Independent report

Building Control Independent Panel report

Published 20 May 2026

Applies to England

A note on acronyms

To ensure consistency across the report, the following terminology is used throughout:

• LA BCAs: Local Authority Building Control Authorities (used to describe the building control functions delivered by local authorities).
• RBCAs: Registered Building Control Approvers (used to describe private sector building control companies).
• BCBs: Building Control Bodies (used to describe the proposed new consolidated bodies in the future model developed by the Panel).

These distinguish between public‑sector building control functions in local authorities, private‑sector providers, and the future consolidated building control bodies proposed in this report.

Chair foreword

In March 2025, the Building Control Independent Panel began our work to consider the future of the building control system in England. This government established the panel in response to a recommendation of the Grenfell Tower Inquiry. As Chair I was tasked to review with the panel the Inquiry findings for the delivery of building control functions for most building work in England.

Our work having now concluded, I am sending this report to government outlining our findings, the evidence we have seen and heard, and our recommendations to make significant improvements to the building control system in England. Our work has taken account of interdependent workstreams within MHCLG related to the Grenfell Inquiry report, work underway in the Building Safety Regulator and plans for a strategy for the built environment professions, trades and occupations in 2027.

What we have seen within the building control profession is a workforce of skilled, knowledgeable and deeply committed people. Many have decades of experience and are driven by a strong public interest ethos. It is equally clear that they are being let down by a system that is fragmented, inconsistent and too often unable to support them to do the job the public needs. Good people cannot compensate indefinitely for a system that places them under conflicting pressures, resource constraints and unmanageable workloads. This reality must inform any credible path forward.

The panel has examined what has changed since 2017 and the implementation of the Building Safety Act 2022. There has been real progress. Registration of building control professionals, new functions within the Building Safety Regulator and improvements in the higher risk regime are important steps in the right direction. But these measures sit within a wider system that still contains inherent weaknesses particularly the way in which duties, commercial incentives and regulatory oversight are structured for most building work. Oversight for most building work is driven by choice rather than the risk of harm or complexity, which conflicts with the performance of the building control function.

In reviewing the Terms of Reference, the panel focused on the two central questions arising from the Inquiry:

• whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process; and
• whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority

The panel’s conclusion is that the current arrangements cannot deliver the assurance, consistency and conflict free oversight that the public deserves to ensure their health and safety. Many of the issues we have identified are structural and will persist without decisive action. If we were designing a system from first principles, we would not create one that allows dutyholders to choose their own regulator. Our recommendations set out how government could transition toward a model that removes this conflict of interest and creates clearer lines of accountability.

We recognise that these are significant reforms, and that achieving them will require both political commitment and careful sequencing. In the near term, steps can be taken to reduce the impacts of conflicts of interest, to support the workforce and to strengthen oversight. Over the longer term, we envisage the move to fewer, more resilient building control bodies with statutory responsibilities, overseen by the emerging Single Construction Regulator. Such a model offers the best opportunity to build capacity, pool expertise and create the clarity that is needed for consistent inspection, enforcement and decision making.

This report does not suggest that work should pause while changes are made. On the contrary, it builds on improvements already underway and highlights further actions to stabilise the system now while preparing for a more coherent model in the future.

My thanks go to the members of the panel, the secretariat team in MHCLG and BSR, and to the professionals, representative organisations, and Registered Building Inspectors who contributed their evidence and insight. Above all I want to recognise the commitment of building control inspectors as a profession across England, whose efforts to uphold standards in difficult circumstances deserve both recognition and a system that enables them to succeed.

Dame Judith Hackitt
Chair, Building Control Independent Panel

1. Executive summary

The building control system in England should perform a vital public safety role in ensuring building work is safe and carried out in compliance with the building regulations. As currently set up the panel consider it cannot provide reassurance that this public safety role is being met consistently, with associated risks to health and safety and the potential for substantial future remediation costs.

The public sector system of building control has been progressively neglected, with LA BCAs unable to sustain the level of advice, oversight and enforcement expected of them for all building work on a consistent basis. The pressure on LA BCAs in certain areas of England to operate a commercial, client-based function has exacerbated a conflict of interest with their wider legal obligations to the public.

The private market has expanded to fill public sector capacity gaps, but with no corresponding public duty to enforce against poor quality building work. This has created an uneven and fragile landscape, with LA BCAs not consistently able to meet their statutory obligations to provide compliance advice and follow that up with risk-based inspections and take early enforcement action where necessary.

Within LA BCAs, there is an inherent conflict of interest, as found by the Inquiry in relation to the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), with the local authority leading large-scale public-sector building and renovation projects, while also acting as the building control and enforcement body. As was seen with the Grenfell Tower tragedy, if the building control service within an authority is not resourced or experienced enough, opportunities to step in and challenge proposals can be missed or advice ignored by the wider LA.

The system depends increasingly on individual professionalism to counter pressures created by the structure itself. This reliance is neither sustainable nor fair on the workforce. The consequence is a model that delivers variable outcomes and exposes the public to risks that are not always visible or consistently managed, even though many of those risks originate upstream in design and construction practices, not within building control itself.

The evidence points to persistent structural weaknesses, with fragmentation across approximately 300 LA BCAs and multiple private providers, alongside low capacity in the sector overall, particularly in LA BCAs, leading to rare and uneven enforcement. LA BCAs are not adequately resourced or incentivised to offer consistent advice, undertake enforcement and prosecute where necessary.

As there is no corresponding duty on the private sector to enforce, LA BCAs face further pressure from ‘reversions’, which is the statutory process by which building control responsibility returns to the local authority when an RBCA can no longer continue acting on a project. There is some evidence that this is driving poor behaviours in the private sector, with them taking on work that is initially undervalued and under inspected, sometimes due to pressures from clients and dutyholders. This has undermined financial resilience over time, leading to closures of RBCAs such as the Assent Group.

The panel’s view is that if we were designing a system from first principles, we would not introduce a system where dutyholders can choose their regulator. Our recommendation for the long-term building control model is for choice to be removed.

Recognising the reforms made since 2017, this report recommends dutyholders should continue, for now, to be able express a preference of building control provider, within a system where the legal obligations currently with LA-BCAs are taken independently of the LA. In this system the mixed public–private nature of building control in England can and should remain. Both local authorities and private providers can continue to offer client facing services, drawing on the strengths and experience that already exist.

This report sets out an end state model for building control. A single, coherent regulatory system that provides independent, consistent oversight for building work in England, and prioritises the public interest. In this model, statutory building control functions are delivered by fewer, larger, publicly accountable ‘Building Control Bodies’ (BCBs), operating at a scale that sustains specialist expertise, offers attractive and stable career pathways, enforcing and inspecting work consistently.

