Guidance

Country policy and information note: sexual orientation and gender identity and expression, Georgia, October 2026 (accessible)

Updated 5 November 2026

Version 3.0

October 2026

Executive summary

This note does not cover the situation in the Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

LGBT+ people in Georgia are unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.

The Constitution of Georgia stipulates that all persons are equal before the law and prohibits any form of discrimination although it does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression. A person’s sex or sexual orientation is formally recognised as a protected ground under anti-discrimination legislation and as a basis of intolerance constituting an aggravating circumstance under the Criminal Code but rarely treated as such in practice. Similar references to gender identity were removed from several laws in 2025.

The 2024 Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors introduced a range of restrictions affecting LGBT+ people, including prohibitions of same-sex marriages, gender-affirming health care, legal gender reassignment or recognition measures, adoption, and fostering. The law further prohibits ‘popularisation’ of same-sex relationships and gender identities. While there were no documented cases of punishments imposed for violating the law, civil society organisations report self-censorship in media output on LGBT+ issues, advocacy, and awareness campaigns.

Entrenched stereotypes and prejudice against persons of diverse SOGIE continue to exist in Georgian society. LGBT+ people face systemic barriers to healthcare, employment, and education. Trans, gender-diverse, and intersex individuals are particularly affected by the 2024 ban of gender-affirming health care. Trans people also face greater exclusion from the labour market.

Spaces for the LGBT+ community to gather are limited and largely concentrated in Tbilisi. While support organisations exist, they face challenges such as vandalism of offices and staff homes and difficult fund-raising procedures following the recent adoption of foreign agent legislation. No Pride events or demonstrations were documented since 2024. Representatives of the ruling Georgian Dream party as well as pro-government media platforms frequently engage in homo- and transphobic rhetoric and portray LGBT+ activism as ‘propaganda’.

A person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a non-state actor is unlikely to be able to obtain protection from the state, as the state is, in general, able but not willing to provide effective protection.

Official statistics on the investigation, prosecution, and conviction for SOGIE-related hate crimes show a decreasing trend, with no hate crimes based on gender identity recorded in 2025. According to civil society and the media, however, violent hate crimes against the LGBT+ community have become more frequent in recent years and are underreported in official statistics. As such, Georgia’s criminal justice system is not considered to be effectively addressing anti-LGBT+ hate crimes. The Public Defender and human rights protection mechanisms are reportedly also not actively investigating complaints by LGBT+ individuals.

In general, internal relocation is likely to be reasonable and not unduly harsh, particularly to urban areas and large cities, such as Tbilisi.

Each case must be considered on its individual facts. Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

Assessment

Section updated: 17 September 2026

About the assessment

This section considers relevant evidence – including country information, refugee and human rights law and policy, and case law – to assess whether, in general:

• a person faces a real risk of persecution or serious harm by state or non-state actors because of their actual or perceived sexual orientation and/or gender identity or expression

• the state (or quasi state bodies) can provide effective protection

• internal relocation is possible to avoid persecution or serious harm

• if refused, a claim is likely or not to be certified as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

This note assesses the situation of actual and perceived lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and people of other minority sexual orientations and gender identities (LGBT+). Sources often refer to LGBT+ people collectively, but the experiences of each group may differ. Where information is available, the note will refer to and consider the treatment of each group discretely. This note does not cover the situation in the Russian-occupied regions of Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

For details on how CPIT makes its assessments, gathers and presents country information, its research methodology and disclaimers and explainers on coverage, source selection, maps, translations and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in developing CPIT products, see About country policy and information notes.

1. Material facts, credibility and other checks

1.1.1 Decision makers must:

• assess credibility (see the Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status, on Sexual identity issues in the asylum claim, and Gender identity issues in the asylum claim.)

• check if there has been a previous application for a UK visa or another form of leave. Asylum applications matched to visas should be investigated prior to the asylum interview (see the Asylum Instruction on Visa Matches, Asylum Claims from UK Visa Applicants).

• consider making an international biometric data-sharing check, when one has not already been undertaken (see Biometric data-sharing process (Migration 5 biometric data-sharing process)).

• consider language analysis testing, where available, in cases where there are doubts surrounding a person’s claimed place of origin (see the Asylum Instruction on Language Analysis)

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2. Exclusion

2.1.1 Decision makers must consider whether there are serious reasons to apply one (or more) of the exclusion clauses. Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

2.1.2 If the person is excluded from the Refugee Convention, they will also be excluded from a grant of humanitarian protection, which has a wider range of exclusions than refugee status.

2.1.3 For guidance on exclusion and restricted leave, see the Asylum Instruction on Exclusion under Articles 1F and 33(2) of the Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and the instruction on Restricted Leave.

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3. Convention reason(s)

3.1.1 Actual or imputed particular social group (PSG).

3.1.2 LGBT+ people form a PSG in Georgia within the meaning of the Refugee Convention because they share an innate characteristic or a common background that cannot be changed, or share a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it and have a distinct identity in Georgia because the group is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.

3.1.3 Although people of diverse SOGIE in Georgia form a PSG, establishing such membership is not sufficient to be recognised as a refugee. The question to be addressed is whether the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account of their membership of such a group.

3.1.4 For further guidance on the 5 Refugee Convention grounds, see the Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status.

4. Risk

4.1 Risk from the state

4.1.1 LGBT+ people in Georgia are, in general, unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from the state. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise.

4.1.2 Consensual same-sex sexual acts are not prohibited (see Provisions relating to same-sex relationships, marriage, and civil union).

4.1.3 The Constitution of Georgia stipulates that all persons are equal before the law and prohibits any form of discrimination, although it does not explicitly prohibit discrimination based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression. Other laws contain non-discrimination provisions relating to sex or sexual orientation. In 2025, laws that had explicitly protected gender identity were amended. While protections based on sexual orientation remain in place, gender identity and gender expression were removed as protected characteristics under anti-discrimination legislation and intolerance on the ground of gender or gender identity is no longer considered an aggravating circumstance under the Criminal Code, a provision that had rarely been enforced previously (see Anti-discrimination provisions and New state policy and legislation affecting LGBT+ people).

4.1.4 The Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, adopted in 2024, introduced a range of restrictions affecting LGBT+ people. The law prohibits ‘popularisation’, defined as the dissemination of information that may be regarded as promoting or presenting same-sex relationships, diverse sexual orientations or gender identities in a positive light. Restrictions apply to media, educational materials, demonstrations and assemblies, as well as other forms of public communication. ‘Popularisation’ in education and advertising is punishable through fines set out in the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia. The legislation defines ‘popularisation’ broadly, leaving scope for varying interpretations as to what expressions are prohibited. Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) report self-censorship in media output on LGBT+ issues, advocacy, and public awareness campaigns on sex education to avoid potential prosecution of staff (see Provisions relating to awareness-raising and activism, Support organisations and New state policy and legislation affecting LGBT+ people).

4.1.5 The 2024 Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors furthermore prohibits legal recognition of same-sex unions as marriage, including where people have married abroad. Its definition of marriage as a union of a woman and a man for the purpose of founding a family had previously been introduced by a 2017 amendment to the Georgian constitution (see Provisions relating to same-sex relationships, marriage, and civil union).

4.1.6 The 2024 Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors also restricts adoption and fostering to heterosexual individuals. Prior to the adoption of the 2024 law, Georgian law did not expressly prohibit adoption by LGBT+ people and single individuals were able to adopt, subject to statutory requirements. As Georgian law did not recognise same-sex marriages or civil unions, same-sex couples did not have a legal avenue to adopt jointly as a couple (see Provisions relating to same-sex relationships, marriage, and civil union).

4.1.7 The 2024 Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors prohibits gender-transition procedures and legal measures associated with gender reassignment or legal gender recognition. Previously, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) had held in its 2022 judgment in the case of A.D. and Others v. Georgia that ‘it is not clear at all what the legal regime for the change of the sex/gender marker [in civil-status records] actually is in Georgia’ (paragraph 74). Notably, the ECtHR had found in the same judgment that ‘despite the fact that … a right [to change the sex/gender marker in civil status records] has existed in the country since 1998, not a single case of successful legal gender recognition has been reported to date’ (paragraph 74). Performance of gender-affirming health care is now punishable through a fine, a temporary occupational ban, or imprisonment for 1 to 4 years. Official crime statistics have, as of mid-2026, not registered any criminal cases for providing prohibited gender-affirming health care (see Trans rights and Arrest, detention, and prosecution of LGBT+ people).

4.1.8 Representatives of the ruling Georgian Dream party as well as pro-government media platforms frequently engage in homophobic and transphobic rhetoric, for instance during the 2024 pre-election period, during the adoption of recent rights-restricting legislation, and during periods of heightened visibility of the LGBT+ community such as Pride Month. Public officials also regularly portray LGBT+ activism as ‘propaganda’ as part of a wider anti-European and anti-liberal rhetoric that is tied in with the promotion of ‘traditional’ Georgian values which adds to the marginalisation of LGBT+ people (see Statements of public officials and state-aligned media).

4.1.9 In the sources consulted (see Bibliography), there were no documented cases in which a person or organisation was fined, convicted, or formally punished for actions prohibited by the 2024 Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors. No official data on dispensed administrative penalties relating to ‘popularisation’ was available (see Arrest, detention, and prosecution of LGBT+ people and Violence against LGBT+ people).

4.1.10 There is limited information in sources consulted (see Bibliography) on police treatment. While one source reported instances of detention and prosecution of LGBT+ people who were themselves victims of assaults, the only example listed was a case that occurred in 2017 and resulted in an administrative fine. A further source made a general reference to instances of violence and harassment by state actors against LGBT+ people but provided no examples. During the 2024/ 2025 demonstrations against the Georgian Dream government, individuals whose appearance deviated from conventional gender presentations were reportedly particularly affected by police violence and exposed to homophobic hate speech by state authorities. However, security forces’ response during protests, and in the context of unrest at that time, is not necessarily representative of broader state treatment outside that specific environment (see Arrest, detention, and prosecution of LGBT+ people and Violence against LGBT+ people).

4.1.11 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status, on Sexual identity issues in the asylum claim, and Gender identity issues in the asylum claim.

4.2 Risk from non-state actors

4.2.1 LGBT+ people in Georgia are, in general, unlikely to face a real risk of persecution or serious harm from non-state actors. The onus is on the person to demonstrate otherwise. LGBT+ people may experience discrimination, harassment, social exclusion, threats, and violence from non-state actors. Each case must be considered on its facts, taking account of the nature, severity and cumulative impact of any treatment experienced by the person.

4.2.2 Entrenched stereotypes and prejudice against people of diverse SOGIE continue to exist in Georgian society, with discriminatory attitudes being particularly pronounced among more rural populations. The Georgian Orthodox Church, to which 82% of the total population of Georgia belongs, frames LGBT+ issues as a threat to ‘traditional’ Georgian values and culture, fuelling stigma, discrimination, and harassment of persons of diverse SOGIE (see Demography, Lived experience, Public attitudes, and Treatment by the public and family members).

4.2.3 The Asylum Instruction on Sexual identity issues in the asylum claim notes that ‘[d]iscrimination and societal disapproval may not in themselves amount to persecution but, if expressed in an extreme way and without effective protection from the State, then outright hostility, general discriminatory measures and the cumulative effects of harassment, threats and restrictions can constitute persecution’ (page 16).

4.2.4 Conversion therapy is not banned however there is limited information on whether it occurs in practise. There is reference to ‘several cases’ of psychiatric intervention for children in 2024 but no further detail. There are no reported cases of surgery on intersex children or on non-consenting adults in sources consulted (see Conversion therapy and involuntary medical practices)

4.2.5 Spaces for the LGBT+ community to gather are limited and largely concentrated in Tbilisi. According to one source, they have at times come under threat, but no further detail on the nature or consequences of the threat was provided. Persons of diverse SOGIE are unable to enjoy the right to assembly and freedom of expression following the adoption of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors and recent changes to the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations. In the sources consulted (see Bibliography), there were no records of recently organised demonstrations or Pride events in Georgia (see Lived experience, Visibility and activism, and Provisions relating to awareness-raising and activism).

4.2.6 While support organisations exist, they face challenges. Community outreach has become increasingly difficult, offices and staff homes have been vandalised and financial resources have decreased. New ‘foreign agent’ legislation has been introduced, granting the state the power to monitor activities, finances, internal communications, and documents of organisations that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad. They also enable the state to restrict foreign funding and support to areas that align with the government’s interests, and make the grant of foreign funds dependent on state approval. Support organisations are thus increasingly unable to continue support and service provision programmes, particularly outside major cities (see Support organisations).

4.2.7 People of diverse SOGIE face systemic barriers to healthcare, employment, and education that render them vulnerable to physical and socio-economic hardship. This vulnerability is exacerbated where an individual’s diverse SOGIE intersects with other socio-economic or demographic vulnerabilities, such as belonging to an ethnic or religious minority, being an internally displaced person, or disability (see Access to services).

4.2.8 Stigma, a lack of specialised medical training, discriminatory attitudes and self-censorship of medical professionals, as well as financial barriers affect the LGBT+ community’s access to healthcare. This situation has worsened with the adoption of the Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, as its ban on gender-affirming healthcare creates significant challenges for trans and gender-diverse individuals undergoing treatment and for those with congenital conditions requiring continuous diagnostics and treatment. The non-governmental organisation (NGO) Equality Movement provides access to HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis treatment and self-testing kits. The effects of the Covid pandemic and the radicalisation of political and societal homophobia in Georgia have reportedly exacerbated the LGBT+ community’s mental health needs, while new legislation restricting foreign funding of CSOs has limited their ability to raise funds for support programmes. CSOs are therefore unable to fully cover the LGBT+ community’s unmet healthcare needs (see Access to healthcare).

4.2.9 Homophobic bullying and discrimination occurs in schools as well as higher and vocational education institutions, albeit slightly less in the latter two. The involvement of some school administrations and academic personnel is reported. While sexual education had never been fully integrated into Georgia’s school curricula, the Law on the Protection of Family Values and Minors now explicitly prohibits the dissemination of information on diverse SOGIE in educational settings and to minors (see Access to education).

4.2.10 Discrimination in the workplace based on sexual orientation and gender identity reportedly occurs during recruitment as well as employment and can serve as ground for termination. This compels many LGBT+ persons to conceal their SOGIE in the workplace. While many persons of diverse SOGIE are integrated in the labour market, employment is frequently precarious and poorly paid. Trans people face greater exclusion from the labour market, leading many to work in the informal economy and engage in sex work, often under abusive conditions and some when they are minors (see Access to employment).

4.2.11 Homophobic and transphobic hate speech and threats, including death threats, against people of diverse SOGIE on social media have increased in recent years. Several cases of blackmailing through the dissemination of personal information, including forced ‘coming out’ of individuals, have been reported. Far-right groups have repeatedly spread discriminatory and inciting rhetoric and mobilised disruptive public protests and counter-demonstrations against LGBT+ events such as IDAHOT, Tbilisi Pride, conferences, and cultural events, leading the organisation Tbilisi Pride to largely suspend its activities and close its office in 2025. However, in the sources consulted (see Bibliography), there were no reports of public LGBT+ events taking place in 2025 or 2026. Familial or friendly association with a person of diverse SOGIE may expose the family member or friend to threats and stigmatisation (see Hate speech and Treatment by the public and family members).

4.2.12 According to reports by civil society and the media, violent hate crimes against members of the LGBT+ community and support organisations have become more frequent in recent years, but are underreported in official statistics as victims frequently refrain from reporting crimes to the authorities. Violent hate crimes are perpetrated both in the public and the domestic spheres, and include physical assault, domestic abuse, and sexual harassment. Official Georgian statistics on hate crimes most often record the social relation between perpetrator and victim as stranger or acquaintance, with intimate partners, parents, and other family members recorded as perpetrators in a few instances only. However, since official Georgian hate crime statistics reportedly only capture a part of the overall anti-LGBT+ violence, this breakdown may be inaccurate (see Public attitudes, Protection, and Violent hate crimes).

4.2.13 According to a report by the Office of the Belgian Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA), most societal violence against LGBT+ people occurs within the family. The OFPRA report noted that experiences varied between LGBT+ people and that gay and bisexual men and trans women were more likely to experience a breakdown in family relations than lesbian women and trans men, indicating familial treatment is likely to depend on a range of factors (see Protection, Lived experience, and Treatment by the public and family members).

4.2.14 Individuals whose physical appearance does not conform to binary norms of femininity or masculinity may be more likely to experience violence and harassment in public, irrespective of their actual SOGIE. Two high profile cases of violence against trans people were reported in the media in 2025, one being a murder for which the perpetrator was convicted. There are also reports of a growing number of assaults against LGBT+ individuals during meetings scheduled through dating applications. Homophobic and transphobic violence has historically increased during periods of heightened LGBT+ visibility such as IDAHOT, Pride Month, and Tbilisi Pride in 2021 and 2023. However, since there are no documented cases of public LGBT+ events taking place since 2024, including due to Tbilisi Pride’s suspending its activities and closing of its office in 2025, it is difficult to ascertain to what extent this still occurs (see Violent hate crimes).

4.2.15 If a LGBT+ person is not ‘out’ about or conceals their sexual orientation and/or gender identity, consider why this is the case. If it is because the person fears persecution or serious harm and this is well-founded, they are likely to require asylum or humanitarian protection.

4.2.16 For further guidance on assessing risk, see the Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status, on Sexual identity issues in the asylum claim and Gender identity issues in the asylum claim.

5. Protection

5.1.1 A person who has a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a non-state actor is unlikely to be able to obtain protection from the state. This is because, in general, it is able but not willing to offer effective protection.

5.1.2 State protection mechanisms for people of diverse SOGIE have in recent years been weakened through the dissolution of the Gender Equality Council as well as the removal of LGBT+ issues from the parliament’s Gender Equality Concept, the National Strategy for the Protection of Human Rights and the related Action Plan (see New state policy and legislation affecting LGBT+ people).

5.1.3 Official statistics on the investigation, prosecution, and conviction for SOGIE-related hate crimes show a decreasing trend over the past five years. While the number of initiated criminal investigations decreased from 106 in 2021 to 28 in 2025, the number of launched prosecutions decreased from 69 in 2021 to only 3 in 2025, with no hate crimes based on gender identity recorded anymore. Whereas the number of convictions has seen a less pronounced decline, this statistic can reasonably be expected to follow the trend of the launched prosecutions given the procedural link (see Protection).

5.1.4 While the declining trends in the official statistics could signify an actual decrease in SOGIE-related hate crimes, this conflicts with reports of civil society organisations and media that consistently point to increased violence and underreporting of crimes to law enforcement authorities. Violent responses to anti-government demonstrations and the use of offensive and homophobic language by law enforcement officers have eroded trust in the police and other state institutions. Victims of hate crimes thus rarely report incidents to the police as they fear discrimination, that they will not be believed, or inaction by law enforcement officers (see Protection).

