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Guidance

Contingent Liability Approval Framework Guidance Update – October 2026

Published 28 October 2026

1. Introduction and Context

1.1 Context

Contingent liabilities are, in the context of Managing Public Money (MPM) and HM Treasury spending control, commitments to use public funds if uncertain future events occur. This is a wider definition than the accounting definition of contingent liabilities, as set out in IAS 37. MPM states that “because commitments can evolve into spending, they should always be scrutinised and appraised as stringently as proposals for consumption”. It also makes clear that Parliament expects advance notice of any commitments to the future use of public funds. Contingent liabilities expose the government to fiscal risk that is not covered by the core fiscal framework. Their appropriate management is an important part of the government’s approach to ensuring the sustainability of the public finances.

As the UK’s finance ministry, HM Treasury has a responsibility to ensure the effective and efficient use of taxpayers’ money. This document aims to provide HM Government officials guidance on contingent liability policy and the contingent liability approval process. In particular it sets out how Treasury intends to scrutinise two types of contingent liabilities, indemnities, and guarantees. It also provides guidance on completing the contingent liability checklist and signposts to support in the Contingent Liability Central Capability. This guidance will be kept under review. It should be read alongside MPM Chapter 5.5 and Annex 5.4[footnote 1] Consolidated Budget Guidance[footnote 2] and where relevant other documents such as the Sourcing Playbook.[footnote 3]

If you have any questions about the content of this document or about any specific contingent liability, you can contact HM Treasury at ContingentLiabilitiesBranch@hmtreasury.gov.uk

1.2 Structure of the document

The document is set out as follows:

  • Chapter 2 – Types of contingent liability. This Chapter defines contingent liabilities and provides guidance on when Treasury approval and parliamentary notification are necessary.
  • Chapter 3 – Contingent Liability Approval and Notification. This Chapter details the contingent liability approval process including how Treasury consent is obtained and how parliament should be notified
  • Chapter 4 – Principles for Achieving Value for Money. This Chapter details general principles Treasury expect to be applied when considering new contingent liabilities
  • Annex 1 – The Contingent Liabilities Checklist
  • Annex 2 – The Contingent Liabilities Checklist Guidance
  • Annex 3 – Contingent Liabilities Letter Template

Box 1: Outline of the contingent liability approvals process

The contingent liability approval process has two parts. The first is Treasury consent, this mirrors the process of Treasury control and consent for departmental spending. The second is parliamentary notification, this ensures that parliamentary oversight of the supply and estimates framework is respected.

Treasury consent is required when departments wish to enter into contingent liabilities that are either over their delegated limits or are novel, contentious, or repercussive. Treasury consent is not usually required if the contingent liability entered into is BAU.

Departmental officials will usually engage with their spending team in the first instance to obtain HMT consent. The Treasury spending team will consult with others in Treasury including the Balance Sheet Team (who have responsibility for government’s whole stock of contingent liabilities and contingent liability policy) before giving consent. Treasury has produced a contingent liability checklist to aid Treasury and departmental officials in communicating the policy proposition, financial implications and risks posed by a new contingent liability.

In addition to Treasury consent, parliament must approve relevant government spending through the supply and estimates process – this is set out in detail in chapter 5 of MPM. As each contingent liability is individually unlikely to lead to spending, potential contingent liability crystallisations are not covered in the supply and estimates process and therefore require another means of parliamentary scrutiny.

Departments must notify parliament before entering into new contingent liabilities which are outside their normal course of business and that do not have a statutory basis. This is set out in detail in annex 5.4 of MPM. Notification is normally done via a Written Ministerial Statement (WMS) and Departmental Minute. The WMS and Departmental Minute should be copied to the chairs of both the PAC and relevant select committee. Parliament should be given 14 sitting days to scrutinise contingent liabilities before they are entered into.

1.3 Application of the Financial Transaction and Contingent Liability Frameworks

Guarantees are subject to this framework (The Contingent Liabilities Approval Framework – CLAF), which governs their appraisal, design, approval, management and parliamentary notification. They may also be subject to the Financial Transaction Control Framework (FTCF).

The FTCF applies where relevant to determining whether a guarantee should be delivered through a designated public financial institution and to controlling risks through economic capital limits. These requirements apply in addition to this framework.

Standardised guarantee schemes are subject to both frameworks. These are schemes under which guarantees are issued in large numbers on identical or similar terms, allowing expected claims to be estimated across the portfolio. They are classified as financial transactions because the expected claims are recognised as a financial liability of government and a corresponding financial asset for beneficiaries.

Departments developing a guarantee that is, or may be, subject to the FTCF should engage their Treasury spending team and the Balance Sheet Team early and satisfy the applicable requirements of both frameworks.

1.4 Role of the Financial Instruments and Transactions Advisory Group

Given the complexity and potential fiscal impact of contingent liabilities, departments need access to appropriate financial, commercial and risk expertise when developing proposals. The Financial Instruments and Transactions Advisory Group (FInTAG) is an analytical and advisory unit within UK Government Investments. FInTAG brings together credit risk, actuarial, corporate finance and data expertise to support HM Treasury, government departments and arm’s-length bodies in the identification, design, assessment and management of financial assets and liabilities.

FInTAG’s work on contingent liabilities supports three broad objectives:

  • Supporting the effective development of new and substantively amended contingent liabilities and financial transactions, so that their purpose, structure, costs and risks are clearly understood before decisions are taken;
  • Improving transparency and oversight of the government’s portfolio of contingent liabilities and financial transactions, including its scale, risk profile, concentrations, interactions and potential fiscal impact; and
  • Promoting consistent standards, robust analysis and good practice in the design, quantification, management, monitoring and reporting of contingent liabilities and financial transactions across government.

Treasury expect that departments work with FInTAG in the design of any new significant contingent liability to ensure risks are properly understood and value for money is maximised. Engagement with FInTAG should come as early as possible in the design phase of any new contingent liability, and ahead of departments seeking Treasury consent. You can engage FInTAG at CLCC@UKGI.org.uk

Box 2: Support available from FInTAG

FInTAG provides advice and analytical support to government departments and arm’s length bodies around new contingent liabilities, including:

  • Identification: assisting departments with clarifying whether contingent liabilities require HMT consent, and supporting them through the process.
  • Risk quantification: supporting departments with financial estimates by providing case studies, promoting relevant data and reviewing estimates using FInTAG’s credit and actuarial expertise.
  • Risk mitigation: advising departments on policy design to reduce financial risks, and promoting robust risk management processes.
  • Charging: advising departments on setting and benchmarking charges where risk is transferred from the private sector.
  • Communication: assisting departments in completing the contingent liability checklist and in explaining the benefits and uncertainties inherent in new contingent liabilities.
  • Ongoing data and monitoring: advising departments on systems for monitoring and reporting on realised losses.
  • Practical considerations: team members with private sector insurance and banking experience can advise on practical considerations.
  • Precedents within public sector: sharing insights from departmental contingent liability disclosures and bringing together colleagues to enable the transfer of knowledge, experience, and best practice.

