Policy paper

A response to the ICIBI's report on the initial processing of migrants arriving via small boats at Tug Haven and Western Jetfoil (December 2021 to January 2022)

Published 21 July 2022

The Home Office thanks the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration for this report.

Since this inspection took place, the Home Office has transformed arrangements for the reception and initial processing of people arriving by small boat across the Channel. The changes to the operation were already in train at the time of the inspection and were specifically aimed at addressing some of the core issues highlighted in this report. The majority of changes were implemented early in 2022 and as such the operation is now fundamentally different to that which was inspected.

The Home Office now operates a two-site model, which fully prioritises immediate humanitarian and medical responses at Western Jetfoil while concentrating initial immigration, border security and asylum checks and processes at a new site at Manston. The Tug Haven site, the focus of much of the criticism of this report, has been closed since mid-January 2022. There remains work to do to, but much of this Report is now of a historic character and the criticisms identified reflect processes and procedures not now followed under the new operation.

Nonetheless, the Home Office acknowledges the observations of fact in the report and accepts all the recommendations without demur. In many cases, work was already in train at the time of the inspection in response to these issues. Almost all of the recommendations have now been addressed, both through the implementation of revised processes, and in the separation of welfare and immigration functions through the two-site model.

We are particularly pleased that the report recognised the enormous fortitude and exceptional personal commitment of Home Office staff.

In response to some of the critical assertions relating to the care given to people arriving by small boat, particularly in the foreword of the report, it is important to emphasise the absolute priority placed by the Home Office (and partners) on the safety of life at sea.

This is an exceptionally high risk operation where the threat to life is ever present. The fact that no known deaths or serious injuries have occurred in UK territorial waters for several years speaks to the coordination of operations, the advanced technology we deploy and the skill of our officers.

Over 2021 we saw crossings attempted in all but the very worst of conditions, at all hours of the day, in overcrowded boats of limited seaworthiness provided by organised criminal gangs who cared nothing for the risk to life that these crossings entailed.

The second half of the year and November in particular saw exceptional arrival numbers frequently in highly dangerous seas. The arrival numbers outstripped even the most pessimistic forecasts by some margin.

In November, in some of the worst weather of the year, almost the same number of migrants crossed in a month as in the entire previous year. Whilst we accept that improvements were needed to the land-side reception arrangements at the time the inspection took place, it was right in the circumstances that prioritisation was given to the effort to preserve life.

In the period of the inspection – as now – leaders at every level worked tirelessly, day and night to deliver a safe and secure operation and make significant improvements alongside live operational delivery.

Substantial improvements were made in 2021, including massive and rapid uplifts in aerial surveillance and the availability of rescue vessels (over 97% of crossings were intercepted and controlled by UK law enforcement officers coordinated through the newly established Home Office Joint Control Room); there was a complete reset of the infrastructure at Tug Haven; the design and build of an entirely new site at the Western Jetfoil was undertaken in just six months; and a new processing site at RAF Manston was brought into live service in just three weeks. This was all completed alongside live operational delivery of the most harrowing and demanding nature.

This inspection focused on the initial processing of migrants arriving via small boats at Tug Haven and Western Jetfoil (WJF), with a particular focus on protecting the border through security checks, and the identification and safeguarding of vulnerable people.

It is important to note that those operations are part of a wider response to Channel crossings that includes a 24/7 command and control structure directing the detection and monitoring of Channel crossings and the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) activities of Border Force and other UK authority vessels; the development and deployment of sophisticated surveillance technology capabilities to enable crossing attempts to be detected and intercepted quickly; and joint working with France and other near borders partners to prevent crossing attempts and investigate the criminals who facilitate them.

Nonetheless, we accepted the recommendations and have been committed to resolving the issues identified, which we believe to be now almost completely addressed. The transformation of the UK operation across Tug Haven, WJF and (now) Manston has continued since the Inspection, representing a fundamental change in approach, in terms of the infrastructure, resourcing and logistics.

The Home Office response to the recommendations:

1. In relation to security (and within 1 month of submission of the report to the Home Secretary) the Home Office should ensure that the staff are sufficiently trained and provided with updated guidance on:

• the operation of the mobile biometric reporting stations (BRS)

• the circumstances and authority level required for a migrant to be transferred from WJF without a biometric check being completed and recorded

• the process for the seizure, retention or return of property including cash and identity documents

• the process for the seizure, retention or return of intelligence material

1.1 Accepted

1.2 The department has completed all the actions required to address this recommendation. We recognise that assurance of processes and individual knowledge lies at its heart.

For all responses to the recommendations, it should be noted that, since 11 February 2022, WJF has pivoted towards SOLAS triage, so the majority of border security and immigration checks now take place at Manston as part of the reception/induction process.

1.3 The Home Office introduced BRS machines at WJF in mid-December 2021, as a mitigation against the issues subsequently identified by the ICIBI in his report at paragraph 3.9. The report seems to conflate biometric capture (undertaken by BRS machines) with biometric checks. While biometric checks are also undertaken as part of the biometric capture process with BRS, the prime function of BRS is to record biometrics.

