Guidance

Counter Proliferation Programme guidance 2026 to 2027

Updated 29 January 2026

1. Executive summary

Countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is integral to the UK’s security and prosperity. The Government’s strategic approach to international security and counter proliferation is set out in the National Security Strategy 2025: Security for the British People in a Dangerous World, which was published to reflect changes in the global context and highlights the Government’s vision for the UK’s role in the world over the next decade and the actions it will take to 2029, and The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad.

The Counter Proliferation Programme is managed by the Counter Proliferation and Arms Control Centre (CPACC). It is the only cross-government fund dedicated to supporting activity to counter the proliferation of WMD. Through the Counter Proliferation Programme, the UK seeks to maintain a leading role in defending and strengthening the international counter proliferation architecture; and increasing international action against the most acute proliferation threats.

The Counter Proliferation Programme is now accepting single year and multi-year proposals (1 to 3 years) for financial years 2026 to 2027, 2027 to 2028 and 2028 to 2029.

Should implementers wish to submit project proposals beyond one year, they should clearly set this out in the Project Proposal Form and Activity-Based budget.

The Annex provides more detail on our programme priorities. Please note that updates to these priorities will be made on an annual basis to maintain alignment with evolving strategic objectives.

The Counter Proliferation Programme is managed under the Programme Operating Framework, through its 10 programming principles and 29 mandatory rules.

2. Call for proposals

Proposals for projects must be submitted by 11:59pm UK time on 8 March 2026. We intend to issue the results by 30 April 2026.

Eligible projects can be single state, multi-country, regional or global in scope.

The Counter Proliferation Programme Board is seeking bids that are ambitious, impactful, and with clear and specific outcomes related to the priorities listed in the Annex.

The Board will prioritise proposals of £100,000 and above.  Proposals must demonstrate real impact in support of UK strategic objectives.

The Programme Board welcomes proposals that follow a consortium approach or are from a single institution or organisation. Organisations may not derive financial profit from receiving grant funding.

Proposals from for-profit entities will only be considered if the project is to be delivered through an officially registered non-profit arm or division of the organisation.

The Programme Board reserves the right to consider other projects outside the timings stated in the timeline at 3.1.

The Counter Proliferation Programme is unable to fund projects which qualify for Official Development Assistance (ODA).

It is highly recommended that potential bidders discuss proposals with the relevant policy leads in CPACC before submitting them.

Please email CounterProliferation.Programme@fcdo.gov.uk to request contact details of policy leads or to submit general questions about the programme or the proposal process.

3. Operational arrangements

3.1 Key Timelines

Programme activity	Timing
Proposal deadline	8 March 2026
Communication of proposal results	By 30 April 2026

3.2 Proposal requirements

Proposals must include:

• a fully completed project proposal form including a theory of change and a draft results framework

• a full activity-based budget

3.3 Project budgets

Budgets must include a detailed month-by-month expenditure breakdown, aligned to intended activities and expected impact, to enable robust financial monitoring throughout the year. All Proposals should be submitted in UK pounds sterling.

Project activity must be delivered within the approved timeframe. Multi-year projects may span more than one UK financial year, while single-year projects must be completed by the end of the relevant UK financial year

The FCDO can only cover costs incurred after the agreement is signed, for activities between the start and end date stated in a funding agreement or contract. The duration and value of all funding arrangements must be fully covered by an approved budget.

3.4 Project impact

Each project proposal must detail how it will measure impact in support of the Programme’s Policy Outcomes.

Proposals must include a theory of change, results framework, and a plan for monitoring and evaluating impact.

For further information about monitoring and evaluation, please see the guidance in section 3.7 below and in the Programme Operating Framework.
 

3.5 Risk analysis and management

The Programme Board monitors spend throughout the year and uses progress reports from each project to monitor the risks both to projects and the overall programme.

