always lead to exploitation or harm. However, research shows that it can open the risk of exposure to dangerous routes, exploitation, and dangers relating to MSHT^{[footnote 163]}. There is strong awareness in the literature that smuggling often moves into human trafficking; that the lines between them are very thin^{[footnote 164]}; and that asylum seekers move in and out of these 2 classifications at different points of their journeys. For instance, lines between human trafficking and smuggling are particularly blurred in cases of ’aggravated smuggling’^{[footnote 165]} or when smugglers exploit their own clientele^{[footnote 166]}. Therefore, while smuggling and human trafficking are distinct and the difference is important, the linkages and differences between them are important to understand. As one interviewee, specialising in modern slavery, noted, “I think there are some horrendous people smuggling gangs that make masses of money out of suffering and have no real regard for others”^{[footnote 167]}.

Human trafficking, which is undertaken for the purpose of making money through power and control, is a crime against an individual in the form of direct exploitation (rather than against the state, as in the case of smuggling). While differentiating between human trafficking and smuggling is critical as they demand different responses, in practice this creates a challenge for authorities. While many of those interviewed understood the difference between the 2, many also talked about the way in which the 2 terms are often used interchangeably. A Home Office interviewee explained: “The Home Office, and everybody, uses those terms interchangeably, and it’s so frustrating that those terms are used so interchangeably. Trafficking now is a catch-all for trafficking and smuggling, I think, because it’s become used as [this]. But it has a very strict legal definition.”^{[footnote 168]} The interchangeable use can, at times, be enforced in an attempt to justify criminalising methods of irregular migration.^{[footnote 169]} However, even for those who understand the difference, ascertaining where smuggling ends and human trafficking begins is a challenge. Another Home Office stakeholder said, “it’s really difficult for Border Force at the border, and other partner agencies, to differentiate between smuggling and we use the term ‘facilitating’ versus trafficking.”^{[footnote 170]} As another person pointed out, the lack of clarity often leads to challenges in translation: “People often use smugglers and traffickers interchangeably and also, when you use an interpreter, you get the interpreter’s version of that word, so I think it’s hard to say. I think ‘smuggler’ I hear a lot more than ‘trafficker’.”^{[footnote 171]}

Rather than the root cause of vulnerabilities, differentiating between smuggling and human trafficking has become important not only from a law enforcement perspective, but also from a policy perspective. The New Plan for Immigration^{[footnote 172]} considers that those who have been smuggled will count as having arrived through irregular routes while those who have been trafficked will be covered by modern slavery legislation and, therefore, eligible for entry into the National Referral Mechanism. Yet in practice, the impact is often similar in a context in which levels of harm for all those who move along irregular routes is high.

4.6 Modern slavery and human trafficking

Modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT), therefore, presents a significant risk to asylum seekers along the migratory journey, and those who are survivors of MSHT are consistently perceived to be particularly vulnerable due to their experiences at the hands of traffickers. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking (ICAT) comprehensively outlines factors of vulnerability in a human trafficking context, and notes that an intersection of factors increases the risk. Personal characteristics were found to include age, gender, disability, and ethnicity; situationally: destitution, temporary illness, unemployment, and legal status; and contextually: discriminatory laws, policies, and social norms, crises, and armed conflicts^{[footnote 173]}. Importantly, when considering MSHT, ICAT’s findings show that despite personal characteristics-based approaches being over simplistic it is critical not to disregard personal characteristics as indicators of vulnerability^{[footnote 174]}. However, it is often the intersection of these characteristics, with situations and contexts, which creates vulnerability in a given point in time and place.

While some groups can be more susceptible to particular types of MSHT and exploiters often identify existing vulnerabilities in order to exploit them, ultimately anyone who falls into the hands of traffickers is, by definition, harmed. As an interviewee working for an anti- modern slavery NGO said:^{[footnote 175]}

“When it comes to exploitation and modern slavery, modern slavery doesn’t really discriminate. If someone can exploit a human being, they don’t care if it is a woman or a man, or old or young, they would just exploit them”.

It is clear, therefore, that someone can fall victim to MSHT at any location of the journey, including once in the UK, and that the harms suffered can take multiple forms (including sexual and labour exploitation).

The implications for arrival in the UK are significant, both for asylum seekers and authorities. Those who are suspected victims of MSHT are referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM), based on the assumption that they are vulnerable as a result of their experience. Survivors of MSHT are consistently perceived by stakeholders and frameworks within the Home Office to be vulnerable due to their experiences of exploitation and risk of re- trafficking. As one Home Office policy stakeholder working on countering modern slavery outlined, “Just by the very nature of being a victim of modern slavery all round, they will be already at the more vulnerable end of the asylum-seeking scale”^{[footnote 176]}.

However, the referral process is dependent on identification of a victim or potential victim of MSHT, and non-disclosure was referred to as one of the key challenges in creating a protective environment for victims of MSHT. As one interviewee said: “In most cases you’ve had your sense of self taken away from you and your sense of dignity… There are lots of male victims of labour exploitation, who find it very hard to recognise that they were in a situation where they were, effectively, owned by somebody else; they had no control over their own lives” ^{[footnote 177]}.

Consequently, survivors of MSHT, both through experience of exploitation, abuse, and control and their susceptibility to re-trafficking and re-exploitation, are significantly vulnerable upon arrival to the UK. While current frameworks employed by the Home Office are designed with indicators of MSHT in mind, non-disclosure remains an ongoing challenge for actually identifying those who have been victims of MSHT.

4.7 Places of particular danger

While most situations on irregular journeys have the potential to lead to harm, interviewees pointed to a number of ‘hotspots’ where levels of exploitation are known to be particularly high, including Libya (on the Central Mediterranean Route (CMR)), Greece (on the Eastern Mediterranean Route (EMR)), and Calais, which many migrants travelling overland pass through en route to the UK. As one Home Office policy stakeholder explained:^{[footnote 178]}

In Libya, for example, there’s a massive market for exploitation, for forced labour. So, Libya being one of the principal transit countries for people from Sudan and the Horn of Africa to enter across the Mediterranean, that’s likely to be a place in which vulnerabilities can be further exploited. In Greece, many are exploited while they wait to get to other countries in Europe. They become destitute whilst trying to get to another country such as Germany or the UK. They’ll often be forced into a form of sexual exploitation as a way of survival. That’s quite commonplace.

Research by Médecins Sans Frontières found that up to 92% of asylum seekers were direct victims of some form of violence in Libya, and nearly 100% were witness to intentional violence^{[footnote 179]} there^{[footnote 180]}. MMC’s 4Mi data corroborates this, with 80% of males interviewed in North Africa having personally experienced physical violence. Other research^{[footnote 181]} has identified a recent rise in slavery auctions in Libya, as well as a backlog of would-be passengers for smugglers due to crackdowns by coastguards on the CMR, leaving many living for extended periods of time in harmful physical circumstances, compounding levels of trauma.

While not necessarily reaching the same levels of danger as the CMR, the Eastern Mediterranean Route (EMR) is also referenced in the literature as dangerous. For example, Akgul et al.’s research identified 5 main themes regarding the personal security of Syrians in Turkey: violence, homelessness, prostitution and early marriage, child labour, and deadly journeys^{[footnote 182]}. Female asylum seekers have also been found to be subject to sexual violence by Turkish authorities^{[footnote 183]}.

In addition to specific routes, means of transport also impacts likely levels of danger. There are different possible means of travel: by road and ferry, by small boat/dinghy, by air, and by train. Those who arrive at the UK border by a small boat are subject to significant danger – this mode of travel creates acute vulnerability to multiple forms of physical and mental harm.

Those with financial and social capital are sometimes able to afford less dangerous modes of travel – for instance, to arrive in the UK by plane with false documents, while those who travel by land and boat are often particularly at risk of harm given the route taken and the length of the journey. The type of journey, however, does not necessarily protect them from exploitation, and those who fly to the UK are not exempt from potential harm – they can still be subject to coercion and control by nefarious actors within the UK, for instance if they owe money for their journey.

Furthermore, while resources matter, they do not always act as protection. Many of those with resources who travel over land can be kidnapped for ransom while their families are forced to pay significant sums for them to be released^{[footnote 184]}. At the same time, those who have minimal resources at the start of their journey often have to work en route in order to pay for the next part of their journey, which can often lead to exploitation. As one Home Office frontline stakeholder said:^{[footnote 185]}

Some, to move on further on their journey, have to borrow money. They usually have to borrow money from people that make money from lending money. We get quite a lot of cases where they report being forced to work.

While the findings point to different locations as being particular sites of danger, ultimately these hotspots are constantly shifting as a result of the broader context in which people are moving. It emphasises the fact that in order to reduce vulnerability of those moving, it is necessary to address the structural factors that lie behind irregular movement rather than just addressing the symptoms.

4.8 The impact of the migratory journey on asylum seeker vulnerability within the UK

Features of, and experiences during, migratory journeys influence the vulnerability of asylum seekers as they arrive at the UK border. This has a number of implications for individuals as they enter the asylum system.

First, irregular routes generally leave asylum seekers physically, mentally, and financially destitute throughout their migratory journey and upon arrival to the UK. Based on interviews with key stakeholders within the UK asylum system, the levels of trauma that people experience are hard to exaggerate. Significantly, their point of arrival is a moment of both extreme relief at having arrived in the UK (if they are even aware of where they are), and extreme vulnerability as a result of harm that they have suffered during and prior to their journey. Appropriate action taken at this point is therefore critical. Migratory journeys cause significant trauma and can lead to mental health issues for asylum seekers and refugees^{[footnote 186]}, including PTSD, depression, anxiety, sleep disturbance, substance misuse, panic attacks, and somatisation^{[footnote 187]}, as well as significantly poorer physical health. In practice, however, many asylum seekers often do not get the opportunity to recover from the impact of their journey as another journey begins: through the asylum system. One stakeholder specialising in human rights abuses against asylum seekers noted with reference to mental health:^{[footnote 188]}

A lot could probably be done to assist their [asylum seekers’] wellbeing, but I think the current [asylum] system is basically set- up to compound those issues around mental health, because of [the] housing situation, people not understanding, not really being able to access lawyers early enough, a lot of hostility from maybe the Home Office or housing providers who they come into contact with. So, I think mental health is a huge issue, people not coping particularly well.

Second, there is potential to exacerbate their vulnerability through re-traumatisation as part of UK asylum processing, both at the point of arrival and beyond. Many stakeholders emphasised that the point of arrival does not necessarily end the challenges faced during the asylum seekers’ endeavour for safe passage and sanction, nor, as will be addressed in the following chapter, does it always create or represent an environment for adequate recovery. For instance, the depth of trauma makes it very unlikely asylum seekers will disclose information straight away – not least because they are likely to have an intrinsic fear of anyone seen as an official. This has particular implications for their first encounter with the UK border. Concerns were also made about people being retraumatised during interviews. As one stakeholder supporting female refugees said, “A lot of people don’t really want to revisit these things but, you know, they know they have to for their asylum claim, but it takes a huge toll on them every time that they do”^{[footnote 189]}. Furthermore, adequate interpretation at the moment of arrival is crucial given that many will struggle to express themselves – but it is also where logistics are perhaps most challenging. One Home Office policy stakeholder explained:^{[footnote 190]}

It’s not necessarily just about the journey, it’s also about how they [children] process it and how they are able to talk about it. So, for example, an experience on the journey, they might not have the language to discuss what’s happened or be able to express it.

Third, several stakeholders pointed to the risk of further exploitation within the UK due to connections with actors who facilitated their journey, as well as situations encountered on the journey. For instance, those who have been victims of human trafficking or slavery en route are susceptible to it in the UK, which means that their vulnerabilities accumulate, particularly if they still owe money for their journey. For instance, some asylum seekers might still be under the control of their traffickers, which will then impact their ability to trust the asylum system they are entering – and prevent them from engaging with it. Others might not know they are being trafficked until a certain point in the process, and often believe they are being smuggled into the country instead. This, too, has an impact on the ability for individuals to disclose harms and situations. Alongside this, many will have an intrinsic fear of those in positions of authority, which further compounds levels of trust of the system.

As one frontline Home Office employee said:^{[footnote 191]}

Eritrean and sometimes Ethiopian claimants are more likely to abscond from reporting arrangements because they have a dim view of what might happen with the police. It’s also because when they pass through Italy and France, they tell us their treatment by the police is usually terrible. So, they often have a really dim view of uniform, and that forms a lot of how they respond to the process in this country.

Finally, the means of arrival is likely to have an impact on integration outcomes. While there is a lack of longitudinal research assessing the impact of the harm faced during the journey on long-term integration, there are indications that negative experiences can have long-term repercussions. As explored in chapter 6, evidence suggests that dangers faced during the migratory journey are likely to erode long-term mental health, which can in turn have ripple effects on the capacity of refugees to make progress on other integration domains, such as education or employment.

4.9 Conclusion

The evidence points to high levels of risk of harm for many who travel irregularly to the UK border. This implies that the focus of those engaging with asylum seekers upon arrival, providing support, and processing claims should be less on who is vulnerable and who is not, but on the degree and specific nature of the harm that was experienced by all those who have undertaken irregular journeys. It is critical that this approach not be taken to create hierarchies of vulnerability, however, but in consideration that irregular journeys inflict significant harm(s) upon all those who undertake them. While particular categories of individuals premised on personal characteristics (internal factors) might be more susceptible to harm in particular circumstances, overwhelmingly the findings point to the fact that it is situations and structures (external factors) that primarily create vulnerability. Consequently, personal characteristics serve as just one dimension and indication of vulnerability and, as explained in the previous chapter, cannot be considered in isolation and without recognition of their intersection with the external environment.

Yet, while the dangers of migratory journeys are recognised by UK authorities, and some of the impact on those who travel along them is acknowledged, there is a tension between the fact that those who travel irregularly are exposed to extremely high levels of harm, and the fact that their arrival through irregular means has a negative impact on their entry into the UK asylum system.

While under international law the means of entry should be irrelevant to an individual’s ability to make a claim for asylum, in practice the means of entry has created hierarchies in the UK asylum system that can potentially fail to address vulnerabilities. This is causing considerable disquiet among many of those interviewed. Ultimately, it is critical to view the migratory journeys of asylum seekers through an appropriate vulnerability lens – and one which embraces the varying dimensions and components of vulnerability. Only this approach can ensure that asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee protection and safeguarding is built on a nuanced understanding of the draws and the risks of irregular movement and can accurately address wellbeing needs.

5. The UK asylum system

5.1 Key findings

The Home Office strategy, guidance documents, and processes for serving and supporting vulnerable asylum seekers specify that vulnerabilities are intersectional, situational, and can vary over time. They also instruct staff to make determinations of vulnerability based on a holistic review of individual case attributes. This perspective is confirmed by the primary and secondary data and evidence generated in this research. However, interviews with stakeholders and reviews of audit reports indicate that operationalisation of this guidance is inconsistent in practice. Reports by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) and some Home Office frontline workers and policy staff indicated that indicators of vulnerability, including for victims of MSHT, can be overlooked during screening and later in the asylum and support process.

Implementation challenges are driven by several factors at the individual level that affect staff. First, while the guidance on vulnerabilities is nuanced and reflects an understanding of vulnerability that is aligned with the research reviewed in chapter 3, it can be a challenge for staff to interpret and apply it in the moment, instead focusing on identifying particular categories of individuals, such as pregnant women or people with visible disabilities. Second, staff and operations on the ground are overstretched, with the result that vulnerability assessments are, at times, deprioritised in favour of meeting the basic welfare needs of asylum seekers. Finally, numerous stakeholders within the Home Office reported that staff face conflicting mandates. Staff roles within the Home Office require them to both protect immigration laws and individuals, which can create tensions at times of pressure.

At the system level, certain factors inherent in the design of the asylum and support systems can contribute to exacerbating or creating vulnerabilities for asylum seekers. The inability of the current processing system to adjudicate claims in a timely manner, for example, has created lengthy processing times that—when coupled with the prohibition on work for asylum seekers— can create mental health vulnerabilities and negatively impact long-term integration outcomes in areas like health and employment. Very low levels of material and emotional support together with the inability to work can also expose asylum seekers to destitution. This, in turn, hinders the ability of newly recognised refugees to build their life in the UK once leave to remain is granted – for instance, limited financial support during the asylum process means that many refugees can struggle to rent accommodation once status is granted.

Finally, exogenous factors in the operating environment have made maintaining a focus on vulnerabilities in asylum processes and support difficult. This includes the rising number of asylum applications, placing strain on staff and systems, and the widespread shortage of housing, which has led to delays in transferring asylum seekers to longer-term accommodation and to issues with overcrowding and inappropriate housing. Stakeholders suggested that these factors in the operating environment could be viewed as long-term trends rather than emergency conditions and thus should be accounted for in the system design and operations.

5.2 Introduction

For most asylum seekers, the asylum process begins shortly after arrival in the United Kingdom. Asylum seekers may apply for asylum either at the port of entry, at the National Asylum Intake Unit, or while in detention. To formalise the registration of their asylum application, asylum seekers undergo a screening interview after they have expressed their intention to apply for asylum^{[footnote 192]}. While this used to take place after 1 or 2 weeks from arrival, waiting times for screening interviews have increased substantially in the last 3 years, with asylum seekers waiting on average 67 days in the first quarter of 2022^{[footnote 193]}. Screening interviews provide an opportunity to collect identity and security information and basic details regarding an individual’s claim, as well as to screen for vulnerabilities or indicators of MSHT. Applicants are then required to complete a substantive interview, during which further details of the claim are collected and reviewed by a decision maker. While asylum seekers are waiting for a decision on their asylum application, they can apply for asylum support in the form of accommodation, subsistence, or both. Support is provided to asylum seekers who would otherwise be destitute. In the Home Office’s Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy (2021 to 2025) vulnerability is defined by the Home Office as “the extent to which a person is likely to be at risk of, or come to, harm”^{[footnote 194]} and should be identified and safeguarded throughout each of these processes.

Identifying and addressing vulnerabilities within the asylum system and support processes has become a priority in recent years. In 2016, the Home Office created the Asylum Safeguarding Hub to receive referrals for vulnerability and safeguarding concerns and to identify appropriate responses. In June 2022, the new Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy (2021 to 2025) was released to provide overall guidance on the treatment of vulnerabilities and safeguarding concerns in the asylum process. The Home Office has also introduced safeguarding leads within each unit to ensure compliance with the strategy, and to provide training on identifying and addressing vulnerabilities to staff across the asylum process. In addition, the Home Office is currently exploring the potential for a new vulnerability identification framework that would provide indicators that could be used by staff to assist with identifying individuals with vulnerabilities related to mental or physical health, gender and sexual orientation, or basic needs. However, the evidence reviewed, and information collected via interviews with the Home Office frontline workers and policy stakeholders, suggest that the asylum and support systems continue to face difficulties identifying and safeguarding vulnerable individuals in practice, and that these systems themselves, as currently constructed and operated, can actually create or exacerbate vulnerabilities.

The asylum system has the potential to mitigate, exacerbate, or create vulnerabilities, depending on how claims are handled and what support is provided.

Building on the findings presented in chapter 3 pertaining to structural drivers of vulnerability, this chapter reviews how vulnerabilities are accounted for, and affected by, the asylum process and asylum support system. It will begin with a review of vulnerability within the asylum process, before considering asylum support, including accommodation and financial support, health services, and education. Finally, it presents the evidence on how vulnerabilities are treated in detention and how the process of digitising the asylum system has affected asylum seekers.

5.3 Vulnerability within the UK asylum process

5.3.1 Identification and referral

The first opportunity to identify individuals with vulnerabilities and refer them for safeguarding and support occurs during the screening interview^{[footnote 195]}. The screening interview aims to collect biometric data and to conduct security and identity checks. During the screening interviews, asylum seekers are also asked questions about their protection claim, immigration history, health conditions, and family, and are provided with a leaflet about their asylum claim, which is available in different languages^{[footnote 196]}. The screening interview also aims to assess whether the declaration of the claimant amounts to a protection claim, and if so, if the claim is admissible to the process.

While most screening interviews take place at the Asylum Intake Unit in Croydon, the screening interview might also be made by the UK Border Force at a port of entry or by Immigration Enforcement when the individual is detained. In certain situations where the asylum seeker is unable to travel to the Asylum Intake Unit in Croydon due to a health condition, a disability, or the fact that the person wanting to claim asylum is an unaccompanied child, they can also request to be screened locally in England, Scotland, and Wales^{[footnote 197]}. Individuals in Northern Ireland can attend their screening interview in Belfast. In 2020, 16% of screening interviews were undertaken by UK Border Force officers at ports of entry^{[footnote 198]}.

Guidance on conducting screening interviews indicates that the interview should be done in a positive and secure environment after an individual’s immediate welfare needs have been met. Asylum seekers should be offered the opportunity to take breaks and the pace of the interview should be adjusted to an individual’s needs. Interviewers are instructed to look for behavioural cues that may indicate hidden or non-manifest vulnerabilities, although these cues are not elaborated in the guidance documents. Guidance also instructs interviewers to consider the impact of trauma and of cultural difference on an applicant’s ability and willingness to disclose vulnerabilities. Applicants who show evidence that they may have been victims of potential MSHT are to be referred to the National Referral Mechanism^{[footnote 199]}. Indicators of vulnerability should result in a referral to the Asylum Safeguarding Hub, and can be flagged in the case management system, Atlas, and on the case file. Guidance on later steps of the asylum process, including the asylum interview, states that “safeguarding is everyone’s responsibility” and instructs caseworkers to contact the Safeguarding Hub if they become aware of any vulnerabilities during the substantive interview or during later parts of the asylum process^{[footnote 200]}.

Despite guidance that reflects an intersectional understanding of vulnerability, there are implementation challenges, and indicators of vulnerability or modern slavery and human trafficking concerns are not always picked up or referred as appropriate, either during the screening interview or later in the asylum process. In interviews conducted for this research, several frontline workers and stakeholders external to the Home Office, providing legal aid and supporting victims of torture, indicated they regularly see individuals who have indicators of human trafficking or torture who have not been referred onward to the Safeguarding Hub or the NRM^{[footnote 201]}. One Home Office policy stakeholder suggested that visible needs are often more readily identified than invisible ones, and issues with mental health or neurodivergence are often not picked up^{[footnote 202]}. The Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration (ICIBI) audit reports in 2017 and again in 2022 found similar issues^{[footnote 203]}, as did a 2022 ICIBI report on the process for receiving small boat arrivals^{[footnote 204]}. When vulnerabilities are identified late, this can create or exacerbate physical and mental health challenges and lead vulnerabilities to be aggravated^{[footnote 205]}.

A primary issue reported by stakeholders and in previous research has been the pressure placed on the Home Office staff by the high number of arrivals of asylum seekers. The 2022 ICIBI report on small boat arrivals expressed concerns that staff had struggled to keep pace with new arrivals while also performing identification and safeguarding functions, and that vulnerability assessments were seen as “non-essential” in this environment^{[footnote 206]}. Interviews with several Home Office frontline workers for this report echoed these concerns^{[footnote 207]}, and indicated that screening can be inconsistent or reduced as a result of high numbers of arrivals^{[footnote 208]}. One interviewee reported that: “You will get a different service almost depending on how you arrive, when you arrive, and how many people arrive with you”^{[footnote 209]}.

Access to quality interpretation services has also been raised as a concern, particularly in the context of small boat arrivals and high demand. In interviews, Home Office frontline workers reported experiencing delays in accessing interpretation, even with interpreters onsite^{[footnote 210]}. One Home Office frontline worker indicated that they sometimes rely on Google Translate to conduct initial screening with people arriving on boats due to the lack of availability of interpretation services^{[footnote 211]}. Two Home Office frontline workers did report using phone interpretation as an alternative, which they viewed as helpful^{[footnote 212]}.

Beyond the issues of capacity and resources that may inhibit the ability of frontline workers to identify vulnerabilities and make appropriate referrals, interviews with frontline workers and reports suggest other barriers that can prevent asylum seekers from disclosing vulnerabilities and needs during the screening process. First, the literature indicates that it is critical for vulnerable individuals to feel secure and to trust their interviewer, to feel comfortable disclosing traumatic experiences or needs that may be viewed as sensitive or private issues. However, several interviewees suggested that it can be difficult to create a positive, trusting environment in practice for several reasons, including:

• staff conducting the screening are in a dual role of enforcement and safeguarding, which can create a perceived conflict of interest for the applicant and can make it difficult to build trust
• screening is primarily conducted via a one-off interview; however, without time to develop a relationship with staff conducting the interviews, asylum seekers often do not feel comfortable disclosing concerns; one Home Office frontline worker described interviewing 3 girls who were “clearly trafficked” but would not disclose it “no matter how many times we asked”^{[footnote 213]}
• initial screening is usually done shortly after arrival, and while guidance dictates that screening should be done when asylum seekers are comfortable and their immediate needs have been met, one Home Office frontline worker indicated that asylum seekers are often traumatised by their journeys and not mentally in a condition to be forthcoming immediately after arrival^{[footnote 214]}; moreover, a 2021 report by the Refugee Council found that childcare is not routinely provided during screening interviews, and the presence of children may also inhibit asylum seekers from disclosing traumatic experiences^{[footnote 215]}

Finally, some vulnerabilities may also develop or manifest over time and may be difficult to identify in a one-off interview. One UK Border Force officer reported in an interview that victims of human trafficking are often not aware that they have been trafficked at the time when the screening interview takes place, and thus are not able to disclose this, or will not present indicators at the screening stage^{[footnote 216]}. It is thus important for the Home Office staff at other stages of the procedure to be able to identify indicators of MSHT or other vulnerabilities. While training on vulnerability indicators is currently offered for staff working in other parts of the asylum process and support system, both within the Home Office and in local services, interviews and reports indicate that this is not always sufficient to support the identification of vulnerabilities later in the asylum process. For instance, a 2021 report based on 29 interviews with NGO support staff found that the level of knowledge of processes for human trafficking victims among policy officers, local authorities, and other first responders was variable^{[footnote 217]}.

Interviewees and reports have also raised concerns regarding the way interviews are conducted. While guidance encourages screening staff to consider the impact of trauma or cultural differences during an interview, the extent to which this is done, in practice, appears to be varied. One frontline worker providing psychiatric support to asylum seekers stated that the approach to screening is not “sufficiently clinical” or suited to picking up mental health issues that asylum seekers may not disclose directly and that may not be immediately visible^{[footnote 218]}. For example, screening questioning does not ask about people’s sleep, nor is it tailored to ask about experiences that may be specific to particular journeys (for example, including detailed questions regarding potential human trafficking of anyone who has transited through Libya). Another Home Office frontline worker suggested that screening quality can vary not just based on training but also depending on the background of the individual conducting the screening. Younger staff with less “life experience”, for example, may rely primarily on the questions they have been instructed to ask rather than being attuned to more subtle indicators of vulnerability or probing further on particular themes^{[footnote 219]}. The dual role of staff can also create tensions, as can the high levels of turnover of staff at the border^{[footnote 220]}. For instance, a 2016 inspection of the Border Force identification and treatment of potential victims of human trafficking found that border officers at immigration control points consider their duty to keep the queues moving as their absolute priority, hindering their ability to identify victims of human trafficking. And according to one frontline worker:^{[footnote 221]}

The guidelines the Home Office has aren’t bad; the problem is about adherence to the guidelines and sustaining good practice […] Sustaining good practice potentially against a culture that goes against that and at the moment we have a really difficult situation with government policies, which are really very hostile to asylum seekers.

The potential tension between safeguarding and a culture of enforcement was also echoed by the internal end-to-end safeguarding review in the Home Office, which concluded that the dual role of the screening interview of enforcement and safeguarding was not conducive to identifying vulnerabilities^{[footnote 222]}.

Individuals who have been flagged for safeguarding concerns are referred to the Asylum Safeguarding Hub, which then reviews the case to determine the appropriate response and makes further referrals for services. Cases with indicators for human trafficking and modern slavery are directed to the National Referral Mechanism. While Home Office policy stakeholders indicated in interviews that the Safeguarding Hub reviews cases based on the facts of individual cases rather than based on categories such as gender or disability^{[footnote 223]}, resource limitations mean that the Hub must prioritise helping “the most vulnerable within the vulnerable”^{[footnote 224]}. The referral form used by the Safeguarding Hub thus includes an internal categorisation for staff that indicates which types of cases should be prioritised for assistance. This list includes individuals who are pregnant or recently gave birth, have physical disabilities or mental health concerns, are victims of torture or abuse, have alcohol or drug dependencies, or have other health conditions. Referral guidance also specifies that cases with more minor conditions that are already being treated by a general practitioner, such as stress or insomnia or headaches, do not need to be referred—although an external stakeholder interviewed working in psychiatry suggested that health conditions such as these can be clinical indications of more serious vulnerabilities such as mental health concerns or trauma^{[footnote 225]}.

Box 1: Identification of unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASCS) and age assessments

Children receive a number of accommodations within the asylum process and support system to ensure their particular welfare needs are met and their best interest has been safeguarded. This includes modifications to the interview procedure, access to caseworkers and legal assistance, and accommodation in foster care or supported accommodation like a shared house or flat, with regular visits from a social worker. Because children have access to special accommodations and procedures, there is some attention towards ensuring that the individuals who benefit from them are genuinely children.

To this end, the Home Office provides an age assessment process for asylum seekers claiming to be unaccompanied children. Currently, the process relies on an on-the-spot visual age assessment shortly after arrival for individuals who cannot provide proof of their age. As outlined in the Home Office’s guidance, 2 Home Office members of staff (one at least of chief immigration officer or higher executive officer grade) will independently conduct an age assessment using on-the-spot visual assessments. The second Home Office member of staff must interact with the claimant to ascertain whether they are a minor or an adult, with guidance stating that an ‘instantaneous’ visual assessment is insufficient.

If a claimant’s physical appearance and demeanour very strongly suggest they are significantly over the age of 18 and there is little or no supporting evidence to support their claim as a child, they will be treated as an adult through the asylum claim process and will access support accordingly. Should there be a doubt on the claimant’s age, and there is a suspicion that a child is on the cusp of 18, caseworkers are to apply the “principle of the benefit of the doubt” and the claimant should be treated as a child until social services in local authorities conduct a Merton compliant age assessment to prevent accidental detention of children.

Interviews conducted for this research and the review of literature point to concerns about relying on visual assessment suggesting that it can be subjective, and unreliable and place children at risk of being misidentified as adults. Children who are wrongly classified as adults will lack access to support that would facilitate disclosures to support their asylum claim and are at risk of being placed in unsuitable accommodation alongside adults or in detention. A 2019 UNHCR assessment, for example, found reports of children being held in detention for days after they were initially misevaluated as adults, with some being held for months in detention. Some of these children were suspected to be victims of human trafficking.

Several specific concerns were raised about the current age assessment process. First, the evidence suggests that staff receive minimal training or guidance on how to properly conduct visual age assessments. A 2017 ICIBI report found that some staff at the National Asylum Intake Unit believed the Home Office guidance on assessing age was vague and, as a result, they did not feel comfortable making visual assessments. Staff also did not receive training in conducting assessments. A 2022 ICIBI inspection at Tug Haven – a point of entry and processing centre – found that caseworkers had little interaction with young people and were overly reliant on visual assessments, contrary to Home Office guidance. Furthermore, no feedback was given to operational staff to improve assessments.

The experiences children have had on their journey can also affect the accuracy of an on-the-spot age assessment, according to stakeholders, and children may present as emotionally or physically mature for their age^{[footnote 226]}. The age assessment and dispute process can also have consequences for the children’s mental health, according to the literature, causing them to question their identity and life story. One stakeholder shared the following experience:

I remember a young Afghan lad. He was 15, but he’d obviously been working since he was 12 with his dad on the land and was a big lad, but you know he was emotionally very much a 15-year-old. But also because of the things that he’d experienced he was developmentally affected by trauma and so he was quite a vulnerable young lad really, and I think he was assessed as 21. It was a long and protracted process. It was harmful, because it is also saying to a young person, you know, “We don’t believe you.” That’s a harmful thing to say, and that’s sort of an intrinsic part of the process, isn’t it, for our clients who are refused. Or whatever stage they’re refused, it’s, “We don’t believe you.” It’s not a good thing for a 15-year-old to hear who’s lost their mum^{[footnote 227]}.

New plan for immigration – age assessment reform

The New Plan for Immigration envisages a reform of the current age assessment process by:

• creating a National Age Assessment Board (NAAB)
• enabling immigration officers and other staff to carry out age assessments
• requiring local authorities to undertake full age assessments or to refer claimants to the NAAB for an assessment if there is an age dispute
• creating a fast-track statutory appeal right against age assessment decisions of the NAAB

The New Plan for Immigration seeks to make the age assessment process less subjective through the NAAB which will oversee the criteria, process, and requirements for age assessments. This will also include the introduction of new technologies to carry out assessment methods such as using X-rays to understand the bone structure of an individual in relation to their age. However, ethical questions have been raised about the use of these scientific methods.

In May 2021, the Safeguarding Advice and Children’s Champion (SACC) conducted a consultation with the Home Office Young People’s Board about planned reforms to the age assessment process. Whilst the participants generally liked the idea of using scientific methods to help determine age, they recognised the associated risks of assuming scientific information was completely accurate and suggested that a combination of various considerations would be desirable to take an informed and balanced view. Stakeholders also raised the risk that young people begin to associate healthcare services with the medical age assessment process, thus discouraging them from accessing healthcare.

Sources: UK Home Office, “Assessing Age v5.0” (Asylum policy guidance, January 14, 2022); Elizabeth Yarrow, A Refugee and Then… Participatory Assessment of the Reception and Early Integration of Unaccompanied Refugee Children in the UK (UNHCR, 2017); Neal, An Inspection of the Initial Processing of Migrants; UK Home Office, “New Plan for Immigration: Policy Statement”, updated March 29, 2022; Safeguarding Advice and Children’s Champions, “Note of the Young People’s Board Consultation on Age Assessment Reforms,” July 2021; Interview with HOP10.

5.4 Interview and decision making

Following the screening interview, admissible asylum applicants undergo an asylum interview – often referred to as the ‘substantive’ interview – based on which the Home Office will decide on the asylum application^{[footnote 228]}. Interviews can be conducted in person or via videoconference, with an interpreter provided by the Home Office for the interview. The claimant is also entitled to bring a legal representative to the interview, although only a few do so in practice as there is a shortage of solicitors across the UK (see section 5.9)^{[footnote 229]}.

