Impact assessment: visa brake (accessible version)
Published 6 March 2026
© Crown copyright 2026
This publication is licensed under the terms of the Open Government Licence v3.0 except where otherwise stated. To view this licence, visit nationalarchives.gov.uk/doc/open-government-licence/version/3 or write to the Information Policy Team, The National Archives, Kew, London TW9 4DU, or email: psi@nationalarchives.gov.uk.
Where we have identified any third party copyright information you will need to obtain permission from the copyright holders concerned.
This publication is available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statement-of-changes-to-the-immigration-rules-hc-1619-5-march-2026/impact-assessment-visa-brake-accessible-version
Title: Visa Brake
Type of measure: Immigration Rules change
Department or agency: Home Office
IA number: HO IA 1030
Type of Impact Assessment: Final
RPC reference number: N/A
Contact for enquiries: Migration and Citizenship Policy, Home Office
Date: 03/03/2026
1. Summary of proposal
1. The visa brake will close out-of-country Skilled Worker and/or Study visa routes for nationalities where there is a high number and high proportion of main applicants that subsequently apply for asylum in the UK. Visa routes and nationalities that will have a visa brake applied are:
-
Skilled Worker visa: Afghanistan
-
Study visa: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan
2. Once in place, a visa brake will result in the refusal of the relevant out-of-country visa applications for an initial 18-month period. Following the initial 18-month period, the brake will be reviewed and may be extended or released. The visa brake is not intended to be permanent and will be released when the government considers it is appropriate to do so.
2. Strategic case for proposed regulation
3. The immigration system is facing an unacceptable number of visa-linked asylum claims and associated support costs. The system must be protected, and public confidence strengthened, particularly since this confidence risks being undermined where purpose-bound visa-routes (like Study and Skilled Worker) are, or are perceived to be, used as a route to claim asylum in the UK. By targeting those routes and nationalities where the proportion of asylum claims to visas issued are highest, the visa brake is designed to reduce the strain on the immigration system and to consequently reduce associated asylum support costs, as well as increase public confidence in the integrity of the immigration system. These actions meet the stated intents of the Immigration White Paper[footnote 1] published in May 2025 and the Asylum and Returns policy statement of November 2025[footnote 2].
4. The number of asylum claims from people who arrived in the UK on a visa or other leave has nearly tripled since the year ending September 2022. In the year ending September 2025, 38 per cent (41,461) of asylum seekers had previously entered the UK on a work, study, visit visa or other leave with relevant documentation[footnote 3]. Figure 1 shows how asylum claims after entering on a ‘Visa or Other Leave’ has grown since 2021.
Figure 1. Asylum claims by route of entry to the UK, year ending September 2021 – year ending (YE) September 2025[footnote 4]
| Irregular arrivals | Visas and other leave | Other | |
|---|---|---|---|
| YE Sep 21 | 31,724 | 7,379 | 6,432 |
| YE Sep 22 | 63,511 | 15,060 | 9,642 |
| YE Sep 23 | 54,975 | 26,000 | 13,157 |
| YE Sep 24 | 43,924 | 37,509 | 15,658 |
| YE Sep 25 | 57,359 | 41,461 | 11,231 |
‘Other’ refers to entries from non-visa countries, clandestine entry, EU nationals exercising Freedom of Movement, UK born descendants of asylum seekers.
5. As set out in the Asylum and Returns policy statement, [footnote 5] around 106,000 asylum seekers are currently receiving state-funded support, with the vast majority living in asylum accommodation. Nationals of Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan present some of the consistently highest proportions of asylum claims relative to visas issued. This is causing notable operational pressure on the asylum system. In total, as of September 2025, 15,906 of these nationals are in receipt of Home Office support, including 6,412 individuals in hotels. Asylum statistics for the year ending September 2025 are published on GOV.UK[footnote 6].
6. For these nationalities, the highest proportion and number of asylum claims come from the Study visa route. For Afghanistan, a high proportion and number of claims also come from the Skilled Worker route. To protect UK border security from these unsustainable levels of visa-linked asylum claims, the Home Office will refuse Study visa applications from main applicants who are nationals of Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar, and Sudan. Additionally, Skilled Worker visa applications will be refused from main applicants who are nationals of Afghanistan.
7. The main benefit of the visa brake is that it will immediately prevent entry to the UK from those targeted nationalities on Study and Skilled Worker visas, and any subsequent asylum claims they would have made, therefore reducing the strain and cost on the asylum system. It will also meet the stated intents of the Immigration White Paper[footnote 7] and the Asylum and Returns policy statement[footnote 8] to drive down asylum and support, particularly where it is preventable, and to strengthen public confidence in the immigration system. The brake is not intended to be permanent and will be reviewed after the initial 18-month period to assess if it will be extended or released.
8. The imposition of this first phase of visa brakes to these targeted nationalities and visa routes will send a message to all. Whilst the UK is open to talented people willing to contribute to this country on Skilled Worker and Study visas, the tighter controls, restrictions and scrutiny introduced will seek to reduce the burden of those who attempt to abuse or misuse the immigration system.
9. An 18-month time frame for the brake has been chosen as this allows for sufficient time to evidence a downward trend in claims, ease the pressure on the asylum system and observe any delayed behaviour response to the policy. Typically, there is up to an 18 month time delay between being issued a visa and claiming asylum for these nationalities and routes. 18 months allows for claimant behaviour response to be monitored in full.
10. The analysis in this IA presents a negative Net Present Social Value (NPSV) – associated with the quantifiable first order effects which balance a loss of visa fee, loss of student tuition fee and wider economic benefits from students and workers (who may not go on to claim asylum) with savings from fewer asylum claims. This cost must be considered in the context of potential longer term unquantifiable benefits (second order effects) which contribute to the rationale for changes.
11. An unquantified benefit is the longer‑term cost savings from fewer asylum claims. The public sector costs have only been quantified for asylum claims up to the point of asylum outcome, or any subsequent appeals or removal of failed asylum seekers. The long-term public sector costs associated with those granted asylum is not quantified. It is unknown what additional fiscal pressures a claimant exerts after asylum is granted, including length of stay in the country and on educational, housing and healthcare usage.
12. There is also an unquantifiable second order benefit from a potential wider behavioural change from sponsors as a result of the visa brake, as they may seek to recruit workers or enrol students that are less likely to apply for asylum. Organisations may pivot to other student and labour markets or adapt their application process to select those most likely to complete the terms of their visa. This may be due to both enforced replacement from sponsors affected by the visa brake, or a proactive adjustment from sponsors to ‘future-proof‘ their recruitment pool should further brakes be implemented. By any means, this could further reduce the number of asylum claims from countries that aren’t included in the brake. Although this behavioural impact is unknown, to give an indication of possible scale, just a one percentage point reduction in the rate of claiming asylum from all migrants arriving on a visa could result in a cost saving of £81 million over 1 year[footnote 9].
13. Whilst the overall NPSV is negative over the 5-year impact assessment period, the public sector Net Present Value (NPV) is -£2.79 million and the low impact scenario is net positive (£23.68 million) Therefore this intervention could plausibly meet the primary objectives to both reduce asylum claims from visas and save overall public sector costs.
14. Without government intervention, the business-as-usual scenario would mean that the number of asylum claims made from those arriving on Skilled Work and Study visas would likely remain high and increase the risks of not meeting the strategic objectives.
3. SMART objectives for intervention
15. This policy will introduce tighter controls, restrictions and scrutiny of those who attempt to abuse and misuse the immigration system. This directly aligns to stated intents of the Immigration White Paper published in May 2025[footnote 10].
16. The objective of the visa brake is to reduce the number of asylum claims made from migrants that arrive on regular visa routes, therefore reducing associated asylum support costs. The policy specifically aims to reduce asylum claims from the nationalities and visa routes in which the visa brake is applied. The number of asylum claims will be regularly monitored throughout the 18-month period brake.
4. Description of proposed intervention options and explanation of the logical change process whereby this achieves SMART objectives
17. Imposing a brake on out-of-country visas for these targeted nationalities and routes prevents this route of entry to the UK. Without entry into the UK, migrants are unable to apply for asylum. The pressure is then reduced on the asylum system in the medium term when a significant proportion of these individuals that would have been issued visas would go on to make an asylum application. The policy particularly aims to target individuals who make their asylum claim shortly after entering the country. Typically, there is up to an 18 month time delay between being issued a visa and claiming asylum for these nationalities and routes. With these routes closed, the system would expect to start seeing tangible reductions in claims within a similar timespan.
5. Summary of long-list and alternatives
18. The Asylum and Returns policy statement published in November 2025[footnote 11] sets out the government’s vision and additional policy intentions to reduce the flow of migrants arriving in the UK with the intention of claiming asylum.
19. The visa brake will target visa routes and nationalities where the proportion of asylum claims to visas issued are highest in order to immediately reduce the strain on the immigration system and consequently reduce associated asylum support costs.
20. The threshold employed for consideration of a visa brake is a minimum 100 asylum claims per year linked to a visa from a particular nationality along a particular route, and the number of asylum claims made whilst on that visa route is at least 15 per cent of the number of Entry Clearance visas issued. The year used for the threshold was year ending September 2025.
21. This threshold was chosen as a basis from which to consider the imposition of a brake upon nationalities / routes. It covers cohorts posing the most substantial risk of visa-linked asylum claims whilst still being proportionate.