2. Types of Contingent Liability

This Chapter defines contingent liabilities for the purpose of MPM and Treasury spending control. It also sets out when Treasury consent and parliamentary notification is required.

2.1 Types of contingent liabilities

Contingent liabilities are, in the context of Managing Public Money (MPM) and HM Treasury spending control, commitments to use public funds if uncertain future events occur. This definition differs from the standard accounting definition of a contingent liability. For example, it includes items accounted for as financial guarantees or insurance contracts, as well as those accounted for as contingent liabilities.

In some cases, it may also be appropriate to apply the contingent liability approval framework to provisions when provisions are made due to very high risk guarantees or indemnities – these should be discussed with the Treasury. Both remote and non-remote contingent liabilities are covered by the contingent liability approval framework. The following table shows the contingent liabilities most often entered into by government.

Guarantees Indemnities Legal Cases Purchaser Protections
When the government agrees to pay the debts of a third party if they default When the government agrees to cover costs if a certain event occurs When a lawsuit is brought against the government Where the government provides warranties relating to asset sales

A guarantee is a commitment provided by a guarantor (in this case, the government) to take responsibility for the debt or performance obligations of another party. Some guarantees are accounted for on balance sheet as financial guarantees under IFRS 9. These are often called standardised guarantees in the public sector. For the purpose of the contingent liability approval framework financial guarantees are classed as contingent liabilities.

An indemnity is a commitment to cover costs if a certain event occurs. Some indemnities are accounted for on balance sheet as insurance contracts under IFRS 4 and in future IFRS 17. For the purpose of the contingent liability approval framework insurance contracts are classed as contingent liabilities.

Contingent liabilities are often created due to ongoing legal cases. This is because the outcome of legal cases may result in departments needing to make payments to third parties. These contingent liabilities do not need Treasury approval or parliamentary notification (as set out in Annex 5.4. 35 of MPM) as entering into them is not within a department’s control – they arise when a third party takes legal action against a department.

Departments may also enter into binding commitments which will impose costs if they do not fulfil an agreement with a third party. A purchaser protection can take various forms, including warranties and other commitments made by the selling department. Departments entering into contracts may also provide assurance against breach of contract through warranties. For the purpose of the contingent liability approval framework, purchaser protections and equivalent warranties or commitments are contingent liabilities. Standard warranties are usually part of a department’s normal course of business. If departments are considering action that could lead to warranty pay-outs, they should consider whether the spending would be novel, contentious or repercussive and therefore require HMT consent. Where fulfilment of the contract remains government policy, the probability of the liability crystallising should be recorded as zero.

Sometimes a contingent liability is created when an uncertain spending commitment is entered into, such as cases where the commitment made is unlimited in scale and the quantum of spend is extremely uncertain. These commitments will normally be accompanied by spending in the estimate. In these cases, departments should discuss with Treasury the appropriate format for Treasury scrutiny of the uncapped element of the spend. Usually, these spending commitments will be made on a statutory basis and so will not require parliamentary notification, but in cases where there is no statutory basis parliamentary notification will be needed as set out from paragraph 3.13 in this document.

Departments sometimes make commitments that may in future lead to the use of public funds, but that are vague as to the mechanism or trigger for any spending. If commitments are vague, they will usually not be considered contingent liabilities. If uncertain you should discuss whether a commitment constitutes a contingent liability with Treasury.

Departments sometimes make commitments to other departments to meet costs if uncertain future events occur. As the Crown is indivisible, ministers (and their departments) cannot give guarantees or indemnities to each other. They can, however, enter into commitments of conditional support with the same effect. These commitments do not need parliamentary notification. Unless they are part of a department’s normal course of business (paragraph 2.11) they should be discussed with Treasury.

2.2 Normal course of business

Contingent liabilities taken out in the normal course of a department’s business do not need notification to parliament. In addition, departments are often given delegation to enter into contingent liabilities in the normal course of business without treasury consent, even if they are above a department’s delegated authority limit, although this is not provided in all cases. If a contingent liability is novel, contentious, or repercussive it cannot be part of a department’s normal course of business.

Normal course of business is defined in Box A5.4A of MPM. For a liability to be considered part of a department’s normal course of business it must be the case that incurring the liability is the accepted standard practice for undertaking the activity and that the activity is part of the department’s business model which has been authorised by parliament. The key test for if the liability is the accepted standard practice for undertaking the activity is whether two private sector bodies would use the same terms. A liability is not in the normal course of business simply because the activity is part of a department’s normal course of business. Incurring the liability needs to be part of the normal course of business.

The Cabinet Office produces model service contracts[footnote 4] that can be used by departments as templates. These contracts contain contingent liabilities which, as they are consistent with standard commercial contracts, should be considered as part of normal course of business and so do not require Treasury consent or parliamentary notification.

In addition, sometimes contingent liabilities become established practice and so part of normal course of business over time. They in effect become the standard practice for undertaking the activity. Departments should keep track of the contingent liabilities they consider to be part of their normal course of business, and they should be open to scrutiny on those liabilities from Treasury and parliament. A contingent liability that is normal course of business for one department isn’t necessarily part of normal course of business for another.

If in doubt over whether a contingent liability is part of a department’s normal course of business, you should contact Treasury.

2.3 Monitoring and crystallisation

Departments should keep contingent liabilities under review. Where the probability of a contingent liability crystallising increases to the point where spend is more likely than not, departments must reclassify the liability as a provision in their accounts. This is an accounting requirement independent of whether the liability has actually crystallised. Departments should notify the relevant Treasury spending team and the Balance Sheet Team when this reclassification occurs, as it may have budgetary implications. This should also be registered in the relevant Estimates documentation.

When a contingent liability is called (crystallises) departments usually need to make that payment from their existing budgets but other arrangements may exist in some cases. If Treasury consent was required to enter into the contingent liability the relevant Treasury spending team and the Treasury Balance Sheet Team should be notified if the liability crystallises.

2.4 Contingent liabilities requiring parliamentary notification

It is a department’s responsibility to ensure proper parliamentary notification occurs. There is not usually a requirement to notify parliament in instances where a contingent liability arises due to events outside a department or ALB’s control rather than through an active policy decision, ahead of that liability being taken on. Contingent liabilities, regardless of their source, will need to be reported in departmental accounts.

