Policy paper

Crime and Policing Bill: ECHR seventh supplementary memorandum: 2 March 2026

Updated 4 March 2026

Introduction   

1. This memorandum supplements memoranda dated 23 February 2025, ^{[footnote 1]} 22 ^{[footnote 2]} and 24 April, ^{[footnote 3]} 10 June 2025, ^{[footnote 4]} 3 November 2025, ^{[footnote 5]} 13 February 2026, ^{[footnote 6]} and 23 February 2026, ^{[footnote 7]} prepared, variously, by the Home Office, Ministry of Justice, Department for Transport and Ministry of Defence, which addressed issues under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) in relation to the Crime and Policing Bill.

2. This supplementary memorandum addresses the issues arising under the ECHR from further government amendments tabled on 2 March 2026 for Lords Report stage. This memorandum has been prepared by the Home Office, Ministry of Justice and DSIT.

3. The amendments considered in this memorandum are:

a. New clauses on “Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders” and supplementary clauses on enforcement, amendment and interpretation, which confer a delegated power enabling the Secretary of State, by affirmative regulations, to impose notification requirements on persons convicted of, cautioned for, or otherwise found to have committed specified child cruelty offences.  The power includes provision to add further offences to the Schedule of child cruelty offences and to prescribe detailed requirements such as matters to be notified, notification periods, occasions of when a notification is to be given, timings and method of notification, and review of indefinite notification.  The regime will broadly mirror, in structure and effect, the notification framework under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003.

b. New clause “OFCOM’s notices to providers of internet services”, which amends the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the Online Safety Act 2023 to:

i. require coroners to notify OFCOM within five working days of all deaths involving a child aged five or above, unless excepted

ii. require OFCOM to issue services with a data preservation notice (‘DPN’) automatically on receipt of the notification from coroners

iii. reduce the length of retention under the DPN from 12 months to 6 months in relation to coronial notification, due to the automatic nature of requests; and

iv. provide explicit vires for regulations made under section 101(E1)(a) of the Online Safety Act 2023 (“OSA”) to include an ambulatory reference, if needed, to external documents as amended from time to time.

c. New clause “Power to amend Online Safety Act 2023:AI” which creates a delegated power for the Secretary of State to make secondary legislation to amend the OSA in order to regulate AI services in relation to illegal content.

4. There are no measures over and above those listed above, and consequential amendments relating to those amendments, to be tabled on 2 March. The detail of the ECHR implications arising from this set of amendments, insofar as considered necessary and appropriate to raise here, is set out below, addressed by measure.

ECHR analysis: individual measures

a. Notification requirements for child cruelty offenders

5. The provisions confer a delegated power on the Secretary of State to impose notification requirements on persons convicted of, cautioned for or otherwise found to have committed specified child cruelty offences, by regulations subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.  In exercising these regulation making powers, the government will fully consider the ECHR implications and ensure that any regulations made are compatible with Convention rights.  Further, before making any regulations under these powers the Secretary of State is required to consult the National Police Chiefs’ Council and any other persons considered appropriate.

Article 7 – No punishment without law

6. Article 7 ECHR is engaged because the notification requirements and related offences may be seen as additional consequences arising from conviction.  Article 7 provides that “no one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence… at the time” and that “nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one applicable at the time the criminal offence was committed.”  It is therefore necessary to consider whether the scheme amounts to the imposition of a penalty or operates retrospectively so as to impose a heavier penalty than that applicable at the time of the offence.

7. The notification scheme is preventive and regulatory rather than punitive.  Its purpose is the management of future risk and the protection of children, not the punishment of past conduct.  Comparable offender notification regimes have been treated as non‑punitive for the purposes of Article 7. ^{[footnote 8]} Any offences created in connection with the regime relate solely to future non‑compliance with notification requirements and do not criminalise past behaviour.  Accordingly, the scheme does not impose a heavier penalty than that applicable at the time the underlying offence was committed.

8. The primary legislation is expressly prospective.  Notification requirements cannot be applied to persons whose convictions, cautions or other relevant disposals occurred before the regulations come into force.  In addition, any future amendment to the Schedule of child cruelty offences, including the addition of new offences, is expressly prevented from applying retrospectively and will not attach to convictions, findings or cautions that pre‑date the amendment taking effect.  The notification regime will therefore apply only to future convictions, cautions or findings.