Recognising that this end state will take time to deliver, the report sets out steps that should be taken earlier, to strengthen the current system while laying the groundwork for long term reform. The panel consider these steps will help reduce pressures in the system, make better use of existing capacity, and create the conditions for further consolidation to proceed smoothly. These include:

• levelling the regulatory environment between public and private providers
• improving guidance and public information so dutyholders understand their responsibilities
• supporting LA BCAs and RBCAs to stabilise workforce capacity;
• establish a strong digital system underpinning building control in England. Improving transparency, data quality and performance oversight

The transition will require careful sequencing and sustained political commitment over several years. It must also be managed in a way that does not destabilise a system already under pressure, particularly as the country faces the challenge of delivering 1.5 million new homes while maintaining public confidence in their safety. Lessons from the establishment of the Building Safety Regulator underline the importance of phasing change at a pace the system can absorb and ensuring that reforms strengthen, rather than stretch, the capacity of those delivering them.

We are mindful that our recommendations introduce further layers of oversight into the system. However, this is a broken system which leaves consumers at risk from buildings which have not been effectively regulated and Investors Insurers and Government at significant financial risk when problems are discovered. The cost of implementing these reforms must be weighed against the significant benefits which will result from greater assurance and increased public confidence in the system.

2. Background to the Report

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry identified weaknesses in the building control system in England. It found that ‘many of those involved in major construction projects, including clients, contractors and even architects, regarded building control primarily as a source of advice and assistance.’

The Inquiry concluded that one of the causes of this inappropriate relationship stemmed from ‘the introduction of commercial interests into the system.’ The Inquiry found that ‘Approved Inspectors (now RBCAs) had a commercial incentive to acquire and retain clients, creating a conflict with their role as guardians of the public interest. Competition for work between approved inspectors and local authority building control departments introduced a similar conflict of interest affecting them.’

The Inquiry recommended that government appoint an independent panel to consider whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be carried out by organisations with commercial interests, and whether, in the interests of professionalism and consistency, those functions should instead be delivered by a national authority.

In February 2025, the government accepted these recommendations and established the Building Control Independent Panel. Membership was published in April 2025, followed in June 2025 by the  Terms of Reference, which set out the scope and questions the Panel should address.  In July 2025, the Panel published an independent problem statement and a public call for evidence. The call for evidence, open for four weeks, invited responses on the structural issues raised by the Inquiry and on the scope set out in the Terms of Reference.

The evidence gathering phase included engagement with Grenfell United, MHCLG policy teams, the Building Safety Regulator, and representative organisations across the building control sector, including LABC, NHBC, ABCA and CABE. The Panel also undertook regional visits across England to meet Registered Building Inspectors, including areas operating shared service arrangements.

Between April 2025 and March 2026, the Panel met monthly to consider evidence, test emerging findings and develop recommendations against the requirements of the Terms of Reference. Throughout the review, the Panel was supported by a secretariat team within the Buildings, Fire and Resilience Group in MHCLG.

3. Background to the Current Model

The modern building control system in England was established by the Building Act 1984, which for the first time created a mixed public and private sector model for regulating building work. The Act enabled the Secretary of State to set mandatory Building Regulations for England and Wales, applied consistently across the country. It also placed a clear duty on LA BCAs to enforce compliance where breaches occurred.

A major change introduced by the Act was the decision to open building control to private sector competition. Approved Inspectors (now Registered Building Control Approvers) were permitted to carry out most building control functions operating under an Initial Notice submitted to the local authority. The intention was to improve efficiency and choice for dutyholders, while retaining LA BCAs as the statutory backstop with responsibility for enforcement.

In 1986, the National House Building Council (NHBC) was designated the first and (at that point) only approved inspector, making it the only entity authorised to carry out private building control alongside local authorities. Concerns grew from the industry that a monopoly was not appropriate and that there should be a more structured system to accredit other approved inspectors into the system. Government decided that there should be a single independent designated body for approving approved inspectors and a system was developed for an approval scheme, with the CIC Approved Inspector Register opening in 1997. After the 1997 system launch, additional Approved Inspectors were registered, allowing multiple private companies and professionals to operate alongside NHBC.

During the period that followed, the private market expanded and many dutyholders increasingly chose private providers for speed and commercial flexibility. LA BCAs continued to have functions to oversee dangerous structures, demolitions and enforcement, but increasing financial pressures and wider local government constraints made it increasingly difficult for many to maintain the scale and resilience of the statutory service. Over time, the landscape became uneven, with some areas maintaining strong public-sector capacity, while others relied more heavily on private provision.

A significant shift occurred during the 2012–2013 deregulatory reforms, when Government removed several of the statutory requirements for dutyholders to notify LA BCAs at key inspection stages.

Alongside these reforms, the building control landscape became more complex with the continued growth of Competent Person Schemes, enabling certain building work to be self-certified by registered tradespeople. While these schemes reduced pressure on building control services, they also increased the system’s reliance on external assurance mechanisms.

The Building Safety Act 2022 introduced the most substantial reforms since 1984. In response to the tragedy at Grenfell Tower, it created the Building Safety Regulator (BSR) and introduced a new regulatory regime for higher risk buildings, including Gateways, new dutyholder roles and mandatory registration for all building control professionals.

For HRBs, the BSR now acts as the building control authority. For most buildings, however, the mixed economy of local authorities and private providers remains, with dutyholders still able to choose their building control body.

Today’s system is therefore the product of a series of incremental changes layered onto the original 1984 framework:

• dual provision through LA BCAs and private Registered Building Control Approvers
• LA BCAs retaining enforcement powers for all building work in their area
• discretionary inspection practices following 2012/13 deregulation
• functional, outcomes-based regulations requiring strong professional judgement
• a growing reliance on industry self-certification through Competent Person Schemes

3.1 The role of building control

Building control is a vital public protection function. Its purpose is to provide regulatory oversight of building work, ensuring that construction in England meets the minimum standards set by the Building Regulations. It acts as a check on compliance, helping to prevent unsafe practices and reduce risks to life, property and the wider built environment.

What building control is responsible for:

• assessing applications and notices for building work against the requirements of the Building Regulations
• making proportionate decisions about compliance based on plans, evidence and professional judgement
• carrying out risk-based inspections to verify that work on site aligns with approved proposals
• identifying potential breaches and taking steps to secure compliance, including through enforcement where required
• issuing completion or final certificates having taken reasonable steps to satisfy themselves that work meets regulatory requirements
• acting as an independent regulator whose primary duty is to the public interest

What building control is not responsible for:

• guaranteeing the quality of all construction work or acting as a clerk of works
• identifying every error, defect or instance of poor workmanship on a site
• substituting for the legal responsibilities of dutyholders - clients, designers and contractors - who are responsible for compliance with the Building Regulations
• providing design solutions or taking on duties that fall within the competence of others in the construction process
• compensating for inadequate design, supervision, supply chain management or site level quality control

Over time, unrealistic expectations have been placed on all building control services. Many dutyholders see building control as the primary assurance mechanism in a process where accountability should sit firmly with clients, designers and contractors. This has fostered a culture in which:

• building control is blamed for failures that originated upstream
• inspectors are asked to correct problems outside their remit or power
• the system becomes overly reliant on individual professionalism rather than the consistency of the framework; and
• regulatory integrity is weakened by misunderstanding across the wider sector

For a modern building control system to function effectively, it must operate within a wider construction ecosystem where each actor understands their legal responsibilities and takes responsibility for their role in creating safe, high-performing buildings. Clearer boundaries around the role of building control, and better public and industry understanding of these boundaries, are essential to restoring confidence and ensuring that inspectors are empowered and enabled to act in the public interest.

