Independent report

Special Representative on UK victims of Qadhafi-sponsored IRA terrorism: executive summary and conclusions

Published 20 October 2025

Executive summary

1. Introduction 

The Terms of Reference provide that the initial Scoping Exercise1 is ‘to inform the next stage of [the Special Representative’s] work’. The Scoping Report is an internal report to the Foreign Secretary, with a preliminary scoping of the issues. The Scoping Report was largely drafted before the outbreak of the coronavirus pandemic; the pandemic affected the last few weeks of the Scoping Exercise and will clearly affect the priority given to this matter. 

Payment of compensation to the victims of Qadhafi-sponsored IRA terrorism has been under consideration by successive governments since 2002. 

The situation in Libya has deteriorated significantly since my appointment was announced in March 2019. The second Section summarises the current situation in, and summarises HMG’s current policy with regard to, Libya. It also gives a brief explanation of the current context in Northern Ireland and includes details of recent legal initiatives and other moves afoot to obtain Qadhafi-era compensation. 

Having set out this background, the Report endeavours to highlight the range of issues and questions raised by the matters I was asked to consider in the Terms of Reference.  It also attempts to identify how to seek reliable answers and some of the obstacles to doing that. The nature and cost of the resources required are also addressed.  

In one respect, I was not able to fulfil the requirements under the Terms of Reference. The strong advice and guidance received from the Victims’ Commissioners and the Victims and Survivors’ Service was that we should not formally meet with victims during the Scoping Exercise for a number of reasons including: risk of re-traumatisation, risk of further raising expectations at a stage when no decision to proceed with compensation has been taken, and lack of time to proceed with a proper consultation.

In three respects, I went beyond the remit set out in the Terms of Reference for reasons set out in the Report: the first is to consider whether the beneficiary class should be widened beyond UK victims of Qadhafi-sponsored IRA terrorism, the second is to consider whether redress should be provided by some other means than the payment of individual monetary compensation, and the third is to suggest that funding should, at least initially, be made available by HMG.   

The reasons for considering these additional issues were: 

• the Victims’ and Survivors’ Service and the Northern Ireland Victims’ Commissioner pressed for a bigger, broader solution than paying compensation to a narrow group; they implored me to understand the policies and politics surrounding victims and to be guided by ‘normal morality’, to deliver a strategic rather than a piecemeal response, and to justify my conclusions
• payment of monetary compensation, in particular tariffed amounts to individual victims, is complicated because of the difficulties inherent in any compensation scheme but also because of the very specific landscape of victim payments and services in Northern Ireland
• it is difficult to see how payment can be obtained from the Libyan State in the short to medium term
• if HMG provides funding (or advance funding), payment to a narrow group of beneficiaries could contribute to tensions over Northern Ireland legacy issues, and could be perceived not to be ‘rigorously impartial’ to both communities in Northern Ireland, an idea that is central to the Good Friday Agreement

2. Range of issues and questions considered

As the Report makes clear, the matters raised by the Review are complex. This is, in part, because the issue of payment of compensation forms part of the legacy issues between the UK and Libya, as well as being part of the Northern Ireland legacy issues. It is also in part because of the highly emotional and charged nature of legacy, victim, and compensation issues in Northern Ireland.  

The recent legal initiatives show that this matter has not gone away and that some victims are willing to resort to litigation to realise their claims. 

The interface between the payment of compensation and the structures and mechanisms already in place for victims in Northern Ireland and the new Victims and Survivors Pension scheme (intended to be operational from May 2020) throw up additional issues.   