22. Once a nationality reaches the threshold, this triggers a broader assessment to inform a final decision on whether to impose a visa brake. This includes not just visa-linked asylum rates, but also wider equities, such as migration considerations, national security, and growth.
23. Once arrived in the UK, migrants have the right to claim asylum regardless of visas previously held. Imposing a visa brake targets those migrants that are issued visas and subsequently apply for asylum, it does this by preventing initial entry to the UK.
6. Description of shortlisted policy options carried forward
24. Option 1: ‘Do nothing’ (Business as usual). This is not a viable option given the sustained disproportionate volumes of asylum claims having entered on a visa from certain nationalities along certain routes. This measure would not support efforts to reduce the proportion of asylum claims that are linked to a visa.
25. Option 2: Impose a visa brake by refusing out-of-country visas from specific nationalities and visa routes for a period of 18 months. This is the government’s preferred option. Visa routes and nationalities that will have a visa brake applied:
- Skilled Worker visa: Afghanistan
- Study visa: Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan
7. Regulatory scorecard for preferred option
Part A: Overall and stakeholder impacts
(1) Overall impacts on total welfare
Description of overall expected impact
The 18-month visa brake is estimated to reduce the number of asylum claims from migrants arriving in the UK on visas by 1,400; of which, 1,300 from Study visas and 90 from Skilled Worker visas.
The brake is estimated to prevent 4,300 Study visas being issued (Afghanistan, Cameroon, Myanmar and Sudan) and 90 Skilled Worker visas (from Afghanistan) during this period.
Overall, the visa brake impact represents a NPSV of between - £127.5 million and -£36.5 million over the 5-year appraisal period. There are substantial costs estimated to be saved by Public Sector with the reduction in asylum claims, particularly from reduced Home Office costs for supported asylum accommodation. However, the NPSV is also dependant on the ability of organisations to replace the enrolment of students from the visa brake nationalities, with other nationalities.
Whilst the IA presents a negative NPSV – associated with the quantifiable short term first order effects – this must be read in the context of potential longer term unquantifiable benefits, including the second order effects which contribute to the rationale for changes.
Directional rating
Uncertain based on all impacts (incl. non-monetised)
Monetised impacts
The monetised impact represents a NPSV between -£127.5 million and -£36.5 million over the appraisal period, with a best estimate of -£86.3 million.
The overall NPSV is predominantly driven by the Business Net Present Value (BNPV); -£107.0 million to -£60.1 million. Organisations that enrol students from nationalities that with a visa brake applied will forego student tuition fees unless enrolments can be filled by other nationalities.
This IA uses a conservative student enrolment replacement assumption of between 0 per cent to 50 per cent. While it is uncertain how quickly institutions will be able to fill vacancies/enrolments within the 18-month window, it is expected that in the longer term all vacancies/enrolments could be filled.
The monetised Public Sector impact represents a NPV between - £20.5 million and +£23.7 million over the appraisal period, with a best estimate of -£2.8 million.
Public Sector visa processing costs saved are estimated to be between +£1.0 million and +£1.5 million. Benefits from Public Sector asylum costs saved are estimated to be between +£5.9 million and +£31.4 million
Visa and Immigration Health Surcharge (IHS) fee foregone represents a cost of -£9.4 million to -£5.6 million, and wider fiscal revenue loss of between -£18.1 million and -£3.60 million.
Directional rating
Negative
Non-monetised impacts
There is an unquantifiable benefit from wider behavioural change from sponsors in response to the visa brake as they may recruit workers or enrol students that are less likely to apply for asylum. Organisations may pivot to other student and labour markets or adapt their application process to select those most likely to complete the terms of their visa. This could reduce the number of asylum claims linked to a visa going forward. Although this behavioural impact is unknown, a modelled one percentage point reduction in rate of claiming asylum from all migrants arriving on a visa could result in a cost saving of £81 million over one year.
The long-term impact for reduced asylum claims has not been quantified. Public Sector asylum impacts have only been monetised up to point of asylum decision, and then any subsequent appeals or removal for those with failed asylum outcomes. The additional fiscal pressures a claimant exerts after asylum grant, including length of stay in the country on housing, educational and healthcare usage, have not been quantified.
Directional rating
Positive
Any significant or adverse distributional impacts?
Low risk of any disproportional impact on small to medium businesses, specific households or on specific nations and regions of the UK.
The top 10 higher educational establishments impacted by the brake are all classified as large organisations (over 250 employees).
Directional rating
Neutral
(2) Expected impacts on businesses
Description of overall business impact
Organisations that enrol students from visa brake nationalities will forego student tuition fees unless they are able to replace their enrolments from other nationalities.
The visa brake impact is proportionality small compared to total visas issued. For year ending September 2025 there were 440,000 Study visas were issued, whilst the visa brake is estimated to impact on 4,300 Study visas during the 18-month period.
The impact on organisations that recruit Skilled Workers from Afghanistan is assumed to be negligible. It is estimated that the brake would impact on only 90 skilled workers, of which 100 per cent are estimated to go on to apply for asylum shortly after arriving, based on historic behaviour.
Directional rating
Negative
Monetised impacts
The monetised impact represents a BNPV between -£107.0 million to -£60.1 million over the appraisal period, with a best estimate of -£83.6 million.
This includes loss of tuition fees ranging from -£107.4 million to - £60.5 million and savings from Immigration Skills Charge/Certificate of Sponsorship/Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies fees of £0.4 million to £0.5 million.
The estimated range represent the impact of 0 per cent to 50 per cent replacement rate of students from other nationalities filling the enrolments during the 18-month brake period.
Directional rating
Negative
Non-monetised impacts
The cost implication for sponsors to alter communications to existing markets or to pivot to other markets has not been monetised.
There may also may an adjustment cost in terms of how student enrolments from visa brake nationalities are replaced with students from other nationalities.
Should universities issue more visas to individuals that are more likely to complete the course and period of their visa, there is likely a positive reputational and economic impact that is not quantified.
Directional rating
Negative
Any significant or adverse distributional impacts?
There is a low risk of any disproportionally impact on small to medium businesses, specific households or on specific nations and regions of the UK.
The top 10 higher educational establishments impacted by the brake are all classified as large organisations (over 250 employees).
Directional rating
Neutral
(3) Expected impacts on households
Description of overall household impact
In line with previous Home Office impact assessments, this IA considers the impact of the visa brakes on the welfare of the UK resident population (considered to be UK nationals and migrants at the point of application for naturalisation as British Citizens). There are no negative impacts on households identified, either monetised or non-monetised due to applying the visa brake to out-of-country visas.
Directional rating
Neutral
Monetised impacts
None.
Directional rating
Neutral
Non-monetised impacts
None
Directional rating
Neutral
Any significant or adverse distributional impacts?
None
Directional rating
Neutral
Part B: Impacts on wider government priorities
| Category | Description of impact | Directional rating |
|---|---|---|
| Business environment: Does the measure impact on the ease of doing business in the UK? | There is likely to be a cost to organisations that sponsor overseas students over this appraisal period due to the adjustment costs set out above. However, over the long-term, given small numbers affected, and historic growth in student numbers, it could be expected that many of these student enrolments could be replaced by other nationalities. | Negative |
| International Considerations: Does the measure support international trade and investment? | The implementation of visa brakes is not likely to have a detrimental impact on international trade or investment. The expected short-term reduction in overseas students as a result of a visa brake is small compared to the total stock of students in the UK. Therefore, any trade impacts are be expected to be small. | Negative |
| Natural capital and Decarbonisation: Does the measure support commitments to improve the environment and decarbonise? | No meaningful impacts have been identified. | Neutral |
8. Monitoring and evaluation of preferred option
26. The Home Office will monitor the effects of the visa brake, with support from other government departments where appropriate. Monitoring will include tracking the number of asylum claims submitted by migrants who arrived on Work, Study, or Visit visas – as well as those that enter into the UK without a visa – to assess any behavioural effects on applicants and sponsors during the visa brake period. At the end of the 18‑month brake period, the policy will be reviewed before decisions are taken on whether, and when, brakes should be lifted. This principally involves a broader cross-government security assessment of the risk of future visa-linked asylum claims. After release, asylum claims linked to visas from those countries in scope of this visa brake will be closely tracked. Routine internal data collection of the number of claims by nationality and method of entry will be used to assess any behaviour response.
9. Minimising administrative and compliance costs for preferred option
27. The visa brakes will be implemented within 21 days of being announced. No applications will be affected before this date. Communication will go out promptly to impacted sponsors to minimise time before replacement individuals can be recruited from alternate labour and student markets.
10. Main assumptions / sensitivities and economic / analytical risks
28. The framework for quantifying first order effects starts by constructing a baseline which estimates potential future migrants that would have applied for and been issued a visa in the absence of any policy intervention. A baseline is also established for the expected number of migrants arriving of these routes that would have gone on to apply for asylum.
29. The impact of imposing a visa brake is then modelled against this baseline to estimate the impact of migrants that are no longer able to arrive on Skilled Worker and Study routes, as well as the subsequent number not claiming asylum.
30. The Net Present Social Value (NPSV) is calculated over a 5-year appraisal period, including both direct and indirect effects associated with modelled changes in migration and asylum claims.