5.1.5 The Georgian authorities have furthermore repeatedly failed to provide effective protection to LGBT+ persons against attacks, especially in the context of Pride events. Although violent groups had announced their intentions to disrupt the 2021 and 2023 Tbilisi Pride events in advance, the police failed to take effective measures to prevent them. The police did, however, evacuate participants of the 2023 Tbilisi Pride. While some anti-LGBT+ protesters were arrested and prosecuted for theft, damage, and destruction of property during the 2021 and 2023 Tbilisi Pride events, the instigators and organisers of the attacks have not been brought to justice. In subsequent years, Tbilisi Pride has refrained from organising further Pride events citing safety concerns (see Protection and Response to violence during the 2021 and 2023 Pride events).

5.1.6 Lawyers’ organisations report that the Law on Family Values and Protection of Minors has affected legal assistance available to LGBT+ individuals, as lawyers feel discouraged from providing legal support out of a fear it could be interpreted as facilitating prohibited action. Judicial and administrative bodies are reported to systematically delay the provision of information and the scheduling of proceedings (see Protection).

5.1.7 Access to human rights protection mechanisms have declined as submissions by LGBT+ people are routinely rejected or ignored. In addition, the removal of ‘gender identity’ as a protected ground from legislation in 2025 has left victims of police discrimination based on gender identity with no legal basis for a challenge. Crimes motivated by gender or gender identity are no longer an aggravating circumstance under the Criminal Code. While the relevant provisions under the Criminal Code were only rarely enforced in the past, a trans or gender-diverse victim now no longer has a legal basis for redress and protection. While the Public Defender’s Office had previously served as an outspoken supporter of the LGBT+ community in anti-discrimination efforts, since the election of a new Public Defender in 2023 it is perceived to be substantially aligned with government interests (see Protection and The Public Defender (Ombudsman)).

5.1.8 For further guidance on assessing state protection, see the Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status, on Sexual identity issues in the asylum claim, and Gender identity issues in the asylum claim.

6. Internal relocation

6.1.1 In general, a person with a well-founded fear of persecution or serious harm from a non-state or rogue state actor is likely to be able to internally relocate to escape that risk. This includes, but is not limited to, the capital city of Tbilisi. Each case must be considered on its facts.

6.1.2 Georgia is a small country with a population of approximately 3.9 million. Approximately 1.3 million people live in the capital of Tbilisi, and safe social spaces for LGBT+ are reportedly available. Further, urban areas such as the capital are reported to provide more socio-economic opportunities than rural areas. Discriminatory societal attitudes remain, however, relatively consistent throughout the country.

6.1.3 Internal relocation will not be an option if it depends on the person concealing their sexual orientation and/or gender identity in the proposed new location if the reason (or one of the reasons) is a fear of persecution. Each case must be considered on its facts.

6.1.4 For further guidance on internal relocation and factors to consider, see the Asylum Instructions on Assessing Credibility and Refugee Status, Sexual identity issues in the asylum claim, and Gender identity issues in the asylum claim.

7. Certification

7.1.1 Where a claim is refused, it is unlikely to be certifiable as ‘clearly unfounded’ under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

7.1.2 Each case must be considered on its individual facts.

7.1.3 For further guidance on certification, see Certification of Protection and Human Rights claims under section 94 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (clearly unfounded claims).

Country information

About the country information

The COI provides the basis for the assessment and the executive summary. Decision makers must use relevant COI as the evidential basis for decisions.

The cut-off date for COI included in this note is 10 August 2026.

Some country information quoted in this CPIN was published in languages other than English and has been translated using free online translation tools. Sources originally published in other languages are clearly signposted throughout.

Where summaries of Georgian legislation reproduce its terminology, in particular the use of ‘sex’ rather than ‘gender’, this is done for accuracy and descriptive purposes, and should not be taken as indicating agreement with, or endorsement of, such terminology.

For details on how CPIT gathers and presents country information, its research methodology and disclaimers and explainers on coverage, source selection, maps, translations and the use of Artificial Intelligence (AI) in developing CPIT products, see About country policy and information notes

8. Demography

8.1.1 According to the results of the 2024 Population Census of Georgia, the population of Georgia stood at 3.9 million as of November 2024. Approximately 1.3 million Georgians live in the country’s capital Tbilisi^{[footnote 1]}.

8.1.2 The 2024 census results furthermore indicate that approximately 3.2 million Georgians adhere to the Georgian Orthodox faith, or 82% of the total population^{[footnote 2]}.

8.1.3 The French Office for the Protection of Refugees and Stateless Persons (OFPRA) noted in a report on the situation of sexual minorities in Georgia (OFPRA 2025 Report), published in French in March 2025: ‘The Georgian LGBT+ community was estimated to number several thousand people in 2019. In 2018, the NGO Tanadgoma estimated the population of gay men at approximately 18,500. The majority of the LGBT+ community lives in Tbilisi, Batumi and Kutaisi.’^{[footnote 3]}

The first sentence of the quoted paragraph paraphrases a report by the UN’s Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity on his visit to Georgia that was published in May 2019 and noted: ‘… at a rough estimate, the trans community in Batumi could be as high as 100 persons and […] thousands of gay men or men who had sex with men, as well as lesbian and bisexual persons, were active members of social networks.’^{[footnote 4]}

9. Legal framework

9.1 Anti-discrimination provisions

9.1.1 Article 11 of the Constitution of Georgia, adopted in 1995 and most recently amended in 2018, stipulates that all persons are equal before the law and prohibits any discrimination. The article contains a non-exhaustive list of potential discrimination grounds that does not explicitly refer to sexual orientation, gender identity and expression (SOGIE)^{[footnote 5]}.

9.1.2 The Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, adopted in 2014 in Georgian language and amended most recently in 2025, is intended to eliminate every form of discrimination and ensure equal rights of every person under the legislation of Georgia, irrespective of, inter alia, gender and sexual orientation^{[footnote 6]}. Whereas the 2014 version of the law specifically referred to “gender identity and expression” as well^{[footnote 7]}, a 2025 amendment deleted this reference^{[footnote 8]}.

For information on LGBT+ individuals’ access to services such as healthcare, education, and employment, see Access to services.

9.1.3 Article 2.3 of the Labour Code of Georgia, adopted in 2010 in Georgian language and amended most recently in 2025, prohibits any discrimination in labour and pre-contractual relations, including, inter alia, on the grounds of gender and sexual orientation^{[footnote 9]}.

For information on accessibility of the labour market for LGBT+ individuals, see Access to employment.

9.1.4 Article 53 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia, adopted in 1999 in Georgian language and amended most recently in 2026, provides that the commission of a crime on the basis of sexual orientation constitutes an aggravating circumstance for all crimes under the Code^{[footnote 10]}. Whereas previous versions of the Criminal Code also listed “gender” and “gender identity” as aggravating reasons for intolerance^{[footnote 11]}, a 2025 amendment deleted these references^{[footnote 12]}.

9.2 Provisions relating to same-sex relationships, marriage, and civil union

9.2.1 Article 30 of the Constitution of Georgia, defines marriage as a union of a woman and a man for the purpose of founding a family^{[footnote 13]}. This definition was introduced by the 2017 law On Amendments to the Constitution of Georgia^{[footnote 14]}.

9.2.2 Similarly, article 4 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, adopted in 2024, defines marriage in Georgia as a voluntary union exclusively between a man and a woman for the purpose of forming a family. It explicitly prohibits the registration or legal recognition of same-sex unions as marriage, including those concluded abroad which have no legal validity in Georgia^{[footnote 15]}.

9.2.3 Article 5 of the same law prohibits the adoption of a child by a non-heterosexual person^{[footnote 16]}. The prohibition is replicated in article 4 of the Law of Georgia on Adoption and Foster Care^{[footnote 17]}.

9.2.4 The undated International Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex Association (ILGA) World Database entry for Georgia indicated that ‘[t]he Criminal Code (2000) of Georgia removed the pre-existing sodomy provisions that were carried through from the Soviet Union period’^{[footnote 18]}, thus decriminalising consensual same-sex sexual acts.

9.3 Trans rights

9.3.1 Article 5 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors prohibits the adoption of a child by a person that does not identify with a biological sex or that identifies with a sex different from their biological sex^{[footnote 19]}.

9.3.2 Article 6 of the same law prohibits procedures intended to assign or reassign an individual to a different sex through medical means^{[footnote 20]}.

9.3.3 Article 176 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia defines the punishment for the performance of a surgical operation or other medical treatment intended to assign an individual to a different sex as a fine, an occupational ban of up to three years, or imprisonment for one to four years^{[footnote 21]}. See Arrest, detention, and prosecution of LGBT+ people.

9.3.4 Article 7 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors prohibits registering or later changing a person’s sex in civil status records to anything other than their biological sex. It also prohibits indicating a different sex in identity documents or other official state-issued documents as well as recognising or enforcing foreign court decisions that assign a person a non-biological or non-binary sex^{[footnote 22]}.

9.4 Provisions relating to awareness-raising and activism

9.4.1 Article 3 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors defines the term ‘popularisation’ as the positive or exemplary portrayal of same-sex relationships as well as of identification with a sex different from one’s biological sex or with a non-binary sex^{[footnote 23]}.

9.4.2 Article 8 of the same law prohibits ‘popularisation’ as defined in article 3 in educational institutions^{[footnote 24]}.

9.4.3 Article 172 10 of the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia, adopted in 1984 and last amended in June 2026, sets the punishment for ‘popularisation’ in educational institutions as a fine of ₾1,500 Georgian lari (GEL) [approximately £425 GBP^{[footnote 25]}] for a natural person [individual human beings] and ₾4,000 GEL [approximately £1,133 GBP^{[footnote 26]}] for a legal person [private or public organisations]^{[footnote 27]}.

9.4.4 Article 9 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors prohibits ‘popularisation’ as defined in article 3 by broadcasters and in advertisements, as well as through direct communication with a minor^{[footnote 28]}.

9.4.5 Article 172 10 of the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia sets the punishment for ‘popularisation’ in advertisements as a fine of ₾800 GEL [approximately £226 GBP^{[footnote 29]}] for a natural person and ₾2,500 GEL [approximately £708 GBP^{[footnote 30]}] for a legal person. ‘Popularisation’ towards a minor is punishable by a fine of ₾1,000 GEL [approximately £283 GBP^{[footnote 31]}] for a natural person and ₾3,000 GEL [approximately £850 GBP^{[footnote 32]}] for a legal person^{[footnote 33]}.

9.4.6 Article 10 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors prohibits public assemblies and manifestations aimed at ‘popularisation’ as defined in article 3^{[footnote 34]}.

9.4.7 Article 9(6) of the Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations, adopted in 1997 and last amended in 2025, prohibits demonstrations aimed at ‘popularisation’ as defined in article 3 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors. Article 13(8) of the Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations stipulates that, where a demonstration is held in contravention of this prohibition, law enforcement authorities may terminate it if the event hasn’t ceased 15 minutes after participants have been informed of its unlawful nature. Article 14(1) of the same law sets out that the Ministry of Internal Affairs is authorised to prohibit the holding of such events^{[footnote 35]}.

See also New state policy and legislation affecting LGBT+ people.

10. LGBT+ community

10.1 Lived experience

10.1.1 Following a visit to Georgia, the UN’s Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity published a report in May 2019, the most recent available. It noted that ‘… systemic factors deny lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and gender diverse persons the right to live free and equal in Georgia.’^{[footnote 36]}

10.1.2 The same report continued:

‘[The Independent Expert] encountered the pervasive notion that the aspects inherent to the sexual orientation or gender identity of lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and gender diverse persons living in Georgia were sinful, shameful or pathologic. The societal goal appears to perpetuate a vision of Georgia as a country composed exclusively of heterosexual, cisgender persons. As a result, the majority view is that lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans and gender diverse persons must conceal their identity if they want to be recognized as citizens respectful of mores and values qualified as “good”. Those convictions are fuelled and reinforced by agents of the church, tolerated and at times sponsored by politicians, governmental and law enforcement agents, and replicated by mass and social media.’^{[footnote 37]}

10.1.3 The same report also noted: ‘The consequences of this concerted attack are real. They include the threat for members of the community of exposure to violence and exclusion from health, housing, work and economic opportunities, and indeed all other basic elements fundamental to a person’s quest for happiness, through mechanisms of social exclusion and ostracism.’^{[footnote 38]}

10.1.4 The same report further stated:

‘Each lesbian, gay, bisexual, trans or gender diverse person in Georgia puts in place some sort of survival strategy. Very few are protected by status or wealth; others leave the country and break their family bonds to seek asylum elsewhere. Those who remain face the choice of revealing their true self and being subjected to certain violence and discrimination or concealing that essential aspect of their identity and living in a parallel world. For them, the fate is the invisibility of their needs and their realities, non-existence in official data and constant fear of exposure.’^{[footnote 39]}

10.1.5 In the 2022 Gallup World Poll, 9% of survey respondents in Georgia indicated that their city or area was a good place to live for gay or lesbian people^{[footnote 40]}. In Georgia, the poll consisted of 1,000 face-to-face interviews conducted between August and October 2022, with South Ossetia and Abkhazia as well as small and remote mountainous villages excluded^{[footnote 41]}.

10.1.6 David Rypel, a London-based ‘social scientist specialising in ethnographic research’^{[footnote 42]} noted in a statement provided to research network Asylos in August 2024:

‘… [S]everal of my LGBTQI [research] participants felt that they had to shield their parents from societal discrimination. Especially those whose families live in smaller villages and communities said they were reluctant to come out or be ‘visible’ in their hometowns to protect their families from peer pressure and shaming. In some cases, this was their parents’ request, and at least one of my participants was discouraged by their mother from reporting their victimisation to the police out of fear that she might become the target of her neighbours’ abuse. Therefore, LGBTQI people must sometimes assume the role of shielding their families from societal discrimination at their own expense.’^{[footnote 43]}

10.1.7 The OFPRA 2025 Report furthermore observed:

‘The decriminalisation of homosexuality in 2000 encouraged the development of […] meeting places. The arrival of the internet enabled LGBT+ people to communicate online through the websites gay.ge and lesbi.ge, as well as through private groups on social media and Russian-language forums. Since the 2010s, certain bars and nightlife venues […] have provided spaces for freedom and socialisation for members of the LGBT+ community. However, these venues have at times come under threat.’^{[footnote 44]} The source did not expand further on the nature of the threat.

10.1.8 The OFPRA 2025 Report also stated: ‘As safe social spaces for LGBT+ people are limited and largely concentrated in Tbilisi, online platforms provide members of the community with opportunities to socialise. However, they also make them more vulnerable to cyberharassment.’^{[footnote 45]}

10.1.9 Equality Movement, a Georgian NGO providing social, legal, and healthcare services for women and the LGBTQ community^{[footnote 46]}, noted in a statement to the CGRS in September 2025, published in the CGRS 2025 Report: ‘… [T]he safe spaces for community gatherings have become extremely limited. Practically, nowadays only queer friendly clubs, bars and community organization’s offices … [are] left as a space for community’s secure socialization.’^{[footnote 47]}

10.1.10 Equality Movement further observed in a statement to the CGRS that was made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report:

‘The family members of LGBTQ+ individuals are also affected. The spread of anti-LGBT propaganda, combined with the recent legal developments has intensified already widespread homo-, bi-, and transphobic hatred in society. This has led to an increase in incidents of bullying, threats, and discrimination, particularly on social media and in public spaces. Given the extreme polarization within society, these issues are becoming even more severe.’^{[footnote 48]}

10.1.11 The same statement continued: ‘[It n]eeds to be stressed that not only families of LGBTQ+ individuals, but also those of professionals working in LGBTQ+ community organizations, are at risk of deteriorating mental health, along with increasing social and economic marginalization. In some cases, the risk may also extend to physical danger.’^{[footnote 49]}

10.1.12 Equality Movement also observed in a statement to the CGRS that:

‘The social and economic challenges faced by the LGBTI community are relatively harsher in the peripheral spaces of the country. The problems, on the one hand, are caused by the uneven distribution of socio-economic resources, which creates a development gap between urban and rural spaces. As a result, structural poverty is more acute in small towns and villages, further exacerbating the socio-economic vulnerability of LGBTI individuals living in these areas.’^{[footnote 50]}

10.2 Returnees

10.2.1 Equality Movement noted in a statement published in the CGRS 2025 Report ‘It is rare to find LGBTQ+ individuals returning to Georgia. The very few who are compelled to return—due to reasons such as denial of asylum in other countries, family obligations, or other personal emergencies—face extreme social and economic exclusion, along with significant risks to their physical safety. … Most LGBTQ+ individuals who have recently returned are actively seeking ways to leave the country again.’^{[footnote 51]}

10.2.2 Equality Movement further observed in a statement to the CGRS that was made in September 2025 and also published in the CGRS 2025 Report in the same month:

‘… [T]he lives of those LGBTQ+ individuals returning are just as full of challenges as those of community members who never left the country. They face serious difficulties related to a radicalized security context as well as social and economic exclusion, such as limited access to employment, healthcare, and other essential issues.

‘The difference may not be large, but it is important to emphasize: when LGBTQ+ individuals are forced to leave Georgia, they must quit their jobs, give up housing, and sometimes lose social connections as well. The difficulties they faced before remain the same or can even worsen when they are compelled to return. … [T]he most common challenges for returnees are ongoing experiences of bullying and discrimination, sometimes including verbal and physical assault, as well as difficulties in finding stable employment to cover housing and basic necessities.’^{[footnote 52]}

10.3 Visibility and activism

10.3.1 The US Department of State’s 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices, published in April 2024 and covering events of 2023 (USSD 2023 Report), noted: ‘The ability of LGBTQI+ individuals to assemble in public or private or to form associations – as well as the ability of LGBTQI+ organizations to legally register or convene events – was limited.’^{[footnote 53]}

10.3.2 The US Department of State’s 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices in Georgia (USSD 2024 Report) did not contain a section on acts of violence, criminalization, and other abuses based on sexual orientation, gender identity or expression, or sex characteristics^{[footnote 54]}.

10.3.3 The OFPRA 2025 Report observed:

‘The issue of visibility divides the community between those who favour discretion in order to continue carrying out grassroots work, and those who favour greater visibility in order to change public attitudes.

‘On the one hand, organisations such as Equality Movement, Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Temida, and Tanadgoma support a more discreet approach so that they can continue their field work safely, particularly with sex workers, people who use injectable drugs, and people living with HIV. Several LGBT+ artists’ collectives have adopted the same strategy, seeking to advance their cause through cultural means without drawing excessive attention to themselves and thereby avoiding direct confrontation.

