Policy paper

Finishing the job: Launching the Pensions Commission

Published 21 July 2025

Ministerial Foreword

It is time to finish the job. Two decades ago, under the last Labour government, the first Pensions Commission laid the groundwork for a new pensions landscape, with a simple State Pension and Automatic Enrolment into retirement savings. That has created savings pots, but it has not yet delivered a pensions system. Instead, too many future pensioners face incomes that are too low, risks that are too high and a system that is too unequal. So, the new Pensions Commission we have launched today has one task: to finish the job by mapping out a path to a pensions system that is truly adequate, in the broadest sense of that word.

The progress that has been made should not be understated. In 1997, pensioner poverty stood at 30%. By 2010 this had reduced to 15%,^{[footnote 1]} in part due to the introduction of Pension Credit in 2003. Automatic Enrolment has reversed the collapse in workplace pension saving to the point that now over 22 million workers are saving each month.^{[footnote 2]}

But welcoming progress is no excuse for complacency, when the work is only half done. Most starkly, we are currently on course for tomorrow’s pensioners to be poorer than today’s. Someone retiring in 2050 is set to have 8% lower private pension income compared to a retiree in 2025, while nearly 15 million working-age people are not on track to have an adequate retirement income.^{[footnote 3]}

Individuals are also bearing far too much risk for us to say we have an adequate pensions system today. The shift from Defined Benefit to Defined Contribution saving is at its heart a transfer of risk – over investment returns and longevity - from employers to individuals. We must do a better job of helping people manage that risk.

For it to endure, a pensions system must be fair as well as adequate. Pensioner poverty has risen again since 2010, principally amongst single pensioners. If you are a lower earner, woman, carer or one of the millions of households likely to be renting in retirement, ^{[footnote 4]} you are significantly more likely not to be saving enough. Despite the success in getting employees back saving, almost half (45%) of the working-age population are still saving nothing into a pension each month. ^{[footnote 5]})

The world has also changed significantly since the first Pensions Commission. Labour market shifts have seen more of some types of insecure work. Disability and poor health are increasing, seeing too many exit the world of work before State Pension age. Britain is also further along its demographic transition: the number of pensioners is set to increase by over half again by the 2070s raising State Pensions expenditure from 5.2% of GDP in 2024 to 2025 to 7.9% by 2073 to 2074. ^{[footnote 6]}

The Pension Schemes Bill, and the work of the Pensions Investment Review, moves our private pensions system forward. Bigger, better pension schemes will drive better returns, as will tackling inefficiencies in our system such as small pots. These changes are focused on ensuring people’s pension savings work as hard for them as they have worked to save. We must never forget that rates of return, not just rates of savings, determine our income in retirement.

The Pensions Commission we are now launching will take a broader view – conducting a review of our pensions system as a whole and the retirement outcomes it delivers. I am very grateful to Baroness Jeannie Drake, Sir Ian Cheshire and Professor Nick Pearce for undertaking this important review. The government’s statutory review of State Pension age will sit alongside this work, with the Independent Report to inform that being led by Dr Suzy Morrissey. This document lays out the background to this work, and the terms of reference for both reviews.

By completing the job of the first Pensions Commission, this Pensions Commission has a clear objective: building a strong, fair and sustainable pension system fit for the middle of the twenty first century.

– Torsten Bell MP, Minister for Pensions

About this document

This document assesses the state of Britain’s pension landscape, including the progress made over the past two decades since the first Pensions Commission. It draws together evidence of the challenges facing current and future pensioners, to lay out the challenges that this Pensions Commission will consider and make recommendations to address.

Laying the foundations

1. The first Pensions Commission was established in 2002 to examine the level of pension provision and saving. It reflected the challenges of the time, in particular concerns about pensioner poverty and the decline in workplace pension saving.

2. The first report of the 2002 to 2006 Pensions Commission was published in October 2004 and analysed the problems at that time. It set out how, over the previous ten years, participation in Defined Benefit (DB) pension schemes – which give a promise of a future level of pension income - had collapsed to a degree far beyond expectations. Some employers had replaced their DB offer with less generous Defined Contribution (DC) schemes, but most had chosen no replacement at all. This held out the prospect that a collapse in private pension saving would leave a large proportion relying solely on the State Pension, something that would be particularly hard to manage as the share of the population who are pensioners was set to grow.