4. A future Building Control System

The panel’s assessment is that the building control system for most building work in England cannot, in its present form, deliver the independent, consistent and proactive assurance of building safety and standards which the public expects.

The current model is fragmented across close to 250 LA BCAs and around 80 RBCAs, with the system underpinned by commercial competition and variable capacity. The purpose of this chapter is to set out the design principles and transition pathway for a future well-resourced, impartial building control system which capitalises on the good practice which exists both in public and private sector but that also applies standards rigorously, removes conflicts of interest, delivers safer buildings, and delivers a service that foremost protects the public interest.

4.1 Principles for reform – governance in the new system

The evidence the panel have seen and heard shows a system characterised by fragmentation, conflicting incentives and uneven statutory capacity. In some parts of England, LA BCA services have been reduced to the point that the statutory oversight function is not being met. In others, LAs have looked to opportunities offered by sharing services outside of normal practices.

In this current system both LA BCAs and RBCAs face commercial pressures from clients that incentivise the dilution of both the rigour of inspection and the willingness to escalate to enforcement. Oversight is too often contingent on local circumstance rather than national expectation, and the system relies excessively on the professionalism of individuals to counteract structural problems.

We consider government should establish a single regulatory system for non HRB work, led by the BSR and SCR in future, that sets standards, holds the data spine, and oversees performance. This should focus on statutory oversight and enforcement. This separation of roles should remove the structural conflicts identified by the Inquiry, enable targeted risk based national oversight, and creates a platform for consistent processes and transparent public reporting.

The future model must be built on 5 principles:

1. Independence in the public interest: regulatory decisions must be insulated from commercial incentives, whether building control is delivered in the public or private sector.
2. Consistency by design: similar work should receive similar oversight and enforcement wherever it occurs and whoever undertakes it.
3. Capability at scale: the model must sustain specialist competence, effective supervision and provide robust career pathways.
4. Transparency and data: a stronger digital backbone, underpinned by clear data standards, interoperability and visible accountability.
5. Efficiency and resilience: fewer, stronger statutory bodies that can plan, prioritise and intervene early.

4.2 National authority model

The Grenfell Tower Inquiry questioned whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process and asked whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority.

The Inquiry looked at the position leading to the fire with a recognition, as the final report developed, of the work underway to establish the Building Safety Regulator. The BSR having been established in 2022 represented a significant shift towards the more centralised model the Inquiry contemplated. The question the panel have considered is how the proposed Single Construction Regulator could provide broader national oversight under our new model proposed.

The Building Safety Regulator (BSR) leads on higher risk buildings, professional registration and oversight of the building control system. The panel have heard suggestions that there should be a split of decision functions from oversight, due to the conflicts of interest in a regulator also being a decision maker for certain buildings. We have also heard concerns that, due to the operational demands of the HRB function, the oversight function in the BSR is under increasing pressure.

The panel agrees that there is a potential for organisational conflict within the BSR, being both the decision maker for HRBs and oversight body. We note that MHCLG have already made moves to bring the BSR functions out of the HSE and more directly accountable to Ministers. In response to concerns about the conflicts and capacity of the regulator, we would encourage MHCLG to look at whether there may be benefits in splitting core functions in future, potentially through the creation of a ‘national building control body’, separating HRBs, and potentially other decisions, from oversight.

Under a model where a ‘national building control body’ is created, it could be tasked to take forward the decisions for HRBs, alongside any other decisions the Government decides should be taken centrally in the public interest. This would leave the SCR in future to concentrate solely on oversight, providing effective performance management. Our proposals for enforcement functions below are relevant in this regard, where we consider that function sits more naturally with oversight.

4.3 Removal of dutyholder choice

The panel considers that allowing dutyholders to choose their regulator is incompatible with impartial decision-making. The competitive dynamic risks driving down fees to a level not reflective of the resource needed to carry out the building control function effectively and therefore may incentivise lighter touch inspections. It also increases the risk of late reversions to local authorities. Although the BSA 2022 removed choice for HRBs, most work remains within a model that embeds the conflicts highlighted by the Inquiry.

We consider the long-term solution to these conflicts of interest is the removal of dutyholder choice from building control. Ideally, allocation of regulatory work should be determined independently, based on competence, capacity and risk, not choice of the dutyholder. This change will underpin independence, enable consistent inspection intensity, and simplify accountability for enforcement.

The panel recognises that this will take agreement, vision, capacity and legislation to achieve. It should be sequenced carefully to maintain system stability and to avoid disrupting the competent client facing services provided by both public and private sectors. Alongside steps recommended to level the playing field in the current system, the proposals that follow consider a model that enables duty holders to express a preference of building control provider but with the final decision on allocation held by BCBs to provide an independent approach to checks, risk-based inspections and enforcement.

4.4 Consolidated building control bodies

This report identifies a public sector function that is under pressure with some LA BCAs unable to maintain proactive oversight, pursue enforcement effectively, or absorb reversions from private providers.

Fragmentation across nearly 250 building control authorities results in uneven enforcement, limits development and retention of inspectors (particularly at Class 2/3), and weakens resilience. RBCAs exiting the market recently have further destabilised LA BCA capacity. The panel considers that building control functions for non-HRB work should be delivered by fewer, larger, publicly accountable Building Control Bodies (BCBs) operating across wider geographies, allowing a mixed delivery model for client based services, drawing on the strengths and experience that already exist across public and private sector providers. These BCBs would:

• apply competence checks at a gateway for non HRB work
• act as the building control body of last resort
• sustain career pathways, supervision and pay flexibility to attract and retain experienced inspectors
• operate to nationally consistent processes and data standards through a digital portal
• be responsible for issuing completion certificates

BCBs should be independent of LAs, while aligning geographies sensibly with patterns of development and enforcement. For example, regional footprints or other coherent areas. Establishment will likely require legislation and managed change over several years. Measures in Chapter 5 are intended to stabilise the current system while the transition proceeds.

Under this model, the LA BCA requirement to deliver statutory regulatory functions would be ‘lifted’ into these new bodies. We consider that new bodies will provide a career pathway for experienced Inspectors wanting to take on a regulatory, oversight and enforcement function, with the ability to secure the people and funding necessary to maintain the service. Proposals for set fees below describe how this could be funded, by utilising money in the system now to better effect.