‘On the other hand, organisations such as Tbilisi Pride—which is responsible for organising events during Pride Month—and GrlzWave pursue extensive social media communication strategies that reach a broad audience. Although activists consider this level of visibility necessary for strengthening connections within the community and raising awareness of issues affecting LGBT+ people, it requires them to implement additional security measures, such as Tbilisi Pride’s practice of verifying the identities of participants before events.

‘Most activists working to defend the rights of LGBT+ persons and, more broadly, human rights, know one another and come together to speak with a unified voice whenever their rights are under attack, despite differing views on the form that their activism should take.’^{[footnote 55]}

10.3.4 The same report noted: ‘Various events are organised discreetly by the LGBT+ community in Tbilisi, without significant publicity. For example, it is possible to attend screenings of certain Georgian LGBT+-themed films…

‘More public events are organised by LGBT+ persons to mark the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia on 17 May, and during the months of June and July, when Tbilisi Pride holds its Pride Festival. However, this period is generally also the time when violence is at its highest. For this reason, in 2024, LGBT+ rights organisations chose to cancel public events. Accordingly, the NGO Tbilisi Pride decided not to organise a Pride Festival in 2024, citing a context in which hatred towards the LGBT+ community was being instrumentalised in the run-up to the parliamentary elections of 26 October that year.’^{[footnote 56]}

10.3.5 Human Rights Watch reported in its World Report 2025, covering events of 2024: ‘In 2024, the organizers of Tbilisi Pride refrained from holding in-person events during Pride Month, citing concerns over potential violence and hate rhetoric, compounded by introduction of the anti-LGBT legislation.’^{[footnote 57]}

10.3.6 The Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia published his 2024 Special Report ‘On the Situation of Equality and Combating and Preventing Discrimination’ (2024 Ombudsman Report) in May 2025, which stated:

‘The LGBTQ+ community in Georgia did not enjoy the constitutional right to assembly and demonstration in 2024. In the context of the right to assembly and demonstration, Article 10 of the Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors is noteworthy, which, among other things, prohibits assemblies aimed at promoting relationships between members of the same biological sex, expressed on the basis of sexual orientation. Although according to the legislative regulation, only the kind of information and actions that present specific issues positively and/or as exemplary are considered popularization, the exact scope of the prohibition remains unclear, which has a deterrent effect in terms of exercising freedom of expression.’^{[footnote 58]}

10.3.7 Equality Movement observed in a statement to the CGRS, published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025 that ‘… the relatively visible part of the community or individuals who openly position as LGBTI activists are more likely to be targeted for physical danger or discrimination.’^{[footnote 59]}

10.3.8 The same statement continued:

‘… [H]uman rights activists focused to raise the visibility of the community are increasingly targeted for demonization and marginalization. They are often labeled by propagandistic media outlets as a “threat to children” or “enemies of the church.” It should be stressed that associating prominent human rights activists with the LGBTI community - regardless of their actual identity - has become a common tactic to undermine their work and discredit their public image. Due to physical threats fueled by such endeavors of the ruling party, many human rights activists had been forced to flee the country.’^{[footnote 60]}

10.3.9 Equality Movement also noted in a statement to CGRS, made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025:

‘Since the law [on Family Values and the Protection of Minors] came into force, LGBTQ+ content … has practically disappeared from the media landscape. Nowadays, concerns about the challenges faced by the community are raised only by a limited number of online media outlets and LGBTQ+ community organizations.

‘… [M]edia coverage of LGBTQ+ issues is significantly limited. The focus is primarily on broadcasting anti-gender legal developments and, occasionally, on a few critical incidents involving activists who are relatively well-known to the public. Notably, positive coverage of LGBTQ+ issues has completely disappeared.’^{[footnote 61]}

10.3.10 The ILGA noted in its latest Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe and Central Asia (2026 ILGA Report), published in 2026 and covering January to December 2025:

‘The Pride movement in Georgia, led by Tbilisi Pride, has constituted one of the most visible tests of equality, civic space, and democratic governance in the country. Pride initiatives have represented not only advocacy for LGBTI rights but also a broader indicator of Georgia’s commitment to human rights standards and the protection of freedom of assembly. Pride-related events, including the March for Dignity in 2021 and the Pride Festival in 2023, were violently disrupted by far-right groups.’ ^{[footnote 62]} See also Response to violence during the 2021 and 2023 Pride events.

10.3.11 Patrycja Grzebyk, rapporteur of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), noted in her ‘Report on Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms since Spring 2024’ (OSCE 2026 Report), published in March 2026:

‘… [The Law on Family Values and the Protection of Minors] constitutes a restriction of … [freedom of expression and freedom of assembly] as it directly prohibits almost any public expression on certain topics and bans assemblies related to a certain theme.

‘… [T]he key category of ‘popularization’ is defined in markedly broad and vague terms as essentially any information or actions aimed at presenting issues related to gender identity, sexual orientation or incest in positive or exemplary light. This could be interpreted as prohibiting education or awareness-raising campaigns aimed at promoting sexual health or even as requiring LGBT+ individuals to conceal their sexual orientation or gender identity in their daily lives. Furthermore, … essentially equating same-sex relationships and gender identity other than conforming to prevailing social norms with incest is stigmatizing and degrading and has no place in countries that claim to uphold human dignity and human rights.’^{[footnote 63]}

10.3.12 In the OSCE 2026 Report, the rapporteur furthermore noted with regards to the Law on Family Values and the Protection of Minors:

‘… [R]estrictions put in place by the said law are so severe that they may be held as infringing upon the very essence of [freedom of expression and freedom of assembly] … In wholly banning public gatherings organized around the theme of LGBT+ rights the law in question essentially nullifies the right to assembly. In banning any expression that would ‘popularize’ LGBT+ rights it can be interpreted as wholly denying the right to speak on those issues or even expressing sexual or gender identities of the persons concerned.’^{[footnote 64]}

10.4 Support organisations

10.4.1 Equality Movement is a Georgian NGO which provides social, legal, and healthcare services for women and the LGBTQ community. At the time of writing, its webpage remained accessible online, with content updated in recent weeks^{[footnote 65]} (see Healthcare).

10.4.2 The Women’s Initiative Supporting Group (WISG) is a feminist organisation advocating for women’s rights, particularly those of lesbian and bisexual women and transe people. Its webpage remained accessible online at the time of writing, with content uploaded in recent weeks^{[footnote 66]}.

10.4.3 Tbilisi Pride is an organisation focused on strengthening the LGBT+ community and conducting advocacy aimed at influencing the political agenda and public opinion in Georgia. Its webpage remained accessible online at the time of writing, with content uploaded in recent weeks^{[footnote 67]}. In recent months, the organisation’s social media channels have only advertised events for the Georgian LGBT+ community abroad to where its staff appear to have relocated^{[footnote 68]}.

10.4.4 The online publication ’Queer’ publishes articles and information on issues affecting the LGBTQ+ community of Georgia. Its webpage remained accessible at the time of writing^{[footnote 69]}.

10.4.5 Queer Initiative is an activist collective advocating for LGBTQ+ rights and equality in Georgia. At the time of writing, its social media channels remained active^{[footnote 70]}.

10.4.6 The Caucasus Research Resource Center, a ‘network of research, resource and training centers established in 2003 in the capital cities of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia’^{[footnote 71]}, noted in a report on civil society organisations working on gender equality in Georgia, published in 2024: ‘The difficulties of working with state agencies are particularly hard for organizations working on LGBTQI+ issues. Due to their infrequent involvement in discussions and working processes, they struggle to participate in the decision-making process, and their recommendations often go unconsidered.’^{[footnote 72]}

10.4.7 The ILGA noted in its 2025 Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe and Central Asia (2025 ILGA Report), published in 2025 and covering the year 2024: ‘In the spring of 2024, Tbilisi Pride office was vandalised twice by unidentified persons likely having ties with the [ruling party] Georgian Dream.’^{[footnote 73]}

10.4.8 The OFPRA 2025 Report observed: ‘Several NGOs and initiatives advocating for the rights of LGBT+ persons exist in Georgia. Emigration and exposure to violence result in a high turnover rate among these organisations and their members.’ ^{[footnote 74]}

10.4.9 The same report noted that ‘… several human rights organisations include LGBT+ rights within their programmes. These include the Social Justice Center (SJC), GrlzWave, Sapari, the Human Rights House, the Human Rights Center, the International Society for Fair Elections and Democracy (ISFED), the Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association (GYLA), Transparency International Georgia, and the Open Society Georgia Foundation (OSGF).’^{[footnote 75]}

10.4.10 The WISG noted in a report on the eradication of LGBTQI+ issues from state policy in Georgia (WISG 2025 Report), published in May 2025:

‘LGBTQI+ organizations in Georgia have recently faced significant challenges regarding safety and security. A homophobic environment has persisted for many years, but the situation worsened during the summer of 2024 when the attacks on the offices of LGBTQI+ organizations and acts of vandalism became increasingly frequent. Between May and June, buildings belonging to non-governmental organizations, as well as the homes of activists, were targeted—splashed with red paint, with eggs and posted with insulting messages directed at LGBTQI+ activists and organizational representatives.’^{[footnote 76]}

10.4.11 Equality Movement reported in a statement to the CGRS that was made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025:

‘… [T]he financial stability of LGBTQ+ organizations had … been undermined by the sudden closure of the U.S.-funded programs, which alarmingly limited the financial resources available to them. All local community NGOs - which serve as the only source of support for vulnerable groups - now face serious financial challenges that limit their ability to sustain program and service provision. Many are no longer able to cover staff salaries, putting the continuity of essential services at immediate risk …’^{[footnote 77]}

10.4.12 Equality Movement observed in a statement to the CGRS that was published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025:

‘… [D]ue to the shortage of financial resources LGBTI community organizations face difficulties operating nationwide, and those based in regional areas are relatively weak financially, which limits access to support programs and services for people living outside major cities. In addition, the internal “research on the updated needs of the LGBTQ+ community in relation to healthcare, psychosocial and legal services” conducted by Equality Movement revealed that regional community organizations face the absence of LGBTI-sensitive service provider staff. Furthermore, the regional activists outline that in recent periods, community outreach became unsafe and the majority of them are identifying themselves labeled and targeted.’^{[footnote 78]}

10.4.13 The 2026 ILGA Report reported: ‘In recent years, Georgia has undergone a marked authoritarian shift, characterised by increasing restrictions on civil society and non-governmental organisations, alongside intensified anti-LGBTI rhetoric. In this context, Tbilisi Pride reported that it was compelled in 2025 to largely suspend its activities, close its office, and relocate staff, citing the inability to organise Pride Week safely under prevailing conditions.’^{[footnote 79]} See also Visibility and activism.

10.4.14 Human Rights Watch noted in an article published in July 2026: ‘The authorities have […] used homophobic rhetoric to delegitimize independent organizations by portraying them as promoters of “LGBT propaganda” and opponents of traditional values.’^{[footnote 80]} See also Statements of public officials and state-aligned media.

10.4.15 Human Rights Watch reported in the same article ‘The government […] denied approval for a grant supporting an LGBT rights organization’s healthcare and harm reduction project for marginalized communities. The group’s director told Human Rights Watch that the authorities provided no explanation for the rejection.’^{[footnote 81]}

10.4.16 Human Rights Watch noted in the same article:

‘Organizations reported increasing self-censorship and fear of criminal prosecution against their leaders and staff. Groups working on LGBT rights described the pressure as especially acute.

‘The Grlz Wave [a queer-feminist organisation based in Tbilisi^{[footnote 82]}] director said, “We had to shift to a regime of self-censorship,” particularly on queer issues. “It is now extremely difficult to find respondents willing to appear in videos on LGBT topics. Even openly out individuals refuse visibility.”

‘Organizations have also curtailed broader programmatic work. The director of a group providing social and healthcare services to vulnerable communities said that “self-censorship was one of the most severe effects.” The organization suspended all cooperation with the government and halted its advocacy work, including a planned 2025 public awareness campaign on sex education, because of the risk that authorities could invoke the “LGBT propaganda” law or the foreign agents law.’^{[footnote 83]}

11. State treatment

11.1 New state policy and legislation affecting LGBT+ people

11.1.1 Equality Movement noted in a report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia in 2024, published in March 2025:

‘The homophobic intentions supported by the ruling party have been gradually transformed into institutional decisions. In 2022/2023, the terminology referring to gender identity or sexual orientation completely disappeared from the strategic documents of national importance. First of all, the LGBTQ+ community has been fully removed from Parliament’s Gender Equality Concept document. It must be emphasized that the document now defines the concept of gender equality exclusively between ‘women’ and ‘men’. A similar scenario occurred during the development of the National Strategy for the Protection of Human Rights of Georgia for 2022-2030 and the respective Action Plan for 2024-2026. Despite the critics and joint efforts of local civil society organizations (CSOs) and international organizations, none of the LGBTQ+ issues have been integrated into the documents.’^{[footnote 84]}

11.1.2 The Coalition for Equality, a NGO-consortium that ‘aims to strengthen the mandate of anti-discrimination mechanisms and promote effective efforts in combating discrimination’^{[footnote 85]}, stated in a report on the state of right of equality in Georgia, released in March 2025:

‘With the exclusion of LGBTQI+ issues from State policy documents and the introduction of discriminatory legislation, the challenges faced by the community have escalated into a practice of state-orchestrated violence. The impact of the anti-LGBTQI+ Law extends across multiple fields and aspects of life for community members. On the one hand, the Law [on the Protection of Family Values and Minors] contradicts the principle of equality enshrined in the Constitution of Georgia, and, on the other hand, it violates international standards and obligations that the country has committed to uphold. Beyond the risks of censorship, healthcare, employment, and education, the Law imposes restrictions on fundamental rights, threatening freedom of expression and assembly while exposing the entire community to discrimination.’^{[footnote 86]}

The source did not expand on what it meant by ‘practice of state-orchestrated violence’ and did not provide examples of this in practice.

11.1.3 The Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), noted in a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in April 2025:

‘On 17 September 2024, the Georgian Parliament adopted a law “on family values and protection of minors” and a related package of amendments. The law imposes restrictions on education, public discussion and gatherings that may be discriminatory based on sexual orientation and gender identity. It reinforces negative stereotypes by equating same-sex relationships with incest, denies legal recognition to same-sex couples and transgender people, restricts access to healthcare and undermines efforts to fight HIV/AIDS…

‘According to publicly available information, the legislative amendments include administrative and criminal sanctions effectively banning certain forms of LGBTQI+ activism, related scientific and professional activities and transgender-specific healthcare services.’^{[footnote 87]}

11.1.4 Human Rights Watch reported in its World Report 2025, covering events of 2024:

‘In September, parliament adopted anti-LGBT amendments imposing discriminatory restrictions on rights to education, health, freedom of expression, and peaceful assembly. The amendments ban gender-affirming medical care for trans people, same-sex marriage, and adoption by same-sex couples. They also prohibit positive references to LGBT people in literature, film, and media, as well as in schools and at public gatherings.

‘In June, the Venice Commission [the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters] urged the authorities not to adopt the amendments, warning that their mere introduction could deepen the already hostile and stigmatizing atmosphere against LGBT individuals in Georgia.’^{[footnote 88]}

11.1.5 The USSD 2024 Report, published in August 2025, noted: ‘Notable negative human rights developments in Georgia during the year included the entry into force of the … so-called law On Family Values and Protection of Minors that criminalized certain types of expression …’^{[footnote 89]}

11.1.6 The Office of the Belgian Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons (CGRS) noted in a report (CGRS 2025 Report), published in Dutch in September 2025:

‘On 3 April 2024, the ruling party Georgian Dream announced the Foreign Agents Law, officially titled the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence. Following a presidential veto on 18 May 2024, Parliament nevertheless approved the law ten days later, and it entered into force on 3 June 2024. Under the law, organisations and media companies that receive more than 20% of their funding from abroad are given two months to register as organisations “pursuing the interests of a foreign power”. … [I]n a small and relatively poor country such as Georgia, this applies to virtually all NGOs… The Ministry of Justice has the authority to monitor the activities, finances, internal communications and documents of registered organisations.’^{[footnote 90]}

11.1.7 The same report noted:

‘In early April 2025, Parliament adopted a national version of the US Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA)… Under the new FARA, a foreign agent is defined as any person (legal or natural) who is under the control of, or acts at the direction of, a foreign power and acts in the interests of that foreign power. … [T]his means that, unlike the Law on Transparency of Foreign Influence, FARA will also apply to individuals. Failure to comply with the law may be punishable by up to five years’ imprisonment, a fine of up to 10,000 GEL (approximately €3,202), or both.’^{[footnote 91]}

11.1.8 The 2026 ILGA Report noted:

‘In April, the Georgian Dream party advanced a series of legislative amendments in the first reading, including significant changes to the Law on Gender Equality. These amendments removed the term “gender” from the text, replacing all references to “gender identity” or “gender equality” with the narrower formulation “equality between women and men.” Accordingly, the 2014 Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination was also amended with “gender identity” being removed from the list of protected grounds, and the Gender Equality Committee [the correct name is Gender Equality Council^{[footnote 92]}] was formally dissolved. The Georgian Dream party justified the initiation of these amendments by claiming that the term “gender” had been purposely introduced into Georgian legislation under foreign influence as a “reflection of the global processes”.’^{[footnote 93]}

11.1.9 The OSCE 2026 Report noted:

‘In September 2024, the parliament adopted the Law on Family Values and the Protection of Minors… The law essentially equates, for its purposes, same-sex relationships and transgender identity with incest. In so doing, it prohibits the ‘popularization’ of all, including in broadcasting, education and during public gatherings. The law also bans gender-affirming care, including through surgical intervention, indication in civil acts and identity documents of a sex different than the one assigned at birth, same-sex marriage and legal recognition of same-sex relationships other than marriage, and adoption by LGBT+ couples or individuals.’^{[footnote 94]}

11.1.10 In the same report, the OSCE rapporteur stated that ‘… the enactment of the Law on Family Values, paired with homophobic and transphobic rhetoric of Georgian politicians and the widespread stigmatization of LGBT+ individuals in the public sphere, certainly contributes to the overall atmosphere, ripe for … deplorable displays of hatred.’^{[footnote 95]}

11.1.11 The OHCHR observed in a report submitted to the UN Human Rights Council in April 2026:

‘In 2025, legislative amendments were enacted to more than 15 laws, with changes including replacing the terms “gender” and “gender equality” with “women and men” and “equality between women and men”, respectively. Amendments to the Law on Assemblies and Demonstrations included discriminatory restrictions based on sexual orientation and gender identity, and gender identity was removed from the list of prohibited grounds in various laws concerning discrimination, aggravating circumstances for hate crimes, and provisions related to incitement to hatred and violence.’^{[footnote 96]}

11.1.12 Human Rights Watch reported in an article published in July 2026:

‘Amendments [to the Law on Grants] adopted in April 2025 required foreign donors to obtain government approval before awarding grants, and penalized organizations that accept a foreign grant without authorization with fines equivalent to double the amount received. A subsequent government decree made approval conditional on foreign grants aligning with “the government’s program, key strategic documents, and the state’s interests.” Further amendments adopted in June 2025 expanded the definition of a “grant” to include various forms of technical and expert assistance…’^{[footnote 97]} See also Support organisations.