Interview guidance recognises that certain vulnerabilities may affect an individual’s ability to fully disclose their case or may put them at risk of further trauma by reliving their experiences during the interview. Asylum seekers are advised to tell the Home Office about any special needs that may require the interview process to be adapted. Policy guidance indicates that interviewing via videoconference might not be appropriate if the claimant has any sight or hearing impairments, learning difficulties, mental health issues, or other factors that “may prevent a claimant disclosing particularly sensitive information in a videoconference”^{[footnote 230]}. Other adjustments might include enabling the claimant to bring a companion to the interview for medical, emotional, or spiritual support, offering additional breaks, or signposting to support services^{[footnote 231]}. The Home Office asylum interview guidance also contains specific recommendations on how to conduct interviews of particularly vulnerable asylum seekers, such as claimants that have suffered gender-based violence, torture, or other forms of abuse. For instance, the guidance calls for the interviewer to stop asking questions about the experiences of torture as soon as it is likely that the abuse has taken place, to avoid creating unnecessary distress in the victims^{[footnote 232]}. The guidance also directs the caseworker to consider the referral of potential victims of modern slavery to the National Referral Mechanism, if the account of the claimant includes details of modern slavery.

A 2021 ICIBI inspection found evidence of good practice when conducting interviews, where Home Office staff adhered to the guidance, acted on safeguarding concerns, and were sensitive in their questioning. However, the report also found that 18 out of 49 (37%) cases where sensitive subjects, including torture, gender-based persecution, modern slavery and mental illness, arose, the interviewer was found, in the inspectors’ opinion, not to have handled the topic sensitively^{[footnote 233]}. In interviews for this research, frontline workers and stakeholders external to the Home Office suggested that insensitive conduct or questioning by an interviewer can have an impact on an individual’s ability and willingness to disclose the details of their case^{[footnote 234]}, which can, in turn, affect the credibility and strength of their case in the eyes of the decision maker. These perceptions are supported by the evidence review. A 2017 study, for example, drawing on focus groups and interviews with frontline workers found that a lack of trust and feelings of fear, shame, or guilt can surface during interviews and can prevent disclosure^{[footnote 235]}. And former asylum seekers interviewed in a 2021 study reported withholding information during their asylum interviews and that withholding this information later negatively affected their cases. The asylum seekers indicated they had withheld the information because they did not feel comfortable disclosing the information during the interview^{[footnote 236]}. Another report based on a review of 30 case files from torture survivors found asylum seekers reported the interview process was frustrating or stressful, and they did not feel able to give their full account^{[footnote 237]}.

Some reports and stakeholder interviews conducted as part of this study did, however, indicate positive experiences with the interview, particularly in recent years. One stakeholder working with LGBTQI+ asylum seekers indicated that in the last year, several of their service users have indicated that they found the Home Office interviewer was “professional and kind”^{[footnote 238]}. And a report commissioned by UK Visas and Immigration (UKVI) which drew on 51 interviews with asylum seekers found that many individuals reported the asylum interview had been conducted professionally and was less “hostile” than they had expected^{[footnote 239]}.

One issue with the conduct of interviews may be the amount of time that decision makers have to prepare for interviews. Staff are supposed to review case files ahead of an interview, including the preliminary information questionnaire (PIQ) completed by asylum seekers, to develop targeted questioning and reach out to reception or safeguarding teams if there are particular vulnerabilities or concerns flagged up in a file. However, a 2021 ICIBI inspection report found that decision makers did not regularly refer to the PIQ during interviews, and the PIQ was not always linked to the applicant’s administrative file. Decision makers also told the inspectors that they often did not have sufficient time to prepare for the interview and had not read the PIQ in full or at all^{[footnote 240]}. A 2020 report based on an analysis of 30 case files found that asylum seekers found fast-paced, consecutive questioning to be exhausting and prevented them from giving a full account or fully elaborating on important aspects of their stories. In some cases, interviews lasted for more than 4 hours but the claimant only had a single break, which affected their wellbeing^{[footnote 241]}.

Experiences of trauma also play an important role in preventing disclosure. In interviews, frontline workers and external stakeholders reported that experiences of trauma can have a significant impact on the ability of asylum seekers to accurately recall and narrate their experiences^{[footnote 242]}. Discontinuities or lack of detail in their stories caused decision makers to doubt the credibility of their claim and thus led to the rejection of their application. This is supported by previous research evidence. Several studies drawing on interviews with frontline support workers, including both Home Office and NGO workers, have found evidence that experiences of trauma can affect individuals’ memory, including their ability to relate events chronologically and recall details of events, which can in turn affect the credibility of their asylum claim^{[footnote 243]}. Issues of credibility are likely to become more important following changes to asylum adjudication introduced by the Nationality and Borders Act (See Box 2 below). Some stakeholders suggested that the interview process could be improved by making the questioning and environment more “trauma-informed”^{[footnote 244]}. According to Home Office policy stakeholders, a working group is currently convening to produce guidance and training on conducting interviews in a trauma- informed manner, which could address some of these concerns^{[footnote 245]}.

Several interviews with external stakeholders indicated that asylum seekers often feel unprepared for the interview and may not know what information is relevant to disclose^{[footnote 246]}. Not knowing what to expect or how to prepare can make the interview experience more stressful and prevent asylum seekers from sharing relevant information. These stakeholders suggested that providing legal support would help asylum seekers to be better prepared for the interview.

Box 2: Nationality and Borders Act – Implications for interviewing and adjudication

The Nationality and Borders Act 2022 introduces a new standard of proof and a 2-stage assessment for adjudicating asylum claims. Prior to the introduction of the Act, decision makers were asked to evaluate whether asylum seekers had a “reasonable likelihood” of fearing persecution on the basis of a protected characteristic. Since the Act came into force in June 2022, however, asylum decision makers are required to assess whether it is more likely than not on the “balance of probabilities” (that is, more likely than not) that an asylum seeker has a fear of persecution on the basis of a protected characteristic. This higher threshold of proof has raised concerns that asylum seekers who have vulnerabilities related to trauma or mental health issues – and thus have difficulty recalling particulars of their case or narrating their case in a consistent or chronological manner – may face more difficulty demonstrating they have a credible claim to a fear of persecution.

Difficulties obtaining appropriate interpretation can further complicate disclosure during the asylum interview. Several external stakeholders reported in interviews that the quality of interpretation can be low, leading to difficulties with the asylum interview^{[footnote 247]}. Several reports similarly found issues with interpretation, particularly situations where male interpreters were assigned when a female interpreter had been requested or where interpreters were assigned for the wrong dialect^{[footnote 248]}. A 2020 ICIBI inspection further found that the Home Office language categorisations were insufficiently precise, which meant that interpreters sometimes spoke a different dialect from the asylum seeker^{[footnote 249]}.

Interviews that become stressful for asylum seekers can also be retraumatising. Several frontline workers interviewed indicated that for individuals with especially traumatic experiences, or where the interview is not handled sensitively, retelling their experiences in the asylum interview can induce new trauma, leading to mental health issues^{[footnote 250]}.

This is supported by a 2021 study that found asylum seekers reported feeling retraumatised after interview experiences that were particularly uncomfortable, adversarial, lengthy, or stressful^{[footnote 251]}. Home Office policy stakeholders and frontline workers suggested some changes could be considered to reduce the stress of the interview process and risk of recurring trauma^{[footnote 252]}. This included the possibility of merging the screening and substantive interviews in situations where sufficient information has been gathered during the screening interview to support the case, or facilitating access of companions during the interview to provide emotional support, which is now only allowed in exceptional cases.

Source: UK Home Office, Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status in Asylum Claims Lodged on or After 28 June 2022; Interview with FW4; Women for Refugee Women et al., “Joint Briefing on Clause 31 Well-Founded Fear Test Nationality and Borders Bill, House of Lords Report Stage” (February 2021); UNHCR, “UNHCR Updated Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill, as Amended”, updated January 2022; House of Commons and House of Lords Joint Committee on Human Rights, Legislative Scrutiny: Nationality and Borders Bill (Parts 1, 2 and 4); Asylum, Home Office Decision Making, Age Assessments, and Deprivation of Citizenship Orders (January 2022).

5.5 Backlogs in asylum processing

As of June 2021, no service standard existed within the Home Office dictating the target timeline for processing asylum claims^{[footnote 253]}. Previously, the Home Office had applied a service standard that aimed to decide 98% of “straightforward” cases within 6 months^{[footnote 254]}. This standard was put into place in April 2014, after criticism from the Home Affairs Select Committee which found it “unacceptable that anyone should have to wait longer than 6 months for an initial decision”^{[footnote 255]}. The service standard was removed in January 2019, and the Home Office Asylum Operations team indicated that claims from vulnerable individuals, UASCs, and individuals receiving asylum support would be prioritised instead.

As of December 2021, fewer than 8% of asylum cases were decided within the previous service standard of 6 months. According to a 2021 report by the Refugee Council, at the end of 2020, 70% of asylum seekers whose claims had been in process for more than 6 months had been waiting for a decision for more than a year^{[footnote 256]}. These delays can be partly attributed to the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, which forced delays in conducting asylum interviews and processing claims.

There is very strong evidence that lengthy waiting times for asylum decisions have a significant effect on the mental health of asylum seekers, potentially exacerbating or creating vulnerabilities. Numerous interviewees from across the Home Office at both the policy and frontline levels, external stakeholders, and external frontline workers expressed concerns about the impact of prolonged waiting times on the mental health of asylum seekers^{[footnote 257]}. One external stakeholder described the impact of prolonged waiting times on asylum seekers’ mental health in the following terms:^{[footnote 258]}

As people wait, they become more and more despondent, mental health deteriorates, and I often felt that [at] the point at which someone actually was granted status, their mental health was so trashed that the idea of them being able to go out and work and integrate in that way was almost ridiculous because they’d had years of just being really ground down.

The views of the stakeholders are supported by numerous studies. Research has found that prolonged waiting periods expose asylum seekers to feelings of hopelessness, lack of control, powerlessness, uncertainty, and humiliation^{[footnote 259]}. Delays in providing decisions put 6-month timeframe was not possible. Internal Home Office guidance outlined 7 broad reasons for categorising a case as “non-straightforward,” including vulnerable cases that required “careful handling,” potential victims of torture awaiting a medico-legal report, or cases where the Home Office was awaiting input from another Home Office unit or government department. For more information, see David Bolt, An Inspection of Asylum Intake and Casework (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2017).

Delays in providing decisions put asylum seekers at risk of anxiety, significant stress, and psychological distress^{[footnote 260]}. One 2021 report considering the situation of UASCs found that children who face lengthy waiting times for decisions are at risk of self-harm, emotional breakdown, anxiety, depression, insomnia, and the inability to concentrate; as well as physical health issues including hair loss, skin irritation, and pain related to stress^{[footnote 261]}.

The impact of delays in providing decisions is exacerbated by the lack of communication from the Home Office with asylum seekers on the progress of their cases. Several interviewees mentioned that applicants have very little information on how long their claim will take to process, and many expect interviews and decisions much sooner than they occur^{[footnote 262]}. One Home Office policy official stated that asylum seekers are often “sitting there thinking that they’ll get interviewed in a week,” and this uncertainty can create or worsen vulnerabilities^{[footnote 263]}.

The effects of processing delays are particularly acute when coupled with the ban on employment for most asylum seekers. Asylum seekers are prevented from working in most instances; however, they are allowed to apply for permission to work in shortage occupations if they have been waiting for more than 12 months^{[footnote 264]} (if that delay is not considered to have been caused by the applicant themselves). Interviews and previous research support the idea that the inability to work can be both harmful to asylum seekers’ mental health and expose them to the risk of destitution or exploitation. Interviewees suggested that without work, asylum seekers have few ways to occupy their time, which contributes to depression^{[footnote 265]}, a perception echoed in other research^{[footnote 266]}. Moreover, without a way to earn additional income beyond asylum support grants, which are minimal, asylum seekers are frequently at risk of financial difficulty, working in undocumented employment, or being vulnerable to exploitation^{[footnote 267]}. The negative effects of processing delays and employment restrictions are also long-lasting and can have detrimental effects on the long-term employment and health outcomes of those that are granted leave to remain, as will be explored in chapter 6.

Delays in asylum decision making can also affect other parts of the asylum process and support—with potential consequences for the ability of the system to address vulnerabilities in other ways. One Home Office Policy Stakeholder pointed out that delays in asylum decision making had increased the burden on the asylum support system, forcing asylum seekers to spend more time in hotels and contingency accommodation^{[footnote 268]}. A 2021 ICIBI report also found that decision makers have reported being under increased pressure to speed-up decision making, and at times, feeling that they must prioritise quantity of decisions over quality^{[footnote 269]}.

Provisions for safeguarding and addressing vulnerabilities have themselves contributed to delays, however. At present, when an asylum applicant is referred to the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) for evaluation based on indicators of MSHT, the case is typically put on hold while the NRM assessment is completed^{[footnote 270]}. This can lead to substantial delays in processing asylum cases, as stakeholders have reported that NRM decisions can take years^{[footnote 271]}. One stakeholder reported having clients who waited 3 to 5 years for decisions on their human trafficking cases, after which the asylum claim was assessed^{[footnote 272]}.

Box 3: Nationality and Borders Act – National Referral Mechanism reforms

The New Plan for Immigration communicated the intention of the government to introduce reforms to the National Referral Mechanism with the intention of reducing NRM processing times and reducing perceived abuse of the NRM system by those with disingenuous claims. To this end, several changes were introduced to the National Referral Mechanism in the Nationality and Borders Act. These include notices that require potential victims to provide information on their cases within a certain timeframe, a higher legal threshold according to which decisions on whether the person is a victim of human trafficking should be made “on the balance of probabilities” (that is, whether it is more likely than not that the person is a victim based on the available evidence), and provisions to disqualify individuals who have been prosecuted for certain crimes from receiving NRM protections.

Several civil society organisations working on MSHT have raised concerns that these amendments will reduce the opportunities for trafficked people to be identified and to access support.

Sources: UK Home Office, “New Plan for Immigration: Policy Statement”, updated March 29, 2022; Detention Taskforce, “Trafficked People Are Being Detained, Not Identified. The Nationality and Borders Bill Will Exacerbate This” (briefing for House of Lords, Second Reading of the Nationality and Borders Bill, December 2021); Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (28 April 2022).

5.6 Meeting support needs

5.6.1 Accommodation and financial support

In the UK, asylum seekers or their dependents who appear to be destitute or likely to become destitute can apply for accommodation and/or financial support while their asylum application and any subsequent appeal is being considered^{[footnote 273]}. Under Section 95, applicants can be granted financial support, accommodation, or both^{[footnote 274]}. In order to apply for Section 95 support, applicants have to pass a “destitution test” to assess whether the applicant is destitute, which the Asylum Act considers as not having adequate accommodation or any means of obtaining it, or not being able meet other essential living needs^{[footnote 275]}. The Home Office thus grants support to asylum seekers based on the likelihood of destitution rather than vulnerability, but official guidance states that the Home Office should take into account the special needs of vulnerable asylum seekers when providing asylum support, such as a disabled person, the elderly, pregnant women, a lone parent with a minor child, or a victim of torture, rape, or other serious forms of psychological, physical, or sexual violence^{[footnote 276]}. Importantly, the guidance states that while caseworkers should consider any evidence submitted regarding a person’s situation and special needs, the Home Office is not obliged to carry out an individual assessment to determine whether the applicant has special needs.

Once a positive decision on the support application is received, asylum seekers who have applied for accommodation are accommodated in a “dispersal area” on a no-choice basis^{[footnote 277]}. A dispersal policy was introduced in order to remove pressure from London and other areas with a high concentration of asylum seekers, and it became mandatory for all local authorities of England, Wales, and Scotland to participate in April 2022^{[footnote 278]}. Asylum seekers also receive a weekly allowance of £40.85 per person on an Asylum Support Enablement Card (ASPEN) to cover food, toiletries, and clothing^{[footnote 279]}. Pregnant women and children below 3 years of age receive an additional allowance, and potential victims of human trafficking go through the NRM process to receive an additional £25.37 per week. Section 95 also allows for covering some health costs after completion of a specific application, which includes travel costs for those undergoing medical treatment^{[footnote 280]}. In addition, destitute asylum seekers awaiting a decision on their Section 95 applications or awaiting transfer to dispersal accommodation can access Section 98 support, often referred to as initial accommodation^{[footnote 281]}. Given the emergency nature of this type of support, decisions on Section 98 support should be made within the same working day when the application is received. The threshold of evidence to pass the destitution test is also lower.

The number of asylum seekers receiving support in the UK has steadily increased in the last 5 years, with 85,007 individuals (74% of those awaiting a decision) receiving support at the end of March 2022 – 39% higher than in the same period in 2021 and 76% higher than in 2018. Of those in receipt of support as of March 2022, 95% received support in the form of accommodation and subsistence, while 5% received only financial support. The increase in numbers is due in part to the sharp rise in and the increasingly long waiting times for asylum decisions, which has increased pressure on the support system, as well as the decision of the UK government to temporarily cease ending asylum support during the COVID-19 pandemic^{[footnote 282]}. The high number of asylum seekers in the support system is also related to the aforementioned employment restrictions, meaning that asylum seekers are often not able to support themselves.

The asylum support system has undergone an important overhaul since 2019, when the government awarded new contracts known as the Asylum Accommodation and Support Contracts (AASC) to 3 private sector accommodation providers. These contracts replaced the previous Commercial and Operating Managers Procuring Asylum Support (COMPASS) contracts that had been in place since 2012. The government also awarded in the same year the Advice, Issue Reporting and Eligibility (AIRE) contract to Migrant Help to assist and guide applicants to navigate the asylum process and the asylum support system^{[footnote 283]}. This includes support with accessing asylum support, the provision of information on the asylum process, and the provision of a 24-hour point of contact for applicants’ queries, requests for assistance, and complaints^{[footnote 284]}. In interviews, the Home Office policy stakeholders indicated that the new contracts were intended, in part, to improve safeguarding those with vulnerabilities. The AASC and AIRE contracts specify that each provider should have a clear safeguarding policy, including the designation of a person with responsibility on safeguarding and clear processes to respond to incidents and ensure referrals. The Home Office has also created an Asylum Support Contracts (ASC) Safeguarding Board to discuss safeguarding across the contracts with key partners^{[footnote 285]}.

The evidence suggests that, while asylum support plays a critical role in lessening the risk of severe destitution during the asylum process, the level of support provided is often insufficient to fully guard against the risk of destitution. For instance, a 2021 study drawing on interviews with 26 asylum seekers found that asylum seekers often had to make choices such as paying for transport or buying food – even if experiences of destitution were often shorter lived than for those who were not receiving support^{[footnote 286]}. Members of the National Asylum Seekers Stakeholder Forum (NASF) have also raised concerns over the amount of the weekly allowance and have asked the Home Office to consider costs such as travel and communications as essential needs^{[footnote 287]}. This limited financial support can exacerbate vulnerability and lead to exploitation, according to the literature reviewed and the interviews conducted for this research^{[footnote 288]}. One interviewee stated:^{[footnote 289]}

I guess overall it’s just the biggest issue is the lack of financial support for people and the fact that people are meant to live on such a small amount of money, it’s not enough money to survive, really, and it does push people into unsafe situations. Whether that’s begging for money or it’s working for £3 an hour.

While the government regularly reviews the amount provided to asylum seekers – with an increase from £39.63 to £40.85 in 2021^{[footnote 290]} – the current cost-of-living crisis is likely further exacerbating this risk. In addition, the literature suggests that limited financial support and transport costs can limit the ability of asylum seekers to attend support services – particularly impacting those with specific needs and vulnerabilities^{[footnote 291]}. This limited financial support can also negatively impact long-term integration, hindering, for instance, the ability of newly recognised refugees to rent accommodation. Asylum seekers can also face difficulties applying for and receiving support in practice. Applicants have reportedly found it challenging to prove they face “inadequate accommodation” before they are immediately at risk of homelessness. For example, a 2018 review of 300 case files from Refugee Action and Asylum Support Housing Advice (ASHA) found that those living in informal situations, such as staying with friends or relatives, had been requested to provide evidence of a formal eviction process to prove they face homelessness^{[footnote 292]}. While asylum seekers can now request the support of Migrant Help to submit evidence, several interviewees mentioned that obtaining evidence was still challenging – for instance, if evidence is abroad, or if they have never had bank statements^{[footnote 293]}. However, Migrant Help can now provide regular feedback to the Home Office on difficulties asylum seekers face in obtaining evidence, which could potentially ease these challenges^{[footnote 294]}.

Many organisations have also reported delays in accessing support, which can expose asylum seekers to destitution. For example, 32% of asylum seekers interviewed in a 2021 study reported they had experienced destitution while they were waiting for their asylum support to start^{[footnote 295]}. While some organisations had reported improvements in access to support since 2017, the transition to new accommodation contracts in 2019 had disruptive effects: out of 259 cases supported by Refugee Action between July 2019 and January 2020, the average waiting time from the moment the application was submitted to Migrant Help until a decision was taken by the Home Office was 20 days. And on average, it took 40 days for people to receive the financial and/or accommodation support they were granted after making an application^{[footnote 296]}.

Concerns over the standards of accommodation have also been frequently raised by different stakeholders in the last 5 years, with multiple reports and stakeholders reporting sub-standard, poorly maintained, and at times unsafe accommodation^{[footnote 297]}. In the past, these have also involved reports of safety incidents for vulnerable applicants, such as victims of gender-based violence and LGBTQI+ asylum seekers^{[footnote 298]}. However, the new AASC contracts aimed to address some of these issues, with the stronger requirement to focus on vulnerable people and to monitor the experience of asylum seekers through regular surveys^{[footnote 299]}. The new AIRE service also allowed asylum seekers to report all maintenance issues in asylum accommodation to Migrant Help, without waiting for a maintenance inspection. These changes have reported some positive results in terms of accommodation standards: according to a National Audit Office report from 2020, the accommodation providers have since 2019 improved performance on addressing emergency maintenance issues and resolving complaints^{[footnote 300]}.

However, the first results from the surveys conducted by the accommodation providers between October 2020 and August 2021 on dispersal accommodation were mixed: while 70% of service users surveyed were satisfied with their accommodation provider in late 2020, this declined to 56% in the last quarter of the survey (June to August 2021). While in the first quarter of 2021, 71% of those surveyed declared being satisfied with their accommodation, this figure decreased to 54% in the last quarter of the year, and satisfaction with the response to maintenance issues also decreased from 71% to 57%^{[footnote 301]}. Concerns over accommodation standards were also raised by several stakeholders interviewed for this research. For instance, several organisations working with vulnerable individuals, such as victims of torture, victims of human trafficking, and LGBTQI+ applicants, declared that accommodation was sometimes unsuitable. This included accommodation being placed in remote locations away from health services, or the use of shared rooms for people with PTSD and disturbed sleep^{[footnote 302]}. An interviewee also mentioned that there are frequent delays in responses to safety incidents – for instance, in moving a victim of gender-based violence to different accommodation, which can lead to an exacerbation of vulnerabilities^{[footnote 303]}.

In addition, the new service provided by Migrant Help to help asylum seekers navigate the asylum and support systems has faced important operational constraints. In the first AIRE Customer Experience Survey, conducted between November 2020 and August 2021, most asylum seekers surveyed declared being satisfied with the information provided by Migrant Help about initial accommodation^{[footnote 304]}. Yet, a 2020 National Audit Office report found that AIRE had so far failed to deliver acceptable performance. Between September and December 2019, Migrant Help answered only one-fifth of calls, as the volume of calls was more than twice as expected^{[footnote 305]}. While Migrant Help recruited more staff in 2020 to address this issue, in May 2021 a transition to a new payment provider led to a sharp increase in calls to Migrant Help and an increase of call waiting times^{[footnote 306]}. A joint report by Refugee Action and Asylum Matters argued that this bottleneck meant that some asylum seekers were unable to access support and were left in unsafe situations, eroding their trust in the system^{[footnote 307]}. Moreover, the aforementioned 2020 National Audit Office report found that asylum seekers still faced long delays in being transferred to a specialist adviser when required, and that there were problems with data sharing between Migrant Help, the accommodation providers, and the Home Office. These operational constraints, likely linked to the rise in asylum applications and increased pressure on asylum support services, are exacerbated by the lack of a forecasting model to estimate the number of people that will claim asylum and demand AIRE service^{[footnote 308]}.

The widespread use of contingency accommodation and delays in moving asylum seekers into dispersal accommodation have also raised serious concerns among stakeholders^{[footnote 309]}. In November 2021, 21,500 asylum seekers were accommodated in 181 hotels, more than double those in May 2021^{[footnote 310]}. In November 2020, the government also opened 2 former army barracks as contingency accommodation (see Box 4 below). As such, the total number of asylum seekers living in contingency accommodation as of March 2022 is 26,859^{[footnote 311]} – an increase of more than 900% from the same period in 2020. Moreover, in a context of increased arrivals and housing shortages, the time asylum seekers spend in contingency accommodation is also increasing – with some asylum seekers spending months, or even years, in hotels, according to an interview with a Home Office official^{[footnote 312]}. Many interviewees from both the Home Office and external stakeholders considered that the increasing use of hotels was highly detrimental and could exacerbate vulnerability. One stakeholder stated:^{[footnote 313]}

I think the use of hotels is really problematic because people are just in hotels for way, way too long and I think it’s very hard for people to start to rebuild or integrate when they’re stuck just in a small room.

Since asylum seekers in hotels receive full board and accommodation, several interviewees reflected on the erosion of asylum seekers’ agency and the ripple effects on vulnerability and mental health. One policy stakeholder from the Home Office explained:^{[footnote 314]}

None of us wants to sit in a hotel room, looking at the walls 24 hours a day, you know, unable to move on with life, unable to engage with our community and unable to make those choices about what you’re going to have for dinner yourself or buy your own food. So, the accommodation situation is definitely exacerbating vulnerability.

Another Home Office frontline worker provided a similar reflection: “They’re told when to eat, what to eat. They don’t have autonomy over their own decisions. They’re not happy about that, and that can lead to mental health issues”^{[footnote 315]}.

A recent scoping study conducted by NHS England echoed this finding, suggesting that the use of contingency accommodation often had detrimental effects on mental health, due to limited independence, cramped conditions, limited to no access to the internet, limited access to health services, and limited access to exercise and activities basic to wellbeing^{[footnote 316]}. Moreover, the uncertainty among asylum seekers over the length of period they would stay at hotels can fuel frustration and stress^{[footnote 317]}.

Box 4: Types of asylum accommodation

There are 3 main types of asylum accommodation in the UK:

1. Initial Accommodation (IA): This is a short-term type of accommodation for asylum seekers who need accommodation urgently, while they are waiting for their Support 98 application, or their dispersal accommodation is being arranged. It can be full-board, half-board, or self-catering. Each accommodate around 200 people.
2. Dispersal Accommodation (DA): Once their Support 95 application has been accepted, asylum seekers are moved into dispersal accommodation across the UK, normally 3 to 4 weeks after entering. Dispersal accommodation consists mainly of flats and shared houses.
3. Contingency Accommodation: Accommodation contracts also contain a provision to procure additional (contingency) accommodation in the event of an unforeseen surge in demand, such as hotels or military barracks.

Sources: Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation; UK Visas and Immigration, “A Home Office Guide to Living in Asylum Accommodation,” 2019; Refugee Council, “Types of Accommodation,” Asylum Information Database, updated March 22, 2022.

In addition, several interviewees also argued that, compared to initial accommodation, the increasing use of hotels can hinder the identification and safeguarding of vulnerabilities, given that there are no permanent staff on- site to signpost to services, and that people are not generally linked to primary care centres who have expertise in dealing with asylum seekers^{[footnote 318]}. While a recent inspection by the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration considered that the work on safeguarding within contingency accommodation was generally good, the report also raised some issues, including the fact that staff directly employed by hotels – such as maintenance or housekeeping staff – do not have safeguarding training, even if they are sometimes the first point of contact with asylum seekers. In addition, some stakeholders have raised concerns over the capacity of accommodation providers to engage with health services, given the speed of setting up hotels and sometimes the lack of prior engagement with healthcare authorities. And since contingency accommodation is designed to be short-term, AASC contracts do not have a specific provision on guaranteeing access to education in initial accommodation, meaning that children staying for longer periods can potentially miss out on education^{[footnote 319]}. The Home Office is aware of many of these challenges, and is reviewing accommodation contracts to attempt to solve issues related to contingency accommodation and working on increasing engagement with local authorities to ensure links with local services^{[footnote 320]}. Apart from the use of hotels, in September 2020 the Home Office opened 2 former military barracks as contingency accommodation in England and Wales^{[footnote 321]}. While the Penally Camp site in Wales has since closed amid growing concerns about its safety and suitability^{[footnote 322]}, the Home Office is planning to set up new asylum reception centres to speed up the processing of claims, which could have an important impact on asylum seekers’ vulnerabilities (see Box 5 below).

Finally, delays in transfers to dispersal accommodation can also have disruptive effects on asylum seekers’ continuity of care. One external stakeholder explained that “each move, and that includes the move in and out of detention, is an opportunity for discontinuity of care”^{[footnote 323]}. Several interviewees from the Home Office and external stakeholders also reflected on the disruptive effect of multiple moves on support networks and knowledge of local areas, which can in turn exacerbate isolation^{[footnote 324]}.

Box 5: Nationality and Borders Act – Implications for accommodation

In its New Plan for Immigration, the UK government announced its intention to set- up new asylum reception centres to provide basic accommodation and speed up the processing of claims. The government had plans to open the first reception centre hosting 1,500 male asylum seekers in a former RAF base in North Yorkshire. Following a backlash from local councillors and residents – who, among others, pointed to the lack of services and infrastructure to meet the needs of asylum seekers – the government decided to cancel this plan in August 2022. However, according to the BBC, a government spokesperson declared that the government “will continue to identify appropriate sites for Greek-style asylum reception centres”.

While the details of what this type of accommodation will entail remains to be seen, inspections on the use of former military barracks such as Napier barracks in Kent as contingency accommodation have raised significant concerns, including little engagement with local authorities to ensure access to service and inadequate assessments of physical and mental health needs for those selected to move into these camps. The Home Office developed suitability criteria for Napier, according to which only single male asylum seekers with no dependents would be sent to Napier. The eligibility criteria also excluded those with serious health problems, those with poor mental health or a history of self-harm, victims of torture, potential victims of human trafficking, and those with a history of disruptive behaviour. However, the inspection found that many vulnerable people slipped through the cracks, with a 2021 inspection finding that one third of residents in Napier reported mental health problems. While the Home Office has since aimed to improve safeguarding in this type of contingency accommodation and improve the provision of wraparound services, it warns about expanding the use of “Greek-style asylum reception centres” for extended periods of time, which are likely to increase isolation and exacerbate vulnerability due, among other factors, to their remote location and distance from mainstream services or community networks.

Sources: Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation; David Neal, A Re-Inspection of Napier Barracks (March 2022) (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2022); Rajeev Syal, Mabel Banfield-Nwachi, and Diane Taylor, “Tories Abandon Plans to House 1,500 Asylum Seekers in Yorkshire Village,” The Guardian, August 9, 2022; BBC News, ‘Linton-on-Ouse: Withdrawal of Asylum Centre Plan Confirmed,” 15 October 2022.

5.6.2 Health services

Asylum seekers in the UK that are awaiting a decision on their application or an appeal are entitled to free primary and secondary healthcare^{[footnote 325]}. Asylum seekers under Section 95 can obtain a HC2 certificate for free NHS prescriptions, dental treatment, or travel costs to and from hospital for NHS treatment^{[footnote 326]}, and the Home Office has policy guidance to ensure asylum seekers can access healthcare in initial and dispersal accommodation. For example, official guidance states that applicants in receipt of emergency support (Section 98) are offered a health check upon arrival in initial accommodation by an in-house healthcare team. If health needs are identified, the healthcare team should inform the accommodation provider to prepare appropriate dispersal arrangements. Home Office guidance also contains guidelines to adapt accommodation services and ensure continuity of care for those with health needs, which include avoiding dispersal in the late stages of pregnancy, the availability of an Asylum Support Medical Adviser to advise caseworkers on fitness to travel, availability of treatment in particular regions, or accommodation that should be provided, or the use of specific accommodation arrangements for pregnant women, those with mobility problems, or those with infectious diseases, among others. Guidance also aims to avoid disruption of treatment for those with healthcare needs by housing them as close as possible to the treatment centre. In addition, dispersal accommodation providers are required to ensure that all supported persons are briefed within one day of arrival at the dispersal accommodation, which includes providing instructions on how to register with a local GP. If the applicant has identified healthcare needs, the provider is obliged to ensure the person is registered with a GP within 5 working days, or one working day for urgent cases.

While guidance is therefore comprehensive and aims to ensure that asylum seekers have their health needs attended to, asylum seekers often experience barriers to accessing and receiving appropriate healthcare services in practice – a problem that has only been exacerbated by the increasing use of contingency accommodation. In interviews, one representative from a support organisation stated that health assessments in initial accommodation are often very basic, and that, in practice, there are very few GPs that write comprehensive medical reports for people that have experienced some form of abuse^{[footnote 327]}. An internal end-to-end safeguarding review in the Home Office similarly found that health screening checks at accommodation sites were inconsistent^{[footnote 328]}. Apart from health screenings, the interviews and the available research shows that applicants often face language barriers to access healthcare, with reports of family members being used as interpreters, which could prevent disclosure and treatment, especially for women and children^{[footnote 329]}. While the NHS used to have an interpreter service which also explained to healthcare professionals the cultural issues that could impact health, this has been cut to reduce budget costs, according to a stakeholder interviewed^{[footnote 330]}. Besides language barriers, asylum seekers often experience other barriers to accessing healthcare in the UK, including delays in accessing documentation needed to register^{[footnote 331]}, the lack of capacity in some areas which have over-stretched GPs^{[footnote 332]}, lack of IT skills and Wi-Fi in private spaces in asylum accommodation that prevents some asylum seekers from making online appointments^{[footnote 333]}, or the lack of knowledge among some NHS staff about the entitlements of asylum seekers^{[footnote 334]}. For instance, a 2019 large-scale study conducted by Doctors of the World about their clients found that asylum seekers were twice as likely to have sought and been denied NHS care than those with permissions to reside^{[footnote 335]}. Several interviewees also flagged the inconsistency of support and lack of expertise of many GPs in dealing with asylum seekers, especially in locations with a low number of asylum seekers. As one stakeholder put it:

If you’re in a village in Cornwall you might not come across many asylum seekers, so it might not be that you’re opposed to working with them, it might just be you’ve never had to and therefore you haven’t seen the need to have training or to understand the issues, whereupon if you’re in a different area, in an inner-city part of London or a major city, you’re likely to have more experience^{[footnote 336]}.

