Guidance

Bus and coach security

Updated 2 December 2025

Introduction

This guidance promotes best practice security measures to support the bus and coach industry to protect against acts of violence, especially terrorism. It covers basic and enhanced security measures for:

• building and sustaining a security culture
• personnel security
• stations, termini, depots
• vehicles

Following this guidance will strengthen counter-terrorism security, reassure passengers, and increase public confidence in using bus and coach services and facilities. It also has benefits in helping to reduce the risk of crime and antisocial behaviour.

The principles underpinning the advice and promoting a good security culture throughout a business are:

• vigilance of staff
• regular security checks that are documented
• overall responsibility for security residing with a senior manager
• risk assessments that are regularly reviewed by senior managers to ensure a coherent and informed approach to security measures

How to use this guidance

This guidance is for managers of bus and coach stations and depots, as well as bus and coach operators and owners. In implementing the guidance contained in this document, management teams should be aware of complying with existing legislation such as the Equality Act of 2010 and the Environment Act of 2021.

The emphasis of this guidance is on protecting the bus and coach sector, its assets, staff and the travelling public, from terrorism. Acts of terrorism in the UK are very rare events but when they do occur, they have the potential to inflict great damage on both the people and the economy. While the emphasis is on counter-terrorist advice and guidance, other aspects of security can also have a significant impact on the sector and so this guidance will address those issues too.

The Department for Transport (DfT) has worked with the National Counter Terrorism Security Office (NaCTSO) and the National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) to ensure relevant products are available for the bus and coach sector on best security practice and increasing staff awareness of counter-terrorism.

The Terrorism (Protection of Premises) Act of April 2025, often referred to as Martyn’s Law, is currently undergoing an implementation phase. When statutory guidance has been issued by the Home Office, the bus and coach security guidance will be updated to provide the sector with the information they require to confirm with the law.

Read more information on Martyn’s Law.

Identifying and responding to security threats

UK terrorism threat levels

Details of the current UK national threat levels can be found on the MI5 website or the ProtectUK website.

The DfT Road Transport Security Team and regional police force’s counter terrorism security advisers (CTSAs) can also provide further information where appropriate.

There are 5 categories at which the threat level can be set:

• low – an attack is highly unlikely
• moderate – an attack is possible but not likely
• substantial – an attack is likely
• severe – an attack is highly likely
• critical – an attack is highly likely in the near future

Threat levels are regularly reviewed by the UK security services and can change at any time as different information becomes available to security agencies.

Received and discovered threats

Threats may be received or discovered by bus, coach, station and depot staff or anyone else connected with bus or coach operations. This also applies to administrative staff and even passengers who may come across items that looks out of place and report them to staff. Staff should then use the HOT protocol to confirm whether an item is suspicious or not.

H – Is it hidden from view, not in clear sight?
O – Is it obviously suspicious because of its appearance (wires, circuit boards, batteries, tape, liquids or putty-like substances) or the circumstances of its discovery?
T – Is it typical of what you would expect to find in this location?

Received threats

Threats may be received in several ways – by phone, email, social media or through the company website ‘contact us’ pages. Threats can be made either:

• directly from people issuing the threat or through intermediaries – for example, the media and press agencies
• via a third party – a person or organisation unrelated to the intended victim and identified only to pass on the message

No matter how implausible the threat may seem, you should try to obtain as much information as possible to help assess it and identify the person(s) issuing it.

Protect UK have produced a threat report form, that you can use to record suspicious activity.

This form can be printed or stored electronically and made easily accessible to staff when required. Whilst threats may be hoaxes intended to cause alarm, disruption, fear, or nuisance, they must be taken seriously and assessed properly. Operators should always seek advice from local police on how to handle any threats received.

Discovered threats

Bus and coach stations, termini and interchanges can be very busy with the travelling public, particularly at certain times of the day, and as such they are a potential terrorist target. Some bus and coach stations were designed and built without security features and may contain voids and spaces which could be used by a terrorist to conceal an explosive device.

Simple security measures can help to create a controlled environment, which will act as both a deterrent and provide reassurance to customers.

Remind passengers, through the use of posters or announcements, not to leave their luggage unattended and advise them to report unattended items or unusual behaviour to staff or the police.

Fit tamper proof seals to cupboards and equipment boxes in public areas.

Keep areas clear and tidy and see what ‘clutter’ bus and coach operators can do without. This approach should not be applied to existing hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures or those elements of street furniture that can help to deter a vehicle as a weapon (VAW) attack.

Conduct regular visual checks in stations, termini and interchanges, looking for any unattended items or people behaving suspiciously.

Review bus and coach operator litter management arrangements and the use of clear plastic refuse sacks in areas the public can access.

Marauding terrorist attacks (MTAs) using bladed weapons or firearms

Marauding terrorist attacks involve the deliberate seeking of targets by an attacker or attackers and can take many forms. A wide range of methodologies from high sophistication to lower complexity can be used as part of an attack, for example, vehicles, bladed weapons and firearms.

In the event of an MTA, staff should follow NaCTSO’s RUN, HIDE, TELL guidance.

Staff should not put themselves at risk in the event of an MTA.

Read ProtectUK guidance on preparing and responding to marauding terrorist attacks.

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs)

Improvised explosive devices (IEDs) can be used by terrorists and are often disguised to look like everyday objects, so it is important that staff are confident in using the HOT protocol to determine whether an unattended item is suspicious. Consider what is normal for the location /situation.

The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) has further information about explosive devices and concealment in its Recognising Terrorist Threats Guide.

There are many methods used to hide and detonate an improvised explosive device. Devices could be hidden at strategic locations, attached under vehicles, or transported to targets by suicide operators. The NPSA have produced a document that explains what to look for when trying to recognise what is and what isn’t a suspicious package.

To help staff deal with a suspicious package the British Transport Police have developed an easily remembered protocol:

• be suspicious of objects that are out of place or unaccounted for
• treat any suspect package with extreme caution
• those dealing with suspicious items should apply the 4Cs protocol:
  • confirm: whether or not the item has suspicious characteristics
  • clear: the immediate area
  • communicate: call 999
  • control: access to the cordoned area
• evaluate any unattended or suspicious item using the HOT protocol

If the staff member continues to have serious doubts about the package after using the HOT protocol, they should report it immediately to the police with a 999 call, as well the relevant manager.

If an IED is discovered on a vehicle, do not use the on-board radio to alert management.

1. Evacuate the vehicle quickly and safely.

2. Alert the police with a 999 call from a safe distance (minimum of 15m), preferably from behind hard cover and away from glazed areas.

3. Inform the bus company management (and site management if applicable) of the situation and ensure passengers do not re-board the vehicle.

If the coach is at a visitor attraction, you should inform site management about the situation as quickly as possible.

Vehicle as a weapon

Vehicle as a weapon (VAW) is the deliberate use of a vehicle to injure and kill people or damage infrastructure. Crowded places are an attractive location for terrorists to conduct high casualty, low sophistication attacks like VAW attacks. VAW attacks can be used as part of a layered attack, examples of which include the attack at Westminster Bridge and London Bridge in 2017, where attackers conducted VAW attacks before exiting the vehicle and carrying out an MTA.   