31. Direct effects are the fiscal and wider economic costs and benefits from reduced immigration along affected routes. Difficult to measure are any second order or indirect impacts, stemming from wider potential behavioural responses. These include:
- a. Bounce-back. Some migrants may delay their visa applications during the 18-month brake and then apply once the brake is lifted. This will reduce fiscal revenue and tuition fee foregone but also reduce cost savings from prevented asylum claims. Because there is no direct evidence on how many would defer, a cautious 20 per cent rate is assumed and included in the modelling. Sensitivity analysis is explored further from paragraph 83 in the evidence base.
- b. Replacement. Since the brake only affects specific nationalities, some lost student enrolments and work recruitments may be replaced by applicants from other countries. The central scenario assumes a 25 per cent replacement rate (ranging from 0 per cent to 50 per cent in high and low impact scenarios – see paragraph 72). This applies only to enrolments that would not have resulted in asylum claims. Over time it could be expected that sponsors will adapt their enrolment or recruitment strategies, reducing the long term impact.
- c. Displacement. No displacement into other routes has been modelled, for example, onto the visit visa route or entry into the UK without a visa. There is no direct evidence base to understand any rerouting of migrants due to closed Study and Skilled Worker routes, particularly given that alternate options vary significantly in eligibility and process. For example, the criteria and costs involved for a migrant to be granted a Study or Skilled Worker visa are substantially higher compared to a visit visa. Any entry from the in-scope nationalities despite the brake is covered within the bounce-back sensitivity analysis.
- d. Behavioural change from sponsors as a result of the visa brake, as they may seek to recruit workers or enrol students that are less likely to apply for asylum. Organisations may pivot to other student and labour markets or adapt their application process to select those most likely to complete the terms of their visa. This may be due to both enforced replacement from sponsors affected by the visa brake, or a proactive adjustment from sponsors to ‘future-proof‘ their recruitment pool should further brakes be implemented. By any means, this could further reduce the number of asylum claims from countries that aren’t included in the brake
Declaration
Department: Home Office
Contact details for enquiries: Migration and Citizenship Policy, Home Office
Minister responsible: Minister Tapp
I have read the Impact Assessment, and I am satisfied that, given the available evidence, it represents a reasonable view of the likely costs, benefits and impact of the leading options.
Signed:
Date:
Costs (£m)
| Option 0. ‘Do nothing – (Business as usual - baseline) | Option 1. Impose a visa brake by refusing out-of-country visas from specific nationalities and visa routes for a period of 18 months. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Low | NA – no change in relation to baseline | -£69.7 million | |
| High | NA – no change in relation to baseline | -£134.9 million | |
| Best | NA – no change in relation to baseline | -£100.3 million | |
| Non-Quantified Impacts | N/A | The public sector costs have only been quantified for asylum claims up to the point of asylum outcome, or any subsequent appeals or removal of failed asylum seekers. The long-term public sector costs associated with those granted asylum is not quantified. The additional fiscal pressures a claimant exerts after asylum grant, including length of stay in the country on housing, educational and healthcare usage, have not been quantified. Additional non-quantified costs are likely to be incurred by organisations in adjusting to their student enrolments from the targeted nationalities. How educational establishments choose to adjust, the relative ease and length of time taken to do so will depend on their dependency of students from these nationalities |
Benefits (£m)
| Option 0. ‘Do nothing – (Business as usual - baseline) | Option 1. Impose a visa brake by refusing out-of-country visas from specific nationalities and visa routes for a period of 18 months. | |
|---|---|---|
| Low | NA – no change in relation to baseline | £33.3 million |
| High | NA – no change in relation to baseline | £7.4 million |
| Best | NA – no change in relation to baseline | £14.0 million |
| Non-Quantified Impacts | N/A | There is a potential wider behavioural change from sponsors because of the visa brake as they may seek to recruit workers or enrol students that are less likely to apply for asylum. They may pivot to other student and labour markets or adapt their application process to select those most likely to complete the period and terms of their visa. This may be due to both enforced replacement from sponsors affected by the visa brake, or a proactive adjustment from any sponsors to ‘future-proof‘ their recruitment pool should further brakes be implemented. By any means, this could further reduce the number of asylum claims from nationalities that aren’t included in the brake. Although this behavioural impact is unknown, a one percentage point reduction in rate of claiming asylum from all migrants arriving on a visa could result in a cost saving of £81 million over one year. |
Net present social value (£m)
| Option 0. ‘Do nothing – (Business as usual - baseline) | Option 1. Impose a visa brake by refusing out-of-country visas from specific nationalities and visa routes for a period of 18 months. | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Low | NA – no change in relation to baseline | -£36.5 million | |
| High | NA – no change in relation to baseline | -£127.5 million | |
| Best | NA – no change in relation to baseline | -£86.3 million |
| Option 0. ‘Do nothing – (Business as usual - baseline) | Option 1. Impose a visa brake by refusing out-of-country visas from specific nationalities and visa routes for a period of 18 months. | |
|---|---|---|
| Public sector financial costs | NA – no change in relation to baseline | Public sector financial costs are included in the NPSV as changes to visa fee, Immigration Health Surcharge (IHS) and Immigration Skills Charge (ISC) revenue. These are set out in detail in the Evidence Base section. |
| Significant un-quantified benefits and costs | NA – no change in relation to baseline | The Public Sector costs have only been quantified for asylum claims up to the point of asylum outcome, or any subsequent appeals or removal of failed asylum seekers. The long-term public sector costs associated with those granted asylum is not quantified. The additional fiscal pressures a claimant exerts after asylum grant, including length of stay in the country on housing, educational and healthcare usage, have not been quantified. |
| Key risks | NA – no change in relation to baseline | There is a risk that those migrants impacted by the visa brake that would have applied for asylum use an alternative way to enter the UK, and therefore still apply for asylum . Displacement onto other visas routes or entry without a visa will be monitored and assessed. The proportion of individuals prevented from applying that wait and apply once the brake is released is unknown. If this proportion is very different from what has been modelled, the true cost/benefit impacts will differ from these estimates. The flexibility of sponsors to pivot to other student/labour markets is unknown. It is also unknown whether the replacement recruitments will be more or less likely to claim asylum. If these proportions are very different from what has been modelled, the true cost/benefit impacts will differ from these estimates. |
| Results of sensitivity analysis | NA – no change in relation to baseline | The central scenario with 20 per cent bounce-back leads to -£86.3 million NPSV. Using the central scenario with 0 per cent bounce-back leads to -£114.6 million, and with 40 per cent is -£58.12 million. |
Evidence base
Analytical Framework
1. The framework for quantifying first order effects starts by constructing a baseline which estimates potential future migrants that would have applied for and been issued a visa in the absence of any policy intervention. Home Office internal visa demand forecasts are used to estimate the number of applications that would have been expected to have been received from particular routes and nationalities. A historic grant rate is then applied to convert this to the number of visas that will no longer be issued because of the brake. In order to estimate the expected number of migrants arriving of these routes that would have gone on to apply for asylum, a historic proportion of migrants claiming asylum is applied to visa estimates. The impact of imposing a visa brake is then modelled against this baseline to estimate the impact of migrants that are no longer able to arrive on Skilled Worker and Study routes, as well as the subsequent number not claiming asylum.
2. The monetised impact of the measure is summarised in the NPSV calculation which includes both direct and indirect effects associated with modelled changes in migration and asylum claims. Impacts are quantified in the appraisal under the following categories:
- a. Fee and Charge revenue and processing cost impacts – these arise from changes in volumes by visa type, which affect the revenue and processing costs in these areas. This direct impact falls to the public sector and on domestic business for Immigration Skills Charge (ISC) charges.
- b. Asylum costs impact from fewer asylum claims – these arise from reducing demand on the asylum system and avoiding the costs of processing asylum claims and providing accommodation and cash support for destitute asylum seekers, as well as costs associated with any appeals against a decision outcome. This impact falls to the public sector.
- c. Tax income and public services pressure - arise from changes in volumes, and the characteristics of migrants that arrive on a particular visa. Changes in volumes result in a change in the number of people residing in the UK for the duration of that particular visa, affecting tax income and public services pressure. For each skilled worker and student that is prevented from being issued a visa as a result of the brake, the public sector faces lost fiscal income from tax revenue. These include direct taxes such as income tax, national insurance, council tax as well as indirect taxes such as VAT. The fiscal benefits modelled for each individual that does not arrive as a result of the brake include reduced government spending from public services on health, education, personal social services, and wider public services. This indirect impact falls to the public sector.
- d. Tuition fee revenue – these arise from behavioural changes in student volumes and the associated change in tuition fee revenue collected by Higher Education Institutions. This indirect impact falls to domestic business.
3. The NPSV is calculated over a five-year appraisal period. This has been chosen due to the short-term nature (18-month) of the initial visa brake while accounting for the time delay between visa issue and claim (over 99% of claims from the routes and nationalities in scope are lodged within 5 years of visa issue).
4. Transfers are detailed from paragraph 63. These cover any money that would have flowed from the private sector to the public sector. In this case, it is limited to the ISC, the skilled worker Certificate of Sponsorship (CoS) fee, and the student Confirmation of Acceptance of Studies (CAS) fee. These are foregone by the public sector and saved by sponsors. These are reported separately and are not included in NPSV totals.
5. There are also unquantified impacts, such as the long-term impacts of migrants that are granted asylum and the potential wider behavioural change from sponsors as a result of the visa brake - they may seek to recruit workers or enrol students that are less likely to apply for asylum. Further details from paragraph 54.