1.4 Recommendation 1a:

By the time the report was received in the Home Office, we had already revised our standard operating procedures (SOPs) for Op ALTAIR to ensure that the operation of BRS at Manston was fully covered in training materials and its usage and data quality was assured.

The process of familiarising all staff with these changes and ensuring that all were suitably trained in the use of BRS equipment and the data quality standards that go with it was completed by the end of March 2022.

A BRS user guide has been incorporated into the SOP. Unaccompanied asylum seeking children (UASCs) and other vulnerable cohorts who are not suitable for Manston continue to have their biometrics taken at WJF.

1.5 Recommendation 1b:

The BRS biometric check for the majority of arrivals now takes place at Manston. As part of our response to recommendation 1a) above, we reviewed the authority level for the exceptional suspension of BRS enrolment at Manston. The authority level for suspension is the Op ALTAIR Gold Commander. Potential mitigation in the event of suspension of BRS enrolment includes a GRABBA check and the flagging of affected cases to Asylum & Protection so that biometrics can be captured as soon as possible from the individuals further into the induction process. Since operations at Manston went live earlier this year, this contingency has not been required.

1.6 As part of the mitigation against procedural delay or technical difficulties preventing swift capture of biometrics, we have an agreement with Detention and Escorting Services that any person for whom all of the Operating Mandate (OM) checks (including biometric registration) have not been completed by the time that the limit on holding at Manston is reached may be detained at an Immigration Reception Centre (IRC) until such time as those mandate checks are completed by asylum and protection staff. This will be dependent on availability at an IRC.

1.7 Recommendation 1c:

A revised process for the seizure, retention or return of property was drawn up and was put in place by the end of March 2022, with all staff (including contractors) suitably inducted into its use and assurance mechanisms in place to monitor and promote adherence.

1.8 Recommendation 1d:

The department does not ‘seize’ material for intelligence purposes. We observe and record information for potential future processing as intelligence material. We drew together, at pace, improvements for intelligence capture and dissemination, with a programme of work to upskill intelligence gathering among staff at WJF and Manston, so that intelligence opportunities could be maximised.

This included all Clandestine Operations Response Team (CORT) staff undertaking mandatory intelligence awareness training. This was completed by the end of April 2022 and processes were further refined in July 2022 as part of our work to continually improve processes and procedures. 

Those IE Rapid Response Team (RRT) members who are consistently deployed to support the processing of arrivals have also been trained. The IE Head of Intelligence for small boats provided written guidance for all staff deployed to work within the small boat threat. This guidance is available electronically to staff and features in joining instructions for officers attending Western Jetfoil/Manston. We also trained, and provided guidance to, the contractors who support our operations following completion of CORT and RRT staff.

1.9 The upskilling and skills refresh activities for most of recommendation 1 was completed by the end of March 2022, together with the implementation of robust assurance processes to ensure that standards are maintained. The upskilling and skills refresh activities for recommendation 1d were completed by the end of April 2022 and have since been reviewed and improved further.

2. Provide guidance, training and monitoring mechanisms for staff to improve operational performance in respect of:

• identifying all vulnerable migrants at the earliest opportunity and engaging, proactively and constructively, with those with inherent vulnerabilities, such as unaccompanied children, single women and families

• accurately recording vulnerabilities on the Op ALTAIR Encounter Log, Pronto and CID

• collecting and utilising vulnerability data to inform staff (regularly and through clear communications) of the vulnerability characteristics of those who have arrived via small boats to inform intelligence and safeguarding priorities

2.1 Accepted

2.2 We accept this recommendation and were already working on improving our identification of vulnerability in our addressing of Recommendation 5.2 in last year’s HMIP report^{[footnote 1]}. The fundamental changes to our processes and the prioritisation of SOLAS management at WJF ahead of formal processing at Manston means that our staff now have more capacity and opportunity to identify vulnerability. Vulnerability is now captured and recorded at the earliest opportunity and tracked and reviewed throughout the non-detained process and thereafter. In most cases it is recorded at the WJF - with Beach Landings being triaged and recorded upon arrival at Manston. We continue to prioritise the welfare of UASCs, families and vulnerable adults at the initial point of arrival.

2.3 Recommendation 2b:

Clandestine Channel Threat Command (CCTC) has worked closely with the Border Force Safeguarding and Modern Slavery (SAMS) National team and Home Office IT colleagues to build a mechanism which will enable work areas to flag and trace vulnerability cases on Home Office systems.

This allows the journey of vulnerable people through the system to be monitored, reducing the risk of vulnerability needs being overlooked during casework and improving the support package for vulnerable cohorts.

The planning work was completed by the end of May 2022. We produced guidance covering the correct and timely recording of vulnerability on HO systems, including the Op ALTAIR Encounter Log, PRONTO and CID/ATLAS.

We took this work forward as part of wider departmental work around improving data quality. We created vulnerability process maps which were shared with staff, and identified 10 vulnerability categories with the aid of partners, including British Red Cross. This ensures consistency when identifying vulnerability. We backed up this guidance with a programme of training which continues.