Vehicles may be purchased, rented, stolen, or hijacked by terrorists. Whilst it is possible to prevent vehicles entering specific areas, it is often not practical or proportionate to protect everywhere from a VAW attack.

NaCTSO and NPSA have developed guidance on ways to minimise the risk from VAW attacks. Where permanent physical security measures are being considered to mitigate this type of attack, bus and coach operators can seek further guidance from the ProtectUK and NPSA websites.

NPSA has guidance on hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures, which focuses on reducing risks associated with VAW threats and vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) threats posed by terrorists.

HVM measures are defined as the integrated deployment of security processes, procedures and physical obstructions to counter vehicle borne threats and can be temporary or permanent.

Chemical and noxious substances

It is not uncommon for unusual or unpleasant smells to be detected inside or in areas near to buses, coaches, stations, and depots. These are usually due to non-malicious activities or infrastructure faults, such as blocked drains, vehicle fumes or antisocial behaviour. But the use of chemical agents for malicious purposes has the potential to put lives at risk within a very short space of time. Biological agents or radioactive material can also be odourless and could potentially put lives at risk over the long term.  

If staff detect, or are made aware of, unusual or unpleasant odours, they need to consider the following:

Could they be linked to recent cleaning activity, painting or maintenance work?

Have they been noticed by staff on other occasions?

Is there any obvious source (for example, blocked drains, bus or coach exhaust fumes)?

Could the smell be from elsewhere – for example, a nearby factory, road resurfacing, a bonfire?

Could the smell be linked to antisocial behaviour?

If the member of staff is still suspicious of the unusual or unpleasant smell, a more serious incident may be occurring. Such incidents are rare, but first indicators of an attack may include: 

• individuals showing unexplained signs of skin, eye or airway irritation, nausea, vomiting, twitching, sweating, disorientation or breathing difficulties
• casualty numbers escalating and in close proximity to each other
• unexplained vapour, mist clouds, powder, liquids or oily drops
• withered plant life and/or distressed birds or animals

If casualty numbers are escalating, or if significant number of people are affected the following actions should be taken:

• report incident to relevant personnel (for example, supervisor, facility manager, first aider and emergency responders).
• do not put yourself or others at further risk
• always evacuate externally into fresh air
• prevent further people entering the area

In the event of a chemical (including acid) attack, the first indication may be reports of victims suffering with injuries. The key actions should be to:

1. Report the incident to relevant personnel (supervisor, facility manager, first aider, emergency responders, including the police) and follow their instructions.

2. Evacuate from the affected area.

3. Remove (where reasonably possible) any soiled or contaminated clothing.

4. Apply first aid assistance (for example, wash chemical agent with copious amounts of water).

5. Make every effort to obtain full details from witnesses – especially immediate contact details – so that police can speak directly to them and ask further questions if required.

Read further NPSA guidance NPSA guidance on how to recognise, assess, react (RAR) for chemical, biological and radiological incidents.

Insider threat

Insider threat has been defined as ‘an insider, or group of insiders, that either intends to or is likely to cause harm or loss to the organisation’.

An insider is any person or persons who have, or previously had, authorised access to or knowledge of the organisation’s resources, including people, processes, information, technology, and facilities. These individuals may be disaffected staff or those who have been radicalised who might choose to carry out crime or an act of terrorism.  

Personnel security is a system of policies and procedures which seeks to:

• reduce the risk of recruiting staff who are likely to present a security concern
• minimise the likelihood of existing employees becoming a security concern
• reduce the risk of insider activity, protect the organisation’s assets and, where necessary, carry out investigations to resolve suspicions or provide evidence for disciplinary procedures
• implement security measures in a way that is proportionate to the risk

The NPSA have created the Personnel Security Maturity Model that has been designed to specifically assess an organisation’s personnel security maturity. The maturity model is based on 7 core elements:

• governance and leadership
• insider risk assessment
• pre-employment screening
• ongoing personnel security
• monitoring and assessment of employees
• investigation and disciplinary practices (response)
• security culture and behaviour change

Hostile reconnaissance

Busy waiting areas for passengers or boarding queues can provide an attractive target to a potential attacker. As such, they may use these areas to conduct their attack planning. This is known as ‘hostile reconnaissance’. Staff members are vital in spotting and reporting potential hostile reconnaissance because they know the area and what is normal and natural to see in those areas.

Regular and visible patrols by uniformed staff are a good deterrent, help reassure passengers and can play an important role in not only discovering suspicious items but also deterring hostile reconnaissance from taking place in the first place.

NPSA has produced guidance which aims to assist organisations understand more about what hostile reconnaissance is, where it may be conducted and what can be done to deter it.

NPSA has an awareness package available to increase staff confidence in spotting hostile reconnaissance. SCaN for all staff is designed for all staff and has 3 core components:

1. See – understanding what hostile reconnaissance is and how to spot it.
2. Check – knowing what to do if you suspect hostile reconnaissance or identify suspicious activity.
3. Notify – who you should tell and what you should tell them.

Cyber threat

A cyber attack has the potential to disrupt day-to-day operational activities and, in the worst-case scenario, could put lives at risk or damage bus and coach assets. Embedding appropriate and proportionate cyber security measures will reduce the likelihood of an incident and help minimise the impact and costs associated with any breaches.

The National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) has been established to act as the government’s industry-facing centre of expertise on cyber security. The NCSC can assist with providing comprehensive cyber security advice and guidance, high-level threat intelligence and a 24/7 incident reporting function.

DfT has also produced some key principles for vehicle cyber security.

The Cyber Security Information Sharing Partnership (CiSP) is a forum for NCSC and industry to collaborate and share information on cyber security issues. Bus and coach operators should consider signing up to the CiSP, which includes a transport and roads forum.

The EU Directive on Security of Network and Information Systems (NIS Directive) provides several principles for the transport industry to follow to protect their operations. The indicators of good practice may be used by bus and coach operators to self-assess their preparedness.

Further advice on cyber security can be found via the NCSC website, in particular the following advice should be considered:

• NCSC’s 10 Steps in Cyber Security
• NCSC’s Cyber Essentials Scheme

Arson

Starting fires can be a relatively easy and used in conjunction with another form of terrorist attack (such as an IED or an MTA), can create an extremely challenging environment.

The control of flammable materials (accumulated rubbish or the storage of cleaning materials) is an obvious first step in reducing the risk of arson.

NPSA has also produced guidance on fire as a weapon.

Antisocial behaviour (ASB)

The threat posed by antisocial behaviour may at first sight seem to be of a secondary order, but it is the security threat that the bus and coach sector has to confront on a regular, sometimes daily, basis. The ability of these security incidents to negatively affect both staff and bus and coach customers is obvious, particularly in the case of violence against women and girls (VAWG).

All employees are responsible for developing a culture within their organisation that ensures women and girls, both staff and customers, feel safe when travelling and are supported and feel confident to report any incidents of sexual harassment to the relevant police service.