If in doubt over whether a contingent liability should be notified to parliament you should consult the Treasury. It is best practice to prioritise transparency to parliament and notify if in doubt.

2.5 Contingent liabilities of ALBs and other entities

ALBs classified as central government are subject to delegations from their sponsor departments that are in turn subject to delegations from Treasury. ALBs need consent from their sponsor department if they wish to enter into contingent liabilities above their delegated limits. If the contingent liability is above the sponsor department’s delegated limit from Treasury, then Treasury consent is required. Contingent liabilities that are either novel, contentious or repercussive always need Treasury consent.

Entities linked to departments but outside of central government (e.g., public corporations) may give rise to financial consequences for their sponsor departments if they cannot meet their contingent liabilities. Any financial consequences of that type would be a form of contingent liability for the sponsor department in question. Therefore, when these entities take on contingent liabilities their sponsor departments should seek Treasury consent for any associated contingent liability which may exist for the sponsor department, if that associated contingent liability is above the sponsor department’s delegated limit or is novel, contentious, or repercussive. If the sponsor department considers that no associated contingent liability arises for the department itself this should be clearly set out to Treasury.

2.6 Responsibility for contingent liabilities

The department entering into, or otherwise responsible for a contingent liability is responsible for its effective management. This includes identifying and quantifying the exposure, securing the necessary approvals, monitoring and mitigating the risk, meeting reporting requirements, and managing any crystallisation. Departments will normally be expected to meet crystallisation costs from within their existing budgets.

Where a contingent liability engages the responsibilities of more than one department, the departments concerned should agree a lead department and clearly allocate responsibility for its management. The lead department should normally be the department that enters into the liability, holds the principal policy or regulatory levers affecting the risk, or through whose budget the costs of crystallisation would be expected to flow. The allocation of responsibilities should be agreed before the liability is entered into and recorded in the checklist.

Where responsibility cannot readily be agreed, or where the liability creates material cross-government or systemic exposure, departments should engage HM Treasury. HM Treasury will support departments to agree and record an appropriate allocation of responsibilities and, where necessary, facilitate agreement on the approach to managing and mitigating the risk.

Box 3: Notifying liabilities to parliament – MPM text

1) The rules for notifying parliament of liabilities are very similar to those for public expenditure. Generally speaking there is no requirement to inform parliament about any liability which:

  • arises in the normal course of business;
  • arises under statutory powers (subject to third bullet point of paragraph 2); or,
  • would normally require notification (i.e. neither arising in the normal course of business nor under statutory powers) but is under £300,000 in value.

2) There are some exceptions to this general rule. Parliament should be notified of any liability, even if it meets one or more of the criteria given in paragraph 1, which:

  • arises as a result of a specific guarantee, indemnity or letter of comfort where the guarantee is not of a type routinely used in commercial business dealings;
  • is of such a size, relative to the department’s total budget, that parliament should be given notice;
  • arises under specific statutory powers which require parliament to be notified; or,
  • is novel, contentious or potentially repercussive

3. Contingent Liability Approval and Notification

This Chapter provides detail about the contingent liability approval and notification process. It covers Treasury consent, the contingent liability checklist, Parliamentary notification and departmental reporting. As with all areas of policy development, early engagement with the Treasury is recommended.

Treasury consent is required for any contingent liability that is novel, contentious or repercussive, irrespective of its maximum exposure or the department’s delegated limit. Where such a liability has a maximum exposure greater than £3 million, completion of the checklist is mandatory; below this threshold, it is recommended. For contingent liabilities that are not novel, contentious or repercussive, Treasury consent is required only where maximum exposure exceeds the department’s delegated limit. Departments are nevertheless encouraged to complete the checklist for all contingent liabilities, including those for which Treasury consent is not required, as this supports robust appraisal and value for money in the use of public funds.

For the purpose of applying the thresholds in the table below, maximum exposure means the maximum amount that government could be legally or contractually required to pay over the lifetime of the contingent liability. For example, this may be the financial limit specified in a contract. Where there is no legal or contractual limit, maximum exposure is unlimited, even where a quantified reasonable worst-case exposure is available. Similarly, where exposure is limited for each crystallisation but there is no limit on the number of crystallisations, maximum exposure is unlimited. The table below sets out when Treasury consent is required and when departments should complete the contingent liability checklist.

In some cases, Treasury will also expect to receive a full business case – usually when the contingent liability is large or is created as part of a new government activity. In these cases, the checklist and business case will have significant overlaps. The checklist should usually be completed first and discussed with Treasury as the business case will tend to provide more detail than the checklist.

Once a checklist has been submitted to relevant spending team officials and the Balance Sheet Team, Treasury expects at least 5 working days to assess the completed checklist and if necessary, advise ministers. In many cases the process will be iterative and will depend on how quickly officials drafting the checklist are able to provide further information. In particularly urgent cases, this timeline can be compressed. Departments are expected to have applied appropriate scrutiny to contingent liabilities before providing a final checklist and requesting Treasury consent. In most cases where Treasury consent is required this will include departmental Accounting Officer (AO) and ministerial sign off.

Below delegated limit and below £3m Below delegated limit and above £3m Above delegated limit and below £3m Above delegated limit and above £3m
NCR HMT approval required
Checklist recommended
HMT approval required
Checklist required
HMR approval required
Checklist recommended
HMT approval required
Checklist required
Non-NRC HMT approval not required HMT approval not required HMT approval required
Checklist recommended
HMT approval required
Checklist recommended

3.2 Contingent liabilities in procurement

Most indemnities arising from procurement will be part of standard commercial contracts and so will be part of a department’s normal course of business. When non-standard indemnities are provided as part of a procurement, and these indemnities are either above a department’s delegated authority limit or novel, contentious or repercussive, Treasury consent is required. More detail is provided in MPM A5.4.17.

The expected cost of the indemnity should be considered alongside all other costs and benefits of the procurement as part of the procurement business case. Treasury consent for the indemnity should be sought alongside Treasury consent for any related spending rather than as a standalone contingent liability.

3.3 Parliamentary notification

Parliament expects advance notice of any commitments to future use of public funds for which there is no active request for resources through Estimates and that have no statutory basis. Chapter 2 of this document details when contingent liabilities need parliamentary notification.

Departments should notify parliament using both WMS and departmental minute – both of which should be cleared by Treasury. The departmental minute is the official record of the contingent liability and should, like all departmental minutes, be placed in the House of Commons Library. The WMS acts to draw members’ attention to the minute. The departmental minute should be copied to both the chair of the PAC and relevant departmental committee. The liability should not be incurred until at least 14 sitting days after the contingent liability has been notified, although it can be announced as long as it is appropriately caveated.