9. Neither the primary provisions nor any regulations will impose a heavier penalty than that applicable at the time the offence was committed, nor do they operate with retrospective effect.  The scheme is preventive, protective and prospective in operation and the government is therefore satisfied that it is compatible with Article 7 ECHR.

Article 8 - Right to respect for private and family life

10. Future regulations which will impose notification requirements on child cruelty offenders engage Article 8 ECHR, as they interfere with the right to respect for private and family life.  The regime will require affected individuals to disclose personal information to the police, including identifying details such as name and address, and to keep that information up to date through periodic and change of circumstances notifications.  It also permits the taking of photographs and fingerprints for identification purposes and enables police entry and search of premises, subject to a warrant.  Notification requirements may apply for an indefinite period, although the legislation requires that such cases are subject to review.  The ECtHR has recognised that offender notification regimes of this nature constitute an interference with private life. ^{[footnote 9]}

11. Any interference with Article 8 will be in accordance with the law.  The primary legislation establishes the framework, scope and limits of the notification regime, including who may be subject to it and the offences that trigger its application.  The detailed operation of the requirements is to be set out in secondary legislation subject to the affirmative resolution procedure.  Enforcement powers, including powers of entry and search, are tightly circumscribed and may be exercised only when authorised by a warrant and where necessary.  The primary legislation also provides for offences and penalties for non‑compliance or the provision of false information.  The regime is therefore sufficiently accessible and foreseeable, particularly given that it will closely align with the established notification regime under Part 2 of the Sexual Offences Act 2003 (SOA 2003).

12. The provisions pursue legitimate aims, namely the prevention of crime, the protection of health or morals, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.  In particular, the notification regime is directed at protecting children from serious harm by supporting the effective assessment and management of risks posed by those convicted of child cruelty offences.

13. The interference with Article 8 is proportionate to those aims.  The regime is targeted in its application, applying only to persons convicted of, or subject to equivalent disposals for, serious child cruelty offences listed in the Schedule.  Age thresholds, minimum sentence requirements and victim age conditions further narrow its scope, ensuring that it focuses on cases presenting the greatest risk.  The structure of the notification requirements will closely mirror the sex offender notification regime under Part 2 of the SOA 2003, which has been upheld as compatible with Article 8. ^{[footnote 10]}

14. In addition, where notification requirements apply for an indefinite period, the legislation requires that regulations provide for review mechanisms which allows for offenders to cease to be subject to requirements following review.  This addresses the concern identified in R (F and Thompson) ^{[footnote 11]} that lifetime notification requirements would be disproportionate with no mechanism of review.  Further safeguards apply to enforcement powers where police entry and search may be exercised only under warrant, where necessary for the purpose of assessing risk, and only after repeated unsuccessful attempts to obtain entry voluntarily.  Where the offender is under 18, notification may be given by a person with parental responsibility, ensuring the regime operates consistently with the welfare of the child offender.

15. The government is satisfied that the provisions and any future regulations introducing the notification regime cause no greater interference than is necessary and proportionate and thus complies with Article 8 ECHR.

b. OFCOM’s notices to providers of internet services

16. The measure imposes a duty on coroners to notify OFCOM in all cases involving the death of a child between the ages of 5 and 17, except where the coroner considers that the data involved is very unlikely to be relevant to the circumstances of death, or where the coroner is satisfied that their duty to investigate does not apply to that child’s death. Subject to these carve-outs, there will also be a requirement for the notification to OFCOM being made within 5 working days of the coroner becoming aware of the child’s death.

17. The measure will also amend the existing regulation-making power of the  Secretary of State to specify the types of services which will receive a DPN in cases where a particular service of interest has not been identified, to include an explicit power to introduce an ambulatory reference. This will likely be used to refer to OFCOM’s independent research, published annually, which identifies the services most commonly used by children. This will allow DPNs to remain up to date without requiring frequent amendment of regulations.

Article 8 – Right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence

18. The amendments may engage Article 8 ECHR, as a DPN may retain third-party information where there was interaction with a deceased child and may interfere with an individual’s right to respect for private and family life, home and correspondence.

19. Any interference with Article 8 rights is proportionate and necessary to meet the legitimate aims of protecting public health and morals and the rights and freedoms of others, on the basis that it will ensure coroners are able to properly investigate the circumstances surrounding a child’s death.