Projects should ensure that their proposals include clear risk management, particularly risks with the potential to affect impact and the wider programme, such as:

• variable or reduced engagement of key stakeholders
• the project failing to deliver impact
• any agreed outputs or objectives not being delivered
• delays in project implementation
• underspend or overspend
• any reputational risks
• safeguarding

3.6 Assessment criteria

Each project proposal will be considered in line with the following criteria:

• strategic alignment: proposals must align with the Government’s approach to countering the proliferation of WMD as set out in the National Security Strategy 2025: Security for the British People in a Dangerous World and The Strategic Defence Review 2025 – Making Britain Safer: secure at home, strong abroad

The Counter Proliferation Programme’s Strategic Priorities are set out in the Annex:

• outcomes: proposals must provide clarity, coherence and clear benefit to the UK. Outcomes should be achievable within the agreed project timeframe and demonstrate measurable impact, sustainability and scalability. Research papers, workshops, etc can be elements of project design, but they should not be the sole outcome

Proposals should consider how they can contribute to a wider outcome in support of the Strategic Priorities set out in the Annex:

• resourcing: proposals should have sufficient and appropriately skilled staff, throughout the entire project lifecycle, to deliver the project outcomes
• suitability: proposals should build on wider capacity building activities and not duplicate efforts already undertaken. Implementers who have previously received funding from this programme should provide a summary of the outputs and impact of those projects and include copies of the relevant project completion reports with new proposals
• monitoring and evaluation: proposals should have robust processes in place to measure and evaluate outcomes
• risk assessment: proposals must identify and assess potential risks and document them in a comprehensive risk register with clear mitigation strategies. Robust risk management ensures delivery remains on track, compliance is maintained, and public funds are protected. The FCDO will conduct an internal Due Diligence Assessment to address risk and mitigation requirements before signing any grant agreement or memorandum of understanding and prior to authorising project activity
• budgets: proposals must contain a clear, detailed budget, aligned with activities, that demonstrate value for money. Strong proposals will spread activity throughout the financial year
• host Government(s) or organisational support and engagement: proposals should demonstrate evidence of wider stakeholder support and engagement, if applicable
• Paris agreement: proposals must align with the Paris Agreement – and assess climate and environmental impact and risks, taking steps to ensure that no environmental harm is done
• Gender equality: proposals must promote gender equality or not contribute to further gender inequality

3.7 Programme monitoring and evaluation requirements

• monthly budget updates: implementers will be required to provide updated expenditure forecasts
• quarterly programme review: implementers must submit quarterly monitoring reports, with particular focus on delivery against the project outcomes. These reports will inform the Counter Proliferation Fund’s overall quarterly review
• end of financial year review: project completion reports will be required to support an end-of-year review of activity, outputs, and impact

3.8 Programme Board

Proposals require approval for funding by the Programme Board. The Programme Board is chaired by the Head of CPACC and formed of representatives from the Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO), Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the Department for Energy Security and Net Zero (DESNZ).

4. Stakeholder management and communication

Proposals must:

• show how the project will communicate with its stakeholders; more widely to other target audiences; and how these communications will contribute to project outputs and help to deliver project objectives
• identify the principal stakeholders for each project, how they have been engaged to date and plans for future engagement
• ensure that successes are celebrated and publicised through a range of media, where appropriate

Annex: Counter Proliferation Programme strategic priorities

1. Relevant strategic and geographic priorities

Countering the proliferation of WMD helps maintain regional and global stability, reduces threats to our citizens and Armed Forces, facilitates safe trade for our industry, and protects high-skilled jobs across the UK.

The global threat landscape is increasingly complex and dynamic. State actors such as Russia, Iran and North Korea continue to undermine international stability and the rules‑based order.

Russia’s use of chemical weapons in Salisbury and alleged use in Ukraine, Iran’s nuclear ambitions, and North Korea’s continued weapons development all pose significant challenges.

Non‑state actors, including terrorist groups and criminal networks, exploit weaknesses in export controls and seek access to dual‑use technologies. Their ability to operate across borders and adapt quickly makes enforcement and disruption particularly difficult.

Emerging technologies are amplifying these risks. Artificial intelligence is enabling autonomous weapons and AI‑driven targeting systems that could destabilise strategic balances.

Advances in synthetic biology and gene editing raise the possibility of new ways to create biological agents or modify existing pathogens. Dual-use technologies such as drones, quantum computing, and advanced materials are increasingly accessible and can be illicitly acquired or repurposed, complicating regulation and enforcement.