6. The policy is due to be implemented as of 26 March 2026. As such, all modelling uses financial year 2025/26 as the price base year.
Threshold for brake
7. Table 1 below sets out the Home Office data used to identify countries meeting the visa brake threshold. It shows the volumes of visas issued for each nationality in scope from 2021 to year ending September 2025 and compares it to the number of asylum claims lodged in the same period for the same nationality-routes.
Table 1. Historic visas issued and asylum claims linked to visas, 2021 to year ending September 2025
| 2021 | 2022 | 2023 | 2024 | YE Sep 2025 | |||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled Worker (General) | Afghanistan | Visas issued | 10 | 50 | 80 | 210 | 90 | ||
| Skilled Worker (General) | Afghanistan | Asylum claims | 0 | 0 | 10 | 110 | 110 | ||
| Skilled Worker (General) | Afghanistan | Proportion | 0% | 0% | 13% | 52% | 122% | ||
| Study | Afghanistan | Visas issued | 330 | 820 | 1,860 | 470 | 360 | ||
| Study | Afghanistan | Asylum claims | 120 | 490 | 2,000 | 550 | 470 | ||
| Study | Afghanistan | Proportion | 36% | 60% | 108% | 117% | 131% | ||
| Study | Cameroon | Visas issued | 420 | 540 | 570 | 390 | 570 | ||
| Study | Cameroon | Asylum claims | 60 | 150 | 130 | 150 | 180 | ||
| Study | Cameroon | Proportion | 14% | 28% | 23% | 38% | 32% | ||
| Study | Myanmar | Visas issued | 490 | 1,130 | 1,580 | 1,780 | 2,080 | ||
| Study | Myanmar | Asylum claims | 20 | 40 | 70 | 250 | 330 | ||
| Study | Myanmar | Proportion | 4% | 4% | 4% | 14% | 16% | ||
| Study | Sudan | Visas issued | 320 | 350 | 290 | 260 | 260 | ||
| Study | Sudan | Asylum claims | 30 | 40 | 90 | 100 | 120 | ||
| Study | Sudan | Proportion | 9% | 11% | 31% | 38% | 46% |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding. Rounded to nearest 10.
Proportion can be over 100 per cent as time periods for visa and asylum claims do not match; asylum claims made during this 12-month period could be from migrants that arrived prior to this. Visas issued count just Entry Clearance (out-of-country). Asylum claims can be linked to either Entry Clearance or Extension visas
8. The threshold employed for consideration of visa brakes is a minimum 100 asylum claims per year linked to a visa from a particular nationality along a particular route, and the number of asylum claims made whilst on that visa route is at least 15 per cent of the number of Entry Clearance visas issued. The year used for the threshold was year ending September 2025.
9. This threshold was chosen to include nationalities from which visa-linked claims were not only significantly high but were also a large proportion of all visas issued. This covers cohorts posing the most substantial risk of visa-linked asylum claims whilst still being proportionate.
10. Once a nationality reaches the threshold, this triggers a broader assessment to inform a final decision on whether to impose a visa brake. This includes not just visa-linked asylum rates, but also wider equities, such as migration considerations, national security, and growth. This assessment is conducted by the Home Office with other government departments. Where other nationalities also meet this threshold, full assessments will be carried out, before a final decision is made to impose a visa brake.
11. A brake, once imposed, will be reviewed by the Home Office after 18 months and will only be lifted once it is clear that there has been a reduction in the risk of high proportions of visa-linked asylum claims recommencing on that route from that nationality. This principally uses the broader cross-government security assessment to inform the final decision, as described in the previous paragraph, to reassess if the risk remains, or if the brake can be removed.
Impact on volumes
Baseline Volumes
12. Table 2 sets out the expected number of visas to be issued to the nationalities and routes in scope for the appraisal period. A five-year appraisal period has been chosen due to the short-term nature (18-month) of the initial visa brake while accounting for the time delay between visa issue and claim (over 99% of claims from the routes and nationalities in scope are lodged within 5 years of visa issue).
Table 2. Baseline forecasted visa issues per year
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled Worker | Afghanistan | 70 | 80 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| Study | Afghanistan | 340 | 340 | 340 | 340 | 340 |
| Study | Cameroon | 470 | 470 | 470 | 470 | 470 |
| Study | Myanmar | 1,950 | 1,960 | 1,960 | 1,970 | 1,970 |
| Study | Sudan | 260 | 260 | 260 | 260 | 260 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding. Rounded to nearest 10.
13. Table 3 applies the ratio of asylum claims to visas (see Table 1, figures year ending September 2025) to the above volumes to estimate the baseline asylum claims per year.
Table 3. Baseline forecasted asylum claims per year
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled Worker | Afghanistan | 70 | 80 | 70 | 70 | 70 |
| Study | Afghanistan | 340 | 340 | 340 | 340 | 340 |
| Study | Cameroon | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 | 150 |
| Study | Myanmar | 310 | 310 | 310 | 310 | 310 |
| Study | Sudan | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 | 120 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding. Rounded to nearest 10.
14. The ratio of asylum claims to visas issued in a fixed period is the Asylum Conversion Rate. It takes asylum claims linked to a visa as a proportion of total visas of the same type issued, within the same timeframe. This method does not match individual visas to asylum claims – asylum claims will typically arise from visa claims prior to the period in question. It is therefore possible that for a particular route and nationality, more claims can be registered in a time period than visas that were issued. This occurred for Afghanistan in year ending September 2025 (see Table 1). For this analysis, any future conversion rate from visa issue to asylum claim is capped at 100 per cent.
Policy Impact on Volumes
15. The volumes affected by the proposed brake is therefore based on those set out in Table 3 above adjusted for the 18-month period of brake.
16. Estimates of visas affected also take account of any ‘bounce-back’ from deferred visa applications: as the visa brake is initially for an 18-month period, it is possible that some migrants may delay their visa application until after the brake is lifted, and then subsequently arrive in UK and apply for asylum. In the absence of a direct evidence base to suggest what this proportion might be, an estimated 20 per cent deferred rate has been applied. For example, if it is expected that 90 fewer Skilled Work visas are issued to Afghanistan nationals during the 18-month brake period, this analysis assumes that 18 of those will wait until the brake is released and still be issued. This means there is a net reduction of 72 issues. Given a 100 per cent conversion rate into asylum claim is used for Afghanistan skilled workers, this also leads to a net 72 fewer asylum claims as a result of the brake. Further details on the impact of this assumption are described in the sensitivity analysis (see paragraph 83).
17. Table 4 details the estimated number of issues reduced as a result of the visa brake, taking account of the estimated bounce-back. Main applicants and dependents are grouped.
Table 4. Visa Brake estimated reduction in visa issues per financial year
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | Total | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled Worker | Afghanistan | -70 | -20 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -90 |
| Study | Afghanistan | -340 | -140 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -480 |
| Study | Cameroon | -470 | -190 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -660 |
| Study | Myanmar | -1,950 | -800 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -2,750 |
| Study | Sudan | -260 | -100 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -360 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding. Rounded to nearest 10.
18. Applying the visa conversion rate to the estimates in Table 4, Table 5 sets out the estimated number of asylum claims reduced as a result of the reduction in visas issued.
Table 5. Visa Brake estimated reduction in asylum claims per year linked to Skilled Worker and Study visas
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | Total | ||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled Worker | Afghanistan | -50 | -40 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -90 |
| Study | Afghanistan | -280 | -200 | 0 | 0 | 0 | -480 |
| Study | Cameroon | -80 | -100 | -10 | 0 | 0 | -200 |
| Study | Myanmar | -120 | -250 | -70 | 0 | 0 | -430 |
| Study | Sudan | -30 | -80 | -40 | 0 | 0 | -160 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding. Rounded to nearest 10.
Given there is an assumption that some of the claims prevented during the brake will still materialise after the brake is released, there can be a net positive volume of claims in later years of the accounting period.
19. Replacement rate. As the visa brake is only applied to migrants from specific nationalities, is it is plausible that the student enrolments impacted by the brake could be replaced by enrolling students from other nationalities. The central scenario uses a conservative 25 per cent replacement rate during the period of 18-month brake, with a range of 0 per cent to 50 per cent tested in the high and low impact scenarios respectively. Replacement rates are only applied to expected number of enrolments where an asylum claim is not made. Over a longer time frame, it would be expected that sponsors could adapt their strategies for student enrolments and so the impact would reduce over time. It is assumed there will be no replacement in the first six months as sponsors adapt to the changed availability or recruitments and then spread evenly over the remaining 12 months of the brake.
20. Table 6 sets out the modelled volumes of replacement workers and students over the appraisal period.
Table 6. Volumes of replacements modelled under 25% replacement assumption.
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled Worker | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| Study | 480 | 480 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 960 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Rounded to nearest 10
Given this analysis uses a 100 per cent conversion rate for Afghanistan Skilled Workers, there is no modelled replacement for Skilled Work as replacement is only applied to those that are not expected to claim.
21. Displacement to other routes. There are no alternative Study visas for students affected by the brake. It is uncertain if a proportion of this student cohort will attempt to arrive via another visa instead, for example a visit visa, as means of gaining asylum status. With little evidence to support this assertion, it is assumed there is no displacement effect into other visa routes that remain open to the nationalities in scope of the brake. Arrivals from these nationalities outside of the brake is covered within the bounce-back sensitivity analysis.