20. Whilst the measure removes coronial discretion in starting the DPN process and is required in all cases involving the death of a children aged over 5, unless excepted in the way envisaged, the amendments enable the preservation of a deceased child’s social media as quickly as possible following notification of their death.

21. DPNs are not issued in cases where there is no possible connection between the death and the child’s use of online services, ensuring a link between the public interest in preserving the data and the potential interference with Article 8. DPNs preserve rather than disclose the data and the preserved data will be retained for a shorter length of time, allowing the coroner to assess whether digital evidence is relevant – at which point a DPN can be revoked, or automatically revoked after 6 months should the coroner not request an extension.

22. In light of the length of any retention of data, and the ability to revoke a DPN should it become apparent it is not relevant to the child’s death, the government is satisfied that the amendments introduce no greater interference than is proportionate and that the regime complies with Article 8 ECHR.

Article 1 Protocol 1 - Right to peaceful enjoyment of property

23. The amendments build upon existing provisions which require services to search for and retain specified information and respond to Ofcom, within specified deadlines, to confirm steps taken to comply with the DPN. Article 1, Protocol 1 is likely engaged on the basis that the provisions control and/or restrict services’ ability to delete information (and could require disruption to or amendment of their usual data retention processes) and compliance with the terms of a DPN could result in services incurring additional costs. The government considers this to be a control of use rather than deprivation of property.

24. As above, the effect of mandating the notification of deaths is likely to require DPNs, and actions by services, in more cases than present. However, the government considers that any such additional interference remains lawful and justified as it is in the general interest, as described above. Current projections suggest that the new provision will apply to approximately 500 child deaths per year, meaning the total burden on any individual provider will be relatively low. Further, once regulations are made under section 101(E1) of the OSA, then application of the law will be accessible, precise and foreseeable in its application, since services of a kind identified in those regulations will be put on notice that they are likely to receive DPNs.

25. Therefore, to the extent that the measure engages Article 1 of Protocol 1, the interference is considered to be a proportionate means of achieving the legitimate aim of the protection of the rights of others.

c. Power to amend Online Safety Act 2023:AI

26. This amendment creates a discretionary power for the Secretary of State to make regulations to bring AI content and services into the scope of the regulatory regime under the OSA, in relation to illegal content.

27. The OSA currently regulates some AI services where they meet the definition of a “search service” (i.e. because they search the live internet) or a “user-to-user service” (because they have functionality that allows users to share content with other users). However, some AI services only draw search responses from their underlying model rather than from the live internet and do not have content sharing functionality, so they remain unregulated under the OSA.

28. Regulations drafted under this power could theoretically engage certain ECHR rights. However, the specific nature of any ECHR implications arising will ultimately depend on how the Secretary of State decides to exercise this power. The regulations made under the power will include further detail as to the precise services and how illegal content is regulated and may include exceptions or exemptions considered necessary by the Secretary of State to maintain the risk-based and proportionate framework in the OSA. In any event, however, under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, any exercise of the regulation-making power will be done in a way that is compatible with Convention rights.

29. The power set out in the new clause limits the purpose of the regulations that may be made under the power to make provision to minimise or mitigate the risks of harm to individuals in the UK presented by illegal AI-generated content and the use of AI services for the commission of facilitation of priority offences.

30. The nature and extent of any interference with ECHR rights will be dependent on the future exercise of the power created by this amendment. It is therefore not possible to provide a definitive detailed analysis of how any such interference will be justified at this time.

31. Given the nature of this power, if exercised, it is likely that some of the ECHR analysis and the safeguards already identified in context of the passage of the OSA will apply here. However, the Secretary of State will consider the ECHR implications carefully before deciding whether and how to exercise this power to ensure that any interference with human rights is proportionate and necessary.

Article 8: right to respect for private and family life

32. Article 8 provides that everyone has the right to respect for their private and family life, home and correspondence.  Selected interference with this right is permitted by Article 8(2) where that is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society.

33. Chapter 5 of Part 7 of the OSA allows Ofcom to issue a notice to service providers to use accredited technology to identify and remove, or prevent users from encountering illegal child sexual exploitation and abuse (‘CSEA’) content or terrorism content on their services; or to use best endeavours to develop or source technology that would identify and remove CSEA content or prevent users from encountering such content.

