Problem statement for the Building Control Independent Panel
Published 15 July 2025
Applies to England
1. The Building Control Independent Panel (BCIP) is publishing this statement following the government’s published Terms of Reference.
2. Following three meetings of the panel since June we are publishing our starting position on the problems raised by the Grenfell Tower Inquiry Report. We will shortly be issuing a call for evidence from those engaged in the building control sector and those who interact with it.
1. Grenfell Tower Inquiry – the problems identified
3. The Grenfell Tower Inquiry set out the problems in the building control system in England that they considered had built up due to conflicts of interest over a significant period.
4. The Inquiry found that ..‘many of those involved in major construction projects, including clients, contractors and even architects, regarded building control primarily as a source of advice and assistance’ and that ‘in many cases that was how building control saw its role’. The Inquiry said that this was ‘fostered by building control bodies themselves, who preferred to co-operate with applicants to enable proposals to be approved rather than enforce the building regulations rigorously.’
5. The Inquiry found that ‘one of the causes of the inappropriate relationship to which we have referred was the introduction into the system of commercial interests’. It said that: ‘Approved Inspectors had a commercial interest in acquiring and retaining customers that conflicted with the performance of their role as guardians of the public interest’. The Inquiry also found that local authorities were not immune from the same issues as ‘local authority building control departments introduced a similar conflict of interest affecting them’.
6. The Inquiry identified wider issues with the building control service provided by the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC) citing individual and collective failings because of wider capacity issues in the authority. This led to failures collectively to scrutinise and challenge the use of combustible building products. The shortcomings were not unique to RBKC. Combustible cladding was found in use across the United Kingdom, leading to reforms affecting higher risk buildings in the Building Safety Act 2022.
7. The Inquiry concluded with the two questions being posed to government and now the panel:
In response to criticisms of the relationship between Approved Inspectors, developers, architects and RBCAs it asked:
whether it is in the public interest for building control functions to be performed by those who have a commercial interest in the process?
Primarily in response to local authority failures in not discharging their statutory responsibilities effectively, it asked:
‘whether all building control functions should be performed by a national authority?
2. The panel’s initial response to the Inquiry findings
8. The problems the Inquiry identified and that the panel has now been set up to examine were clearly present in certain parts of the built environment sector and professions prior to 2017. Commercial interests were too often put ahead of building safety. Collective failures to identify how combustible products were being used led to the proliferation of unsuitable cladding that was subsequently uncovered.
9. Since 2017, significant reforms have been made to attempt to address these issues, notably with the introduction of the Building Safety Act 2022. This has led to the establishment of the Building Safety Regulator as the single building control body for higher risk buildings (HRBs) and responsibility for oversight of building control as a newly regulated profession.
10. The challenge for the panel is to determine whether the issues identified by the Inquiry persist across the wider built environment and where. We will consider what is currently being done and what more could be done to improve the oversight of key building safety risks and hold bad actors to account.
11. The panel notes the concern raised by the Inquiry about both Local Authority and Registered Building Control Approvers preferring to cooperate with applicants rather than to enforce the building regulations. We intend to examine how to maintain the right balance as we believe that both working together effectively are essential elements of an effective building control approach.
3. Our approach to taking forward the work
12. The panel’s view is that by posing questions on ‘whether to’ change the system, rather than moving straight to recommendations, the Inquiry has given us room to consider the issue more widely, identify evidence and stakeholder views and consider whether we see a need to change the system further and if so how. This is welcome and also enables us to assess how well the recent changes are bedding in.
13. The Terms of Reference are clear that in answering the Grenfell Inquiry’s core questions (whether to remove commercial interest and move to a national authority building control model), the review should not be limited to looking at just those options. The panel agrees it will be helpful to broaden the work out into a review of options to ensure an effective regulatory landscape and a secure building control profession to deliver this and future government’s priorities.
4. The commercial model
14. The panel notes that England is far from unique in operating a mixed public and private sector model for building control. It is our intention to look more closely at what safeguards are in place in other countries, where systems are working effectively.
15. In England, a commercial building control model means clients have a choice of provider (local authority or Registered Building Control Approver). For certain building work local authorities and RBCAs are competing on price with clients. Local authorities operate under more regulatory restrictions and there does not appear to be a level playing field, with local authorities also having several statutory functions they cannot currently charge for.
16. Those statutory functions include offering advice, investigating concerns and taking enforcement action, as the public and private sector building control systems interact at key stages (approval, commencement, and completion). The panel will want to consider whether this model can work effectively based on evidence of how these powers are being used and whether there is merit in moving to a more independent enforcement and oversight function.