Some key questions considered during the Scoping Exercise were: 

• has the time passed for making compensation
• how do you avoid exacerbating existing divisions around legacy, victim and compensation issues in Northern Ireland
• does a narrow focus on a group of victims detract from current policies and the broader political, social and economic objectives
• is payment of individual monetary compensation desirable and, if so, how do you attribute monetary value
• what other forms of redress would address the needs of victims
• how do you determine the eligibility criteria to avoid mass claims and yet avoid creating a hierarchy of victims
• would compensating only Semtex victims create more harm than not  compensating at all
• does the Victims’ and Survivors’ Pension scheme mean that only those not covered by it now need to be considered for compensation
• how do you arrive at an estimate of the likely amount of funding required and what sources of funding are available

3. Potential challenges

Potential challenges to the resolution of this issue are highlighted throughout the Report and in Section 10. They include navigating: 

• legacy, victim and compensation issues
• potential re-traumatisation of victims and raising of expectations
• HMG’s Libya policy and Northern Ireland policy
• political sensitivities in Northern Ireland
• precedent-setting concerns
• timing issues and
• funding issues

4. Resources and costs

More time and resources will need to be devoted to any further phase(s) of this work. 

It is not possible at the end of this Scoping Exercise to estimate the amount of funding required for compensation, for the reasons set out in the Report. There would, of course, in addition to such amount be other costs, which are detailed in the Report.  

Conclusions

Investigations of the feasibility of calculating a precise number of people affected

It will only be feasible to calculate a number of ‘people affected’ when there is agreement on the definition of ‘victim’, ‘UK victim’, the period during which incidents and events must have occurred, the loss or damage to be addressed, and the other eligibility criteria. It will not be possible to establish the specific group comprising victims of Qadhafi-sponsored IRA terrorism nor, given the wider context and if funding is to come from HMG, may it be prudent, or possible to do so under the terms of the GFA. 

Investigations of the feasibility of calculating the amount of compensation due to the people affected from the Libyan Government

It will only be possible to determine an amount of compensation when the number of ‘people affected’ (eligible victims) has been calculated and decisions have been taken about matters such as: the nature of the compensation (tariff-based monetary compensation; humanitarian or need-based payments; non-monetary (provision of services); investment in infrastructure); whether payment will be made on an individual or other basis; whether up-front or in instalments; what amounts will be deducted and how these can be collected. The question of funding is also crucial.

Consideration of the nature of compensation arrangements already reached with Libya

From the precedents considered, it is clear that payment of compensation was made as a result of the acceptance of legal liability by the Libyan Government and/or requirements under UNSCR or, in the case of the USLCSA, as a result of a bilateral agreement where neither side accepted responsibility.

One of the arguments made frequently by victims’ representatives is that HMG failed to obtain compensation for its victims whilst the US, French and German governments obtained compensation for their citizens. This is simplistic for a number of reasons including:

• when HMG was negotiating with Libya for the 1995 Statement, the question of compensation for IRA victims had not been raised with it; with hindsight, it might have been the best time raise the issue
• no legal findings or settlement pertaining to the supply of arms by Libya to the IRA existed prior to the resumption of diplomatic relations with Libya in 1999
• HMG determined that it would be difficult for the UK to enter into a bilateral agreement with Libya since there was evidence that the IRA was supported by a number of foreign governments and there was the issue of the Counter-claims
• HMG did not think it appropriate to enter into a bilateral relationship on compensation since the relationship with Libya had been transformed following the renunciation of terrorism and WMD in 2003
• at the time of entry into the USLCSA, Libya wanted to be taken off the State-sponsors of Terror list and the US wanted to ensure Libya destroyed its WMD and renounced international terrorism
• The US State Department said the deal was ‘humanitarian’ and ‘does not constitute an admission of fault by either party’
• FCO records suggest that France secured compensation for the victims in accordance with UNSCRs
• the French and German governments were not parties to the lawsuits in France in 2004 and Germany in 2011; the claims were brought by representatives of the victims
• records suggest the Humanitarian Fund was funded by foreign companies and international institutions operating in Libya including American companies, and a philanthropist

Meetings with victims’ representatives and parliamentarians

Victims’ expectations have been raised by a number of recent events, including my appointment and the Recent Legal Initiatives. We were informed that when such events are announced, there is a spike in anxiety levels amongst victims and survivors. It is for that reason, and others set out in the Report, that we did not seek to consult victims directly during the Scoping Exercise, although we did consult victims’ representatives.  Victim consultation will need to be undertaken in the next stage. The desired outcomes are varied and often contradictory. A path will need to be found through them.