We recommend that organisations consider communications campaigns to:

• reassure women and girls
• make clear that unwanted or antisocial behaviour will not be tolerated
• highlight how to report incidents

It is also recommended that organisations consider the training available to staff to:

• be equipped with the skills and knowledge to recognise sexual harassment happening around them
• understand the different forms that sexual harassment can take
• be aware of the options available to somebody who has experienced or witnessed sexual harassment

Resources to use that will help to inform your policy on VAWG include:

• the Home Office ‘Enough’ campaign
• the Rail Delivery Group (RDG) ‘Zero Tolerance’ campaign

As well as tackling improving the experience of passengers (and the working environment for staff), measures to combat ASB are equally useful in tackling the threat from terrorism. For example, security lighting, visible patrols by staff, well placed and continually monitored CCTV will not only discourage ASB, they will also discourage and disrupt hostile reconnaissance.

Several guidance documents have been produced by the following organisations to tackle ASB:

• British Transport Police guidance on tackling antisocial behaviour
• Department for Transport guidance on tackling antisocial behaviour

Station, terminus and interchange security

Stations, termini and interchanges can be crowded places and therefore a potential terrorist target. Simple security measures can help to create a controlled environment, which will act as both a deterrent and provide reassurance to customers.

Remind staff to be vigilant when on the premises and of what to do if they see a suspicious item or person acting unusually.

Remind passengers not to leave luggage unattended and advise them to report unattended / suspect packages or suspicious activity to staff or the police.

Secure worksites and equipment when leaving and ensure all doors are properly closed when exiting a location, particularly doors leading to non-public areas.

Fit locks or tamper proof seals to cupboards and equipment boxes in public areas.

Keep areas clear and tidy (this approach should not be applied to existing Hostile Vehicle Mitigation measures or street furniture, which can help to deter a vehicle as a weapon attack in crowded places) and ensure litter management arrangements are in place.

CCTV

CCTV has a deterrent and investigative value. It can be used to cover parts of stations or facilities on stations that criminals and terrorists could exploit, such as litter bins, cycle racks, lockers and doors to non-public areas.

Recommended CCTV specifications

CCTV image specification – the size of the image and the images per second per camera (ipspc) – varies according to the purpose of the camera and how you intend to use the CCTV system as a whole. The code of practice on CCTV surveillance is available via the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) website.

As a starting point, bus and coach companies are strongly advised to complete an operational requirement to understand what they need from a CCTV system before it is procured and installed.

CCTV systems should be capable of swiftly exporting data, ensuring that both the time and date are embedded within the images supplied. Any exported images must either:

• include the necessary software to view or replay the footage
• be compatible with standard computer systems, so that no additional software is required

Local police contacts can also supply details of digital evidence management systems (DEMS), which can aid the use of CCTV equipment.

It is recommended that CCTV recordings be retained for 31 days before the recording media is reused, and that the images are made available to police on request. A control log should be maintained to provide a record should CCTV recordings be required by the police or other agencies.

As with any technological system, things can go wrong and it is essential that good maintenance arrangements are in place so that any faults can be identified and repaired quickly. If current CCTV systems are to be replaced or new ones installed, digital systems should be considered. Further information can be found on the NPSA website.

Bus and coach station operators should consider liaising with other local organisations and operations (for example, railway stations, local authorities, shopping centres) to identify whether it would be beneficial to have compatible systems or ensure that adjacent CCTV systems leave no areas uncovered and avoid duplication.

Areas of concealment

Some bus and coach stations were designed and built without security features and may contain spaces which could be used by a terrorist to conceal an explosive device. In addition, any ‘dark corners’ (particularly those that are out of view of staff and members of the public) can be potential areas of concealment in which criminal activities could occur. It is important to remember that these spaces are not necessarily at ground level, for example, the tops of self-service left luggage lockers.

The ProtectUK website has some valuable insight into this aspect of improving security.

Whilst it may not be possible to eliminate all such areas, measures can be taken to reduce them.

Location of equipment – where possible any grit bins, vending machines or other equipment boxes should be flush to walls so that nothing can be hidden behind or to the side of them.

Tamper evident seals – can be fitted to cupboards or equipment boxes that cannot be locked.

Boarding or sealing up voids that cannot be removed – for example, under vending machines or around equipment boxes.

Lighting – additional lighting can be installed to improve security and make security checks easier in darker areas.

Those involved in designing or refurbishing facilities at bus and coach stations can help design in security enhancing features. For example, curved tops on ticket machines reduce the area available to conceal items, fitting machines back-to-back, or on legs with large gaps underneath can do the same. Flower planters should be designed to make it impossible to hide anything underneath and planting should not be so dense that it hinders searches.

Police crime prevention officers and ‘Designing Out Crime’ officers can help in thinking through changes to station layouts.

Access control

Staff and passengers

The public should not be able to gain access to non-public areas such as staff rest rooms, storerooms and cleaners’ cupboards. All doors between public and non-public areas should be clearly marked and kept locked or controlled to prevent unauthorised access. This will also minimise areas that need to be searched and patrolled.

Door keys should be kept securely and controlled by a responsible person. A record should be kept of who has been issued a key. If access is controlled by a keypad, the code should only be given to staff members with a legitimate need to know. Keypad codes should be changed from the factory setting immediately on being installed. Codes should be changed regularly (on a frequency to be determined locally) or when required in instances like staffing changes.

Key management is crucial to maintain the integrity of a building’s security. A record of all keys issued should be kept and regular audits conducted. All keys issued should be returned as part of the exit procedure for staff leaving the organisation. If a key cannot be accounted for, there should be a contingency plan to deal with a potential compromise of access control.

An electronic lock may be appropriate, but this represents a compromise between mechanical locks and a fully electronic access control system. If mechanical PIN code locks are used, a plan should be in place to change PIN codes regularly. Best practice is to change them after a member of staff leaves, after a security breach or every 6 months.

Bus and coach companies should put in place, through induction training and regular staff briefings, a ‘challenge culture’ whereby anyone who is not recognised or wearing a company issued ID badge is politely challenged as to their reason for being on site. This approach to access control is often labelled ‘the power of hello’ and can be very effective in both engaging staff and also protecting company premises from unwanted intruders.

Visitors and contractors

All visitors and contractors to a bus or coach station should be required to either:

• report to the reception or duty manager to notify the company of their arrival on site
• go through a pre-booking system

Taking these steps:

• provides an important audit trail – including sign-in/out times and the purpose of the visit
• can be crucial in the event of an emergency evacuation of the premises

Visitors and contractors should be given a security awareness briefing upon arrival, which covers areas such as the following.

Where a pass is issued, it should always be displayed prominently whilst they are on the premises.

If they have a vehicle parked on site, any work or parking permits should be displayed prominently in the windscreen and the vehicle registration given to reception or the station manager.

The need to remain vigilant when on the premises and what to do if they see a suspicious item or person acting unusually.

Instruct them to properly close all doors when leaving an area, particularly doors leading to non-public areas, and not allow entry to anyone who may be tailgating them into non-public areas.

Ask them to secure their worksites and any remaining equipment on leaving the premises.

If somebody is replacing a known and trusted contractor, it may be appropriate to consider chaperoning them whilst on site.

