Qualitative research into the behavioural impact of the penalties regime for benefit fraud and error

Question 1

Executive summary

Accepted Answer

This qualitative research explores how DWP’s current penalties regime influences the thoughts and behaviours of people who commit welfare fraud and error. 48 interviews were conducted with individuals who had received a benefit overpayment due to fraud or error and subsequently received a penalty.

Please note that this research uses the term “penalty” broadly, as applying to all three options available to DWP in response to claimant fraud and error. Individuals interviewed had received one of these three penalties:

Civil Penalty for Error: A £50 civil penalty may be imposed following a benefit overpayment that was judged to have arisen due to claimant failure to disclose information, negligence or failure to disclose timely information to DWP without reasonable excuse and has been caused by claimant error.
Administrative Penalty (Ad Pen): An Ad Pen is a financial penalty offered by DWP as an alternative to prosecution where trained investigators believe there is sufficient evidence to offer a realistic prospect of conviction. A person has to accept the Ad Pen, if the Ad Pen is rejected, the Department refers the case to the prosecuting authorities for consideration for prosecution. Ad Pens are offered where the case is not so serious that the first option should be prosecution.
Prosecution: This is usually reserved for cases above the £5,000 overpayment threshold. Cases below this can also be considered for prosecution if there are aggravating factors present such as the use of false documents or identity, if they occupied a position of trust, or there is evidence of premeditated or organised fraud. Prosecution should also be sought if the offer of the Ad Pen is refused. Prosecution should normally be considered in the first instance for overpayments higher than £5,000 but each case should be judged on its own merits. The ‘prosecuted’ group sampled for this research was only drawn from individuals whose prosecution resulted in a conviction.

Contextualising the findings

This research was qualitative. Therefore, while the findings explore the range of experiences and opinions of participants, the findings are not generalisable to the overall population of individuals who have received a penalty. In this research specifically, where no financial incentive was used, there is a particular risk that those who received a penalty, who would admit that that they were at fault, may have been less willing to participate and discuss their experiences.

This qualitative research is not designed or intended to establish the objective truth about the events leading up to or following a penalty, an event which was inherently adverse for these participants. The research instead provides insight based on the perspective of claimants who received a penalty specifically. It would be expected that other perspectives on these events may support different interpretations.

The findings throughout the report are based on participants’ perceptions. For the purposes of readability, we have not consistently used explicit phrasing to highlight that these findings reflect participant perceptions when reporting the findings. However, it should be borne in mind that the findings throughout describe what participants perceived rather than being corroborated with external data, comparisons with DWP policy and processes, or alternative perspectives.

Key findings

1. Behaviour and circumstances leading to a penalty

Participants reported having low levels of awareness of the penalties regime before receiving a penalty. This was reported to be a significant factor in participants’ failure to tell DWP about their circumstances or their fraudulent behaviour.
This research identified a spectrum of perceived intention around benefit fraud and error, with three main categories of participant: those who felt this was completely unintentional, those who believed they had made a mistake, and those aware of their benefit fraud.
In terms of reasons for why fraud or error occurred, leading to participants receiving a penalty, this research identified four aspects of participant perceptions and behaviour that were thought to be responsible for this:
1. Not perceiving behaviour / circumstances as non-compliant with the rules or perceiving non-compliance to be ‘minor’. Those aware that they could be breaking the rules did not perceive this as fraud or recognise its seriousness. Those who claimed to be unaware of non-compliance were also influenced by not seeing their behaviour as wrong.
2. Limited capability to understand and follow rules and reporting obligations, often due to poor health, cognitive challenges, or low financial and digital literacy. This led to confusion about the threshold for reporting a change of circumstances that affected benefit entitlement.
3. Lack of understanding of an individual claimant’s responsibility for reporting a change of circumstances or possible overpayment. This related to misconceptions about whether individuals should report their changes of circumstances or errors, with a perception that DWP or sometimes third parties should identify these first.
4. Difficulty identifying ways to report a change of circumstances or possible overpayment. DWP channels were said to have limited capacity and did not allow for reporting of more complex changes.

2. Impact of penalties

Participants were supportive of the penalties regime but did not believe they fit their perceived criteria of what a fraudster was (due to their level of poverty, vulnerability, “mistakes”, and if this was their first offence) and therefore often felt they were being unfairly treated.
Participants described interconnected negative impacts from the penalty and loss of benefits, including on their finances, their physical and mental wellbeing, and their social life and relationships. While penalties have a general punitive purpose, not all these specific negative impacts may be intended to result from the penalty.
Receiving a penalty appeared to increase understanding of what fraud looked like and how to avoid this in the future. The key desired behaviour change observed here was increased reporting of changes of circumstances that could impact their benefit claim.
However, for others, the desired behaviour change was unclear, and this led to other (sometimes unexpected) behaviour changes such as disengagement from DWP or the benefit system or taking cash in hand work.