2.4 Recommendation 2c:

Internal communications around vulnerability have been improved and have an appropriately senior manager leading work to bridge the vulnerability and intelligence pieces.

An awareness campaign has taken place, with a newsletter for staff now regularly circulated to inform them of the vulnerability characteristics of those who have arrived via small boats.

CCTC has created an additional role to improve the link across to Intelligence teams and networks. The postholder will work closely with intelligence partners to understand the upstream threat posed by illegal migration and how this is likely to adapt in response to both international developments and UK action.

3. In relation to the collection and use of information (and within 3 months of submission of this report to the Home Secretary) the Home Office should:

• improve the quality of the information recorded in the Op ALTAIR Encounter Log, Pronto and CID, by establishing clear, minimum data entry requirements for biographic details, encounter, arrest and search records; and develop and implement an assurance regime for data collected about migrants including contemporaneous spot checks on Pronto records by Bronze Commanders, with regular feedback to staff

• commission a review of the collection, reconciliation and usage of data related to migrant arrivals via small boats

• identify a SCS to be responsible for all data related to small boats

• design and implement a robust and auditable methodology to establish a single, comprehensive, contemporaneous, accurate database of information relating to migrants’ arrivals and initial processing performance

3.1 Accepted

3.2 We accept this recommendation. A review of the collection, reconciliation and usage of small boats arrivals data identified a number of process and oversight improvements, which are currently being implemented, and clarified ownership responsibilities under a single SCS. In parallel, there is also wider work underway across the department to more closely track small boat arrivals through the system to monitor performance.

3.3 Recommendation 3a:

It is acknowledged that the quality of information captured across systems needs to be standardised to become a single coherent narrative. Since the ICIBI inspection we have revised training/briefing material for CORT/frontline IE/BF officers to improve data quality by standardising entries on these systems, in order to ensure that every record has the same data fields populated in a consistent manner.

We also established an assurance mechanism, using random sampling, and this was in place by the end of March 2022. This enables us to reconcile any anomalous data and provide feedback to teams and individuals so that data quality is improved.

3.4 Recommendation 3b:

A CCTC-led review of how data relating to small boats arrivals is captured, input and reconciled was completed in June 2022 and implementation of a series of process improvements is underway. On usage, work on improving the retrieval and sharing of data between HO systems is being undertaken by DDAT. This wider piece of work continues.

3.5 Recommendation 3c:

The review at 3b) considered oversight arrangements and whether changes were needed to existing SCS responsibilities. The review identified a single SCS owner for the collection, reconciliation and usage of small boats arrival data, and recommended additional governance arrangements to improve oversight.

3.6 Recommendation 3d:

It is accepted that data on processing performance relating to migrant arrivals required improvement. There is a comprehensive programme of work ongoing (Project Aspen) which seeks to bring together multiple databases, and track migrants through the WJF/Manston process.

Work started in January 2022, and a pilot of a new wristband barcode tracking system began this week (week commencing 18 July 2022). We will continue to work with DDaT to use this product to inform the development of a single system that is compatible with, and can write-back to existing HO systems. The next iteration is due to deliver in autumn 2022.

4. Review the operational staffing requirements for both CORT and supplemental staff and produce accurate and detailed statements of requirement (SOR).

Define and monitor:

• stand-up levels: both the trigger point (i.e. predicted migrant numbers) and associated staffing requirement, considering both skills and numbers for each level

• how and where consistent administrative support could improve operations at WJF

4.1 Accepted

4.2 We accept this recommendation, and work is already in hand to address much of its substance. This takes into account the changes in processes (WJF and Manston), as will any involvement of the Ministry of Defence (MOD) in operations.

4.3 Recommendation 4a:

A review of the stand-up levels and work with partners to agree a more workable and sustainable arrangement for the stand-up was completed by the end of May 2022. We have reviewed numbers and skillsets required for the two-site model (WJF for SOLAS triage and Manston for initial reception), including consideration of whether simplification was needed of the levels of support against increasing volumes.

This review also included identifying how and from where suitably qualified staffing resources could be assured for all contingencies. While the review was completed by the end of May 2022, the operationalising of these SORs is taking longer, in line with our expectations at the time that this report was received in the Home Office.

4.4 Recommendation 4b:

By the time the report was submitted to the Home Office, we had already reviewed the skills and powers mix required for the reception phase at WJF and subsequently mapped where administrative support would provide the most value, and where we could lessen our reliance on surge support from Immigration Compliance and Enforcement (ICE) teams and Border Force.

This piece was completed by the end of May 2022 and forms the template for our future administrative resourcing. We recognise the importance of improving administrative support and will prioritise recruitment. The highly competitive market and essential security checks on prospective new employees/contractors means that the transition to full administrative support is a slower piece, but it will be completed no later than December 2022.

1. Recommendation 5.2 from HMIP report (‘Report on an unannounced inspection of the detention of migrants at Dover and Folkestone, November 2021’): The Home Office should undertake full screening and welfare interviews for adults and children when detainees have had a chance to rest in suitable accommodation. Decision-makers should recognise the challenging circumstances in which detainees currently receive their screening interview when assessing any subsequent disclosure of vulnerability. ↩