Brief doctor–patient time can also be insufficient for culturally specific communications and can result in poor treatment and care^{[footnote 337]}. Moreover, the increasing number of arrivals has placed additional strains on the capacity of healthcare services which must sometimes register up to 100 asylum seekers with little planning, according to an NHS report^{[footnote 338]}. The growing use of contingency accommodation has further exacerbated challenges in accessing healthcare. A 2022 large-scale study drawing on a questionnaire distributed among 313 asylum seekers living in contingency accommodation found that even those registered with a GP struggled to navigate the healthcare system, or to understand the outcomes of a consultation. Of those surveyed, 83.1% indicated that they did not know where to get a prescription for their medication, and only 26.7% of people had a HC2 certificate to help with health costs^{[footnote 339]}. This was echoed by some stakeholders interviewed. The recent scoping study conducted by NHS England suggests that these issues particularly impact groups with specific vulnerabilities, such as pregnant women, children, and those with disabilities. For example, many regions in England raised concerns over their ability to monitor the health of asylum-seeking children due to very high caseloads, which could lead to undiagnosed and untreated conditions, inadequate nutrition, or missed immunisation. One area in England also reported not knowing about a hotel where children needed health assessments and made 38 referrals to specialist services once they gained access to the hotel. Lack of information among local authorities of where people were housed also raised concerns regarding increased risks of exploitation and re-trafficking^{[footnote 340]}.

In addition, both the interviews and the literature point to the generalised lack of mental health support for asylum seekers. A representative from a support organisation argued that asylum seekers’ mental health needs are often seen as too complex or as not meeting the needs for secondary care, so they are neglected^{[footnote 341]}. One individual focused on education, flagged a lack of specialised mental health services for young asylum seekers and children, which he attributed to the dispersal game being a ‘numbers game’ instead of hinging on adequate access to services^{[footnote 342]}. As a consequence, asylum seekers often need to rely on under-resourced NGOs for psychological support, who do not always have interpreter services or sufficient capacity – meaning that those that are able to access mental health services might face waiting lists of several months and only be offered a reduced amount of sessions^{[footnote 343]}. This lack of mental health support was widely regretted by interviewees, as evidenced by this statement from a support organisation representative: “I think as a country we’re completely failing people seeking asylum in terms of their therapeutic and mental health needs”^{[footnote 344]}.

Importantly, the Home Office is working towards addressing this gap in mental health support, and in September 2022 launched a 2-year project to improve mainstream mental health service provision for adult asylum seekers. This project builds on a previous pilot conducted between October 2021 and March 2022, which provided virtual therapeutic support and delivered positive results. The Home Office is also developing trauma-informed training for Home Office staff and has identified some pain points in the asylum journey where mental health services could be signposted, including during the screening and substantive interview^{[footnote 345]}. The Home Office also has a forum bringing together the NHS and experts to improve issues such as access to healthcare and safeguarding of mental health and to react quickly when any challenges are identified^{[footnote 346]}.

5.6.3 Education

Asylum seeking children have access to free education across the UK, and local authorities in England, Wales, and Scotland have a duty to provide a school place for all school aged children resident in their area, regardless of their status^{[footnote 347]}. However, the evidence suggests that asylum seeking children still face challenges both in accessing and thriving in education.

While there is little information available on waiting times to access a school place for accompanied asylum seeking children, a 2018 report drawing on 86 interviews with asylum seeking and refugee children found that delays were frequent, particularly for children entering at the secondary and further education levels, with only a quarter of the children interviewed accessing education within 20 days^{[footnote 348]}. This is partly explained by the fact that some schools are oversubscribed. While this is a problem shared by the general population, the evidence suggests that asylum accommodation has increased pressure in low-rent areas, which has affected the availability of schools to provide for these children^{[footnote 349]}. Children with special educational needs (SEN) face particular challenges in finding a school place.

Research commissioned by UNICEF in 2018 found that schools are sometimes reluctant to admit asylum seeking children at upper-secondary level, fearing that poor results will influence the school’s position on league tables^{[footnote 350]}. While age-disputed children should be treated as children according to policy guidance, an interviewee working in education suggested that schools might also be reluctant to accept age-disputed children, fearing that they might be bringing a potential adult to the classroom^{[footnote 351]}. In addition, asylum seeking families, particularly those who do not speak English, can struggle to navigate the UK school admission system, contributing to delays. This is exacerbated by the fact that admission systems are often online, hindering access for those with limited digital skills^{[footnote 352]}.

Another key issue affecting entry into education is the delay in transfer to dispersal accommodation. As previously mentioned, AASC accommodation contracts do not have a provision to facilitate access to education for those in initial accommodation, given the short-term nature of this type of accommodation^{[footnote 353]}. As such, delays in transfer to dispersal accommodation can have ripple effects on the ability of children to access education – particularly for those staying at hotels for long periods. Moreover, a 2022 report from the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration also noted that hotels are sometimes set-up without sufficient engagement with local education authorities, leading to pressures on schools when they were asked to accommodate several children at short notice^{[footnote 354]}. Some local authorities are trying to address this issue by ensuring children in initial accommodation are enrolled into education. For example, in Cardiff, children in initial accommodation used to receive a reduced education offer, but amid increasing times in initial accommodation, the council decided to start admission processes from the point of arrival^{[footnote 355]}.

Asylum seeking children also appear to face barriers in remaining and thriving in education, with insufficient English as additional language (EAL) support in some schools and a general lack of expertise among teaching staff about the needs of asylum seeking children^{[footnote 356]}. A 2018 report notes that the disruption of specific central government funding for EAL students had deteriorated the quality of EAL provision^{[footnote 357]}. One representative from a local authority interviewed for this research also mentioned that language barriers in education can be particularly challenging for older children^{[footnote 358]}. And while some schools have specialised personnel to deal with the needs of asylum seeking and refugee children, this remains rare^{[footnote 359]}. In sum, experiences of bullying and isolation can also affect children’s education. In the aforementioned report, one quarter of asylum seeking and refugee children interviewed had experienced bullying or social exclusion^{[footnote 360]}. The stress of the asylum process and low financial resources – for instance, to afford educational material or participate in school activities – can also impact asylum seeking children’s education^{[footnote 361]}.

Adult asylum seekers have access to higher education, and in some instances, English language courses. However, asylum seekers are considered as international students in the higher education system, and high education fees mean that in practice, very few asylum seekers can access higher education^{[footnote 362]}. A representative from a support organisation interviewed for this research also reported cases of clients that had been refused entry to a higher education institution because of their status, suggesting that some institutions might lack knowledge of the entitlements of asylum seekers^{[footnote 363]}. Access to English language courses varies across the UK. In England, asylum seekers who have been waiting 6 months for a decision on their asylum application can receive partial funding to cover 50% of English for Speakers of Other Languages (ESOL) courses. Meanwhile, in Wales, Scotland, and Northern Ireland, adult asylum seekers are eligible for free ESOL classes on arrival^{[footnote 364]}. However, several representatives from support organisations and a local authority mentioned that formal ESOL provision is often limited across the UK, and that asylum seekers often need to rely on informal ESOL courses provided by civil society organisations. One stakeholder also flagged that asylum seekers face issues registering in colleges:^{[footnote 365]}

I think probably only a fifth of the people we support would actually be having English classes, because I think it’s quite difficult, especially for people that don’t speak English, [it’s] really difficult to go through registration at colleges and there’s no support there for people to do that. So, often people are just in an area for a year and haven’t been to an English class.

Limited English skills, in turn, can impact asylum seekers’ ability to navigate the asylum system and access services, which could exacerbate vulnerabilities. Moreover, delays in English learning can also delay progress on key integration domains, such as employment and education once status is granted.

5.6.4 Legal aid

Apart from education, free legal aid is available to asylum seekers who do not have sufficient resources. In England and Wales, this is provided only by contractors through the Legal Aid Agency (LAA), while in Scotland and Northern Ireland, all solicitors can access legal aid work^{[footnote 366]}. However, legal assistance is limited to advising asylum seekers before and immediately after the substantive interview, with few asylum seekers obtaining assistance for their screening interview^{[footnote 367]}. Legal aid is also available for appeals under certain conditions^{[footnote 368]}. Moreover, legal aid in England and Wales is paid as a fixed fee of £413 – with solicitors only being able to receive an hourly rate if they can demonstrate that they have done 3 times the level of work. The low fee, according to the literature and interviews for this research, deters solicitors from supporting asylum seekers, and makes it difficult for them to conduct a comprehensive examination of their cases. In the words of a representative from a law clinic supporting asylum seekers, “it’s very, very hard to find a legal aid lawyer because, as I said, the cases take such a long amount of time and the amount that legal aid lawyers can charge for it is very, very small, so it’s not worth their time”^{[footnote 369]}.

The shortage of solicitors means that for asylum seekers, finding a solicitor “is like a lottery” depending on where they are in the UK, according to a stakeholder^{[footnote 370]}. This was evidenced by a recent mapping study conducted by Refugee Action, which found that there were “legal aid deserts” in many areas in the UK. For instance, the study found that Plymouth and Stoke- on-Trent only had one qualified legal aid practitioner each despite being dispersal cities. In Scotland provision is better than in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland, but it is heavily concentrated in Glasgow^{[footnote 371]}.

This limited provision can affect particularly those with specific vulnerabilities, as demand pressure means that solicitors are likely not to take complex or long-running cases. Moreover, the mapping study found that the number of human trafficking victims referred to the National Referral Mechanism is significantly higher than the available specialist human trafficking legal advisors. Lack of access to specialist advice can create a barrier to escaping abusive relationships for victims of gender-based violence^{[footnote 372]}. And a support organisation working with victims of torture interviewed for this research flagged that their clients often speak to a solicitor only at the appeal stage^{[footnote 373]}. This lack of support has important repercussions not only in the ability of asylum seekers to make their cases – particularly in those with special needs and vulnerabilities – but also in the ability of asylum seekers to navigate the system, with one stakeholder arguing that “people have no idea what is going on with their case”^{[footnote 374]} – with knock-on effects on anxiety and mental health.

5.7 Vulnerability in detention

In the UK, asylum seekers might be detained on the same basis as others who are subject to immigration control. This includes new arrivals awaiting examination to determine their right to enter the UK, those who have been denied entry and are awaiting removal, or those already in the UK awaiting a decision on whether to be removed or awaiting their removal, such as refused asylum seekers^{[footnote 375]}. Asylum seekers can be detained in immigration removal centres (IRC), short-term holding facilities (STHF), or pre-departure accommodation (PDA). According to official statistics, there were 1,440 people in immigration detention as of March 2022^{[footnote 376]}. The government also notes that an increasing proportion of those entering detention relate to clandestine arrivals detained for short periods of time to confirm their identity^{[footnote 377]}.

In response to the findings of a Home Office commissioned inspection on the welfare of vulnerable persons in detention conducted in 2016 by Stephen Shaw, the government decided to introduce a new “Adults at risk” (AAR) policy to have a clearer presumption against the detention of vulnerable people.^{[footnote 378]} The policy establishes that, when an individual is being considered for immigration detention to facilitate removal, an assessment must be first conducted to determine whether the person is an “adult at risk.” The policy also applies to individuals already in detention to assess whether continued detention is appropriate. The policy contains a non-exhaustive list of indicators of risk, including physical disability, serious health condition or illness, mental health conditions, torture victims, potential victims of human trafficking or modern slavery, the elderly, pregnant women, and transsexual and intersex people. Importantly, the policy also contains guidance on how to weigh evidence, with self-declaration afforded limited weight compared to reports or declarations from professionals. If the individual is identified as an adult at risk, risk factors are assessed against immigration factors, such as likely time of removal, compliance history, and public protection concerns. If these immigration factors outweigh risk factors, the individual at risk can be detained. The AAR policy also contains other relevant provisions, such as the establishment of a limited period of 7 days for those in short-term holding facilities, or the use of ongoing assessments while in detention to identify any emerging risk factors in detention. While there is no maximum time limit on detention in removal centres, the policy specifies that detention time should be carefully considered^{[footnote 379]}. In addition, the AAR policy contains provisions to guard against harm of detention once a person is detained. First, detention can be reconsidered considering Rule 35 (for normal detention centres) or Rule 32 reports (for short-term holding facilities). These rules state that doctors working in detention centres can conduct assessments reporting on a detained person whose health is likely to deteriorate due to continued detention, who has suicidal ideation, or who is suspected to be a victim of torture. These reports can then be used to reassess the suitability of detention. In addition, to safeguard identified vulnerable individuals, caseworkers are required to open a Vulnerable Persons Care Plan (VACP) for vulnerable detainees. There is also a specific process to monitor individuals where there are concerns about suicide and self-harm^{[footnote 380]}.

Therefore, the adults at risk policy has several provisions to reduce the risk of harm caused by detention for vulnerable people. Yet, the evidence suggests that in practice this policy does not prevent the entry of vulnerable people into detention, nor the continued detention of vulnerable detainees. Representatives from an organisation supporting people in detention were highly critical of the effectiveness of the policy, as illustrated by the following statement:^{[footnote 381]}

It categorically does not prevent acutely vulnerable asylum seekers being detained […] It’s bureaucratic, slow, it does not divert people away. It might help some people get released after a long period of time, when detention has already worsened the vulnerabilities. But it doesn’t do what it was intended to do.

This statement is backed by a 2021 inspection of the adults at risk policy in immigration detention conducted by the Independent Chief Inspector for Borders and Immigration, which showed that between July 2020 and February 2021, 98% of those designated as adults at risk were accepted into detention^{[footnote 382]}. The report also found that pre-detention screening to identify vulnerabilities for those arriving in small boats and held in short- term holding facilities pending removal is often “rushed and incomplete”, and described cases where individuals encountered in likely sites of exploitation were only identified as victims of MSHT after detention. Two Home Office frontline workers interviewed for this research echoed this point, noting that some vulnerabilities can be missed and be later identified once the person is in detention^{[footnote 383]}. The inspection also raised concerns over the safeguarding of those with identified vulnerabilities, flagging inconsistencies in the processes followed for vulnerable individuals. Furthermore, the report highlighted the inconsistency between the relatively low numbers of Rule 35 reports based on suicidal ideations – with only 15 cases assessed for suicidal ideation between January 2019 and October 2020 – and the high level of self-harm in detention, which is well documented^{[footnote 384]}. The lack of Rule 35 assessments for those at risk of suicide was also flagged by a stakeholder working with detained asylum seekers^{[footnote 385]}. Moreover, the interviewee suggested that Rule 35 assessments are often of poor quality and vague, and that even when doctors specifically advise against detention due to the increased risk of harm, detainees rarely get released^{[footnote 386]}.

In addition, several inspection reports by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons on short-term holding facilities for new arrivals also raise concerns about the detention of vulnerable people. For instance, a 2020 inspection of the conditions of detainees in ports and seaports found that some vulnerable detainees were held for too long, and that the oversight of the detention of children was inadequate^{[footnote 387]}. While the report found that staff interactions with detainees were mostly respectful and that Border Force staff generally showed awareness of the vulnerable situation of detainees, it found that trained officers in safeguarding and modern slavery (SAMS officers) were not always available and that referrals to the National Referral Mechanisms varied considerably between ports. It also found that facilities were sometimes not suitable for detainees with mobility issues, and there was a lack of available female staff to support female detainees. A 2021 report on an unannounced inspection at Dover and Folkestone also found that detention of new arrivals averaged over 26 hours, with some vulnerable children often held for long periods alongside unrelated adults in crowded rooms^{[footnote 388]}. Apart from challenges related to safeguarding, the evidence points to practical issues in the support asylum seekers receive while in detention, which can also exacerbate or create vulnerabilities. For instance, while policy states that all detainees should be seen by a doctor within 24 hours of their admission into an IRC upon consent, the flipside of this consent requirement means that many detainees do not undergo this initial screening^{[footnote 389]}. In addition, while one Home Office policy stakeholder noted that health services are available 24/7 and that those with mental health needs can receive additional support – either inside the IRC or being escorted to external appointments – a stakeholder interviewed for this research working with detainees declared that healthcare appointments are often held via phone, and that there were long waiting times to access healthcare in detention. The stakeholder also reported that treatment for those with mental health needs was often inadequate, with detainees often receiving only medication and limited therapeutic counselling: “We have cases of most extreme physical and mental health issues, maybe psychotic, and they’re given paracetamol”^{[footnote 390]}.

Challenges have also been reported in relation to legal aid. Detained asylum seekers are entitled to receive half an hour of legal advice through the Detained Duty Advice Scheme^{[footnote 391]}. However, one Home Office frontline worker working with people in detention highlighted that demand surpasses available capacity of immigration lawyers, meaning that some detainees do not receive legal advice. She also mentioned the poor quality of legal advice, with detainees often not even getting the half an hour of advice they are entitled to, and lawyers missing risk indicators^{[footnote 392]}. The interviewee also reported challenges in accessing translation in detention, with some detainees speaking minority languages having to wait weeks to obtain an interpreter^{[footnote 393]}.

Therefore, the evidence suggests that, even if the Home Office aims to protect vulnerable people in detention, in practice vulnerable people are often detained, and mechanisms to support detainees and safeguard those with identified risk factors do not work as intended. This can have important repercussions on vulnerability, given that the evidence suggests that detention can have a highly detrimental impact on detainees. In the words of a stakeholder interviewed for this research:^{[footnote 394]}

Being detained also creates vulnerabilities in itself. Detention exacerbates existing vulnerabilities. It can lead to deterioration in someone’s mental health. Sometimes people that did not have vulnerability as such, their vulnerability can be severely damaged.

Another interviewee provided a similar reflection and argued for setting a strict statutory time limit on detention to reduce the risk of harm:^{[footnote 395]}

When talking about vulnerability, the way detention operates, it’s a deeply inhumane system that breaks already vulnerable people. We have leading efforts to call an end to indefinite detention and argue for a strict statutory time limit. For every client we speak to it’s the indefinite nature of it that triggers feeling of loss of control and all the vulnerabilities that flow from that.

In a similar vein, a recent report conducted by Refugee Tales drawing on the insights from 100 participants identified the indefinite aspect of detention as one of the most damaging elements of detention on mental health^{[footnote 396]}. The report also argued that detention deprives people of their agency and can have a negative impact on physical health^{[footnote 397]}. Several interviewees suggested that this detrimental effect can have a long-lasting impact on health as well as trust in the system of those that are granted status, as will be discussed in the next chapter^{[footnote 398]}.

To reduce the detrimental impact of detention, some organisations have also advocated for the establishment of alternatives to detention (ATDs). The UK government decided to test some community-based alternatives to detention in response to the Stephen Shaw inspection, and a first ATD pilot was conducted between 2019 and 2021 to support asylum seeking women through support from a caseworker, shared accommodation, and legal counselling. The evaluation of the pilot showed positive results, including reduced costs in comparison to detention and increased wellbeing of participants^{[footnote 399]}. However, a stakeholder flagged that other planned pilot projects were discontinued by the Home Office^{[footnote 400]} – and another interviewee argued that efforts made by the Home Office to reduce harm in detention risk being set back by an increasing use of detention, given the highly negative effects of indefinite detention on mental health^{[footnote 401]}.

5.8 Impact of digitisation

The digitisation of internal and client-facing processes within the asylum system has progressed rapidly in recent years. According to interviews with Home Office policy and frontline workers, these changes have primarily been undertaken with the aim of improving the efficiency of the asylum system, as well as improving user experience. One Home Office policy official described these changes as focused on:^{[footnote 402]}

How to build efficiency, [a] more sustainable system, how to reduce backlog and supporting new applications, how to optimise the entire journey for the customer, how to work more effectively for various stakeholders […] and how to look at implementing new digitisation programmes and getting integrated systems and things that are working elsewhere.

The Home Office has so far undertaken digitisation efforts in 5 primary areas:

1. Interviews: Using videoconference technology to conduct interviews remotely.
2. Services: Providing services such as therapeutic support remotely via videoconference.
3. Internal communication and data sharing: Using digital tools to improve casework and facilitate communication on specific aspects of cases.
4. Process flows: Using digital tools to increase the efficiency of case allocation and prioritisation.
5. Intake and communication with clients: Allowing for digital submission of evidence, booking appointments, providing information during intake, and sharing information about accommodation.

Given the importance of the asylum interview for determining the outcome of an individual’s case, virtual interviews have received the most scrutiny and critique of the digital tools that have been introduced into the asylum system. Stakeholders reported that remote interviewing via videoconference (RIVC) can have advantages – most notably the flexibility of location. Frontline workers working with UASCs particularly reported positive experiences with RIVC. One frontline worker, for instance, outlined that prior to RIVC’s rollout, children under their care would have to make a 5-hour journey to attend interviews, placing significant stress on already vulnerable individuals^{[footnote 403]}. These journeys sent kids’ anxiety levels “through the roof”^{[footnote 404]}. Following the initial rollout of remote interviewing, the Home Office collected feedback from the children who had participated in these interviews. According to a Home Office policy stakeholder, this feedback indicated that children appreciated the flexibility of being able to remain in a stable, familiar environment during the interview^{[footnote 405]}. Social workers are also in the room with the child during the interview to provide immediate support, if needed.#

However, stakeholders working with adults who used RIVC reported some notable disadvantages. For example, those with low digital literacy or lack of access to technology and internet found the process disconcerting and difficult to navigate, adding stress and discomfort in what is already a tense and uncertain scenario. One Home Office policy stakeholder explained: “Digitisation, for me, potentially runs the risk that some people who don’t have access to technology or don’t understand technology could fall through the gaps a little bit”^{[footnote 406]}. Further, a frontline stakeholder expressed concern around the consequences of heightened user distress: “there’s so much lost in the digital. If we’re thinking about distress […] and emotional or psychological vulnerability […] there’s so much riding on these meetings that it’s going to be triggering for them”^{[footnote 407]}. Two Home Office stakeholders identified that those with the most difficulty navigating digital tools are more likely to be older generations and those from particularly remote geographic areas^{[footnote 408]}.

There may also be limitations to the quality of interviews that can be conducted remotely. Crucially, stakeholders reported that in remote interviews visual cues have been missed by the Home Office interviewers and indicators of human trafficking, mental health issues, exploitation, and domestic or gender-based violence have been overlooked. It was acknowledged by both Home Office and non-Home Office stakeholders that face-to-face interviews made it easier to identify asylum seeker vulnerabilities^{[footnote 409]}. It was also identified that while RIVC has the potential for maximising asylum seeker comfort through flexibility of location, it is not necessarily the asylum seeker’s choice:^{[footnote 410]}

Remote interviewing has the potential to be a good thing, [it] has the potential to shift the power balance a little bit in favour of the asylum seeker, but the way the Home Office is doing it [lack of asylum seeker agency to choose] doesn’t necessarily maximise those benefits.

As outlined by an ICIBI report on asylum casework, Plans for Asylum Operations Transformation (AOT) sought to increase the number of asylum decisions made by 2023 by between 14% and 24% through 3 methods: enhanced screening, introducing digital platforms, increasing the use of videoconferencing, and employing an “interview and decide model”^{[footnote 411]}. However, there were no specific timelines for implementation, and many of the plans were in draft format as of June 2021. The Home Office’s response to the report affirms the notable shift towards digitising processes outlined by stakeholders, in that the increased use of technology is part of a commitment “to transform the asylum system, streamlining and simplifying processes to speed-up decision making and increase efficiency and output, meaning that fewer people will require asylum support”^{[footnote 412]}.

RIVC consequently presents several trade-offs. Consistently, stakeholders emphasised that while it provides flexibility to address particular barriers or stressors, like the need for long journeys or uncomfortable environments, it can also create barriers or stress, particularly for individuals who are not comfortable with technology. Further work is needed to ensure safeguarding protocols and guidelines can still be followed and implemented in a remote environment. One Home Office policy stakeholder noted that there are internal discussions around ways to provide support for asylum seekers during remote interviews, such as incorporating the needs of vulnerable asylum seekers who are blind, cannot use assisted technology, or are illiterate, but it is presently unclear as to whether there are specific plans for implementation.

The findings also clearly point to the need for directly ascertaining asylum seekers’ perceptions on RIVC to streamline its implementation and mitigate the creation or exacerbation of user vulnerabilities. Although one Home Office policy stakeholder noted that they had recommended a user questionnaire be rolled out to record asylum seekers’ perceptions and experiences of RIVC, they were unsure whether this was to be implemented^{[footnote 414]}. Finally, the findings highlight the need for ensuring digital support for asylum seekers who may not be digitally literate or confident.

There have also been efforts to provide some services remotely. For instance, the Home Office is currently planning a remote therapeutic support service to run from September 2022 through to 2025. Remote support will aim to improve the availability of mental healthcare in remote areas where otherwise there would not be options for asylum seekers and asylum- route refugees. It also promises to reduce barriers resulting from the cost of travel, shorten waiting times, and address concerns about potential stigma that asylum seekers may face for accessing mental health services^{[footnote 415]}. However, the lack of physical presence leads to a sense of being disconnected and difficulties identifying issues as well as its digital nature presenting challenges and barriers akin to those of RIVC^{[footnote 416]}.

The Home Office case working system has also recently been updated to improve the efficiency of casework, communication, and documentation. Atlas – the Home Office’s new digitised immigration case working system – was recently introduced to replace the Case Information Database (CID). Atlas was perceived by most of the Home Office policy stakeholders as a welcome move away from CID – which was seen as slow, disorganised, and difficult to navigate. Atlas was generally perceived as an improvement enabling greater speed, efficiency, and tightening the feedback loop in how referrals could be made. There were concerns, however, about the transition from CID to Atlas, as some functionality still has not been transferred to Atlas, and as a result both systems are still in operation, which has led to some confusion and frustration^{[footnote 417]}.

Interviewees did identify one crucial limitation to the new Atlas system. Atlas does not have the same level of visible information or signposting on special conditions, which could lead these conditions to be overlooked by service providers who use these files to target their support. One Home Office participant explained:^{[footnote 418]}

One of my concerns about Atlas is – so on CID, the computer system that we [still] use at the moment, there is a screen that has what’s called special conditions. And on special conditions you can record things like if there’s modern slavery in a case, or whether the applicant has physical disabilities, mental health problems, and when you open up CID and you click on a record, this is the first screen that, kind of, hits you. And it will alert you to the fact that there might be issues that you need to think about. As far as I’m aware, Atlas doesn’t do that which potentially could make it easier for things to be missed in the future.

In addition, several processes have been or are currently being considered for digitalisation, with the aim of improving the efficiency of the asylum process and potentially reducing wait times, particularly in the face of rising caseloads. These include case allocation – Case Allocation Prioritisation (CAP), for instance, is close to full development, and is a tool that will automate the allocation of asylum cases to caseworkers. This was seen as a promising way to improve the efficiency of allocating cases, which is currently done through spreadsheets^{[footnote 419]}. The submission of evidence function is also undergoing a digitisation discovery phase. Manage Asylum Claim (MAC) will enable immigration advisors to upload documents and/or evidence to support clients’ asylum claims straight to the asylum claim portal for caseworkers’ access and assignment. One Home Office Policy Stakeholder referred to this possibility as “quick, secure, and efficient” compared to sending evidence by post^{[footnote 420]}. Another area undergoing digitisation is appointment booking, whereby a beta digitised appointment booking system will replace spreadsheets and potentially allow asylum seekers to book appointments online themselves^{[footnote 421]}. Furthermore, the digitisation of appointment booking would likely enable substantive interview staff to create interviews more easily and provide more options for the claimant, such as whether a male or female interviewee is preferred. There are also some proposals for introducing digital tools that would provide better information to asylum seekers about the status of their claim or information on accommodation^{[footnote 422]}.

There was a sense among Home Office policy stakeholders that digital efficiency tools could help to address some, but not all, of the workload and efficiency issues that they currently face. One Home Office policy stakeholder said that digitisation of the casework system and referral forms has improved the speed and the feedback loop around how referrals are made^{[footnote 423]}. But achieving efficiency via digitisation might come with trade-offs. One Home Office policy stakeholder expressed concerns that relying too heavily on digital tools to interact with asylum seekers would “risk that some people who don’t have access to technology or don’t understand technology could fall through the gaps”^{[footnote 424]}. Another Home Office policy stakeholder questioned whether digitisation alone would be sufficient to improve efficiency and meet growing demand on the asylum system:^{[footnote 425]}

Our ways of working, our ways of thinking are just operationally not where they need to be. We can’t cope with the constant pressure; it’s relentless. Just when you think you’ve overcome one thing, COVID was gone, we got told it finished, and then suddenly the Afghan crisis lands, and then you’re still reeling. We’ve never got back anywhere where you need to be, when the people keep coming. We’ll get there; it’s fine. We’ll get there eventually. The answer to it is go back to real basics. Do we really need to interview everybody like this? And the answer is yes at the moment, because to claim asylum you are interviewed, but I think we actually need to ask ourselves some slightly different questions.

5.9 Conclusion

Accurately identifying vulnerabilities and providing required safeguards has become more of a priority for the Home Office in recent years, as stakeholder interviews and reviews of Home Office guidance and reports have demonstrated. The Home Office has introduced a number of policy and operational changes that endeavour to improve the identification and safeguarding of vulnerable individuals. These include the new Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy (2021 to 2025), which was introduced in June 2022, and the creation of the Safeguarding Hub in 2016. Guidance documents, trainings, and other material generally reflect an understanding that vulnerability is complex, intersectional, and may change over time.

However, stakeholder interviews and recent inspection reports suggest that there continue to be difficulties translating this guidance into practice, with the result that individuals with needs for safeguarding or other needs are not receiving the necessary support. A number of implementation challenges emerged from the research. First, while guidance reflects a nuanced understanding of vulnerability, in practice, staff tend to fall back on a categories- based understanding of vulnerability to identify who is in need of assistance. This is due in part to the need to prioritise those most in need of assistance when resources for extra support are limited. However, staff have also faced challenges in applying a more nuanced understanding of vulnerability. Identifying vulnerabilities that are not visible often requires spending more time with an applicant or undertaking screening interviews in a more probing or sensitive way, which may be difficult in a situation where staff have limited time to interact with asylum seekers or do not feel adequately prepared to do so. Particularly, when dealing with small boat arrivals, interviews and recent reporting suggest that staff lack the capacity or preparation to identify more complex needs, and screening is often cursory and prioritises visible vulnerabilities.

Second, the conditions under which asylum seekers experience the asylum process are not always conducive to fully disclosing needs and vulnerabilities. The literature and interviews suggest that it is important for vulnerable individuals to feel secure and have a trusting relationship with their interlocuter in order to disclose sensitive or traumatic experiences. However, for adult asylum seekers, most interactions in the asylum process occur as one- off encounters with individuals conducting screening, decision makers, or other staff. This makes it difficult to build the relationships and trust that help to facilitate disclosure. In addition, the techniques used to collect information from asylum seekers are not always sufficiently sensitive or well-suited to building security or trust. Interview techniques that are overly direct, are not culturally appropriate, or are not adapted to the circumstances of an individual case can lead an asylum seeker to feel unheard or defensive, and reduce disclosure or, at worst, be retraumatising. In addition, asylum seekers are often asked to disclose similar information several times during the asylum procedure—screening, NRM decision, asylum interview—which can also exacerbate feelings of stress or create the potential for trauma to reoccur.

Beyond the gap between guidance and practice, the design and operation of the asylum system itself can create and exacerbate vulnerabilities, undermining the burgeoning efforts of the Home Office to improve safeguarding and care of vulnerable individuals. The main challenge is the effect of mounting wait times for asylum decisions. Interviews with stakeholders were very clear about the harm that can be caused by lengthy wait times, a view widely supported by the literature. Long waits for asylum decisions can contribute to or cause mental health issues and interfere with individuals’ ability to cope with or heal from trauma. While interviews and literature suggested that rising asylum application numbers have contributed to longer wait times, evidence also suggested that other factors are at play. In particular, the sequencing of the NRM decision process before the examination of an asylum claim significantly extends the time an asylum applicant is waiting for a decision.

The negative effects of lengthy wait times are exacerbated by the prohibition on work during the asylum application period and the relatively low levels of financial support provided to asylum seekers. Without the opportunity to work, asylum seekers are left with few financial resources and are vulnerable to exploitation in the informal sector. Delays in providing asylum decisions have also contributed to backlogs in the accommodation system, where rising numbers of claims in process have exceeded capacity, leading to widespread use of temporary accommodation facilities, such as hotels. Prolonged periods in temporary accommodation and frequent moves between accommodation can disrupt the provision of services and contribute to stress.

Several efforts are underway within the Home Office that seek to mitigate some of these challenges. For example, one ongoing process seeks to develop a training for Home Office staff on trauma-informed interview techniques. Another process has brought together a steering group to facilitate communication between Home Office staff and the NHS and thus to improve health and support systems available to asylum seekers in accommodation. Efforts are also underway to digitise certain aspects of case allocation, communication, and workflows with the aim of improving the efficiency of asylum procedures.

While these efforts address important challenges for vulnerable individuals, they leave large, structural issues with the asylum system untouched. In particular, operational issues around the sequencing of asylum decisions with the NRM process and extensive backlogs of asylum cases remain unaddressed. Issues around efficient processing of asylum claims, and the implications for wait periods, are likely to remain critical as long as intake levels continue to be high within the asylum system. Addressing wait times is also key to reducing pressures on the accommodation system and thus the need to subject asylum seekers to temporary accommodation or frequent and disruptive moves.

Furthermore, no actions seem to be underway to reconsider the prohibition on employment during the asylum process or address low levels of support, both of which can be especially harmful in the context of prolonged decision times. The literature and interviews outlined in this chapter suggest that addressing these structural issues is critical to ensuring the asylum system is able to safeguard the needs of vulnerable individuals rather than exacerbating them.