Vehicles

The movement of vehicles into and out of bus and coach stations, other than authorised buses and coaches, should be controlled where possible. For example:

• a parking permit system for staff, and where possible, for visitor and contractor vehicles
• monitoring retail delivery vehicles to ensure they do not stay in the station for longer than is necessary
• pre-arranged deliveries only
• the proportionate use of hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) equipment to deny all vehicles access to certain areas

Certain vehicles may need to routinely access your site. You may want to issue vehicle passes to identify these vehicles. You should manage these passes in line with your standard access control procedures.

Vehicles that need to gain access without a pass should only do so by prior arrangement.

Operators should consult their local police force to agree a system for reporting and dealing with suspicious, unattended or abandoned vehicles, and liaise with them regarding evacuation plans.

Patrolling public areas

The travelling public is always reassured by the sight of identifiable staff members walking around a station, particularly during the hours of darkness, and so at its very least, patrolling a bus or coach station is an excellent customer service tool. However, as a cheap and effective counter-terrorism measure, it is second to none.

Regular patrols by uniformed staff wearing hi-vis jackets are a good deterrent, help to reassure passengers and can play an important part in finding concealed items and detecting unusual behaviour.

Patrolling patterns should not be shared outside the organisation. Where possible, unpredictable patrols (the length of time the patrol lasts for, the route it follows and the time of day the patrol starts) are better. Some operating companies might find the use of mobile patrols (visiting a number of sites over a given time) a more practical option.

It is recommended that you maintain a patrol log that records timings and any actions taken by the patrol.

Limiting reporting to ‘exception reporting’ fails to demonstrate that regular patrolling is taking place.

Staff should also be encouraged to engage with the public and look out for individuals loitering with no clear sense of purpose or individuals attempting to avoid staff interaction.

While dedicated security patrols are ideal, resources may not always permit this. Therefore, security checks can be shared between staff and incorporated into their daily duties. For example:

• by those monitoring bus stands as part of their customer service and safety duties
• by cleaners as part of their routine duties
• by ticketing or sales staff present in the ticket halls or on concourse areas

Staff are familiar with their own particular work environments so are well placed to spot anything out of the ordinary.

Tenant organisations (such as newsagents or cafes) should also be involved. This can help ensure that all parts of the bus or coach station security check area is fully covered and that effective lines of communication are established between tenants and the bus station itself.

The following steps will support effective security checks.

Define the area

Staff designated to undertake a check should be sufficiently briefed and aware of what is required. Asking someone to ‘check the station’ is not sufficiently detailed – a start / finish point and boundaries need to be established.

Plan the patrol

The process can be simplified if laminated plans or accessible electronic records of areas to be checked are produced. The plans do not need to be particularly detailed, but should highlight key features of the areas (such as toilets and emergency exits) to be covered.

Thoroughness

Checks need to be sufficiently thorough to detect any unattended or concealed items. Staff should pay particular attention to areas that are not in clear public view, such as low roofs, emergency exits, toilets etc. Any areas beyond doors that are found to be unlocked should be checked before they are secured.

Sealing

Any locations (for example, stores) not in regular use should be checked to ensure they are securely locked with a key. Where this is not possible, tamper evident seals are a good option. This will eliminate the need to check inside such boxes or cupboards unless the seal is no longer intact.

Proportionality

It is not necessary to lift drains or the covers to other utilities, unscrew access panels or search areas where access is not possible.

Suspicious items

Suspicious items are items which are deemed suspicious in accordance with the HOT protocol and are reasonably suspected to present a risk to life, often through the potential concealment of an IED or other hazardous substance. The item may be hidden from view, have visual clues suggesting it may be hazardous, or be found after a suspicious event. Consider what is normal for the location /situation.

The National Protective Security Authority (NPSA) has further information about explosive devices and concealment in their Recognising Terrorist Threats Guide.

If an unattended item is found, whether as part of a security patrol or in the course of staff carrying out other duties, it is important that there are established procedures to follow, for example, the HOT protocol.  

Unusual activity

Bus and coach stations are often busy public locations with a high volume of people transiting through them each day, making them priority targets for malicious actors like terrorists. Procedures for staff to report any unusual activity to supervisors (and when necessary, the police) should be developed and briefed to all staff, with all reports being assessed and acted upon if necessary. Any concerns reported by staff or the travelling public should be taken seriously and supervisors or managers should establish:

• when the person was seen displaying the behaviour – for example, are they threatening passengers now, or did they board a service 5 minutes ago
• whether there was any time lapse between witnessing the behaviour and it being reported

Every effort should be made to obtain full details from the witness – especially immediate contact details so that the police are able to contact them directly if required.

Station facilities

Waste management

Litter bins provide an easy and convenient method of concealment for an IED and have been used to do so in previous attacks. Certain types of receptacles, such as those made of metal, concrete or plastic, pose a greater risk as they can add to blast fragmentation, which can cause serious injury and structural damage.

It is recommended that the design of the bin should consist of a clear plastic sack suspended from a metal hoop sack holder with integral bungee strap(s) to secure the plastic sack. Tinted sacks are acceptable, provided the colour does not obstruct easy viewing of the contents.

They should not have a lid, unless rubberised. The hoops should be attached to concrete or brick walls, or a wooden or single section steel or stainless-steel metal post. Consideration should be given to covering bins by CCTV so that anyone placing an item in the bin could be clearly identified. Recent design work has been done in this area for equipping railway stations.

Small receptacles, for example, for used tickets, cigarettes, chewing gum may be provided so long as any opening is only as large as is needed to put the intended item in.

Recommended Dos and Don’ts for the control of waste

Do

• check empty bins regularly
• place bins near staffed positions where possible, for deterrent value and to ensure they do not become over-full
• keep the number of bins to the lowest practicable level and monitor usage to identify those not necessary to requirements

Don’t

• allow litter bins to overflow – ideally, they should be emptied when no more than half full
• place litter bins near control rooms, evacuation routes, sources of possible fragmentation, such as overhead glass canopies, windows, mirrors, fire hydrants or electrical equipment etc

Large bulk rubbish containers (including wheelie bins, compactors and skips) should be kept in secure non-public areas where possible. However, if they are to be located in public areas, like carparks or adjacent to entrances, they should be emptied, checked regularly and be capable of being locked and kept locked and covered by CCTV.

Equipment boxes

It is recommended that all equipment boxes, such as sand and grit bins, fire extinguisher boxes and first aid equipment, are all kept shut and secured to prevent anything from being concealed inside. These equipment boxes can be secured by using a tamper evident seal (for example, plastic or wire seals, stickers) that can be easily broken in the event of an emergency. Any broken seals will be of interest to a security patrol.  

Public toilets and facilities

When public toilets are checked at a station, particular attention should be paid to potential areas of concealment (such as exposed cisterns). Where old style cisterns are used, a tamper evident seal should be placed onto the cistern. If refurbishment of a public toilet facility is being considered, designs that reduce or eliminate areas of concealment are preferred.

Sanitary waste receptacles and receptacles for baby changing should be a purpose designed product and should ideally have a restricted aperture and be as small as practically possible. They should be checked and emptied regularly.

Bicycle and e-scooter parking areas

Bicycles and e-scooters should be stored appropriately at bus and coach stations to minimise security risks and prevent hazards for staff and the public.