In the sources consulted (see Bibliography), no publicly reported cases in which an individual or organisation had actually been fined, detained, arrested, prosecuted, or convicted specifically for breaching the provisions of the new Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors were identified. See also Arrest, detention, and prosecution of LGBT+ people.

11.2 Statements of public officials and state-aligned media

11.2.1 The Democracy Research Institute, a Tbilisi-based ‘public policy think tank’^{[footnote 98]}, noted in a report on anti-gender rhetoric and gender stereotypes in social media, published in 2024:

‘In Georgia, the main actors of the anti-gender discourse are representatives of the “Georgian Dream,” its satellite political forces, openly pro-government media platforms, and far-right groups. Their main focus is on women’s and children’s rights, religious values, the institution of the family, the rights of sexual minorities, and issues of gender identity and sexuality. The more or less fragmented anti-gender campaigns of far-right groups were transformed by the government into a powerful political instrument, and over time, it became the lead sponsor of the homophobic, sexist, and anti-gender campaign.’^{[footnote 99]}

11.2.2 The same report noted:

‘… [I]n the run-up to the 2024 parliamentary elections, the complete turn of the ruling party towards ultra-conservatism became especially visible. This further highlighted the identical contours of the “Georgian Dream” party and the anti-gender and homophobic discourse of the violent, far-right actors. The political vocabulary and rhetoric of these groups have become so similar that it is often difficult to identify the originating source of anti-gender, sexist, and misogynistic campaigns.’^{[footnote 100]}

11.2.3 The same report continued: ‘… [O]ver time, far-right groups and the authorities have increasingly manipulated public opinion on gender and LGBTIQ+ identity issues. Homophobic rhetoric is visible in public and political discussions, largely driven by political homophobia promoted by the authorities.

‘Sexist statements by government representatives, verbal attacks on opposition female MPs and the President of Georgia, anti-gender legislative initiatives, and homophobic statements of the two Prime Ministers of Georgia, Irakli Gharibashvili and Irakli Kobakhidze […] are particularly noteworthy. Homophobic conspiracy theories voiced by high-ranking government officials, both locally and internationally, have given anti-gender rhetoric more visibility and political legitimacy.’^{[footnote 101]}

11.2.4 The Georgian Elections Observatory 2024 was a ‘short-term initiative focused on fact-checking pre-election narratives in the lead-up to the parliamentary elections on October 26 [2024]’^{[footnote 102]}, supported by the Fojo Swedish Media Institute (FSMI) in collaboration with the Investigative Media Lab (IML), and the University of Georgia’s Security, Policy, and Nationalism Research Center (UGSPN). Its final report found that senior figures of the ruling Georgian Dream party, including the party founder Bidzina Ivanishvili, prime minister Irakli Kobakhidze, and chairman of the Georgian Dream parliamentary faction Mamuka Mdinaradze, repeatedly instrumentalised anti-LGBT sentiments and family values during the pre-election period^{[footnote 103]}.

11.2.5 The Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics, an independent self-regulatory body that ‘considers the facts of any violation of professional [journalistic] standards on the behalf of the charter’s members on the basis of submitted complaints’^{[footnote 104]}, determined in June 2024 that the Imedi TV channel had violated multiple ethical principles of journalistic ethics by broadcasting inaccurate and discriminatory reporting on LGBT issues, and that describing LGBT awareness-raising as “propaganda” was not supported by accurate evidence^{[footnote 105]}.

11.2.6 The OFPRA 2025 Report stated: ‘Hateful and discriminatory statements towards LGBT+ people are increasingly present in the public sphere, coming from politicians, senior public officials and religious leaders, as well as from certain ultraconservative and right-wing media outlets.’^{[footnote 106]}

11.2.7 The OFPRA 2025 Report also observed:

‘From 2021 onwards, certain political figures from the Georgian Dream party, including former Prime Minister Irakli Gharibashvili and Prime Minister Irakli Kobakhidze, have made openly discriminatory statements towards LGBT+ persons. During debates surrounding the so-called “foreign agents” and “anti-LGBT+ propaganda” laws, as well as during periods of heightened visibility of the LGBT+ community (such as Pride Month and the opening ceremony of the Paris 2024 Olympic Games), politicians affiliated with Georgian Dream have been particularly virulent in their rhetoric.’^{[footnote 107]}

11.2.8 The Media Development Foundation, a ‘Georgian non-governmental organization in media research and communication’^{[footnote 108]} observed in a report on gender- and identity-based disinformation, published in April 2025, analysing data from 2024: ‘Gender-based disinformation, which focuses on the intersection of gender and disinformation—where women, non-binary individuals, and the LGBTQIA+ community are disproportionately targeted by false and manipulative content—similar to the previous years, was once again predominantly used as a political tool against opponents.’^{[footnote 109]}

11.2.9 The Media Development Foundation noted in a report on sexist hate speech and homophobia amid the 2024 parliamentary elections, published in May 2025: ‘While in previous years public opinion on gender and sexual orientation was primarily manipulated by pro-Kremlin and far-right actors, recently, the Georgian government has been attempting to mainstream these topics. This has manifested not only in rights-opposing rhetoric but also in the adoption of rights-restricting and anti-democratic legislation…’^{[footnote 110]}

11.2.10 The WISG 2025 Report stated:

‘In Georgia, it is common for high-ranking officials to disseminate discriminatory statements and hate speech targeting the LGBTQI+ community. Such rhetoric not only reinforces existing discriminatory prejudices but also fosters an increasingly hostile environment in which LGBTQI+ individuals are placed at heightened risk of harassment and violence… This behavior exacerbates societal discrimination and significantly increases the danger that members of the LGBTQI+ community will face violence and harassment based on their sexual orientation or gender identity.’^{[footnote 111]}

11.2.11 The European Commission noted in a report prepared as part of Georgia’s bid to join the European Union, published in November 2025: ‘Homophobic and transphobic rhetoric, including messages incited and amplified by high-level officials, continued…

‘The authorities not only fail to recognise and address the systemic nature of discrimination against LGBTIQ persons but amplify discrimination, intolerance and systemic violence.’^{[footnote 112]}

11.2.12 Amnesty International observed in a report on repression in Georgia, published in June 2026:

‘…[T]he authorities and government-aligned media ramped up a programme of scapegoating and stigmatization against LGBTI people to divert attention, sow division and ultimately entrench power. They portrayed LGBTI rights and gender equality as a foreign-imposed agenda threatening “traditional values”, the safety of children and the overall social order. Through stigmatizing rhetoric, activists and human rights defenders, especially those defending minority rights, were framed as “dangerous”, “immoral” or “anti-national”. This messaging not only deepened social divisions and fostered discrimination but also helped to marginalize dissent and weaken solidarity across protest movements. These conspiracy narratives paved the way for the adoption, in September 2024, of the Law “On the Protection of Family Values and Minors”, banning any public expression or assembly deemed to “promote same-sex relationships”, with effects extending far beyond LGBTI people.’^{[footnote 113]}

See also Provisions relating to awareness-raising and activism and Support organisations.

11.3 Arrest, detention, and prosecution of LGBT+ people

11.3.1 The OFPRA 2025 Report noted in March 2025: ‘In some cases, … [police forces] have detained and prosecuted LGBT+ persons who were themselves victims of assaults, as occurred in 2017 in the case of Levan Berianidze and Tornike Kusiani.’^{[footnote 114]}

The LGBT+ activists Levan Berianidze and Tornike Kusiani were arrested by the Georgian police and charged with hooliganism and civil disobedience in August 2017, after having been attacked by several men^{[footnote 115]}. Both individuals were released on the day of their arrest and found guilty of the alleged offences by the Batumi City Court one day later, each receiving a fine of ₾300 GEL [approximately £85 GBP^{[footnote 116]}]^{[footnote 117]}.

11.3.2 The investigative agencies of Georgia regularly release unified reports on registered crime statistics. The 2025 end-of-year report and the 2026 mid-year report both list 0 cases registered under article 176 1 of the Criminal Code of Georgia which relates to violations of the prohibition of gender-affirming health care established by the Law of Georgia “On the Protection of Family Values and Minors”^{[footnote 118]},^{[footnote 119]}. See also Trans rights.

11.3.3 While the Georgian Ministry of Internal Affairs publishes statistical tables on selected administrative offences^{[footnote 120]}, it does not provide data on administrative offences relating to the Law of Georgia “On the Protection of Family Values and Minors”, specifically Article 172 10 of the Administrative Offences Code of Georgia that relates to ‘popularisation’. See also Provisions relating to awareness-raising and activism.

11.3.4 In the sources consulted (see Bibliography), no further reports on arrests, detention, or prosecution of LGBT+ people were available. See also New state policy and legislation affecting LGBT+ people.

11.4 Violence against LGBT+ people

11.4.1 The WISG 2025 Report noted: ‘… [V]iolent responses to peaceful demonstrations and incidents of police brutality have significantly undermined public trust.’^{[footnote 121]}

11.4.2 A group of Georgian human rights NGOs published a joint report titled ‘Human rights crisis in Georgia following the 2024 parliamentary elections’ in 2025, covering 28 November 2024 until 28 February 2025. This report, analysing police violence in response to protests against the Georgian Dream government, noted:

‘It is noteworthy that at all stages of the violence, the special forces, as well as other police units actively used homophobic […] language and narratives. Particularly severe violence was inflicted on the people who stood out from the others in some way that the police perceived as less masculine (dyed hair, earrings, wearing hygienic lipstick (the so-called lip balm)). The special forces often called the protesters “f*ggots” while beating them. This insulting term was also used by the police officers involved in the transportation of the arrestees and the ones at the police station…

‘The protesters recall that the violence by special forces was more intense against the men with dyed hair, long hair, or similar distinguishing marks.’^{[footnote 122]}

11.4.3 The USSD 2023 Report noted: ‘There were instances of violence and harassment by state … actors against LGBTQI+ persons and those reporting such abuse.’^{[footnote 123]}

11.5 Response to violence during the 2021 and 2023 Pride events

11.5.1 For a detailed overview of the violence that occurred during the 2021 and 2023 Pride events, see version 2.0 of this Country Policy and Information Note.

11.5.2 The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders noted in her report of March 2024: ‘In July 2021 and July 2023, there were major disruptions at events organized in Tbilisi to celebrate the country’s LGBTQI community. In both instances, events planned by LGBTQI rights defenders were attacked by far-right and ultraconservative groups exercising extreme violence and well-organized aggression. There has been total impunity for the instigators of these attacks…’^{[footnote 124]}

11.5.3 The same report observed:

‘… Despite … statements of intent [by leaders of far-right groups] to disrupt Pride Week events [in 2021] by any means necessary, videos depicting the events show only a minimal police presence in place to protect human rights defenders and journalists. While the Ministry of Internal Affairs in a statement issued on 7 July 2021, stated that up to 3,200 police officers had been deployed on the day, it seems that any significant police action was only taken once it was too late.’^{[footnote 125]}

11.5.4 The same report continued:

‘In response to the events of 5 July 2021, an investigation was launched by the Ministry of Internal Affairs, with 56 individuals granted victim status, including 47 journalists and camera operators, but not the Tbilisi Pride or the Shame Movement. While 31 persons were arrested and some individuals prosecuted for their participation in the violence committed on the day, including attacks against journalists, none of the organizers or leaders of the violence, most notably leaders of far-right groups, have been brought to justice.’^{[footnote 126]}

11.5.5 The same report also noted: ‘Pride Week events were generally able to go ahead peacefully in 2022, when they were organized in private locations. In 2023, however, there was a further serious attack against LGBTQI defenders in Georgia; on the 8 July 2023 an open-air festival was violently disrupted by an organized far-right group.’^{[footnote 127]}

11.5.6 The same report observed: ‘… In videos depicting the events, although a substantial police presence can be seen at the venue, they did not intervene in any effective way to prevent the destruction of the site [by counter-protesters, following the evacuation of LGBTQI organisers and journalists by the police].’^{[footnote 128]}

11.5.7 The Special Rapporteur continued in the same report:

‘In response to requests for information about the events of 2023, the Special Rapporteur was informed by the Ministry of Internal Affairs that while substantial efforts had been made in advance of 8 July to ensure that the festival could go ahead peacefully, citing several meetings between the Ministry, the Office of the Public Defender and the Pride organizers, they were taken by surprise by the number of counter-protestors who arrived on the day. The Ministry also cited the difficulty in policing an open space such as the site of the festival and noted the amount of police resources needed to protect it for the duration of the event. … This, however, seems insufficient to explain the failure of the State to ensure that the event could go ahead, given the clearly stated intentions of the counter-protestors to mobilize en mass and the knowledge of the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the likelihood of a large number of counter-demonstrators …’^{[footnote 129]}

11.5.8 The same report continued:

‘As at August 2023, investigations into the attack on 8 July had been opened, on the basis of articles 177, 187 and 353 of the Criminal Code, for theft, damage or destruction of property and assault of a police officer, respectively. However, as with the events of 5 July 2021, to date there has been total impunity for the organizers of this violence. In response to requests for information, the Special Rapporteur was informed by the authorities that there is insufficient evidence to prosecute those responsible, despite the very public nature of their actions.’^{[footnote 130]}

11.5.9 The USSD 2023 Report, noted: ‘On July 8 [2023], opponents of the Pride Festival in Tbilisi broke through a police cordon and entered the territory of Lisi Lake, where the event was to be held. Violent groups had announced the disruption of the event in advance; however, authorities did not take necessary measures to prevent the disruption and looting that ensued. LGBTQI+ persons and their supporters had to leave the site with the help of police.’^{[footnote 131]}

11.5.10 The Conversation, a news platform providing ‘analysis and informed comment written by academic experts’^{[footnote 132]} reported in an article published in July 2024: ‘… [W]ith parliamentary elections coming up in October, Tbilisi Pride decided it would not hold any public events in 2024. In a post on Facebook, the organisers cited concerns about safety and hostile pre-election rhetoric.’^{[footnote 133]}

11.5.11 The ILGA 2026 Report noted:

‘Pride-related events, including the March for Dignity in 2021 and the Pride Festival in 2023, were violently disrupted by far-right groups. Civil society organisations reported limited and ineffective protection by law enforcement authorities and, in some instances, inflammatory statements by senior public officials. As of 2025, no effective investigations had been carried out, organisers had not been granted official victim status, and those responsible for organising and perpetrating the violence had not been held accountable.’^{[footnote 134]}

11.5.12 The same report observed: ‘… Tbilisi Pride reported that it was compelled in 2025 to largely suspend its activities, close its office, and relocate staff, citing the inability to organise Pride Week safely under prevailing conditions.’^{[footnote 135]}

11.5.13 In the sources consulted (see Bibliography), no information was available to suggest that Pride events took place in 2026.

11.6 Protection

11.6.1 The UN Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor, noted in a report on her visit to Georgia, published in March 2024:

‘The continuing impunity for attacks against human rights defenders, and for human rights violations more broadly, is demonstrative of a lack of political will to address the issue. … [T]his lack of will is reflected in the damning failure to mention LGBTQI issues in the country’s human rights strategy or action plan, as well as statements by high-ranking Government officials, including the Prime Minister, painting the promotion of equality and non-discrimination against the LGBTQI community as “false freedoms” and “propaganda”.’^{[footnote 136]}

11.6.2 The same report continued: ‘… [T]he failure to protect the LGBTQI community when exercising their right to freedom of assembly, as well as impunity for attacks against them, is a historical problem for the Georgian authorities …’^{[footnote 137]}

11.6.3 The USSD 2023 Report noted: ‘There were instances of violence and harassment by state … actors against LGBTQI+ persons and those reporting such abuse. Occasionally, police or other government agents failed to adequately respond to instances of violence or harassment against LGBTQI+ individuals.’^{[footnote 138]}

11.6.4 The same report noted: ‘The law made prejudice based on a person’s sexual orientation or gender identity an aggravating factor for all crimes. According to NGOs, however, the government rarely enforced the law.’^{[footnote 139]}. It is important to note that gender identity was removed from the Criminal Code’s list of aggravating reasons for intolerance in 2025 (see Anti-discrimination provisions).