3. Opportunities for behaviour change

There are three key behaviours expected of participants by DWP:
- Reading the benefit declaration and engaging with their responsibilities.
- Applying the declaration to their own personal circumstances.
- Reporting any changes in circumstances to DWP promptly, through the appropriate channels.
Participants shared accounts in which they claimed they were acting in line with expectations and attempting to follow these behaviours but still found themselves penalised for fraud or error. Reasons given for this included a perception that the declaration was not clear enough on claimants’ level of responsibility and how this specifically related to their circumstances, difficulty knowing what qualified as a change, or struggling to get through to DWP to report. Therefore, this research highlights the potential value in the department reviewing how clearly desired claimant behaviours are defined and communicated, in order to help prevent overpayments.
This research indicated that harsher penalties alone would not have effectively led to the desired behaviours among those interviewed. Participants felt that other options beyond penalties as deterrents could have helped in their cases:
- More clarity at the declaration-signing stage about fraudulent behaviour. For example, through in-person support, prompts, prioritising key information in the declaration.
- Awareness-raising initiatives to help participants recognise changes in circumstances. For example, multi-channel reminders and prompts, check-ins, tools to assess personal circumstances or targeted support for the more vulnerable / less capable.
- Improved tools and prompts to encourage reporting. For example, interactive tools to log changes.
- Work to increase capacity or unblock channels. For example, more flexible reporting options and communication methods, better logging of communications and clarity over the steps in repayment process.
- More tailored, considered and empathetic treatment of individuals. For example, amnesty options for disclosure and leniency for first-time offences.

Question 2

Acknowledgements

Accepted Answer

The authors wish to thank all the participants who gave their time to take part in this study and the DWP research team for their support throughout the project.

Question 3

Authors

Accepted Answer

Lucie Loridon, Research Executive at Verian

Mary Suffield, Senior Director at Verian

Milo Warby, Associate Director at Verian

Question 4

Glossary and use of terms

Accepted Answer

Receiving an overpayment

As discussed, this report focuses on participant fraud and error. However, in some places, we use the term “receiving an overpayment” instead. While fraud and error both involve participants being paid more than they were entitled to, the phrase “receiving an overpayment” is used in this report to refer in general terms to situations where a participant receives a higher benefit payment than they should have. We use this term to help examine participants’ behaviour around such overpayments, for example, whether they intended, noticed, reported, or acted on them. This contributes to developing insights about the actions expected from claimants to fulfil their role in ensuring that they are paid the right amount of benefit and prevent non-compliant behaviour which could lead to them receiving a penalty.

Fraud and error

This research uses the term fraud and error as an overarching category to describe behaviour for which penalties are awarded. Civil Penalties are awarded for claimant error. Administrative Penalties and prosecutions are used where it is believed that there is sufficient evidence to offer a realistic prospect of conviction for an offence such as fraud or attempted fraud.

Penalty

Please note that this research uses the term “penalty” broadly, as applying to all three options available to DWP in response to claimant fraud and error. Individuals interviewed had received one of these three penalties.

Types of penalty

There are three options available to the Department when an overpayment is found that has resulted from either negligence or intent, they are:

Civil Penalty for Error: A £50 civil penalty may be imposed following a benefit overpayment that was judged to have arisen due to claimant failure to disclose information, negligence or failure to disclose timely information to DWP without reasonable excuse and has been caused by claimant error.
Administrative Penalty (Ad Pen): An Ad Pen is a financial penalty offered by DWP as an alternative to prosecution where trained investigators believe there is sufficient evidence to offer a realistic prospect of conviction. A person has to accept the Ad Pen, if the Ad Pen is rejected, the Department refers the case to the prosecuting authorities for consideration for prosecution. Ad Pens are offered where the case is not so serious that the first option should be prosecution.
Prosecution: This is usually reserved for cases above the £5,000 overpayment threshold. Cases below this can also be considered for prosecution if there are aggravating factors present such as the use of false documents or identity, if they occupied a position of trust, or there is evidence of premeditated or organised fraud. Prosecution should also be sought if the offer of the Ad Pen is refused. Prosecution should normally be considered in the first instance for overpayments higher than £5,000 but each case should be judged on its own merits. The ‘prosecuted’ group sampled for this research was only drawn from individuals whose prosecution resulted in a conviction.

Prompted disclosure

This report uses the term prompted disclosure to describe a form of ‘amnesty’ option where admission of potential fraud or error would encourage leniency from DWP.

Investigation

Please note that this research refers to investigations in a generic sense to cover the experiences of participants and their interactions with DWP after suspected fraud or error was committed and before a decision was made about the outcome of their case.

Question 5

1. Introduction

Accepted Answer

1.1. Research background

There is an evidence gap in up-to-date, detailed understanding of the behavioural impacts of the current penalties regime in deterring fraud. The penalties regime and the wider fraud and error landscape has changed significantly in the last 10 years, for example as a result of the introduction of Universal Credit in 2013 and the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Fraud, Error and Debt Policy and Strategy Directorate are reviewing the processes underpinning the penalties regime to ensure that processes are robust and help understand how DWP’s penalties regime can be most effectively targeted to maximise deterrence and help prevent fraud and error. The Department is looking at legislative and non-legislative options to support this, alongside wider changes.

1.2. Research aims and questions

The overarching aim of this research was to gain insights into how the current penalties regime influences the thoughts and behaviours of people who commit welfare fraud. The research also investigated the influence of the threat of criminal prosecution on behaviour, as well as how potential changes to the penalties regime may have an effect on claimant behaviour and deterrence.

The research explores the impact of the punitive approach both before and after an individual has committed fraud or error, to gain insights into how to better deter fraud and limit recidivism.

The research questions fell into four key themes:

Current awareness and perceptions of penalties
- What was the level of knowledge of the penalties regime prior to receiving a penalty?
- How likely did they feel that they would get caught, and to what extent did this affect their behaviour?
- How quickly did they think they would get caught and have penalties applied. To what extent did this affect their behaviour?
Impact of penalties for driving deterrence
- To what extent were potential penalties a deterrent?
- If they were not aware of the penalties, would they have acted differently if they had known about the current penalties?
- What was the impact of the penalty?
- Did the enforcement / repayment of penalties impact on behaviours?
- What would have been more of a deterrent?
Exploring what might change behaviour
- What are claimant views on prompted disclosure?
- Would a higher penalty in monetary terms (or loss of benefit) make / have made a difference?
Understanding and preventing recidivism
- If this is a repeat occurrence, why was the penalty from the first occurrence not a deterrent?
- How and why would getting a penalty affect future behaviour?