If possible, you should locate a bicycle or e-scooter park in a well-lit space with passing pedestrian traffic. This will not only help to deter the concealment of items, but also reduce crimes such as theft.

It is good practice to avoid placing bicycle racks directly:

• opposite station entrances, exits or evacuation routes
• next to large windows

Derelict and abandoned bicycles should be removed promptly once adequate notice of removal has been given.

Bicycle lockers (whether for storage or for bicycle hire) also bring associated security risks. As with bicycle racks, positioning can minimise those risks. Lockers should be secured with a padlock and key, or any other equivalent measure designed to prevent unauthorised access. Consideration should be given to how the police will be given access to check lockers at short notice in the event of a security incident or alert.

Risk of battery fires

There has been evidence of e-bicycle and e-scooter batteries malfunctioning and catching fire, so it is important that any e-bikes or e-scooters are stored correctly and safely.

Read separate guidance on e-cycle and e-scooter batteries: managing fire risk for public transport operators – GOV.UK.

Post boxes, self-service storage lockers, and staffed left-luggage facilities

Post boxes

Any post boxes located at a station should be kept locked or otherwise securely closed, apart from any opening used for the posting of letters. They should only be opened by a person authorised to collect the contents of the box.

Self-service storage lockers

The provision of lockers for public use at bus and coach stations may be undertaken by a bus or coach station for several reasons, including for:

• internet purchases (click and collect)
• luggage storage
• mobile device charging facilities

Controls on their location and arrangements for their security management should be put in place.

When planning locker security, factors to consider include placing them in less crowded areas of stations and ensuring they are covered by CCTV for effective monitoring during security incidents. Additionally, arrangements should be in place for staff or police, via the locker provider, to access and inspect the lockers if necessary, for instance, in response to a bomb threat.

Self-service lockers should, whenever possible, avoid flat tops, which could provide a space to leave unattended items or be of such a design that they can be quickly and easily checked by staff.

Staffed left-luggage facilities

At staffed left-luggage facilities, operators may wish to consider only accepting bags for deposit from genuine passengers (as a minimum, those capable of presenting a valid ticket as evidence of travel). Luggage should only be accepted on the condition that the owner agrees to the item being searched or X-ray screened as deemed appropriate by the operator. A record should be kept of the left luggage dealt with in this way.

We recommend that searching be carried out by hand, searching items of luggage and their contents, or screened by using X-ray equipment, if it is available. A standard test piece (available from X-ray machine manufacturers) determines whether an X-ray machine meets the standards in terms of image quality and will help to ensure that performance is maintained. Where it is used, X-ray equipment should be checked regularly to ensure that it is operating correctly and be maintained in accordance with the manufacturer’s recommendations. Operators of X-ray equipment should be trained to the appropriate standard.

Read NPSA guidance on search and screening – explosives, weapons and CBRN detection.

Left-luggage facility operators should encourage their staff to pay particular attention to any bags that appear to be suspicious or are handled in such a way as to raise suspicion. Where a customer refuses permission to search and screen their items, staff should not accept them and should consider notifying their local police force.  

Car parks

Public car parks adjacent to bus and coach stations should, where possible, be monitored to ensure that vehicles near to buildings are not left for longer than authorised. If on-road car parking is available near station entrances or other passenger facilities, a procedure for dealing with suspicious vehicles should be agreed with the local police force. If car parks are owned and operated by the bus company, then the use of ANPR (automatic number plate recognition) and/or CCTV is recommended and should be aided by security lighting.

Evacuation planning

If a security incident warranted it, an evacuation of bus and coach premises might be deemed necessary. While employees will know the evacuation routes to take and the location of assembly areas through their induction training, the travelling public, on the other hand, will need to be assisted off the premises and moved away from the buildings. This will require staff members to be briefed on this important function.

Such evacuation plans will need to be regularly rehearsed and require regular training, good communications amongst staff members supervising the evacuation, a capable control room and, crucially and effective announcement system. The public will look to staff members to lead them in an incident and operators must ensure that their staff members can do so.

The NPSA has produced guidance on this and other areas where staff members will be expected to assist the public in staying safe.

Possible use of third-party security contractors

The use of third-party contractors to provide security services (for example, patrolling, X-ray screening in left luggage facilities, securing car parking facilities) could be a useful solution when specific skills and experience are required and/or staffing resources do not allow for the security work to be effectively resourced by the bus or coach company themselves. Procuring third-party security contracts does involve considerable work and a detailed cost/benefit analysis should be undertaken before any contract is signed.

Read NPSA guidance on procurement.

If third-party contractors are sought, the Security Industry Association can advise on best practice for procurement of these services, but the process should consider the following points:

• appointing a senior manager to oversee the contract over its whole life
• defining the requirement and documenting evidence to support your decisions
• establishing key performance indicators (KPI) for the security function and the minimum levels of training required for the security staff
• negotiating the cost with the chosen supplier
• regularly monitoring KPIs with the contractor during the life of the contract
• taking remedial action promptly when required to ensure the contract delivers all the benefits that are sought – do not let poor KPI scores become the norm

Vehicle and depot security

Checking vehicles

Drivers should visually check inside their vehicle to ensure that nothing has been concealed or left behind:

• at the start and end of a route
• when they hand over
• before the next journey

Checks should include areas underneath seats and any storage areas (for pushchairs and bags etc) within the vehicle.

Coach drivers or other coach crew should also ensure that luggage holds, other storage compartments, overhead luggage shelves and toilets are included as part of the vehicle visual checks. These visual checks should only take a few minutes to complete. It may be useful to create a printed checklist for staff to complete when conducting visual checks on vehicles.  

Should drivers find an unattended item, whether as part of a security check or during their duties, it is important that they know what to do. Procedures like the HOT protocol are a useful tool, but may not be suitable for all environments. Where this is the case, operators are encouraged to have discussions with their local police force to establish a system to enable unattended items to be reported and dealt with appropriately by their staff.

Securing vehicles

Drivers should ensure that all doors, windows and baggage holds are closed and locked whenever vehicles are left unattended, such as:

• at the start and end of a journey
• during a comfort break
• whilst parked up at termini, depots or stations

This is to protect against someone entering the vehicle and leaving an IED on board or taking the vehicle and potentially using it as a weapon.

Measures to prevent vehicles being taken by terrorists and used as a weapon include:

• vehicles never being left unattended at the roadside with the ignition running
• ignition keys never being left in the vehicle when the driver is not present
• considering alternative security measures, involving 2 separate stages for vehicles not requiring an ignition key -putting in place security measures at bus and coach stations to prevent unauthorised access to vehicles
• drivers and bus and coach operators reporting any concerns about suspicious activity that occurs on or close to their vehicle

NaCTSO and NPSA have developed guidance on ways to minimise the risk from VAW attacks. Where permanent physical security measures are being considered to mitigate this type of attack, known as hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM), bus and coach operators should seek specialist advice from CTSAs within their local police force area.

Control of passengers boarding and leaving

Buses

Passengers should only be permitted to board buses and coaches when the driver is present and after a vehicle security check has been completed.