11.6.5 Equality Movement observed in its report on LGBTQ+ rights violations in Georgia, published in March 2025, that ‘… the organization’s lawyers underline that the trust of LGBTQ+ individuals in police and investigative institutions is noticeably decreased. Due to the anti-democratic developments in recent periods, even in cases of evident violence, victims refrain from reporting incidents to the relevant institutions.’^{[footnote 140]}

11.6.6 The same report continued: ‘It should be pointed out that communication with judicial and other administrative bodies has become extremely difficult during the reporting period. The institutions have been systematically violating deadlines, both in terms of scheduling proceedings and providing feedback on requested information that hindered the process of providing legal services comprehensively.’^{[footnote 141]}

11.6.7 The OFPRA 2025 Report noted in March 2025: ‘The Georgian authorities fail to effectively protect LGBT+ persons from the attacks they face, particularly around Pride Month, and also fail to bring to justice the groups responsible for such violence…

‘Police forces do not systematically protect LGBT+ persons who are threatened or are victims of violence […].’^{[footnote 142]}

11.6.8 The WISG 2025 Report noted:

‘A deep lack of trust in law enforcement agencies has further exacerbated security challenges for LGBTQI+ individuals in Georgia. Activists often face difficulties cooperating with the police, as they fear both direct threats and the unwillingness or inability of law enforcement to ensure their safety. The adoption of anti-LGBTQ+ legislation has only worsened the situation, limiting the community’s capacity to report acts of violence against them to the authorities…’^{[footnote 143]}

11.6.9 The Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia noted in his 2024 report on the situation of protection of human rights and freedoms in Georgia, published in May 2025: ‘As in the previous year, problems persist in the investigation and initiation of criminal proceedings for alleged hate crimes. These issues stem, on the one hand, from law enforcement agencies’ inadequate fulfillment of their positive obligations to protect the equality of vulnerable groups, and on the other hand, from concerning instances in which law enforcement officers have used offensive and homophobic language.’^{[footnote 144]}

11.6.10 Lawyers for Lawyers, an ‘independent, non-political and not-for-profit lawyers’ organisation’^{[footnote 145]}, observed in its submission to the Universal Periodic Review 51st Session from July 2025:

‘… [T]he Law on Family Values and Protection of Minors (the ‘Anti-LGBTIQ+ law’) has abolished nearly all rights for the LGBTIQ+ community. Consequently, lawyers are no longer able to provide meaningful legal assistance to them. For instance, offering legal assistance to transgender clients, particularly in matters involving identity recognition or changes to gender markers, could be viewed as facilitating prohibited actions under the new law. The chilling effect of the law may discourage lawyers from engaging in legitimate legal support, leaving LGBTIQ+ individuals without access to the protections they are entitled to.’^{[footnote 146]}

11.6.11 Equality Movement noted in a statement to CGRS, made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025:

‘It should be emphasized that a significant number of hate crimes recorded by the Equality Movement were not reported to the police or relevant institutions due to victims’ refusal. The widespread distrust among LGBTQ+ individuals toward the police and other state institutions responsible for human rights protection is fueled by the expectation of indifferent treatment, as well as the fear of facing additional discrimination and oppression from institutional representatives. […] The recent political developments, coupled with the adoption of the anti-LGBT law, have led to increasingly indifferent treatment by the police and the prosecutor’s office.’^{[footnote 147]}

11.6.12 Equality Movement further observed in its statement to the CGRS:

‘Lawyers providing legal aid to LGBTQ+ individuals report that human-rights protection mechanisms have effectively ceased to function. Submissions to public institutions are routinely rejected or ignored, making it nearly impossible for victims of SOGI-motivated hate crimes to obtain ‘aggrieved party’ status. Court hearings are delayed, and both victims and their lawyers are met with indifference. In summary, what was once a formal commitment has been reduced to mere goodwill—which may or may not be honored.’^{[footnote 148]}

11.6.13 Equality Movement also reported in its statement to the CGRS:

‘The removal of ‘gender identity’ as a protected ground from legislation has left no legal basis to challenge police discrimination based on gender identity. As a result, the treatment of LGBTQ+ individuals by police and other state institution personnel now largely depends on their personal beliefs[.] … The state’s failure to coordinate with NGOs in recent years, coupled with insufficient training of police and prosecutors on SOGI issues, has led to a concerning level of institutional desensitization…’^{[footnote 149]}

11.6.14 The same statement continued: ‘… [The Ministry of Internal Affairs] has undergone a large-scale replacement of police officers. Recent amendments to the Law of Georgia on Police allow individuals with only a general education diploma to be employed in law enforcement, which has significantly weakened the overall qualifications of personnel[.] … The extreme politicization of state institutions—including the judiciary—has resulted in decisions being driven by political will rather than legal standards. This environment encourages practices of mistreatment, discrimination, and human rights violations within state bodies.’^{[footnote 150]}

11.6.15 The European Commission noted in its November 2025 Report on Georgia: ‘The legal protection of the rights of LGBTIQ persons is largely insufficient and LGBTIQ persons face serious discrimination, intolerance and systemic violence…

‘The national strategy for the protection of human rights and its action plan for 2024-26 omit considerations for the rights of LGBTIQ persons. Georgia has systematically failed in implementing ECtHR rulings, including in the A.D and others v. Georgia case. The impunity of instigators and organisers of violence that target LGBTIQ persons, including at Tbilisi Pride in 2021 and 2023, continues.’^{[footnote 151]}

11.6.16 The 2026 ILGA Report observed:

‘Monitoring reports identify persistent shortcomings in prevention and investigation, including delays in initiating proceedings, obstacles in granting victims formal “aggrieved party” status, misqualification or failure to recognise bias motives, and limited sensitivity among law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities. Civil society further reported continued under-reporting of incidents, attributed to fear of secondary victimisation, concerns regarding confidentiality, and low levels of trust in law enforcement institutions.’^{[footnote 152]}

11.6.17 The Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (MIAG), the Prosecution Service of Georgia (PSG), and the Supreme Court of Georgia (SCG) publish annually a joint report of data on crimes committed on grounds of intolerance with discrimination bias^{[footnote 153]}. The below numbers have been compiled by CPIT from the reports covering 2021 – 2025^{[footnote 154]},^{[footnote 155]},^{[footnote 156]},^{[footnote 157]},^{[footnote 158]}. The table shows the number of investigations, prosecutions and convictions for hate crimes committed on the grounds of intolerance of sexual orientation and/or gender identity.

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Number of criminal investigations initiated	106	76	50	29	28
Number of criminal prosecutions launched	69	55	22	15	3
Number of persons convicted	20	40	19	14	14

11.6.18 The 15 cases prosecuted in 2024 related to 14 victims, 7 of which were male, 1 was female, and 6 were transgender women. 13 victims were adults aged between 18 and 60 years, 1 victim was underage. All 15 defendants were male, 12 were above 18 years old, and 3 were aged between 14 and 18. The social connection between defendants and victims was recorded 7 times as ‘stranger’, 5 times as ‘acquaintance’, 1 time as ‘parent’, 1 time as ‘intimate partner’, and 1 time as ‘other member of family’^{[footnote 159]}

11.6.19 The 14 convictions in 2024 concerned 13 male and 1 female individual. 11 convicts were aged 18 or over, and 3 were aged between 14 and 18 years. The social relation of the convict with the victim was recorded 11 times as ‘stranger’, 1 time as ‘acquaintance’, 1 time as ‘parent’, and 1 time as ‘other member of the family’^{[footnote 160]}.

11.6.20 The 3 cases prosecuted in 2025 related to 4 victims, 3 of which were male and 1 was a transgender woman. All victims were adults aged between 18 and 60 years. The 3 defendants were all male above 18 years old. The social connection between defendants and victims was recorded 2 times as ‘stranger’, 1 time as ‘acquaintance’, and 1 time as ‘intimate partner’^{[footnote 161]}.

11.6.21 The 14 convictions in 2025 all concerned male individuals aged 18 or over. The social relation of the convict with the victim was recorded 7 times as ‘stranger’, 5 times as ‘acquaintance’, and 2 times as ‘intimate partner’^{[footnote 162]}. The data on defendants, convicts, and victims of crimes committed on grounds of intolerance with discrimination bias for 2023 revealed a similar pattern to 2024 and 2025. No detailed breakdown was available for 2022 and 2021.

11.6.22 The General Prosecutor publishes a separate annual analysis report on the prosecution of hate crimes. The below numbers have been compiled by CPIT by analysing the reports covering 2021 – 2025^{[footnote 163]},^{[footnote 164]},^{[footnote 165]},^{[footnote 166]}, ^{[footnote 167]}. The table shows the number of prosecutions for the commission of hate crimes based on gender identity and/ or sexual orientation. As both grounds can be recorded for a single case, the total number of SOGIE-related hate crime prosecutions is provided in the bottom row.

	2021	2022	2023	2024	2025
Number of prosecutions for the commission of hate crimes based on gender identity	55	18	14	6	/
Number of prosecutions for the commission of hate crimes based on sexual orientation	45	37	9	9	3
Total number of prosecutions for the commission of hate crimes based on gender identity and/ or sexual orientation	69	55	22	15	3

11.7 The Public Defender (Ombudsman)

11.7.1 According to its webpage, the Public Defender of Georgia ‘is a constitutional institution, which supervises the protection of human rights and freedoms within its jurisdiction on the territory of Georgia. It identifies the violations of human rights and contributes to the restoration of the violated rights and freedoms.’^{[footnote 168]} The Public Defender supervises state agencies, local self-government agencies, public institutions, and public officials^{[footnote 169]}.

11.7.2 Equality Movement noted in its report on LGBTQ+ rights violations in Georgia, published in March 2025: ‘On March 7, 2023, alongside the protest rallies against the so-called Russian Law [the Foreign Agent Law], the Georgian Parliament elected a new Public Defender, Levan Ioseliani, for a 6-year term. It quickly turned out that the Public Defender’s Office, which previously ac[t]ed as an ally of the LGBTQ+ community, became significantly influenced by the government.’^{[footnote 170]}

11.7.3 The WISG 2025 Report noted:

‘The Public Defender of Georgia serves as the primary equality body responsible for enforcing the law on the “Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination”. Over the years, the Public Defender’s Office has established important legal precedents and issued recommendations and researches on LGBTQI+ issues. Notably, in 2013, the Public Defender’s parliamentary report for the first time highlighted challenges faced by the LGBTQI+ community. That same year, on May 17 IDAHOT Day, Public Defender made a public statement in support of the community. However, in recent years—amid a broader regression in state policy—this institution’s public stance has notably shifted. On May 17, 2024, the Public Defender issued no statement, despite ongoing violence and widespread homophobia targeting LGBTQI+ individuals. Moreover, Public Defender has failed to respond to the anti-LGBTQI+ law (the law on “Protection of Family Values and Minors”) even though it falls squarely within its anti-discrimination mandate. The Public Defender has also remained silent in the face of public hate speech and discriminatory rhetoric from ruling party members and other public figures.’^{[footnote 171]}

11.7.4 iFact, a Georgian platform for investigative journalism^{[footnote 172]}, noted in an article published in May 2025: ‘For nearly three decades, Georgia’s Public Defender has served as a vital watchdog for human rights, exposing violations, identifying the responsible parties, and urging officials to take corrective action. According to its mandate, the institution is meant to be politically independent. And for most of its existence, through five different ombudspersons, it largely was.

‘But over the past two years, that independence has come under serious doubt. Public dissatisfaction has grown, with many claiming the office, once a critical counterbalance to government power, has become loyal to it instead. Levan Ioseliani, the current Public Defender, has been widely criticized for abandoning the bold and outspoken stance of his predecessors. On issues of national importance, citizens say, he has remained silent.’^{[footnote 173]}

11.7.5 The same article observed: ‘Our review of all public-facing documents from 2021 to 2024 shows a clear shift. Since Ioseliani took office, the number and depth of critical reports have declined. Key topics—such as LGBTQ+ rights and police misconduct—have been deprioritized or excluded entirely. The language has grown softer, often avoiding blame or concrete recommendations.’^{[footnote 174]}

11.7.6 The same article also stated: ‘Perhaps most troubling is the growing distance between the Public Defender and civil society organizations—once its most trusted allies. LGBTQ+ groups, once heavily reliant on the institution’s protection, say they have been all but abandoned.

‘Tbilisi Pride director Tata Jaqeli recalls two brief meetings with Ioseliani, both of which left the community feeling unheard and unsupported. “In our first meeting, we presented our concerns and asked critical questions, but his answers were generic and detached,” she said. “In the second meeting, we were each given five minutes to speak. He then talked for ten minutes about how he couldn’t take a firm stance on the anti-LGBT bill. He said he needed to maintain a cooperative tone with the government.” Jaqeli concluded: “We used to see the Public Defender as a last line of defense. Now the bridge is completely burned. Maybe if we’re physically attacked again, we’ll turn to him—but only then.”’^{[footnote 175]}

11.7.7 The same article continued: ‘Eka Tsereteli, director of WISG (Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group), echoed the concern. “We had a chance to meet Ioseliani after his appointment, but it was disappointing. He wasn’t sensitive or willing to help,” she said. “He made it clear his priority was socio-economic issues and saw no role for himself beyond that. When we met again to discuss the anti-LGBT bill, it was pointless. He had no grasp of the gravity of the situation.” According to her, the office has gone from a partner to a threat—part of the state’s authoritarian drift.’^{[footnote 176]}

12. Societal treatment

12.1 Public attitudes

12.1.1 The Integrated Values Surveys combined responses from the cross-sectional longitudinal European Values Study and the World Values Survey^{[footnote 177]}, who jointly conducted a survey of 2,194 adults residing in Georgia between 2017 and 2022, comprising a national-wide random representative sample^{[footnote 178]}. The survey responses indicated that 93.1% of the sampled Georgian population expressed the opinion that homosexuality can never or rarely be justified^{[footnote 179]}. No further disaggregation of survey data was available.

12.1.2 UN Women’s Gender Equality Attitudes Study in Georgia was conducted from January to February 2024 through face-to-face interviews with 1,238 individuals aged 16 or above, measuring the prevalence of discriminatory attitudes and gender-based stereotypes. Two thirds of the study participants were women, and one third men. 41% of interviews were conducted in Tbilisi, 31% in other urban areas, and 28% in rural settlements. The study report noted: ‘Only 11 per cent of the Georgian public believes that it is difficult for most men to run for elected office in the country … However, twice as many people (22 per cent) believe that it is difficult for most women to do the same… A majority (57 per cent) believes that it is difficult for LGBTQI+ individuals who do not hide their orientation.’^{[footnote 180]}

12.1.3 The same study included the below graphic, indicating in percentages the surveyed population’s responses to the question ‘In general, how easy is it for sexual minority women (lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer or intersex) who do not hide their sexual orientation / sexual minority men (gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or intersex) who do not hide their sexual orientation to run for elected office in Georgia?’ The 11-point scale was recoded into three categories: Scores of 0–3 were categorized as “difficult”, scores of 4–6 were categorized as “neutral”, and scores of 7–10 were categorized as “easy”^{[footnote 181]}.

12.1.4 The Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights observed in a statement, published in March 2024, that ‘… entrenched harmful stereotypes and prejudice against LGBTI people […] still prevail in segments of Georgian society …’^{[footnote 182]}

12.1.5 The Caucasus Research Resource Centers conduct the Caucasus Barometer Georgia, a regular household survey about social-economic issues and political attitudes. The most recent edition of the Caucasus Barometer Georgia was conducted between April and May 2024 among 1,509 adults, excluding populations living in territories affected by military conflict, in particular South Ossetia and Abkhazia^{[footnote 183]}. 73% of respondents did not approve of doing business with a sexual minority person, while 19% approved^{[footnote 184]}.

12.1.6 In the same survey, 9% of respondents answered ‘sexual minorities’ in response to the question ‘Which of these people would you not wish to have [as] your neighbors most?’, the third most common response after ‘drug addicts’ (36%) and ‘criminals’ (32%)^{[footnote 185]}.

12.1.7 The OFPRA 2025 Report stated: ‘In 2021, 84% of Georgians considered sexual relations between two people of the same sex to be inherently wrong. While some sources report a slight decline in homophobic and transphobic attitudes in Georgian society, other surveys indicate that the proportion of Georgians who consider homosexuality unacceptable has not decreased.’^{[footnote 186]}

12.1.8 The same report noted:

‘According to a study published in 2022 by the organisation [Women’s Initiative Supporting Group] … with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), “the share of the population that believes protecting the rights of the LGBT+ community is important increased from 21% to 27%” between 2016 and 2021. The study also found an increase in the proportion of Georgians who regard restrictions on LGBT+ rights as unacceptable and who believe that the State does not respond adequately to the violence and discrimination experienced by LGBT+ persons.

‘However, the study emphasised that these changes were mainly linked to the attitudes of women, as well as younger people and residents of the capital, because “male respondents have hardly changed their views on this issue”, a pattern also seen among older people and rural populations. In addition, homosexuality is more accepted among women than among men.

‘Despite this relative change in attitudes, LGBT+ persons remain among the most marginalised and least protected groups in Georgia.’^{[footnote 187]}

12.2 Treatment by the public and family members

12.2.1 The Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia noted in his 2023 report on the situation of protection of human rights and freedoms in Georgia, published in May 2024:

‘As in previous years, the rights situation of LGBT+ people remains an important/serious challenge. Members of the LGBT+ community still face violence, discrimination, and harassment, and this is caused by homophobic attitudes, hate crimes, and other discriminatory attitudes in society. Individuals with far-right ideologies, through their actions and statements, contribute to the spread of homophobic sentiments, incite discrimination and, at the same time, commit actions that are often manifested in serious violations of the rights of LGBT+ people.’^{[footnote 188]}

12.2.2 Social scientist David Rypel noted in a statement to the research organisation Asylos in August 2024: ‘Several of my [research] participants or their friends and acquaintances were thrown out of their homes by their parents upon their coming out, potentially to prevent bringing ‘shame’ to the household.’^{[footnote 189]}

12.2.3 The WISG 2025 Report observed:

‘The Church remains one of the most trusted institutions in Georgia, and its stance on moral issues—particularly regarding sexual orientation and gender identity—significantly shapes public opinion. This environment fuels ultra-right movements, which, in collaboration with religious authorities, frame LGBTQI+ issues as a threat to Georgian identity, culture, and national values. Despite numerous violent acts carried out by these groups, the effective enforcement of justice has consistently been inadequate, fostering the perception that these groups operate with the backing of the government.’^{[footnote 190]}

12.2.4 The OFPRA 2025 Report noted:

‘Since the 2000s, the Patriarchate of the Georgian Orthodox Church has opposed the visibility of LGBT+ people, whom it regards as “destabilising the country and public life” by “promoting a non-traditional way of life”. In 2014, the Georgian Orthodox Church established Family Purity Day on 17 May—the same date as the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (IDAHOBIT)—and in July 2023 it called for legislation prohibiting LGBT+ propaganda.’^{[footnote 191]}

12.2.5 The OFPRA 2025 Report also stated, summarising several older reports that were published between 2019 and 2022:

‘The family is the primary social sphere in which violence against LGBT+ people occurs, often leading to individuals leaving the family home after coming out, encountering difficulties in finding alternative accommodation, and experiencing a degree of economic insecurity. Nearly one in five LGBT+ individuals report being isolated from their family and friends. Associating with LGBT+ people may also expose their relatives and close associates to threats and stigmatisation. However, family attitudes vary depending on sexual orientation and gender expression: gay and bisexual men, as well as transgender women, are more likely to experience a breakdown in family relations than lesbian women and transgender men.’^{[footnote 192]}

The ‘nearly one in five’ figure on social isolation quoted above stems from a 2020 report by the Georgian CSO Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre, which summarised 320 survey responses that were gathered via face-to-face interviews with LGBT+ people in Georgia between September and December 2019. Over 86% of the study participants were aged between 18 and 29 years, and approximately two thirds were living in the capital Tbilisi. Due to this sampling method, the study’s findings cannot be generalised to the whole LGBT+ population of Georgia. The study found that 19% of respondents reported to have experienced social isolation from friends and family in the last two years^{[footnote 193]}. Notably, the results stem from the pre-Covid period.