1.3. Methodology

Verian conducted 48 in-depth interviews with three separate groups between January and April 2025. The three groups were those that received a Civil Penalty, accepted an Administrative Penalty or individuals whose prosecution for benefit fraud resulted in a conviction. In-depth interviews were chosen as a methodology for this audience as they allowed participants to discuss the nuanced and complex stages of their experience of fraud and error and receiving a penalty and were flexible to accommodate discussion of a sensitive nature. For example, discussing personal topics and having possibly committed a crime.

Interviews were conducted either by telephone or online via Microsoft Teams to allow participants to choose a mode which best suited their needs. Interviews lasted approximately 45 minutes. Participants were not financially incentivised or compensated for this research.

1.3.1. Sample design

Verian and DWP agreed on a set of criteria that informed the sample frame for recruitment. The primary criterion was the specific type of penalty received, which was chosen to ensure that meaningful analysis across penalty types could be conducted. These were then recruited in phases, starting with those who had received a Civil Penalty or were prosecuted, followed by those who received an Administrative Penalty.

The secondary criteria included age, gender and benefit received to ensure a range of experiences were heard. A breakdown of the achieved sample can be found in Appendix 1: Achieved sample.

1.3.2. Recruitment

The recruitment was conducted in phases between January and April 2025 using a DWP-supplied sample.

The following steps were taken to recruit from the sample:

Potential participants were initially engaged through an opt-in / opt-out email to give individuals time to register their interest in taking part or request to not be contacted.
Those who opted-in for the research were then taken through a bespoke recruitment screener. As well as screening for quotas, this allowed the recruiter to answer any initial questions about the research. At the end of the call, the participant was booked in for an interview.
Once the opt-out period closed, participants who had not responded were called by our specialised recruiters.

1.3.3. Development of research material

In collaboration with DWP, Verian designed a flexible discussion guide which aimed to address the research questions by exploring all the stages of each participant’s experience of fraud of error in detail. This was designed to identify when non-compliance began and what circumstances led to non-compliance and fraud and error. The guide then aimed to assess the impact of the penalty received by the participant and asked them to share what, hypothetically, could have changed their behaviour to avoid them receiving the penalty. See the discussion guide in Appendix 2: Discussion guide.

1.3.4. Safeguarding

The research team anticipated that this research may cover sensitive topics, therefore a robust safeguarding procedure was embedded within the research design. An approach was also mapped out for each step in DWP’s safeguarding process for customer interactions. Where necessary, participants were signposted to appropriate resources, but the escalation process was not required in this research.

1.3.5. Limitations

Due to the opt-in nature of research and lack of incentive, those who opted to take part in this research may have a different perspective compared to people who received penalties for fraud or error generally. For example, those participants who were prosecuted or accepted an Administrative Penalty may be skewed towards those who perceived their case to be less intentional and underrepresent those who would admit to fraudulent intent. Those who perceive that they committed fraud may feel less wronged by the department in comparison with those who perceived their case to be less intentional. Therefore, they may have been less driven to share their side of the story. Offering a financial incentive could potentially have encouraged greater participation from this group. Comparatively, those who perceived their case to be less intentional may have been motivated to participate, despite the lack of financial incentive, as a way of sharing their side of the story.

Similarly, by only recruiting those who have received a penalty, the research was limited in its potential to understand the deterrent effect of penalties on those who changed their behaviour to avoid an initial penalty.

These interviews discussed experiences of fraud and error and receiving a penalty with these claimants alone. The research therefore reflects participant perspectives on their experiences, and the views shared are their interpretation of events. This research is not intended to provide the objective truth about why participants received a penalty or their wider interactions with DWP. Instead, the research provides insight from the perspective of people who received a penalty for fraud or error, in the context of an experience that was inherently adverse for them. The findings have not been corroborated with external data, comparison to DWP policies and procedures or wider perspectives. In any research about a sensitive and contested topic such as this, findings based on the perspective of one type of participant group may differ from the insight that could be gained if other perspectives were considered. The findings should be considered in this light.

A set of factors are likely to have influenced the perspectives of these participants, and the accuracy of the information shared. These include limitations in recall due to events described potentially occurring a number of years prior (including events preceding receiving a penalty), post-hoc rationalisation and stigma associated with admitting fraudulent intent, and errors in factual understanding about DWP policies and procedures described.

For reasons of readability, this report does not explicitly reiterate, in describing the findings, that these are based on the perceptions of these participants. However, this should be borne in mind when considering the findings throughout the report.

Question 6

2. Behaviours and circumstances leading to a penalty

Accepted Answer

This section identifies three key behaviours DWP requires from claimants to prevent fraud. It highlights a spectrum of intention in the actions that led to a penalty and explores reasons for this variation between individuals. It examines the behaviours and attitudes that contributed to participants receiving a penalty, including awareness of the penalties regime.

2.1. Defining the desired behaviour change

This research is designed to inform efforts to strengthen the penalties regime to deter non-compliance and reduce the likelihood of repeat offences. To achieve this, DWP must promote certain positive behaviours while discouraging others. Before examining the behaviours that led participants to receive a penalty, it is helpful to frame this discussion through DWP’s expectations of how claimants should behave.

