Policy paper

UK action against Russian foreign information warfare

Updated 11 May 2026

Across Europe, we are witnessing an escalation in hybrid threats – from physical and cyber attacks through to information warfare – designed to destabilise our democracies, weaken our critical national infrastructure, and undermine our interests, all for the advantage of malign foreign states.

Foreign Information Manipulation and Interference (FIMI) operations create fake websites and use social media and bot accounts to undermine democratic elections and spread deliberately misleading narratives in support of Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. Russian organisations responsible for vast malign online networks like Doppelgänger specialise in flooding social media with counterfeit documents and deepfake material in English, German, and French, advancing Russia’s strategic aims. In December 2025, the Foreign Secretary condemned Russia’s use of information warfare and committed the UK to stepping up activity to counter it.

We are scaling cooperation with European partners on hybrid and information threats, including through the UK-EU Security and Defence Partnership, and through deep cooperation between teams in the UK, in France, Germany, Poland and Brussels, to deliver a pan-European response to a pan-European threat.

Latest activity

Since October 2024, this government has sanctioned 40 entities and individuals responsible for delivering Russia’s information warfare. On 11 May 2026, the UK sanctioned an additional 56 interference actors for their role in destabilising Ukraine:

• 49 employees of the Social Design Agency (SDA)
• ANO Strategic Communications Caspian 2030
• Vladimir Grigorievich Tabak
• Timofey Vladimirovich Vasiliev
• Internet Development Institute
• Expert Institute for Social Research
• Euroview
• Govorit

Entities designated

Social Design Agency (SDA)

In October 2024, the UK designated the SDA for delivering FIMI campaigns designed to undermine international support for Ukraine on behalf of the Russian Presidential Administration. The SDA has been attributed as behind the malign online network commonly known as “Doppelgänger”, which impersonates trusted media outlets to disseminate pro-Kremlin and anti-Ukraine narratives through cloned websites, fabricated material and coordinated inauthentic behaviour.

The SDA is tasked and funded directly by the Russian state and, along with its partner company Structura, has attempted to deliver a series of interference operations designed to undermine democracy and weaken international support for Ukraine. In 2024, the SDA attempted to incite protests in several European countries.

The SDA has planned campaigns which were almost certainly tasked by the Presidential Administration. This included seeking to establish pro-Russia organisations in Armenia and influence a change in power towards pro-Russia figures.

Since October 2024, the UK has designated senior SDA figures – Ilya Andreevich Gambashidze, Nikolai Aleksandrovich Tupikin and Andrey Naumovich Perla – alongside 63 further SDA employees. In November 2025, the UK designated AEZA Group for providing internet hosting services for use in the SDA’s malign interference campaigns targeting Ukraine. In May 2026, the UK designated ANO Strategic Communications Caspian 2030 as a new SDA vehicle for carrying out interference in the CIS region.

ANO Dialog

The UK designated ANO Dialog in October 2024 for carrying on business as a Government of Russia-affiliated entity, including being paid by the Kremlin to establish content centres in Russia-occupied Ukraine and supporting Russia’s sham regional elections. ANO Dialog operates overt and covert online assets designed to push Russian state propaganda.

ANO Dialog is tasked by the Russian Presidential Administration and has worked alongside Russian intelligence services to carry out malign influence campaigns on behalf of the Government of Russia. ANO Dialog has also coordinated with Russian intelligence on interference plans aimed at Armenian domestic politics.  

In May 2026, the UK designated ANO Dialog senior employees Timofey Vladimirovich Vasiliev and Vladimir Grigorievich Tabak for being involved in the destabilisation of Ukraine.

Foundation for the Support and Protection of the Rights of Compatriots Living Abroad (Pravfond)

In December 2025, the UK designated Government of Russia-affiliated entities facilitating and delivering Russian propaganda which undermines international support for Ukraine. Leaked reports suggest Pravfond, attributed as a front for the GRU by Estonia, has funnelled money into Euromore and Golos, nominally independent news outlets which hide their connection to the Russian state to spread Kremlin propaganda targeting Ukraine to European audiences.

Following the designation of Euromore and Golos in December 2025, the websites ceased their regular operations. In May 2026, the UK designated Euroview and Govorit as new inauthentic media websites designed to continue the destabilising activity of Euromore and Golos respectively.