12.2.6 The Bertelsmann Stiftung, ‘a private operating foundation which engages in evidence-based and solely nonprofit activities’^{[footnote 194]} noted in its Transformation Index 2026: ‘… [S]exual minorities face heightened stigma and discrimination, particularly following the enforcement of the 2024 law “On the Protection of Family Values and Minors,” which is widely seen as homophobic and transphobic.’^{[footnote 195]}

12.3 Hate speech

12.3.1 Equality Movement stated in its report on LGBTQ+ rights violations in Georgia, published in March 2025, that ‘the number of cases processed by [Equality Movement] concerning homophobic hate speech or gender-based discrimination on social networks, particularly TikTok, was remarkably high in 2024…

‘Also, during the reporting period, several cases were processed involving the disclosure of information about the private lives of LGBTQ+ individuals, with or without the use of social networks, and cases of blackmailing through the dissemination of personal information, including forced “coming out” of individuals.’^{[footnote 196]}

12.3.2 The WISG 2025 Report noted: ‘… [The] main focus [of Georgian ultra-right groups] lies in promoting nationalist and homophobic rhetoric, which they actively spread through social media and their own media platforms. These platforms are often used to disseminate anti-Western propaganda and incite hatred within society. A vivid example is Alt-Info, which for years has been vocal in spreading pro-Russian and homophobic narratives. Although Alt-Info ceased broadcasting in 2024, other members of the organization have continued using all available media channels to spread hate and reinforce anti-Western sentiment.’^{[footnote 197]}

12.3.3 The same report stated that ‘… in Georgia, ultra-right groups that promote anti-gender narratives also tend to propagate homophobic discourse. These groups frequently accuse various media outlets and non-governmental organizations of engaging in the so-called “promoting of corruption” and “corrupting the nation.”’^{[footnote 198]}

12.3.4 The same report continued:

‘Ultra-right groups are most active during events organized by LGBTQI+ groups or organizations. Their primary methods of mobilization include public protests and counter demonstrations, especially during events such as IDAHOT, Tbilisi Pride, various conferences, and cultural festivals. These groups often resort to physical attacks, threats of violence, organized aggression, and hate speech—none of which are effectively addressed by the state.’^{[footnote 199]}

12.3.5 Equality Movement noted in a statement to CGRS, made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025, that ‘… the use of homophobic hate speech and threats, including death threats, has alarmingly increased on social media platforms. In addition, it has become normalized for individuals, especially for those who actively participate in anti-Russian protests to be bullied simply by being labeled as members of, or associated with, the LGBTQ+ community that increases their risks of physical vulnerability.’^{[footnote 200]}

12.3.6 Equality Movement stated in its 2025 annual report, published in May 2026 and covering 2025, that its legal team had provided legal assistance in 136 cases, including 96 cases newly opened during the year. 30 cases related to violence and threats^{[footnote 201]}.

12.4 Violent hate crimes

12.4.1 Social scientist David Rypel observed in a statement to the research organisation Asylos in August 2024: ‘The general impression among the participants of my qualitative research was that gay cis men and trans women have a higher chance of being assaulted on the street, making them more visible victims of anti-queer violence.’^{[footnote 202]}

12.4.2 The same expert noted: ‘Lesbian cis women face less visible forms of oppression, such as domestic abuse, or gender-based sexual harassment, such as slut-shaming, and violence that might not always be recognised as ‘anti-queer.’’^{[footnote 203]}

12.4.3 Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL), a news outlet that seeks ‘to promote democratic values by providing accurate, uncensored news and open debate in countries where a free press is threatened and disinformation is pervasive’^{[footnote 204]}, reported in an article published in October 2024: ‘Nata Talikishvili, a transgender activist in Georgia, was attacked in Tbilisi on October 20, just a month after the killing of another transgender woman, Kesaria Abramidze, reflecting the worsening climate for LGBT rights in the South Caucasus country. The Interior Ministry told RFE/RL a suspect was arrested for allegedly insulting Talikishvili and hitting her with a brick, leaving her with a concussion.’^{[footnote 205]}

12.4.4 In the sources consulted (see Bibliography), no information was available about the outcome of the criminal prosecution for the attack against Nata Talikishvili.

12.4.5 InterpressNews, a Tbilisi-based Georgian news agency^{[footnote 206]}, stated in an article published in July 2025, that ‘… [t]he Tbilisi Court of Appeals has upheld, without changes, the guilty verdict against Beka Jaiani for the deliberate murder of Kesaria Abramidze committed with particular cruelty on the grounds of gender. This information was released by the Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia.’^{[footnote 207]}

12.4.6 The i Paper noted in an article published in October 2024: ‘LGBT people in Georgia are facing increasing violence and persecution after the government passed a law that imposed sweeping restrictions on the community. Many LGBTQ+ people have described living in fear, with some forced to flee the Caucasus country because of threats and discrimination about their sexualities and gender.’^{[footnote 208]}

12.4.7 The same article observed: ‘Ilga-Europe, an LGBTI advocacy group, says there has been a sharp rise in violence against the community, including vandalism of organisations Tbilisi Pride and WISG, and violent threats – including death threats against LGBT activists and their families.

‘“People in my community have experienced physical violence, homelessness, extreme poverty, and mental health challenges,” … says [Tamar Jakeli, director of Tbilisi Pride], noting how these effects are rooted in the way LGTBQ+ people are treated in Georgia by the government, employers, and friends and family. “Police are usually very unhelpful and even hostile…”’^{[footnote 209]}

12.4.8 The 2025 ILGA Report noted:

‘Just one day after the Parliament of Georgia passed the anti LGBTI law, a celebrity trans woman, Kesaria Abramidze was found brutally murdered in her apartment. The subsequent investigation pertains to premeditated murder with aggravating circumstances of special cruelty based on gender identity. In October, a month after Kesaria’s murder, renowned trans activist Nata Talikishvili was physically attacked with a brick, resulting in a concussion.’^{[footnote 210]}

12.4.9 Equality Movement stated in its report on LGBTQ+ rights violations in Georgia, published in March 2025:

‘… [S]everal attacks on LGBTQ+ community members followed an identical pattern in 2024. The incidents happened during meetings scheduled through dating applications. For instance, [Equality Movement] … was contacted by a citizen of a foreign country stating that after he arrived at such a date, unidentified people appeared at the scene, who physically assaulted and verbally abused him. … [T]he person refrained from reporting the incident to the police. … [V]ictims of other dating app-related attacks have not contacted law enforcement agencies either.’^{[footnote 211]}

12.4.10 The OFPRA 2025 Report noted that ‘[hate crimes against LGBT+ persons in Georgia] … are rarely reported to the authorities, in whom LGBT+ people have little confidence. Moreover, discrimination based on sexual orientation or gender identity is rarely treated as an aggravating circumstance.’^{[footnote 212]}

12.4.11 The OFPRA 2025 Report further observed:

‘Each year, from May to July, around Pride month, NGOs observe an increase in homophobic and transphobic violence and assaults. Violence against LGBT+ persons reaches its peak during the period when they are most visible, stretching from the International Day Against Homophobia, Biphobia and Transphobia (17 May) until July, when Tbilisi Pride holds its Pride festival. Spikes in violence may also occur when information is disseminated by ultra-conservative groups, as happened during the screening of Levan Akin’s film And Then We Danced.’^{[footnote 213]}

12.4.12 The OFPRA 2025 Report also stated: ‘Within the LGBT+ community, transgender persons are the most exposed to violence.’^{[footnote 214]}

12.4.13 The WISG 2025 Report noted: ‘Transgender individuals are facing particular challenges. There have been documented cases of verbal abuse in public, as well as physical assaults—two of which escalated into physical attacks.’^{[footnote 215]}

12.4.14 Equality Movement noted in a statement to CGRS, made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025: ‘… [T]he state no longer classifies hate crimes on SOGI grounds separately. In addition, given that the majority of incidents go unreported, the official statistics fail to reflect reality.’^{[footnote 216]}

12.4.15 Equality Movement also observed in its statement to the CGRS:

‘Equality Movement’s lawyers report that, alongside the massive anti-LGBT campaign and related legal developments, there has been a noticeable increase in attacks motivated by transphobia. Some transgender individuals and other LGBTQ+ community members who remain in Georgia are facing severe physical security risks - being verbally and physically assaulted multiple times per month - which ultimately forces many to flee the country.’^{[footnote 217]}

12.4.16 Equality Movement further stated: ‘Particularly concerning are emerging trends in SOGI based violence, such as attacks on LGBTQ+ individuals orchestrated by luring them through dating applications.’^{[footnote 218]}

12.4.17 Equality Movement noted in a second statement to the CGRS, made in September 2025 and equally published in the CGRS 2025 Report in the same month:

‘The risks to physical safety for lesbian, gay, bisexual, and non-binary persons are closely tied to their appearance. Individuals whose physical presentation does not conform to binary norms of femininity or masculinity often become immediate targets of violence and harassment. Moreover, victims of homophobic aggression are not always members of the community. In some cases, individuals are targeted simply because their appearance deviates from culturally accepted norms. Hatred in society is increasing alongside the intensification of homophobic rhetoric.’^{[footnote 219]}

12.4.18 The Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe’s (OSCE) Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights compiles an annual hate crime report on participating OSCE states, with a focus on specific bias motivations^{[footnote 220]}. The 2024 Hate Crime Report, published in November 2025, records 27 anti-LGBTI hate crimes for Georgia^{[footnote 221]}.

12.4.19 The 2026 ILGA Report observed:

‘In 2025, the continued prevalence and systemic nature of hate crimes motivated by sexual orientation or gender identity remains one of the most pressing challenges faced by the LGBTI community in Georgia. Nonetheless, a mismatch between the official statistics and reality was induced by the obstacles hindering the effective prevention and investigation of SOGI-based hate crimes — such as delays in launching investigations, granting victims the status of ‘aggrieved party’, or properly qualifying criminal cases, combined with the lack of sensitivity and awareness among police officers, prosecutors, and investigators.’^{[footnote 222]}

12.4.20 The same report noted:

‘Data collected by civil society organisations in 2025 indicate that, despite a decrease in officially recorded cases in recent years, bias-motivated crimes based on sexual orientation and gender identity remain a significant concern.’^{[footnote 223]}

For information on the arrest and prosecution of crimes committed against LGBT+ people, see Protection.

12.5 Conversion therapy and involuntary medical practices

12.5.1 The undated ILGA World Database entry for Georgia indicates that ‘… laws in force in Georgia do not regulate or restrict sexual orientation, gender identity or gender expression change efforts (SOGIECE), regularly known as “conversion therapies”.’^{[footnote 224]}

12.5.2 The USSD 2023 Report observed: ‘So-called conversion therapy practices were not banned. According to Tbilisi Pride, there were several cases of parents taking children to a psychiatrist in an attempt to change the sexual orientation or gender identity or expression of the child.’^{[footnote 225]}

12.5.3 The same report continued: ‘There were no reports of surgeries performed on intersex children or nonconsenting intersex adults. The law and medical associations did not limit these practices or speak out against them.’^{[footnote 226]}

13. Access to services

13.1 General

13.1.1 Equality Movement noted in its report on LGBTQ+ rights violations in Georgia, published in March 2025:

‘The number of state services responding to the needs of vulnerable groups is critically limited in Georgia. For many years now, the non-governmental sector has tried to bridge this gap. In this regard, the LGBTQ+ community faces particular exclusion. Over the years, due to the inadequate implementation of anti-discriminatory mechanisms and domination of oppressive discourses in society, especially among professional groups, the state services designed to mitigate and overcome the challenges faced by the community remain absent.^{[footnote 227]}

13.1.2 Equality Movement further noted in a statement to the CGRS, made in September 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in the same month:

‘… [S]ince 2022 no comprehensive research has been carried out on socio-economic vulnerability of the community. However, Equality Movement’s systematic observations, conducted to design and adjust programs and services in line with the community’s needs, reveal that systemic barriers to education, employment, healthcare, and other areas remain persistent. Equality Movement’s internal “research on the updated needs of the LGBTQ+ community in relation to healthcare, psychosocial and legal services” conducted in the beginning of 2025 shows that some of these barriers have further intensified.’^{[footnote 228]}

13.1.3 Equality Movement also observed in a statement to the CGRS that was published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025:

‘Multiple factors can be fueling the physical and socio-economic vulnerability of certain LGBTI individuals. Due to failures of state policy and institutions, factors such as belonging to an ethnic or religious minority, being a migrant or internally displaced person, or living with a disability all contribute to structural poverty. When these socio-economic or demographic vulnerabilities intersect with SOGIESC-related issues, the barriers to fully realizing human rights and achieving wellbeing become even more severe.’^{[footnote 229]}

13.1.4 The same statement continued:

‘An individual’s socio-economic vulnerability is often shaped by their family’s socio-economic conditions. The situation becomes even more severe when LGBTI individuals experience domestic violence. At this stage, the cycle of socio-economic exclusion frequently begins: neglected by their families or forced to leave home at an early age to escape violence, many are deprived of access to proper education, which in turn limits their employment opportunities to low-wage jobs or sex work, which contributes to additional social challenges and physical security risks.’^{[footnote 230]}

13.2 Access to healthcare

13.2.1 UNAIDS, the Joint United Nations Programme on HIV and AIDS, issued a press release in October 2024 that expressed ‘deep concern over the recently adopted anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in Georgia, which poses serious risks to public health and human rights…

‘These discriminatory laws violate fundamental rights to autonomy, dignity, and equality, exacerbating stigma and hindering LGBTQ+ people’s access to essential health services. This undermines Georgia’s efforts to end AIDS and combat other infectious diseases.’^{[footnote 231]}

13.2.2 The OFPRA 2025 Report observed: ‘LGBT+ people are more exposed to mental health problems due to their vulnerability and persistent discrimination. When needed, some turn to community organisations for support. According to Coalition for Equality, a coalition of five human rights NGOs, members of the LGBT+ community do not seek state-funded psychiatric support services because they do not trust them.’^{[footnote 232]}

13.2.3 The same report noted: ‘Among transgender people, the main barrier to healthcare is the lack of training among medical staff regarding their specific needs.

‘The COVID-19 pandemic particularly affected the mental health of the LGBT+ community, as restrictions on movement increased the isolation of LGBT+ individuals from their community.

‘Stigma towards people living with HIV/AIDS persists in Georgia and creates additional barriers to accessing testing. The NGO Equality Movement provides access to HIV pre-exposure prophylaxis (PrEP) treatment as well as self-testing kits that can be delivered to people’s homes and are advertised through the dating application Grindr. Although HIV testing and treatment are free of charge in Georgia, medical care and treatment for other illnesses that may be contracted as a result of HIV/AIDS remain very expensive.’^{[footnote 233]}

13.2.4 The 2024 Ombudsman Report further noted:

‘It is important to emphasize the impact of the law [of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors] on the right to life and health. According to Article 6 of the law, it is prohibited to perform a surgical operation or to use any other medical manipulation in order to assign a person to a gender different from his/her biological sex. This restriction is not limited to surgical operations and applies to all types of medical interventions, which poses serious challenges for people undergoing gender-affirming surgery, since access to medical services is critically important for their life and health, which will be at risk if medical personnel refuse to provide necessary medical services on the grounds of non-compliance with the law. The right to health implies access to necessary medical care without discrimination.’^{[footnote 234]}

13.2.5 The three non-governmental organisations ECOM – Eurasian Coalition on Health, Rights, Gender and Sexual Diversity, Equality Movement, and Tbilisi Pride in July 2025 issued a joint submission to the 51st Universal Periodic Review session in January 2026. In this document, the organisations noted:

‘In the absence of comprehensive state protection, civil society organizations including LGBT led and allied NGOs have assumed a critical role in the realization of the right to health … These organizations have been central in the delivery of HIV prevention and care services, provision of psychosocial support, legal aid, human rights monitoring, and policy advocacy. Their work has been instrumental in partially filling gaps in the national healthcare system, particularly in addressing the needs of men who have sex with men (MSM), transgender persons, and other key populations. However, due to budget constraints and the lack of respective medical licenses, they are unable to fully meet the demand for physical and mental health services coming from the community.’^{[footnote 235]}

13.2.6 Equality Movement indicated in its 2025 annual report, published in May 2026, that 12,665 beneficiaries had received a basic package of essential tools for preventing the spread of HIV and sexually transmitted infections in 2025. Furthermore, 8,247 beneficiaries had received voluntary counselling and testing services for HIV and other sexually transmitted infections, including viral hepatitis (B and C) and syphilis. 484 beneficiaries were enrolled in the HIV Pre-Exposure Prophylaxis (PrEP) programme^{[footnote 236]}.

13.2.7 The WISG 2025 Report observed:

‘The latest legislative amendments have had a severely negative impact on healthcare services for the LGBTQI+ community. Under the newly adopted law, transgender individuals are entirely deprived of access to healthcare. The law imposes criminal liability on doctors or other healthcare professionals who provide medical services to LGBTQI+ individuals, banning healthcare procedures that are vital for their health and survival or other manipulations.’^{[footnote 237]}

13.2.8 The same report continued: ‘Access to healthcare has never been fully available to the LGBTQI+ community in Georgia. State policy has failed to improve the situation over the years, and the absence of national guidelines and protocols has long been a problem. Even discriminatory attitudes within the healthcare system were widespread. Community members often felt compelled to hide their sexual orientation or gender identity—or avoid healthcare services altogether—due to fears of stigma, harassment, or degrading treatment.

‘… [T]ransgender individuals have faced mistrust from medical personnel, inadequate service provision, and openly hostile attitudes.’^{[footnote 238]}

13.2.9 Equality Movement noted in a statement to the CGRS, made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025: ‘Self-censorship among medical professionals was already in effect even before the law was enacted - transgender individuals were denied access to essential healthcare services. Having no possibility to continue hormonal therapy or exercise right to health in a safe medical environment, forced numerous trans individuals to flee the country…

‘The service provider professionals report that the increasingly radicalized environment in the country, combined with constant stress and fear, has led to a severe deterioration of the community’s mental health. The demand for Equality Movement’s psycho-social care services has alarmingly raised in recent periods …’^{[footnote 239]}

13.2.10 The same statement continued: ‘The adoption of the anti-LGBT law has had a profoundly negative impact on service and program provision. The criminalization of trans-specific healthcare has forced local LGBTQ+ organizations to shut down all gender affirming programs and services.’^{[footnote 240]}

13.2.11 Equality Movement noted in a further statement to the CGRS, made in September 2025 and also published in the CGRS 2025 Report in the same month:

‘… LGBTI individuals’ access to healthcare is hindered by both financial and cultural factors. Economic exclusion deprives community members of sufficient resources not only for costly medical treatments but also for routine health needs, including medical check-ups and essential medications. The situation becomes even more severe for those with congenital conditions requiring continuous diagnostics and treatment. In many cases, community members are forced to take bank loans to meet urgent medical needs, which further exacerbates their vulnerability. As a result, crowdfunding has become a common means of financing treatment. However, supporters’ financial resources are themselves limited.’^{[footnote 241]}

13.2.12 The same statement continued: ‘In addition to financial barriers, violations of medical ethics and mistreatment of patients motivated by homophobia are widespread in Georgia’s healthcare sector. Examples revealed by Equality Movement’s internal research conducted in the beginning of 2025 include the stigmatization of sexually transmitted diseases, the provision of ‘unofficial’ treatments by doctors, and suggestions to withhold medical diagnoses.’^{[footnote 242]}

13.2.13 The same statement also observed:

‘Due to the severity of the problem, Equality Movement supports LGBTI individuals through ensuring their access to HIV and STDs-related prevention and treatment, advocating for PrEP and PEP, providing outreach in order to make medical services accessible for hidden community groups, providing certain medical consultations on the basis of organization’s resource centre or referring community members to “friendly” doctors, and in some cases even co-financing the certain medical bills. However, similar to Georgia’s broader civil society sector, the adoption of restrictive laws on NGOs and amendments to the Law on Grants have severely hindered international donors’ fundraising efforts. As a result, the financial resources of LGBTI community organizations are being depleted, creating a serious risk that even the limited access to medical care currently available will soon disappear.’^{[footnote 243]}

13.2.14 The same statement noted:

‘Another pressing challenge is the limited access to mental health services. Due to state neglect, mental health is largely excluded from national healthcare policy. Consequently, access to such services remains financially unavailable, even for individuals with private insurance coverage. In recent years, the radicalization of political and institutional homophobia, significantly hindering the wellbeing and safety of LGBTI individuals, triggered various mental health-related issues. Through the course of 2024, approximately 60% of beneficiaries addressing the Equality Movement’s social worker service were redirected to the mental health services. Although the Equality Movement tries to increase the organizational capacity to fully meet the community’s mental health-related needs, it is always challenging to overcome the waiting lines for the psycho-social services. In case the grant giving won’t be reactivated in Georgia, by the beginning of 2026 the organization will be severely hindered in its ability to continue providing services.’^{[footnote 244]}

13.2.15 The 2026 ILGA Report noted that ‘LGBTI persons remained particularly affected by stigma, confidentiality concerns, and discriminatory practices in healthcare, with trans people facing additional hurdles due to the absence of national protocols for trans-specific care, limited medical competences, and a lack of insurance coverage.’^{[footnote 245]}

13.3 Access to education

13.3.1 The WISG 2025 Report noted: ‘LGBTQI+ individuals in Georgia continue to face various forms of harassment and discrimination within educational institutions. While universities and vocational schools tend to offer a slightly more open environment, homophobic attitudes from some students and professors remain a significant concern.’^{[footnote 246]}

13.3.2 Equality Movement noted in a statement to the CGRS, made in September 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in the same month: ‘The barriers obstructing LGBTI individual’s access to education can be divided into two major parts: financial and cultural. While physical access to school education is largely ensured in Georgia, systemic poverty and the absence of family support often prevent LGBT individuals from continuing their studies beyond secondary school, leaving them without the financial means to pursue higher or vocational education.