Coaches

On scheduled services where tickets are issued, coach drivers should ensure that all passengers present a valid ticket before they board. If the driver is responsible for loading the luggage, passengers should not be permitted to board until loading has been completed. If a coach makes a stop en route (for example, at a service station), the driver should satisfy themself that the correct passengers are re-boarding, perhaps by asking them to re-present their tickets. These measures will help increase security and reassure passengers.

Luggage reconciliation on coaches

Coach drivers, or any other member of the coach crew, where possible, should be responsible for loading and unloading all items of passenger baggage. Procedures should be developed to minimise the risk of someone placing an item in the baggage hold without boarding the coach, or of a disembarking passenger leaving baggage behind.

Reconciling passengers and luggage should:

• act as a deterrent to those seeking to conduct criminal activity, including acts of terrorism
• give the coach crew an opportunity to visually check baggage on loading and identify any unusual activity – special attention should be paid to any luggage that appears suspicious or is handled by the passenger in such a way as to raise suspicion
• reassure passengers that the coach operator has appropriate security measures in place
• minimise the risk of baggage items being left behind and any associated security implications and delays this may cause

As with all suspicious activity, when staff encounter it, they should know what action to take and how to report it. This is even more important when a vehicle is operating away from the premises where support from other members of staff is limited or unavailable.  

Security awareness messages for passengers

Security awareness messages are very useful in promoting vigilance and providing reassurance to passengers. Security posters can be displayed inside vehicles, reminding passengers of key security messages and developing relationships with local policing teams (crime prevention officers and CTSAs) will help to promote current security messaging. Where buses and coaches are fitted with electronic messaging, TV screens and public address systems, these can also be used to disseminate security messages.

CCTV on vehicles and drivers wearing body-worn cameras

CCTV has useful deterrence and investigative value. If CCTV has been fitted at least one camera should provide identifiable quality images of everyone entering the vehicle (a clear image of the face plus characteristics of clothing, items carried etc.) ‘Live view’ is a useful facility but will inevitably cost more than a system that just records images for later analysis.

For further information on CCTV recommendations, see the section of this guidance on station, terminus and interchange security. 

The Information Commissioner’s Office has produced guidance on the use of body-worn video.

The ability of drivers to recognise and report suspicious behaviours is a real asset in the fight against crime and terrorism (the free on-line ACT and SCaN packages available on Protect UK will support this) but the ability to record incidents, either by the use of on-board CCTV or body-worn cameras will not only reassure the public and staff members but also assist the police in solving crimes and preventing future incidents. Strict protocols on how these types of devices are used should be developed by the bus and coach operator before they are deployed.

Evacuation of vehicles

The situation may arise where a rapid evacuation of passengers from a bus or coach is required. Obviously, this will involve a dynamic risk assessment by the driver at the time of the incident. The training, in the form of recommended procedures, given to drivers during their induction period, is useful because it makes the driver aware of how to handle a difficult and challenging situation.

The procedure for the rapid evacuation of vehicles is dependent on the type of vehicle in use, and to some extent, the route the vehicles might take – for example, an urban or rural environment. It is expected, therefore, that bus companies will develop their own evacuation protocols to suit their own particular needs.

Once senior management has developed a rapid evacuation procedure for a specific vehicle or route, drivers assigned to that vehicle or route should be given adequate time to familiarise themselves with the procedure and practise it before it is officially implemented.

The difficulty of quickly evacuating passengers into a street busy with traffic should not be underestimated. For this reason, the procedure should be briefed and exercised by all drivers at regular intervals. The overriding factor is that staff and passengers are kept as safe as possible at all times.

See an example of a vehicle evacuation procedure with actions for the driver.

Disposal of vehicles

Prior to disposal or sale to third parties, it is recommended that vehicles have internal and external livery, legal lettering and the licence disc removed, along with destination blinds and other equipment (for example, radio and access control systems) to avoid potential use by others for malicious purposes. The proper disposal of vehicles has implications not only for security but also for corporate reputation.

Vehicle depots

All sites where buses or coaches are parked when not in service should be subject to a minimum of security controls. This can include:

• physical access barriers around the site, such as walls and fences, which should be in good repair
• access control measures at all entrances to prevent unauthorised access
• measures to protect buses and coaches within the site – locking vehicles, regular patrols, or CCTV cameras with live monitoring to detect any unauthorised access

Any vehicle within the depot should have been checked to ensure that nothing suspicious has been concealed inside. Such vehicle checks may be carried out by drivers at the end of their shift or by cleaners who have received basic instruction in what to look for and have undergone appropriate security vetting. A record should be kept of the checks carried out on each vehicle.

Building and sustaining a security culture within a transport company

Establishing a cost-effective security regime will generally involve a combination of:

• physical and procedural measures – for example, searching, physical barriers and patrolling
• secondary measures – for example, emergency planning, background checks, briefing and training

Building a multilayered approach to security is more robust, as no single measure will be able to mitigate every type of threat.

Read NPSA guidance on creating a strong security culture

A good security culture will be overseen by a senior member of staff and actively supported by all the organisation’s managers and supervisors. The procedural measures should apply to all members of staff – ‘leading by example’ should be seen as an important aspect of building and sustaining a security culture.  

As with all management processes, a security regime needs to be monitored, and poor performance needs to be addressed rapidly. Establishing a number of critical key performance indicators (KPIs) for the security function would help to do this.

The process of developing a security culture should start with a risk assessment conducted by senior managers.

Read ProtectUK guidance on developing a risk management system.

A risk assessment need not be a long and laborious process. It should be a careful examination of what, in the environment the organisation operates in, could cause harm to staff, passengers and the business itself as a viable and thriving company. This will enable the management team to weigh up whether enough precautionary measures have been taken in order to prevent harm.

Information about potential risks can be obtained by reviewing the current threat level, liaising with the local police force and reviewing the company’s own statistics (incident logs, driver reports, etc). The aim is to build a picture of what the potential risks are and then develop a plan to mitigate those risks. A risk assessment should be reviewed whenever the operating circumstances of the organisation change significantly.

After conducting a risk assessment, work through the actions that need to be taken in order to address the risks that have been identified. The security plan need not be a long document, but it should, as a minimum, identify:

• key staff members
• security procedures for staff to follow
• immediate actions to take after a security incident
• contact details for important outside agencies

It should be signed off and dated by the senior manager responsible for security.

Personnel security

Having good personnel security policies and procedures in place mitigates the risk of staff exploiting their legitimate access to an organisation’s assets for unauthorised and/or malicious purposes. When consistently applied, personnel security measures not only reduce operational vulnerabilities but also help build a security culture at every level of the organisation.

NPSA Personnel Security Maturity Model guidance is designed to specifically assess an organisation’s personnel security maturity.

Personnel security policies and processes refer to the measures taken to ensure that staff employed by the organisation never become a threat to the organisation itself. Sometimes called the ‘insider threat’, protecting the organisation starts with ensuring a robust recruitment process such that all the necessary pre-employment checks are undertaken.

Read NPSA guidance on employment screening.

When a staff member leaves the organisation, procedures should be in place to ensure staff passes are returned, if appropriate, passwords to IT systems are changed, access codes are changed and staff uniforms are returned.