Options for the organisation of statutory and client facing services:

The panel has examined two possible organisational approaches, reflecting different ways in which statutory and client-based functions could be structured. In both models the mixed model for client-based services remains, with RBCAs continuing to operate and remain an integral part of delivery.

Option 1 — BCBs deliver both statutory and client-based services

Under this option, BCBs would undertake both the statutory responsibilities and the direct delivery of building control services. Existing LA BCA teams would be transferred into BCBs, meaning each BCB would house both the regulatory workforce and a client-based service, while also allocating work to private sector providers. To ensure BCBs do not preferentially allocate work to themselves over RBCAs, or LA companies, robust firewalls and governance arrangements would be required.

Option 2 — BCBs deliver statutory functions only (panel preference)

Under this option, BCBs would carry out statutory functions only. Client-based services would continue to be delivered by RBCAs and LAs who want to continue offering a client-based service; noting there are already examples of LAs coming together to offer shared services effectively, through the establishment of local companies.

The panel’s preference is option 2, because separating statutory functions from delivery offers the strongest foundation for independence, fair allocation and public confidence. However, both options should be considered by government as it determines the suitable design of the future model.

In both options, all projects in a BCB area - including public sector projects - would be routed through the BCB. In the transition period, the BCB would carry out preapplication checks and gateway scrutiny before allocating work using a preference-based model. In the end state model, the BCB would move to full independent allocation of providers and would issue completion certificates.

Crucially, allocation must be impartial and fair, with final decisions made independently by the BCB using transparent criteria based on competence, capacity and risk, regardless of provider type.

4.5 Pay flexibility in future bodies

The panel have heard that local government pay structures prevent LA BCAs from offering competitive salaries to RBIs relative to RBCAs. This contributes to recruitment and retention challenges, particularly for experienced inspectors. This pay rigidity makes it difficult to reward specialist expertise or reflect the complexity of work. As a result, many LAs cannot easily sustain the teams they need.

The consolidated Building Control Bodies proposed in Chapter 4 must be established with modern HR and pay frameworks that allow competitive market aligned salaries, allowing clear progression pathways. These measures are essential to prevent the new bodies from inheriting the same structural constraints that have weakened LA BCA capacity.

Modern pay frameworks should allow Building Control Bodies to recruit and retain advanced practitioners. Flexible reward mechanisms will help recognise expertise and incentivise career progression. Removing legacy constraints should prevent the new bodies from inheriting the structural limitations that weakened LA BCA capacity. Competitive pay will be essential to building a stable, competent and motivated workforce for the long-term model.

4.6 Central enforcement function

In designing new bodies and roles and responsibilities as described, the panel considers that the SCR should be established to provide a stronger support and expertise for the enforcement function and role going forward. The panel has found that LA BCAs are not resourced or incentivised to act when it is necessary, with authorities often finding that despite evidence of non-compliance the risk appetite and resources within the authority are insufficient to support action.

Proposals in Chapter 5 seek to level the playing field on enforcement, giving certain powers equally to both LA BCAs and RBCAs. Under this model all building control bodies would be given the same responsibility to act in the public interest by being able to issue ‘compliance’ and ‘stop’ notices. In this model, LA BCAs would retain the powers to take further action to the Courts. In due course, with the establishment of new BCBs, these Court action powers should transfer to the new BCBs.

This system of enforcement will need better support at a national level. We propose that in setting up the functions of the SCR, it is given a clearer role and the powers necessary to support LA BCAs and RBCAs in pursuing enforcement in the public interest. The SCR should have the legal expertise to help build up the case for action where necessary. In due course enforcement powers currently with LA BCAs should be transferred to new BCBs, simplifying the landscape further.

Recommendations

1. Establish a single, independent statutory building control system.

Legislate for a unified statutory system for all non HRB work, built on independence, national consistency, clear duties and transparent public accountability.

2. Remove dutyholder choice from statutory building control.

End client selection of regulator and move to independent allocation model based on risk, competence and capacity. In transition to this, enable preference of BCB to be established.

3. Create consolidated Building Control Bodies (BCBs).

Establish fewer, larger building control bodies to take on statutory functions from LA BCAs, to deliver consistent decisions, risk-based inspections and enforcement.

4. Define the role and powers of the Single Construction Regulator (SCR).

Set out the SCR’s remit across oversight, registration, performance monitoring, HRB decisions and enforcement.

5. Strengthen national enforcement capability.

Provide the SCR with specialist legal, investigatory and technical capacity to support robust and consistent enforcement across England.

5. Levelling the current system

The long-term model set out in Chapter 4 represents a fundamental structural realignment of the building control system, with a shift to independent, publicly accountable Building Control Bodies, supported by the BSR and SCR in future, with clear statutory duties and clearly defined roles.

The current mixed model does not operate from a fair or consistent baseline. LA BCAs and RBCAs work under different legislative requirements, with varying duties, enforcement powers and information expectations.

This uneven regulatory landscape drives behaviours that prioritise competition over consistency, creates distortive incentives, and leaves the statutory function vulnerable to capacity pressures and decline. Levelling the environment in the short term is therefore essential to stabilising the system and enabling a smooth transition to the future model.

Regardless of decisions taken on our proposals for a future model, we consider that the current system must be stabilised and strengthened to increase confidence that the public is more consistently and better protected. This chapter sets out the practical measures that government can start implementing now to level the regulatory environment by:

• aligning regulations on applications, notices and processes
• improving inspection consistency
• reforming fees and funding
• modernising digital and oversight frameworks
• provide consistent enforcement powers across LA BCAs and RBCAs

These steps will stabilise the current system and lay the essential groundwork for a smooth and credible transition to the consolidated statutory model described in Chapter 4.

5.1 Alignment of applications, notices and processes

Rules for applications, building notices and initial notices have evolved differently across sectors. Notices accept minimal upfront information while applications require fuller designs before work begins. That divergence invites ‘route shopping’ and gaming of the system, delays early regulatory engagement and establishes associated construction risks.

We consider government should align systems so that all providers work to one unified set of statutory processes and regulations, with clearer requirements for when an application for approval is needed, regardless of service provider. Within this there should be consistent and easily understood definitions of building work allowable by notices used by all building control authorities.

In doing so and following the conclusion of the reforms set out in this report, government should consider consolidating the regulatory instruments into a single, coherent framework aligned to the Building Safety Act and these reforms, removing other contradictions. In due course, the establishment of a unified set of regulations should replace the 2010 versions.

Recommendations

6. Create one statutory process for applications, notices and approvals.

Align requirements across all providers so the statutory function operates to the same clear and modernised rules.

7. Consolidate and modernise statutory instruments.

Remove contradictions, update outdated provisions and consolidate building regulations to create a coherent framework for all providers.