If, exceptionally, a new liability needs to remain confidential, the chairs of the relevant select committee and the PAC should be informed; then parliament should be informed openly when the need for confidentiality lifts. If it is not possible for the full 14 sitting days to be provided due to the urgency of the contingent liability, then the department must explain the need for urgency to parliament and agree revised wording of the WMS and departmental minute with the Treasury. This is set out in full in Annex 3.

3.4 Reporting

The final stage of the contingent liability approval process is reporting. The contingent liability will be reported through Estimates and in the departmental or ALB Annual Report and Accounts - for details see The Government Financial Reporting Manual. Following publication in the departmental or ALB Accounts, the Treasury will publish on a consolidated basis, as part of the Whole of Government Accounts (WGA), contingent liabilities for the whole public sector.

As part of their forecasts, the Office of Budget Responsibility (OBR) may publish their assessment of government’s contingent liabilities and their impact on the public finances. The starting point for these publications will be the contingent liability checklists. Treasury will coordinate a process of confirming details of any contingent liabilities with departments before publication.

Even where a contingent liability is considered remote and would not require disclosure under IAS 37, departments should consider whether the size or nature of the liability is such that Parliament would reasonably expect to see it disclosed and have the opportunity to scrutinise it at the point of issuance. In such cases, disclosure in the accounts is expected even absent a strict accounting requirement, and should therefore be notified to Parliament by the issuing department.

In addition, one of the objectives of FInTAG is to report on the government’s whole stock of contingent liabilities. They will do this through an annual report. FInTAG will contact departments to discuss the data requirements they need to achieve this objective.

4. Principles for Achieving Value for Money

This Chapter details the principles Treasury expect departments to apply when entering into new contingent liabilities. The principles described will not always be appropriate but when a department chooses not to apply them Treasury expects the rationale to be clearly set out.

4.1 Principles applied to contingent liabilities

Affordability – contingent liability crystallisation should be affordable within existing departmental budgets. Departments should be able to manage the reasonable worse case crystallisation of any contingent liability they hold. A reasonable worst-case crystallisation of a contingent liability will not be considered unforeseeable and so will not normally meet the bar for a reserve claim. Detail on reserve claims is set out in Box 2B of Treasury’s Consolidated Budget Guidance. If that is not possible, then departments must agree with Treasury an appropriate funding arrangement before entering into the contingent liability although the bar for an alternate arrangement will be high.

Market failure – when government offers indemnities or guarantees that transfer risk from the private to the public sector there should be a clear articulation of the market failure necessitating government action. Why have private insurance or credit markets not been able to offer these financial products or why should government support the activity facilitated by these financial products?

Charging for risk - departments should ensure that guarantees and indemnities offered to the private sector, and public sector bodies outside central government, are charged for appropriately. The charge should normally be at least enough to compensate for expected costs. Commercial rates, higher than expected costs, should be charged for commercial services. When departments do not wish to charge for risk, they should be able to put forwards a clear and compelling case. This is set out in MPM A5.4.13.

Value for money against other options – often contingent liabilities will have no upfront cost. This, in of itself, is not a justification for entering into contingent liabilities. A contingent liability’s expected cost should be evaluated when considering VfM. If public spending equal to that expected cost generates better policy outcomes, then it will likely achieve better VfM than the contingent liability. Loans and equity investments should also be considered instead of guarantees. Government should be risk neutral at the margin when assessing the cost of contingent liabilities. For example, a 1% chance of a £100m liability and a 10% chance of a £10m liability both have the same expected costs. When assessing VfM they should be treated equivalently.

Delivery through public financial institutions – departments proposing guarantees should consider at an early stage whether the guarantee is of sufficient size, complexity or risk that it should be delivered through one of the government’s designated public financial institutions. The criteria for determining whether a guarantee is large, complex or high-risk are set out in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 of the FTCF. Where those criteria are met, delivery through a public financial institution should be the default approach unless otherwise agreed with HM Treasury.

Time limited – contingent liability exposure should be limited in time. Time limits should apply to both the risk exposure (i.e., the dates between which an event could occur causing the liability to crystallise) and the liability exposure (i.e., the dates between which a claim could be paid). This time limit can be long dated but should be as short as possible to fulfil its policy objectives.

Limited exposure – the government’s risk exposure should be capped or limited where possible. There should be a clear VfM case for offering uncapped indemnities. The scope of any indemnity should be limited, so that risk exposure is only provided for damage or loss as is necessary to achieve the policy objective. Indemnity crystallisations can be provided as either loans or grants and a clear rationale for the most appropriate lever should be provided on a case-by-case basis. All guarantees should have a limited exposure. For guarantees with a potentially unlimited uptake, there should be a limit on the amount any individual/entity can borrow.

5. Annex 1 – The Contingent liability checklist

The contingent liability checklist is designed to allow Treasury and departmental officials to discuss the details of a proposed contingent liability. The checklist will also form the basis of any advice to Treasury ministers. Treasury would encourage departments to share checklists in draft form to enable joint policy discussions ahead of any final decision.

If a business case is required, a pragmatic approach should be taken to the checklist given the significant overlap. It is usually best to discuss the checklist with HMT first as it will contain the key information needed which the business case will then further detail.

The Financial Instruments and Transaction Advisory Group (FInTAG) CLCC@UKGI.org.uk are available to support departments in the design of contingent liabilities and to ensure best practice is met across government. As part of that process, they will be able to assist your department in the completion of this checklist.

When sending a checklist to Treasury please include a contact email for the relevant policy official, the commercial sensitivity of the proposed contingent liability and group or team responsible for the proposal.

Annex 2 of this document provides detailed guidance to support the completion of the checklist.

Summary

Please set out details of the contingent liability/liabilities for which you are seeking Treasury consent.

Please complete the following table summarising the financial impacts of this contingent liability. If you have used an alternate method to calculate expected cost, please adjust the table accordingly.

Contingent Liability Summary Table
(1) Start and end dates of risk exposure [the dates between which an event could occur causing the liability to crystallise]  
(2) Start and end dates of liability exposure [the dates between which a claim could be paid]  
(3) Maximum exposure (£ millions)  
(4) Reasonable worst case exposure (£ millions)  
(5) Average cost per crystallisation (£ millions)  
(6) Probability of crystallisation [if only one crystallisation can occur] or Expected number of crystallisations [if more than one crystallisation is possible] (%/number)  
(7) Lifetime expected gross cost [average cost per crystallisation (5) multiplied by probability of/expected number of crystallisations (6)] (£ millions)  
(8) Lifetime expected income (£ millions)  
(9) Lifetime expected net cost [Lifetime expected gross cost (7) minus Lifetime expected income (8)] (£ millions)  
(10) Probability of any costs arising [for single event CLs this would be the same as the probability above, for portfolios this will be higher – perhaps even 100%] (%)  

Why is it beneficial for government to take on this contingent liability?

