UK Right of Reply on behalf of AUKUS partners IAEA September 2026
Delivered to the IAEA Board of Governors in Vienna, September 2026. Agenda item: Transfer of the nuclear materials in the context of AUKUS and its safeguards in all aspects under the NPT.
Chair,
I take the floor on behalf of the United Kingdom, Australia and the United States to reject the claims we have just heard about Australia’s acquisition of conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines through AUKUS. Australia’s decision to develop this capability is fully consistent with the letter and spirit of the NPT and the global safeguards framework.
We have just heard certain statements that are designed to sow doubt in your mind about whether or not this is legitimate. We have heard unsubstantiated claims about our activities that try to falsely imply a compliance issue where none exists. China has repeatedly used this Board agenda item to promote a political narrative.
The repeated inclusion of this item undermines the right of all Member States to engage directly and in-confidence with the IAEA on safeguards and verification arrangements. For all these reasons, we must take the floor on this item at every Board to challenge such interference and call it out for what it is.
We continue to question the utility of China’s item. It is politically motivated and has never enjoyed consensus. It adds unnecessary time and cost to the Board’s operations, and it undermines the Director General’s independent technical mandate on Australia’s naval nuclear propulsion programme. This is in none of our interests.
Chair,
The Board has repeatedly heard allegations that ignore information provided by AUKUS partners in good faith and contradict the Director General’s statements.
The facts are clear:
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AUKUS partners are fully complying with their respective international obligations, including under the NPT, the Treaty of Rarotonga and its Protocols, and Australia’s IAEA safeguards agreements.
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The IAEA Statute authorises the Agency to negotiate safeguards and verification arrangements directly and confidentially with Member States. Political interference – such as that proposed – would weaken its independence and technical authority and should concern us all.
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Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the NPT. Article 14 of the IAEA’s model CSA (INFCIRC/153) – on which Australia’s CSA is based – is the specific provision enabling States Parties to use nuclear material in Naval Nuclear Propulsion, within the safeguards framework.
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The NPT permits the transfer of nuclear material at any enrichment level provided the transfer is not for nuclear weapons and is carried out in a manner consistent with any relevant safeguards obligations. Australia’s programme will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures, consistent with its longstanding non-proliferation obligations. Australia’s Article 14 arrangement will enable the Agency to continue meeting its technical objectives.
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Once Australia and the Secretariat agree an Article 14 arrangement, it will come to the Board for appropriate action. Suggestions that the Board will be bypassed are categorically false.
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Contrary to the false assertions we have heard, AUKUS partners have been transparent in updating this Board about our work to support Australia’s preparations to operate conventionally armed, nuclear-powered submarines.
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As we have informed the Board, UK and US submarine visits to Australia, including through Submarine Rotational Force-West from 2027, are central to preparing Australia to operate, maintain and steward nuclear-powered submarines safely and securely. Direct experience alongside AUKUS partners is the most effective way to build this capability. These visits are consistent with AUKUS partners’ international obligations. We will update the Board again about recent developments under Any Other Business.
Chair,
Since AUKUS was first announced in 2021, AUKUS partners have provided extensive updates at every regular Board, all of which are available online. We encourage China and others to review these and raise any further questions directly with AUKUS partners, rather than taking up the Board’s valuable time on issues that have already been addressed.
We will continue our open and transparent engagement on AUKUS, update the Board under “Any Other Business”, and welcome further reports from the Director General when he considers them appropriate.
Thank you, Chair.