3. The first Commission issued its final report in November 2005 and set out its recommendations to set up a low-cost occupational pension scheme which individuals would be automatically enrolled into; make reforms to the State Pension system to reduce means-testing by re-linking the basic State Pension to average earnings growth; and increase State Pension age to reflect increases in life expectancy over time.

4. Successive governments have introduced these changes, driving real improvements. The new State Pension provides a simplified, solid basis for retirement planning and Automatic Enrolment has ensured that the vast majority of employees are participating in a workplace pension. This is the foundation on which we must now build.

How the foundations have fared

5. Two decades on from the first Pensions Commission, we can now assess the extent to which it has achieved some of its objectives. Its reforms have clearly succeeded in two key ways: reducing pensioner poverty (by improving pensioner incomes) and raising pension savings rates.

Pensioner Poverty

6. Significant progress has been made on reducing pensioner poverty which was rightly a huge concern in the 1990s. ^{[footnote 7]} At that time almost 30% of those over the age of 65 lived in relative poverty (after housing costs). This rate halved by 2010, driven by the increased value of pensioner benefits (principally the introduction of Pension Credit), private pension income and earnings. The result is pensioners have gone from being more likely to be in poverty than the population as a whole, to less likely. However, the number of pensioners in poverty has increased over the past decade by around 200,000, with the poverty rate rising from its low of 13% in 2011 to 2012 to 16% in 2023 to 2024.

Figure 1: Percentage of population in relative poverty (after housing costs), 1994 to 1995 to 2023 to 2024 ^{[footnote 6]}

The State Pension

7. The first Pensions Commission saw the State Pension as the foundation of the UK pensions framework, delivering a predictable platform on which people could save additionally via their employer and individually. It is a feature of successful frameworks across the world.

8. The introduction of the Triple Lock, and, in 2016, the new State Pension, delivered on the first Commission’s recommendations. The former has seen increases faster than both earnings and prices, so that people receiving the full rate of the new State Pension now receive around 30% of typical earnings from the State Pension. The government is committed to the Triple Lock throughout this Parliament, which is likely to mean this proportion continues to grow.

Figure 2: Basic and new State Pension (full rate) as proportion of median earnings, 1984 to 2024 ^{[footnote 8]}

9. The reliance on the State Pension has somewhat reduced since the first Pensions Commission, with the percentage of people solely dependent on the State Pension and benefit income falling from 14% to 13%. ^{[footnote 9]} Total spending on pensioner support will of course continue to increase for decades to come despite increases in the State Pension age.

10. The new State Pension (nSP) is a simpler, flatter rate, and more broadly available pension (its full rate has become available to more people each year). While much attention focuses on its headline higher rate than the basic State Pension, the real change is that the nSP has reduced the range of amounts people receive, creating more equal outcomes, not least setting State Pension outcomes for men and women on the path to equalisation.

Figure 3: State Pension mean weekly amount of benefit by type of pension ^{[footnote 10]}

Saving participation

11. The first Commission’s most radical recommendation was for an Automatic Enrolment (AE) system of workplace pension saving, supported by a low-cost state-funded pension scheme (Nest). Following extensive consultation this has been implemented and it is hard to argue it has been anything other than a policy triumph. It has directly addressed the central challenge the first Pensions Commission highlighted: collapsing workplace saving.

12. As of 2023, 20.8 million eligible employees are participating each month in workplace pension saving. This represents 88% of the eligible population of employees, up from 55% in 2012. ^{[footnote 11]} More than 10 million employees are now saving compared to 2012 and therefore saving for retirement. The UK’s slide towards the bottom of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) league table on workplace saving has reversed.

Figure 4: Pension Participation for those eligible for AE ^{[footnote 12]}

13. Another measure of this success is the high participation and low opt-out rate in AE. Initially many people were expected to opt-out and decide that the employer contribution element was not sufficient to be worth the sacrifice of income they had to contribute themselves. The government itself heard evidence that opt-out would range from 20% to 50%, with a final central estimate of around 30%. ^{[footnote 13]} The opt out rate has in fact not gone above around 11% since roll-out, ^{[footnote 14]} despite the Covid pandemic and high levels of inflation putting pressure on household finances.