Please provide an options analysis demonstrating what alternatives have been considered.

Evidence and Rationale

Please provide evidence to support the maximum possible and reasonable worst case estimates in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty.

Why is this size necessary? If there is no explicit maximum, please explain why.

Why is the risk and liability exposure of this contingent liability necessary? If the contingent liability exists in perpetuity, please explain why.

Will there be any review points where parameters of the liability can be changed and are there options to exit the liability before the maturity?

Please provide evidence to support the “Average Cost per Crystallisation” in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty?

Please provide evidence to support the “Probability of Crystallisation/Expected Number of Crystallisations” in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty.

Please provide evidence to support the income received estimate in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty.

Why is this level of income received appropriate? In particular, if your department does not intend to charge, please explain why.

If the liability crystallises, what is the impact on future crystallisations of this liability?

Risk management

What are the triggers for this contingent liability crystallising?

How does your department plan to monitor and report risks once the CL is approved, both to Treasury and internally?

What risk mitigation tools will be applied to reduce the risk of this liability crystallising and the quantum of any crystallisation?

Will the liability be funded in advance by, for example, holding assets against the liability? As set out in Box 4 of the contingent liability approval framework, this is rarely good VfM.

Affordability

If the contingent liability crystallised, how will your department meet the required payment (reasonable worst-case cost) from your department’s existing budget?

What other liabilities are held by your department have similar triggers? If this liability crystallises what is your assessment of the impact on the likelihood of crystallisation of other liabilities – would this be affordable within existing budgets?

6. Annex 2 – The Contingent liability checklist guidance

This annex summarises the checklist format and provides detailed guidance on how to answer each question in the checklist. FInTAG <(CLCC@UKGI.org.uk> are available to assist departments in completing this checklist and supporting contingent liability policy development. FInTAG have also published guidance (and will publish future guidance) on a number of technical areas related to contingent liabilities – this guidance can be found on the following webpage.

Summary

The first section of the contingent liability checklist asks departments to set out what the contingent liability is, how much it is expected to cost, the rationale for taking on the liability and an options analysis showing why this contingent liability has been put forwards amongst other options.

Please set out details of the contingent liability/liabilities for which you are seeking HMT approval.

  • This question asks you to summarise the contingent liability (CL) being proposed. Having read this section someone unfamiliar with the proposition and wider policy context should be able to understand what contingent liability your department wishes to enter into including what risk is being taken from who and why.
  • This summary should include the type of CL (see table below)
  • If the CL is arising as part of a procurement what is the status of the rest of the procurement? Normally CLs arising as part of a procurement should be agreed in the round with any other element of the procurement that needs Treasury consent.
  • Who is the beneficiary of the CL – to whom would the payment be made if the contingent liability crystallised?
  • Is the proposed CL a single contingent liability or a programme of contingent liabilities? If it is a programme what role will Treasury have in approving each contingent liability within the programme?
  • How will the CL be recorded in your accounts (e.g., financial guarantee, CL, remote CL, insurance contract, provision etc.)?
  • What is the wider policy context for the CL? Have there been any previous government announcements or agreements (e.g., in a manifesto or at an SR) that relate to this proposal?
  • Will your department charge the beneficiary of this CL – if so, what are the charging arrangements?
  • When will the CL be entered into – when and how will parliament be informed?
Type of contingent liability Category Description
Indemnity Procurement indemnity An indemnity offered to a supplier as part of a procurement contract
  Policy indemnity An indemnity offered to support private sector activity the government wishes to support that wouldn’t occur without the indemnity
  Appointment indemnity An indemnity against personal liability offered to an individual appointment to a role
  Inter-public sector indemnity An indemnity offered by one part of the public sector to another - usually from central government to the wider public sector
  Other indemnity Any other indemnity
Purchaser protection Purchaser protection An indemnity offered to an organisation purchasing or using a government asset
Guarantee Callable capital An obligation from holding callable shares in an organisation
  Pension guarantee An obligation relating to shortfalls in a funded pension scheme
  International guarantee A guarantee arising due to agreements with other countries or international organisations
  Policy guarantee A guarantee offered to support private sector activity the government wishes to support that wouldn’t occur without the guarantee
  Other guarantee Any other guarantee
Uncertain cost Uncertain cost A commitment that has such materially uncertain costs that it is classes as a contingent liability
Other Contingent Liability Other Contingent Liability Any other contingent liability

Please complete the following summary table of the financial impacts of this contingent liability. If you have used an alternate method to calculate expected cost, please adjust the table accordingly.

  • This table summarises the financial implication of the proposed CL. Treasury officials will use this table in presenting the costs of this CL to Treasury ministers.
  • Given the nature of CLs it is likely that the figures in this table will be estimates with a degree of uncertainty. The Evidence and Rationale section askes for more detail on these figures including detail on uncertainty. Please provide your best estimate, at a minimum an indication of the quantum using the categories provided below. It is acceptable to apply professional judgment when quantifying the financial impact in this table as long as it is explained in section 2. Professional judgment could include consulting domain experts, analytical experts, actuarial professionals or FInTAG guidance as appropriate when producing estimates.
  • If the CL is in a non-GBP currency, please covert it to GBP in the table and note the exchange rate used. -Start and end date of risk and liability exposure - This section asks you to detail the time over which government could be exposed under this CL. Please detail both the risk exposure (i.e., the dates between which an event could occur causing the liability to crystallise) and the liability exposure (i.e., the dates between which a claim could be paid).
  • Maximum exposure – this should represent the maximum possible limit of government exposure over the lifetime of the CL. For example, a limit placed in a contract. If there is no legal limit, please say that the maximum exposure is unlimited even if there is a quantified reasonable worst case exposure. If there is a limit on the exposure per crystallisation but no limit on the number crystallisations, the maximum possible exposure is unlimited.

Maximum exposure categories

  • Unlimited
  • More than £1bn
  • £500m to £1bn
  • £100m to £500m
  • £50m to £100m
  • £10m to £50m
  • Less than £10m

  • Reasonable worst case exposure – this is necessarily judgment based. It represents the costliest plausible manifestation of the CL crystallising over the lifetime of the CL once very highly unlikely scenarios have been discounted. You will be asked to set out what your reasonable worst case scenario is in 2.1. The nature of CLs means this will be an unlikely scenario that you do not expect to happen.