22. In country asylum claims. It is assumed there is no increase in asylum claims from those already in the country due to the announcement of the visa brake. The brake only directly impacts on new arrivals and therefore it is assumed no change in behaviour for those already in the UK.
23. Dependents. The main applicants from those targeted nationalities will directly be impacted by the visa brake, and therefore it is assumed their dependents will also be impacted.
Assumptions on length of stay
24. Non-asylum claimant length of stay. For those migrants that would have entered on a visa and not gone on to claim asylum, historic average length of visa issued is used to estimate the value and profile of their fiscal contribution.
25. Asylum claimant length of stay. For those that would have entered on a visa and gone on to claim asylum, historic average time between issue and claim, by route and nationality is used to estimate the value and profile of their fiscal contribution. It is assumed these figures sustain for the duration of the accounting period. Table 7 details these lengths of stay.
Table 7. Average time between Visa issue and Asylum claim, years
| Afghanistan | Cameroon | Myanmar | Sudan | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled Worker | 0.49 | NA | NA | NA |
| Student | 0.29 | 1.08 | 0.86 | 1.14 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Data from year ending June 2025.
26. 3C leave / late arrival. 3C leave is the continuation of a person’s existing visa permissions (right to work/study) from when a person has claimed asylum up to the point of the asylum decision outcome. For asylum claimants, it is assumed that their fiscal contribution occurs for the duration of the average time between visa issue and asylum claim. In practice, some individuals will arrive after their visa validity date, and some will continue to work under 3C leave after their claim has been lodged. The extent of these behaviours is unknown, though the impacts are likely small, particularly given students have working hours restrictions.
27. Having claimed asylum, the historic time duration receiving Home Office support and duration in the appeals system is used to estimate total support and processing costs and their profile. It is assumed these figures sustain for the duration of the brake period.
Economic Impact Assumptions
Home Office Fees and Charges
28. Visa fee foregone. The Home Office would face a direct lost income from reduced visa applications. This amounts to £1,519 for a Skilled Worker main applicant and dependent for visas longer than three years, and £769 for a Skilled Worker main applicant and dependent for visas three years or less. For students, the lost fee is £524 for a Study main applicant or dependent[footnote 12].
29. Processing cost saved. The Home Office would process fewer visa applications during the visa brake period. This would save £172 per overseas Skilled Worker applicant and dependent and £266 per overseas student and dependent[footnote 13].
30. Illegitimate applications. The planned mechanism for ‘blocking’ visas is an automatic refusal should applicants from the in-scope nationalities and routes still apply. In this case, some labour cost would still be required to refuse the application, however the visa fee would be retained. This analysis assumes that none of these applications would be submitted. This means that the figure for lost fee revenue may be an underestimate.
31. Immigration Health Surcharge. The Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015[footnote 14] requires temporary migrants who make an immigration application to come to the UK for more than six months, or who apply to extend their stay in the UK, to make a direct contribution to the NHS via payment of an IHS. The total amount surcharge payers are liable for is dependent on the duration of their visa. The full amount is payable upfront and in line with other fees as part of the visa application, although unsuccessful applicants receive a refund.
32. The IHS is currently levied at a rate of £1,035 per person per year, with a concessionary rate of £776 for students and their dependants. The rate is assumed to remain unchanged across the appraisal period.[footnote 15]
33. Certificate of Sponsorship (CoS). Domestic businesses wishing to sponsor foreign workers are subject to pay a CoS fee, currently levied at £525 per individual migrant on Skilled Worker routes[footnote 16]. Sponsorship fees are only applicable to main applicants (that is, the sponsored individual), not their dependants.
34. Confirmation of Acceptance for Studies. Domestic education providers wishing to sponsor international students are subject to pay a CAS fee, currently levied at £55 per individual student[footnote 17]. CAS fees are only applicable to main applicants.
35. Immigration Skills Charge. For each Skilled Worker visa that is not issued, public Sector loses ISC the from sponsors of £1,320 per year of visa[footnote 18].
Public Sector asylum and return costs
36. The Home Office would save on asylum support and return costs from the reduced number of asylum claims due to the visa brake being applied. These estimates use internal data covering the average time in support, cost of accommodation, average refusal rates, average appeal rates and average return rates by nationality. Public sector cost savings also include average initial decision (ID) processing, interpreter, appeal processing, legal aid and court costs.
37. The main parameter varied in the high and low asylum support cost scenarios is the type of support that individuals receive. This ranges from dispersal accommodation at £23 per person per night (pppn)[footnote 19], to hotel accommodation at £119 pppn[footnote 20]. The central scenario uses a weighted average based on historic usage at £55 pppn[footnote 21].
Fiscal Methodology and Assumptions
38. The net fiscal impact of immigration represents a balance between the tax income changes of migrants and the public services pressure they carry through their use of services like healthcare. This balance varies across different migrant cohorts, influenced by factors such as employment rate, income level, age, and their propensity to use different types of public services.
Tax income changes
39. Tax income changes refer to the tax income that governments receive, including both direct and indirect taxes. In the context of migration, tax income changes capture the financial contributions made by migrants through their economic activity in the UK. A reduction in the volumes of visa holders residing in the UK is considered to result in lower contributions through decreased direct and indirect tax revenues. Accordingly, tax income changes are modelled based on estimated changes in volumes of those in employment in the UK and the associated tax revenue from their earnings. For non-working dependants, indirect tax contributions are assumed to be derived from the earnings of the main applicants and are therefore not estimated separately
40. To estimate these components for main applicants on the Sponsored Work routes, this IA uses projected earnings distributions for migrants (still eligible following the July 2025 Immigration Rules changes[footnote 22]) and assumes that all main applicants are employed. In 2025/26 prices, the median earnings of the affected Skilled Worker cohort (based on CoS data at the point of sponsorship being granted) are £56,500 for skilled workers. The median earnings are calculated from all Skilled Workers combined, and so is not specific to the individual nationalities targeted by the visa brake.
41. For adult dependants, data from the Skilled Worker evaluation[footnote 23] indicate that the average employment rate is approximately 71 per cent, with average earnings estimated at around £26,000.
42. Home Office internal management information provides estimates on the age distribution of dependant applicants for 2025 across the largest visa routes. On the Skilled Worker route, approximately 55 per cent of dependant applicants were aged 18 years of age or older.
Public Services Pressure
43. Public services pressure refers to the public spending required to provide services to migrants. The spending components considered for public services pressure are health, education, personal social services, wider public services and core congestible public goods (usage correlates with population such as policing services and waste collection), and non-core congestible public goods (do not directly scale with population for example public transport, green space provision).
44. Changes in the volume and characteristics of migrants can also influence expenditure on services such as health and education. Demographic variations, such as age distributions, across nationality groups can lead to differences in the cost of delivering public services. For instance, younger populations may increase demand for education, while older or more vulnerable groups may require more healthcare or social assistance. In this analysis, the cost of healthcare is assumed to remain constant across individuals of the same age (group).
45. Whilst most migrants are subject to No Recourse to Public Funds during their visa period, they gain full access to welfare benefits upon applying for Indefinite Leave to Remain after at least five years in the UK on an eligible route. This IA covers a five-year appraisal period and so assumes zero welfare expenditure throughout their stay, excluding welfare payments.
Fiscal Position
46. Under the central scenario, based on the assumptions around tax income changes and public services pressure, the following net balance between the two is estimated for an average individual in 2025/26 prices across each cohort affected by this set of policy measures. A positive value indicates a net financial gain for the exchequer from an individual’s presence in the country, while a negative value indicates a net cost.
Table 8: Illustrative Home Office per person per year tax income and public services pressure estimates by affected cohort, 2025/26 prices (£).
| Cohort | Main Applicant / Dependent | Tax income | Public Services Pressure | Tax income less public services pressure |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Skilled | Main Applicant | 37,000 | 6,000 | 31,000 |
| Worker | Dependent | 5,000 | 8,000 | -4,000 |
| Student | Main Applicant | 8,000 | 6,000 | 2,000 |
| Student | Dependent | 6,000 | 8,000 | -2,000 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis. Rounded to nearest thousand.
The above was previously published in the Autumn 2025 Immigration Rules Impact Assessment[footnote 24]
47. The figures used in the above tables are averages across all nationalities. These may be over- or under-estimates of the true values for the nationalities in scope of the brake. Given the small volume of Afghanistan Skilled Worker main applicants prevented from entering (50 of the 90 people in Table 4 are main applicants) and the short time period that they historically spend on the visa before claiming asylum (see Table 7), the Skilled Worker figure doesn’t have a material impact on NPSV. The Student fiscal figures vary little by nationality, and any dependents prevented from arriving are an equal fiscal cost saving from reduced fiscal pressure.
48. The figures relate to a full year of tax income and public service use. For claimants, the analysis only counts this net fiscal impact for the average time period on a visa before claiming. If this average is less than a year, the net fiscal impact is less than listed in the table.
Non-Public Sector costs
49. Tuition fees. For each student that is prevented from being enrolled onto a study course as a result of the brake, the educational establishment (for example, university) on average face lost income from tuition fees of £14,629 per year per overseas student. This is calculated by taking the total income from non-UK students in 2023/24[footnote 25] and divide it by the total volume of entrants (undergraduate and postgraduate) in the same period[footnote 26], inflated to 2025/26.