The National Security Strategy 2025 and the Security and Defence Review 2025 highlight the growing threat from chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) weapons from, hostile states and terrorist groups. They set out the ongoing risks from chemical and biological weapons, including the misuse of emerging biotechnologies and dual‑use research. They also identify nuclear proliferation as a Tier One national security threat. They also highlight the risks of radiological terrorism, such as dirty bombs and attacks on nuclear infrastructure, and the risk that CBRN materials could reach non‑state actors through illicit networks or weak international controls.

2. Programme design

2.1 Strategic outcomes

For financial year 2026 to 2027 to financial year 2028 to 2029, the Counter Proliferation Programme seeks the following strategic outcomes:

• to uphold counter proliferation norms and ensure the effective implementation or improved adherence to international security regimes, treaties and initiatives
• to increase the number of States taking disruptive action against the most acute proliferation of WMD threats

2.2 Policy outcomes

The following information highlights the programme’s intended policy outcomes, including some suggestions for potential programme activities.

Policy Outcome 1: Strengthen counter proliferation architecture and improve implementation

To uphold counter proliferation norms and ensure the effective implementation or improved adherence to international security regimes, treaties and initiatives.

We seek to implement and enhance international counter proliferation architecture, counter efforts to undermine global norms, and support implementation and universalisation of counter proliferation and disarmament regimes.  We will also focus on improving the resilience and capability of international organisations such as the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW), Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Implementation Support Unit (BTWC ISU), the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).   

Themes and activities:

• the Non-Proliferation Treaty is fundamental to global and UK security goals. We welcome projects proposals that strengthen the fulfilment of its objectives

• we welcome proposals to support the IAEA in the delivery of its objectives

• we welcome proposals to engage, learn from and re-enforce existing nuclear weapon free zones and work towards future zones including in the Middle East

• we welcome proposals to support the work of the OPCW, including its Syria missions and activities in Ukraine. We are particularly interested in innovative methods, using technology, to strengthen the implementation of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) and support effective detection, verification and investigation of violations of the Convention

• HMG is committed to holding those who use chemical and biological weapons (CBW) to account.  We welcome innovative proposals which generate options to hold users of these weapons to account

• biosafety and biosecurity in the context of rapid scientific and technical advances is increasingly important. We welcome proposals that identify the opportunities and risks posed by the convergence and co-development of technologies linked to biological weapons, which propose proportionate and effective policy responses; and which support implementation of the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) and the UN Secretary-General’s Mechanism for Investigation of Alleged Use of Chemical and Biological Weapons (UNSGM)

• innovative use of emerging technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence, can enhance the implementation of international security regimes, treaties and conventions. We welcome proposals that strengthen the FCDO’s capacity to engage on issues relating to counter proliferation and emerging technologies, including the risks and opportunities they present for countering evolving threats, reinforcing international security, and exploring existing governance options within the CP space. This could include engagement with technology companies, research laboratories, academia, and civil society
• we welcome proposals that support work to deliver the objectives of the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention, Convention on Cluster Munitions and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons (CCW) and application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in relation to Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems (LAWS).

The Counter Proliferation Programme will not fund direct mine action programming activities such as clearance, victim assistance and stockpile destruction, which the UK funds through other processes, but may consider other work in support of the Conventions.

• we welcome proposals to drive the implementation and universalisation (particularly in underrepresented regions) of the Arms Trade Treaty (ATT) and the Hague Code of Conduct (HCoC)

The Counter Proliferation Programme will not fund projects related to the ATT which would be better addressed through the Treaty’s Voluntary Trust Fund.

Policy outcome 2: Increased threat reduction

To increase the number of States taking disruptive action against the most acute proliferation of WMD threats.

Themes and activities:

• the risk of Iran developing nuclear weapons continues to be a concern for the UK, which requires collective international action. We welcome proposals to identify approaches most likely to deliver support for collective action to counter Iran’s ongoing nuclear escalation, including in multilateral fora. We would also welcome proposals that assist the UK to work with States in the region to counter Iranian security threats related to their nuclear activities

• we welcome proposals to encourage dialogue between nuclear powers in South Asia, building understanding and reducing the risk of miscalculation.

• we welcome bids that help prevent state and non-state actors from gaining the chemical, biological, radiological and/or nuclear (CBRN) technology and knowledge required to create WMDs

• export controls are a critical counter proliferation tool. We welcome proposals that seek to raise awareness and strengthen the willingness of States and their ability to disrupt illicit procurement networks, and the circumvention of export controls