During the period of employment, if a ‘whistleblowing’ process is in place, any concerns about an employee (for example, a change of mental state, reckless or unsafe behaviour) can be reported to senior managers in a safe and confidential manner. Bus and coach companies can contract third-party suppliers of this type of service, as well as other related staff welfare issues.

Protecting a company from an insider threat might also involve softer, more traditional management procedures such as regular staff appraisals, good internal communications and incentive schemes.

Bus station tenants (for example, cafes, newsagents, left luggage facilities) have their part to play in the security plan and should follow the same basic principles and guidelines that the bus and coach company does. Periodic meetings should take place with tenants to discuss security issues and to make them aware of the importance of vigilance, as well as being given details on incident reporting procedures - who to report to and what to report etc.

Tenants should also be aware of the need to protect their premises and, where appropriate, monitor and supervise any delivery vehicles. Cleaners should ensure that they lock cleaning cupboards when not in use and do not leave any cleaning equipment unattended.

Building good working relationships with tenants who understand the broader security picture is vital if a bus station is to be secure. The weak link in any security regime is often third-party contractors (for example, shops and cafes) who may be seen as the back door into an otherwise robust setting.

Similarly, contractors who are only present for a very short period of time (for example, plumbers, electricians, delivery drivers) all have access to the site and can therefore inadvertently weaken the security regime in place.

IT security

The importance of IT security (sometimes called cyber security) is becoming increasingly relevant to the whole of UK industry. There are now numerous examples of businesses being badly affected after a breach of their computer system. It can, of course, be a very technical subject to think through, but that does not stop a few basic precautions from greatly strengthening the resilience of a business’s computer network. Basic precautions are very much in reach of every UK business, no matter what sector they operate in.

The government’s National Cyber Security Centre (NCSC) provides free online training for industry and is a good starting point for initial training and gaining the skills to be able to review the resilience of a company’s IT system.

The starting point of good IT security establishes the ways in which staff interact with the company’s IT system – the use of a password, how often it should be changed, the types of websites that can be accessed, plugging in personal storage devices, etc. These simple procedures may keep a company safe from most cybercrimes. Unauthorised interaction with the computer system by a staff member should therefore be considered a breach of the security plan and dealt with accordingly.

Business continuity

Responding in the right way in the days and weeks after a security incident is vital if the bus or coach operator is not to lose significant business. Business continuity (BC) plans have long been used to set out in detail what a company’s response would be to a variety of incidents and situations, such as bad weather, fuel shortages or multiple vehicles being unavailable. But BC planning should be extended to work through the response to security incidents, both major and minor.

Testing and exercising

Testing and exercising allow companies and outside agencies to rehearse procedures for dealing with a security incident in a safe environment from which lessons can be drawn. The lessons learnt are used to update and improve the security plan.

Once a risk assessment has been completed and a security plan written up, a good security culture will periodically test the procedures in place. Think of the fire drill that all companies regularly run to test the alarm signal, the evacuation process, the response of key individuals such as fire wardens and to highlight any problems that may arise, which are then reviewed and alterations made to the existing fire plan.

Exactly the same process should apply to security plans and while testing need not be every month, it should be regular and should be followed by a review of what went right and what went wrong.

Exercising a security plan might involve a management team planning an incident that features in the risk assessment and working through all aspects of the response within a realistic timeframe.

A particular feature of exercising security plans is testing communications ‘under stress’ across the management chain, between members of staff managing the incident on the ground and with outside agencies who would be involved in a real security incident (for example, fire, police or ambulance services).  

An exercise should have an element of realism and might therefore alarm members of the public. For this reason, it may be deemed preferable to alert key staff members in advance that an exercise is taking place in order not to spread alarm and confusion amongst the travelling public.  

Volunteering to assist the emergency services in exercising their plans and procedures is an excellent way for a company to experience well organised exercises that test the full range of responses and communication channels. Assistance to the emergency services might involve the use of premises, vehicles or participation of members of staff.

Company safeguarding policy

A safeguarding policy is a documented policy that sets out how a company looks after the young and the vulnerable when they are either on their vehicles or inside one of their bus stations. It is an element of security that might not immediately come to mind when conducting a risk assessment. But if there are large numbers of school children using particular service routes or frequenting bus stops, they represent an identifiable security risk that the company needs to factor into their security plan.

If the young and the vulnerable represent a significant percentage of a company’s customer base, it would be advisable to appoint a safeguarding officer. They would oversee the implementation of the safeguarding policy and liaise with police and, for example, school authorities when appropriate or necessary to do so.

Cross-border operations

Cross-border operations are undertaken by a variety of operators, both long-distance coaching lines and coach companies, either carrying private hire parties or running their own excursions to overseas holiday destinations. Over and above the risks already discussed in this guidance, 3 specific risks to coach companies apply to overseas operations.

1. Clandestine immigration

The primary risk to overseas operations is from clandestine immigration from overseas to the UK. This can be facilitated by falsified passports, visas or travel documentation. It can also cause a problem of stowaways in the vehicle – luggage compartments, underneath the vehicle, engine bays or auxiliary luggage trailers. This highlights the importance of regular vehicle checks to look for any evidence of tampering with locks or external access points.

There is a clandestine entry civil penalties scheme to sanction both drivers and operators who unwittingly allow clandestine immigration into the UK.

2. Importing prohibited items

A secondary risk to overseas operations comes in the form of the importation of prohibited items. The UK Border Force has established a list of prohibited items that cannot be imported into the UK.

Attempts to bring back these types of items into the UK can often be defeated by the travelling group (for example, a school party) being properly briefed on what is and what is not legal to import. When a booking is made with a school group travelling overseas, reference to the UKBF’s list could be made, such that the responsibility to check for such items clearly resides with the group’s leaders.

More serious types of contraband (for example, firearms or drugs) will be the responsibility of UKBF officials to detect and deal with as the vehicle passes through the UK customs control point. This is achieved through a combination of sophisticated screening techniques, targeted intelligence and the experience and skills of customs officers.

3. Clandestine exit from the UK

A third risk to overseas operations exists but is often overlooked by coach companies, perhaps because it is the most unexpected – clandestine travel from the UK to overseas locations. The existence of this threat highlights the need in all cross-border operations for meticulous control of a passenger’s documentation (passports, visas and travel documents).

The See, Check and Notify course produced by NaCTSO can help to improve the skills of a coach company in this area. It also points towards all drivers being well briefed in how and where to report suspicious activity.

Planning for safe and secure overseas operations

Overseas trips can best be broken down into 3 distinct phases, with each phase planned for in order to maximise the likelihood of an uneventful and profitable journey for the coach company.

Phase 1 – Pre-departure from the UK

Join the accreditation scheme for the Clandestine entrant civil penalties scheme.

Ensure the driver receives a briefing on current threats, the importance of daily vehicle checks and recommended actions for the driver on discovering:

• clandestine immigrant(s)
• prohibited item(s)

Review the company’s incident log for any recent events and consider any developing trends.

Issue contact numbers for key staff members that can be used at critical times of the journey (for example, time of boarding the ferry on the return leg).

Issue Port Safe contact details and reporting procedures.