5.2 Inspection consistency and minimum requirements

A consistent theme throughout the panel’s evidence gathering was that inspection levels for common building types vary across England, with concerns they are being determined not by risk or technical complexity but by pressure from clients.

Arguably, the removal of statutory notification points in 2012/13 has contributed to an increasingly discretionary approach to inspections, allowing dutyholders to commission building control services that offer fewer or less intrusive visits than may be appropriate. Combined with pressures from clients, this has produced a landscape in which similar work is subject to different levels of regulatory assurance

The panel heard examples where inadequate or inconsistent inspection regimes directly contributed to poor outcomes. For example, standard house types or extensions inspected only at completion, leading to undetected structural defects; small commercial fit outs with no meaningful oversight; and housing developments constructed without awareness of updated accessibility requirements. Such variation poses avoidable risks to the public, undermines confidence in the system, and leaves diligent providers at a commercial disadvantage.

For most domestic and small scale non HRB work, the panel found broad consensus that certain stages of construction are predictably safety critical, such as foundations, drainage, key structural points, fire protection measures in extensions, and completion. The absence of consistent mandatory points means there is no reassurance these inspections are carried out. Sampling approaches, widely used in some parts of the sector, have also raised concerns about workmanship and the reliability of compliance findings.

The panel ask government to consider the benefits of introducing set minimum inspection levels for standard build types and stages, such as typical house builds, extensions, and routine refurbishment work. These mandated inspections should:

• be agreed across the public and private sectors, with technical input from the SCR and BSR
• reflect known risk points and lessons learned from past failures
• eliminate the ability to under cut on inspection intensity
• be supported by clearer fee structures that cover the cost of the required visits

Consistent minimum expectations should help ensure that the majority of England’s building activity receives a reliable level of scrutiny regardless of who delivers the service. They create fairness among providers, clearer expectations for dutyholders, and greater protection for residents and the public. They will help re establish the principle that key inspections should be consistently carried out

Recommendation

8. Consider introducing mandated inspections for standard build types.

Set nationally agreed inspection points at key stages in construction of a building, so that work receives consistent, risk appropriate oversight.

5.3 Charges and future funding arrangements

The funding model that underpins building control is not sustainable, with the statutory function not being delivered under constraints that no longer reflect its public safety purpose or the realities of modern regulation of building work.

LA BCAs are bound by the 2010 charging regulations, which restrict what can be recovered through fees and prevent investment in supervision, enforcement or the upskilling necessary to meet rising regulatory expectations.

Private sector providers, by contrast, are not subject to the same constraints and can set fees more flexibly, including at levels that do not realistically fund the oversight required for safe outcomes. The resulting mismatch has weakened LA BCA capacity, intensified competitive pricing and contributed to uneven quality of service across England.

These pressures have become more acute as the system adapts to the Building Safety Act 2022. New professional standards, reversions from failed providers, and higher expectations for inspection and enforcement all require stable and predictable funding.

Without reform the statutory function will continue to rely on overstretched teams, inconsistent local capabilities and fee structures that incentivise minimal oversight rather than thorough regulatory intervention. Stabilisation in the short term therefore depends on modernising how building control is funded, correcting the imbalances between sectors and ensuring that income is used transparently and exclusively to support public interest regulatory oversight.

Government should complete and implement the review of the 2010 regulations to enable full cost recovery for all statutory building control functions, including enforcement and compliance activity, modernise the charging framework to align with the requirements of the Building Safety Act 2022. In doing so a review should seek to remove outdated restrictions that prevent services investing in the staff, technology and skills they need. This should stabilise LA BCA services over the next 2 to 3 years and enable a smoother transition to the future model.

Updating the charging regulations will allow LA BCA services to invest in staff, training and enforcement, restore fairness between sectors and ensure that the statutory function is equipped for the demands placed upon it. A modernised regulatory funding base also helps prepare the ground for the consolidated statutory bodies proposed in Chapter 4.

5.4 Set fees in a future model

In reviewing the fees and charges regulations to support the future system proposed in Chapter 4, the panel consider that the benefits of standardising charging should be explored.

The establishment of fewer, larger, building control bodies would we consider benefit from set fees, paid in a new digital front end. Those fees could be set at a level that enables new bodies to carry out all their functions effectively.

Under our proposals for a ‘preference’ based approach, we consider that existing BSR data could be used to automate most decisions, with data being used to inform a proportionate, risk-based approach to oversight, inspections and enforcement. It would bring efficiencies and consistency to building control and clarity to dutyholders.

Our view is that there may be a benefit in going further and standardising charges for set inspections for standard build types, in line with our proposals above, to move to this approach.

5.5 Ringfencing income

The panel have heard that building control income in LA BCAs is often absorbed into wider corporate budgets, with no guarantee that fees paid by dutyholders are reinvested into delivering the statutory function, alongside an inconsistent and variable source of income from general funding allocations. This has contributed to staffing shortages, reduced enforcement capability and a reliance on goodwill from overstretched teams. RBCAs can reinvest income directly in their service, exacerbating disparities between the sectors.

Our view is that without a protected service, any uplift in fees generated by changes to regulations is less likely to translate into improved statutory capacity. In developing fewer building control bodies, Government should ensure that the income generated through standardised fees is protected within those organisations for the delivery of their building control functions. This money should be designed to ensure the recruitment and retention of the RBI workforce for the long term.

Recommendations

9. Complete reform of the 2010 Fees and Charges Regulations.

Enable full cost recovery for all statutory activities and remove outdated constraints on how services fund essential functions.

10. Protect building control income.

In designing the new model of delivery, ensure income is guaranteed for the long term by ringfencing it to ensure BCBs can deliver their functions effectively.

5.6 Levelling enforcement procedures

The panel are concerned at the evidence showing that enforcement is uneven and that the public are not being protected consistently as a result. LA BCAs hold enforcement powers but lack the sustained capacity and legal support to use them consistently. RBCAs lack equivalent powers, creating structural imbalance and leading to problematic reversions.

A structural imbalance exists in the system, as only LA BCAs can issue compliance and stop notices, while RBCAs must revert work back to BCAs when formal action is required. We have heard that some RBCAs may delay escalation to avoid harming commercial relationships, with BCAs then facing unpredictable, resource intensive ‘reversions’. The result is rare enforcement, missed opportunities, unclear accountability and questions left open regarding quality and safety of build.

To achieve parity and predictability BCAs and RBCAs should have equivalent responsibilities to act in the public interest. The panel recommends extending compliance and stop notice powers to RBCAs, while prosecution powers remain with LA BCAs.

Extending compliance and stop notice powers to RBCAs closes a longstanding structural gap that has weakened enforcement. In a system where only LA BCAs can act formally, effective enforcement is not guaranteed, creating inconsistency and leaving dutyholders and building owners unclear about accountability.