Reasonable worst case exposure categories

  • More than £1bn
  • £500m to £1bn
  • £100m to £500m
  • £50m to £100m
  • £10m to £50m
  • Less than £10m

  • Average cost per crystallisation – this represents the average pay-out your department will have to make each time this liability crystallises. This should be the average pay out for each crystallisation rather than the average pay-out in each financial year. If there are a very large number of small crystallisation then the categories below are likely not appropriate. You’ll be asked to provide evidence for this figure in 2.6

Average cost per crystallisation categories

  • More than £1bn
  • £500m to £1bn
  • £100m to £500m
  • £50m to £100m
  • £10m to £50m
  • Less than £10m

  • Probability of crystallisation or Expected number of crystallisations – the answer to this question will depend on whether it is possible for the CL to crystallise once or multiple times. If the CL can crystallise only once, please provide the probability of the CL crystallising expressed in a percentage. If the CL can crystallise multiple times, please say how many times the CL is expected to crystallise on average. This can be less than once if the CL is unlikely to occur.
  • For example, if it is possible the CL will crystallise 100 times (due to e.g., 100 guarantee contracts being signed as part of a guaranteed programme) and there is a 5% probability of each contract resulting in a pay-out then the expected number of crystallisations would be 5 (100 multiplied by 5%). If the probability of a pay-out was 0.1% for each contract, then the expected number of crystallisations would be 0.1 (100 multiplied by 0.1%).
  • If the CL is triggered by a future controllable government action, then answer this question with N/A.
  • If the probability of multiple crystallisations is extremely low but technically possibly it may be more appropriate to answer this question with the probability of crystallisation – this should be discussed with FInTAG.

Probability of crystallisation categories

  • More than 50% (in more than 1 year in 2 costs will occur)
  • 25% to 50% (in between 1 year in 4 and 1 year in 2 costs will occur)
  • 10% to 25% (in between 1 year in 10 and 1 year in 4 costs will occur)
  • 5% to 10% (in between 1 year in 20 and 1 year in 10 costs will occur)
  • 1% to 5% (in between 1 year in 100 and 1 year in 20 costs will occur)
  • 0.1% to 1% (in between 1 year in 1000 and 1 year in 100 costs will occur)
  • Less than 0.1% (in less than 1 year in 1000 costs will occur)

  • Lifetime expected gross cost – this is probability of crystallisation or number of crystallisations multiplied by average cost per crystallisation. If you have used ranges take the higher numbers in calculating the expected cost. This figure is the average amount HMG should expect to pay out due to this CL over its lifetime. As HMG has a large portfolio of CLs, Treasury expect total cross government spending on CLs to be equal to the sum of each CL’s expected cost.
  • Lifetime expected income – how much income do you expect to receive by charging the beneficiaries of this CL. If you are not charging put £0. Questions 2.8 asks you to justify why the level of income received is appropriate.
  • Lifetime expected net cost – this should be calculated as gross expected cost minus income received. A positive number means on average this CL will cost HMG money; negative number means on average HMG gains money.
  • Probability of any costs arising– this represents the probability of any crystallisation of this contingent liability happening. This includes the probability of a single large cost and multiple small costs; this is not the probability of the reasonable worst case scenario occurring.

Why is it beneficial for government to take on this contingent liability?

  • Please set out the positive case for taking on this CL. What is the policy objective your department is trying to achieve and why will taking on this contingent liability achieve that objective? Treasury officials will use this case to explain to Treasury ministers why they should consent to your department taking on this CL.
  • If your department has produced a business case for this CL, then this answer should link to the strategic case for the CL in your business case.
  • This answer should set out how taking on this CL helps to advance the government’s strategic priorities. It should also set out if this CL is in tension with any other government priorities.
  • If a net present value (NPV) of this CL (based on the green book methodology) has been produced, then please provide that here and set out how the NPV has been calculated. A NPV isn’t necessary to answer this question.

Please provide an options analysis demonstrating what alternatives have been considered.

  • This question asks you to provide an options analysis comparing this CL with other options. This should show how the proposed CL is best able to meet the government’s strategic priorities and deliver value for money.
  • The options analysis should compare the proposed CL with other CL options where for example more or less exposure is taken on, a do nothing option, and options such as lending or departmental spending where appropriate. If the proposed CL is part of a procurement, then the do nothing option should compare the price of the procurement with and without the CL and the option of not procuring.
  • Options should be assessed against at least the strategic fit with the policy objective, deliverability, and value for money. Other criteria can be added to this assessment if you have used them in your own options analysis.

Evidence and Rationale

This section of the contingent liability checklist asks you to provide evidence on how you have estimated the financial impacts of the proposed contingent liability. These estimates will be uncertain and so this section provides space to discuss that uncertainty and any stress testing. It also asks you to provide a rationale for the scale of the financial impacts, time period of exposure and income received.

Please provide evidence to support the maximum possible and reasonable worst case estimates in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty.

  • This question asks you to provide evidence supporting the figures you have provided in table you have completed in 1.2.
  • For maximum exposure, please set out if there is a maximum exposure how that maximum is achieved. For example, what contractual provisions are in place to limit exposure to this amount.
  • The reasonable worst case scenario is necessarily judgment based. It is the costliest plausible manifestation of the CL crystallising once very highly unlikely scenarios have been discounted. Please describe the scenario you have considered. What happens in that scenario and what are the associated costs, how have you calculated these costs? Why have you chosen that scenario as your reasonable worst case? What assumptions have you made and how would changing those assumptions affect the cost in this scenario?
  • If you have not been able to quantify the reasonable worst case, please describe the circumstances which might represent a plausible but costly outcome, and the factors which determine the size of the cost in that event.

Why is this size necessary? If there is no explicit maximum, please explain why.

  • This question asks you to justify why this maximum and reasonable worst case exposure is necessary to meet the policy objectives while achieving value for money.
  • If the maximum exposure is not capped, why can the amount not be capped? What impact would capping exposure have on the policy objectives and on achieving VfM? If the exposure is capped could the cap be lowered, what would the policy and VfM impact be of a lower cap?
  • In the reasonable worst case scenario, what could be done to reduce exposure proactively. Could government risk share or increase the amount of risk sharing it will undertake? What would the policy and VfM impacts of further risk sharing be?

Why is the risk and liability exposure of this contingent liability necessary? If the contingent liability exists in perpetuity, please explain why.

  • Please set out why the maturity in the summary table is necessary for meeting the policy objective and achieving VfM.
  • If the CL exists in perpetuity, please set out why this is necessary. What would happen if the CL had a specific end date (e.g., significantly into the future)? Please set this out for both the dates exposed to risk and the dates exposed to liabilities.
  • If the CL has a specific end date, please set out why this end date meets the policy objectives and achieves VfM. What would happen if the CL had a shorter maturity, how would this impact the policy objectives and VfM?

Will there be any review points where parameters of the liability can be changed and are there options to exit the liability before the maturity?