‘In addition to financial obstacles, widespread bullying and discrimination in educational institutions - rooted in cultural barriers - significantly hinder the community’s access to education. Locally conducted studies confirm that homophobic bullying and discrimination remain pervasive across schools, as well as higher and vocational education institutions. These problems are driven by the absence of adequate anti-discrimination policies and mechanisms, while staff in educational institutions frequently lack the necessary qualifications to address cases of discrimination. Alarmingly, observations often indicate the involvement of school administration and academic personnel in bullying and discriminatory practices. Based on observations, it can be emphasized that in ‘exceptional’ cases where the educational process is not affected by homophobic oppression, it is achieved at the cost of concealing one’s identity.’^{[footnote 247]}

13.3.3 The same statement continued: ‘It needs to be stressed that sexual education has never been properly incorporated into Georgia’s educational agenda. On the contrary, it has often been used as a tool to promote ‘cultural protectionism’. The lack of basic awareness of SOGIESC-related issues has further reinforced these barriers, significantly hindering the LGBTI community’s ability to properly exercise their right to education.’^{[footnote 248]}

13.3.4 Equality Movement further observed in its statement to the CGRS:

‘The situation has drastically deteriorated after the adoption of the “Law on Family Values and Minors” that introduced additional barriers to educational inclusiveness and obstructed efforts to combat widespread homophobic discourses in society… In direct contradiction to the principle of inclusiveness, the law prohibits the incorporation of SOGIESC related information into all types of formal educational programs, as well as the dissemination and/or facilitating the dissemination of such information within formal educational institutions, including schools, universities, and vocational education centers. By imposing such uncompromising control over educational content, the law effectively enables state censorship and erects significant barriers to academic freedom. Furthermore, by banning direct communication with minors on matters of sexual orientation and gender identity the law eliminates the possibility of educating adolescents about fundamental concepts of gender and sexuality even in informal settings. According to the Equality Movement’s information, although the law has not yet been enforced, consequently, no educational institutions have been fined for violating it, students have already faced rejection of academic theses on SOGIESC-related topics by their supervisors or institutional administration.’^{[footnote 249]}

13.3.5 The International LGBTQI Youth & Student Organisation (IGLYO), ‘the world’s largest network dedicated to LGBTQI young people and their rights’^{[footnote 250]}, noted in its LGBTQI Inclusive Education Report 2025:

‘Although the Law on General Education and the Law on Higher Education formally prohibit discrimination, there are no specific policies or programmes to foster tolerance toward diverse sexual orientations and gender identities. Likewise, there are no regulatory mechanisms in place to address bullying based on SOGIESC grounds.’^{[footnote 251]}

13.3.6 The same report noted:

‘There is currently no mandatory teacher training on LGBTQI awareness for school teachers. NGOs have typically encountered obstacles in their efforts to promote awareness-raising initiatives among teachers…

‘The LGBTQI community organisation’s attempts to collaborate with relevant state institutions to train school teachers on gender and sexuality issues have largely been rejected. The situation has been further exacerbated by the adoption of the anti-LGBTQI law, which prohibits such discussions within formal educational institutions.’^{[footnote 252]}

13.3.7 The same report stated: ‘Despite widespread LGBTQIphobia [sic] in educational institutions in Georgia, the government has failed to establish effective mechanisms to prevent and mitigate such incidents.’^{[footnote 253]}

13.4 Access to employment

13.4.1 The USSD 2023 Report observed: ‘LGBTQI+ activists said discrimination in the workplace based on gender identity and sexual orientation remained widespread and underreported.’^{[footnote 254]}

13.4.2 UN Women’s Gender Equality Attitudes Study in Georgia, implemented from January to February 2024 to measure the prevalence of discriminatory attitudes and gender-based stereotypes, noted: ‘The public is mostly in agreement that being hired as skilled workers is difficult for … LGBTQI+ individuals (lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender, queer and intersex) who are public about their sexual orientation (61 per cent).’^{[footnote 255]}

13.4.3 The same study included the below graphic, indicating in percentages the surveyed participants’ responses to the question ‘In general, how easy is it for most sexual minority women (lesbian, bisexual, transgender, queer or intersex) who do not hide their sexual orientation / sexual minority men (gay, bisexual, transgender, queer or intersex) who do not hide their sexual orientation to be hired as skilled workers in Georgia?’ The employed 11-point scale was recoded into three categories: Scores of 0–3 were categorized as “difficult”, scores of 4–6 were categorized as “neutral”, and scores of 7–10 were categorized as “easy”^{[footnote 256]}.

13.4.4 The OFPRA 2025 Report noted:

‘Most LGBT+ persons are integrated into the labour market, primarily in the service and cultural sectors, but more than half partially or completely conceal their gender identity and/or sexual orientation at work. As is often the case in Georgia, employment is frequently precarious and poorly paid, leading many individuals to hold multiple jobs: in 2020, 68% of LGBT+ persons were employed, and among them one in five held at least two jobs. These data derive from a study conducted before the COVID-19 pandemic, during which more than two out of three LGBT+ persons lost their jobs. Nearly one LGBT+ person in three reported experiencing discrimination in the workplace, and the majority did not seek assistance, either because they considered it unnecessary or believed that nothing could be done.’^{[footnote 257]}

13.4.5 The OFPRA 2025 Report further observed:

‘Transgender persons, particularly transgender women, face greater exclusion from the labour market, notably because of the personal identification documents they are required to present. They are also the group most exposed to prostitution, often entering sex work after experiencing violence in previous employment. A quarter were minors when they began engaging in prostitution, and nearly 90% reported having experienced violence at the hands of a client.’^{[footnote 258]}

13.4.6 The WISG 2025 Report stated: ‘Discrimination in the labour market is … widespread. … LGBTQI+ community members—particularly transgender individuals— face systemic inequality in employment. The lack of legal gender recognition mechanisms further exacerbates their exclusion, often forcing them into unofficial or exploitative working conditions.’^{[footnote 259]}

13.4.7 The same report continued: ‘… LGBTQI+ individuals in Georgia struggle to find jobs with dignified conditions. Many are relegated to informal labour with no employment protections, often in the service sector. The state’s discriminatory policies have worsened their already precarious socio-economic conditions, solidifying existing barriers and institutionalizing discrimination in the labour sphere.’^{[footnote 260]}

13.4.8 Equality Movement noted in a statement to the CGRS, made in July 2025 and published in the CGRS 2025 Report in September 2025: ‘Since the adoption of the anti-LGBT law, the social and economic exclusion of the LGBTQ+ community has alarmingly intensified. Local community organizations and service providers report incidents such as the dismissal of transgender individuals from workplaces on the basis of their gender identity…’^{[footnote 261]}

13.4.9 Equality Movement noted in a further statement to the CGRS, made in September 2025 and equally published in the CGRS 2025 Report in the same month: ‘The “Law on Family Values and Minors” also significantly affects the community’s access to employment as it provides vaguely formulated provision on labor rights exempting employers from anti-discriminatory obligations to respect the person’s gender identity in labor relations …’^{[footnote 262]}

13.4.10 Equality Movement continued in the same statement:

‘The cycle of socio-economic exclusion of the LGBTI community creates significant barriers to their access to the labor market. Studies indicate that discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity is widespread, occurring both during recruitment processes and throughout employment. In addition, a person’s sexual orientation and/or gender identity often serve as grounds for employment termination. Such barriers often compel LGBTI individuals to hide their identity in the workplace. Equality Movement’s internal “research on the updated needs of the LGBTQ+ community in relation to healthcare, psychosocial and legal services” reveal that for ‘open’ members of the community, the service industry—particularly its entertainment sector—remains the relatively feasible and safe space for employment. However, this sector is characterized by inadequate labor regulations, job instability, and low wages, which contribute significantly to the structural poverty experienced by the community. The cases of labour rights violations processed by Equality Movement’s lawyers frequently involve a person’s illegal dismissal from a work motivated by homophobia.’^{[footnote 263]}

13.4.11 Equality Movement also noted in a statement to the CGRS that was published in the CGRS 2025 Report: ‘… employment opportunities are particularly limited for openly identified [LGBTI] community members. Even within the service industry, which is considered relatively more accessible, they are often subject to exotification—a practice that undermines, rather than supports, genuine emancipation.’^{[footnote 264]}

13.4.12 The Council of Europe’s Group of Experts on Action against Trafficking in Human Beings noted in a report published in October 2025, that individuals of diverse SOGIE ‘…face difficulties in accessing the labour market, as employment opportunities are scarce for those who identify outside the traditional gender binary, leading them to work more in the informal economy (including prostitution) or even to accept abusive job offers.’^{[footnote 265]}

14. Freedom of movement

14.1.1 The WISG 2025 Report observed: ‘… [C]oncerns around safety in public spaces have intensified. Increasingly, activists are avoiding preferred gathering locations and instead opting for alternative venues, choosing to use taxis rather than public transportation to minimize the risk of violence. These adaptations reveal how deeply security concerns are limiting the community’s freedom of movement …, compelling them to adopt restrictive survival strategies.’^{[footnote 266]}

Terms of Reference

1. Legal framework
   • a. General anti-discrimination provisions
   • b. Same-sex sexual relations
   • c. Same-sex couples, including marriage and civil union
   • d. Legality of conversion therapy
   • e. Relevant national and international jurisprudence
2. LGBTI community in Georgia
   • a. Lived experience
   • b. LGBTI activism and support organisations
3. State treatment
   • a. Prosecution
     • i. Government policies/ programmes that discriminate against LGBTI persons
     • ii. Restrictions/ enforcement of law against LGBTI freedom of assembly
   • b. Protection
     • i. Government policies/ programmes that assist LGBTI persons
     • ii. Access to and effectiveness of the criminal justice system
4. Societal treatment
   • a. Public opinion
   • b. Treatment by the public (including anti-LGBTI movements) and family members
   • c. Hate speech
   • d. Violent hate crimes
   • e. Conversion therapy
5. Access to services
   • a. Accommodation
   • b. Healthcare
   • c. Education
   • d. Employment (barriers, discrimination, and situation at the workplace)
6. Freedom of movement

Bibliography

Sources cited

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Asylos, Georgia: The situation of LGBTQI+ people, September 2024. Accessed: 27 July 2026

Bertelsmann Stiftung,

About Us, no date. Accessed: 19 June 2026

BTI 2026 Country Report – Georgia, 2026. Accessed: 19 June 2026

Caucasus Research Resource Center,

About, no date. Accessed: 22 July 2026

Capacity and Needs Assessment of Civil Society Organizations Working on Gender Equality in Georgia, 2024. Accessed: 3 August 2026

Caucasus Barometer 2024 Georgia, May 2024. Accessed: 22 July 2026

Caucasus Barometer 2024 Georgia – Factsheet, no date. Accessed: 22 July 2026

Civil Georgia, Gay Rights Activists Assaulted, Briefly Detained, 26 August 2017. Accessed: 3 August 2026

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The Conversation,

Who we are, no date. Accessed: 27 July 2026

Georgia’s ruling party steps up its assault on the country’s LGBTQ+ people, 12 July 2024. Accessed: 27 July 2026

Council of Europe,

Evaluation Report Georgia, 20 October 2025. Accessed: 21 July 2026

Georgia: political manipulation and harassment of LGBTI people and human rights defenders have no place in a democratic society, 27 March 2024. Accessed: 22 July 2026

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Equality Movement,

Mission / Vision, no date. Accessed: 21 July 2026

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Gallup,

Gallup Worldwide Research Methodology, no date. Accessed: 21 July 2026

Majority Worldwide Now Say Their Area Is Good for Gay People, 21 June 2023. Accessed: 21 July 2026

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Hate Crime Analysis 2022, 2023. Accessed: 23 July 2026

Hate Crime Analysis 2023, 2024. Accessed: 23 July 2026

Hate Crime Analysis 2024, 2025. Accessed: 23 July 2026

Hate Crime Analysis 2025, 2026. Accessed: 23 July 2026

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Grlz Wave, About Us, no date. Accessed: 20 July 2026

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Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Trans and Intersex People in Europe and Central Asia 2025, 2025. Accessed: 29 July 2026

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About, no date. Accessed: 24 July 2026

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InterpressNews,

About us, 19 September 2015. Accessed: 31 July 2026

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The i Paper, Georgia’s LGBT community is living in fear of violence after sweeping new law, 25 October 2024. Accessed: 31 July 2026

Human Rights Watch,

Georgia: New Laws Devastate Independent Civic Groups, 9 July 2026. Accessed: 20 July 2026

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Lawyers for Lawyers,

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Media Development Foundation,

About MDF, no date. Accessed: 24 July 2026

Gender- and Identity-Based Disinformation, 15 April 2025. Accessed: 24 July 2026

Sexist Hate Speech and Homophobia – Amid 2024 Parliamentary Elections, 7 May 2025. Accessed: 24 July 2026

Ministry of Internal Affairs, Administrative offences, no date. Accessed: 24 July 2026

Ministry of Internal Affairs of Georgia (MIAG), Prosecution Service of Georgia (PSG), and Supreme Court of Georgia (SCG),

Joint report of data on crimes committed on grounds of intolerance with discrimination bias 2021, 2022. Accessed: 6 August 2026

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Joint report of data on crimes committed on grounds of intolerance with discrimination bias 2023, 2024. Accessed: 6 August 2026

Joint report of data on crimes committed on grounds of intolerance with discrimination bias 2024, 2025. Accessed: 6 August 2026

Joint report of data on crimes committed on grounds of intolerance with discrimination bias 2025, 2026. Accessed: 6 August 2026

National Statistics Office of Georgia,

2024 Population Census of Georgia results, 14 November 2024. Accessed: 24 July 2026

Hate Crimes Statistics, no date. Accessed: 6 August 2026

Unified Report on Criminal Justice Statistics (Dec, 2025), December 2025. Accessed: 6 August 2026

Unified Report on Criminal Justice Statistics (June, 2026), June 2026. Accessed: 6 August 2026

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Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR),

Cooperation with Georgia - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 23 April 2025. Accessed: 19 June 2026

Cooperation with Georgia - Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 27 April 2026. Accessed: 30 June 2026

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE),

Hate Crime Report 2024 – Georgia, 6 November 2025. Accessed: 23 July 2026

Hate Crime Report – Our Methodology, no date. Accessed: 23 July 2026

Report on Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms since Spring 2024, 24 February 2026. Accessed: 19 June 2026

Our World in Data, Share of people who think homosexuality is never or rarely justified, 2022, 27 June 2025

Parliament of Georgia,

Administrative Offences Code of Georgia, 1984

Constitution of Georgia, 1995

Criminal Code of Georgia, 2026

Labour Code of Georgia, 2025

Law of Georgia on Adoption and Foster Care, 2017

Law of Georgia on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia, April 2025

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Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations, 1997

Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, April 2025

Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024

On Amendments to the Constitution of Georgia, 2017

Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia,

Mandate, no date. Accessed: 24 July 2026

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On the Situation of Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms in Georgia 2024, 23 May 2025. Accessed: 30 July 2026

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Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL),

About RFE/RL, no date. Accessed: 31 July 2026

Georgian Police Arrest Gay-Rights Activists After Attack, 25 August 2017. Accessed: 21 July 2026

Transgender Activist Attacked Amid Rising LGBT Hostility In Georgia, 21 October 2024. Accessed: 31 July 2026

Tbilisi Pride,

@tbilisipride (Instagram account), no date. Accessed: 21 July 2026

Mission, no date. Accessed: 21 July 2026

UNAIDS, UNAIDS statement on anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in Georgia, 1 October 2024. Accessed: 29 July 2026

UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on protection against violence and discrimination based on sexual orientation and gender identity on his visit to Georgia, 15 May 2019. Accessed: 22 July 2026

UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the situation of human rights defenders, Mary Lawlor, on her visit to Georgia,19 March 2024. Accessed: 27 July 2026

UN Women, Gender Equality Attitudes Study in Georgia, 2024

US Department of State,

2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices: Georgia, 22 April 2024. Accessed: 27 July 2026

2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices: Georgia, 12 August 2025. Accessed: 24 July 2026

Women’s Initiative Supporting Group (WISG),

About Organisation, no date. Accessed: 21 July 2026

Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues from State Policy: Challenges to Equality in Georgia, 17 May 2026. Accessed: 24 July 2026

World Values Survey, Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2022 data-set, June 2024. Accessed: 22 July 2026

Sources consulted but not cited

Coalition for Equality, The Main Challenges of the Social Protection System for Various Vulnerable Groups in Georgia, 2022. Accessed: 24 July 2026

The Conversation, First year of Georgia’s ‘foreign agent’ law shows how autocracies are replicating Russian model − and speeding up the time frame, 28 March 2025. Accessed: 27 July 2026

El País, Georgia’s LGBTQ+ community under threat: The end of the Caucasus’ capital of freedom, 7 January 2025. Accessed: 27 July 2026