The research has considered three key behaviours reflecting DWP expectations:

1. Reading the benefit declaration carefully^{[footnote 1]} and engaging with the responsibilities it outlines;

2. Applying the declaration to their own personal circumstances;

3. Reporting any changes in circumstances to DWP promptly and through the appropriate channels.

In this research, participants often expressed that they struggled to follow these behaviours. The difficulties they reported were linked to challenges in understanding the declaration, particularly how specific and detailed the information within it is. They also reported uncertainty about which changes of circumstances were relevant, and a lack of confidence in knowing whether they had successfully reported these to DWP. These challenges will be explored in detail throughout this report.

2.2. Awareness and perceptions of the penalties regime and of non-compliant behaviour

This research sought to establish participants’ levels of awareness of the penalties regime and how they perceive it. It also explored the extent participants were aware of their own non-compliant behaviour, including fraudulent activity where applicable.

Participants reported having low levels of awareness, understanding of and engagement with the penalties regime before receiving a penalty. This was consistent across all three types of penalty. Having received a penalty, they also typically remained confused about what they had done wrong, why they had received this specific penalty and what their obligations as a claimant had been. This reported lack of awareness and engagement was often discussed as the primary factor leading to fraud and error and participants receiving a penalty as a result. This is explored in more detail in 2.3 Behavioural context for receiving a penalty, below.

Among those interviewed, this research found there was a spectrum of perceived intention around benefit fraud and error: from unintentional to deliberate. Participants often presented their reasons for allowing an overpayment as being in a ‘grey area’: they were aware of a change in their circumstances but unclear about their duties when it came to reporting.^{[footnote 2]} There were three main categories of participants who fell across this spectrum of intention.

1. Those who claimed to have been unaware of their non-compliance.

These participants appeared to have the most limited capability to engage effectively with the penalties regime. This included challenges with processing and understanding information, with managing personal administration, finance and technology, as well as mental or physical health issues that prevented them from fully engaging with their obligations. Participants included both those who relied on relatives for support in these areas and individuals claiming on behalf of someone else with limited capability (such as a child with a disability). These limitations were said to influence behaviours, leading to these individuals struggling to know what they were responsible for and having little agency over their circumstances or in reporting overpayments.

I found it difficult doing forms I must admit.

(Ad Pen, ESA)

I can’t really say there wasn’t enough information, but I just didn’t have the awareness.

(Prosecuted, Income Support)

2. Those who felt they had made a “mistake”.

These participants were typically aware of a change in their circumstances but were unsure whether this was against the rules. They described this as the result of disengagement or confusion with the penalties regime and their responsibilities when claiming. This included not being willing to read the declaration fully, being unaware of what the threshold for a change of circumstances was or answering questions incorrectly.

I never [recorded a change of circumstance] on my journal because I rang up to tell them [instead]… because it was complicated to write down, you know.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

3. Those who admitted to being aware of the fraud or error.

This was rare among those interviewed.^{[footnote 3]} Awareness and perceptions of penalties varied depending on the specific reason for an overpayment and whether the overpayment had been allowed to continue without intervention. For example, this group included an individual who was aware of a change in their circumstances, believed they had reported this to DWP on time through the right channels, but had still received a Civil Penalty. This participant was aware of potential fraud and error and perceived the penalty as unfair given the feeling they had responded proactively. Others were aware of penalties and that they had done the “wrong thing” but presented their levels of fraud as minor. This group are discussed in more detail below.

It was a stupid mistake I made. That was my fault really. I should have told them. I put my hands up to that… I didn’t think that they would do that to me, to be honest.

(Prosecuted, UC)

2.3. Behavioural context for receiving a penalty

For participants, partly due to the general lack of awareness and engagement around the penalties regime discussed above, the threat of a penalty alone appeared to be limited as a deterrent. Participants’ perceptions of their circumstances and responsibilities appeared to be more influential in shaping behaviour.

This research identified four key aspects of participant perceptions and contextual factors in this regard: 1) Not perceiving behaviour / circumstances as non-compliant or perceiving non-compliance to be ‘minor’; 2) Limited capability to understand and follow rules and reporting obligations; 3) Lack of understanding of responsibility for reporting a change of circumstance or possible overpayment; 4) Difficulty identifying ways to report a change of circumstance or possible overpayment.

2.3.1. Not perceiving non-compliant behaviour

Participants often claimed to have been unaware of non-compliant behaviour, but some admitted they knew they had done something wrong. In both cases, participants were affected by a perception that their actions did not constitute fraud.

Even those who had been aware of potentially breaking the rules did not expect to face the penalties they ultimately received. This was in part due to low engagement with the declaration and perceptions while completing it, and varied levels of awareness of what specific fraud they were committing and how seriously this offence would be treated by DWP. These perceptions of “minor” inaccuracy or oversight could affect the declaration stage and behaviour towards change of circumstances.

For example, one participant who was told they were eligible for Employment and Support Allowance admitted exaggerating their circumstances but felt encouraged to do so through finding “detailed”, “complicated” and “irrelevant” questions on the form. Their health information was not strictly accurate, meaning they were well enough to take on part-time work at a later stage. While they read about the threat of prosecution in the declaration, they believed these would not apply to them and that at most they would be expected to pay back the overpayment they had received.

Others described being aware of potential “minor” wrongdoing as a benefit claimant, for example waiting too long to declare a lump sum received from a pension pot. These participants also presented getting this penalty as a surprise. In line with their perceptions of their offence, they expected this to be minor, for example receiving a small fine.

I knew being caught was possible, but didn’t think about it, [it was] a slim chance, but I thought they’d [only] stop or reduce benefits. Not make me pay it all back.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

It was something I was gonna do [declare money they’d received] but then I just didn’t and I don’t know why… I was just so pleased to have some cash. It’s my fault and I take that on board.