GDP and GDP per Capita
50. This cohort will contribute to GDP through two main channels – through an increase in the labour supply for those on a Skilled Worker visa, or working part-time while on a Study visa, and through the direct contribution to exports of student tuition fees.
51. As a broad order of magnitude, when considering contribution to the labour market, the OBR estimate an annual 200,000 change in net migration results in a change in overall GDP by between 1 per cent and 2.5 per cent in 2028/29[footnote 27]. Research also suggests impacts from any reductions in immigration on GDP per capita – a better reflection of the impacts on living standards - are assumed to be small. From the House of Lords (2008)[footnote 28] stating “the overall conclusion from existing evidence is that immigration has very small impacts on GDP per capita, whether these impacts are positive or negative” to the Migration Advisory Committee (2020)[footnote 29] summarising “regardless of the direction of the impact on GDP per capita the magnitudes are generally small”. Reflecting this, the OBR estimate the same annual 200,000 change in net migration could affect GDP per capita by between -0.4 per cent and +0.8 per cent[footnote 30]
52. London Economics in their report for the Higher Education Policy Institute estimate that the net economic impact was estimated to be £96,000 per non-EU domiciled student in the 2021/2022 cohort.[footnote 31] In other words, every 11 international students generate £1 million worth of net economic impact for the UK economy over the duration of their studies. While this research has limitations, particularly the use of significant multiplier effects, this indicates that the value to the economy of students is larger than just the GDP and GDP per capita impacts from contributions to the labour market.
53. However, the estimated reduction in immigration set out above is up to 4,300 Study visas prevented and 90 Skilled Worker visas during the 18-month period. Due to the relatively small overall number of migrants impacted by the visa brake, the short-time period over which this brake is assumed to apply and the likelihood that, over time, sponsors could adapt their strategies to replace the cohorts affected it is likely that the impact on both GDP and GDP per capita is comparatively small and has not been quantified further.
Unquantified Costs
54. The lifetime fiscal contribution from asylum seekers has not been quantified. There are various evidence gaps that make this difficult to estimate not limited to: the proportion of granted asylum seekers that go into work; the average salaries of those in work; the length of time they stay in the country. Any additional lost tax revenue beyond the point of claims has not been included in the foregone income due to reduced asylum claims. Also, any costs from lost revenue from students extending or switching into other routes has not been quantified due to uncertainty.
55. Any Public Sector costs associated with communications of this policy to both the impacted UK sponsors and the population of the relevant countries have not been included. Any additional cost associated with this are expected to be negligible if any.
56. The cost implication for sponsors to alter communications to existing markets or to pivot to other markets has not been accounted for. It is uncertain to what extent sponsors will redirect recruitment and what the cost burden associated with this is.
Unquantified Benefits
57. There is a potential wider behavioural change from sponsors as a result of the visa brake, as they may seek to recruit workers or enrol students that are less likely to apply for asylum. They may pivot to other student and labour markets or adapt their application process to select those most likely to complete the period and terms of their visa. This may be due to both enforced replacement from sponsors affected, or a selection adjustment from any sponsors to ‘future-proof‘ their recruitment pool should further brakes be implemented. By any means, this would further reduce asylum costs in the longer term beyond what has been estimated.
58. For example, comparing to year ending September 2025 rates, a five percentage point reduction in the proportion of visas issued that result in an asylum claim for the nationalities in scope would lead to a £1.0 million cost saving in one year. A ten percentage point reduction would lead to a £2.1 million cost saving in one year[footnote 32].
59. It is also plausible that this change in sponsor recruitment behaviour due to the threat of further brakes – both on the nationalities post release and on other nationalities during and after the brake – could lead to a reduction in asylum claims from visas across the board. Compared to year ending September 2025 rates of claim, a one percentage point reduction in the proportion that claim for all nationalities could lead to an £81 million cost saving in one year. A two percentage point reduction for all nationalities could save £133.7 million in one year.[footnote 33]
60. The public sector costs have only been quantified for asylum claims up to the point of asylum outcome, or any subsequent appeals or removal of failed asylum seekers. The long-term public sector cost saving associated with those granted asylum is not quantified, as the impact is a considerably longer timeframe than this five-year appraisal period (for an 18-month visa brake). Equally public sector costs from workers or students extending or switching into other routes has not been quantified.
61. The Migration Advisory Committee in their fiscal report[footnote 34] presents lifetime fiscal impact of working migrants and their dependents for a range of scenarios, showing how overall impacts vary over time, and are highly dependent on earnings achieved. In their 2025 Annual Report the MAC reports that they “expect the lifetime net fiscal impact of those entering through asylum and refugee routes to be unambiguously negative. This is largely due to their low employment rates and wages, high rates of economic inactivity and their exemption from the no recourse to public funds rule.”
62. The direct tuition fee loss to universities has been captured but any saving from not delivering the courses has not been included. Given that delivery costs of tuition are aggregated over full intake rather than per person, it is estimated that the reduction in student volumes listed in Table 4 will have a negligible savings implication on course-wide costs, such as staffing and overheads. Additionally, it is estimated that a proportion of those that don’t arrive as a result of the brake will have their student enrolments replaced and thus reduce any unit-cost benefits to the organisations.
Transfers
63. For each Skilled Worker visa that is not issued, Public Sector loses the ISC fee from sponsors of £1,320 per year of visa[footnote 35] and £525 per CoS[footnote 36].
64. For each Study visa not issued, Public Sector loses £55 from the sponsor for the CAS[footnote 37].
65. Table 9 sets out the total transfers from private to public sector reduced as a result of the visa brake.
Table 9 – Transfers under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | NPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| ISC fee lost by Public Sector | -0.13 | -0.07 | - | - | - | -0.20 |
| CoS fee lost by Public Sector | -0.03 | -0.02 | - | - | - | -0.05 |
| CAS fee lost by Public Sector | -0.13 | -0.04 | - | - | - | -0.17 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Net Present Value, Business Net Present Value, Net Present Social Value
Net Present Value Summary
66. Public sector NPV is defined total public sector benefits minus total public sector costs, discounted over time. Table 10 below presents the breakdown of the central NPV over each year of the appraisal period.
Table 10 – Public Sector fiscal Costs and benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | NPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits |
| Public Sector visa processing costs saved | 0.85 | 0.39 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 1.24 |
| Public Sector Asylum & returns costs saved | 3.84 | 6.65 | 1.53 | 0.25 | 0.07 | 12.34 |
| Total Benefits | 4.69 | 7.04 | 1.53 | 0.25 | 0.07 | 13.58 |
| Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs |
| Visa fee & IHS foregone | -5.78 | -1.68 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -7.46 |
| Net fiscal revenue foregone | -3.72 | -4.81 | -0.38 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -8.91 |
| Total Costs | -9.50 | -6.49 | -0.38 | 0.00 | 0.00 | -16.37 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -4.81 | 0.55 | 1.15 | 0.25 | 0.07 | -2.79 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
67. In summary, Table 10 shows that overall public service costs are negative over the time period, with initial visa fee and revenue losses outweighing later savings from reduced asylum costs. This outcome is very dependent on a number of factors including asylum costs and tax revenues foregone, and any bounce back or replacement assumptions. The outcome is also driven by the proportion of visas resulting in asylum claims. Results differ across selected countries, which is demonstrated in the breakdowns in the Annex.
Business Net Present Value Summary
68. The BNPV accounts for estimated quantified impacts that affect businesses. Aside from those identified in the NPV above, the BNPV also reflects changes in the incidence of transfers that have a net impact on business. As such, an additional business benefit resulting in an estimated reduction in transferred CoS/CAS and ISC fee revenue from business to the public sector is included in the BNPV, but not the NPSV.
69. The identified impacts on business as a result of this policy are principally and quantifiably due to foregone tuition fee revenue to universities. Table 11 summarises the estimated impacts.
Table 11 – Cost/benefit implications on Business under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | BNPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tuition Fees foregone | -64.64 | -19.33 | - | - | - | -83.97 |
| ISC, CoS, CAS Fees saved | 0.29 | 0.13 | - | - | - | 0.42 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -64.35 | -19.20 | - | - | - | -83.55 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
70. Should replacement rates be higher than modelled in the central scenario, the BNPV losses could be substantially less. See the Scenarios and Sensitivities sections that follow.
71. The only identified direct cost to business is the additional increase in ISC, CoS, and CAS saving that would have transferred from business to the public sector relating to the reduced migrant arriving. The equivalent annual net direct cost to business per year (EANDCB) is therefore estimated at -£0.07 million (undiscounted, 2025/26 prices).
Net Present Social Value High and Low Impact Scenarios
72. The NPSV is defined total benefits minus total costs to UK society as a whole, discounted over time. This includes all public sector and wider business costs and benefits. The estimated impact is extremely uncertain, and is based on a range of assumptions, and a number of scenarios are set out below to demonstrate the impact.
73. A high impact case scenario was modelled using the following changes to parameters:
-
Any asylum claims are made at the end of visa (estimate more tax revenue foregone).
-
Zero per cent replacement of students/workers from other nationalities.
-
Low scenario of asylum support cost saved (less time spent in asylum system).
This scenario would result in lower NPSV.
74. A low impact case scenario was modelled using the following parameters:
-
Any asylum claims made come at the start of visa (estimate less tax revenue foregone).