6. Integration: Understanding the long-term impact of (un)met need and vulnerabilities

6.1 Key findings

Almost every interviewee commenting on integration noted that integration does not begin when someone receives status. Rather, the building blocks of integration are established – or not – from the moment asylum seekers arrive in the UK. Integration strategies in the devolved administrations are based on this principle. In England, the UK government, however, only focuses on integration once asylum seekers have obtained leave to remain.

There is limited evidence on the integration experience of those with particular vulnerabilities. However, the evidence indicates that unmet needs and vulnerabilities – whether they arose prior to migration, during the journey, or during the asylum process – can be exacerbated and cost the government more in the long run (through health and mental health needs and wasted human capital). This way, negative experiences in the migratory and asylum journeys can delay progress once asylum seekers have been granted leave- to-remain on some of the key integration domains identified by the Home Office in its Integration Framework, such as employment, education, and healthcare. The ‘move-on’ period can be a particular moment of vulnerability to destitution, homelessness, and exploitation. While the support during this period provided by Migrant Help through the AIRE contract supports refugees to navigate this transition, the evidence suggests that this period is still highly challenging for newly recognised refugees and can exacerbate existing vulnerabilities, such as mental health issues. On receiving leave to remain, refugees receive a potential integration boost in the form of access to the labour market and the mainstream benefits system. Yet, mainstream services are rarely tailored to the needs of refugees. Vulnerability is not systematically considered when refugees receive status, and support services heavily depend on provision by local authorities and NGOs.

Several features of the asylum system, such as long waiting times, employment prohibitions, dispersal policies, detention, and processes such as age determinations have direct effects on multiple domains of integration, for instance, by contributing to mental health issues and delaying labour market integration. They also have indirect effects, by diminishing individual agency and limiting asylum seekers’ ability to plan their lives.

The evidence on the impact of migratory journeys on long-term integration is scarce. However, the existing evidence suggests that experiences before arrival in the UK, including experiences of harm during the migratory journey, can have a long-term impact of mental health – with potential knock-on effects on other integration domains. Broader asylum and immigration processes can affect how asylum- route refugees are received and welcomed by the community. Compliant environment policies, for instance, can increase distrust among refugees towards official institutions, potentially impacting their engagement with key support services and undermining the broader Home Office objectives to increase public trust.

Addressing elements of the asylum system that can be detrimental to long- term integration – such as long waiting times, employment restrictions, or gaps in ESOL support – has the potential to mitigate existing vulnerabilities and improve longer-term integration outcomes. Improving integration support once asylum seekers obtain leave to remain – for instance, through the provision of wraparound casework support or tailored employment support – can also provide a nurturing ground for successful integration.

6.2 Introduction

Successful integration brings value not only to refugees themselves, but also to the economy and local community. As acknowledged by the Home Office Indicators of Integration Framework^{[footnote 426]}, successful integration helps refugees realise their full potential, access services, and contribute to the economy, while strengthening social cohesion. The economic benefits of integration have also been demonstrated empirically, and different studies have shown that investments in integration bring long-term socioeconomic and fiscal benefits for host societies^{[footnote 427]}.

While there is general consensus in the UK of the importance of integration, refugees in the UK still experience substantial disadvantage. Drawing on data from the EU Labour Force Survey collected between 2010 and 2016, a study found that asylum-route refugees are 22 percentage points less likely to be employed than UK natives, and have 55% lower weekly salary^{[footnote 428]}. While this gap narrows over time, the study found that the employment gap remained even after 25 years in the country^{[footnote 429]}. After controlling for socio-demographic factors, asylum-route refugees were also 9 percentage points more likely to report a health problem that hinders their ability to work, and were more likely to report mental health problems^{[footnote 430]}. A 2005 to 2008 longitudinal survey conducted by the UK government found similar results, with refugees reporting poorer employment and health outcomes than the general population. The survey also identified some factors that had an impact on integration, including the country of origin, socio-demographic characteristics, English skills, health, previous education, and employment, and living with family and friends. For instance, the survey found that on average, men had better English skills in comparison to refugee women and were more likely to be employed^{[footnote 431]}.

One especially underexplored dynamic is the impact of migratory and asylum journeys on integration. In many asylum and immigration systems around the world, asylum processes and integration are considered as separate policy spheres: asylum seekers first go through the asylum process, and only once they are granted status are the wheels of integration policies set in motion. As such, mechanisms in the asylum system to identify and safeguard specific vulnerabilities are designed primarily to refer asylum seekers to appropriate services during the asylum process and adapt asylum procedures and reception conditions accordingly. Ensuring that vulnerabilities do not spiral into long-term integration challenges is rarely addressed^{[footnote 432]}.

Yet, there is strong evidence showing that experiences in the asylum system lay the groundwork for successful integration. Almost all interviewees that reflected on integration emphasised that the asylum system and integration, rather than being distinct processes, are closely interlinked. For instance, one Home Office frontline worker provided the following reflection:^{[footnote 433]}

The more positive an experience they could have with their asylum claim, the more positive experience they’ll have long term. The happier they’ll be to integrate [….] but if they have had a negative one, I think they might be more disenfranchised and less likely to integrate smoothly.

From decision waiting times, to work regulations, through to asylum accommodation and early access to services, experiences in the asylum system can have a long-lasting impact and shape refugees’ integration experiences. Early support for those with specific needs and vulnerabilities can thus tap into asylum seekers’ resilience and provide them with a solid base once they are granted status. And, conversely, experiences of vulnerabilities and needs not being met during the asylum system can compound and be more resource intensive over time through health needs, wasted human capital, and weakened social cohesion.

The conditions asylum seekers find themselves in once they are granted leave to remain can also impact integration. Recent shifts in the UK migration landscape are likely to have significant effects on the ability of newly recognised refugees to integrate. Through the passing of the new Nationality and Borders Act^{[footnote 434]} in April 2022, the government has created a 2-tier refugee status under UK law, which sets out that refugees who come directly from a country where their life was threatened will be considered ‘Group 1’ refugees. By contrast, refugees that do not fulfil this condition – such as those travelling through Europe and those arriving irregularly via boat – will be considered ‘Group 2’ refugees and be normally granted a period of 30 months to stay that might include limited access to benefits and family reunion (see section 6.4.2)^{[footnote 435]}.

Those that are granted humanitarian protection (when the applicant does not qualify for refugee status but there’s a risk of harm upon return to their country of origin) will also receive a temporary status with the same restrictions as Group 2 refugees. The government also announced an enhanced integration package for refugees arriving through regular routes in its New Plan for Immigration, resulting in differential treatment between refugees arriving through regular or irregular routes^{[footnote 436]}. Many interviewees speculated that the new law would constrain many asylum-route refugees’ ability to build a new life in the UK, once they are granted refugee status, by prolonging the period of limbo, making it harder to find employment, and restricting access to family unification – a well-established building block of integration.

This chapter will analyse the support available to asylum-route refugees once they are granted leave to remain. The chapter will then explore how experiences during the migratory journey – and during the asylum system – can profoundly shape the process of integration.

6.3 Definition

In 2019, the Home Office published a new version of its Indicators of Integration Framework (first published in 2004) aimed at complementing national and local integration strategies and providing a shared understanding of integration for different actors involved in the process^{[footnote 437]}. The framework identified 14 key domains for integration, which include 5 markers of integration (work, housing, education, health, and social care), social links with the community and with institutions, as well as facilitators of integration, such as language, culture, digital skills, safety, and stability. In this sense, the framework sets out a comprehensive understanding of integration, understood as multi-dimensional, multi- directional – that is, involving adjustments by everyone in society, and specific to particular populations in a particular context and timeframe.

In the UK, many policy areas related to integration, such as education, healthcare, and social services, are devolved to Scotland, Northern Ireland, and Wales. As such, compared to the asylum system, the integration landscape in the UK is more fragmented. However, both the government and the devolved administrations have embarked on considerable thinking in the last few years about what integration means and how to best support newcomers’ integration: Scotland and Wales updated their refugee integration strategies in 2018 and 2019 respectively^{[footnote 438]}; meanwhile, in 2019 England released an Action Plan to build more integrated communities^{[footnote 439]}, and Northern Ireland is currently in the process of developing its first refugee integration strategy^{[footnote 440]}.

Despite the Home Office’s ambitious goal of developing a common understanding across government and the devolved administrations of what integration entails, there is no shared understanding of when integration starts. The UK government focuses on integration only once asylum seekers have obtained leave to remain. This position is in stark contrast with how integration is conceived in Northern Ireland, Wales, and Scotland, whose integration strategies are based on the principle that integration starts from day one of arrival^{[footnote 441]}. These different understandings of integration have significant policy implications. The integration strategies of Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland target both refugees and asylum seekers, and consider that the experiences of asylum seekers and the support services they receive during the asylum process have a direct impact on their integration – an understanding that was echoed by the interviewees in this study that reflected on this question and that is supported by the existing evidence.

6.4 Integration support

Generally speaking, newly recognised refugees receive a potential integration boost in the form of access to the labour market and mainstream benefits. This includes Universal Credit for those who are on a low income or are unemployed and who are not in full-time education or training^{[footnote 442]}. Refugees can also request employment assistance from the local Jobcentre Plus, and can access the national education and healthcare systems^{[footnote 443]}. In addition, refugees can request housing support from their local authority if they are homeless or threatened with homelessness within 56 days^{[footnote 444]}. Apart from access to mainstream benefits, there is very limited governmental support provided to asylum-route refugees across the UK. Newly recognised refugees can apply for an interest-free refugee integration loan to pay for a rental deposit or to rent household items, education, and training for work, ranging from £100 and £500 for an individual and between £100 and £780 for those with a partner^{[footnote 445]}. But the move-on period is thought to be especially challenging by stakeholders external to the Home Office, and even beyond this point asylum-route refugees may face considerable barriers to access employment, education, housing, and health services.

6.4.1 The move-on period

To support their transition out of the asylum support system, refugees are granted 28 days to leave the asylum support system and access mainstream benefits. This period is often referred to as the ‘move-on’ period. While the aim of this period is to ease the transition out of the support system, the literature and interviews suggest that this period can be a particular moment of vulnerability.

During the move-on period, newly recognised refugees have to complete a series of tasks, including finding and moving into new accommodation, finding a job and/or applying for mainstream benefits, and opening a bank account^{[footnote 446]}. The literature suggests that the short time period to complete these tasks and exit the support system, together with delays in receiving documentation and accessing benefits, can leave newly recognised refugees destitute and exacerbate existing vulnerabilities^{[footnote 447]}. For instance, various studies since 2016 have found that refugees often experience delays in receiving their Biometric Residence Permit (BRP) or their National Insurance Number (NINO), which can in turn delay or prevent other procedures such as opening a bank account and accessing Universal Credit^{[footnote 448]}. And since newly recognised refugees can struggle to access housing, this transition period can lead to homelessness and destitution. For example, a 2017 assessment of the experiences of 54 refugees supported by the Refugee Council found that none of those living in asylum support accommodation were able to find secure accommodation by the end of the move-on period^{[footnote 449]}. This ‘destitution gap’^{[footnote 450]} can also increase the risk of exploitation. Women, for instance, can become vulnerable to sexual exploitation and abuse as they might need to rely on friends or acquaintances for accommodation^{[footnote 451]}. Consequently, key stakeholders have long argued for an extension of the move-on period and for support for newly recognised refugees during the move-on period to avoid destitution. For example, the British Red Cross has advocated for extending the move-on period to 56 days. Drawing on a cost-benefit analysis conducted by the London School of Economics, it is estimated that this change could save from £4 to £7 million annually to the British taxpayer, given a reduced risk of homeless, mental health deterioration, entrenched destitution, and exploitation, among others^{[footnote 452]}.

Acknowledging these challenges, the government has taken steps in the last 5 years to improve the support refugees receive during this period. In 2017 the Post Grant Appointment Service (PGAS) was established to improve the information received during the move- on period to access benefits from the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP). This included sending a letter to newly recognised refugees explaining how to access benefits, a telephone line for assistance, and helping refugees to make appointments with the DWP^{[footnote 453]}. The evaluation of this service, however, showed that only 35% of those that took up the service received advance payments within the 28-day move-on period^{[footnote 454]}. Most recently, in 2019, the government commissioned Migrant Help to provide support to service users during the move-on period as part of the national AIRE contract. As one stakeholder put it, this support aims to “make sure that people are aware of the steps they need to take”^{[footnote 455]}. For instance, Migrant Help can support clients to liaise with the DWP to make sure the claim for Universal Credit is started as soon as possible and direct them to their local authority to request housing support^{[footnote 456]}.

Interviewees were cautiously optimistic about AIRE, seeing it as a positive development that will likely ease the challenges faced by refugees during this challenging period. However, the first evaluation of the advice offered by Migrant Help during the move-on period – conducted as part of the contract requirement to actively monitor the experience of service users – shows mixed results. On average, 76% of customers surveyed by Migrant Help between November 2020 and August 2021 expressed satisfaction with the information received during this period, and close to 94% declared they had received information in a language they could understand. But only 52.6% of those surveyed declared that they had received information about where to get help with housing once they left dispersal accommodation^{[footnote 457]}. Migrant Help attributes this low percentage to the fact that the Home Office temporarily paused evictions from asylum accommodation as a COVID-19 measure for those that had received an asylum decision, which means that those surveyed might have had problems understanding the question^{[footnote 458]}. Apart from the quality of the information received, one non- Home Office interviewee signalled that services provided by Migrant Help might struggle to scale-up services when numbers increase, given that they work within the boundaries of the AIRE grant agreement^{[footnote 459]}.

In addition, the effectiveness of the new AIRE support in easing this transition period will likely be constrained by structural conditions. Some interviews and recent studies suggest that the period is still too short, given that the minimum processing time for new Universal Credit claims is 35 days and that the claim can be further delayed if refugees face problems in receiving key documentation^{[footnote 460]}. While Migrant Help can request an extension of the move-on period if the client faces particular barriers, the short move-on time together with the long waiting lists to access social housing in the UK, the difficulty to rent privately due to limited financial support during the asylum system and lack of familiarity with the rental market, and the challenges to securing permanent employment mean that this period can still be very challenging for newly recognised refugees and lead to destitution. And those with existing vulnerabilities, such as those with mental health issues, human trafficking victims, or victims of gender-based violence, are likely to see their vulnerabilities exacerbated due to the stress of this period, and the increased risk of destitution and exploitation.

In this sense, while the AIRE monitoring survey provides a glimpse of the experiences of service users, more data is needed on the average time to access mainstream benefits, and secure employment and settled accommodation to have a more comprehensive picture of the experiences of newly recognised refugees during this period – as well as on particular pain points, such as limited access to housing, which might be exacerbating vulnerabilities.

6.4.2 Access to housing, employment, education, and health services

While refugees can access the aforementioned benefits, the evidence suggests that newly recognised refugees can struggle settling into their new life. For instance, refugees often encounter challenges securing settled accommodation. Local authorities have a responsibility to support people threatened with homelessness within 56 days^{[footnote 461]}, but existing research suggests that there is still a high prevalence of homelessness and housing insecurity among newly recognised refugees. For instance, out of 54 refugees interviewed by the Refugee Council in 2017, the majority had slept rough or in a homeless shelter. Newly recognised refugees can also apply for council housing^{[footnote 462]}. While the criteria to allocate social housing varies from council to council, factors such as being disabled, escaping domestic abuse, having low income, or being homeless are usually taken into account^{[footnote 463]}. Being an asylum-route refugee, thus, is not a preferential category in itself to access council housing, and increasingly long waiting lists for social housing in the UK mean that refugees can spend years waiting for long-term accommodation^{[footnote 464]}. At the same time, limited financial support during the asylum process also means that refugees can struggle to pay a deposit and rent private accommodation, and many of them also have no experience of renting or knowledge of their rights as a renter^{[footnote 465]}. Challenges in securing accommodation can increase the risk of exploitation, as newly recognised refugees can fall prey of situations of sexual or labour exploitation in exchange for accommodation^{[footnote 466]}. Moreover, a study conducted by UNHCR and the British Red Cross in 2021 drawing on interviews with 18 people with lived experience and focus groups totalling 69 professionals found that temporary council accommodation – an emergency type of accommodation the council can provide while waiting for long-term social housing – was sometimes unsuitable or unsafe. The study also identified insufficient data-sharing about an individual’s vulnerabilities between the Home Office and local authorities or support organisations, which could result in discontinuity of care^{[footnote 467]}. This risk can be exacerbated for victims of MSHT, as there are reports of newly recognised refugees being re-contacted by traffickers once they gained refugee status to reclaim a debt^{[footnote 468]}.

Refugees can also access employment support from Jobcentre Plus, but the lack of specialisation on the needs of refugees of these services means that their needs can remain unmet. A 2018 large-scale study commissioned by UNHCR drawing on 9 focus groups and 76 interviews with Eritrean refugees in the UK found that many refugees were disappointed with the Jobcentre Plus staff, who did not take into account their specific needs and barriers to employment. In addition, given that some refugees have limited English skills, and the lack of interpreters in the Jobcentre Plus facilities, many refugees were not able to properly engage with them^{[footnote 469]}. A stakeholder from an organisation supporting refugees into work also noted that work coaches from Jobcentres often have high caseloads and are not able to spend sufficient time with each individual. He added that many individuals are referred to job opportunities that are not in line with the refugees’ preferences^{[footnote 470]}. Jobs are also often not in line with refugees’ levels of skills: the UK-wide Survey of New Refugees conducted between 2007 and 2009 found that more than half of employed refugees felt they were overqualified for their jobs^{[footnote 471]}. This lack of tailored employment support can have important consequences, given that refugees face specific barriers to access employment, such as refugees’ limited English skills, limited recognition of their qualifications, or the reluctance of employers to hire refugees^{[footnote 472]}. Securing employment can be particularly difficult for those with specific vulnerabilities, such as healthcare or mental health needs^{[footnote 473]}. The lack of support to access employment, in turn, can have knock-on effects on other integration domains, such as health, housing, or education, and can be detrimental from an economic point of view. As one interviewee from the Home Office reported, “it is bad for the refugee but also for the economy”^{[footnote 474]}. In addition, challenges accessing employment can increase refugees’ vulnerability to labour exploitation. For example, participants of a study conducted by UNHCR and the Red Cross reported cases of refugees being offered unpaid jobs immediately after obtaining refugee status with the promise of a paid job in the long run. Many were inclined to accept these offers, given their urgency to find a job and their lack of knowledge of UK labour market conditions^{[footnote 475]}.

Between 2008 and 2011, the government funded the Refugee Integration and Employment Service (RIES) to support new refugees, which included 12-month support to access housing, education, social security, and the job market through a mentoring service and a personal case manager^{[footnote 476]}. This had a particular focus on employment support, through tailored advice with writing CVs or helping refugees get their qualifications recognised or access training^{[footnote 477]}. But after this service was discontinued in 2011, there has not been a similar UK- wide employment support programme for asylum-route refugees. Some NGOs, such as Breaking Barriers, The Entrepreneurial Refugee Network, and Ashley Community Housing, have tried to fill this gap by providing employment support to newly recognised refugees, with very positive results, according to several interviewees. However, one stakeholder working in the public sector flagged that these NGOs do not have the capacity to help all refugees, and that support outside urban areas is very limited^{[footnote 478]}. In this sense, several interviewees from the Home Office, non-governmental organisations, and local authorities advocated for increasing government employment support for newly recognised refugees to improve employment outcomes. Some recent pilot programmes, like the Refugee Transition Outcomes Fund and the UK Refugee Entrepreneurship Pilot Scheme, could provide a blueprint for these efforts (see Box 6 below).

And in 2019, the Welsh government launched the ReStart programme, co-financed by the EU Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund (AMIF), which established Hubs in the dispersal cities of Cardiff, Swansea, Newport, and Wrexham. These Hubs undertake an assessment of refugees’ language, job, and other skills and support refugees into employment through dedicated caseworkers. The Hubs are also supported by 3 Regional Employer Engagement Officers who support employers to understand immigration law and seek job opportunities for refugees^{[footnote 479]}. While there is no publicly available data on the results of this project, the Welsh government claimed in September 2021 that the programme had supported refugees to find paid employment in different sectors, including hospitality, security, transport, and healthcare^{[footnote 480]}. Providing tailored employment support to refugees, therefore, promises to reap important benefits in the long term.

Box 6: Piloting enhanced support for refugees: the UK Refugee Entrepreneurship Pilot Scheme and the Refugee Transition Outcomes Fund

In 2019, the Home Office and the National Lottery Community Fund jointly funded 4 organisations under the UK Refugee Entrepreneurship Pilot Scheme to provide business support programmes for refugees over a one-year period. Overall, 112 refugees accessed business support. An evaluation of the pilot showed positive experiences a high demand for support across 4 locations. The pilot fed into the launch of the Refugee Transition Outcomes Fund (RTOF) in March 2021, a £14 million cross-government initiative that aims to increase the self- sufficiency and integration of newly recognised refugees, with a focus on achieving employment, housing and wider integration outcomes. In Summer 2021, 4 pilot projects were selected in the North East, Greater Manchester, Plymouth and the West Midlands, which will run until March 2024.

The RTOF pilots are based on an innovative outcome-based financing model, where social investors are repaid by the Government if the programme results are delivered. While this type of model has not been widely tested in the integration field, it has so far shown promising results when tested in other countries such as Belgium and Finland, as it can, for instance, foster collaboration between different partners, several stakeholders interviewed for this research were optimistic about this initiative. In addition, the Home Office has commissioned an independent evaluation of the RTOF, which will strengthen the future evidence base of integration support.

The pilots under the Refugee Transition Outcomes Fund are considered to provide a blueprint on how to enhance asylum-route refugees support to achieve better integration outcomes, and will test how innovative financing models can be leveraged to this aim.

Sources: Interview with HOP4; Interview with OS23; Interview with OS19; Ecorys, “Reflections on the Evaluative Studies of the Refugee Transition Outcomes Fund and UK Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund,” updated June 2022; Meghan Benton and Alexandra Embiricos, Doing More with Less: A New Toolkit for Integration Policy (Brussels: Migration Policy Institute Europe, 2019); UK government, “Entrepreneur Training Pilots for Refugees Launched Across the UK,” updated 17 October 2019; Michelle Richey, Jade Brooks, Raymond Randall and M.N. Ravishankar, UK Refugee Entrepreneurship Pilot. Independent Evaluation (2021).

Refugees also face challenges to access or thrive in education. While refugee children can access the mainstream education system, a recent study focusing on the knowledge of educators about refugee pupils through a survey distributed to 295 educators in England found that most educators learnt about the needs of refugee students mostly through direct experience and ad hoc support from colleagues^{[footnote 481]}. One official from a local authority interviewed for this research also flagged capacity issues in some schools of the city^{[footnote 482]}. At the same time, there are relevant civil society initiatives to improve the support for refugee children in schools. The national network Schools of Sanctuary, for example, includes over 350 nurseries, primary and secondary schools committed to fostering a welcoming and supporting environment for refugee and asylum-seeking students, and is actively supported by some local authorities^{[footnote 483]}. The government and devolved administrations have also made higher education accessible for refugee students, who can apply to UK universities as ‘home’ students after 3 years of residence in the UK^{[footnote 484]}. In Scotland, those with refugee and humanitarian protection status who are residing in Scotland and who want to pursue a first degree can also apply to have tuition fees paid by their Student Awards Agency for Scotland^{[footnote 485]}, and some universities across the UK offer scholarships for refugee students^{[footnote 486]}. However, refugee students still face particular barriers to accessing higher education, including language barriers, lack of information about their legal rights and the education system and processes, difficulties navigating the enrolment system, problems in the recognition of previous qualifications recognition, and financial constraints^{[footnote 487]}.

Apart from higher education, refugees can also access English for Speakers of Other Language (ESOL) courses. In England, the government funds, through the Adult Education Budget, adult ESOL up to Level 2 for those aged 19 years and over who are unemployed or in receipt of certain benefits^{[footnote 488]}. However, the amount of money allocated to ESOL delivery dropped almost 60% between 2008 and 2015, and current funding is reported to be insufficient to meet demand^{[footnote 489]}. In a government survey distributed among 172 providers in England in 2019, 66% said that it was “fairly or very difficult” to meet demand^{[footnote 490]}. This impacts the ability of refugees to access English courses, with some refugees waiting over a year for English lessons^{[footnote 491]}. The engagement of the Scottish government in the preparation of the New Scots strategy similarly found that the availability of formal ESOL classes was an issue in Scotland, and that refugees experienced barriers to attending classes, including access to childcare and transport^{[footnote 492]}. There are some initiatives to address these barriers – London, for instance, provided funding in 2019 to 2020 to 2 ESOL providers to design innovative pilots to meet the needs of learners with childcare responsibilities, with positive results including increased learners’ confidence, women’s independence, and community cohesion. The city also funded a pilot to deliver ESOL lessons tailored to workers^{[footnote 493]}. In addition, integration strategies in the 4 UK nations signal the ambition of the government and the devolved administrations to improve ESOL provision. Yet, there was a consensus among interviewees that reflected on ESOL provision that this was still insufficient and was highly dependent on the voluntary sector^{[footnote 494]}. The lack of ESOL provision is likely to impact other integration domains, such as employment and social inclusion^{[footnote 495]}. Insufficient ESOL provision can be particularly detrimental for vulnerable refugees, as limited English skills can be a frequent barrier in accessing specialised services, including mental healthcare^{[footnote 496]}. Lastly, while refugees in the UK are fully entitled to free National Health Service (NHS) care, they can also experience challenges accessing healthcare and mental healthcare. A 2018 participatory assessment conducted by UNHCR drawing on more than 70 interviews with refugees found that language barriers and a lack of awareness of the rights of refugees in GP surgeries and hospitals – particularly for asylum-route refugees – means that some refugees experience obstacles to navigating the health system and accessing healthcare in practice^{[footnote 497]}. Similarly, a recent study based on 92 interviews in Yorkshire and Humber region found that refugees faced registration issues to access GP surgeries due to limited language skills and poor provision of interpreters, with refugees often relying on the voluntary sector to obtain support to register. Since GPs receive no support to respond to the specific needs of refugees, the study also found that the quality of care is highly dependent of the area and the personal commitment by the individual GP – with GPs in areas with few refugees having less awareness of the challenges these often encounter. In addition, the study signalled the lack of widely available mental health services^{[footnote 498]}. While this shortage of mental health provision is a challenge shared by the general population, the higher prevalence of mental health needs among asylum seekers and refugees means that this lack of support can particularly affect newly recognised refugees – especially those that are particularly vulnerable.

To address these challenges to access mainstream services and make progress in key integration domains, such as employment and housing, many refugees have to rely on the third sector. In the words of a Home Office policy stakeholder:^{[footnote 499]}

House of Commons Library, “Eligibility for home fee status and student support in England,” updated August 18, 2022; UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, “Eligibility for home fee status and student support in Wales,” updated August 17, 2022; UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, “Eligibility for home fee status and student support in Scotland,” updated August 18, 2022; UK Parliament, House of Commons Library, “Eligibility for home fee status and student support in Northern Ireland,” updated September 7, 2022.

How refugees who have come through the asylum system integrate is, I would say, heavily dependent on where they are, or where they go. Once you’ve had your decision, you can go anywhere and [it depends on] what the service provision is in the area that they decide to settle. By service provision, I really mean NGO service provision, because there is very little state support.

Another stakeholder, focused on refugee employment, provided a similar reflection:^{[footnote 500]}

If we look at refugees, you get your refugee status and you’re told you’ve got 28 days to move on and wish you all the best of luck. My question would be, “What support?” Especially state-funded support; there’s lots of support from organisations like ourselves, but it’s very piecemeal, it’s very region-by-region, and it’s very un-joined up and it’s not scalable.

In this sense, several interviewees and studies pointed to a ‘2-tier’ support system in the UK, with asylum-route refugees receiving very limited integration support in comparison to resettled refugees. For instance, resettled refugees receive a caseworker who provides tailored support to help the resettled family register in services, attend Jobcentre Plus appointments, or refer them to specialist services^{[footnote 501]}.

Accommodation for resettled refugees is also secured by local authority accommodation before their arrival, while asylum-route refugees need to find their own accommodation after the 28-day move-on period.

This variable integration support for resettled and asylum-route refugees has implications for integration outcomes: a 2021 longitudinal study based on 484 interviews with Syrian refugees in the UK found that resettled refugees appeared to settle better than those coming through the asylum route^{[footnote 502]}. This difference may now also be seen for refugees that arrive by different routes with the passing of the Nationality and Borders Act in April 2022 (see Box 7 below). This distinction has been widely criticised by the civil society sector and organisations such as UNHCR, who have pointed out the negative effects that this precarious status can have on refugees’ employment opportunities, mental health, and long-term integration. For instance, existing empirical evidence shows that secure residence and family life have positive effects on boosting labour market outcomes. This was echoed by a stakeholder focused on victims of torture:^{[footnote 503]}

I think that will have big impact on integration, if people are expected to reapply every 30 months. That instability is going to be very unsettling for people and it will make people more vulnerable.

In addition, the New Plan for Immigration announced an enhanced integration package for refugees arriving through safe and legal means^{[footnote 504]}. Since refugees who arrived through irregular means are, as explained in chapter 4, more likely to be vulnerable due to the dangers faced on their migratory journeys and the detrimental impact of the protracted asylum process, this could widen the gap in integration outcomes between resettled and asylum-route refugees.

Integration can be further delayed for those who have had negative experiences during their migratory and asylum journeys. This will be further explored in the next subsection.

Box 7: Nationality and Borders Act – Impact on integration

The new Nationality and Borders Act sanctioned in April 2022 formalises in law that refugees arriving through irregular routes might receive shorter leave to remain and fewer rights. The Act distinguishes between Group 1 refugees, who must have come directly from a country or territory where their life or freedom was threatened and have presented themselves without delay to the authorities, and Group 2 refugees, who do not fulfil these requirements. Those entering unlawfully will additionally need to “show good cause for their unlawful entry or presence.” The distinction is designed to deter asylum seekers from travelling through irregular routes, including small boats, as Group 2 would cover most refugees who have travelled across Europe. The Act subsequently establishes that the Secretary of State or an immigration officer may treat Group 1 and Group 2 refugees differently in respect to the amount of leave given, the requirements they must meet for that leave, access to public funds, and family unification. The associated Guidance sets out that Group 1 refugees will normally be granted an initial period of 5 years’ permission to stay, while Group 2 refugees will be granted an initial period of 30 months to stay that may include the right to work, resource to public funds, and limited family reunion.

Sources: Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (28 April 2022); UNHCR, “UNHCR Observations on the Nationality and Borders Bill,” October 2021; Interview with OS3; UK Home Office, “Permission to Stay on a Protection Route for Asylum Claims Lodged on or After 28 June 2022,” Guidance, June 28, 2022; Özge Bilgili, Thomas Huddleston, and Anne-Linde Joki, The Dynamics Between Integration Policies and Outcomes: a Synthesis of the Literature (March 2015).

6.5 The impact of (un)met needs and vulnerabilities on integration

While integration is often conceived as a process that starts once asylum seekers are granted leave to remain, the literature and interviews conducted as part of this study suggest that previous experiences can have a long-lasting impact in the integration of refugees. While there is a dearth of research on the long-term impact of the dangers faced during the migratory journey (see Box 8 below), the evidence shows that experiences during the asylum system can lay (or not) the groundwork for integration.

Box 8: The impact of migratory journeys on integration

As explained in chapter 4, there is strong evidence of the dangers that asylum seekers who use irregular routes face during their journey to the UK. These include physical violence, deprivation, lack of shelter, sexual violence, and dangerous travel conditions. While the experience of each individual hinges on multiple factors – including the type of route, the use of smugglers, or the number of borders crossed, among others – existing studies show that experiences of violence and harm are widespread. The studies that focus on irregular migratory journeys also show that the dangers of the journey do not end when reaching the UK border: the journey can have a highly detrimental impact on asylum seekers’ mental health, and situations encountered during the journey, such as engagement with smugglers, can make asylum seekers susceptible to exploitation in the UK.

However, there is a lack of longitudinal research assessing the impact of the harm faced during the journey on long-term integration. But there are indications that these experiences can have long-term repercussions. A 9-year longitudinal study in Denmark with 131 refugees aged 11 to 23 years old from the Middle East found that the number of types of traumatic experiences before arrival predicted the incidence of psychological problems 9 years after arrival, even when correcting for other variables such as sex, age, specific traumatic event, parents’ education and health, and social situation. Some research studies have also shown that newly arrived asylum-seeking children are at higher risk of psychological distress due to the migration stress and the exposure to dangers during the journey. Several interviewees from civil society and academia corroborated this point and argued that being subjected to harm, either during the migratory journey or the asylum system, is likely to leave an imprint on long-term integration. A Home Office policy stakeholder also noted that due to the period of high adrenaline upon arrival, it is possible that asylum seekers experience mental health symptoms once that initial stress has subsided, thus potentially affecting their integration in the longer term. This detrimental impact might be exacerbated due to the lack of specific training within public health services to identify and treat the health issues arising from migratory journeys.

Therefore, the evidence suggests that dangers faced during the migratory journey are likely to erode long-term mental health, which can in turn have ripple effects in the capacity of refugees to make progress on other integration domains in the longer term, such as education or employment. However, more longitudinal studies are needed to robustly assess this link.

Sources: Mixed Migration Centre 4Mi database; Edith Montgomery, “Trauma and Resilience in Young Refugees: A 9-Year Follow-Up Study,” Development and Psychopathology 22, no. 2 (2010): 477–89; Bouhenia et al., “Quantitative Survey on Health and Violence Endured by Refugees During Their Journey and in Calais, France,” International Health 9, no. 6 (2018): 335–34; Christina Kien et al., “Prevalence of Mental Disorders in Young Refugees and Asylum Seekers in European Countries: A Systematic Review,” European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 28 (2019):1295–1310; Interview with HOP4; Interview with OS23; Interview with OS15.