(Ad Pen, ESA)

Other participants struggled to perceive their own behaviour as fraud and had a very specific picture of what a fraudster looked like, which they did not identify with. They perceived fraudsters to be ‘benefits cheats’ who were repeatedly and deliberately defrauding the government of large sums of money. Participants also associated fraud with lavish spending, rather than using the money to pay for necessities. They contrasted this with their own behaviour which they believed to be a genuine mistake. They often blamed the mistake or misunderstanding on their vulnerabilities and their perception that it was DWP’s responsibility to be aware and notify them of the error.

For people that have committed fraud…intentionally… [they] should face the full wrath of the law.

(Prosecuted, Income Support)

I’m angry because over the years [this person I know] worked and claimed benefits… she went on 6 to 7 holidays a year… she’d had a lot of money in the past and just wasted it. She’d been investigated and got away with it every time.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

The research identified different perceptions of wrongdoing in line with the penalty received. Some of those receiving Civil Penalties, despite potentially finding receiving a penalty emotionally distressing, claimed not to identify this as a “penalty” (as they had just received a fine or paid the money back) and recognised that this was received as a result of error. Some of those who were prosecuted were upset at being viewed as criminals and at the penalty they received which they did not feel was proportionate to what they had done wrong.

Case study: Unaware that taking on a voluntary role would contradict their claim of being unable to work, and they were unclear when to report changes in their health.

This participant undertook a voluntary role that they were unaware needed to be declared as they were not earning money, but it contradicted their PIP claim (as they said they were unable to work). DWP conducted surveillance and observed that they took long drives and went on holiday. Additionally, due to their fluctuating medical condition and taking a range of trial medications, they were unaware of when they needed to report changes in their symptoms. They felt that the treatment by DWP and the court system was not considerate of their vulnerabilities and felt they were treated like a “fraudster”. Being taken to court left them feeling very stressed, and in court they were told they did not need their oxygen tank when they believed they did. They are now too scared to claim for anything, and they want to see additional information on what ‘changing circumstances’ equates to, specifically for those with fluctuating health conditions.

It’s like where in that process do you, do you say that this is a change of circumstances? Because when you’re trialling stuff medically, you can’t determine that… it’s not for you to determine because you can’t… it’s the doctors that have to determine that it’s not working anymore.

(Personal Independence Payment claimant, Prosecuted)

2.3.2. Limited capability to recognise and disclose

This research also found that non-reporting was often perceived to be linked to confusion, limited financial and digital fluency or cognitive bandwidth. As described above, those who reported cognitive challenges, or mental or physical health issues, appeared to struggle more with this aspect of their responsibility.

Firstly, participants were confused about the threshold for reporting a change in their circumstances. This audience included those with fluctuating health conditions, for example who discussed feeling “fine one day and much worse another”. This made it challenging to know what constituted a change. Participants also discussed how their financial circumstances were precarious and their living and working contexts could be open to change. This made it hard for them to know exactly what constituted a change in this area. These aspects could interrelate in a way that meant some participants struggled to know what they were receiving the penalty for. For example, in the case study above, a participant received a penalty for taking on voluntary work, but was unsure whether the work was the issue, or instead what it indicated about their health. Some participants struggled with managing and overseeing their finances and were unsure what types of income needed to be declared or could affect their benefits.

[If they had remembered that an extra account existed] I [still] wouldn’t have been 100% on whether you should declare ISAs or not.

(Ad Pen, UC)

Secondly, participants discussed having a lack of bandwidth that made it difficult for them fully engage with their benefit declaration, the threat of the penalty, or the penalty itself. This was said to be the result both of long-standing health or mental health issues and also difficulties dealing with specific life events and changes. The participants interviewed included those going through divorces and experiencing multiple family bereavements at the time of claiming or receiving the penalty. Others discussed their lives as being subject to constant change that increased the mental load on them and made it harder to properly engage with their reporting responsibilities, including the potential to receive a penalty.

To be honest I was going through a divorce and everything else at the same time, I literally just went through the form, and I didn’t probably read anything… and just signed it at the end.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

In another case, a participant described that it was difficult to engage meaningfully with their reporting responsibilities because, as their partner described, once they stop needing to pay attention to information, it completely goes out of their mind and they “move on to the next thing”. This participant was accompanied in the interview by their partner who explained that they likely have undiagnosed learning difficulties.

Finally, participants discussed limitations in their financial and digital fluency processing information, and the quality of advice available to them as making it hard to know when to report. This included both those who genuinely struggled as well as others who were frustrated at getting no advice or incorrect advice from those they were reliant on. Participants also discussed technical issues that made things difficult, such as struggling to access the Universal Credit portal.

Nobody told me [that what I was doing could lead to penalty], not even my financial advisor, Citizens Advice, no one.

(Ad Pen, UC)

Case study: Dealing with severe mental health issues due to grief led to challenges executing their parents’ will and not declaring information to DWP.

This participant’s parents passed away and they were deemed as the executor of their estate. Due to ongoing mental health issues in dealing with depression, they felt they were unable to report the estate money in their account. They were also unaware of how much of the money would be left after all bills had been settled. During the trial they reportedly felt threatened and did not feel able to explain their situation. They were unhappy with how they were treated during their trial, for example, not being allowed to ask questions, and believed DWP should apologise for this treatment. This highlights a misconception that court procedure is within DWP’s control. In the future, they would think a lot more carefully about decision making. They did not perceive the penalty as proportionate and deemed it excessive.