The job is only half done

14. The first Pensions Commission deserves much credit for setting these foundations and for their success in boosting financial security in retirement in the two decades since its final recommendations.

15.However, it is hard to look at today’s pension landscape and conclude anything other than that this is a job only half done. While much progress has been made, the truth is we are on course for future generations of pensioners to face incomes that are too low, risks that are too high and a system that is unequal in too many ways.

16. In addition there are new challenges that have emerged in the two decades since the first Commission. Pensions never exist in a vacuum, and shifts to our labour and housing markets, not to mention developments with our health as a nation, have profound implications.

17. The rest of this document lays out the challenges we now face. In addressing them, the goal is to finish the job started by the first Pensions Commission. Two decades on, the government is launching a revived Pensions Commission to chart a course to exactly that destination.

Adequacy

18. If we do nothing, tomorrow’s pensioners are at serious risk of being poorer than today’s. Many may have a lower income in retirement than they expect, and certainly than they would like.

19. The first Pensions Commission set levels for target replacement rates for low, median, and higher earners of 80%, 67% and 50% of pre-retirement earnings, respectively. Against these headline metrics, 4 in 10 working-age individuals ^{[footnote 15]} are not on track to meet their target for adequate income in retirement.

20. Other measures of adequacy, such as the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA) Retirement Living Standards, ^{[footnote 16]} show that 1 in 8 are not on track to meet a minimum living standard in retirement and 3 in 4 ^{[footnote 17]} are not on track to meet a moderate living standard.

Figure 5: Proportion of working-age people projected to not meet their Target Replacement Rate or PLSA Retirement Living Standards ^{[footnote 18]}

21. As the average total income received from DB pensions diminishes year-on-year and the average total income received from DC pensions increases at a slower rate, we are going to see average (mean) weekly occupational pension income actually fall in real terms from the next decade. ^{[footnote 19]} Indeed, it is projected not to return to today’s levels for nearly 40 years. Someone retiring in 2050 is set to have 8% (£800 per year) lower private pension income compared to a retiree in 2025.

22. This trend is not something the first Pensions Commission planned for. AE was never intended to be used to fill all of the ‘retirement savings gap’, with the first Commission envisaging that additional voluntary saving would form as significant a chunk of saving (it was hoped this would represent a quarter of target income replacement in retirement for a median earner). This has simply not materialised. 75% of DC savers have not chosen to change their contribution levels in the past 3 years ^{[footnote 20]} and the average (median) contribution rate has remained at 8% of total pay since 2019 (for private sector DC savers). ^{[footnote 21]} Relying on individuals to choose to save more has proven risky. The result is that people are on course to be more reliant on the State Pension with it contributing a greater proportion of people’s retirement income.

Figure 6: How much income future retirees will have in their first year of retirement (mean weekly amounts in 2023 to 2024 earnings terms) ^{[footnote 22]}

23. Below these headline adequacy and income figures, specific groups are doing less well than others.

24. Average earners: The group who are more likely to not be on track for their target replacement rate (TRR) are in the middle to upper income quintiles. More than half of TRR ‘undersavers’ are earning at least £42,000. Whilst much less likely to achieve the PLSA’s Minimum Retirement Living Standard, less than 1 in 5 of the poorest pensioners are set to miss out on what the first Pensions Commission defined as an adequate level relative to working life thanks to the larger role of the State Pension in driving their replacement rates.

25. Generation X: many of those born between 1965 and 1979 will not see the full benefits of the last two decades of pensions reform. Most of their years in employment come after the demise of DB arrangements, and AE was rolled out too late for it to make a big enough difference to their level of savings come retirement.