A protracted asylum process does not only affect asylum seekers while they are waiting for their decision – it can also have knock-on effects on long-term integration once leave to remain is granted. For instance, a small-scale study drawing on interviews with highly skilled refugees identified the length of the asylum process as a barrier to professional reintegration^{[footnote 505]}. While most studies in the UK examining the impact of waiting times are small-scale, a quantitative study drawing on longitudinal data from a household survey in Germany found that the length of the asylum process delayed labour market integration for male refugees after a decision was granted^{[footnote 506]}. And in Switzerland, another longitudinal study drawing from data provided by the Swiss Federal Statistical Office found that waiting one additional year for a decision lowers the probability of being employed by 4.9 percentage points^{[footnote 507]}. In the words of a stakeholder working with victims of torture, the difference between a protracted and short asylum process “is the difference between that individual being an economic contributor and an economic drain”^{[footnote 508]}. Moreover, uncertainty over the length of the asylum process can also deter civil society organisations offering employment advice to asylum seekers so that they are better prepared once status is granted. According to a representative from one of these organisatios:^{[footnote 509]}

We don’t support asylum seekers because if we supported them I don’t know whether they’re going to be waiting for one month or 20 years (…) If we had a bit more clarity about that we would open our services up to asylum seekers and provide that intervention earlier, [so that] people were better set up for success once they did get their status.

The length of the asylum process can also impact refugees’ long-term physical and mental health. In a 2021 large-scale quantitative study building on data from the Survey of New Refugees^{[footnote 510]} in the UK found that the percentage of refugees reporting poor or very poor emotional health generally increases with longer asylum waiting times. The study found that, at the time of the decision, those who had been waiting longer had worse emotional health – an effect that persisted 21 months later after the decision. The impact was especially pronounced for women that had waited long times, and who reported the highest scores of poor emotional and physical health. These effects remained consistent even when controlling for other variables that could be associated with health, such as years of education, age, region of country of origin, and English fluency^{[footnote 511]}. Similarly, a 22-year longitudinal study in Denmark found that refugees that had been waiting longer than one year faced an increased risk of mental health disorders^{[footnote 512]}. Moreover, leaving the asylum system emotionally depleted can have a domino effect on other integration domains, such as education and employment. As one interviewee put it: “If someone’s been in the system for a long time and struggling, it’s pretty difficult to then move them on in a way where they can really be empowered and just go out and find work and find accommodation”^{[footnote 513]}.

For instance, a study found that delays in the asylum procedure can potentially affect the ability of asylum-seeking children to invest in their education^{[footnote 514]}. And, based on a longitudinal study in Germany, long waiting times can also reduce the likelihood that people invest in language acquisition^{[footnote 515]}.

Most interviewees that reflected on integration believed that the detrimental impact of long waiting times is magnified by the general prohibition to work during the asylum process^{[footnote 516]}. As one Home Office official put it, “the longer you’re out of work, the harder it is to find a job” due to skill atrophy, drops in self-confidence, and the CV gap that can make refugees unattractive to employers^{[footnote 517]}. A recent study argues that the link between devaluation and occupation can become a vicious cycle: the less valued an individual is, the fewer opportunities are presented to them to demonstrate their value to others^{[footnote 518]}. The detrimental impact of work prohibitions on labour market integration is supported by evidence from a natural experiment in Germany, which exploits a court ruling in 2000 that shortened the country’s employment ban. The study found that it took a decade for those barred from working for just 7 additional months to catch up with the cohort allowed to work earlier^{[footnote 519]}. While the UK government has recently reviewed the work policy for asylum seekers, the review concluded that employment restrictions would be maintained given the risk that permission to work could become a ‘pull factor’ and undercut the domestic work force^{[footnote 520]}. However, taking into account that the majority of asylum seekers in the UK are currently granted leave to remain^{[footnote 521]}, the benefits of allowing asylum seekers to work in relation to long-term employment and integration are likely to outweigh any risks – even more so in the current context of widespread labour shortages. Lifting restrictions would get the UK closer to other European countries, which normally allow asylum seekers to work after a specific waiting time (see Box 9 below), and it would also reap important economic benefits: the aforementioned study in Germany, for instance, calculated the employment ban costed Germany around €40 million per year on average, in terms of welfare expenditure and foregone tax revenues^{[footnote 522]}. Similarly, the Lift the Ban report estimated that lifting restrictions could result in an economic benefit of £42.4 million as a result of additional savings and tax revenues – even if the UK government considered this estimate optimistic^{[footnote 523]}.

Box 9: Legislation on asylum seeker employment in other European countries

In the European Union, the 2013 Reception Conditions Directive establishes within 9 months the maximum period that asylum seekers in the EU can wait before obtaining the right to work. While some countries in the EU have adopted this 9-month waiting period, the majority of EU countries allow asylum seekers to work earlier. In Spain, Poland, and the Netherlands, asylum seekers are allowed to work after waiting for 6 months, and in January 2022 the Slovak government shortened the waiting period to access the labour market from 9 to 6 months. Other countries have shorter waiting periods, with Belgium allowing asylum seekers to work after 4 months, Switzerland, Romania, Germany, Bulgaria, and Austria after 3 months, Italy after 2 months, and Portugal after one month. Sweden goes a step further and allows asylum seekers to work from day one.

While some countries impose some employment restrictions after the waiting period – such as the Netherlands, which allows asylum seekers to only work a maximum of 24 weeks in a year – others, such as Denmark or Spain, do not impose any restrictions. However, asylum seekers still face practical obstacles to access employment, including language barriers, discrimination, and issues with qualification recognition.

Sources: Lift the Ban Coalition, Lift the Ban: Why People Seeking Asylum Should Have the Right to Work (Lift the Ban, 2018); Anita Orav, Labour Market Integration of Asylum-Seekers and Refugees (European Parliamentary Research Service, 2022); Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), International Migration Outlook 2022 (October 2022); Dutch Council for Refugees, Netherlands: County Report (Asylum Information Database, European Council of Refugees and Exile, 2022); ACCEM, Spain: Country Report (Asylum Information Database, European Council of Refugees and Exile, 2022).

Apart from lifting work restrictions, some interviewees flagged the untapped opportunities to make greater use of the waiting period so that newly recognised refugees can hit the ground running. This could take the form of language courses, skill mapping, or supporting asylum seekers to get into relevant volunteering opportunities. In the words of a Home Office interviewee working in policy, this would mean:^{[footnote 524]}

Enabling them to fill their time, but to fill it constructively. Ensuring that they don’t have that kind of skills atrophy, [that] they don’t lose their understanding of how work works.

Another element of the asylum system that appears to impact long-term integration is housing. Several studies suggest that multiple moves during the asylum process can hinder the ability of asylum seekers to develop support networks and their knowledge of local areas, negatively impacting their mental and physical health. One stakeholder, for instance, argued that moves to dispersal accommodation exacerbate isolation^{[footnote 525]}. And one study drawing on 36 interviews with asylum seekers in Northern Ireland identified dispersal as one of the barriers that hindered the ability of participants to undertake physical activity, due to little knowledge of the area and local facilities^{[footnote 526]}. While the study does not explore long-term effects, this impact can arguably have ripple effects on longer-term health. In addition, a 2015 report that uses data from the New Survey of Refugees found that refugees dispersed as asylum seekers were less likely to be in employment 8 months after their status was granted, compared to those choosing to live with family or friends, and were more likely to move onwards to access employment opportunities^{[footnote 527]}. While this correlation does not imply that there is a direct impact of dispersal on long-term employment, it hints at a potential negative effect that should be further explored.

Apart from multiple moves during the asylum system, the literature and interviews suggested that the type of accommodation can also shape integration experiences. Some interviews suggested that the increasing use of hotels and barracks to accommodate asylum seekers can prevent asylum seekers from developing connections with local communities^{[footnote 528]}. Moreover, this physical separation can also reinforce narratives that see asylum seekers as ‘the other’, which could potentially impact social cohesion and longer-term integration^{[footnote 529]}. For UASC, the type of accommodation where they are placed can also affect integration. A 2019 UNHCR participatory assessment drawing on 65 interviews with asylum seeking and refugee children found that children placed in foster care placements reported having more positive experiences and had higher levels of English language skills and were better integrated, compared to those placed in semi-independent accommodation, who often reported instead feeling isolated and cut off from society. Children in foster care also referred to the benefits of learning about British society and the local area^{[footnote 530]}. This was echoed by an official from the Department of Education, who argued that the family-type environment of foster care placements helped UASC integrate more quickly and even build stronger links with the local community than accompanied asylum seeking children^{[footnote 531]}.

The evidence therefore suggests that asylum accommodation can have knock-on effects on integration. Yet, the few studies that discuss the impact of housing on integration are often small-scale and do not assess long-term impact. As such, more longitudinal studies are needed to robustly assess this relation.

While evidence is limited, the literature and interviews pointed to other aspects of the asylum system that can have lingering effects on refugees, such as the generally limited ESOL provision during the asylum process. One 2021 longitudinal study comparing the integration outcomes of refugees found that those with better English language skills were more satisfied with their education and employment and had more positive experiences with British people^{[footnote 532]}. Therefore, limited ESOL provision during the asylum journey is likely to delay integration. In addition, negative experiences during the substantive interview – for instance, due to intense questioning that can lead to re-traumatisation– was also found in one small- scale study to affect the integration of LGBTQI+ refugees once they received their status^{[footnote 533]}. One practitioner also flagged that for vulnerable individuals, the negative impact of intense questioning during the substantive interview was exacerbated by the limited psychological support during the asylum system, which could in turn affect integration: “They [the Home Office] can make it very difficult for people to reintegrate in societies again, particularly if they don’t have any psychological support, even post that [after the interview]”^{[footnote 534]}.

Some interviewees also suggested that experiences in detention can be highly detrimental to long-term integration. A representative from a civil society organisation in contact with people with experience in detention noted that many former detainees declare that detention is re-traumatising and has a longer-term impact than the initial harmful persecution they had suffered in their home country^{[footnote 535]}. Another stakeholder from this organisation shared, “people were expecting to be treated humanely and it’s such a shock to the system. Many have an idea that [the] UK is meant to stand for fairness and justice. That’s a damaging shock”^{[footnote 536]}. This organisation also noted that detention experiences can affect their trust in the system and the community and thus their ability to integrate. In this sense, this organisation argued that the experience of signing with the Home Office on a weekly basis can make individuals feel that they might be detained again, which could “re-traumatise people on an ongoing basis”^{[footnote 537]}.

There are no over-time quantitative studies following the integration of unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASC), but the evidence suggests that their experiences in the asylum system can also shape their integration experience. A 2019 participatory assessment conducted by UNHCR in the UK, based on 44 interviews and focus group discussions with children and young people, 57 key expert interviews with stakeholders, and 7 site visits to children’s places of residence found that age disputes can have a detrimental impact on integration. Age disputed children can be placed in inappropriate accommodation, are likely to be denied access to education, and are at increased risks of going missing or being trafficked, which can in turn hinder integration. Delays under the National Transfer Mechanism can also affect the early integration of UASC: according to a 2017 inspection, most transfers take months^{[footnote 538]}. This means that by the time children are transferred, they might have formed attachments with caregivers or been registered with local services^{[footnote 539]}. Delays in transfer to dispersal areas can also increase difficulties in accessing education or specialist healthcare. Moreover, the frequent delays in accessing education – with no region in the UK meeting the 20-day target to find a placement for UASC in 2018^{[footnote 540]} – was also found to affect the integration process and threaten the mental wellbeing of unaccompanied children^{[footnote 541]}. In addition, most children that participated in the UNHCR assessment were enrolled in part-time ESOL lessons instead of full-time, mainstream education – a factor that can also potentially affect longer-term integration, given that the few children attending mainstream education had better English skills and were better integrated. The UNHCR assessment also found gaps in specialised mental health support for UASC children, which can have knock-on effects on integration.

Lastly, several interviewees from academia, civil society, and the Home Office highlighted the overall impact of more hostile policies and rhetoric in the integration process of refugees. For instance, a stakeholder signalled that the asylum agreement with Rwanda – a 5-year partnership signed in April 2022 that allows the UK to send asylum seekers to Rwanda^{[footnote 542]} – has made more asylum seekers fearful of engaging with the Home Office for fear of being deported, which left them at greater risk of exploitation^{[footnote 543]}. This distrust towards public institutions, in turn, can erode the broader Home Office objective to increase public trust. Several interviews from civil society organisations and the Home Office similarly stressed the impact of the public representation of refugees and migrants on integration. In the words of one stakeholder: “I think the sort of hostile environment that the government has created for many years now, and that the Home Office sets, has a huge impact on how safe people feel and how welcomed they feel and how much they feel able to settle, contribute, and integrate”^{[footnote 544]}.

6.6 Conclusion

Successful refugee integration is a social good that brings benefits not only to refugees, but also to the society as a whole, through increased economic benefits and stronger social cohesion. Recognising the importance of supporting the integration of newcomers, the government and the devolved administrations have released or updated integration strategies in the past years to renew their commitment to integration. Yet, measures to foster the integration of refugees will fall short if they neglect to acknowledge that, in practice, integration starts on arrival, and if there is not a formal commitment to address the elements of the asylum system, that can delay long-term integration. Aligning the approach taken in England with the refugee strategies of Wales, Northern Ireland, and Scotland, which target both asylum seekers and refugees, could mitigate some of the current negative impact of the asylum system on integration. As the Draft Refugee Integration Strategy of Northern Ireland states, “The asylum process and the restrictions it imposes affect every aspect of life and can have serious and long-term repercussions on physical and mental health and on the individual’s journey towards integration”^{[footnote 545]}. This is particularly the case for those with specific vulnerabilities, including those that still experience the impact of the dangers faced during their migratory journey.

To set refugees off to a good start once status is granted, the government and the devolved administrations could, for instance, improve access to healthcare and mental healthcare during the asylum process, or increase the formal provision of ESOL courses. Stepping up the foster care capacity for UASC and ensuring that children are enrolled in mainstream education is also likely to boost long-term integration. And, most importantly, the UK government could address the elements of the asylum system that are reserved matters and that have been found to be the most detrimental to integration: protracted waiting times and the general restriction to work. Given the strength of the evidence on the negative impact of long waiting times, reducing backlogs in asylum processing would likely bring significant benefits for integration, especially for people with specific vulnerabilities. Moreover, easing work restrictions for asylum seekers would also reap important benefits, both for refugees and for the economy. This decision will not come without trade-offs: as signalled by the government, lifting this restriction could potentially become a pull factor. Yet, no evidence has been established on the link between opening up access to the labour market and asylum applications^{[footnote 546]}. And surveys suggest that it is not well known among those seeking to travel to the UK to claim asylum that people seeking asylum are generally not allowed to work^{[footnote 547]}. On the other hand, the long-term costs of employment restrictions in terms of employment and health – and likely also on other domains of integration, such as language, social links, and education – are well documented. Given that a substantial proportion of asylum seekers in the UK currently obtain status, the long-term benefits of allowing asylum seekers to work are likely to outweigh any costs and bring substantial benefits for both refugees and the UK society. Alternatively, kick-starting employment support during the asylum process could alleviate some of the negative effects of employment restrictions on longer-term integration.

7. Conclusion: Framing responses to vulnerability needs, and support

7.1 Introduction

This report has explored asylum seeker and refugee vulnerabilities, needs, and support across the migratory and UK asylum journeys. The purpose of the research was 2-fold: to improve the UK Home Office’s understanding of vulnerabilities during migratory journeys and within the UK asylum system; and to create a better understanding of the needs and support that asylum seekers receive while seeking asylum. Its aim was to enable the Home Office to improve provision and targeting of support, and to have a better understanding of, and response to, the needs and vulnerabilities that asylum seekers and refugees face.

Since 2015, the Home Office has introduced measures with the intention of improving the safeguarding of vulnerable asylum seekers, including the establishment of safeguarding teams, the creation of the Asylum Safeguarding Hub to centralise referrals, the rollout of training on vulnerability and safeguarding across different units, the formulation of the adults at risk (AAR) policy and, most recently, released its Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy in an attempt strengthen the Home Office’s understanding of vulnerability. This recent Home Office guidance for identifying vulnerabilities can be considered relatively nuanced, in that it specifies that vulnerabilities are not necessarily fixed to certain types of individuals, and recognises that they can be situational, intersectional, and vary over time and place. However, the findings from this research suggest that commitments to prioritise the recognition and safeguarding of vulnerable individuals within the asylum system are hindered by multiple operational and structural challenges, and, subsequently, that changes in both practice and the wider policy environment are needed in order to address these objectives. At an operational level, a number of key factors, including high numbers of arrivals and a national housing shortage, have undeniably altered the operating environment and introduced new constraints that have made maintaining a focus on vulnerability a challenge. In addition, growing backlogs in asylum processing as a result of higher numbers of applications, COVID-19 pandemic-related delays, and systems that have not yet been adapted to cope with additional demands, have lengthened the time in which asylum seekers are left in a period of limbo, along with other, structurally-induced challenges such as employment prohibition, temporary housing, and low income that can delay or complicate opportunities to address such vulnerabilities. On a structural level, the findings demonstrate that improvements in safeguarding will ultimately remain palliative without sufficient attention paid to the role played by structural determinants of vulnerability, including the wider policy environment. That is to say, the Home Office’s ‘compliant environment’ has a significant role and impact in creating and aggravating the vulnerability of asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees, particularly in the context of addressing the challenges associated with irregular entry to the UK as demonstrated by the passing of the Nationality and Borders Act through the New Plan for Immigration. In light of these challenges to identifying and limiting the vulnerability of asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees, the research findings indicate the acute need for a framing for conceiving the vulnerability, or potential vulnerability, of individuals. The research calls for a framing that moves away from a focus on crisis and threat, that is premised on building resilience and preventing (further) harm for asylum seekers, and, simultaneously, that avoids costing the UK government more financially in the longer term as a result of increased physical and mental health needs or wasted human capital. Accordingly, this concluding chapter presents a summary of the key findings of this research report, outlines a number of guiding principles for a recalibrated framing of vulnerability, and finally presents targeted recommendations for the Home Office.

7.2 Overview of findings

Despite the fact that relatively nuanced conceptualisations of vulnerability are apparent in various recent Home Office guidance documents, the findings from this research demonstrate that such nuances are absent at an operational level and in many of the wider political and policy structures that constitute the legal basis for the asylum system itself. In practice, frontline staff often rely on preconceived, visible, internal factors (mostly personal characteristics) as indicators and determinants of an individual’s vulnerability and, subsequently, less visible vulnerabilities can be overlooked as a result. Consequently, there is widespread recognition both within the Home Office and within the sector more broadly that an approach that depends on identifying pre-defined categories of individuals is at once insufficient and detrimental. The tendency and attempt to rely on quantifying vulnerability according to who or what somebody is or looks like means only certain vulnerabilities are being identified, and others are being missed. Furthermore, such an approach, by designating what ‘is’ or ‘is not’ ‘vulnerability’, leads to both an explicit and implicit construction of a hierarchy of vulnerabilities. In other words, despite more refined understandings of vulnerability emerging on paper and, indeed, recognition from Home Office staff that vulnerability itself is extremely nuanced, these are not being reflected operationally.

Consequently, the research findings point to a number of areas where increased operational investment is needed:

1. Situations and experiences of individuals – within the country of origin, along the migratory journey, and/or within the UK asylum system – matter significantly when identifying and considering vulnerability. For instance, migratory journeys, particularly those that are ‘irregular’, expose the vast majority of asylum seekers to an array of physical and non-physical dangers, and the trauma experienced has a significant impact on their vulnerability upon arrival and throughout their UK asylum journeys. Therefore, the focus needs to be less on who is vulnerable and who is not, but rather on the degree of harm experienced by asylum seekers prior to and/or during the asylum process – and on preventing susceptibility to future harm. While the recent Home Office Safeguarding Strategy (HOSS) recognises the role of situations and experiences in creating vulnerability, there remains a lack of clarity over how to instrumentalise this, particularly where situations are not self-evident and asylum seekers are reluctant to disclose information. It thus demands increased awareness-raising of the HOSS amongst all Home Office staff and service providers who interact with asylum seekers.
2. The concept of vulnerability needs to be viewed as something that is deeply embedded in the institutional and social context in which it operates. This means that systems, policies, and structures, including within the UK as the destination country, can create and exacerbate vulnerability. For instance, structural drivers – including lack of legal routes and increased deterrence mechanisms – have led to an increase in irregular movement, which often leads to dangerous situations and, therefore, increased vulnerability. Likewise, the UK asylum and immigration processes can affect how asylum- route refugees are received and welcomed in UK society, their needs, and the support they receive. Furthermore, the wider policy environment and the public messaging that surrounds it have, at times, aggravated vulnerability by creating a sense of alienation and become counterproductive to other policies. Other key examples include the prohibition of work, low levels of support provision, and long processing times. Therefore, it is critical to understand not only the potential negative impact that different structural factors have on the vulnerability of asylum seekers, but, conversely, and most importantly, the subsequent potential capacity for systems and structures themselves to support and address sources of vulnerability.
3. There needs to be a recognition that vulnerability can accumulate over time and space and that it impacts different people differently. For example, a young male asylum seeker who did not initially present as vulnerable to Home Office staff may be subject to various mental health issues resulting from trauma experienced on his journey, which then evolve into a full mental health crisis by a prolonged period of uncertainty and inactivity as he awaits a decision on his asylum claim. It is critical to consider vulnerability as dynamic and account for how it changes over time, and acknowledge that the vulnerability of an asylum seeker or refugee is rarely the result of a static set of circumstances. Key changes, such as streamlining decisions so that waiting times are reduced and allowing asylum seekers to work, would help mitigate negative impacts of the system that affect individuals in a plethora of ways.
4. Vulnerability is intersectional. Personal characteristics, situations, and structures/ contexts intersect and overlap with one another, which means that vulnerability is multi- dimensional and unique to each individual rather than exclusive to particular groups. There is consequently a need for a multi-dimensional approach to identifying vulnerability that allows for linkages to be made between different sources of vulnerability and, subsequently, different mechanisms designed to respond to that vulnerability. This points to the need for a more coherent process by moving away from a siloed approach and towards a more joined up system that focuses on the end-to-end journey for asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees.
5. Vulnerability needs to be, and as some have argued can only be, understood in conjunction with resilience – which, in many respects, is viewed as an antidote to vulnerability. Yet, the capacity for an asylum seeker to be resilient is largely reflective of the system or context in which they are situated. In the findings, resilience was particularly linked to the importance of integration, suggesting the need from both a policy and safeguarding perspective to ensure that the building blocks of integration are established early in the asylum process – at the beginning of an asylum seeker’s asylum journey in the UK. Therefore, it is important to consider ways in which the label of ‘vulnerability’ itself may mask and undermine asylum seeker and refugee autonomy, agency, and resilience, and to recognise that there is an intrinsic need for approaches to protection that empower asylum seekers in any vulnerability assessment and provide avenues for individuals to excel, not just access support.

Given the limitations of an approach by Home Office staff who, despite existing guidance, oftentimes rely on more visible indicators, the findings suggest that presenting a framework for identifying or defining vulnerability runs the risk of generating yet another measurement tool premised on factors that are simplified for the purpose of operationalisation. Instead, the research lays the foundation for a framing of vulnerability, outlined below, to serve as a reference point for how and why vulnerabilities may materialise and manifest, the factors that may exacerbate them, and the actions that can be taken to reduce or prevent them. Guidelines should form one component to this, but should not be viewed in isolation to wider policy and structural aspects that also determine outcomes. This requires a redesign of how the asylum system functions, including the policies that sit behind the asylum system processes and structures, that accounts for vulnerabilities and resilience in its day-to-day operations and not just in response to identified needs.

7.3 Framing vulnerability: Principles for effective engagement

The research findings point to the conclusion that the most effective methods for mitigating the vulnerabilities of asylum seekers and refugees are structural. As such, this report proposes 7 core principles based on the evidence which, if applied and internalised, have the potential to reduce vulnerability, including through understanding and addressing the multiple factors that create and exacerbate it:

1. Create systems that will work for all asylum seekers, without necessitating a distinction between the ‘vulnerable’ and the ‘not-vulnerable’. This approach avoids seeing vulnerability as a tool for separating the ‘deserving’ from the ‘undeserving’, but instead applies it as a lens for identifying an individual’s specific needs premised on their situation and experiences, their susceptibility to harm, and their capability to deal with adversity. In practice, this implies thinking about individualised case management across the board, rather than just for specific individual cases.
2. Focus on re-adjusting structural factors that cause or create vulnerability (including the UK asylum system), not just the individual, and make changes to tackle structural drivers of vulnerability. This means ensuring a clear understanding of the impact of different policies that sit behind the UK asylum system both in terms of their potential to create or increase vulnerability and their potential to enhance resilience. For instance, current waiting times are serving neither individuals (since they contribute to exacerbating vulnerabilities and prolong integration) nor the legitimacy of the system (since by the time people are granted status, they may find it harder to return to their country of origin), and policies to shorten asylum processing times therefore need to be urgently considered.
3. Recognise where the system can do more to foster resilience rather than create vulnerability. This puts the emphasis on creating a policy and operating environment that is supportive, and that provides a platform for asylum seekers to be agents of change in the society in which they are living, albeit sometimes temporarily. For example, through easing employment restrictions or alternatively providing voluntary work placement during the asylum period, especially if this is well designed to enable asylum seekers to complement their employment history with UK-based work experience.
4. Consider integration from the start of the asylum process as mutually beneficial for asylum seekers and the state, not only at the end. Regardless of the outcome, the asylum system should reduce rather than exacerbate vulnerability. If someone is granted permission to stay in the UK, this will enable them to integrate more easily; and if they are to return to their country of origin, it ensures a more rights-respecting process. In both cases, it builds resilience and acts as an antidote to vulnerability.
5. Adapt the asylum system to empower (rather than disempower) asylum seekers, to build resilience and agency (and, by implication, not to undermine it) – but without using ‘resilience’ as a reason for overlooking vulnerability. This requires a reframing of the way asylum is understood, whereby there is a deliberate focus on strengthening protective factors and resilience at the earliest opportunity.
6. Recognise the importance of situations and experiences in understanding levels of vulnerability. For instance, encourage and enable asylum seekers to describe themselves and their situation in a way that makes sense of their experience rather than expecting their experience to fit within a pre-ordained framework. (Ask: “What has happened to you?” instead of, “What is wrong with you?”). In practice, a more nuanced understanding of the complexities of vulnerability will require more than guidance. It will also demand increased awareness-raising amongst all Home Office staff and service providers who interact with asylum seekers.
7. Recognise that internal categories have a role to play, are necessary, but are not sufficient for identifying vulnerability. Guidance around ‘categories’ of individuals that are seen to be particularly vulnerable to certain types of harm are valid, but they need to be viewed as part of a wider response to identifying and responding to vulnerabilities. External factors must be considered – including the situation or context an individual is in at the time of consideration – as well as the fact that vulnerability is non-static, changes over time, and can accumulate. Ultimately, and given the evidence of high levels of harm on journeys, there is also a case to be made for assuming that any asylum seeker who arrives in the UK through irregular routes should be assumed to be vulnerable and offered support accordingly. In practice, this could include moving away from additional support for people designated as vulnerable and instead offering set support (including financial, accommodation, and healthcare and mental health support) at a level that meets the requirements of asylum seekers with complex needs, taking into account that many needs will be invisible.

8. Policy recommendations and areas for further research

8.1 Policy recommendations

8.1.1 Migratory journeys

1) Invest more effort and resources in identifying and addressing the factors that push people to use irregular routes, including the impact of wider immigration policy on pathways to asylum-seeking in the UK (and specifically the vulnerabilities of asylum seekers en route). The prospect of expanding legal pathways for certain profiles of asylum seekers who face particular vulnerabilities en route could be explored in greater detail, but lies beyond the scope of this report. Address the symptoms of irregular movement (including harms suffered as a result of moving through dangerous territories and the impact of MSHT) through ensuring that asylum seekers, at the point of entry, are given sufficient social–psychological support.

2) Ensure adequate investment in initial reception structures, including appropriate translation and interpretation and trauma-informed support, and throughout their asylum journey. Irregular routes leave many asylum seekers physically and mentally harmed, and there is potential to exacerbate vulnerability through re-traumatisation.

8.1.2 The UK asylum system

3) Introduce trauma-informed techniques and approaches throughout the asylum process at each stage where staff are interfacing with asylum seekers, particularly screening and substantive interviews. This could include the rolling out of the training on trauma-informed interview techniques that the Home Office is currently developing for all staff in contact with asylum seekers. In addition to sensitive questioning techniques, consider changes to the setting, timing, and length of interviews that could help to facilitate disclosure. This could include ensuring childcare is provided during the screening interview, providing asylum seekers with a caseworker or other support to build trust and inform them on the asylum interview and how to prepare, and allowing screening and substantive interviews to occur over multiple sessions, as is typically the case with interviews with UASC.

4) Reintroduce a service standard for processing asylum claims that aims to return processing timelines to a reasonable duration. Consider measures that could relieve pressure on asylum decision making, including relying on data collected via the screening interview, pre-interview questionnaire, or submitted evidence when these sources have already revealed clear grounds for granting asylum, and ensure decision makers have sufficient time to prepare and review collected data before the interview. Avoiding a second interview, when sufficient data has already been gathered, would also reduce stress and the risk of re-traumatisation for asylum seekers.

5) Identify ways to better support frontline staff with fulfilling their screening and safeguarding responsibilities. Ensure adequate staff in border areas at times of high numbers of arrivals and communicate to staff the importance of screening. Provide staff—both at the border and in other customer-facing roles—with sufficient training on identifying vulnerabilities, particularly those that are not visible, including experiences of trauma and mental health needs. Offer refresher trainings or guidance to staff positions that operate on a deployment basis or experience frequent rotation or turnover.

6) Improve communication and coordination between units within the asylum process on particular cases. Work to reduce the need for asylum seekers to communicate the same information multiple times to different contact points. Ensure that flags for vulnerabilities and specific needs are sufficiently visible to caseworkers in case files, including in the new Atlas system, and complete the transition from the former Case Information Database (CID) system to Atlas to avoid information being duplicated or missed.

7) Develop a joined up UK government approach for relevant departments operationally supporting and working with asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees in the asylum process and throughout integration efforts. For example, create a working group to enable better data sharing and learning between departments including the Home Office, Department for Work and Pensions, Department for Health and Social Care, Ministry of Justice, Department for Levelling Up and Housing Communities, HM Treasury, and the Department for Education. This could include sharing information about emerging needs for asylum seekers, access to finance and education, and continuity of care when status is granted.

8) Build networks and provide support to local service workers, including the health and education sectors, in areas receiving asylum seekers for the first time to ensure they are prepared to serve a population with more diverse and complex needs. Leverage existing platforms with relevant stakeholders to improve services for asylum seekers, such as the forum bringing together the NHS and the Home Office or the Strategic Migration Partnerships. Provide briefings or training on the services to which asylum seekers are entitled (such as health benefits or access to education), information about navigating cultural difference, and resources for service providers, such as interpretation.

9) Work to ensure that asylum accommodation is suitable for those with specific vulnerabilities and special needs, including ‘invisible’ ones, such as mental health needs that can disturb sleep and make shared rooms less suitable. Increase the number of foster care arrangements for unaccompanied asylum seeking children.

10) Consider increasing the support benefits paid to asylum seekers. Increasing support in line with those paid to people in the NRM would help reduce incentives to misuse this route. This would also be an acknowledgement that many non-NRM asylum seekers are in fact vulnerable (many of them in invisible ways). The current support system favours families, pregnant women, and suspected victims of human trafficking, and could overlook needs for young single men, in particular. Alternatively the UK government could increase support in line with recent inflation and provide other financial benefits to cover important needs such as transportation or communications costs that would enable asylum seekers to access critical support services and information about their asylum claims.

11) Improve the provision and quality of free legal aid to asylum seekers to improve their ability to navigate the system and reduce uncertainty. Consider increasing compensation for immigration solicitors to improve supply or expand the pool of available and high quality solicitors through the Legal Aid Agency.

12) Strengthen the alignment of the National Referral Mechanism (NRM) and Asylum System ( process to improve information sharing and to ensure that asylum seekers who are pending a decision from NRM are not delayed in their AS claim/decision nor is access to support hindered. Alignment of the NRM and AS systems must maintain independence on decision making.

13) Ensure that digital tools are introduced to facilitate interactions with asylum seekers — whether for appointment booking, case status updates, or virtual interviews — options continue to exist and be accessible for individuals who are not confident using or well-served by technology, such as the possibility for in-person interviews or appointment booking. Further, digital tools should be designed and tested with asylum seekers to ensure the tools do not create or amplify vulnerability.

14) Ensure that correspondence, resources, or support services that are shared with asylum seekers are easily accessible and available in an array of languages.

15) Consider a redesign of the asylum system to move away from a siloed approach to case management throughout the asylum journey and move towards a system that focuses on the end-to-end journey for asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees. Consider appointing a mid-level accountability manager to oversee the end-to-end journey for asylum seekers whilst ensuring skilled individuals cover individual elements of the asylum process.

8.1.3 Integration

16) Adopt an ‘early intervention’ approach to asylum and integration, considering integration as a day 1 issue, which would bring England more in line with Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. Many policy fields have revolutionised their approach in recognising the value of upstream, preventative investments, and it is clear that similar benefits would be realised in the area of integration of asylum-route refugees.

17) Consider allowing asylum seekers to work while their claims are being processed which could deliver considerable benefits for long-term employment and integration. This would bring the UK closer to other European countries, which generally allow asylum seekers to work after they have waited for their decision for a specific period of time. At the very least, enabling them to plug gaps in their skills and experience, including through voluntary work or internship/work experience programmes (which is permitted but has not been sufficiently promoted), would help make use of the asylum period.

18) Reduce processing times and backlogs in line with recommendation number 4. This would perhaps be the single most useful step for integration, but would also bring benefits related to efficiency and costs, and system legitimacy.

19) Increase formal ESOL provision during the asylum process. This could include increasing funding or building on existing local pilot projects that are tailored to the needs of specific learners such as those with childcare responsibilities.

20) Consider extending the move-on period to reduce the risk of homelessness, exploitation, and destitution, and improve data collection when accessing mainstream benefits, housing, and employment to monitor the experiences of newly recognised refugees.

21) Consider wraparound casework support, on the model of the Refugee Integration and Employment Service. This could include assigning a caseworker to newly recognised refugees for 12 months so that they can provide tailored support and ensure they can access and navigate key services.