34. This might engage the right to privacy protected by Article 8 as the regulations may expose new service providers to Ofcom’s powers to require the analysis or scanning of private communications for the purposes of identifying and removing CSEA content.

35. The government considers that any interference would be justified as in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society to protect individuals from harm and to pursue the legitimate aims of protection of health and morals and the prevention of crime.

36. To the extent that they relate to terrorism content, the obligations imposed on service providers under the illegal content safety duties could be justified as being necessary in the interests of national security.

Article 10: freedom of expression

37. Article 10 provides that everyone has the right to freedom of expression. The right includes freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference. Selected interference with this right is permitted by Article 10(2) where that is prescribed by law, pursues a legitimate aim and is necessary in a democratic society.

38. In principle, the power could engage Article 10 to the extent that any duties imposed on service providers could impact the ability of users to receive or impart certain types of information online.

39. The government considers that any interference is justified as in accordance with the law, necessary in a democratic society to protect individuals from harm and to pursue the legitimate aims of protection of health and morals and the prevention of crime.

40. Further, it is considered that any interference with this right would be in pursuit of a legitimate aim such as the prevention of disorder or crime or protection of health or morals; and Article 17 (prohibition of abuse of rights) is likely to mean that certain content (e.g. content expressing support for terrorism) would not be protected by Article 10 in any case.

Article 6: right to a fair trial

41. Article 6 provides that everyone is entitled to a fair trial, that is a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. It may be argued that the enforcement powers under the OSA could interfere with Article 6 in relation to the obligation to pay penalties or Ofcom’s power to impose business disruption measures. This power could expose new service providers to these existing enforcement measures.

42. In the event that Article 6 rights were engaged by this provision, we consider that there are sufficient protections already in place to protect against any infringement. There are strong safeguards already built into the OSA including a statutory right for Ofcom to give reasons for issuing a penalty, a right to make representations, provide evidence to the regulator and to appeal penalties. Business disruption measures under the OSA are not designed to be punitive and there exist procedural safeguards in the OSA such as a right to challenge initial applications to court and right to appeal any order made by the court.

Article 1 of Protocol 1: protection of property

43. Article 1 of Protocol 1 (‘A1P1’) entitles everyone to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions. No one is to be deprived of their possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.

44. It is possible the business disruption enforcement provisions in the OSA could engage the protections conferred by A1P1 and this power could expose new service providers to these provisions.

45. The government considers that any interference would not amount to a deprivation of property but a restriction of its use or enjoyment and any interference may be justified as part of the measures necessary to enforce laws as set out in the OSA. Further, they are likely to be proportionate and necessary measures that will normally only be used as the culmination of the enforcement process and/or when addressing the most serious breaches of the duties set out in the OSA to protect the users of online services from harm.

Further mitigations

46. The OSA includes provisions relating to proportionality and protection of freedom of expression which would protect against any rights infringements. In exercise of their functions Ofcom and the Secretary of State are required, under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998, to act in a way which is compatible with ECHR rights.  The power requires the regulations to be made under the affirmative procedure which would add a further layer of protection through additional Parliamentary scrutiny.

Home Office, Ministry of Justice and Department for Science, Innovation and Technology

2 March 2026

Footnotes

1. ECHR Memo.pdf ↩

2. Crime and Policing Bill: ECHR supplementary memorandum 22 April 2025 - GOV.UK ↩

3. Crime and Policing Bill: ECHR second supplementary memorandum: 24 April 2025 - GOV.UK ↩

4. Crime and Policing Bill: ECHR third supplementary memorandum: 10 June 2025 (accessible) - GOV.UK ↩

5. Crime and Policing Bill: ECHR fourth supplementary memorandum: 3 November 2025 (accessible) - GOV.UK ↩

6. Crime and Policing Bill: ECHR fifth supplementary memorandum: 13 February 2026 ↩

7. Crime and Policing Bill: ECHR sixth supplementary memorandum: 23 February 2026 ↩

8. Gardel v France (2010) Application no. 16428/05; 17 December 2009 ↩

9. R (on the application of F (by his litigation friend F)) and Thompson (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 17; Gardel v France Application (2010) no. 16428/05; 17 December 2009 ↩

10. Adamson v United Kingdom (1999) App. No. 42293/98 ↩

11. [2010] UKSC 17 ↩