When you’re claiming for benefits, it doesn’t tell you that you have to report that you’re an executor. And because I was ill, and I couldn’t sort out my parents’ dealings, not until I was better. So by the time I’d dug myself out of what I was feeling at the time DWP called [about the instance of fraud].

(Universal Credit claimant, Prosecuted)

2.3.3. Lack of understanding of responsibility for reporting

The research suggested that participants faced a set of barriers to reporting stemming from common assumptions and confusion about responsibility. Collectively, participants appeared to link these to their inaction and complacency and said it made it difficult for them to know how to report a change in their circumstances and who to.

Before receiving a penalty, participants often said they assumed the responsibility for identifying and reporting an overpayment belonged to the various organisations they were in contact with. Participants generally expected DWP to either stop payments or find and make them aware of their errors or non-compliant behaviours. Participants whose penalties were connected to issues with income and payments (for example, receiving a lump sum from an inheritance or pension) also described how they had expected their bank or pension provider to have communicated any worrying changes to DWP. Finally, some participants claimed to expect different local and national government departments overseeing their circumstances to communicate and share information with one another.

Participants also discussed a number of areas of confusion. For example, whether government departments and local government were separate or connected, whom exactly they should report changes to (DWP or others) and the correct channel through which to report, for example by phone, through their journal, or in person.

Case study: Allowed overpayment as they expected DWP would stop payments after not hearing from them, based on their interpretation of the wording in the UC journal.

This participant was claiming for Universal Credit and was aware that there was an eligibility criteria to receive this benefit. They were awarded £30,000 from a previous employment tribunal. They assumed DWP would stop the payment as they no longer fulfilled the eligibility criteria. They were unaware it was their responsibility to report a change in their circumstances or update their journal. This was based on their interpretation of the UC journal and declaration. They continued to receive UC payments, leading to the overpayment. No reasonable adjustments were made for perceived emotional or learning disabilities. During the trial they felt that they were not given adequate support or signposting to who could be their advocate. They are now very mindful of future payments. They want there to be a cut-off point for payments if people do not update their journal.

I didn’t know it [UC payment] was going in [to my account]… They did tell me you don’t get paid if we don’t hear from you.

(Universal Credit claimant, Prosecuted)

2.3.4. Difficulty identifying ways to report

Even when participants suspected they should report an overpayment, they believed existing reporting channels had limited capacity to deal with them. The main challenge discussed in this context was DWP’s “busy” and “stressful” phone lines. Participants discussed long waiting times, struggling to get through to someone who could help them, and generally finding contact with DWP an uncomfortable experience. As described above, participants also struggled with identifying the correct channel and limitations in other ways of reporting. For example, the Universal Credit portal was said in cases to not be helpful for logging more complex changes of circumstances.

I knew [it was] an overpayment. … it was who to get through or what department to speak to… there’s not a button to press… they would say you ring this number you just still find yourself struggling to get through, and then they’re like you’re waiting for ages on the phone.

(Civil Penalty, ESA)

[After spending so much time on hold] The thought of having to call the DWP will make me physically sick.

(Civil Penalty, ESA)

There’s no unified point of contact for anything when it comes to this kind of stuff, so it can be very, very difficult to find the right answer to what you’re looking for.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

Case study: Reported a change of circumstances by telephone but unaware that they should have also reported it on their Universal Credit journal, so felt their penalty was extremely “unfair”.

This participant’s benefits were increased when their child was living with them. Once their child moved out, they were aware that they had to report the change in their circumstances but were unaware on the suitable channel to do so. They rang DWP as it was too complicated to write down on the UC journal. They thought the change was confirmed by DWP; however, they were then overpaid. They felt that the whole situation was “traumatic” and that it was unfair to penalise them as they had taken action. They state that it made them panic, and that this had knock on effects as their declining mental health had an impact on their children. They would be more vigilant in confirming their payments are correct. But they did not express that they would change the way they report changes of circumstances in the future. They also reported a decline in mental health due to the process.

I never did it on my journal because I rang up to tell them that because it was complicated to write down, you know.

(Universal Credit claimant, Civil Penalty)

Question 7

3. Impact of penalties

Accepted Answer

This section explores the impact of the punitive approach on participants’ lives to gain insight into how to deter fraud and limit recidivism. Participants described interconnected negative impacts from penalties, including on their finances, their physical and mental wellbeing, and their social life and relationships. While penalties have a general punitive purpose, the wide-ranging impacts discussed by participants may not have all been intended. Specifically, this section aims to answer research questions around the influence of penalties as a deterrent and on behaviour before and after receiving a penalty.

3.1. Attitudes towards penalties

Participants were not generally opposed to the penalties regime. They were supportive of the punitive approach to wrongdoing where this was deliberate. Some discussed the need for individuals who committed fraud to lose access to benefits entirely rather than temporarily. However, where they felt that their non-compliant behaviour was an unintentional error, participants opposed the punitive approach. As explored in the section above, 2.3.1 Not perceiving non-compliant behaviour, participants held a very specific image of what a fraudster looked like: repeat and deliberate offenders, who received large sums in overpayments and spent this lavishly.

Repeat offenders need tough love.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

However, those participants who had committed fraud still did not identify themselves within this definition, even though their prosecution had resulted in conviction or they had accepted an Administrative Penalty. Typically, they reasoned that they had not been living extravagantly and, in their view, they had not deliberately allowed the overpayment to happen. As a result, they disagreed with DWP’s assessment that their behaviour constituted fraud.