Giving all providers enforcement powers enables issues to be addressed at the point they arise, reduces incentives to avoid escalation for commercial reasons. It makes clear that all building control inspectors in both public and private sector must act as regulators and delivers outcomes that can be easily monitored. This parity stabilises enforcement and lays the groundwork for a future system based on consistent statutory responsibilities and public interest decision making

Recommendation

11. Extend compliance and stop notice powers to private sector RBCAs.

Give all providers equivalent duties to act in the public interest, while retaining prosecution powers with new BCBs and the SCR.

5.7 Digital backbone

To stabilise the current system and enable a future consolidated model, building control must also transition to a modern digital system, establishing a digital backbone that can be utilised easily by regulators, building control authorities and those seeking building control approval.

A modern building control system should be underpinned by shared digital infrastructure, common data standards and transparent reporting. These capabilities are prerequisites for consistent regulatory decision making, public trust, and effective national oversight.

Building control currently operates across a fragmented information landscape. Most BCAs use systems that are reliant on several IT providers, while RBCAs use a mixture of bespoke or commercial platforms. Government and the regulator have limited visibility of applications, notices, inspection activity or completion outcomes. This lack of interoperability reduces transparency, weakens oversight, and prevents data from being used to support risk based regulatory decisions.

The current reliance on multiple systems means that the building control function lacks a unified source of truth. Dutyholders have limited visibility of how the process works or what stage their project has reached. This fragmentation undermines efficiency, accountability and the ability to identify risks early.

To address these issues, government should establish a digital framework underpinning building control in England, providing:

• a clear route for submitting applications, building notices and initial notices
• standardised workflows towards issuing completion certificates
• integration with the SCR’s oversight and performance monitoring functions
• accessible information for homeowners, developers and the public

A common digital system will reduce administrative burden, ensure consistency across BCA and RBCA services. It will enable the SCR and government to use data to target oversight and enforcement effectively. It makes interactions more transparent for dutyholders and creates the backbone of a national regulatory system where decisions and data flow predictably across all providers.

Data standards and transparency

Digital infrastructure alone is not sufficient. Inconsistent data quality was a major concern raised by both providers and the regulator. Current datasets do not reliably capture inspection activity, risk indicators, outcomes or enforcement action. Many of the recently introduced operational standards and KPIs have limited value because the underlying data is incomplete or inconsistently defined. Without common data standards, government cannot understand system performance, identify emerging risks or evaluate how well duties are being discharged across England.

Digital transformation must be accompanied by clear national data standards, including:

• consistent definitions of key regulatory actions (e.g., inspection types, compliance decisions, notices served)
• mandatory reporting requirements for all BCBs
• interoperability across all software used during transition
• transparent publication of core metrics to improve public confidence

These data standards should form the foundation of the SCR’s future performance and risk based oversight framework. Once the consolidated BCB model is in place, these standards will enable consistent benchmarking, targeted improvement and robust regulatory intelligence across England

High quality data enables meaningful oversight. Standardised definitions and mandatory reporting allow the SCR to understand performance, identify trends and target intervention where it is most needed. Transparency strengthens trust; interoperability supports continuity during transition; and a shared data spine provides the infrastructure on which the future consolidated model will rely.

Recommendations

12. Deliver a strong digital building control system.

Create a clear route for all submissions, workflows and records, enabling consistent processes and real time regulatory visibility.

13. Establish national data standards and mandatory reporting.

Ensure consistent, high‑quality data on inspections, compliance, enforcement and outcomes across all providers. This includes automating data capture, improving consistency and strengthening real-time risk-based oversight.

14. Improve transparency and secure information sharing.

Enable structured sharing of regulatory data between providers, the SCR, government and the public to support accountability and risk-based oversight.

6. People, culture and performance

6.1 Workforce and capacity

A stable and competent public sector workforce focused on the recruitment and development of Inspectors is essential to the functioning of the current system.

Evidence presented to the panel shows that the current building control workforce is under significant and growing pressure. Shortages of new entrants alongside an ageing demographic present a cliff edge scenario that needs to be addressed for the long term. Without decisive action now, an already stretched system will not have the people it needs to deliver safe oversight for the future.

The current BSR data suggests the system is already around 2,000 inspectors short of what is needed, with a further 1,500 expected to retire by 2035. This is occurring at the same time as the system is contending with the new requirements of the Building Safety Act 2022, increasing regulatory workload, reversions from failed RBCAs, and rising statutory expectations.

The workforce is the system’s most critical asset but unless recruitment and retention are stabilised, other reforms will not deliver their intended impact. A more secure workforce directly reduces regulatory risk, prevents loss of expertise and ensures that experienced staff remain available to support the future system.

LA BCAs cannot compete on pay with the private sector, particularly for Class 2 and Class 3 inspectors, who are in extremely high demand. The panel have heard examples of authorities losing newly trained inspectors only a few years into their careers, before the benefits of public sector pensions and stability become significant factors. The collapse of some RBCAs has also strained recruitment pipelines, with the public sector having to absorb sudden increases in workload without the ability to recruit staff immediately to meet it.

Government should take action now to stabilise the workforce by ensuring that the shortfalls generated over decades are made up with immediate funding for the public sector service. This should be focussed on supporting LA BCAs to recruit and retain RBIs, with a consistently available career path for those who show promise. In the short to medium term, changes to the fees and charges regulations should be aimed at ensuring a service that is self-sustaining. In the longer term, building control bodies benefiting from a protected income should be aimed at ensuring that the workforce pressures and uncertainties seen now are not repeated for future governments again.

6.2 Revalidation and registration reforms

The introduction of mandatory registration and revalidation for building inspectors was welcomed in principle, but its early implementation has created burdens that further risk driving experienced inspectors from the profession.

The panel heard concerns that the revalidation cycle is too rigid and exam heavy, with experienced inspectors and building control managers feeling insufficiently supported through the process. The panel also considers that inconsistent approaches between training providers is causing unnecessary confusion and that there should be a consideration given to a single proportionate and consistent approach. With upcoming revalidation points approaching, without action now there is a risk that the workforce cliff edge will get worse if experienced inspectors decide to exit the profession.

The panel recommend that government should reform the registration and revalidation process to reduce unnecessary burdens while maintain standards. Within a rethink of the approach, the emphasis should be on validation of experience and knowledge and continuous professional development rather than an over reliance on exams.

In taking forward this reform of revalidation, it should reduce burdens without compromising professional standards. This will help to retain experienced inspectors at a critical time for the sector. A harmonised assessment routes will create clarity, while shifting the emphasis to CPD supports continuous competence. Predictable, supportive processes should reduce the risk of attrition spikes. These changes improve system stability and prepare inspectors for more structured development pathways within future BCBs.

Recommendation

15. Reform registration and revalidation to support competence without excessive burden.

Shift towards CPD based, predictable and harmonised assessment processes that retain experienced inspectors.