17. While commercial interest has now been removed for buildings defined as ‘higher risk,’ a commercial choice model still exists for all other building control work. The panel will wish to explore further the extent to which concerns identified by the Inquiry persist in parts of the built environment, including but not limited to the role of building control bodies, where bad practice may be embedded as custom and practice. This may go beyond fire safety and structural risks and be focussed on concerns about compliance against other functional requirements of the building regulations. We will work to test and evidence this, working with MHCLG, the Regulator and stakeholders.
18. Where local authorities choose to maintain a viable building control service, offering advice, managing projects and effective enforcement, we understand authorities are seeing benefits in commercial operations across shared service companies. The panel wants to understand the benefits of operating more efficiently and effectively in further detail, where it is leading to effective oversight and enforcement of work not being led by authorities.
19. We have been told that operating under restrictions and with increases in regulations and oversight, local authorities are struggling to deliver their enforcement function against poor quality building work in the private sector. We have heard in addition that commercial bodies are reverting work to authorities in unreasonable circumstances, increasing the local authorities workloads. Where authorities are in this position, it is no surprise that that inspector time is stretched and reactive. In some areas of the country, authorities have stated publicly they do not have the time or people to undertake the inspections necessary.
20. There are implications for how this impacts on authorities ability to inspect and enforce the work of the private sector operating in their area. The panel will want to work with authorities to discuss how effective enforcement and advice can be provided under challenging circumstances.
5. Local authority capacity and workforce
21. The panel are particularly concerned about evidence suggesting that building control bodies in local authorities and the private sector are struggling to recruit, This is particularly challenging for local authorities who want to train and retain sufficient building inspector capacity to meet current requirements, meaning that little enforcement activity nationally is pursued. We are concerned about the potential impact on this and future government’s ambitions for delivering safe buildings. Wherever the functions sit, the profession needs to be seen as a rewarding career path in both the public and private sectors, if those growth and ambitions are to be delivered safely. these challenges mean that there is little evidence of local authority enforcement activity being pursued, beyond the requirement to provide informal advice.
22. Local authorities are at a disadvantage compared to the private sector when paying staff, as a combination of centrally and locally set rules and regulations prevent them from paying staff comparable salaries with the private sector. Where local authorities are competing for building control work there is no guarantee that any income raised through the service will remain in the building control teams to fund their statutory functions and recruit staff, as we are told most income is used to deliver other services.
23. The panel considers that an assessment of the financial, regulatory and operational restrictions for local authorities is necessary. The benefits to society of having confidence in safe buildings at the construction stage provides better protection and significant financial savings for the taxpayer if it avoids expensive remediation costs later. Without confidence in the local authority service and their ability to recruit staff to undertake inspections and early enforcement action, there will continue to be little societal reassurance about building standards in England.
6. Inspection and supervision
24. One of the outcomes of the commercial interest model, certainly in the period up to 2017 and beyond to the introduction of the Building Safety Act 2022, was that behaviours led to an inadequate inspection and oversight service of building work.
25. Developers and clients who wanted to move forward quickly and seamlessly would often choose the lowest quote that gave them the quickest route to sign off for their buildings to be sold. We will test whether this is still happening and the drivers for clients choosing a building control body. We will look at whether inspections and supervision of work is taking place regularly based on an assessment of key building safety risks. We are keen to hear evidence of good practice where this exists so that lessons can be learned and shared
26. We are concerned that there is no certainty on inspection and supervision arrangements across the building control sector and that there is an incentive for a minimalist service to be offered to win work. This raises serious concerns about the extent of such inspections as well as the efficiency and effectiveness of them. The panel will build the evidence base and options, focusing on improving the effectiveness of the service provided across public and private sectors.
7. Enforcement through better product testing
27. While the pressure to compete commercially may have been one aspect of industry wide failings, the Inquiry also criticised an easy acceptance of test results/products and the proliferation of the use of combustible cladding that followed. Some local authorities and other professional bodies did not ask tough questions. Local authorities could have used powers available to them at the time to demand tests. The Inquiry concluded that RKBC faced a serious capacity issue, with staff struggling with the workload, but this should not have prevented them and other local authorities from demanding more reassurance in products from the private sector. The panel will engage with work underway on product and testing reforms as a lot is being proposed already.
8. Next steps
28. We will shortly publish our call for evidence questions on GOV.UK, providing a month from the date of publication to respond.
29. The panel will work with MHCLG, the Building Safety Regulator and interested organisations and individuals, to identify and collect positions and data that test our early positions. If this problem statement is largely supported, we want to focus the next steps on looking at what needs to be put right, rather than more discussion on the problems. Our intention is to publish a review before the end of the year.