Figure 7: Proportion not meeting their TRR before and after housing costs by decade reaching State Pension age ^{[footnote 23]}

26. These trends reflect the fact that average workplace pension contribution rates have declined in the past two decades, not only despite AE but in part because of it. The average contribution rates as a percentage of pay for those saving is lower in the latest year (2023) compared to the level before AE rollout in 2012 and lower than the levels at the time of the first Pensions Commission. This reflects how AE has greatly increased the number of savers, many of whom are on low and middle incomes – and therefore a far greater number are saving at lower contribution levels (with many at the AE minimum). In addition, there has also been a shift of employers moving their employees from saving into Defined Benefit (DB) schemes to saving into Defined Contribution (DC) schemes, where average contributions historically have been lower.

Figure 8: Median total contributions into a workplace pension by pension type [as a percentage of total pay] by scheme type ^{[footnote 24]}

27. There is a clear relationship between earnings and the rates of contribution an individual and their employer make. Around 1 in 2 workers in the private sector only save around the minimum contribution level (8% or less of total pay), this is particularly the case for low earners. Around 1 in 2 (48%) of those earning £10,000-£20,000 per year are saving at AE minimum levels (8% of qualifying earnings bands) and around 3 in 4 are saving at 8% of total pay or less. This is significantly greater than higher earners, where just 1 in 10 workers are saving at AE minimum levels.

Figure 9: Contribution levels of employees saving into Private Sector DC schemes by earnings ^{[footnote 26]}

28. The success of AE can also be overstated if we only focus on participation rates of eligible employees, rather than savings rates amongst working-age people in general. Across the working-age population, just over half (55%) are saving into a pension. Alongside those who have opted out of AE, this reflects the fact that some people do not work at all, while low earners including those in multiple part-time jobs and the self-employed are not covered by AE. 1. There are also gaps across some ethnic minority groups, for example just 1 in 4 of those from a Pakistani or Bangladeshi background are saving into a pension.

Figure 10: Pension participation across different groups ^{[footnote 27]}

29. Low earners: Currently, those earning below £10,000 are not automatically enrolled into a workplace pension. As a result, pension participation levels are significantly lower for this earnings group, with only around 1 in 4 private sector employees participating in a pension when earning less than £10,000. ^{[footnote 28]} This threshold has been frozen for almost a decade. When coupled with fast rises in the minimum wage, fewer lower earners fall below it (the starting point for AE has fallen from 30 hours a week at National Living Wage in 2014 to 2015 to just 16 hours in 2025 to 2026).

Figure 11: Workplace pension participation by earnings ^{[footnote 29]}

30. Self-employed: In 1998, 48% of self-employed people saved into a pension which has now declined to less than 20%. ^{[footnote 30]} That means over 3 million self-employed are not saving into a pension. Only a small amount of this difference can be explained by characteristics of those classified as self-employed. ^{[footnote 31]}

31. Young people: Pension outcomes are affected by how early people start saving. This is due to the power of compound interest – the earlier pension contributions are made and invested the more growth they will see – as well as the importance of habit-building and improving financial resilience for retirement (if working lives are interrupted in subsequent years). Investment growth can account for around 60% of the final DC pension pot. ^{[footnote 32]} Currently, participation amongst those who just miss out on eligibility for AE but are in work is low with just 21% of 18 to 21-year-olds participating in a workplace pension; significantly lower than the 86% of 22 to 29-year-olds who are eligible.^{[footnote 33]}

32. These projections for future generations of pensioners, and for particular groups, highlight the challenge to pension adequacy in the coming decades. But that is not the only challenge.

Fairness

33. Behind these average levels of incomes or replacement rates sit a range of inequalities. In a world where the problem was that millions were saving nothing, it is perhaps understandable that questions of very different outcomes for different groups took a back seat in the aftermath of the first Pensions Commission. But there is no excuse for that to continue. Nor should the headline falls in pensioner poverty make us complacent.

34. New Department for Work and Pensions analysis shows that the Gender Pensions Gap now stands at 48%. ^{[footnote 34]} This means a typical woman currently approaching retirement can expect a private pension income worth over £5,000 less than that of a typical man (just over £100 per week for a woman compared to just over £200 a week for a man. This means that, despite the new State Pension having already broadly resulted in women reaching State Pension age now receiving similar amounts to men, the overall gap in retirement income between men and women is set to remain huge.