6.3 Performance monitoring and oversight

Effective oversight relies on accurate, consistent and meaningful performance data. Under the current system, however, the Operational Standards Rules (OSRs) - the mechanism through which the Building Safety Regulator monitors the performance of building control bodies - have not delivered the clarity or insight required to support risk-based regulation. Providers reported that the OSRs are bureaucratic, costly, and overly complex, with too many indicators that are of limited practical use. The data collected is inconsistent, difficult to compare across providers, and often not sufficiently reliable to inform proportionate regulatory intervention.

As a result, the OSRs have not achieved their intended purpose: they do not give the regulator a clear, actionable picture of system performance, nor do they help identify emerging risks or support consistent improvement across the sector. Reform is essential to ensure that oversight mechanisms align with both the immediate needs of the transition period and the long-term ambitions of the future consolidated model.

6.4 Reform approach to measuring performance

The panel heard widespread concerns that the OSRs place a heavy administrative burden on providers without providing meaningful insight into regulatory performance or risk. Many indicators measure process rather than outcomes, others duplicate information or track activity of marginal relevance. Inconsistent data definitions and outdated submission routes further limit the usefulness of the OSR dataset.

Government should work with the BSR to reform the approach to measuring performance, focusing on:

• purpose driven indicators that reflect core statutory functions
• alignment with the new digital system to automate data capture
• reduced administrative burden, with less manual reporting
• clear definitions to ensure consistent interpretation across providers

The OSR framework should be streamlined to a concise set of no more than 20 indicators that focus on what matters - inspection activity and sufficiency, compliance outcomes, enforcement action, timeliness and quality of decisions, competency and supervision, and the completeness and accuracy of data. These should be chosen explicitly for their ability to highlight risk, drive improvement and reflect the health of the statutory function.

A reformed performance monitoring framework will provide clarity, transparency and a credible tool for oversight during transition. Integrating OSR reporting into the digital system makes oversight more accurate, consistent and real time, giving the SCR a robust basis for identifying risk and improving performance across all providers.

Recommendations

16. Reform the approach to measuring performance.
Replace the current burdensome framework with a streamlined, outcome focused approach aligned to statutory purpose.

17. Reduce OSR indicators to a concise set of no more than 20.
Focus on inspection sufficiency, compliance, enforcement, competence and data quality to enable meaningful oversight.

6.5 Building control relationships

The challenges facing building control are not only structural but cultural. Throughout the panel’s engagement, it became clear that many inspectors across the public and private sectors consistently display a strong sense of professional duty, integrity and public interest commitment.

The culture in which they operate is however strained by commercial pressures and client expectations and some unhelpful behaviours, leading to adversarial relationships and reactive working patterns that can undermine confidence and morale. These cultural factors directly influence how decisions are made, how risk is managed and how consistently the building regulations are applied. Addressing them is essential to stabilising the system and preparing for the future model.

While many Inspectors across both sectors display a strong public interest ethos, the system often relies on professionalism to compensate for unclear expectations, uneven processes and conflicting incentives. Many inspectors in LA BCAs are pulled between their statutory duties and the pressures created by commercial competition, fee structures and client relationships.

These dynamics can discourage challenge, delay escalation and weaken the independence that the public expects from a regulator. Boundaries remain blurred, with some dutyholders still expecting building control to act as a designer, troubleshooter or quality assurer, while inspectors struggle to assert their regulatory role consistently when sector norms or employer priorities point in a different direction. These tensions mirror the structural conflicts highlighted by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry and contribute directly to inconsistent decision making.

Government should set clearer and more consistent expectations for the regulatory role, reinforcing that building control is a public interest function, not a commercial service and subject to a code of conduct. Alignment of statutory processes, improvements in guidance and parity of enforcement powers across sectors will give inspectors the tools and confidence to act.

The short-term reforms in Chapter 5 on charges, notices and inspection requirement will help reduce disagreements. Over the medium term, transitioning to consolidated Building Control Bodies will remove competitive pressures from statutory decision making entirely, allowing inspectors to operate within an organisational model explicitly designed for independence of functions.

Bringing clarity and independence to the regulatory role will strengthen confidence in the system and reduce the risk that commercial priorities override public interest decisions. A shared understanding of responsibilities will help inspectors act consistently, reduce friction with dutyholders and align behaviour across public and private sectors. These cultural foundations are essential for both stabilising today’s system and preparing for the single, impartial regulatory function envisaged in the future model.

Relationships between LA BCAs and RBCAS vary. In some areas, we have found that collaboration is strong. In others, distrust, competition and negative assumptions have created an adversarial culture. Reversions, uneven enforcement responsibilities and hostile online commentary reinforce these divisions and hinder the willingness to cooperate on shared public interest objectives.

Inspectors, particularly in LA BCAs, have told us they operate in a culture of firefighting. Unpredictable pressures from dangerous structures, reversions, urgent enforcement actions and public complaints, leave little scope for proactive regulation or development. This reactive mode contributes to burnout and reduces morale. The panel heard troubling accounts of unhelpful behaviours, including online hostility and reputational attacks, which further damage confidence and harm the profession’s attractiveness.

6.6 Dutyholder responsibilities

The well documented failures seen in building work encountered in recent years do not originate within building control but in the wider construction process and people involved. Gaps in understanding of the Building Regulations and inconsistent levels of design and supervision upstream create problems that inspectors are then expected to identify and resolve late in the build.

The Panel have identified that there is a poor understanding of what building control is, what it does, and what it is not designed to do. This misunderstanding exists not only among homeowners and small builders, but also across parts of the wider construction sector. As a result, building control is frequently expected to identify or prevent failures that should have been addressed earlier in design, coordination, supervision and workmanship.

Although the Building Safety Act 2022 placed dutyholder responsibilities for clients, designers and contractors on a clearer legal footing, we consider that awareness and understanding of these duties across the wider sector remains uneven.

We find there is a need to reinforce the responsibilities of dutyholders through clearer, up to date public guidance and stronger communication about the legal obligations introduced by the Building Safety Act. The Manual to the Building Regulations and associated GOV.UK guidance should be updated to reflect regulatory changes and remove contradictions.

A clearer understanding of legal responsibilities will help reduce avoidable noncompliance and prevent building control from being treated as the primary safety net for failures originating earlier in the construction process. A more consistent and accountable approach to self-certification will protect consumers, reduce the risk of unsafe work passing undetected and ensures that building control capacity is used where it adds most value.

Strengthening dutyholder knowledge and accountability should be seen as a key part of stabilising the current system and supporting the transition to the future model

Recommendations

18. Establish a single professional code of conduct for all BCAs, setting expectations for independence, behaviour and public interest standards across the sector.

19. improve dutyholder understanding of the building regulations and building control by updating the Manual to the Building Regulations and supporting that with a communication drive.