OC Media, Patriarch Shio III targets abortion, ‘gender ideology’ on ‘Family Purity Day’, 18 May 2026. Accessed: 28 July 2026

PLOS Global Public Health, Factors associated with HIV infection and the utilization of HIV testing services among transgender people in Georgia, 22 July 2025. Accessed: 3 August 2026

Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, How Georgia’s Ruling Party Is Using Laws On ‘Foreign Agents’ And ‘Gay Propaganda’ To Maintain Its Grip On Power, 18 April 2024, 18 April 2024. Accessed: 27 July 2026

SHAPEDEM-EU, Gender Equality and Democracy Support in Georgia: A Spotlight on LGBTQI+, March 2025. Accessed: 3 August 2026

Sociologija. Mintis ir veiksmas, Gender as a Political Conflict: Transgender Vulnerability and LGBTQ+ Rights in Contemporary Georgia, 12 June 2025. Accessed: 3 August 2026

Tbilisi Pride, Updates on the Investigation into the Violent Attack at Tbilisi Pride Fest 2023 (July 8th), 12 October 2023. Accessed: 27 July 2026

Women’s Initiative Supporting Group,

From Prejudice to Equality - Study on Public Knowledge, Awareness and Attitudes Towards LGBT(Q)I Community and Legal Equality, 2023. Accessed: 22 July 2026

Transformed Parenthood - Voices of parents of queer persons: collective sorrow and power, 29 September 2025. Accessed: 29 July 2026

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1. National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2024 Population Census of Georgia results, 14 November 2024 ↩

2. National Statistics Office of Georgia, 2024 Population Census of Georgia results, 14 November 2024 ↩

3. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 8), 24 March 2025 ↩

4. UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on … (paragraph 29), 15 May 2019 ↩

5. Parliament of Georgia, Constitution of Georgia, 1995 ↩

6. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, April 2025 ↩

7. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination, May 2014 ↩

8. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on Amendments to the Law of Georgia on the …, April 2025 ↩

9. Parliament of Georgia, Labour Code of Georgia, 2025 ↩

10. Parliament of Georgia, Criminal Code of Georgia, 2026 ↩

11. Parliament of Georgia, Criminal Code of Georgia, 2024 ↩

12. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on Amendments to the Criminal Code of Georgia, April 2025 ↩

13. Parliament of Georgia, Constitution of Georgia, 1995 ↩

14. Parliament of Georgia, On Amendments to the Constitution of Georgia, 2017 ↩

15. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

16. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

17. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on Adoption and Foster Care, 2017 ↩

18. ILGA, World Database – Georgia, no date ↩

19. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

20. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

21. Parliament of Georgia, Criminal Code of Georgia, 2024 ↩

22. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

23. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

24. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

25. Xe, Currency Converter, 7 August 2026 ↩

26. Xe, Currency Converter, 7 August 2026 ↩

27. Parliament of Georgia, Administrative Offences Code of Georgia, 1984 ↩

28. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

29. Xe, Currency Converter, 7 August 2026 ↩

30. Xe, Currency Converter, 7 August 2026 ↩

31. Xe, Currency Converter, 7 August 2026 ↩

32. Xe, Currency Converter, 7 August 2026 ↩

33. Parliament of Georgia, Administrative Offences Code of Georgia, 1984 ↩

34. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on the Protection of Family Values and Minors, 2024 ↩

35. Parliament of Georgia, Law of Georgia on Assemblies and Demonstrations, 1997 ↩

36. UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on … (paragraph 26), 15 May 2019 ↩

37. UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on … (paragraph 27), 15 May 2019 ↩

38. UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on … (paragraph 28), 15 May 2019 ↩

39. UN General Assembly, Report of the Independent Expert on … (paragraph 30), 15 May 2019 ↩

40. Gallup, Majority Worldwide Now Say Their Area Is Good for Gay People, 21 June 2023 ↩

41. Gallup, Gallup Worldwide Research Methodology (page 191), no date ↩

42. David Rypel, About me, no date ↩

43. Asylos, Georgia: The situation of LGBTQI+ people (page 14), September 2024 ↩

44. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 15), 24 March 2025 ↩

45. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 12), 24 March 2025 ↩

46. Equality Movement, Mission / Vision, no date ↩

47. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 39), 19 September 2025 ↩

48. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 48), 19 September 2025 ↩

49. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 48), 19 September 2025 ↩

50. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 48), 19 September 2025 ↩

51. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 49), 19 September 2025 ↩

52. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 49), 19 September 2025 ↩

53. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

54. US Department of State, 2024 Country Report on Human Rights Practices…, 12 August 2025 ↩

55. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genree (page 16), 24 March 2025 ↩

56. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 16), 24 March 2025 ↩

57. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025 – Georgia, 2025 ↩

58. Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, On the Situation of Equality … (page 17), 2 May 2025 ↩

59. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 47), 19 September 2025 ↩

60. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 47), 19 September 2025 ↩

61. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 33), 19 September 2025 ↩

62. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 67), 2026 ↩

63. OSCE, Report on Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human … (page 74), 24 February 2026 ↩

64. OSCE, Report on Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human … (page 76), 24 February 2026 ↩

65. Equality Movement, Mission / Vision, no date ↩

66. Women’s Initiative Supporting Group, About Organisation, no date ↩

67. Tbilisi Pride, Mission, no date ↩

68. Tbilisi Pride, @tbilisipride (Instagram account), no date ↩

69. Queer, About Us, no date ↩

70. Queer Initiative, @queer.initiative (Instagram account), no date ↩

71. Caucasus Research Resource Center, About, no date ↩

72. Caucasus Research Resource Center, Capacity and Needs Assessment of … (page 32), 2024 ↩

73. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, … (page 62), 2025 ↩

74. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 15), 24 March 2025 ↩

75. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 15), 24 March 2025 ↩

76. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 17), 17 May 2025 ↩

77. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 52), 19 September 2025 ↩

78. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 48), 19 September 2025 ↩

79. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 67), 2026 ↩

80. Human Rights Watch, Georgia: New Laws Devastate Independent Civic Groups, 9 July 2026 ↩

81. Human Rights Watch, Georgia: New Laws Devastate Independent Civic Groups, 9 July 2026 ↩

82. Grlz Wave, About Us, no date ↩

83. Human Rights Watch, Georgia: New Laws Devastate Independent Civic Groups, 9 July 2026 ↩

84. Equality Movement, Report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia 2024 (page 6), 3 March 2025 ↩

85. Coalition for Equality, The State of Right of Equality in Georgia (page 1), 3 March 2025 ↩

86. Coalition for Equality, The State of Right of Equality in Georgia (page 15), 3 March 2025 ↩

87. OHCHR, Cooperation with Georgia - Report of the United Nations High … (page 6), 23 April 2025 ↩

88. Human Rights Watch, World Report 2025 – Georgia, 2025 ↩

89. US Department of State, 2024 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices …, 12 August 2025 ↩

90. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 14), 19 September 2025 ↩

91. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 14), 19 September 2025 ↩

92. Inter-Parliamentary Union, Gender Equality Council, no date ↩

93. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 66), 2026 ↩

94. OSCE, Report on Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human … (page 34), 24 February 2026 ↩

95. OSCE, Report on Developments in Georgia in Respect of Human … (page 90), 24 February 2026 ↩

96. OHCHR, Cooperation with Georgia – Report of the United Nations High … (page 6), 27 April 2026 ↩

97. Human Rights Watch, Georgia: New Laws Devastate Independent Civic Groups, 9 July 2026 ↩

98. Democracy Research Institute, Vision and Mission, no date ↩

99. Democracy Research Institute, Anti-gender rhetoric and gender stereotypes in … (page 5), 2024 ↩

100. Democracy Research Institute, Anti-gender rhetoric and gender stereotypes in … (page 5), 2024 ↩

101. Democracy Research Institute, Anti-gender rhetoric and gender stereotypes in … (page 5), 2024 ↩

102. FSMI, IML, and UGSPN, Georgian Elections Observatory 2024 (page 1), 2024 ↩

103. FSMI, IML, and UGSPN, Georgian Elections Observatory 2024 (page 43), 2024 ↩

104. Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics, About Us, 10 November 2017 ↩

105. Georgian Charter of Journalistic Ethics, Decision in the case of the NGO …, 12 June 2024 ↩

106. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 9), 24 March 2025 ↩

107. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 17), 24 March 2025 ↩

108. Media Development Foundation, About MDF, no date ↩

109. Media Development Foundation, Gender- and Identity-Based … (page 9), 15 April 2025 ↩

110. Media Development Foundation, Sexist Hate Speech and Homophobia … (page 7), 7 May 2025 ↩

111. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 13), 17 May 2025 ↩

112. European Commission, Georgia 2025 Report (page 40), 4 November 2025 ↩

113. Amnesty International, Anatomy of Repression – Georgia: 500 Days of … (page 10), 14 June 2026 ↩

114. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 17), 24 March 2025 ↩

115. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty, Georgian Police Arrest Gay-Rights Activists …, 25 August 2017 ↩

116. Xe, Currency Converter, 7 August 2026 ↩

117. Civil Georgia, Gay Rights Activists Assaulted, Briefly Detained, 26 August 2017 ↩

118. National Statistics Office of Georgia, Unified Report on Criminal … (row 104), December 2025 ↩

119. National Statistics Office of Georgia, Unified Report on Criminal Justice … (row 104), June 2026 ↩

120. Ministry of Internal Affairs, Administrative offences, no date ↩

121. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 17), 17 May 2025 ↩

122. Georgian Young Lawyers’ Association et al., Human rights crisis in Georgia …, June 2025 ↩

123. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

124. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 40), 19 March 2024 ↩

125. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 42), 19 March 2024 ↩

126. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 43), 19 March 2024 ↩

127. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 45), 19 March 2024 ↩

128. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 46), 19 March 2024 ↩

129. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 47), 19 March 2024 ↩

130. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 48), 19 March 2024 ↩

131. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

132. The Conversation, Who we are, no date ↩

133. The Conversation, Georgia’s ruling party steps up its assault on the country’s …, 12 July 2024 ↩

134. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 67), 2026 ↩

135. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 67), 2026 ↩

136. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 49), 19 March 2024 ↩

137. UN Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on … (paragraph 50), 19 March 2024 ↩

138. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

139. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

140. Equality Movement, Report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia … (page 12), 3 March 2025 ↩

141. Equality Movement, Report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia … (page 12), 3 March 2025 ↩

142. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 17), 24 March 2025 ↩

143. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 17), 17 May 2025 ↩

144. Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, On the Situation of … (page 180), 23 May 2025 ↩

145. Lawyers for Lawyers, Who We Are, no date ↩

146. Lawyers for Lawyers, Georgia – Submission to the Universal Periodic … (page 3), 17 July 2025 ↩

147. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 27), 19 September 2025 ↩

148. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 28), 19 September 2025 ↩

149. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 30), 19 September 2025 ↩

150. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 30), 19 September 2025 ↩

151. European Commission, Georgia 2025 Report (page 40), 4 November 2025 ↩

152. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 68), 2026 ↩

153. National Statistics Office of Georgia, Hate Crimes Statistics, no date ↩

154. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2021 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N1, N2, N10), 2022 ↩

155. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2022 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N1, N4, N12), 2023 ↩

156. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2023 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N3, N12, N31), 2024 ↩

157. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2024 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N3, N12, N31), 2025 ↩

158. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2025 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N3, N12, N31), 2026 ↩

159. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2024 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N13, N14, N16), 2025 ↩

160. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2024 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N33, N34), 2025 ↩

161. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2025 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N13, N14, N16), 2026 ↩

162. MIAG, PSG, and SCG, 2025 Joint report of data on crimes … (charts N33, N34), 2026 ↩

163. General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, 2021 Analysis of Crimes Committed with …, 2022 ↩

164. General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, Hate Crime Analysis 2022, 2023 ↩

165. General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, Hate Crime Analysis 2023, 2024 ↩

166. General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, Hate Crime Analysis 2024, 2025 ↩

167. General Prosecutor’s Office of Georgia, Hate Crime Analysis 2025, 2026 ↩

168. Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, Mandate, no date ↩

169. Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, Mandate, no date ↩

170. Equality Movement, Report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia 2024 (page 6), 3 March 2025 ↩

171. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 10), 17 May 2025 ↩

172. iFact, Mission and Values, no date ↩

173. iFact, How Georgian Dream Stole the Public Defender’s Office, 10 April 2025 ↩

174. iFact, How Georgian Dream Stole the Public Defender’s Office, 10 April 2025 ↩

175. iFact, How Georgian Dream Stole the Public Defender’s Office, 10 April 2025 ↩

176. iFact, How Georgian Dream Stole the Public Defender’s Office, 10 April 2025 ↩

177. European Values Study, Integrated Values Surveys (IVS) 1981 – 2022, no date ↩

178. World Values Survey, Joint EVS/WVS 2017-2022 data-set, June 2024 ↩

179. Our World in Data, Share of people who think homosexuality is never or rarely …, 27 June 2025 ↩

180. UN Women, Gender Equality Attitudes Study in Georgia (page 24), 2024 ↩

181. UN Women, Gender Equality Attitudes Study in Georgia (page 24), 2024 ↩

182. Council of Europe, Georgia: political manipulation and harassment of LGBTI …, 27 March 2024 ↩

183. Caucasus Research Resource Center, Caucasus Barometer 2024 Georgia – Factsheet, no date ↩

184. Caucasus Research Resource Center, Caucasus Barometer 2024 Georgia, May 2024 ↩

185. Caucasus Research Resource Center, Caucasus Barometer 2024 Georgia, May 2024 ↩

186. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 8), 24 March 2025 ↩

187. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 8), 24 March 2025 ↩

188. Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, On the Situation of … (page 145), 24 May 2024 ↩

189. Asylos, Georgia: The situation of LGBTQI+ people (page 31), September 2024 ↩

190. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 15), 17 May 2025 ↩

191. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 9), 24 March 2025 ↩

192. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 12), 24 March 2025 ↩

193. Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre, Social Exclusion of LGBTQ … (page 86), 2020 ↩

194. Bertelsmann Stiftung, About Us, no date ↩

195. Bertelsmann Stiftung, BTI 2026 Country Report – Georgia (page 26), 2026 ↩

196. Equality Movement, Report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia … (page 14), 3 March 2025 ↩

197. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 15), 17 May 2025 ↩

198. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 15), 17 May 2025 ↩

199. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 16), 17 May 2025 ↩

200. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 38), 19 September 2025 ↩

201. Equality Movement, Annual Report of Equality Movement 2025 (page 6), 5 May 2026 ↩

202. Asylos, Georgia: The situation of LGBTQI+ people (page 14), September 2024 ↩

203. Asylos, Georgia: The situation of LGBTQI+ people (page 17), September 2024 ↩

204. RFE/RL, About RFE/RL, no date ↩

205. RFE/RL, Transgender Activist Attacked Amid Rising LGBT Hostility In Georgia, 21 October 2024 ↩

206. InterpressNews, About us, 19 September 2015 ↩

207. InterpressNews, The Court of Appeals upheld the verdict of life imprisonment …, 21 July 2025 ↩

208. The i Paper, Georgia’s LGBT community is living in fear of violence after …, 25 October 2024 ↩

209. The i Paper, Georgia’s LGBT community is living in fear of violence after …, 25 October 2024 ↩

210. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, … (page 62), 2025 ↩

211. Equality Movement, Report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia … (page 14), 3 March 2025 ↩

212. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 10), 24 March 2025 ↩

213. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 10), 24 March 2025 ↩

214. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 9), 24 March 2025 ↩

215. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 17), 17 May 2025 ↩

216. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 28), 19 September 2025 ↩

217. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 38), 19 September 2025 ↩

218. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 38), 19 September 2025 ↩

219. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 39), 19 September 2025 ↩

220. OSCE, Hate Crime Report – Our Methodology, no date ↩

221. OSCE, Hate Crime Report 2024 – Georgia, 6 November 2025 ↩

222. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 66), 2026 ↩

223. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 68), 2026 ↩

224. ILGA, World Database – Georgia, no date ↩

225. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

226. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

227. Equality Movement, Report on LGBTQ+ Rights Violations in Georgia … (page 11), 3 March 2025 ↩

228. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 42), 19 September 2025 ↩

229. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 48), 19 September 2025 ↩

230. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 48), 19 September 2025 ↩

231. UNAIDS, UNAIDS statement on anti-LGBTQ+ legislation in Georgia, 1 October 2024 ↩

232. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 13), 24 March 2025 ↩

233. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 14), 24 March 2025 ↩

234. Public Defender (Ombudsman) of Georgia, On the Situation of Equality … (page 18), 2 May 2025 ↩

235. ECOM, Equality Movement, Tbilisi Pride, Joint Submission to the … (paragraph 6), July 2025 ↩

236. Equality Movement, Annual Report of Equality Movement 2025 (page 2), 5 May 2026 ↩

237. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 18), 17 May 2025 ↩

238. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 18), 17 May 2025 ↩

239. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 46), 19 September 2025 ↩

240. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 46), 19 September 2025 ↩

241. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 46), 19 September 2025 ↩

242. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 46), 19 September 2025 ↩

243. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 47), 19 September 2025 ↩

244. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 47), 19 September 2025 ↩

245. ILGA, Annual Review of the Human Rights Situation of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual … (page 68), 2026 ↩

246. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 19), 17 May 2025 ↩

247. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 43), 19 September 2025 ↩

248. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 43), 19 September 2025 ↩

249. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 44), 19 September 2025 ↩

250. IGLYO, About, no date ↩

251. IGLYO, LGBTQI Inclusive Education Report 2025 (page 91), 2025 ↩

252. IGLYO, LGBTQI Inclusive Education Report 2025 (page 91), 2025 ↩

253. IGLYO, LGBTQI Inclusive Education Report 2025 (page 92), 2025 ↩

254. US Department of State, 2023 Country Report on Human Rights Practices… , 22 April 2024 ↩

255. UN Women, Gender Equality Attitudes Study in Georgia (page 19), 2024 ↩

256. UN Women, Gender Equality Attitudes Study in Georgia (page 19), 2024 ↩

257. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 13), 24 March 2025 ↩

258. OFPRA, Géorgie: Situation des minorités sexuelles et de genre (page 13), 24 March 2025 ↩

259. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 19), 17 May 2025 ↩

260. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 19), 17 May 2025 ↩

261. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 43), 19 September 2025 ↩

262. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 44), 19 September 2025 ↩

263. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 44), 19 September 2025 ↩

264. CGRS, Georgië: Seksuele en genderminderheden (page 47), 19 September 2025 ↩

265. Council of Europe, Evaluation Report Georgia (paragraph 95), 20 October 2025 ↩

266. Women’s Initiatives Supporting Group, Eradication of LGBTQI+ Issues … (page 17), 17 May 2025 ↩