Phase 2 terms of reference
Published 13 April 2026
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Terms of reference for phase 2 Southport Inquiry
1. On 29 July 2024, Axel Rudakubana carried out a knife attack at a children’s dance club in Southport. He murdered three young girls, Elsie Dot Stancombe, Alice da Silva Aguiar and Bebe King, and injured 10 others. Sixteen others survived the attack but live with psychological injuries.
2. Following the conviction of the perpetrator, the Home Secretary established the Southport Inquiry on 7 April 2025 to produce a definitive account of the events leading up to the attack and the attack itself, and to identify appropriate steps to minimise the risk of a future tragedy.
3. Phase 1 has now concluded. The phase 1 findings were published on 13 April 2026.
4. Phase 2 of the Inquiry will examine the following areas:
I. The adequacy of arrangements in England and Wales for managing the risk from violence fixated individuals (VFIs). VFIs are individuals at risk of extreme violence, where ideology is not the primary driver. Where arrangements are considered inadequate, the Inquiry is asked to make recommendations for improvements. In particular, the Inquiry should examine:
a. How effective are multi-agency arrangements for identifying, assessing and managing the risk posed by VFIs? This includes Prevent, youth offending teams and policing.
b. How integrated are these arrangements with wider safeguarding systems, mental health services, social care and education? Could improvements be made to better identify and manage VFIs?
c. What interventions reduce the risk to the public from VFIs? What barriers exist to delivering them and how can they be overcome?
d. Do other threat management systems such as those for terrorism or organised crime have lessons for good management of VFIs?
II. The role of the internet and social media in influencing and enabling VFIs to prepare and carry out violent attacks. Proportionate to the timetable set out below, the Home Secretary would welcome expert evidence on this subject.
III. The effectiveness of current laws and systems for identifying, monitoring and disrupting the activities of VFIs online and reducing the harm caused by online spaces which promote extreme violence.
IV. The effectiveness of policies, regulation and criminal enforcement in relation to the sale and possession of offensive weapons and articles with a point or blade.
5. The Inquiry will examine all evidence as the Chair shall judge appropriate. The Inquiry will also consider alternative forms of evidence gathering to assist it in providing effective and pragmatic recommendations, seeking advice from a range of experts on how to address VFI risk. This may include, but is not limited to, commissioning responses from relevant organisations, authorities, legal or academic experts and holding seminars to provide a platform for robust debate and analysis of the current systems and any recommended proposals.
6. Phase 2 of the Inquiry will begin immediately, with the aim of concluding proceedings and producing a report to the Home Secretary by May 2027.