7. Responding to the wider Terms of Reference

The Terms of Reference provided a wider scope for our work. In considering the future model for building control in England, the Terms asked us to look at the relationship between building control and warranties and for our views on the operation of the Competent Persons schemes.

7.1 Warranties and building control

The principle of offering warranty and building control services together is well established. The current system sees two main providers (NHBC and LABC) offering warranties combined with building control. Several other smaller providers operate in the market, linking with building control providers.

The panel have heard conflicting views about this relationship. One view is that it is a legitimate and conflict free relationship to ensure that building control decisions are offered with warranties. The counter view is that warranty provision provides an easy route for building control work to be offered at low cost subsidised by the fee for the warranty.

We consider that on the face of it, combined provision should provide an incentive to get the building right first time, to avoid pressures on the warranty and insurance later, provided that the necessary safeguards are in place to ensure independent oversight and transparency of charging. Assuming warranties are robust, they should give consumers the benefit of reassurance that building compliance issues, should they be found, will be addressed.

The concerns expressed centre around how inspections are separated under some warranties, and the impact on the price of the building control element. It has been suggested that with building control and warranty inspections combined, there is not adequate challenge between them. In turn, it has been suggested that this model serves to diminish the value of the building control service, as more money is made from warranties and savings are being found by pooling inspector decisions.

The panel have been made aware of moves already underway in MHCLG to regulate the approach to warranty provision in England. We support such moves to bring confidence to the public. As part of this move to standardising the offer to consumers, we consider the Department should explore the concerns raised about combined inspections and whether this is driving down the value of the building control element. If these issues can be addressed through common standards and regulation, we see no reason in principle why building control and warranties should not be offered together.

We recognise that our proposals for removal of choice will raise questions about the future relationship with warranties under that model. Our view is that a system designed to ensure better checks of dutyholders preference could extend to a judgment on the warranty provider. If warranty standards are improved as planned, then this could be as little as ensuring a warranty is in place.

Recommendation

20. Progress planned work to improve and regulate the warranty market. As part of that consider the issues raised with the panel about the approach to inspections and the impact on BC fees.

7.2 Competent Persons Schemes

The problems seen in the approach to self-certification of some aspects of building work are well documented. Self-certification is often referred to as ‘low risk’, when the problems that have been seen, for example in insulation provision, has led to serious health issues and fatalities. Poor quality work can often leave problems that only surface years later, often laying hidden until they become a problem.

The panel observe that when first established, the approach to self-certification was limited to gas and electrical work. These are supported by regulators that licence and re-assess an installer’s ability to carry out and self-certify their work. In our opinion, this model remains the clearest example where self-certification with robust oversight has been shown to work effectively for the public and from where lessons can be best drawn.

Over time the scope of work able to be self-certified has grown, with variable approaches to regulation and oversight of each scheme, often designed by Departments in reaction to crisis moments, or in a desire to see work agreed quickly, for example in response to new technologies requiring installation. Taken together these competing incentives have caused problems and added complexity into a system that would benefit from consistency and a level of oversight which provides assurance.

Where building work is covered by CPS schemes currently these should be allowed only where robust oversight is provided by a third party or by building control. Following documented concerns, we understand that changes to bring certain insulation techniques have already been brought in, requiring building control sign off for work.

Where government determines self-certification is to remain an option, the panel heard evidence from the BSR that reviewing the ‘conditions of authorisation’ is key to bringing consistency and confidence in the system. We encourage government to support that work and ensure that performance against those is regularly measured and acted on.

Recommendation

21. Bring together Departmental interests to issue a statement on the future of the CPS scheme. As part of that prioritise and support the BSR’s plans to review ‘conditions of authorisation’.

Full list of recommendations

1. Establish a single, independent statutory building control system. Legislate for a unified statutory system for all non HRB work, built on independence, national consistency, clear duties and transparent public accountability.

2. Remove dutyholder choice from statutory building control. End client selection of regulator and move to independent allocation model based on risk, competence and capacity. In transition to this, enable preference of BCB to be established.

3. Create consolidated Building Control Bodies (BCBs). Establish fewer, larger building control bodies to take on statutory functions from LA BCAs, to deliver consistent decisions, risk-based inspections and enforcement.

4. Define the role and powers of the Single Construction Regulator (SCR). Set out the SCR’s remit across oversight, registration, performance monitoring, HRB decisions and enforcement.

5. Strengthen national enforcement capability. Provide the SCR with specialist legal, investigatory and technical capacity to support robust and consistent enforcement across England.

6. Create one statutory process for applications, notices and approvals. Align requirements across all providers so the statutory function operates to the same clear and modernised rules.

7. Consolidate and modernise statutory instruments. Remove contradictions, update outdated provisions and consolidate building regulations to create a coherent framework for all providers.

8. Consider introducing mandated minimum inspections for standard build types. Set nationally agreed inspection points at key stages in construction of a building, so that work receives consistent, risk appropriate oversight.

9. Complete reform of the 2010 Fees and Charges Regulations. Enable full cost recovery for all statutory activities and remove outdated constraints on how services fund essential functions.

10. Protect building control income. In designing the new model of delivery, ensure income is guaranteed for the long term by ringfencing it to ensure BCBs can deliver their functions effectively.

11. Extend compliance and stop notice powers to private sector RBCAs. Give all providers equivalent duties to act in the public interest, while retaining prosecution powers with new BCBs and the SCR.

12. Deliver a single national digital building control portal. Create one route for all submissions, workflows and records, enabling consistent processes and real time regulatory visibility.

13. Establish national data standards and mandatory reporting. Ensure consistent, high‑quality data on inspections, compliance, enforcement and outcomes across all providers. This includes automating data capture, improving consistency and strengthening real-time risk-based oversight

14. Improve transparency and secure information sharing. Enable structured sharing of regulatory data between providers, the SCR, Government and the public to support accountability and risk based oversight.

15. Reform registration and revalidation to support competence without excessive burden. Shift towards CPD based, predictable and harmonised assessment processes that retain experienced inspectors.

16. Reform the approach to measuring performance. Replace the current burdensome framework with a streamlined, outcome focused approach aligned to statutory purpose.

17. Reduce OSR indicators to a concise set of no more than 20. Focus on inspection sufficiency, compliance, enforcement, competence and data quality to enable meaningful oversight.

18. Establish a single professional code of conduct for all BCAs, setting expectations for independence, behaviour and public interest standards across the sector.

19. improve dutyholder understanding of the building regulations and building control by updating the Manual to the Building Regulations and supporting that with a communication drive.

20. Progress planned work to improve and regulate the warranty market. As part of that consider the issues raised with the panel about the approach to inspections and the impact on BC fees.

21. Bring together Departmental interests to issue a statement on the future of the CPS scheme. As part of that prioritise and support the BSR’s plans to review ‘conditions of authorisation’.