Phase 2 – Journey

Ensure vehicle security checks are carried out at the start of each day and immediately prior to boarding the ferry on the return leg.

Take a headcount of every passenger after every rest break.

If a clandestine entrant is discovered, ensure the safety of passengers and staff before alerting the authorities and then alerting the company’s management of the situation.

If prohibited items are discovered or suspected, use the Port Safe reporting line to alert the authorities.

Consider the use of third-party security checks before boarding the ferry for the return leg of the journey.

Plan the route and timings of the return leg so that the vehicle does not stop for at least the last 75km before arrival inside the secure zone of the port.

Phase 3 – Post-arrival in the UK

Ask the driver to fill out the incident log if appropriate and ensure that any incidents are reviewed by management.

Search the coach for any rubbish or discarded items that might be suspicious in nature (for example, discarded travel documents) and, if appropriate, report the findings to the police.

Regular long distance coaching lines might be targeted for clandestine immigration or smuggling on a more frequent basis. But they can establish procedures and practices in a more systematic way than companies that only conduct occasional trips abroad.

The UK has a long-standing agreement with the Irish Republic and the Crown Dependencies of the Isle of Man, Guernsey and Jersey called the Common Travel Area (CTA). It allows for nationals of these territories to travel between them without the use of a passport.

While this concession is well established and provides much-appreciated freedom of movement between participating nations, it can, under certain circumstances, be exploited and provide a loophole through which clandestine entrants can benefit. The need for coach companies to strictly control travel documentation when travelling overseas and to report any suspicious behaviour is a key requirement and this is particularly so when operating coaching lines within the CTA.

Private hire coach trips abroad can be a big selling point for coach companies. To some extent, because they are a ‘closed group’, looking after their safety and security is a relatively easy task. This task can be aided still further by asking for a member of the group to act as a ‘liaison person’ between the driver and the passengers to ensure that appropriate security messages are passed on to all passengers.

Training and exercising

Security training should be given to all staff (for example, drivers, cleaners, security staff) upon commencement of employment, and refresher training given at regular intervals throughout employment. Security training of some description is the key building block in developing a good security culture across the company.  

Training records

Where bus and coach staff are given specific training, it is strongly recommended that operators maintain training records, which include the:

• date that each member of staff took up a security related post
• initial and refresher training given to each member of staff
• date or dates on which security training was given
• signature of each member of staff to confirm that they received the training - ensure that these records are retained in line with data protection regulations

If a security incident were to occur, a review of training logs can be very useful in determining where the gap in staff knowledge has occurred. It can also lead to a greater understanding on the part of management as to what is required to avoid similar incidents in the future.

Increased threat level security enhancements

Security enhancements that could be introduced at times of an increased threat level – as and when communicated by the police and security services.

Station, terminus and interchange security

Carry out more frequent and thorough security checks of public areas in a station, termini or interchange.

Remove litter bins or increase the frequency of bin checks.

Close bicycle parking facilities within the station area, or request that panniers are removed before bicycles are left.

Introduce or increase the frequency of passenger security announcements and display posters.

All staff on duty in public areas are to wear hi-vis jackets or company tabards.

Withdraw left-luggage or self-service lockers from use or increase the amount of screening on left luggage.

Deliveries to be by prior appointment only. Details of supplier, vehicle and driver to be checked and recorded on arrival.

Fully brief staff on the importance of vigilance and remind them how to report any concerns.

Escort all unexpected visitors whilst on site.

Vehicle and depot security

Increase frequency of security checks on board buses and coaches.

Tighten security controls of boarding passengers and luggage reconciliation on long-distance coaches.

Increase the frequency of security announcements to passengers and display security posters.

Deploy revenue control officers and other bus and coach staff to travel on the network, wearing hi-vis jackets.

Require all visitors to report to the depot manager or other responsible person on arrival.

Secure buses and coaches when they are not subject to maintenance work.

Deliveries to be by prior appointment only. Details of supplier, vehicle and driver to be checked and recorded on arrival.

Brief staff on the importance of vigilance and remind them how to report any concerns.

Organisation and personnel security

Review the risk assessment and security plan and ensure that all staff are briefed and aware of their roles and responsibilities.

Introduce daily security briefings for key staff to ensure they are aware of any changes to the threat picture.

Display security posters in staff areas, reminding staff to close internal doors, lock equipment away and be vigilant and report any unusual behaviour.

Remind staff to never put themselves at risk.

Brief staff on the importance of vigilance and remind them how to report any concerns.

Cross-border operations

Consider suspending some cross-border operations or cancelling planned trips if the situation warrants it.

Consider the use of third-party vehicle screening services in the approach to overseas ports.

On overseas trips, transporting school children or vulnerable adults, consider increasing the number of adult supervisors you would normally require per trip.

Ensure that up-to-date information for out-of-hours contacts is carried by the driver.

ProtectUK guidance

The ProtectUK website has a menu of tactical options that can be referred to as threat levels increase.

Although not applicable to all industries, they do give an overview of what might be suitable for certain situations that may be unfamiliar to a bus or coach company.

Reporting a crime or incident  

In an emergency, or if you need urgent police assistance, you should always dial 999. 

You can also report incidents to the police online.

Or you can contact Crimestoppers by calling 0800 555 111 if you want to remain anonymous.

If you have seen or heard something that could potentially be related to terrorism, trust your instincts and report suspicious activity online.

If you want to talk to your local police, get crime prevention advice, or report a crime that does not need urgent assistance, call 101.

Rapid evacuation from vehicles

An example of a vehicle evacuation procedure based on Confederation of Passenger Transport (CPT) guidance.

Actions for the driver if you need to quickly evacuate a vehicle

Assess reports from passengers and others. For example, where a passenger reports seeing or smelling smoke. 

Identify vehicle warnings and alarms. 

Stop the vehicle in the safest possible place. For example, in a layby or hard shoulder. Try to stop the vehicle away from:

• hazardous infrastructure like petrol stations or tankers
• buildings
• street furniture
• busy junctions
• schools
• tunnels

Apply the handbrake, put the vehicle into neutral, activate the hazard warning lights.

Isolate the battery and fuel if you can.  

Open the vehicle doors when safe to do so. 

Once stopped, the priority is to get the passengers off the vehicle and to a safe place. This should be at least 20 metres from the vehicle and not downwind of a fire.

You should make a loud announcement to tell passengers that they need to leave the vehicle. You should provide assistance to less able-bodied passengers. You could take the fire extinguisher with you to assist in keeping yourself and passengers safe. 

If you need to check the upper deck of a vehicle, ensure that someone else at the scene is informed before you do so. 

Contact the emergency services, providing details of the incident and the location of the vehicle.

For rural locations, it could be useful to use What3Words app to report where you are.

You should have a telephone number for the company control room or a relevant company officer to report the incident. You should not remain in the vehicle to use any radio equipment. 

Do not open any covers or flaps if there might be a fire behind them.

If in doubt, stay out of the vehicle and confer with the fire brigade. 

After evacuation is complete, do not return to the vehicle unless directed to do so by the fire brigade

Contact information

Contact DfT’s Land Transport National Security Division for further enquiries on bus and coach security at roadtransportsecurity@dft.gov.uk.