35. More broadly, whilst pensioner poverty has fallen, pensioner inequality has not. Over time, the ratio between the top and bottom fifth of the income distribution for pensioner couples has stayed constant whilst the ratio has grown for pensioner singles over the past decade, highlighting an increasing gap amongst the richest and poorest pensioner singles. ^{[footnote 35]} A single person in the top fifth of the income distribution has seen their income increase by 10% in real terms since 2010. For the poorest fifth, their income has barely changed with a 1% increase over 14 years.

Figure 12:  Income ratio and relative poverty rate, 1994 to 1995 to 2023 to 2024 ^{[footnote 36]}

36. Another challenge has emerged from a change to household make-up in the past two decades. Due to higher rates of divorce and increased longevity, being single in retirement – especially later life – is far more common than at the turn of the millennium. As at the 2021 census, there were 3.3 million people living alone aged over 65 in England and Wales.^{[footnote 37]} This represented 36.3% of older women and 22.7% of older men. This impacts adequacy of retirement income as there is only a single income on which to rely. For single-person households, costs such as energy bills or vehicle costs are much less than 50% lower than couple households meaning a ‘single premium’ exists. Single pensioners are therefore significantly less likely to have an adequate retirement income.

37. Relatedly, the recent increase in pensioner poverty has impacted certain groups more than others with a greater proportion of single pensioners in poverty. The relative poverty rate for single pensioners was 16% in 2010 to 2011 and this has risen to 21% in 2023 to 2024, whilst the relative poverty rate (after housing costs) for pensioner couples fell from 13% to 12% over the same period.

Figure 13: Estimated percentage of pensioners in relative poverty (after housing costs) by family type, 1994 to 1995 to 2023 to 2024 ^{[footnote 38] [footnote 39]}

38. Those approaching retirement are more likely to be in poverty, with 22% of those aged 60 to 64 in relative poverty in 2023 to 2024. They have also seen the least change in their poverty rates since the 90s. Between 1994 to 1995 and 2023 to 2024, the poverty rate for 60 to 64 year olds showed little change from 20% to 22%.

39. Older pensioners are also more likely to be in poverty; 20% of those aged 85+ were in relative poverty in 2023 to 2024. The poverty rate for 85+ decreased from 30% in 1994 to 1995 to 20% in 2023 to 2024. Falls in pensioner poverty have been greatest amongst those in their 70s and early 80s.

Figure 14: Relative poverty rates (after housing costs) by age group, 1994 to 1995 and 2023 to 2024 ^{[footnote 40]}

40. Debates about pensioner poverty in the 1990s and 2000s tended to focus on relative poverty (i.e. with a poverty line linked to 60% of the typical household’s income), in large part because falls in absolute poverty (i.e. with a fixed real terms poverty line) were simply taken for granted. But they can be taken for granted no longer. Reductions in absolute poverty have slowed over time with the past decade exhibiting just a 1 percentage point fall in absolute pensioner poverty compared to 10 percentage points over the previous decade. This reflects the fact that improvements in living standards generally have stalled, for everyone not just pensioners, during the last 15 years of economic stagnation.

Figure 15: Absolute poverty rates (after housing costs) by age group, 1994 to 1995 to 2023 to 2024 ^{[footnote 41]}

41. Inequalities in life expectancy are also very real, driving big differences in the proportion of adult life spent in retirement experienced across the population. Life expectancy in 2021 to 2023 was highest in southern regions of England and lowest in Scotland and northern regions of England. In England, the lowest life expectancy across local areas was in Blackpool (73.1 years for males and 78.9 years for females); the highest life expectancy was in Hart (Hampshire) for males (83.4 years), and in Kensington and Chelsea (86.5 years) for females. ^{[footnote 42]} The evidence suggests this is down to a variety of reasons including access to and use of health care and public services as well as wider socio-economic determinants such as income, education, housing and employment. Pensioners are also more likely than other age groups to be on an NHS waiting list, impacted by the growing waiting lists over the past decade. ^{[footnote 43]}

Figure 16: Life expectancy at birth by sex in 2021 to 2023 for England, Scotland, Wales and English regions ^{[footnote 44]}

42. While gaps in life expectancy across local areas are long standing, what stands out is that they have generally widened in recent years.