Therefore, despite agreeing with penalties in theory, participants who were prosecuted or received an Administrative Penalty often either struggled to see why penalties should apply to them, or felt that when applied to them, the specific penalty they received was unfair. Participants’ unwillingness to accept that they had committed fraud was also influenced by this having been a first offence for many. They felt shocked and that it was unfair that they were suddenly being “treated like a criminal”.

[Others received a penalty] because they were robbing, but I wasn’t doing that!

(Ad Pen, UC)

You have to face the consequences, but if you’re innocent it’s unfair.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

Some participants who received a Civil Penalty also expressed that they had been made to feel like a criminal when they received a phone call from DWP about the overpayment. However, those who received a Civil Penalty were generally more accepting of the penalty because it was easier for them to recognise that they had made a “silly mistake”. Participants’ greater acceptance of the Civil Penalty reflects its lower level of severity than other penalties discussed.

3.2. Impact of the penalties regime on claimant’s lives

Participants reported that the process of receiving a penalty had an overwhelmingly negative impact on their lives: on their health, socially and financially. It is important to understand this within the context of the penalties regime as a punitive approach to wrongdoing, where some negative impact is intended. The type and degree of impact varied by type of penalty, from relatively less extreme impacts for Civil Penalties to more serious and long-lasting for those prosecuted or receiving an Administrative Penalty. Although the penalty itself had an impact on the lives of participants, it became apparent that the impact was also driven by participants’ experiences of being investigated for an overpayment.

The impact of the investigation, interview under caution, and penalty on those interviewed was often exacerbated by external and personal factors. Those who were most vulnerable, not only financially but also in terms of health, saw the greatest impact on their lives. Similarly, the impact of the penalties process was often exacerbated where participants were going through difficult periods in their lives at the time of the investigation.

3.2.1. Physical and mental wellbeing

Generally, across penalties, participants felt that the process leading to receiving a penalty had a negative impact on their mental wellbeing. In some cases, participants discussed instances of suicidal ideation (see section 1.3.4 Safeguarding in 1.3 Methodology for details on the safeguarding procedure for this research). Where participants discussed a decline in mental wellbeing, this tended to be exacerbated by personal circumstances and pre-existing mental health issues. For example, if participants experienced difficult life events before or during the investigation, this tended to make participants more vulnerable to mental health issues. The perceived level of awareness of the overpayment also tended to exacerbate the impact on mental health. Participants who perceived themselves as unaware of the overpayment felt caught off guard when first finding out about the overpayment. In these cases, participants recalled feeling shocked and distressed at finding out they had made an error or suddenly being labelled as a criminal where they had committed fraud.

It’s all psychological mind games to break you down and make you weak…it’s a really really cruel way to treat people who possibly already have mental health problems, you’re compounding them.

(Prosecuted, UC)

I could have, just for what I’ve gone through for three years with the DWP. I could have literally just walked outside and stepped in front of a car, a bus, lorry, anything. I’d planned it in the head.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

The penalty type also appeared to influence the likelihood and severity of mental health impacts reported by participants. Those who were prosecuted or accepted an Administrative Penalty tended to report more severe and long-lasting impacts to their mental wellbeing. This may be attributed to the lengthier penalty process, but some participants also described the penalty as a “hard pill to swallow”. The penalty put into question how they viewed themselves, and participants felt distressed at the thought of feeling like or being viewed as a criminal. Specifically, where the participant’s name appeared in the papers, the shame associated with this had a detrimental impact on their mental health.

When participants experienced a decline in mental wellbeing, this also impacted their ability to engage effectively with penalties – specifically accepting an Administrative Penalty. Some participants who were already experiencing mental health issues discussed accepting an Administrative Penalty as they felt unable to go to court and face possible prosecution. They feared that going to court could further damage their mental and physical health. Some described feeling pressured into accepting the Administrative Penalty, even though they were aware that going to court was an option. They felt pressured to accept because attending court was presented in a negative light by DWP investigators. Similarly, those who got legal advice from a solicitor or charity (such as the Citizen’s Advice Bureau), were advised not to go to court because of an assumption that cases against DWP “never win”. Lastly, they felt pressured to accept the Administrative Penalty because of the risk of going to prison, which many found stressful and frightening.

Case study: Accepted an Administrative Penalty due to “overwhelming” experience of the interview under caution and desire not to go to court.

This participant’s living situation changed before applying for Universal Credit, but their tenancy agreement was never amended. They were aware of the inconsistency but still submitted a single person claim because they felt the information they gave was accurate. As a survivor of abuse, they felt the interview under caution was not trauma informed and they described being extremely overwhelmed. At points in the interview under caution, they said they were unable to speak. They felt the interview made their long-term health condition worse and that it was triggering. They accepted the Administrative Penalty as they did not feel they could undergo further investigation, for fear of re-traumatisation.

I just wanted it to go away, I wanted it to be dealt with, I didn’t want to have to engage with it anymore.

(Universal Credit claimant, accepted Administrative Penalty)

In contrast, Civil Penalties tended to have a more temporary and short-term impact on mental health, as the penalty process was less lengthy. In some cases, participants did not realise that they had received a penalty, meaning the penalty did not prompt distress or mental health impacts resulting from feeling accused of breaking the rules. This also reflects the penalty being less punitive in nature compared to Administrative Penalties and prosecution.

For some participants, the investigation and penalty process impacted their physical health. This tended to impact participants with pre-existing or long-term health conditions. In these cases, participants described how the stress of the experience made their physical symptoms worse. For example, one participant described experiencing seizures more often and believed this was a result of a stressful phone call they had with DWP to discuss the overpayment. Other participants described how the impact of the penalty on their mental health also impacted their physical health, for example, leading to extreme weight loss. The penalty type had less of an influence on physical health impacts, rather this tended to be connected to pre-existing vulnerabilities and mental health.