Internet Development Institute (IRI)

The UK designated IRI in May 2026 for commissioning and producing material intending to destabilise Ukraine, including attempts to glorify the invasion of Ukraine through original films. Further, IRI has created deliberately misleading video games designed to promote malign Russian narratives. IRI was also designated for being a Government of Russia-affiliated entity, due to being established by the Russian Presidential Administration and receiving hundreds of millions of pounds in funding from the Government of Russia.

Expert Institute for Social Research (EISI)

The UK designated EISI in May 2026 for supporting the destabilisation of Ukraine. EISI has played a direct role in implementing Russian state policy intended to entrench control over occupied territory in Ukraine and was central to creating false Russian narratives designed to legitimise the invasion of Ukraine. EISI was also designated for being a Government of Russia-affiliated entity; despite being nominally run by leading Russian universities, the Government of Russia maintains indirect control of EISI for use as a think tank for the Russian Presidential Administration.

Rybar LLC

In December 2025, the UK designated Rybar LLC, a media company partially resourced by the Government of Russia that hides its connections to the Russian state and runs a covert FIMI network that promotes international support for the illegal invasion of Ukraine and interferes in global democratic processes, including elections in the EU and Moldova.

Rybar uses manipulation tactics including fake “investigations” and AI-driven content to respond rapidly to global events and shape narratives in the Kremlin’s favour. Rybar is partially coordinated by the Presidential Administration, receives funding from Russian state corporation Rostec and works with members of the Russian intelligence services. The UK has also designated Mikhail Sergeevich Zvinchuk, Rybar LLC’s co-owner and General Director.

Centre for Geopolitical Expertise (CGE)

In December 2025, the UK designated the Moscow-based “think tank” CGE for funding and directing Russian FIMI networks that undermine international support for Ukraine, and its founder Aleksandr Dugin, a prominent supporter of the invasion of Ukraine whose work closely informs Putin’s calculations. The CGE is linked to the Russian intelligence services and has coordinated support for the Russian FIMI network known as Storm-1516 to further its aims of undermining Ukraine.

Storm-1516 is a malign influence network which produces content that seeks to undermine European unity and create support for Russia’s illegal war in Ukraine. It repeatedly targets European political figures and domestic political parties with false and divisive claims, such as allegations of corruption or impropriety. These videos are then spread through social media accounts, news portals and inauthentic websites. Some of these inauthentic sites impersonate legitimate organisations or media outlets.

Evrazia and A7A5

In April 2025, the UK designated Evrazia, a Russian non-profit, for operating in Moldova on behalf of the Moldovan oligarch Ilan Shor, to destabilise Moldovan democracy. The organisation was used to bribe Moldovan citizens to vote “no” in a 2024 referendum on joining the EU; Moldovan police found that approximately 130,000 citizens received a total of $15 million from Evrazia. In August 2025, the UK designated actors involved in sanctions circumvention and cryptocurrency networks exploited by Russia. These included entities supporting the rouble-backed cryptocurrency A7A5, closely linked to Ilan Shor’s company A7.

The UK had previously designated Shor in December 2022 under the Global Anti-Corruption Sanctions Regulations 2021, for being involved in serious corruption with respect to bribery of foreign public officials, namely his involvement in the theft of one billion USD from Moldovan banks.

African Initiative

In July 2025, the UK designated African Initiative – alongside employees Artyom Sergeevich Kureyev, Anna Sergeevna Zamaraeva and Victor Aleksandrovich Lukovenko – for promoting deliberately misleading narratives designed to undermine international support for Ukraine in Africa.

African Initiative is a social media content mill established and funded by Russia and employing Russian intelligence officers to conduct information operations in West Africa. This includes attempts to undermine global health initiatives in the region by pushing baseless conspiracy theories to further the Kremlin’s political agenda.

Next steps

We will continue to work with international partners to expose and attribute hostile information activity, strengthen the resilience of our democratic institutions, and disrupt those responsible using the full range of tools available – including sanctions where appropriate. The UK will not be deterred from standing up to foreign information manipulation and interference that seeks to undermine our security and values.

Note

Some of this analysis is drawn from open source material. As such, there is a risk that information may exist that contradicts, alters or strengthens the conclusions contained within this document.

The information regarding designated persons was correct at the date of publication. See the UK Sanctions List for an up-to-date list of those subject to sanctions.