-
50 per cent replacement of students/workers from other nationalities.
-
High scenario asylum support costs saved (longer time spent in asylum system).
This scenario would result in higher NPSV.
75. The Public Sector NPV and BNPV of these scenarios is noted in Table 12.
Table 12. Total Public Sector NPV and BNPV from the high, central and low impact case Scenarios (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million
| High impact scenario | Central scenario | Low impact scenario | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public Sector NPV | -20.54 | -2.79 | 23.68 |
| BNPV | -106.98 | -83.55 | -60.13 |
| NPSV | -127.52 | -86.34 | -36.45 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Risks and Sensitivity Analysis
Risks
76. Displacement to other routes. It is unknown if there will be a displacement impact into alternative routes of entry, such as via visit visas or entry into the UK without a visa from the nationalities in scope intending to apply for asylum. However, there is currently a large financial barrier (tuition fees) that asylum claimants arriving on the Study visa overcome. Choosing to do so instead of alternative lower cost routes suggests this cohort may have considered these options already. The Home Office will continue to monitor the impact of asylum claims from migrants across all Work, Study and Visit visas, and those that arrive without a visa.
77. In country asylum claims. It is unknown if the announcement of the visa brake will lead to an increase in asylum claims from those targeted nationalities that are already in the UK. It may be considered the least path to resistance to remain in the UK should they not be able to leave and return on a new visa.
78. The approach taken in this IA is considered proportionate given the size of the cohorts impacted. There is still considerable uncertainty around estimates which is discussed throughout. The best and latest data available has been used along with sensible and proportionate assumptions, informed by engagement with stakeholder groups. A considerable effort has been devoted to this analysis, but no more than that required given the scale of costs and benefits involved. Projected migration volumes are also highly uncertain; therefore, ranges have been provided around central estimates. Analysis has been subject to proportionate analytical quality assurance. The resources devoted to the analysis is proportionate to the complexity of the analysis and the associated risks.
Sensitivity Analysis
79. The parameters that were varied in the high and low case scenarios were the upper and lower asylum costs (based on length of time on support), time between issue and claim (which varies fiscal contribution), and replacement rate. See Table 12 above for impacts on NPV.
80. For the low impact scenario, a 50 per cent replacement rate was used to estimate a ‘high’ rate of filling vacancies/enrolments within the 18-month brake period. While it is uncertain how quickly institutions will be able to fill vacancies/enrolments within the 18-month window, it is likely that in the longer term all vacancies/enrolments would be filled.
81. The true ‘break-even’ replacement rate is likely a little higher than this given the modelling assumed that replacements do not claim asylum. In practice, a proportion of the replacement students and workers may still claim but likely to be a much smaller proportion than those with a brake applied.
82. Other parameters that were not included in the high and low case scenarios but should be tested for their influence on the model are detailed below.
Deferred asylum claims; ‘bounce-back’ rate
83. The proportion of those that are prevented from applying for a visa that wait to apply once the brake is released is unknown. An assumption of 20 per cent was used for the central scenario based on estimation only. This analysis does not attribute any likelihood to any particular value. To test the sensitivity of the model to the bounce-back rate, a 0 per cent and 40 per cent scenario has also been modelled with all other parameters remaining as that of the central, including rate of claiming asylum from a visa issue. Bounce-back applicants are not treated as more or less likely to claim than the historic average for that nationality. The impact on public sector and business is recorded in Table 13 below.
Table 13. Total Public Sector NPV and BNPV from other Bounce-back Scenarios (PV, FY25/26 prices), £ million
| Central (20% Bounce-back) | Central with 0% Bounce-back | Central with 40% Bounce-back | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Public Sector NPV | -2.79 | -4.86 | -0.72 |
| BNPV | -83.55 | -109.71 | -57.40 |
| NPSV | -86.34 | -114.57 | -58.12 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026.
84. Increasing the bounce-back rate impacts public sector NPV in both positive and negative directions; less fiscal revenue is foregone, and less asylum cost is saved. Overall increasing bounce-back has a small net positive public sector impact. Increasing bounce-back also means that universities forego less tuition fee revenue. It is expected that universities in the medium term will replace these enrolments and so these lost fees may be less than estimated in the central scenario.
85. As noted above, this impact assessment does not attempt to measure any wider impact that this measure would have on influencing wider behaviour from sponsors to enrol students or recruit workers less likely to claim asylum. Any such behavioural impact has the potential to achieve a substantial impact over time.
Wider Impacts
Gender
86. The Home Office does not believe that there will be direct discrimination as the proposals set out mean that people will not be treated differently because of their gender.
87. Of the Skilled Worker sponsored visas issued in year ending September 2025 from countries in scope of the brake (Afghanistan), 54 per cent were from males and 46 per cent female. Of claims linked to Study visas for all nationalities in scope, 55 per cent were from males and 45 per cent females.[footnote 38]
88. Of the asylum claims linked to all Skilled Worker sponsored visas in the same time period from countries in scope of the brake (Afghanistan), 55 per cent were from males and 45 per cent female. Of claims linked to Study visas for all nationalities in scope, 63 per cent were from males and 37 per cent females.[footnote 39]
Age
89. The imposition of the visa brake will have a greater impact on those aged 16 years and older as this is the minimum age requirement to obtain a UK Study visa or 18 years and older for a Skilled Work visa. It may also have a greater effect on those aged 23 years and under, with 60 per cent of international students who completed the UK’s visa holder survey are in this cohort.
Environment
90. The estimated fall in visas granted due the visa brake, albeit proportionately very small when compared to the wider immigration system, represents a reduction in the demand for travel to the UK, resulting in fewer carbon dioxide equivalent (CO2e) emissions. As this impact is relatively small, no further quantification has been undertaken as part of this IA.
Impact on small and medium sized businesses
91. The tuition fee impact on universities is reported in Table 11 using the central replacement assumption detailed in paragraph 19 of the evidence base. High and low replacement scenarios are modelled in Table 12 above. Any additional replacement beyond what has been modelled would reduce these income losses.
92. It is not expected that this brake will significantly impact small and medium sized businesses. The top 10 universities that each of these nationalities enrolled at in 2025[footnote 40] all employ over 250 full time staff so are considered large businesses.
Trade Impact
93. Education is an export and total UK revenue from education related exports and transnational education activity was estimated to be £25.6 billion in 2020[footnote 41]. As a result, the reduction in international students, and the tuition fee revenue they generate in the UK, represents a reduction in that export value. However, there is literature on the impacts of immigrants more generally on trade flows.
94. There are a number of channels through which immigration may affect trade and, in general, the external literature finds a positive relationship between the stock of immigrants and trade. At a macro-level, high immigration to the UK increases the UK population and consequently aggregate demand and the demand for imports.
95. Given the temporary nature of student migration, it is unlikely that student migration specifically will have an additional indirect impact on trade flows beyond the reduction in exports their tuition fee revenue represents, as set out above. However, international students may have a wider impact on trade if they choose to stay in the UK and work after graduation.
96. As outlined above (see Table 4) while not negligible, the expected reduction in visas granted to students as a result of the preferred option is small compared to the total number of visas granted. Therefore, any wider trade impacts are expected to be small.