  • While you anticipate that the CL will exist until the dates set out in 2.3, circumstances may change, and it could be advantageous to exit the CL before these dates.
  • It may also be beneficial to have review points where parameters of the liability can be changed, such as fees charged, or amount guaranteed/indemnified. Please can you set out whether there are review points, when they will be and what parameters will be considered.
  • If there are opportunities to exit the CL before maturity, please detail them, for example break clauses or formal review points. How will your department monitor the CL to ensure the CL is retained only if it still delivers the policy objectives and achieves VfM.
  • If there is no option to exit this liability before maturity, please set out why it is not possible to include one. What impact would an exit clause have on the policy objective and VfM.

Please provide evidence to support the “Average Cost per Crystallisation” in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty?

Please provide evidence to support “Probability of Crystallisation/Expected Number of Crystallisations” in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty.

Please provide evidence to support the “Income Received” estimate in the summary table, including an assessment of uncertainty.

  • These questions (2.6, 2.7 and 2.8) ask you to provide evidence supporting the figures you have provided in table you have completed in 1.2.
  • Please set out how you have come to the figures provided in the summary table. Given the nature of CLs this is likely to be uncertain and so you should provide your best assessment and detail the points of uncertainty. If relevant, please set out the calculations you have used.
  • If detailed analysis sits behind these figures (such as actuarial reports), please summarise the methodology and findings here and refer as appropriate to other supporting documents such as more detailed analytical reports.
  • To assess uncertainty, where you have made assumptions, please detail them and the impact of reasonable changes to these assumptions on the figures provided.
  • If you are unable to provide any figures, please describe the circumstances under which a cost might arise and what will determine the size of the cost.

Why is this level of income received appropriate? In particular, if your department does not intend to charge, please explain why.

  • Please set out your department’s planned charging approach and how you have come to the decision that the level of income you are set to receive is appropriate for this CL. Approaches to charging include no charge, charge to cover administration, charge to cover expected cost excluding admin or including admin and industry standard charging.
  • If the CL is being entered into as part of a procurement, Treasury would not expect a fee to be charged but you should considerer whether the reduced cost of the procurement justifies the CL. You should set out the scale of the cost reduction.
  • If your department is not charging a fee for this CL or receiving an economic benefit from the CL beneficiary in some way, please set out why charging a fee would not be appropriate. What impact would charging even a notional fee have on the policy objectives and on achieving VfM.
  • If a fee is being charged, but the fee is insufficient to cover the gross expected cost of the CL please set out why it would not be appropriate to charge a fee covering the gross expected cost (such that the net expected cost is £0). Please set out how charging a fee to cover gross expected cost would impact the policy objectives or VfM.
  • It is often necessary to consider subsidy control legislation when considering the level of charging. If relevant, please set out how this CL is consistent with subsidy control legislation.

If the liability crystallises, what is the impact on future crystallisations of this liability?

  • This question asks you to consider how crystallisations of this CL may be correlated with future crystallisation of this CL. Given the nature of CLs this is likely to be highly uncertain but please provide at least an indicative qualitative assessment.
  • If the CL crystallises – if any payment is made under the CL – will that increase, decrease, or not impact the probability and quantum of future crystallisations of this CL.
  • For example, an indemnity could be capped such that only a certain £ quantum of payments could be made, in which case a crystallisation could lower the future amounts that could be paid under this CL. Or an indemnity could be triggerable only once, such that if the CL crystallises the probability of future crystallisations falls to 0%.
  • Another example could be a guarantee scheme where a crystallisation could imply future crystallisations will be more likely due to credit risk being greater than anticipated.

Risk management

This section of the contingent liability checklist asks you to set out the triggers for this CL and how risks will be managed, including whether your department intends to put in place a fund to pay for future crystallisations.

What are the triggers for this contingent liability crystallising?

  • Please set out the chain or chains of events that would cause money to be paid out under this CL. How much warning will HMG have that this CL will crystallise?

How does your department plan to monitor and report risks once the CL is approved, both to HMT and internally?

  • What processes will your department put in place to monitor the risks this CL poses. Will those processes be linked to the monitoring of other similar CL or spending risks held by your department?
  • How will your department assess whether the expected cost of the CL has changed? At what point will these changes be reported to HMT?

What risk mitigation tools will be applied to reduce the risk of this liability crystallising and quantum of any crystallisation?

  • What tools will your department have to mitigate the likelihood and quantum of any CL crystallisation?
  • The most important risk mitigation tool will be ensuring the party most able to mitigate risk is incentivised to do so. How this is achieved will differ but often this involves agreeing risk sharing arrangements such as partial guarantees or excesses below which indemnities are not paid. Fees can also be a useful tool to incentivise the beneficiary of a CL to exit the CL at the earliest opportunity. Please set out how the party most able to mitigate risk is incentivised to do so under the design of the CL.
  • Another important set of risk mitigation tools used to lower the financial cost of any crystallisation are collateral or covenants. Collateral could be placed so that if a guarantee is called government has a stake on the credit structure of an insolvent firm. Covenants can also be placed on the beneficiary to limit their actions and reduce risk; these can range from limits on debt to the halt of dividend payments while government support is ongoing. Please set out what risk mitigation tool are in place to lower the cost of any crystallisation, collateral, covenants or other.
  • Please set out any other risk mitigation tools being applied to reduce the probability and quantum of any crystallisation of this CL.
  • Finally, if legal action is involved in the crystallisation of this CL who will represent the HMG’s interests in any legal case?

Will the contingent liability be funded in advance by, for example, holding assets against the liability?

  • It is not normally good VfM for the payment of CLs to be funded in advance. Please set out whether your department propose to fund this liability in advance either by directly holding financial assets against the CL or through similar arrangement, e.g., where a supplier holds assets on behalf of your department.
  • If your department does propose to fund this liability in advance, please set out why this is necessary to achieve the policy objectives and VfM, what would the impact be if the CL was not funded in advance?
  • If a fund is used what investment strategy is proposed and how will the fund be governed?
  • To note: your department will need to agree separately with HMT the use of a fund and any investment strategy.

Affordability

The final section of the contingent liability checklist asks you to assess whether the proposed contingent liability is affordable for the department planning to take it on.

If the contingent liability crystallised, how will your department meet the required payment (reasonable worst-case cost) from your department’s existing budget?

  • This question asks you to set out why taking on this CL is affordable for your department. Departments are expected to meet calls on CL from within their existing budgets. If there is a risk that the crystallisation of a contingent liability would not be affordable within existing budgets your department must have agreed a plan for financing the contingent liability on crystallisation as part of HMT’s contingent liability consent.
  • Please set out how your department would meet the reasonable worst case scenario from within your existing budgets. For example, can the reasonable worst case be met from underspends or would existing spending need to be reprioritised. If spending needs to be reprioritised what would your reprioritisation plan be? How will this CL crystallising affect your department’s wider delivery?
  • To contextualise your response please provide information on the size of your department’s relevant DEL budget.