Section 12: Conclusions

Conclusions relating to the specific questions posed in the Terms of Reference are set out at the end of each Section. In addition, I have reached the following conclusions: 

Resolution 

1. It is time to draw a line. The pain and suffering of the victims is real and harrowing; it has been compounded by the length of time this matter has been under discussion and that victims have waited for the redress they believe is due to them, partly because they have been encouraged in that belief.

2. It may not be possible to make the solution part of a comprehensive strategy.

‘People affected’ 

3. It is not possible to identify the number of ‘people affected’ by Qadhafi-sponsored IRA terrorism. If HMG is providing the funding, the beneficiary class may need to be widened.

Compensation 

4. Victims deserve material and other assistance, but there is a limit to the capacity of HMG to provide these.

5. Unless payment can be obtained from the Libyan State, individual compensation payments cannot be any greater than those paid under the UK Schemes if the integrity of the latter is to be preserved.

6. Some victims have already received compensation from the UK Schemes (but it is not possible to identify which) and/or payments or services from other sources and/or will receive payment under the VASP scheme; but gaps can be identified in the provision of payments and services which could be filled in priority to those already addressed.

7. The payment of tariffed amounts to individual and specific victims is considered by those on the front line to be undesirable. Other options are outlined in this Report.

8. How any resources are distributed and how outcomes will be monitored are also key issues to address.

Acknowledgement of harm and regret 

9. A statement of acknowledgment and regret of harm done by HMG is as important as material and other assistance. VSS and victims’ representatives noted the sensitivity and care that went into the message delivered by the Queen in the Republic of Ireland. (See the extract in Annex 14). Such a statement would be an expression of regret, not an acceptance of blame.

Libya

10. Libyan support undoubtedly contributed to the operational capacity of the PIRA and the longevity of its activities and to the destruction and violence on both sides of the conflict.

11. There is currently no stable/legitimate government in Libya and, even if there were, it would not consider this issue a priority.

12. Legally, the frozen assets/ interest on frozen assets cannot be used under the terms of the UNSC sanctions. Consideration can be given to refusing to release frozen. assets/blocking the lifting of the partial asset freeze from all or some of the institutions still subject to it in the UK; an application for release on licence or by way of humanitarian exemption; or hypothecating the tax collected on the income and gains on the frozen assets. All except the hypothecation of tax would require apportionment of liability to the Libyan Government.

HMT Funding 

13. HMT should fund the Scheme and consider whether there should be separate funding for NI and England. Funding could be obtained from the tax accrued on the frozen Libyan assets but will probably be insufficient, depending on the solution chosen. Other sources of government funding will probably be required.

14. If HMT advances the funds, consideration needs to be given to whether and how such funds would be reclaimed from Libya, accepting that this may not transpire.

Cross-government approach 

15. This matter has mostly to date been handled by the FCO. The next phase needs to be led by No 10 and receive the necessary political support. This support needs to be genuine and available throughout.

16. A cross government approach is necessary to take into account HMG’s wider policies and objectives.

Clear communication 

17. Many simplistic arguments have been made. Discussion of what may look straightforward to lay people – such as accessing the frozen assets or the interest on the frozen assets – has raised expectations without the context being explained to, and understood by, victims.

18. The next phase(s) will require political will, sustained focus, and clear communication.  The vulnerability of victims and the risks of raising expectations and re-traumatisation need to be carefully handled.

My conclusions will need to be developed, including following consultation with victims, and tested.  That is why I have recommended proceeding to the next stage of the Review.