Annex
Annex A
Afghanistan only Skilled Worker Public Sector fiscal costs and benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | NPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits |
| Public Sector visa processing costs saved | 0.01 | - | - | - | - | 0.01 |
| Public Sector Asylum & returns costs saved | 0.39 | 0.74 | 0.11 | 0.02 | - | 1.26 |
| Total Benefits | 0.40 | 0.74 | 0.11 | 0.02 | - | 1.27 |
| Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs |
| Visa fee & IHS foregone | -0.37 | -0.08 | - | - | - | -0.45 |
| Net fiscal revenue foregone | -0.36 | -0.31 | - | - | - | -0.67 |
| Total Costs | -0.73 | -0.39 | - | - | - | -1.12 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -0.33 | 0.35 | 0.11 | 0.02 | - | 0.15 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex B
Afghanistan only Skilled Worker Business cost/benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | BNPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tuition Fees cost/benefit | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| ISC, CoS, CAS Fees cost/benefit | 0.16 | 0.09 | - | - | - | 0.25 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | 0.16 | 0.09 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.00 | 0.25 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex C
Afghanistan only Study Public Sector fiscal costs and benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | NPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits |
| Public Sector visa processing costs saved | 0.10 | 0.04 | - | - | - | 0.14 |
| Public Sector Asylum & returns costs saved | 2.70 | 3.71 | 0.22 | 0.04 | - | 6.67 |
| Total Benefits | 2.80 | 3.75 | 0.22 | 0.04 | - | 6.81 |
| Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs |
| Visa fee & IHS foregone | -0.92 | -0.36 | - | - | - | -1.28 |
| Net fiscal revenue foregone | -0.15 | -0.09 | - | - | - | -0.24 |
| Total Costs | -1.07 | -0.45 | - | - | - | -1.52 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | 1.73 | 3.30 | 0.22 | 0.04 | - | 5.29 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex D
Afghanistan only Study Business cost/benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | BNPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tuition Fees cost/benefit | -8.18 | -3.30 | - | - | - | -11.48 |
| ISC, CoS, CAS Fees cost/benefit | 0.02 | 0.01 | - | - | - | 0.03 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -8.16 | -3.29 | - | - | - | -11.45 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex E
Cameroon only Study Public Sector fiscal costs and benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | NPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits |
| Public Sector visa processing costs saved | 0.11 | 0.06 | - | - | - | 0.17 |
| Public Sector Asylum & returns costs saved | 0.38 | 0.78 | 0.28 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 1.54 |
| Total Benefits | 0.49 | 0.84 | 0.28 | 0.07 | 0.03 | 1.71 |
| Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs |
| Visa fee & IHS foregone | -0.62 | -0.15 | - | - | - | -0.77 |
| Net fiscal revenue foregone | -0.48 | -0.80 | -0.12 | - | - | -1.40 |
| Total Costs | -1.10 | -0.95 | -0.12 | - | - | -2.17 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -0.61 | -0.11 | 0.16 | 0.07 | 0.03 | -0.46 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex F
Cameroon only Study Business cost/benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | BNPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tuition Fees cost/benefit | -10.22 | -3.09 | - | - | - | -13.31 |
| ISC, CoS, CAS Fees cost/benefit | 0.02 | 0.01 | - | - | - | 0.03 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -10.20 | -3.08 | - | - | - | -13.28 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex G
Myanmar only Study Public Sector fiscal costs and benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | NPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits |
| Public Sector visa processing costs saved | 0.54 | 0.26 | - | - | - | 0.80 |
| Public Sector Asylum & returns costs saved | 0.19 | 0.71 | 0.41 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 1.37 |
| Total Benefits | 0.73 | 0.97 | 0.41 | 0.05 | 0.01 | 2.17 |
| Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs |
| Visa fee & IHS foregone | -3.38 | -0.96 | - | - | - | -4.34 |
| Net fiscal revenue foregone | -2.51 | -3.20 | -0.19 | - | - | -5.90 |
| Total Costs | -5.89 | -4.16 | -0.19 | - | - | -10.24 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -5.16 | -3.19 | 0.22 | 0.05 | 0.01 | -8.07 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex H
Myanmar only Study Business cost/benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | BNPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tuition Fees cost/benefit | -41.17 | -11.28 | - | - | - | -52.45 |
| ISC, CoS, CAS Fees cost/benefit | 0.08 | 0.02 | - | - | - | 0.10 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -41.09 | -11.26 | - | - | - | -52.35 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex I
Sudan only Study Public Sector fiscal costs and benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | NPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits | Benefits |
| Public Sector visa processing costs saved | 0.08 | 0.04 | - | - | - | 0.12 |
| Public Sector Asylum & returns costs saved | 0.18 | 0.69 | 0.52 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 1.50 |
| Total Benefits | 0.26 | 0.73 | 0.52 | 0.08 | 0.03 | 1.62 |
| Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs | Costs |
| Visa fee & IHS foregone | -0.50 | -0.13 | - | - | - | -0.63 |
| Net fiscal revenue foregone | -0.22 | -0.41 | -0.08 | - | - | -0.71 |
| Total Costs | -0.72 | -0.54 | -0.08 | - | - | -1.34 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -0.46 | 0.19 | 0.44 | £0.08 | 0.03 | 0.28 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex J
Sudan only Study Business cost/benefits under central assumptions (PV, FY 2025/26 prices), £ million, FY 2026/27 to FY 2030/31
| FY 2026/27 | FY 2027/28 | FY 2028/29 | FY 2029/30 | FY 2030/31 | BNPV | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Tuition Fees cost/benefit | -5.07 | -1.66 | - | - | - | -6.73 |
| ISC, CoS, CAS Fees cost/benefit | 0.01 | - | - | - | - | 0.01 |
| Net Cost/Benefit | -5.06 | -1.66 | - | - | - | -6.72 |
Source: Home Office internal analysis 2026. Figures may not sum due to rounding
Annex K
| Mandatory specific impact test - Statutory Equalities Duties | Complete |
|---|---|
| Statutory Equalities Duties The proposed visa brake targets specific nationals and therefore constitutes direct discrimination on the grounds of race (nationality). This is lawful within the Immigration Rules and assessed as necessary and proportionate to achieving the Home Office’s objective of reducing asylum claims via visa routes. No direct impacts were identified for other protected characteristics, including age, disability, gender reassignment, marriage or civil partnership, pregnancy and maternity, religion or belief, sex or sexual orientation, as the measure does not intentionally differentiate on these grounds. There are potential indirect impacts for age, as the visa brake will have a greater impact on those aged 16 and over as this is the minimum age requirement to obtain a UK Study visa or 18 for a Skilled Work visa. It may also have a greater effect on those aged 23 and under, with 60 per cent of international students who completed the UK’s visa holder survey are in this cohort. The SRO has agreed these summary findings. | Yes |
-
Restoring Control over the Immigration System May 2025: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6821f334ced319d02c906103/restoring-control-over-the-immigration-system-web-optimised.pdf. ↩
-
Asylum and returns policy statement - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asylum-and-returns-policy-statement . ↩
-
Immigration system statistics data tables - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/immigration-system-statistics-data-tables . ↩
-
Immigration system statistics data tables - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/immigration-system-statistics-data-tables#asylum . ↩
-
Asylum and returns policy statement - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asylum-and-returns-policy-statement. ↩
-
Immigration system statistics data tables - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistical-data-sets/immigration-system-statistics-data-tables. ↩
-
Restoring Control over the Immigration System May 2025: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6821f334ced319d02c906103/restoring-control-over-the-immigration-system-web-optimised.pdf . ↩
-
Asylum and returns policy statement - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asylum-and-returns-policy-statement. ↩
-
One percentage point reduction on each nationality’s rate of claiming asylum from a visa from year ending September 2025 rates, capped at zero per cent. Average cost of asylum claim used for all nationalities. ↩
-
Restoring Control over the Immigration System May 2025: https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/6821f334ced319d02c906103/restoring-control-over-the-immigration-system-web-optimised.pdf. ↩
-
Asylum and returns policy statement - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/asylum-and-returns-policy-statement . ↩
-
Visa fees transparency data - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/visa-fees-transparency-data . ↩
-
Visa fees transparency data - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/visa-fees-transparency-data . ↩
-
The Immigration (Health Charge) Order 2015: https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2015/792/made . ↩
-
Pay for UK healthcare as part of your immigration application: How much you have to pay - GOV.UK. ↩
-
UK visa sponsorship for employers: Certificates of sponsorship - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/uk-visa-sponsorship-employers/certificates-of-sponsorship . ↩
-
Home Office immigration and nationality fees, 1 July 2025 - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/visa-regulations-revised-table/home-office-immigration-and-nationality-fees-1-july-2025#sponsorship. ↩
-
UK visa sponsorship for employers: Immigration skills charge - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/uk-visa-sponsorship-employers/immigration-skills-charge. ↩
-
Home Office estimate as of June 2025. ↩
-
Home Office estimate, January to March 2025 average. ↩
-
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/media/691c503a21ef5aaa6543eed7/asylum-seekers-receipt-support-datasets-sep-2025.xlsx Weighted on proportions in each accommodation type (dispersed accommodation, subsistence only, and hotel) between October 2024 to September 2025. ↩
-
Statement of changes to the Immigration Rules: HC 997, 1 July 2025 - GOV.UK. ↩
-
Skilled Worker route evaluation - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/skilled-worker-route-evaluation. ↩
-
https://www.hesa.ac.uk/data-and-analysis/finances/table-6. ↩
-
Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 - Office for Budget Responsibility: https://obr.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-march-2024/. ↩
-
Immigration Report - The Economic Impact of Immigration: https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200708/ldselect/ldeconaf/82/82.pdf . ↩
-
Migration Advisory Committee report 2020 https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/873155/PBS_and_alary_Thresholds_Report_MAC_word_FINAL.pdf . ↩
-
Economic and fiscal outlook – March 2024 - Office for Budget Responsibility: https://obr.uk/efo/economic-and-fiscal-outlook-march-2024/ . ↩
-
International students boost UK economy by £41.9 billion: https://www.hepi.ac.uk/2023/05/16/international-students-boost-uk-economy-by-41-9-billion/ . ↩
-
Absolute reduction compared to year ending September 2025 rates for nationalities in scope. Includes Support, Processing, Appeal and Returns cost of asylum claim. ↩
-
Absolute reduction compared to year ending September 2025 rates for all nationalities, capped at zero per cent Includes Support, Processing and Appeal cost of asylum claim. Returns are not included so savings may be greater. ↩
-
The Fiscal Impact of Immigration: Static and Dynamic Estimates for the UK :. ↩
-
UK visa sponsorship for employers: Immigration skills charge - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/uk-visa-sponsorship-employers/immigration-skills-charge . ↩
-
UK visa sponsorship for employers: Certificates of sponsorship - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/uk-visa-sponsorship-employers/certificates-of-sponsorship . ↩
-
Home Office immigration and nationality fees, 1 July 2025 - GOV.UK: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/visa-regulations-revised-table/home-office-immigration-and-nationality-fees-1-july-2025#sponsorship. ↩
-
Home office internal management information, year ending September 2025. ↩
-
Home office internal management information, year ending September 2025. ↩
-
Home Office internal management information; CAS issues year ending 2nd February 2026. ↩
-
https://explore-education-statistics.service.gov.uk/find-statistics/uk-revenue-from-education-related-exports-and-transnational-education-activity . ↩