What other liabilities are held by your department that have similar triggers? If this liability crystallises what is your assessment of the impact on the likelihood of crystallisation of other liabilities – would this be affordable within existing budgets?

  • This question asks you to assess the links between the proposed CL and other contingent liabilities held by your department.
  • Given the nature of CLs and the policy remit of each department it is possible that the proposed CL will have similar triggers to other CLs currently held by your department. For example, your department may be exposed via multiple CLs to a single firm, sector of the economy, or country. Therefore, affordability needs to be considered on a portfolio basis not a single contingent liability basis.
  • To answer this question please set out the details of any other CL held by your department with similar triggers. Set out their reasonable worse case exposure and your assessment of whether the proposed CL and these existing CL will crystallise at the same time.
  • If it is likely that these CLs will crystallise at the same time, please provide an equivalent answer to questions 4.1 but for the full stock of CLs likely to crystallise at the same time.

7. Annex 3 – Contingent liabilities letter templates

7.1 Written Ministerial Statement

[Title of Contingent Liability] [Overview of policy issue]

[Explanation of why this gives rise to a contingent liability and what the liability covers.]

[Set out the amount of the proposed liability.] [If helpful: explain the expected duration of the proposed liability and/or why the likelihood of the liability crystallising is considered low or remote.]

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. A Departmental Minute has been laid before the House of Commons providing more detail on this contingent liability. The liability will not be incurred until at least fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the Minute was laid, to give Members an opportunity to review it. [If applicable, edit this paragraph and explain why the matter is urgent and the normal deadlines cannot be observed, in accordance with paragraph A5.4.32 of Managing Public Money. Revised text must be agreed with the Treasury where less than fourteen days’ notice is being given.]

[Alternatively, if the liability was notified first to committee chairs during recess or due to extreme urgency, explain what happened, including any liability already undertaken.]

7.2 Departmental Minute Template

[Title of Contingent Liability]

It is normal practice, when a government department proposes to undertake a contingent liability in excess of £300,000 for which there is no specific statutory authority, for the Minister concerned to present a Departmental Minute to Parliament giving particulars of the liability created and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from incurring the liability until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

[Describe the nature of the proposed contingent liability and the circumstances giving rise to it.]

[Describe the amount and expected duration of the proposed liability, giving an estimate if precision is impossible.]

[Explain which bodies are expected to benefit, and why.]

[If applicable, explain why the matter is urgent and why the normal deadlines cannot be observed, in accordance with paragraph A5.4.32 of Managing Public Money. Revised text must be agreed with the Treasury where less than fourteen days’ notice is being given.]

[Alternatively, if the liability was notified first to committee chairs during recess or due to extreme urgency, explain what happened, including any liability already undertaken.]

If the liability is called, provision for any payment will be sought through the normal Supply procedure.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen Parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date on which this Minute was laid before Parliament, a Member signifies an objection by giving notice of a Parliamentary Question or by otherwise raising the matter in Parliament, final approval to proceed with incurring the liability will be withheld pending an examination of the objection. [If applicable, including where the liability has already been undertaken, edit this paragraph and explain why the matter is urgent and the normal deadlines cannot be observed, in accordance with paragraph A5.4.32 of Managing Public Money. Revised text must be agreed with the Treasury where less than fourteen days’ notice is being given.]

7.3 Confidential Notification Template

[Department Header]

[Name of Sender] [Department]

[Address]

[Chair of departmental committee / Public Accounts Committee] [Departmental committee / Public Accounts Committee]

[Date]

Dear [Name of Chair],

It is normal practice, when a government department proposes to undertake a contingent liability in excess of £300,000 for which there is no specific statutory authority, for the Minister concerned to present a Departmental Minute to Parliament giving particulars of the liability created and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from incurring the liability until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

[Describe the nature of the proposed contingent liability and the circumstances giving rise to it.]

[Describe the amount and expected duration of the proposed liability, giving an estimate if precision is impossible.]

[Explain which bodies are expected to benefit, and why.]

[Explain why the liability cannot be notified to Parliament transparently and why confidential notification is necessary.]

[If applicable, explain why the matter is urgent and why the normal deadlines cannot be observed, in accordance with paragraph A5.4.32 of Managing Public Money.]

If the liability is called, provision for any payment will be sought through the normal Supply procedure.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. If, during the period of fourteen Parliamentary sitting days beginning on the date of this letter, you signify an objection in writing, final approval to proceed with incurring the liability will be withheld pending an examination of the objection. [If it is not possible to give Chairs fourteen sitting days’ notice, revised text must be agreed with the Treasury.]

I have also written to the [Chair of the Public Accounts Committee / departmental committee] with this information.

Yours sincerely, [Signature]

7.4 Urgent/Recess Notification Template

[Department Header]

[Name of Sender] [Department]

[Address]

[Chair of departmental committee / Chair of Public Accounts Committee]

[Departmental committee / Public Accounts Committee]

Dear [Name of Chair],

[Date]

It is normal practice, when a government department proposes to undertake a contingent liability in excess of £300,000 for which there is no specific statutory authority, for the Minister concerned to present a Departmental Minute to Parliament giving particulars of the liability created and explaining the circumstances; and to refrain from incurring the liability until fourteen Parliamentary sitting days after the issue of the Minute, except in cases of special urgency.

[Describe the nature of the proposed contingent liability and the circumstances giving rise to it.]

[Describe the amount and expected duration of the proposed liability, giving an estimate if precision is impossible.]

[Explain which bodies are expected to benefit, and why.]

[Explain why the matter is so urgent that the normal Parliamentary notification procedure cannot be followed, in accordance with (paragraph A5.4.38 of Managing Public Money.)] [Alternatively, for a notification during recess, explain why the liability needs to be undertaken before Parliament reconvenes.]

If the liability is called, provision for any payment will be sought through the normal Supply procedure.

The Treasury has approved the proposal in principle. [For a notification during recess: If, during the period of fourteen working days from the date of this letter, you signify an objection in writing, final approval to proceed with incurring the liability will be withheld pending an examination of the objection.]

[If it is especially urgent and not possible to give Chairs fourteen

working days’ notice, revised text must be agreed with the Treasury.]

[The Department will lay a Written Ministerial Statement and Departmental Minute at the earliest opportunity, explaining what has happened, including any liability undertaken.]

I have also written to the [Chair of the Public Accounts Committee / departmental committee] with this information.

Yours sincerely, [Signature]