Figure 17: Gap between the highest and lowest local area life expectancies at birth, by sex and constituent country, selected periods between 2001 to 2003 and 2021 to 2023 ^{[footnote 45]}

Risk

43. The third significant challenge is risk, specifically, how this impacts savers’ ability to support themselves financially in retirement. The move from DB to DC, when combined with Pension Freedoms, has structurally shifted risks from employers to individuals. Alongside investment return risk, people saving into DC pension schemes now retire with savings pots rather than a pension income for life. This leaves them facing longevity risks that are very difficult for any individual to manage in isolation. The challenges posed by these risks play out in a range of ways.

44. Investment risk: Lifestyling has emerged as the principal way in which savers’ assets are invested to glide members down towards their chosen retirement age. Through most of members’ working life their savings typically will be invested in equities and focused on growth. Then, as savers move through their 50s and then to pre-retirement, the pension scheme will allocate their assets to ‘safer’ investments which, whilst attracting a lower rate of return, will be less volatile and reduce the span of outcomes in the months and weeks before retirement. On average this approach will mean smaller pension pots than would be the case if people stayed invested in return-seeking assets, but it reflects the trade-off between security and growth when the investment risk sits squarely with the individual.

45. In the past, DB scheme investment risk was for the employer to grapple with, with the individual certain about what they would receive. Now market movements towards retirement have a large impact on the annual income a saver is able to buy – via an annuity or drawdown arrangement – or the size of any lump-sum taken. Recent research finds lifestyling can take place around 15 years before retirement ^{[footnote 46]} and 5-year annualised returns for those 5 years from retirement have significant variation (see chart below).

Figure 18: Average annualised returns (5-year average) for savers 5 years from retirement across range of providers ^{[footnote 47]}

46. Longevity risk from savings pots not pensions: In addition to the impact of the investment strategy on the relative value of retirement options, it is now the individual who has to decide how best to secure an income at retirement and manage the consequent longevity risk. An individual with a DB scheme needs to decide only when to retire and where to settle on the sliding scale between lump-sum and income but is then assured of a set income until the end of their life. A DC scheme saver must consolidate their pension pots to get best value and choose between an annuity, a lump sum, drawdown or full cash out. They must – often without the support of paid-for financial advice or guidance – analyse annuity rates and market returns across various providers and select the product that matches their circumstances and personal risk appetite, reviewing this choice regularly. The combination of these critical decisions has the potential to result in suboptimal outcomes for millions as more and more people rely on DC pots as their main source of income in retirement. Trying to manage this is likely to see many consume too little early in retirement or risk running out of funds entirely if they live into older ages, leaving them reliant on the state.

47. Regulated advice and guidance is available to support people with these risks, but research shows that only 16% of 40 to 75-year-olds used an independent financial adviser or Pension Wise in the past 12 months. ^{[footnote 48]}

48. The government is pressing ahead urgently with solutions to this, including via the Pension Schemes Bill, which will require trustees and managers of schemes to default people into the solution that best suits their needs and delivering outcomes from the joint HM Treasury and FCA review of the advice and guidance boundary. There may be further ways to enable people to better balance longevity and financial risk up to and through retirement.

The Pensions Commission

49. This report has argued that the first Pensions Commission created a strong foundation for our pension system. But it left much undone, while much else has changed in the past two decades.

50. It is time to finish the job and put in place not just savings pots but a strong, fair and sustainable pensions landscape that is fit to last into the middle of the 21st century and beyond.

51. To chart the course to that point, the government has established this Pensions Commission. Overseen by Baroness Jeannie Drake, Sir Ian Cheshire and Professor Nick Pearce, it will examine our pensions system as a whole and the retirement outcomes it delivers before making longer term recommendations for change.

52. The government’s statutory review of State Pension age will sit alongside this work, with the Independent Report to inform that being led by Dr Suzy Morrissey.