22) Improve continuity of care for vulnerable asylum-route refugees once they are granted leave to remain through better data exchange with local authorities. This could involve, for instance, ensuring that information of specific vulnerabilities and support provided, such as victims of human trafficking or domestic abuse, is transferred to local authorities.

23) Consider making asylum-route refugees a priority group for social housing, especially given their likely difficulties accessing the private rental market and the fact that they are likely to have vulnerabilities, some of them invisible, associated with the route they took to enter the UK and the experience of the asylum system. At the same time, given supply issues with social housing, efforts should also be made to improve asylum route refugees’ access to private housing, by addressing discrimination, helping refugees navigate the rental market, or ensuring refugees can benefit from rent deposit schemes.

24) Scale up lessons from pilot projects, such as the ongoing Refugee Transition Outcomes Fund. Social impact investment approaches could provide a blueprint for improving support for asylum-route refugees against the context of limited funding, by allowing private investors to fund initiatives and be reimbursed based on results.

8.2 Areas for further research

Gaps remain in the evidence base around vulnerabilities, needs of, and support for asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees in the UK asylum system that follow from the research findings, and would benefit from further investigation. Central to filling these gaps is the need to conduct research with asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees, or those with lived experiences in the UK asylum system, more broadly. Further, research that centres the voices and experiences of asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees should also seek to ensure this research is actioned and derives benefit to those affected. In this vein, recommendations for future research based on the gaps identified through this research are outlined below:

1) Research conducted in partnership with asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees into the vulnerabilities, needs, and support required during and after the UK asylum process. Working in partnership with asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees could include the establishment of a lived experience panel or conducting primary research ethically using co-creation and participatory methods. By adopting these approaches, research will benefit from richer insights into the vulnerabilities and needs of asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees, potentially leading to more effective interventions. Findings from this research show that whilst there are other research studies that conduct interviews with asylum seekers and refugees, these are often small-scale. Further research should seek to engage a larger sample size to gain a better representation of experiences.

2) Longitudinal research to assess the impact of the migratory journey and the asylum system on long-term integration. There is a dearth of evidence related to how experiences during the migratory journey affect long-term integration. While some studies assess the impact of some elements of the asylum system on long-term integration, such as waiting times or employment restrictions, these are often based on a limited number of interviews and do not measure impact over time. To better understand the impact of migratory and asylum journeys on long-term integration, longitudinal, quantitative research that assesses the experiences of a representative sample of asylum seekers and refugees would be beneficial. For example, drawing inspiration from the study in Germany that assessed the long-term impact of employment restrictions^{[footnote 548]}, longitudinal studies could assess the impact of early access to employment opportunities on long-term employment outcomes, by comparing the long-term employment outcomes of asylum seekers that obtain permission to work or access volunteering opportunities with those that do not. Similarly, longitudinal research could be conducted to compare long-term integration outcomes based on access to ESOL courses, education, or mental health support during the asylum journey, among other factors. Longitudinal research could also assess the impact of dispersal policies on long-term integration.

3) Research on the integration experiences of asylum-route refugees with particular vulnerabilities. There is limited evidence on the integration experiences of newly recognised refugees, particularly those with specific vulnerabilities, such as victims of human trafficking or those with health issues. Further research on these experiences, particularly using longitudinal research, could provide further insights into how vulnerability shapes long-term integration, and where support is currently missing.

4) Primary research with asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees on their perceptions of and experiences with digital tools, including remote interviewing. Given the increasing adoption of digital tools including remote interviews by the Home Office, further research with asylum seekers is recommended to understand specific opportunities, challenges, and barriers to the digitisation of the asylum system. Research with asylum seekers about their experiences will lead to richer insights to improve digitisation: for example, mapping asylum seekers’ ‘user journey’ to understand key touchpoints where issues such as accessibility, digital literacy, and language support could help improve the use of digital tools or pose incentives to explore alternatives to help asylum seekers navigate the asylum system. It would be important to understand the varied experiences of asylum seekers of remote interviewing and how beneficial or hindering the use of remote interviews can be in order to optimise the use of the system.

5) Further research on the use of digital non-invasive tools to conduct age assessments. Given that the Nationality and Borders Act will include the establishment of new age assessment methods, building the knowledge base on how to conduct age assessments more accurately and ethically would be beneficial. This could include, for instance, exploring best practices in other countries. Additionally, primary research with and alongside asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees on their experiences, rights, and (perceived) risks associated with the use of digital tools including X-rays would be of benefit as this is rolled out as part of the Nationality and Borders Act. Specific attention to ensuring the rights of children and young adults are protected throughout the age assessment reform should be prioritised.

6) Investigate the impact of separating the NRM and asylum system process on vulnerabilities and long-term integration for asylum seekers. Victims and survivors of MSHT have to navigate both the NRM and asylum processes. Findings have shown that, while the NRM and asylum systems are parallel processes, in practice asylum decisions are put on hold until a decision is made under the NRM process, in turn causing delays to asylum claim decisions. Therefore, primary research is recommended to explore the impact this has on the vulnerability of asylum seekers. Additionally, an internal review of how the 2 processes can be better aligned whilst maintaining independence in decision making would be beneficial.

7) As the Nationality and Borders Act continues to be rolled out, it would be prudent to closely monitor and map the impact of policies and changes to the asylum system on the wellbeing and vulnerabilities of asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees. Findings from this research highlight that some asylum seekers share concerns about the changes in policy and are unsure about how they will be impacted. Therefore, primary research with asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees on the impact to their wellbeing of changes to the asylum system, including offshoring processes, should be conducted.

Annex 1: Research questions and methods

Table 3: Research matrix

Cluster themes	Objectives	Code	Research questions	Primary method of data collection	Supporting methods of data collection
Vulnerability	1	Conceptualising vulnerability
		1.1	What frameworks are used in the UK and elsewhere to understand asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee needs and vulnerabilities?	Evidence review - deep dive
		1.2	What examples of good practice exist concerning the conceptualisation and treatment of asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees with vulnerabilities in the UK or elsewhere?	Evidence review - deep dive
		1.3	How is the concept of vulnerability taken into account in the UK asylum process, in processing claims for asylum and providing support to asylum seekers and to asylum route refugees?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
	2	Vulnerability along migratory journeys
		2.1	How do features of migratory journeys, such as physical dangers, influence the vulnerability of arriving asylum seekers?	Evidence review – deep dive	Stakeholder interviews; 4Mi database
		2.2	How does each identified vulnerability factor into experiences along migratory routes and throughout the UK asylum journey? For example, how do gender, age, disability, economic status, health, sexual orientation, cultural background, experiencing modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT), affect experience?	Evidence review - deep dive	Stakeholder interviews; 4Mi database
		2.3	What are the physical dangers such as those associated with methods of travel, the people asylum seekers encounter, and the environments they find themselves in along migratory routes – and how do they cause vulnerability?	Evidence review - deep dive
		2.4	How do children become ‘UASC’? How can ‘(un)accompanied’ be defined? What dangers and difficulties do UASCs face on their journeys?	Evidence review - deep dive
		2.5	What are the vulnerabilities associated with being a victim of MSHT?	Evidence review – deep dive; Stakeholder interviews
		2.5	How does vulnerability to MSHT vary by geographical region?	Evidence review – deep dive; Stakeholder interviews	4Mi database
Asylum systems	3	Support
		3.1	What support (that is, multi agency) is available to meet asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee needs?	Evidence review - deep dive	Stakeholder interviews
		3.2	What motivates people to claim, or not claim, support?	Evidence review – deep dive
		3.3	What are the experiences of claiming asylum support (that is, multi-agency) and how could this be improved?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
Integration		3.4	How do experiences of vulnerability and unmet need in the asylum system affect longer-term integration outcomes?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
Asylum systems	4	Asylum system process and individual experiences
		4.1	How have asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees experienced any changes in the asylum processes? Have any changes impacted a particular group – for example, gender, culture, region, disability, age, stage of the asylum process and applicant type, – more than others, for example?	Evidence review - deep dive	Stakeholder interviews
		4.2	What are the experiences and perceptions of the age assessment process?	Evidence review - deep dive
		4.3	What is the variation in experience as a result of different processes?	Evidence review - deep dive
		4.4	What are the barriers to accessing and engaging with the asylum system in the expected way?	Evidence review - deep dive; Stakeholder interview
		4.5	How do experiences in migration affect vulnerability and safeguarding in processing and during the asylum claims process?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
		Specific experiences linked to the Home Office (HO)
		4.6	What processes does the Home Office have for identifying, processing, and safeguarding vulnerability relating to (potential) asylum-seeking and refugee populations? What alternative approaches exist and what are their advantages and disadvantages?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
		4.7	How do individuals experience the process of sharing information with the Home Office? How easy is it to communicate with the Home Office?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
		4.8	What prevents individuals from disclosing vulnerabilities at the first point of contact with the Home Office? What is the impact of this? What are the reasons for later disclosure?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
Integration		Impact of integration
		4.9	How does being subject to harm as a result of internal/personal factors which influence vulnerability, during the migratory journey, impact integration?	Evidence review - deep dive	Stakeholder interviews; 4Mi database
		4.10	How does experiencing the vulnerabilities associated with the migratory journey – poor living conditions, instability, immobility, – impact integration outcomes?	Evidence review - deep dive	Stakeholder interviews; 4Mi database
		4.11	How do experiences in the asylum system affect ongoing experiences of integration?	Evidence review - deep dive	Stakeholder interviews
		4.12	What additional support could be provided to vulnerable people to support integration (for example, impact on health; reduction in skills over time)?	Evidence review - deep dive	Stakeholder interviews; 4Mi database
Asylum Systems	5	Digitisation
		5.1	How have asylum seekers and support organisations experienced moves to digitise the asylum claim process, including remote interviewing via videoconference (RIVC)?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch
		5.2	What is the impact of asylum process digitisation on experiences of communicating with the Home Office?	Stakeholder interviews	Evidence review - light touch

Annex 2: Methodology

This study implemented a mixed-methods approach that included 3 workstreams:

• an evidence review including a systematic review of 313 documents
• an analysis of 810 survey interviews with migrants from MMC’s 4Mi database
• 72 key informant interviews across 3 groups of stakeholders including Home Office policy, frontline workers (non-Home Office and Home Office), and Other Stakeholders (made up of a mix of practitioners and organisations in the asylum seeker and refugee sector)

Annex 2 provides an overview of how each workstream was conducted, the ethical considerations accounted for, and the limitations of the methodology employed.

2.1 Evidence review

The evidence review was designed to uncover the most relevant and high-quality sources of literature from available material, which was both flexible and iterative. The evidence review had 4 components of data collection: 1) initial scoping, 2) systematic review of academic literature, 3) review of grey literature, and 4) review of material shared by stakeholders. Searches were conducted, and evidence was logged according to each research objective and each research cluster theme (see Annex 1).

2.1.1 Initial scoping

During the scoping phase of the research study, an initial search of relevant academic and grey literature was conducted, which identified 210 references. This initial review of literature aimed to inform the development of both the research study and research instruments prior to the systematic evidence review. In particular, an initial search and interrogation of literature surrounding the conceptualisation, measurement, and assessment of vulnerability ensured that research instruments were appropriate and informed by evidence – not preconceptions nor simplified notions of what ’vulnerability’ constituted in the context of migration.

2.1.2 Systematic review of academic literature

Following the initial scoping of evidence and subsequent formulation of research instruments, an extensive search and review of evidence was conducted. This review included academic literature, policy reports by research institutions, reports by multi-lateral and non-governmental organisations, and internal Home Office documents. Systematic keyword searches were conducted, and inclusion and exclusion criteria, which are outlined below, were applied in the academic database(s)^{[footnote 549]} themselves. Once search results were identified, sources were exported to a software programme called Covidence^{[footnote 550]} whereby an initial title screening for relevance was conducted, followed by abstract screening. This latter screening step afforded a more granular review of the topic area and subsequent assessment of relevance.

Each article was then coded by topic tag, research objective, and, where possible, research question. At the abstract screening stage, a rapid scan and quality check of literature took place. Full text reviews and further screening for quality and relevance were then conducted.

2.1.3 Review of grey literature

Keywords were generated and inputted into 22 online non-academic databases to uncover grey literature relevant to the research questions. In total, 75 sources were identified as potentially relevant based on a title screening stage. 25 records were excluded after a secondary title and abstract/executive summary screening. The remaining 50 records were assessed for eligibility following full-text review, and 30 sources were subsequently included in the analysis.

2.1.4 Review of material shared by stakeholders

Throughout the research study, an iterative approach was applied to the evidence review, and documentation provided by the Home Office and several other stakeholders were included in the analysis.

2.1.5 Inclusion and exclusion criteria during the evidence review process

To ensure that results were both relevant to the research aim, objectives, and research questions and were also manageable in terms of volume; 5 key inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied.

Table 4: Inclusion and exclusion criteria

Criterion	Include	Exclude
Geography	Evidence from research conducted in the UK or along key migration routes to the UK. Evidence from research that was global in scope if there was a clear overarching relevance for a UK asylum context (for example, transnational guidance documents prepared by international organisations).	Material with a geographic focus on non-UK migratory routes (for example, North America) unless in the context of vulnerability conceptual frameworks (thus, widely applicable to an asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee context).
Time	Material published from 2014 onwards to account for the large-scale arrival of asylum seekers in Europe at the beginning of that year and subsequent increase in academic attention, except for key UN or other policy documents formulated before 2014 that were essential for the legal and policy context(s).	Material published pre-2014, except for key UN or other policy documents formulated prior to 2014 that have not been updated since. Evidence collected prior to 2014.
Content	Material in which the primary focus is the experience of asylum seekers/refugees. Evidence from primary research conducted with/about asylum seekers and refugees. Material that addresses UK-specific asylum policy. Material that cuts across the thematic areas of vulnerabilities, needs, support, the asylum system, and integration directly relevant to the research questions	Material that does not directly relate to asylum seeker experience (for example, issues of child labour, modern slavery and human trafficking, mental health, re-traumatisation, domestic violence, sexual exploitation, or LGBTQI+ discrimination was only included if it had direct relevance to migration and asylum processes). Material that focuses solely on international asylum policy and has no relevance to the research questions.
Document type	Written material including peer-reviewed articles, books, policy reports, etc.	Non-written evidence (including podcasts)
Language	English	Non-english

Search strings were tested in the 2 academic databases, Web of Science and Scopus, and inclusion and exclusion criteria were applied. In total, 1,680 references were identified and uploaded onto the Covidence platform. After duplicates were removed and sources from the initial search were added, 1,176 references were filtered for screening. Titles and abstracts were subsequently screened based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria, and 442 references were selected for full-text review. 176 references were excluded, and 313 sources were included for the final analysis.

2.1.6 Screening approach

The screening of academic and grey literature was conducted by at least 2 reviewers, ensuring intercoder reliability relating to inclusion, exclusion, quality, and relevance. Any discrepancies between the 2 reviewers were addressed by a third reviewer, and the references finally included were coded against the research questions. Tags to the references were also assigned in order to initially designate the topical and/or thematic focus of the material.

2.1.7 Coding approach

The research questions were mapped against the research objectives of the study. During the evidence review process, the researchers employed research question-objective coding, initially, to organise evidence, against each objective. The reviewers used the following tags to code the evidence:

• accommodation
• age assessment
• agency
• asylum interview
• asylum process
• asylum system
• barriers to support
• categories-oriented approach to vulnerability
• children
• conceptualising vulnerability
• decision-making
• detention
• digitisation
• disabilities
• education
• employment
• external vulnerability factors
• gender
• harm
• health
• healthcare
• human trafficking
• integration
• interpreters
• legal infrastructure LGBTIQ+
• mental health
• migratory journey
• modern slavery
• needs
• NRM
• protected characteristics
• resettlement
• resilience
• safeguarding
• situational vulnerability factors
• smuggling
• structural vulnerability factors
• support, trauma
• UASC
• UK asylum journey
• unmet needs
• vulnerability

2.2 Mixed migration centre: 4MI database

In partnership with MMC, the data analysed and included in the final report is drawn from the 4Mi database. The 4Mi database is MMC’s flagship primary data collection system, which is an innovative approach that helps fill knowledge gaps and inform policy and response regarding the nature of mixed migratory movements and the protection risks for refugees and migrants. As part of the research study a dataset of 22,722 survey interviews conducted in North Africa (Tunisia, Libya, Sudan), West Africa (Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso), East Africa (Somalia, Kenya), Asia (Turkey, Malaysia, India, Indonesia), and Europe (Greece, Italy) between December 2019 and March 2022 were analysed. The data are collected using mixed method approaches and MMC has over 120 enumerators who conduct survey interviews with refugees and migrants across the aforementioned countries. The database comprises all survey participants who reported the United Kingdom as their destination country. As the scope of this research study focuses on the migratory journey as the journey up until arrival in the UK, the dataset was filtered to only include survey responses when the respondent cited the UK as their destination. As such, a total of 810 survey interviews were analysed. The sample composition of the MMC database respondents is not random or representative. The limitations of this sample are discussed later in this section.

2.3 Stakeholder interviews

Semi-structured stakeholder interviews constituted a core component of the evidence gathering for this research. Seventy-two stakeholder interviews were conducted, which included 22 Home Office policy stakeholders, 22 frontline workers (Home Office and non- Home Office workers), and 28 ‘other’ stakeholders such as NGO workers, academics, sector experts, and support providers.

Each interview lasted between 45 and 60 minutes, and was conducted virtually on Zoom or on Microsoft Teams. A standardised set of questions were developed to gain insights across the 27 research questions. The discussion guide protocol was customised according to the interviewee category (Home Office policy, frontline, or ‘other’) in order to pursue particular lines of enquiry and to provide the most valuable insights. In addition, there was a degree of standardisation across all interviews, and all interviewees regardless of stakeholder group were asked a common set of questions on how they understood ‘vulnerability’.

2.3.1 Sampling approach: Points of engagement

It was imperative to gain insights from a wide array of stakeholders from across the UK asylum ecosystem to build a robust understanding of vulnerability, needs, and support applicable to the UK asylum system, and refugee integration services. The sampling strategy was designed to capture various stages and outcomes of the journey experienced by asylum seekers and asylum-route refugees.

While it was recognised that people’s journey within the asylum system was and is not linear, a stage-based approach enabled a mapping of the point(s) of engagement during which any given stakeholder provided support, engagement, or expertise with an individual or group of individuals.

Subsequently, the points of engagement were mapped across the following stages, and an even spread was sought across the 3 main stages:

1) Migratory journey and entry to the UK: Engagement with asylum seekers as a first- or near first-point-of contact upon their arrival in the UK, marking their transition from the migratory journey to the beginning of their UK asylum journey.

2) Application and processing time: The initial preparation and submission of an asylum application, the time spent awaiting outcome, appeals for unsuccessful application, and any time spent in detention since initial entry, up until the point of asylum granting.

3) Refugee integration: The point of being granted asylum and thus refugee status, and the subsequent settling of refugees into communities within the UK.

2.3.2 Sampling approach: Support provision/area(s) of engagement

As part of the sample, 10 areas of engagement relating to asylum seeker and asylum-route refugee needs and support were also identified. These areas, importantly, were not seen as mutually exclusive nor exhaustive. Rather, they served to span a range of areas under which service provision, expertise, or general engagement with individuals occur across the stages of the UK asylum journey, and consequentially a reference point for identifying relevant interviewees.

4) Processual: Specific to the Home Office, comprising stakeholders whose responsibilities are not necessarily in the provision of support per se, but which are more generally in contribution to the operations and mechanisms of the asylum system (for example, border control).

5) Safeguarding: Support provision relating directly to the protection of asylum seekers and refugees, taking measures to protect the health, wellbeing, and human rights of individuals, as well as exploring the gaps to identify needs relating to safeguarding.

6) Housing: Actions related to providing advice, guidance, or service delivery regarding the provision of housing and accommodation for asylum seekers and refugees.

7) Interpreters: Specific support provision to capture the complexity of asylum seeker and refugee engagement with the asylum system through language barriers and how this interacts with, prevents, or exacerbates vulnerability and identifying specific needs relating to this.

8) Application process assistance: Referring to the provision of information or advice to asylum seekers in the formulation and submission of asylum applications.

9) Mental health: Provision of mental health support to asylum seekers and refugees.

10) Health: Provision of general health support to asylum seekers and refugees.

11) Education: Advice relating to, or the direct provision of, education to asylum seekers and refugees – whether in a school environment or elsewhere.

12) Legal: Comprising legal expertise, advice, and service to support asylum seekers and refugees, thus, encompassing both law firms and NGOs.

13) Employment: Advice relating to employment or direct provision of job opportunities for asylum seekers and refugees.

2.3.3 Sampling approach: Population type

Where possible, to capture the vulnerabilities and needs of, and support provided or absent from, key sub-groups of asylum seekers and refugees in the UK, stakeholders with expertise and/or experience working and engaging with the following 7 population types were interviewed:

1) Expertise with gender: Stakeholders who have experience or expertise operating with a gendered lens in their engagement or support provision. For example, stakeholders may focus on support provisions for women and girls, or young asylum-seeking men and boys. This enabled us to capture gender specific asylum seeker and refugee experiences throughout both their migratory and UK asylum journeys.

2) Expertise in specific nationalities or ethnic groups: This refers to stakeholders who work with specific nationalities or ethnic groups to help us explore their unique challenges, vulnerabilities, and needs.

3) Expertise with children and young people (CYP): Stakeholders with a focus on children and young people and providing guidance in their navigation of the asylum system including through mental health or education support.

4) Expertise with unaccompanied asylum-seeking children (UASC): While expertise working with UASC may cross over with CYP, UASC has been included specifically considering the absence of guardianship – a significant indicator of vulnerability upon arrival.

5) Expertise with LGBTQI+ individuals: Stakeholders who engage with or have experience working specifically with LGBTQI+ asylum seekers or refugees, to capture the experiences of this group and how this internal characteristic interacts with the notion of vulnerability, as well as specific needs and support.

6) Expertise with disabilities: Engagement with or specific support provision for asylum seekers or refugees with physical health disabilities or neurodivergence.

7.) Expertise with modern slavery and human trafficking (MSHT) survivors: Those with a direct focus on victims and survivors of MSHT.

2.4 Ethical considerations and interview principles

A series of ethical protocols guided the research. Informed consent was obtained prior to the commencement of interviews with all stakeholders for the individual to participate in the study and for the interview to be recorded for the purpose of transcription. All research participants were sent an information sheet outlining the purpose of the study, identifying the European Union Asylum, Migration, and Integration Fund (AMIF) as the funder, the Home Office as the commissioning entity of the project, and details about the time required from participants, their right to withdraw, and a form to sign indicating consent to participate.

If a respondent did not give their consent to participate, the interview did not proceed. If a respondent gave consent to participate but did not consent for the interview to be audio recorded, detailed notes were taken either by hand or digitally. Interviewees were also informed that their data would be treated confidentially, anonymously, and securely, and of their right to refuse participation, terminate discussion, or skip any topics they wished not to discuss. Research participants also had the right to withdraw before, during, or after the interviews, and anonymity of participants and their data was maintained throughout the project. Furthermore, the personal details of interviewees were anonymised during the gathering and collation of findings, and in this research report. Where quotes have been used, any identifying information has been removed. Safeguarding protocols were also adhered to, ensuring that no physical or psychological or physiological harm (‘Do No Harm’) would come to participants as a result of participating in the research. Interview questions were designed to reduce the risk of re-traumatisation or re-triggering traumatic feelings or experiences, particularly for frontline stakeholders in their service provision to asylum seekers and refugees. In concurrence to not asking research participants to divulge personal information or details of a particular incident, the nature of the interview and questions asked were directly relevant only to the topic and this research study.

Subsequently, a raw data review protocol was employed to ensure that the information shared in the stakeholder interviews did not identify any vulnerable individuals in the asylum claim or refugee integration system or in any way exacerbate their vulnerability.

To ensure this:

All interviewees were requested not to make any references in their interviews to any individuals by name, physical or character description, historical circumstances or events that might identify any vulnerable individuals.

1. All transcripts were checked to highlight if any references were made.
2. All references were redacted to protect the identity of the individuals.
3. In upholding good practice with regards to data protection Egnyte, a secure data platform, was used to safely transfer and store data. Egnyte provides end-to-end data protection whilst adhering to data and security compliance and requirements^{[footnote 551]}.

2.5 Methodological limitations

The breadth and depth of data generated in this research afforded the opportunity to produce a series of strategic recommendations for the Home Office across a broad range of policy and practice areas. However, when drawing on the data and evidence reviewed in this study on sensitive topics and vulnerable groups, it is imperative to acknowledge the methodological limitations encountered in the research.

First, MMC’s 4Mi database provides a substantial dataset regarding asylum seekers intending to reach the UK. The scope of this research study was to look at migratory journeys to the UK. Although 810 asylum seekers cited the UK as their intended destination, not all may have made it to the UK. Similarly, other asylum seekers who did not cite the UK as their destination country at the time of the survey may have come to the UK. These experiences will not have been captured as part of our sample; furthermore, some may have been on routes to, or eventually ended up in the UK but not cited it as their destination at the time they were surveyed.

Second, as people were interviewed at different stages, not all the data was standardised. However, this was seen more as a benefit than a limitation of the methodology as this enabled the team to gain an overview of the varying experiences throughout the migratory journey. Furthermore, not all survey questions in the 4Mi dataset received the same level of responses, therefore sample data, missing data, and reliability may vary across respondents.

Third, questions within the 4Mi survey interviews required individuals to share sensitive details. People responding to the survey, firstly, may not have felt comfortable or ready to disclose certain experiences, for example, around sexual exploitation. Therefore, responses may not be fully reflective of the broad range of asylum seeker experiences nor the number of asylum seekers who had been subject to particular circumstances.

Fourth, 131 stakeholders were invited to participate in the study, with the aim of speaking with 74 stakeholders. The final sample included 72 stakeholders across the groups. Since it was not possible to speak to a wide range of representatives from local authorities and private accommodation providers across the UK, we supplemented this with findings from the evidence review and through interviews with other stakeholders. Finally, it was not within the scope of this project to engage with asylum seekers or asylum- route refugees themselves, either along migratory journeys or directly among those who were currently in the asylum process. Although not a limitation of the prescribed methodology, it represents a limitation in acquiring the most valuable data relating to the project objectives. The value and importance of engaging with and including the voices of asylum seekers is recognised both from a data effectiveness and ethical perspective. To ensure that these experiences were captured, stakeholder interview questions were designed to enquire about individual experiences of asylum seekers and refugees. Additionally, during sampling, specific attention was paid to engage with organisations who work, support, represent, or advocate directly with asylum seekers. Stakeholders who had lived experience and who are now working within the sector were included in the sample, and MMC’s 4Mi database also afforded the opportunity to include asylum seeker perspectives.

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1. UK Home Office, Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention: Version 8.0 (Home Office, 2021). ↩

2. United Nations General Assembly, “Protocol Against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, Supplementing the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime” November 15, 2000. ↩

3. United Nations General Assembly, “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime,” November 15, 2000. ↩

4. Modern Slavery Act 2015, c. 30, accessed October 13, 2022. ↩

5. UK Visas and Immigration, “National referral mechanism guidance: adult (England and Wales),” updated 19 May 2022. ↩

6. UNHCR, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum (Geneva: UNHCR, 1997). ↩

7. Sara Portnoy and Allison Ward, “Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Children and Young People – Understanding Their Journeys Towards Improved Physical and Emotional Health,” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 25, no. 3 (2020): 636–647; Ayesha Kadir, Anna Battersby, Nick Spencer, and Anders Hjern, “Children on the Move in Europe: A Narrative Review of the Evidence on the Health Risks, Health Needs and Health Policy for Asylum Seeking, Refugee and Undocumented Children,” BMJ Paediatrics Open 3 (2019): 1–15; UNHCR, “What Is a Refugee?,” accessed July 18, 2022. ↩

8. See also: Luke Hamilton, “(Re)Conceptualising Vulnerability in International Refugee Law and Practice: An Exploration of the Value of a More Dynamic Approach to Vulnerability in Refugee Status Determination” (PhD thesis submitted to the National University of Ireland, Galway, 2020). ↩

9. Daria Mendola and Alessandra Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees: Some Reflections on Definitions and Measurement Practices,” International Migration (2021): 2. ↩

10. These include the 1951 United Nations (UN) Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (Refugee Convention) and its 1967 Protocol. United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” July 28, 1951. ↩

11. The research also drew upon data from the Mixed Migration Centre’s (MMC) 4Mi database. More details are outlined in Chapter 2: Methodology, and Annex 2. ↩

12. For the purposes of this research, the ‘migratory journey’ is understood as the journey made by an asylum seeker from their country of origin up to the immediate point prior to entering the UK, and the ‘UK asylum journey’ refers to an asylum seeker’s experience through various stages from the point of arrival, to the initial claim process (including making a claim, the decision making process, grant and refusal/appeal (including fresh appeals), and integration (both short- and long-term). ↩

13. As will be outlined in this research study, the findings suggest – and recommendations are subsequently made relating to – the consideration of ‘integration’ as a process that is initiated from the point of arrival in the UK and not solely once asylum has been granted (that is, not solely ‘asylum-route integration’). ↩

14. A set of research objectives were originally outlined and pre-defined by the Home Office Analysis and Insight team (HOAI). These were later refined by the research team in collaboration with HOAI. ↩

15. The research matrix depicts the process by which the research team coded and classified evidence against the research objectives. ↩

16. Reuters Staff, “New Home Secretary Javid Opposes ‘Hostile Environment’ Approach to Immigration,” Reuters, April 30, 2018. ↩

17. Against Borders for Children, The Anti-Raids Network, Doctors of the World UK, Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants (JCWI), Liberty, Migrants’ Rights Network (MRN), National Union of Students, North East London Migrant Action (NELMA), and Project 17, A Guide to the Hostile Environment: The Border Controls Dividing Our Communities – And How We Can Bring Them Down, ed. Liberty (May 2019). ↩

18. Immigration Act 2014, c. 22, accessed July 22, 2022. ↩

19. Immigration Act 2016, c. 19, accessed September 29, 2022. ↩

20. Wendy Williams, Windrush Lessons Learned Review (London: House of Commons, 2020). ↩

21. UK Visas and Immigration and Home Office, ”Apply for a Visa Under the Ukraine Sponsorship Scheme (Homes for Ukraine),” updated September 15, 2022. ↩

22. Mark Easton, “Channel Migrants: Manston Processing Centre Criticism Prompts Minister’s Visit,” BBC News, October 27, 2022. ↩

23. BBC News, “Dover Attack on Migrant Centre Driven by Hate, Say Terror Police,” BBC News, November 1, 2022. ↩

24. Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees”. ↩

25. Luke Hamilton, “(Re)Conceptualising Vulnerability in International Refugee Law and Practice”. ↩

26. United Nations General Assembly, “Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees,” July 28, 1951. ↩

27. See, for instance: UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk: Exploitation and the UK Asylum System (UNHCR and British Red Cross, 2022) ↩

28. David Bolt, An Inspection of the Home Office’s Approach to the Identification and Safeguarding of Vulnerable Adults, February to May 2018 (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2019). ↩

29. UK Visas and Immigration, “Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy, Version 1.0: Safeguarding of Adults and Children 2021 to 2025” (guidance for Home Office staff, London: UK Home Office, June 22, 2022). ↩

30. As defined in this project’s original Statement of Requirements (SOR). ↩

31. See for example: “Directive 2013/32/EU of the European Parliament of the Council of 26 June 2013 on Common Procedures for Granting and Withdrawing International Protection (Recast),” Official Journal of the European Union 2013 L160/60 (June 26, 2013); “Directive 2013/33/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 26 June 2013 Laying Down Standards for the Reception of Applicants for International Protection (Recast),” Official Journal of the European Union 2013 L180/96 (June 29, 2013); Harry Brown, Nicola Giordano, Charles Maughan, and Alix Wadeson, Vulnerability Assessment Framework: Population Study 2019 (Amman: UNHCR, 2019); UNHCR, Procedural Standards for Refugee Status Determination Under UNHCR’s Mandate (Geneva: UNHCR, 2020); UNHCR, United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF), and the World Food Program (WFP), VASyR 2021: Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees in Lebanon (UNHCR Microdata Library, 2021); David Bolt, An Inspection of the Home Office’s Approach to the Identification and Safeguarding of Vulnerable Adults, February–May 2018 (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2019); UK Government, “The Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005,” UK Statutory Instruments 2005 no. 7, Regulation 1 (February 5, 2005). ↩

32. Alison Cole, “All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable than Others: The Political Ambiguity of Vulnerability Studies, an Ambivalent Critique,” Critical Horizons 17, no. 2 (2016): 260–277. ↩

33. Natalie Welfens and Yasemin Bekyol, “The Politics of Vulnerability in Refugee Admissions Under the EU–Turkey Statement,” Frontiers in Political Science, 3 (2021). ↩

34. UK Government, “The Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005,” UK Statutory Instruments 2005 no. 7, Regulation 1 (February 5, 2005). UK Government, “The Asylum Seekers (Reception Conditions) Regulations 2005,” UK Statutory Instruments 2005 no. 7, Regulation 1 (February 5, 2005). Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees.” ↩

35. Rebecca Yeo, “The Regressive Power of Labels of Vulnerability Affecting Disabled Asylum Seekers in the UK,” Disability & Society 35, no. 4 (2020): 676–681; Amalia Gilodi, Isabelle Albert, and Birte Nienaber, “Vulnerability in the Context of Migration: A Critical Overview and a New Conceptual Model,” Human Arenas (2022); Encarnación La Spina, “The Legal Interpretation and Semantic Indeterminacy of Migrant Vulnerability: An Analysis of Conceptual and Argumentation Problems,” ↩

36. Revista de Llengua I Dret 76 (2021): 186–201; Jane Freedman, “The Uses and Abuses of “Vulnerability” in EU Asylum and Refugee Protection: Protecting Women or Reducing Autonomy?,” Papeles del CEIC, International Journal on Collective Identity Research 1 (2019): 1–15; Erol Nezih Orhon, Elif Akcakaya, and Tayfun Dalkılıç, Vulnerability Context: Definition and Guidelines: Reshaping Attention and Inclusion Strategies for Distinctively Vulnerable People Among the Forcibly Displaced (Anadolou University: RAISD, 2019); Veronika Flegar, “Who Is Deemed Vulnerable in the Governance of Migration? Unpacking UNHCR’s and IOM’s Policy Label for Being Deserving of Protection and Assistance,” Asiel- & Migrantenrecht 8 (2018): 374–383; Maija Mustaniemi-Laakso et al., The Protection of Vulnerable Individuals in the Context of EU Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration (Åbo Akademi University: FRAME, 2016). ↩