1. Households below average income: for financial years ending 1995 to 2024 - GOV.UK ↩

2. Workplace pension participation and savings trends: 2009 to 2023 ↩

3. Analysis of Future Pension Incomes 2025 ↩

4. 202311-the-uk-pensions-framework-final2.pdf ↩

5. Family Resources Survey: financial year 2023 to 2024 - GOV.UK ↩

6. Fiscal risks and sustainability – September 2024 - Office for Budget Responsibility ↩ ↩²

7. Households below average income: for financial years ending 1995 to 2024 - GOV.UK ↩

8. Abstract of DWP benefit rate statistics 2024 - GOV.UK ↩

9. Pensioners’ Incomes: financial years ending 1995 to 2024 - GOV.UK ↩

10. Stat-Xplore (November 2024) ↩

11. Workplace pension participation and savings trends of eligible employees: 2009 to 2023 - GOV.UK ↩

12. Workplace pension participation and savings trends of eligible employees: 2009 to 2023 - GOV.UK ↩

13. House of Commons - Automatic enrolment - Work and Pensions Committee ↩

14. Workplace pension participation and savings trends of eligible employees: 2009 to 2023 - GOV.UK ↩

15. Analysis of Future Pension Incomes 2025 ↩

16. Home - Pensions UK - Retirement Living Standards; the Pensions and Lifetime Savings Association (PLSA) became Pensions UK in July 2025 ↩

17. Analysis of Future Pension Incomes (2025) ↩

18. Analysis of Future Pension Incomes 2025 – Note, the “lump sum” scenario reflects a scenario where 25% of the pension pot is fully withdrawn before annuitisation. ↩

19. Analysis of Future Pension Incomes 2025 ↩

20. Financial Lives 2024 survey - Pensions: Selected findings ↩

21. Analysis of Automatic Enrolment Saving Trends 2025 ↩

22. Analysis of Future Pension Incomes 2025 ↩

23. AAnalysis of Future Pension Incomes 2025 ↩

24. Analysis of Automatic Enrolment Saving Trends 2025 ↩

25. Analysis of Automatic Enrolment Saving Trends 2025 ↩

26. Workplace Pension Participation and Family Resources Survey ↩

27. Workplace pension participation and savings trends of eligible employees: 2009 to 2023 - GOV.UK ↩

28. Workplace pension participation and savings trends: 2009 to 2023 - GOV.UK ↩

29. Workplace pension participation and savings trends of eligible employees: 2009 to 2023 - GOV.UK ↩

30. Trends in pension saving among the long-term self-employed – Institute for Fiscal Studies ↩

31. Pension fund investment and the UK economy - GOV.UK ↩

32. DWP analysis of ONS ASHE data. ↩

33. Gender Pension Gap 2025 publication ↩

34. Quintiles divide the population, when ranked by household income, into equal sized groups. The Top 20: Bottom 20 ratio (also knows as 80:20 ratio) is the income at the top 20% (quintile 5) divided by the income of the bottom 20% (quintile 5). The higher the number, the greater the gap between those with high incomes and those with low incomes. ↩

35. Households below average income: for financial years ending 1995 to 2024 ↩

36. Profile of the older population living in England and Wales in 2021 and changes since 2011 - Office for National Statistics ↩

37. Households below average income: for financial years ending 1995 to 2024 ↩

38. The 2020 to 2021 estimates calculated below UK (headline) level are not available, due to sample quality concerns arising from the impact of the coronavirus (COVID-19) pandemic on FRS fieldwork. Further details can be found in the technical report which accompanied the release of the 2020 to 2021 Households Below Average Income statistics. ↩

39. Households below average income: for financial years ending 1995 to 2024 ↩

40. Households below average income: for financial years ending 1995 to 2024 ↩

41. Life expectancy for local areas of Great Britain - Office for National Statistics ↩

42. Wave 10 of the Health Insight Survey commissioned by NHS England, ONS Health Insight Survey May 2025 ↩

43. Life expectancy for local areas of Great Britain - Office for National Statistics ↩

44. Life expectancy for local areas of Great Britain - Office for National Statistics ↩

45. DWP Pension Provider Survey 2025 ↩

46. CAPA Q12025 ↩

47. Planning and Preparing for Later Life 2024 ↩