37. Annika Lems, Kathrin Oester, and Sabine Strasser, “Children of the Crisis: Ethnographic Perspectives on Unaccompanied Refugee Youth in and en Route to Europe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 2 (2020): 315–225; Paolo De Stefani, “Conceptualizing “Vulnerability” in the European Legal Space: Mixed Migration Flows and Human Trafficking as a Test,” Frontiers in Human Dynamics 4:861178 (2022): 1–12; Yeo, “The Regressive Power of Labels”; Aila Spathopoulou, Anna Carastathis, and Myrto Tsilimpoiunidi, “’Vulnerable Refugees’ and ‘Voluntary Deportations’: Performing the Hotspot, Embodying its Violence,” Geopolitics (2020): 1–27; Paloma Torres López, “’Vulnerability Shopping’ Making Migrants Invisible: Intersectional Analysis on the Impact of EU Vulnerability Identification Policy on Unaccompanied and Separated Girls in Greece” (Master’s thesis submitted to Paneteion University of Social and Political Sciences, 2018). ↩

38. Lauren Heidbrink, “Anatomy of a Crisis: Governing Youth Mobility Through Vulnerability,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45, no. 5 (2021): 988–1005; Lewis Turner, Are Syrian Men Vulnerable Too? Gendering The Syria Refugee Response (Washington DC: Middle East Institute, 2016); Natalie Welfens and Yasemin Bekyol, “The Politics of Vulnerability in Refugee Admissions Under the EU–Turkey Statement,” Frontiers in Political Science, 3 (2021). ↩

39. Karin Åberg, “Examining the Vulnerability Procedure: Group-Based Determinations at the EU Border,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 41, no.1 (2021): 52–78; Torres López, “’Vulnerability Shopping’”; Yeo, “The Regressive Power of Labels”; Veronika Flegar, “Who is Deemed Vulnerable in the Governance of Migration? ↩

40. Unpacking UNHCR’s and IOM’s Policy Label for Being Deserving of Protection and Assistance,” Asiel- & Migrantenrecht 8 (2018): 374–383; Mustaniemi-Laakso et al., The Protection of Vulnerable Individuals in the Context of EU Policies on Border Checks, Asylum and Immigration. ↩

41. La Spina, “The Legal Interpretation and Semantic Indeterminacy of Migrant Vulnerability.” ↩

42. Martha Fineman, “Equality, Autonomy and the Vulnerable Subject in Law and Politics,” in Vulnerability: Reflections on a New Ethical Foundation for Law and Politics, ed. Martha Fineman and Anna Grear (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013); Cole, “All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable than Others.” ↩

43. Lewis Turner, “The Politics of Labeling Refugee Men as ‘Vulnerable’,” Social Politics 0, no. 0 (2019): 1–23; Melanie Griffiths, “‘Here, Man Is Nothing!’: Gender and Policy in the Asylum Context,” Men and Masculinities 18, no. 4 (2015): 468–488; Turner, Are Syrian Men Vulnerable Too? ↩

44. Luc Leboeuf, Humanitarianism and Juridification at Play: ‘Vulnerability’ as an Emerging Legal and Bureaucratic Concept in the Field of Asylum and Migration: Vulner Research Report 1 (Max Planck Society, Vulner, 2021); Constantin Hruschka and Luc Leboeuf, “Vulnerability: A Buzzword or a Standard for Migration Governance” (policy brief no. 20, Population Europe, Max Planck Society, January 2019). ↩

45. Eliza Galos, Laura Bartolini, Harry Cook, and Naomi Grant, Migrant Vulnerability to Human Trafficking and Exploitation: Evidence from the Central and Eastern Mediterranean Migration Routes (Geneva: IOM, 2017); Martha Albertson Fineman, “Vulnerability and Inevitable Inequality,” Oslo Law Review 4 (2017): 133–149; La Spina, “The Legal Interpretation and Semantic Indeterminacy of Migrant Vulnerability” ; Freedman, “The Uses and Abuses of “Vulnerability” in EU Asylum and Refugee Protection.” ↩

46. Samantha Currie, “Compounding Vulnerability and Concealing Unfairness: Decision-Making Processes in the UK’s Anti-Trafficking Framework,” Public Law (2019): 495–516. ↩

47. Cole, “All of Us Are Vulnerable, But Some Are More Vulnerable than Others”; Yeo, “The Regressive Power of Labels”; Judith Butler, Zeynep Gambetti, and Leticia Sabsay, “Introduction” in Vulnerability in Resistance, ed. Judith Butler, Zeynet Gambetti, and Letica Sabsay (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2016); Åberg, “Examining the Vulnerability Procedure”; Gilodi, Albert, and Nienaber, “Vulnerability in the Context of Migration”; Freedman, “The Uses and Abuses of “Vulnerability” in EU Asylum and Refugee Protection”; Mustaniemi-Laakso et al., The Protection of Vulnerable Individuals; Hruschka and Leboeuf, “Vulnerability”; Torres López, “‘Vulnerability Shopping’”. ↩

48. Martha Fineman, “The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition,” Yale Journal of Law & Feminism 20, no. 1 (2008): 1–24; Erinn Cunniff Gilson, “Vulnerability and Victimization: Rethinking Key Concepts in Feminist Discourses on Sexual Violence,” Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society 42, no. 1 (2016): 71–98; Gilodi, Albert, and Nienaber, “Vulnerability in the Context of Migration.” ↩

49. Yeo, “The Regressive Power of Labels.” ↩

50. The Inter-Agency Coordination Group Against Trafficking in Persons (ICAT), “Addressing Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons” (issue brief 12, ICAT, 2022). ↩

51. Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees.” ↩

52. Situational factors are a form of ‘external’ vulnerability factor, as are contextual factors, in contrast to personal characteristics which are ‘internal’ vulnerability factors. ↩

53. Gilodi, Albert, and Nienaber, “Vulnerability in the Context of Migration.” ↩

54. Christina R. Clark, “Understanding Vulnerability: From Categories to Experiences of Young Congolese People in Uganda,” Child. Soc. 21 (2007): 284–296. ↩

55. Renos K. Papadopoulos, “Trainers’ Handbook: Enhancing Vulnerable Asylum Seekers Protection” (training handbook, International Organization for Migration, Rome, 2010). ↩

56. ICAT, “Addressing Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons.” ↩

57. Annalisa Busetta, Daria Mendola, Ben Wilson, and Valeria Cetorelli, “Measuring Vulnerability of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Italy,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 47, no. 3 (2021): 596–615. ↩

58. Rachel Sabates-Wheeler and Myrtha Waite, “Migration and Social Protection: A Concept Paper” (working paper T2, Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation, and Poverty, Sussex, December 2003). ↩

59. Eleonore Kofman, “Gendered Mobilities and Vulnerabilities: Refugee Journeys To and In Europe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 45, no. 12 (2019): 2185–2199; Gilodi, Albert, and Nienaber, “Vulnerability in the Context of Migration.” ↩

60. Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees.” ↩

61. Erol Nezih Orhon, Elif Akcakaya, and Tayfun Dalkılıç, Vulnerability Context: Definition and Guidelines: Reshaping Attention and Inclusion Strategies for Distinctively Vulnerable People Among the Forcibly Displaced (Anadolou University: RAISD, 2019). ↩

62. Sabates-Wheeler and Waite, “Migration and Social Protection.” ↩

63. International Organization for Migration (IOM), IOM Handbook on Protection and Assistance for Migrants Vulnerable to Violence, Exploitation and Abuse (Geneva: IOM, 2019). ↩

64. Veronika Flegar, “Who Is Deemed Vulnerable in the Governance of Migration? Unpacking UNHCR’s and IOM’s Policy Label for Being Deserving of Protection and Assistance,” Asiel- & Migrantenrecht 8 (2018): 374–383. ↩

65. La Spina, “The Legal Interpretation and Semantic Indeterminacy of Migrant Vulnerability.” ↩

66. Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees.” ↩

67. Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees.” ↩

68. UNHCR and IDC, Vulnerability Screening Tool: Identifying and Addressing Vulnerability: A Tool for Asylum and Migration Systems (Geneva: UNHCR, 2016); Thiri Scwesin Aung, Thomas B. Fischer, and Yihan Wang, “Conceptualization of Health and Social Vulnerability of Marginalized Populations During Covid-19 Using Quantitative Scoring Approach,” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 20, no.1 (2022): 1–16; Laura Tarvainen, “Embodied and Embedded Vulnerable Subject: Asylum Seekers and Vulnerability Theory,” No Foundations: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and Justice no. 17 (2019): 183–206; Jesuit Refugee Service, Becoming Vulnerable in Detention: Civil Society Report on the Detention of Vulnerable Asylum Seekers and Irregular Migrants in the European Union (The DEVAS Project) (Brussels: Jesuit Refugee Service-Europe, 2010); Heidbrink, “Anatomy of a Crisis”; Belal Shneikat and Chris Ryan, “Syrian Refugees and Their Re-entry to ‘Normality’: The Role of Service Industries,” The Service Industries Journal 38, no. 3-4 (2018): 201–227. ↩

69. Laura Tarvainen, “Embodied and Embedded Vulnerable Subject: Asylum Seekers and Vulnerability Theory,” No Foundations: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Law and Justice no. 17 (2019): 183–206. ↩

70. UNHCR and IDC, Vulnerability Screening Tool. ↩

71. Torres López, “’Vulnerability Shopping’.” ↩

72. Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees.” ↩

73. Kimberle Crenshaw, “Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Policies,” University of Chicago Legal Forum 140 (1989): 139–167. ↩

74. Mendola and Pera, “Vulnerability of Refugees.” ↩

75. Nezih Orhon, Akcakaya, and Dalkılıç, Vulnerability Context: Definition and Guidelines. ↩

76. ICAT, “Addressing Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons.” ↩

77. Gilodi, Albert, and Nienaber, “Vulnerability in the Context of Migration”; Nezih Orhon, Akcakaya, and Dalkılıç, Vulnerability Context: Definition and Guidelines. ↩

78. Chesmal Siriwardhana, Bayard Roberts, and Martin McKee, “Vulnerability and Resilience: Thematic Discussion Paper” (discussion paper, 2nd Global Consultation on Migrant Health: Resetting the Agenda, International Organization for Migration Development Fund, 2017). ↩

79. Samantha Currie, “Compounding Vulnerability and Concealing Unfairness: Decision-Making Processes in the UK’s Anti-Trafficking Framework,” Public Law (2019): 495–516; Shneikat and Ryan, “Syrian Refugees”; Mustaniemi-Laakso et al., The Protection of Vulnerable Individuals. ↩

80. Papadopoulos, “Trainers’ Handbook.” ↩

81. Shneikat and Ryan, “Syrian Refugees.” ↩

82. La Spina, “The Legal Interpretation and Semantic Indeterminacy of Migrant Vulnerability.” ↩

83. Mianna Lotz, “Vulnerability and Resilience: A Critical Nexus,” Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics 37, no. 1 (2016): 45–59. ↩

84. Butler, Gambetti, and Sabsay. ‘Introduction’ in Butler, Gambetti, and Sabsay (Eds.), Vulnerability in Resistance. ↩

85. Francesca Ippolito, Understanding Vulnerability in International Human Rights Law (Naples: Editoriale Scientifica, 2020). ↩

86. ISSOP Migration Working Group, “ISSOP Position Statement on Migrant Child Health,” Child Care Health Dev. 44, no. 1 (2018): 161–170. ↩

87. ISSOP Migration Working Group, “ISSOP Position Statement on Migrant Child Health.” ↩

88. Marieke Sleijpen, Trudy Mooren, Rolf J. Kleber, and Hennie R. Boeijie, “Lives On Hold: A Qualitative Study of Young Refugees’ Resilience Strategies,” Childhood 24, no. 3 (2017): 348–365. ↩

89. Melissa Mary Anderson and Dagmar Soennecken, “Locating the Concept of Vulnerability in Canada’s Refugee Policies at Home and Abroad,” Laws 11, no. 25 (2022): 1–25. ↩

90. UK Visas and Immigration, “Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy.” ↩

91. Whilst being a victim of MSHT or human rights abuses is not a personal characteristic, these were wider ‘categories’ or protected characteristics that were deemed to indicate extreme vulnerability. ↩

92. Interview with HOFW7. ↩

93. Interview with HOP8. ↩

94. Interview with OS16. ↩

95. Interview with HOP9.

    ↩

96. Interview with HOFW10. ↩

97. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

98. Interview with OS3. ↩

99. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

100. Interview with HOP2. ↩

101. UK Visas and Immigration, “Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy.” ↩

102. Amy Cortvriend, “Coping with Vulnerability: The Limbo Created by the UK Asylum System,” International Journal for Crime, Justice and Social Democracy 9, no. 3 (2020): 61–74. ↩

103. Interview with HOP5. ↩

104. Interview with HOFW1 ↩

105. Interview with OS23. ↩

106. Interview with OS2. ↩

107. Interview with OS19. ↩

108. Interview with OS1. ↩

109. Interview with OS21. ↩

110. Interview with HOP4. ↩

111. Interview with OS18. ↩

112. Interview with OS18. ↩

113. Interview with FW3. ↩

114. Interview with OS3. ↩

115. Interview with FW2. ↩

116. Luke Hamilton, “(Re)Conceptualising Vulnerability in International Refugee Law and Practice.” ↩

117. Interview with HOFW12. ↩

118. Interview with HOP9. ↩

119. Papadopoulos, “Trainers’ Handbook.” ↩

120. For the purpose of this research, the ‘migratory journey’ starts in an asylum seeker’s country of origin and continues to the point of arrival at the UK border. ↩

121. Interview with OS16. ↩

122. For instance, research has shown that trauma experienced by women in their country of origin continues to have a serious impact on their mental health once they are in the UK. See Amanda Firth and Melanie Haith-Cooper, “Vulnerable Migrant Women and Postnatal Depression: A Case of invisibility in Maternity Services?,” British Journal of Midwifery 26, no. 2 (2018): 78–84. ↩

123. See, for instance: Tuesday Reitano et al., Integrated Responses to Human Smuggling from the Horn of Africa to Europe (Geneva: The Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime, 2017), 1–68. ↩

124. Lucy Hovil, Mark Gill, Iolanda Genovese, Olivia Bueno, Josiah Kaplan, and Ramya Subrahmanian, Reimagining Migration Responses: Learning from Children and Young People Who Move in the Horn of Africa (Florence: UNICEF Office of Research, 2021), 1–79. ↩

125. Lucy Hovil and Lutz Oette, Tackling the Root Causes of Human Trafficking and Smuggling From Eritrea: The Need for an Empirically Grounded EU Policy on Mixed Migration in the Horn of Africa (International Refugee Rights Initiative and Strategic Initiative for Women in the Horn of Africa and Centre for Human Rights Law, SOAS, 2017), 1–50. ↩

126. See, for instance: Lucy Hovil and Nicholas Maple, “Local Integration: A Durable Solution in Need of Restoration?,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2022): 238–266. ↩

127. Interview with FW3. ↩

128. “Local Integration: A Durable Solution in Need of Restoration?,” Refugee Survey Quarterly 41, no. 2 (2022): 238–266; Jamal Barnes, “Torturous Journeys: Cruelty, International Law, and Pushbacks and Pullbacks Over the Mediterranean Sea,” Review of International Studies 48, no. 3 (2022): 441–460. ↩

129. Barnes, “Torturous Journeys.” ↩

130. Hovil et al., Reimagining Migration Responses; Hovil and Oette, “Tackling the Root Causes of Human Trafficking and Smuggling From Eritrea”; Jean-Luc Jucker and Jessamy Garver-Affeldt, A Sharper Lens on Vulnerability (West Africa) (Mixed Migration Centre, 2020). ↩

131. Simon Nissling and Ana-Maria Murphy-Teixidor, A Sharper Lens on Vulnerability (North Africa) (Mixed Migration Centre, 2020). ↩

132. Interview with OS1. ↩

133. Malika Bouhenia et al., “Quantitative Survey on Health and Violence Endured by Refugees During Their Journey and in Calais, France,” International Health 9, no. 6 (2018): 335–342. ↩

134. Jane Freedman, “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Refugee Women: A Hidden Aspect of the Refugee ‘Crisis’,” Reproductive Health Matters 24, no. 47 (2016): 18–26. ↩

135. Nationality and Borders Act 2022, c. 36, accessed September 23, 2022. ↩

136. Anna Crepet et al., “Mental Health and Trauma in Asylum Seekers Landing in Sicily in 2015: A Descriptive Study of Neglected Invisible Wounds,” Conflict and Health 11, no. 1 (2017): 1–11. ↩

137. Leigh Daynes, “The Health Impacts of the Refugee Crisis: A Medical Charity Perspective,” Clinical Medicine (London, England) 16, no. 5 (2016): 437–440. ↩

138. Arif Akgul, Cuneyt Gurer, and Hasan Aydin, “Exploring the Victimization of Syrian Refugees through the Human Security Model: An Ethnographic Approach,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 21, no. 1 (2021): 46–66. ↩

139. Bouhenia et al., “Quantitative Survey on Health and Violence Endured by Refugees.” ↩

140. Interview with OS10. ↩

141. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

142. Interview with OS22. ↩

143. UNHCR, Guidelines on Policies and Procedures in Dealing with Unaccompanied Children Seeking Asylum (Geneva: UNHCR, 1997). ↩

144. Sara Portnoy and Allison Ward, “Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Children and Young People: Understanding Their Journeys Towards Improved Physical and Emotional Health,” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 25, no. 3 (2020): 636–647; Ayesha Kadir, Anna Battersby, Nick Spencer, and Anders Hjern, “Children on the Move in Europe: A Narrative Review of the Evidence on the Health Risks, Health Needs and Health Policy for Asylum Seeking, Refugee and Undocumented Children,” BMJ Paediatrics Open 3 (2019): 1–15.; UNHCR, “What Is a Refugee?,” accessed July 18, 2022. ↩

145. Marie Norredam, Laura Nellums, Runa Schmidt Nielsen, Stine Byberg, and Jørgen Holm Petersen, “Incidence of Psychiatric Disorders Among Accompanied and Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Children in Denmark: A Nation-Wide Register-Based Cohort Study,” European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 27, no. 4 (2018): 439–446; Maria Fernanda Garcia and Dina Birman, “Understanding the Migration Experience of Unaccompanied Youth: A Review of the Literature,” American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 92, no. 1 (2022): 79–102. ↩

146. Eliza Galos, Laura Bartolini, Harry Cook, and Naomi Grant, Migrant Vulnerability to Human Trafficking and Exploitation (Geneva: International Organization for Migration, 2017); Sara Portnoy and Allison Ward, “Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Children and Young People: Understanding Their Journeys Towards Improved Physical and Emotional Health,” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 25, no. 3 (2020): 636–647; Joseph Lelliot, “Smuggled and Trafficked Unaccompanied Minors: Towards a Coherent, Protection-Based Approach in International Law,” International Journal of Refugee Law 29, no. 2 (2017): 238–269; Thinh Ngo and Matthew Hodes, “Pervasive Refusal Syndrome in Asylum-Seeking Children: Review of the Current Evidence,” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 25, no. 1 (2020): 227–241. ↩

147. Pervasive refusal syndrome (PRS) is defined as “a rare child psychiatric disorder characterized by pervasive refusal, active/angry resistance to help and social withdrawal leading to an endangered state.” See: Tine Jaspers, G. M. J. Hanssen, Judith A. van der Valk, Johann G. Hanekom, Gijs Th. J. van Well, and Jan N. M. Schieveld, “Pervasive Refusal Syndrome as Part of the Refusal–Withdrawal–Regression Spectrum: Critical Review of the Literature Illustrated by a Case Report,” European Child & Adolescent Psychiatry 18, no. 11 (2009): 645–651. ↩

148. Ayesha Kadir, Anna Battersby, Nick Spencer, and Anders Hjern, “Children on the Move in Europe: A Narrative Review of the Evidence on the Health Risks, Health Needs and Health Policy for Asylum Seeking, Refugee and Undocumented Children,” BMJ Paediatrics Open 3 (2019): 1–15; Thinh Ngo and Matthew Hodes, “Pervasive Refusal Syndrome in Asylum-Seeking Children: Review of the Current Evidence,” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 25, no. 1 (2020): 227–241. ↩

149. Sara Portnoy and Allison Ward, “Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Children and Young People: Understanding Their Journeys Towards Improved Physical and Emotional Health,” Clinical Child Psychology and Psychiatry 25, no. 3 (2020): 636–647. ↩

150. Lauren Heidbrink, “Anatomy of a Crisis: Governing Youth Mobility Through Vulnerability,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 47, no. 5 (2020): 1–15; Annika Lems, Kathrin Oester, and Sabine Strasser, “Children of the Crisis: Ethnographic Perspectives on Unaccompanied Refugee Youth in and Enroute to Europe,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 46, no. 2 (2020), 315–335. ↩

151. Lems, Oester, and Strasser, “Children of the Crisis.” ↩

152. Heidbrink, “Anatomy of a Crisis.” ↩

153. Hovil et al., Reimagining Migration Responses. ↩

154. Hovil et al., Reimagining Migration Responses. ↩

155. Interview with HOFW10. ↩

156. Hovil et al., Reimagining Migration Responses; Hovil and Oette, “Tackling the Root Causes of Human Trafficking and Smuggling From Eritrea.” ↩

157. Hovil et al., Reimagining Migration Responses. ↩

158. Daynes, “The Health Impacts of the Refugee Crisis.” ↩

159. Not 4Mi data accessed for this research project. ↩

160. Nissling and Murphy-Teixidor, A Sharper Lens on Vulnerability (North Africa); Jucker and Garver-Affeldt, A Sharper Lens on Vulnerability (West Africa). ↩

161. Hovil and Oette, Tackling the Root Causes of Human Trafficking and Smuggling from Eritrea. ↩

162. Interview with OS10. ↩

163. Hovil and Oette, Tackling the Root Causes of Human Trafficking and Smuggling from Eritrea. ↩

164. Hovil and Oette, Tackling the Root Causes of Human Trafficking and Smuggling from Eritrea. ↩

165. “Aggravated smuggling” is defined by article 6 (3) of the UNODC Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants as acts “(a) That endanger, or are likely to endanger, the lives or safety of the migrants concerned; or (b) That entail inhuman or degrading treatment, including for exploitation, of such migrants.” ↩

166. Julia Litzkow, Bram Frouws and Roberto Forin, Smuggling and Mixed Migration Insights and Key Messages Drawn From a Decade of MMC Research and 4Mi Data Collection (Mixed Migration Centre, 2021), 1-10. ↩

167. Interview with OS1. ↩

168. Interview with HOFW4. ↩

169. Litzkow, Frouws and Forin, Smuggling and Mixed Migration Insights. ↩

170. Interview with HOFW4. ↩

171. Interview with OS20. ↩

172. UK Home Office, “New Plan for Immigration: Policy Statement,” updated March 29, 2022. ↩

173. ICAT, “Addressing Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons.” ↩

174. ICAT, “Addressing Vulnerability to Trafficking in Persons.” ↩

175. Interview with OS27. ↩

176. Interview with HOP7. ↩

177. Interview with OS1. ↩

178. Interview with HOP9. ↩

179. Non-accidental interpersonal violence and suicidal behaviour. ↩

180. Jamal Barnes, “Torturous Journeys: Cruelty, International Law, and Pushbacks and Pullbacks Over the Mediterranean Sea,” Review of International Studies 48, no. 3 (2022): 441–460. ↩

181. Barnes, “Torturous Journeys.” ↩

182. Arif Akgul, Cuneyt Gurer, and Hasan Aydin, “Exploring the Victimization of Syrian Refugees Through the Human Security Model: An Ethnographic Approach,” Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism 21, no. 1 (2021): 46–66. ↩

183. Freedman, “Sexual and Gender-Based Violence Against Refugee Women.” ↩

184. Mirjam van Reisen, Meron Estefanos, and Conny Rijken, Human Trafficking in the Sinai: Refugees between Life and Death (Brussels: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2012); Mirjam van Reisen, Meron Estefanos and Conny Rijken, The Human Trafficking Cycle: Sinai and Beyond (Brussels: Wolf Legal Publishers, 2014), 1–200. ↩

185. Interview with HOFW10. ↩

186. Daynes, “The Health Impacts of the Refugee Crisis.” ↩

187. Firth and Haith-Cooper, “Vulnerable Migrant Women and Postnatal Depression”; Anna Crepet, Francesco Rita, Anthony Reid, Wilma Van den Boogaard, Pina Deiana, Gaia Quaranta, Aurelia Barbieri, Francesco Bongiorno, and Stefano Di Carlo, “Mental Health and Trauma in Asylum Seekers Landing in Sicily in 2015: A Descriptive Study of Neglected Invisible Wounds,” Conflict and Health 11, no. 1 (2017): 1–11.; Daynes, “The Health Impacts of the Refugee Crisis”; Rebecca Blackmore, Jacqueline A. Boyle, Mina Fazel, Sanjeeva Ranasinha, Kylie M. Gray, Grace Fitzgerald, Marie Misso, and Melanie Gibson-Helm, “The Prevalence of Mental Illness in Refugees and Asylum Seekers: A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis,” PLoS Med 17, no. 9 (2020): 1–24. ↩

188. Interview with OS3. ↩

189. Interview with FW3. ↩

190. Interview with HOP8. ↩

191. Interview with HOFW6. ↩

192. Gina Clayton and Judith Dennis, Asylum Information Database Country Report: United Kingdom (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2021), 1–106. ↩

193. Knowledge and Information Management Unit, Home Office, “Data on Screening Interview waiting times,” updated July 8, 2022. ↩

194. UK Visas and Immigration, “Customer Services Safeguarding Strategy.” ↩

195. The booklet is available in English and other 14 languages, according to a 2021 report. See: Gina Clayton and Judith Dennis, Asylum Information Database Country Report: United Kingdom (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2021), 1–106; UK Visas and Immigration, “Information Booklet About Your Asylum Application,” updated April 26, 2022. ↩

196. Gina Clayton and Judith Dennis, Asylum Information Database Country Report: United Kingdom (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2021), 1–106. ↩

197. UK Home Office, Asylum Interviews v9.0 (London: UK Home Office, 2022). ↩

198. David Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Migration, 2021) 73; David Bolt, An Inspection of the Home Office’s Approach to the Identification and Safeguarding of Vulnerable Adults, February–May 2018 (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2019). ↩

199. Home Office, Asylum Screening and Routing. Version 7.0 (asylum Policy guidance, 2022). ↩

200. UK Home Office, Asylum Interviews v9.0 (London: UK Home Office, 2022). ↩

201. Interview with OS15; Interview with OS3; Interview with FW3. ↩

202. Interview with HOP15. ↩

203. David Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Migration, 2021) 73; David Bolt, An inspection of the Home Office’s approach to the identification and safeguarding of vulnerable adults, February-May 2018 (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2019). ↩

204. David Neal, An Inspection of the Initial Processing of Migrants Arriving via Small Boats at Tug Haven and Western Jet Foil (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2022). ↩

205. UK Home Office, “End to End Review: Safeguarding Review” (presentation, July 2021). ↩

206. Neal, An Inspection of the Initial Processing of Migrants. ↩

207. Interview with FW10; Interview with HOFW2; Interview with HOFW12. ↩

208. Interview with HOFW12; Interview with FW10. ↩

209. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

210. Interview with FW10; Interview with HOFW2. ↩

211. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

212. Interview with HOFW8; Interview with HOFW2. ↩

213. Interview with OS5. ↩

214. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

215. Judith Dennis, Asylum Information Database Country Report: United Kingdom (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2021). ↩

216. Interview with HOFW8. ↩

217. Carole Murphy, ”Surviving Trafficking, Seeking Asylum: Waiting, Status and the State,” International Journal of Sociology and Social Policy 41, no. 5/6 (2020): 627–642. ↩

218. Interview with FW4. ↩

219. Interview with FW10. ↩

220. Interview with HOP19. ↩

221. Interview with FW4. ↩

222. UK Home Office, “End to End Review: Safeguarding Review” (presentation, July 2021). ↩

223. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

224. Interview with HOFW2. ↩

225. Interview with FW4. ↩

226. Interview with OS18. ↩

227. Interview with OS18. ↩

228. UK Home Office, “Claim Asylum in the UK,” accessed July 10, 2022. ↩

229. Jo Wilding, No Access to Justice: How Legal Advice Deserts Fail Refugees, Migrants and Our Communities (Refugee Action, 2022). ↩

230. UK Home Office, Asylum Interviews, 15. ↩

231. UK Home Office, Asylum Interviews. ↩

232. UK Home Office, Asylum Interviews, 15 ↩

233. Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework. ↩

234. Interview with OS18; Interview with FW4; Interview with OS21. ↩

235. Paaras Abbas, Martha von Werthern, Cornelius Katona, Francesca Brady, and Yeree Woo, “The Texture of Narrative Dilemmas: Qualitative Study in Front-Line Professionals Working with Asylum Seekers in the UK,” BJPsych Bulletin 45, no. 1 (2021): 8–14. ↩

236. Rebecca Chaffelson, “The Challenges Faced When Seeking Asylum in the United Kingdom: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis” (PhD thesis submitted to University College London, 2021). ↩

237. Emily Wilbourn and Ariel Plotkin, Beyond Belief: How the Home Office Fails Survivors of Torture at the Asylum Interview (Freedom from Torture, 2020). ↩

238. Interview with FW6. ↩

239. UK Visas and Immigration, Revealing Realities: The Asylum Seeker Journey: Executive Summary (n.d.). ↩

240. Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework. ↩

241. Wilbourn and Plotkin, Beyond Belief. ↩

242. Interview with FW4; Interview with OS3; Interview with OS30. ↩

243. Rebecca Yeo, “The Deprivation Experienced by Disabled Asylum Seekers in the United Kingdom,” Disability & Society 32, no. 5 (2017): 657–677; Gillian McFadyen, “Memory, Language and Silence: Barriers to Refuge Within the British Asylum System: The Texture of Narrative Dilemmas,” Journal of Immigrant & Refugee Studies 17, no. 2 (2019): 168–184. ↩

244. Interview with FW4; Interview with OS30. ↩

245. Interview with HOP19. ↩

246. Interview with OS18; Interview with OS21. ↩

247. Interview with OS30; Interview with OS21. ↩

248. UK Home Office, “End to End Review: Safeguarding Review” (presentation, July 2021); Wilbourn and Plotkin, Beyond Belief. ↩

249. David Bolt, An Inspection of the Home Office’s Use of Language Services in the Asylum Process (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2019). ↩

250. Interview with FW2; Interview with OS30. ↩

251. Rebecca Chaffelson, “The Challenges Faced When Seeking Asylum in the United Kingdom: An Interpretative Phenomenological Analysis” (PhD thesis submitted to University College London, 2021). ↩

252. Interview with HOP11; Interview with HOFW6. ↩

253. Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework. ↩

254. The categorisation distinguished between “straightforward” and “non-straightforward” claims, which included cases where, due to factors outside of the Home Office’s control, a decision within the 6-month timeframe was not possible. Internal Home Office guidance outlined 7 broad reasons for categorising a case as “non-straightforward,” including vulnerable cases that required “careful handling,” potential victims of torture awaiting a medico-legal report, or cases where the Home Office was awaiting input from another Home Office unit or government department. For more information, see David Bolt, An Inspection of Asylum Intake and Casework (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2017). ↩

255. David Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Migration, 2021), 18. ↩

256. Andy Hewitt, Living in Limbo: A Decade of Delays in the UK Asylum System (Refugee Council, 2021). ↩

257. Interview with HOP19; Interview with HOWF6; Interview with HOFW1; Interview with OS27; Interview with OS3; Interview with FW4; Interview with OS11. ↩

258. Interview with OS3. ↩

259. Samson Maekele Tsegay, “Hope Springs Eternal: Exploring the Early Settlement Experiences of Highly Educated Eritrean Refugees in the UK,” Journal of International Migration and Integration 23, no. 3 (2022): 1235–1255. ↩

260. Maekele Tsegay, “Hope Springs Eternal”; Rakinder Reehal, Sarah Taal, and Gaja Maestri, Seeking Asylum: Women’s Experiences of Home Office Decision Making, Destitution and Mental Health Issue (Baobab Women’s Project, CARAG, Women with Hope, MEENA Centre for Women and Children, Coventry Migrant Women’s Houses, and Refugee Rights Europe, 2019). ↩

261. Greater Manchester Immigration Aid Unit, Wasted Childhoods: The Impact of COVID-19 Asylum Delays on Children in the North West of England (2021). ↩

262. Interview with HOP19; Interview with FW4. ↩

263. Interview with HOP19. ↩

264. Melanie Gower, Asylum Seekers: The Permission to Work Policy (House of Commons Library, 2021). ↩

265. Interview with OS11; Interview with FW4; Interview with OS21. ↩

266. Nuria Targarona Rifa and Giorgia Donà, “Forced Unemployment of Undocumented Work: The Burden of the Prohibition to Work for Asylum Seekers in the UK”,Journal of Refugee Studies 34, no. 2 (2021): 2052–2072.; Refugee and Asylum Seeker Voice, The Waiting Game: The Impact of Delayed Asylum Decisions (n.d.). ↩

267. Nuria Targarona Rifa and Giorgia Donà, “Forced Unemployment of Undocumented Work: The Burden of the Prohibition to Work for Asylum Seekers in the UK,” Journal of Refugee Studies 34, no. 2 (2021): 2052–2072.; Refugee and Asylum Seeker Voice, The Waiting Game: The Impact of Delayed Asylum Decisions (n.d.).; Interview with OS15. ↩

268. Interview with HOP9. ↩

269. Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework. ↩

270. Interview with OS27; Interview with OS23; Neal, An Inspection of Asylum Casework. ↩

271. Interview with OS27; Interview with OS23. ↩

272. Interview with OS27. ↩

273. UK Visas & Immigration Home Office, Asylum Support: Policy Bulletins Instructions (UK Visas & Immigration, 2021). ↩

274. As of the end of March 2022, there were 52,715 asylum seekers in the UK receiving Section 95 support, of whom 48,097 were living in dispersal accommodation. UK Government, “Asylum and Resettlement Datasets,” accessed October 17, 2022. ↩

275. UK Government, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, accessed July 12, 2022. ↩

276. UK Visas & Immigration Home Office, Asylum Support: Policy Bulletins Instructions (UK Visas & Immigration, 2021). ↩

277. In the UK, the policy of dispersing asylum seekers started in 2000 to relieve the concentration of asylum seekers in London and the South East. Currently, most asylum seekers are dispersed in the North West, and Glasgow is the local authority hosting more asylum seekers dispersed. See: UK Government, “Asylum and Resettlement Datasets,” accessed October, 17 2022. ↩

278. The Home Office launched a consultation for local authorities to shape the design of this new dispersal model. UK Home Office, “Consultation to Improve Arrangements for Asylum Accommodation Dispersal,” April 13, 2022. ↩

279. British Refugee Council, Asylum Support (British Refugee Council, June 2022); UK Government, “Asylum Support: What You’ll Get,” accessed November 10, 2022. ↩

280. UK Visas & Immigration Home Office, Asylum Support: Policy Bulletins Instructions (UK Visas & Immigration, 2021). ↩

281. Asylum Support Appeals Project, “Section 98 Support” (Factsheet, April 2017). ↩

282. UK Home Office, “How Many People Do We Grant Protection To?,” updated September 23, 2020.; UK Government, “Asylum and Resettlement Datasets,” accessed October 17, 2022. ↩

283. David Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2022). ↩

284. UK Parliament, “UK Advice, Issue Reporting and Eligibility Support. Schedule 2: Statement of Requirements” (UK Parliament, n.d). ↩

285. UK Home Office, “Asylum Support Contracts Safeguarding Framework,” updated May 9, 2022. ↩

286. Tamara Al-Om, How Will We Survive? Steps to Prevent Destitution in the Asylum System (British Red Cross and Refugee Survival Trust, 2021). ↩

287. UK Government, Report on Review of Weekly Allowances Paid to Asylum Seekers and Failed Asylum Seekers: 2021, updated April 19, 2022. ↩

288. For instance, a 2022 study describes cases of women in London being offered £10 a day for domestic work. UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk: Exploitation and the UK Asylum System (UNHCR and British Red Cross, 2022). ↩

289. Interview with FW3. ↩

290. UK Government, “Report on Review of Weekly Allowances Paid to Asylum Seekers and Failed Asylum Seekers: 2021,” updated April 19, 2022. ↩

291. Jennifer New, “Seeking Support in Liverpool: Issues and Barriers for Asylum Seekers and Refugees Who Are Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans or Intersex,” HIV Nursing 15 (2015): 66–75. ↩

292. Refugee Action, Slipping Through the Cracks (Refugee Action, 2017). ↩

293. Interview with OS25; interview with HOFW1. ↩

294. Interview with OS25. ↩

295. Tamara Al-Om, How Will We Survive? Steps to Prevent Destitution in the Asylum System (British Red Cross and Refugee Survival Trust, 2021). ↩

296. Refugee Action, Wake Up Call: How Government Contracts Fail People Seeking Asylum (Refugee Action, 2020). ↩

297. See, for instance: UK Parliament, “Asylum Accommodation,” updated January 24, 2017; Victoria Perez and Tristan Scholz, A Place to Call Home: A Report on Housing Conditions for Asylum Seekers in Birmingham and the West Midlands (Migrant Voice, 2017); Fee Mira Gerlach and Marta Werlander, Finally Safe? Experiences of Women in Asylum Accommodation in Birmingham (Refugee Rights Europe, 2018). ↩

298. Kate Lyons, “Abused and Ignored: LGBTI Asylum Seekers Let Down by the System,” The Guardian, March 4, 2018; Helen Baillot and Elaine Connelly, Women Seeking Asylum: Safe from Violence in the UK? (Refugee Council and Asylum Support Appeals Project, 2018), 1–62. ↩

299. Gareth Davies, Asylum Accommodation and Support (National Audit Office, 2020), 1–58. ↩

300. Davies, Asylum Accommodation and Support. ↩

301. UK Visas and Immigration, AASC Customer Experience Survey. Performance Summary. Dispersal Accommodation (version 1, n.d.). ↩

302. Interview with FW4; interview with OS3. ↩

303. Interview with FW6. ↩

304. 68-69% declared being satisfied with information given by Migrant Help about what will happen in initial accommodation, while 16-18% were neutral. UK Visas and Immigration, AIRE Customer Experience Survey – Performance Summary, Year 1, (UK Visas and Immigration, n.d.). ↩

305. Davies, Asylum Accommodation and Support. ↩

306. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

307. Refugee Action, Wake Up Call: How Government Contracts Fail People Seeking Asylum (Refugee Action, 2020). ↩

308. Davies, Asylum Accommodation and Support. ↩

309. Interview with HOP9. ↩

310. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

311. In March 2020, 2,577 applicants were living in initial accommodation. This means that, while in the same period of 2020 only 5% of asylum seekers in receipt of support were living in contingency accommodation, this percentage is now 31.5%. ↩

312. Interview with HOFW6. ↩

313. Interview with OS3. ↩

314. Interview with HOP19. ↩

315. Interview with HOFW12. ↩

316. NHS England and NHS Improvement, The Health, Wellbeing and Safeguarding Needs of Individual Asylum Seekers. Key National Findings and Recommendations (2021). ↩

317. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

318. Interview with FW4; interview with HOFW5. ↩

319. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

320. UK Home Office, “Response to the ICIBI’s Report: ‘An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation (May 2021 to November 2021)’.” updated May 12, 2022. ↩

321. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

322. Welsh Government, “Written Statement: Penally Asylum Accommodation March Update.” updated March 24, 2022. ↩

323. Interview with FW4. ↩

324. Interview with HOFW2; interview with FW3. ↩

325. British Medical Association, “Refugees’ and Asylum Seekers’ Entitlement to NHS Care,” accessed July 10, 2022. ↩

326. UK Visas and Immigration, “Healthcare Needs and Pregnancy Dispersal Policy,” (Policy Guidance, 2016). ↩

327. Interview with OS18. ↩

328. UK Home Office, “End to End Review: Safeguarding Review” (presentation, July 2021). ↩

329. Interview with FW3; NHS England and NHS Improvement, The Health, Wellbeing and Safeguarding Needs of Individual Asylum Seekers. Key National Findings and Recommendations (2021). ↩

330. Interview with OS10. ↩

331. Interview with FW3. ↩

332. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

333. See, for instance: Susannah Hermaszewska, Paul Cilia La Corte, Maurice Kollewe, Ahmed,, Improving Access to Primary Care for Refugees and Asylum Seekers, Sept 2020 – June 2021 (Refugee Council, n.d); NHS England and NHS Improvement, The Health, Wellbeing and Safeguarding Needs of Individual Asylum Seekers (2021). ↩

334. Sophie J. Weller, Liam J. Crosby, Eleanor R. Turnbull, Rachel Burns, Anna Miller, Lucy Jones, and Robert W. Aldridge, “The Negative Health Effects of Hostile Environment Policies on Migrants: A Cross-Sectional Service Evaluation of Humanitarian Healthcare] Provision in the UK,” Wellcome Open Res 4, (2019): 1–14. ↩

335. Weller et al., “The Negative Health Effects of Hostile Environment Policies on Migrants”; Teresa Polland and Natasha Howard, “Mental Healthcare for Asylum- Seekers and Refugees Residing in the United Kingdom: A Scoping Review of Policies, Barriers, and Eablers,” International Journal of Mental Health Systems 15, no. 60 (2021): 1–15. ↩

336. Interview with OS15. ↩

337. Mei Lan Fang, Judith Sixsmith, Rebecca Lawthom, Ilana Mountian, and Afifa Shahrin, “Experiencing ‘Pathologized Presence and Normalized Absence’; Understanding Health Related Experiences and Access to Health Care Among Iraqi and Somali Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Persons Without Legal Status,” BMC Public Health 15, no.923 (2015): 1–12. ↩

338. NHS England and NHS Improvement, The Health, Wellbeing and Safeguarding Needs of Individual Asylum Seekers. Key National Findings and Recommendations (March 2021). ↩

339. Lucy Jones, Jenny Phillimore, Lin Fu, Jeanine Hourani, Laurence Lessard-Phillips, and Briony Tatem, “They Just Left Me”: Asylum Seekers, Health, and Access to Healthcare in Initial and Contingency Accommodation (Doctors of the World, 2022). ↩

340. NHS England and NHS Improvement, The Health, Wellbeing and Safeguarding Needs of Individual Asylum Seekers. ↩

341. Interview with OS18. ↩

342. Interview with OS22. ↩

343. Interview with OS18. ↩

344. Interview with OS18. ↩

345. Interview with HOP40. ↩

346. Interview with HOP19. ↩

347. Catherine Gladwell and Georgina Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children: Access and Equality in England, Scotland and Wales (UNICEF, 2018). ↩

348. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

349. Joanna McIntyre and Christine Hall, “Barriers to the Inclusion of Refugee and Asylum-Seeking Children in Schools in England,” Educational Review 72, no. 5 (2020): 583–600: Interview with OS17. ↩

350. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

351. Interview with OS22. ↩

352. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

353. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

354. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

355. Interview with OS17. ↩

356. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

357. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

358. Interview with OS17. ↩

359. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

360. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

361. Interview with HOP9; Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children; Matthew Fuyer and Ben Hayes, “What are the Experiences of Education for Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Minors in the UK?” Child: Care, Health and Development 46, no.4 (2020): 414-421. ↩

362. Interview with OS10. According to a report from the Refugee Council, asylum seekers are usually classed as overseas students, even if some universities in England, Wales, and Northern Ireland have agreed to treat asylum seekers as home students. In Scotland, asylum seekers below 25 are treated as home students if they have resided for 3 years in Scotland. Gina Clayton and Judith Dennis, Asylum Information Database Country Report: United Kingdom (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2021), 1–106. ↩

363. Interview with FW4. ↩

364. Refugee Action, Locked Out of Learning. A Snapshot of ESOL Provision in England (Refugee Action, 2017); Welsh Government, “Sanctuary. Help for sanctuary seekers to understand their rights,” accessed November 23, 2022. ↩

365. Interview with OS11. ↩

366. Jo Wilding, No Access to Justice: How Legal Advice Deserts Fail Refugees, Migrants and our Communities (Refugee Action, 2022). ↩

367. Gina Clayton and Judith Dennis, Asylum Information Database Country Report: United Kingdom (European Council on Refugees and Exiles, 2021), 1–106. ↩

368. For instance, a needs test is needed in England, and a merit test in Wales. See Clayton and Dennis, Asylum Information Database Country Report. ↩

369. Interview with OS15. ↩

370. Interview with FW3. ↩

371. Wilding, No Access to Justice. ↩

372. Wilding, No Access to Justice. ↩

373. Interview with OS3. ↩

374. Interview with FW3. ↩

375. The Migration Observatory, “Immigration Detention in the UK.” updated November 2, 2022. ↩

376. Home Office, “How Many People Are Detained or Returned?.” updated May 26, 2022. ↩

377. Home Office, “How Many People Are Detained or Returned?.” ↩

378. Stephen Shaw, A Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons: A Report to the Home Office by Stephen Shaw (Home Office, 2016); UK Government, Government Response to Stephen Shaw’s Review into the Welfare in Detention of Vulnerable Persons (UK Government, n.d); UK Home Office, Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention: Version 8.0 (Home Office, 2021). ↩

379. UK Home Office, Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention: Version 8.0. ↩

380. David Neal, Second Annual Inspection of ‘Adults at Risk in Immigration Detention’ July 2020 – March 2021 (Independent Chief Inspector for Borders and Immigration, 2021). ↩

381. Interview with OS26. ↩

382. Neal, Second Annual Inspection. ↩

383. Interview with HOP5; interview with HOFW10. ↩

384. Neal, Second Annual Inspection; for instance, a 2018 study based on 1010 interviewees with detainees in immigration detention in the UK found that 75% screened positive for at least one mental health disorder. A stakeholder also noted that “suicide and self-harming are endemic in detention”; Piyal Sen et al., “Mental Health Morbidity Among People Subject to Immigration Detention in the UK: A Feasibility Study,” Epidemiology and Psychiatric Sciences 27, no. 6 (2017): 628–637; Interview with OS26. ↩

385. Interview with FW3. ↩

386. Interview with FW3. ↩

387. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Report on a National Inspection of the Short-Term Holding Facilities in the UK Managed by the Border Force (London: HM Inspectorate of Prisons, 2020). ↩

388. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Report on a National Inspection. ↩

389. HM Chief Inspector of Prisons, Report on a National Inspection. ↩

390. Interview with OS26. ↩

391. Interview with HOP16. ↩

392. Interview with FW3. ↩

393. Interview with FW3. ↩

394. Interview with FW3. ↩

395. Interview with OS26. ↩

396. Gatwick Detainees Welfare Group, Report of the Walking Inquiry into Immigration Detention (2022). ↩

397. Gatwick Detainees Welfare Group, Report of the Walking Inquiry into Immigration Detention. ↩

398. Interview with FW1; Interview with OS26. ↩

399. NatCen Social Research, Evaluation of ‘Action Access’, an Alternatives to Detention Pilot: Report on an Independent Evaluation (Geneva: UNHCR Evaluation Service, 2022). ↩

400. Interview with FW1. ↩

401. Interview with OS26. ↩

402. Interview with HOP18. ↩

403. Interview with HOP12. ↩

404. Interview with HOP12. ↩

405. Interview with HOP12 ↩

406. Interview with HOP15. ↩

407. Interview with FW2. ↩

408. Interview with HOP13; Interview with HOP10. ↩

409. Interview with HOP13; Interview with HOP15; Interview with OS21; Interview with FW4. ↩

410. Interview with FW3. ↩

411. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

412. Neal, An Inspection of Contingency Asylum Accommodation. ↩

413. Interview with HOP15. ↩

414. Interview with HOP40. ↩

415. Interview with FW2. ↩

416. Interview with HOP2. ↩

417. Interview with HOP15. ↩

418. Interview with HOP1; Interview with HOP2. ↩

419. Interview with HOP2. ↩

420. Interview with HOP1; Interview with HOP14; Interview with HOP2. ↩

421. Interview with HOP20; Interview with HOP16. ↩

422. Interview with HOP7. ↩

423. Interview with HOP15. ↩

424. Interview with HOP2. ↩

425. Carolyne Ndofor-Tah et al., Home Office Indicators of Integration Framework 2019 (Open Government License, 2019). ↩

426. d’Artis Kancs and Patrizio Lecca, “Long-term social, Economic and Fiscal Effects of Immigration into the EU: The Role of the Integration Policy,” World Economy 41, no. 3 (2018); Marcel Fratzscher and Simon Junker, “Integrating Refugees: A Long-Term, Worthwhile Investment,” German Institute for Economic Research 5, no. 45/46 (2015): 612–616. ↩

427. Zovanga Kone, Isabel Ruiz, and Carlos Vargas-Silva, Refugees and the UK Labour Market (Oxford: Centre on Migration, Policy and Society, University of Oxford, 2019). ↩

428. Kone, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva, Refugees and the UK Labour Market. ↩

429. Kone, Ruiz, and Vargas-Silva, Refugees and the UK Labour Market. ↩

430. Andreas Cebulla, Megan Daniel, and Andrew Zurawan, “Spotlight on Refugee Integration: Findings from the Survey of New Refugees in the United Kingdom” (research report 37, Research, Development, and Statistics Directorate, July 2010). ↩

431. See, for instance: Minos Mouzourakis, Kris Pollet, and Ruben Fierens, The Concept of Vulnerability in European Asylum Procedures (European Council on Refugees and Exile, 2017). ↩

432. Interview with HOFW12. ↩

433. Nationality and Borders Act 2022, c. 36, accessed September 23, 2022. ↩

434. Nationality and Borders Act 2022, c. 36, accessed September 23, 2022. ↩

435. UK Home Office, “New Plan for Immigration: Policy Statement”, updated March 29, 2022. ↩

436. Carolyne Ndofor-Tah et al., Home Office Indicators of Integration Framework 2019. ↩

437. Scottish Government, New Scots: Refugee Integration Strategy 2018 to 2022 (COSLA and Scottish Refugee Council: 2018); Welsh Government, Nation of Sanctuary – Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan (Open Government License, 2019). ↩

438. Ministry of Housing, Communities & Local Government, Integrated Communities Action Plan (HM Government, 2019). ↩

439. The Northern Ireland Executive Office, “Draft Refugee Integration Strategy 2022–2027” (Northern Irish Government, 2021). ↩

440. For instance, the Refugee and Asylum Seeker Plan from the Welsh Government states: “The Welsh Government firmly believes that the integration of refugees and asylum seekers should begin on day one of their arrival.” In a similar vein, the New Scots strategy declares that “Scottish Ministers have always been clear that people who seek asylum in Scotland should be welcomed and supported to integrate into our communities from day one.” The Draft Refugee Integration Strategy of Northern Ireland also contains a similar statement, see: The Northern Ireland Executive Office, “Draft Refugee Integration Strategy 2022–2027” (Northern Irish Government, 2021). See also: Scottish Government, New Scots. It is also important to note that, while these strategies are based on the principle that integration starts on day one of arrival, asylum seekers may have arrived in England before moving to Wales, Scotland, or Northern Ireland. ↩

441. The amount a person receives depends on factors such as age, household income, and dependants. See: UK Government, “Guidance: Claiming Universal Credit and Other Benefits if You Are a Refugee,” updated July 1, 2020; Understanding Universal Credit, “New to Universal Credit,” accessed October 12, 2022. ↩

442. UK Government, “Guidance: Claiming Universal Credit.” ↩

443. British Red Cross, The Costs of Destitution: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Extending the Move-On Period (British Red Cross, 2022). ↩

444. According to the Refugee Council, most of the refugees they support use the loan to pay for a rental deposit. See: Refugee Council, “Written evidence from the Refugee Council [UCW0019]” (written submission to the UK Parliament, Refugee Council, April 2020). ↩

445. British Red Cross, The Costs of Destitution: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Extending the Move-On Period (British Red Cross, 2022). ↩

446. See, for instance: UNHCR, Scottish Refugee Council, and Refugee Council, A Journey Towards Safety: A Report on the Experiences of Eritrean Refugees in the UK (UNHCR, 2018); Refugee Council, Refugees Without Refuge: Findings from a Survey of Newly Recognised Refugees (Refugee Council, 2017). ↩

447. Alison B. Strang, Helen Baillot, and Elodie Mignard “’I Want to Participate.’ Transition Experiences of New Refugees in Glasgow”, Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44, no. 2 (2018): 197–214; UNHCR, Scottish Refugee Council, and Refugee Council, A Journey Towards Safety. ↩

448. Refugee Council, Refugees Without Refuge. ↩

449. British Red Cross, The Costs of Destitution: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Extending the Move-On Period (British Red Cross, 2022). ↩

450. Helen Baillot and Elaine Connelly, Women Seeking Asylum: Safe from Violence in the UK? (Refugee Council and Asylum Support Appeals Project, 2018), 1–62; Interview with OS1; UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk. ↩

451. British Red Cross, The Costs of Destitution: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Extending the Move-On Period (British Red Cross, 2022). ↩

452. The evaluation of this service found that around 50–60% of eligible refugees took up the offer of support, but only 35% received advanced payments before the end of the move-on period. See: Department for Work and Pensions and the Home Office, “Helping Refugees Granted Leave to Remain Transition to Mainstream Benefits During the ‘Move On Period’. Joint Home Office/DWP Evaluation Report” (joint report, Department of Work and Pensions, June 2019). ↩

453. The service contacted about 50–60% of newly recognised refugees. The evaluation found that the Home Office is generally unable to contact 40–50% of refugees by phone – for instance, in cases where the Home Office does not have a contact number – and suggested considering other ways of making contact. See: Department for Work and Pensions and the Home Office, “Helping Refugees Granted Leave.” ↩

454. Interview with OS25. ↩

455. Interview with OS25; interview with HOP4. ↩

456. UK Visas and Immigration, AIRE Customer Experience Survey – Performance Summary, Year 1, (UK Visas and Immigration, n.d.). ↩

457. UK Visas and Immigration, AIRE Customer Experience Survey – Performance Summary, Year 1, (UK Visas and Immigration, n.d.). Interview with OS17. ↩

458. Interview with OS3; ↩

459. Claire Walkey, Philip Brown, and Philip Martin, “Breaking the Impasse: Rethinking Refugee Integration Through the Equality Act 2010 in the United Kingdom,” Social Policy and Society (2022): 1–16; British Red Cross, The Costs of Destitution: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Extending the Move-On Period (British Red Cross, 2022). ↩

460. British Red Cross, The Costs of Destitution: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of Extending the Move-On Period (British Red Cross, 2022). ↩

461. Refugee Council, Refugees without Refuge: Findings from a Survey of Newly Recognised Refugees (Refugee Council, 2017). ↩

462. Shelter England, “Housing for refugees and people fleeing war,” accessed November 23, 2022. ↩

463. In England, waiting lists for social housing in 2020 reached one million, and were expected to double during the pandemic. Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland also face long waiting lists. See, for instance: Conor Matchett, “‘A Continued Failure’ as 150,000 Waiting for Council Houses in Scotland,” The Scotsman, July 26, 2021; Andrew Madden, “Concern as Northern Ireland’s Social Housing Waiting List Could Take 50 Years to Clear,” Belfast Telegraph, August 23, 2022; Michael Savage, “Waiting List for Council Homes in England ‘Will Double to 2 Million,” The Guardian, November 14, 2020. ↩

464. UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk; Interview with Other Stakeholder (OS23). ↩

465. UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk. ↩

466. UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk. ↩

467. UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk. ↩

468. UNHCR, Scottish Refugee Council, and Refugee Council, A Journey Towards Safety. ↩

469. Interview with OS23. ↩

470. Cebulla, Daniel, and Zurawan, “Spotlight on Refugee Integration.” ↩

471. Matthias Flug and Jason Hussein, “Integration in the Shadow of Austerity – Refugees in Newcastle upon Tyne,” Social Sciences 8, no. 7 (2019): 212; Claire Walkey, Philip Brown, and Philip Martin, “Breaking the Impasse: Rethinking Refugee Integration Through the Equality Act 2010 in the United Kingdom,” Social Policy and Society (2022): 1–16; Interview with HOP16; Interview with OS11. ↩

472. For example, the longitudinal Survey of New Refugees in the UK found that those with poorer health were less likely to be in employment and also had poorer English language skills. Cebulla, Daniel, and Zurawan, “Spotlight on Refugee Integration.” ↩

473. Interview with HOP4. ↩

474. UNHCR and British Red Cross, At Risk. ↩

475. Dirk Gebhardt, European Website on Integration, “Refugee Integration & Employment Service (RIES),” accessed July 24, 2022. ↩

476. Dirk Gebhardt, European Website on Integration, “Refugee Integration & Employment Service (RIES).” ↩

477. Interview with OS28. ↩

478. Welsh Government, “ReStart: Refugee Integration Project: Increasing Employability Opportunities for Refugees in Wales” (Open Government License, 2020). ↩

479. Minister for Social Justice, Welsh Government “Reply to Written Question WQ83455 (e),” (2021) accessed September 18. 2022. ↩

480. Caitlin M. Prentice and Eleanor Ott, “Previous Experience, Trickle-Down Training and Systemic Ad Hoc-ery: Educators’ Knowledge Acquisition When Teaching Refugee Pupils in One Local Authority in England,” Teachers and Teaching 27 (2021): 1–4, 269–283. ↩

481. Interview with OS17. ↩

482. Coventry City Council, “Schools of Sanctuary,” accessed October 20, 2022. ↩

483. Refugee Education UK, “I have Indefinite Leave to Remain (ILR): what are my options for higher education (HE)?,” accessed October 20, 2022; UK Parliament, ↩

484. Universities Scotland and Scottish Refugee Council, Refugees Welcome: Guidance for Universities on Providing Asylum Seekers and Refugees with Access to Higher Education (Universities Scotland and Scottish Refugee Council, 2016). ↩

485. Refugee Study UK, “The UK University Scholarship Directory,” accessed October 20, 2022. ↩

486. Agata A. Lambrechts, “The Super-Disadvantaged in Higher Education: Barriers to Access for Refugee Background Students in England,” Higher Education 80 (2020): 803–822. ↩

487. Sue Hubble et al., “Investment in the Provision of English for Speakers of Other Languages” (research briefing, House of Commons Library, July 2019). ↩

488. Refugee Action, Locked Out of Learning. A Snapshot of ESOL Provision in England (Refugee Action, 2017). ↩

489. John Higton et al., “English for Speakers of Other Languages: Access and Progression,” research report, Department for Education, June 2019. ↩

490. Refugee Action, Locked Out of Learning. ↩

491. Scottish Government, New Scots Refugee Integration Strategy 2018–2022 (COSLA, Scottish Refugee Council, and Scottish Government, n.d.). ↩

492. Greater London Authority, “Information Pack: ESOL Plus – Childcare Programme” (Greater London Authority, 2018); Major of London, “Supporting the Formal and Informal ESOL Sector,” accessed October 20, 2022. ↩

493. Interview with OS3; interview with OS23; interview with OS28. ↩

494. For instance, the New Survey of Refugees conducted by the UK Government in 2007–2009 showed that refugees with higher English language skills were more likely to be employed than refugees with lower language skills. See: Cebulla, Daniel, and Zurawan, “Spotlight on Refugee Integration.” ↩

495. Claire Walkey, Philip Brown, and Philip Martin, “Breaking the Impasse: Rethinking Refugee Integration Through the Equality Act 2010 in the United Kingdom,” Social Policy and Society (2022): 1–16; Theresa Pollard and Natalie Howard, “Mental Healthcare for Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Residing in the United Kingdom: A Scoping Review of Policies, Barriers, and Enablers,” International Journal of Mental Health Systems 15, no. 60 (2021): 1–15. ↩

496. UNHCR, Scottish Refugee Council, and Refugee Council, A Journey Towards Safety. ↩

497. Walkey, Brown, and Martin, “Breaking the Impasse.” ↩

498. Interview with HOP4. ↩

499. Interview with OS28. ↩

500. UK Home Office, “UK Refugee Resettlement: Policy Guidance,” (UK Home Office, August 2021). ↩

501. Nicola Burns, Gareth Mulvey, Teresa Piacentini, and Nicole Vidal, “Refugees, Political Bounding, and the Pandemic: Material Effects and Experiences of Categorisations Amongst Refugees in Scotland,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 48, no. 17 (2022): 4066–4084. ↩

502. Interview with OS3. ↩

503. UK Home Office, “New Plan for Immigration: Policy Statement,” updated March 29, 2022. ↩

504. Sara Ganassin and Tony Johnstone Young, “From Surviving to Thriving: ‘Success Stories’ of Highly Skilled Refugees in the UK,” Language and Intercultural Communication 20, no. 2 (2020): 125–140. ↩

505. Yuliya Kosyakova and Hanna Brenzel, “The Role of Length of Asylum Procedure and Legal Status in the Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany,” ↩

506. Soziale Welt: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 71, no.1–2 (2020): 123–159. ↩

507. Jens Hainmueller, Dominik Hangartner, and Duncan Lawrence, “When lives are put on hold: Lengthy asylum processes decrease employment among refugees,” Science Advances 2, no.8 (2016). ↩

508. Interview with OS3. Interview with OS28. ↩

509. The Survey of New Refugees is the only large-scale quantitative dataset on refugee integration in the UK. The UK Government sent a baseline questionnaire one week after grant of status to 8,254 refugees over the age of 18, which was returned by 5,742 participants. The samples size dropped to 1,840, 1,259, and 939 in the 3 follow-up surveys. See: Cebulla, Daniel, and Zurawan, “Spotlight on Refugee Integration.” ↩

510. Jenny Phillimore and Sin Yi Cheung, “The Violence of Uncertainty: Empirical Evidence on How Asylum Waiting Time Undermines Refugee Health,” Social Science & Medicine 282 (2021): 114154–114154. ↩

511. Camilla Hvidtfeldt, Jørgen Holm Petersen, and Marie Norredam, “Prolonged Periods of Waiting for an Asylum Decision and the Risk of Psychiatric Diagnoses: A 22-Year Longitudinal Cohort Study from Denmark,” International Journal of Epidemiology 49, no. 2 (2020): 400–409. ↩

512. Interview with OS3. ↩

513. Matthew Fuyer and Ben Hayes, “What Are the Experiences of Education for Unaccompanied Asylum-Seeking Minors in the UK?,” Child: Care, Health and Development 46, no. 4 (2020): 414–421. ↩

514. In total, the study covered an analytical sample of 3863 individuals. See: Yuliya Kosyakova and Hanna Brenzel, “The Role of Length of Asylum Procedure and Legal Status in the Labour Market Integration of Refugees in Germany,” Soziale Welt: Zeitschrift für Sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung und Praxis 71, no. 1–2 (2020): 123–159. ↩

515. Helen Claire Hart, “‘Keeping Busy with Purpose’: How Meaningful Occupation Can Shape the Experience of Forced Migration,” Migration Studies 9, no. 3 (2021): 1322–1342. ↩

516. Interview with HOP4. ↩

517. Hart, “‘Keeping Busy with Purpose’.” ↩

518. Five years after being allowed to work around 50% of the group with the shorter wait were employed, compared to less than one third of the group with the longer wait. It took 10 years to close the gap. See: Moritz Marbach, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner, “The Long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees,” Science Advances 4, no. 9 (2018): 1–6. ↩

519. Tom Pursglove, UK Parliament, “Asylum Policy. Statement Made on 8 December 2021,” accessed September 6, 2022. ↩

520. According to UK Government data, over three-quarters (76%) of the initial decisions in the year ending June 2022 were grants – a higher number than in the past decade, where around one third of applications were grants. While there is no publicly available data on appeals for 2022, 66% of appeals submitted between 2018 and 2020 after an initial refusal were granted. Thus, the recognition rate is likely to be higher. See: Home Office, “How Many People Do We Grant Asylum or Protection To?,” updated September 23, 2022. ↩

521. Moritz Marbach, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner, “The Long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees,” Science Advances 4, no. 9 (2018): 1–6. ↩

522. Tom Pursglove, UK Parliament, “Asylum policy. Statement made on 8 December 2021,” accessed 6 September 2022; Lift the Ban Coalition, Lift the Ban: Why People Seeking Asylum Should Have the Right to Work (Lift the Ban, 2018). ↩

523. Interview with HOP4. ↩

524. Interview with OS3. ↩

525. Melanie Haith-Cooper, Catherine Waskett, Jane Montague, and Maria Horne, “Exercise and Physical Activity in Asylum Seekers in Northern England; Using the Theoretical Domains Framework to Identify Barriers and Facilitators,” BMC Public Health 18, no. 1 (2018): 762. ↩

526. Emma Stewart and Marnie Shaffer, Moving On? Dispersal Policy, Onward Migration and Integration of Refugees in the UK (ESRC and University of Strathclyde, 2015). ↩

527. Interview with OS1; Interview with HOP26. ↩

528. Elizabeth Yarrow, A Refugee and Then… Participatory Assessment of the Reception and Early Integration of Unaccompanied Refugee Children in the UK (UNHCR, 2019). ↩

529. Yarrow, A Refugee and Then…. ↩

530. Yarrow, A Refugee and Then…. ↩

531. Georgios Karyotis, Gareth Mulvey, and Dimitris Skleparis, “Young Syrian Refugees in the UK: A Two-Tier System of International Protection?,” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 47, no. 3 (2019): 481–500. ↩

532. Katrina Struthers, “LGBTI Refugee Protection in a Culture of Disbelief: The Impact of Integration,” working paper no. 50, Refugee Law Initiative, 2020. ↩

533. Interview with OS21. ↩

534. Interview with FW1. ↩

535. Interview with OS26. ↩

536. Interview with FW1. ↩

537. By November 2017 transfer times were increasing and averaging 30 days. Some children experienced delays of several months. See: David Bolt, An Inspection of How the Home Office Considers the “Best Interests” of Unaccompanied Asylum Seeking Children. August – December 2017 (Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration, 2018). ↩

538. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

539. Gladwell and Chetwynd, Education for Refugee and Asylum Seeking Children. ↩

540. Yarrow, A Refugee and Then…. ↩

541. For more information, see: Melanie Gower and Patrick Butchard, “UK–Rwanda Migration and Economic Development Partnership” (research briefing, UK Parliament, July 2022). ↩

542. Interview with OS28. ↩

543. Interview with OS18. ↩

544. The Northern Ireland Executive Office, “Draft Refugee Integration Strategy 2022–2027” (Northern Irish Government, 2021): 29. ↩

545. Lucy Mayblin, “Access to the Labour Market as a ‘Pull Factor’ for Asylum Seekers: What the Research Shows,” policy briefing, University of Warwick, March 2016. ↩

546. Of the 246 people with experience in the asylum system surveyed by Lift the Ban, 72% declared that prior to arrival in the UK they did not know that asylum seekers are generally unable to work. Lift the Ban Coalition, Lift the Ban: Why People Seeking Asylum Should Have the Right to Work (Lift the Ban, 2018). ↩

547. Moritz Marbach, Jens Hainmueller, and Dominik Hangartner, “The Long-Term Impact of Employment Bans on the Economic Integration of Refugees.” Science Advances 4, no.9 (2018) 1-6. ↩

548. Scopus and the Web of Science were the academic databases selected for the systematic evidence review. ↩

549. This software enables easy management of references and identification of documents with particular codes. It allows researchers to quantify documents with specific codes to answer specific research questions that are outlined in the Statement of Requirements (SOR) and those that emerge during the analysis. ↩

550. Egnyte’s physical security of data is managed extensively with Tier III, SSAE 16 compliant co-location facilities that feature 24-hour manned security, biometric access control, and video surveillance. All servers reside in private cages that require physical keys to open. Data is stored and managed in line with best practices security frameworks. M&C Saatchi World Services’ deletion policies were designed in line with NIST and ISO 27001 frameworks and have subsequently been through third party audit and accredited as part of our ISO27001 certification. ↩