I was having 3 or 4 seizures a day, I was so wound up… I was having a good patch at the time seizure wise, and then that just went all out of the window [when I heard about the overpayment].

(Civil Penalty, ESA)

Claimants described various social impacts of being investigated for fraud, many of which were linked to or led to mental health issues. Some claimants described feeling isolated by the shame and stigma surrounding the penalty. These participants described how the penalty made them feel small and “like a criminal”. Some participants described how shame made them not want to go out or interact with others, causing further isolation. Others described feeling paranoid about who they spoke to during the investigation, which made some participants feel like they had to deal with this difficult time alone. Lastly, some participants described how the penalty and investigation caused relationships to breakdown within their family unit. For example, one participant described how their relationship with their children deteriorated in the process of being prosecuted, ultimately leading to their children no longer speaking to them. They blamed this loss of contact on DWP.

I didn’t go out, I didn’t want to see anybody because I felt so small, I felt like a criminal.

(Ad Pen, ESA)

It [being prosecuted] shattered [my family life], it separated my children.

(Prosecuted, Income Support)

The social impacts of the penalty process tended to be exacerbated by poor mental health and participants feeling like they had no one to talk to. For example, some participants described that they had no family or friends to help them through this difficult time.

The social impact varied by penalty type, with the impact being more pronounced for those who were prosecuted. When prosecuted, participants felt like criminals, often for the first time in their lives, and therefore had greater feelings of shame and stigma compared with those who received a Civil Penalty. Similarly, having their names appear in the papers added to the feelings of shame and social isolation.

The worst thing about it all was what was in the papers as they exaggerated the whole story.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

3.2.3. Financial wellbeing

Almost all participants described how the penalty affected them financially. For many participants, financial struggles were directly linked to repaying the overpayment and penalty. For participants that experienced a loss of benefits, they described experiencing further financial hardship and having to rely on other sources of incomes, such as hardship payments or savings. Some were shocked at the amount they had been overpaid given that they did not feel materially better off, whereas others were shocked by the amount that the penalty was. This was true of both Civil Penalties and Administrative Penalties. Specifically, some participants described how the repayment amounts were unaffordable to them. These participants did not see repaying the overpayment and penalty as distinct; they saw it as one payment. Participants who lost access to benefits described this aspect of the penalty as a significant source of their financial hardship. The financial hardship caused by the repayment or loss of benefits manifested itself in the use of food banks and the prioritisation of bills. For some, they had to temporarily rely on Recoverable Hardship Payments or loans to cover repayments and basic necessities.

However, for others who were prosecuted, the penalty impacted their ability to get a job, leading to financial insecurity. For example, one participant who was prosecuted and worked in care described how having the penalty on their Disclosure and Barring Service (DBS) check made it very difficult for them to get a job again. They described crying during job interviews as potential employers were turning them down because of their conviction.

It makes me feel very unsafe… Will I ever get a job again, because it will be on my record, it’s on my DBS [because] I’m a carer.

(Prosecuted, UC)

Other participants described how receiving the penalty made them too scared to apply for benefits again, leading to financial insecurity. A participant described having to deplete their savings to afford basic necessities because of this. Similarly, some participants described having to release equity on their homes to pay for the penalty or to repay the overpayment.

I’m living off my savings so I have to be as careful as possible, prioritise my bills and repaying what I owe them [DWP]… I hope I can work again soon, but I don’t know how and I don’t know if I can claim benefits again in the future.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

The financial impacts of penalties were exacerbated by personal circumstances. For example, where participants were already financially vulnerable, the burden of the penalty was greater. These participants could not rely on savings to help ease the financial burden of the penalty. Comparatively, participants who had higher paying jobs were able to afford the monthly repayments and the financial impact on them was minimal (where they received a Civil or Administrative Penalty).

The type of penalty received also influenced the extent of the financial impact on participants. Those who were prosecuted tended to experience more indirect but significant financial impacts. For example, participants reported being too scared to claim for benefits again or having to release equity on their homes to cover the legal fees and repayments, leading to financial insecurity.

30 odd years of working 7 days a week and only thing I had to show for it was my house and they [DWP] took that away from me.

(Prosecuted, UC)

Other participants felt that having this conviction on their DBS affected employability. In comparison, some participants who accepted an Administrative Penalty described feeling grateful for having this option, to ensure their criminal record stayed clean.

It was quite a relief to have the option to take the fine.

(Ad Pen, UC)

Those who received an Administrative Penalty described different financial impacts depending on their experience of agreeing a repayment plan. Some participants were able to agree on monthly repayment amounts to ensure affordability, and others described being able to adjust repayment amounts when personal circumstances changed. For example, when a participant became pregnant, Debt Management reduced the monthly repayment amounts to take into account the additional cost of having a child. In these cases, participants described having a relatively positive experience and appreciated the flexibility.

For those who received a Civil Penalty, the financial impact tended to be less pronounced. One claimant described the impact of the Civil Penalty as an inconvenience because they were not allowed to pay it all back in one go using a credit card.

If I want to pay on a credit card, that’s up to me to manage my finances, not for them to comment on really, I feel that that’s, you know, there were minor inconveniences.

(Civil Penalty, ESA)

3.3. Impact of penalties on behaviour

3.3.1. Before instance of fraud or error

Before the fraud or error, penalties tended to have a limited effect as a deterrent for those interviewed. This finding should be understood in the context of the research limitation that, by only recruiting those who have received a penalty, we were limited in understanding the deterrent effect of penalties on those who changed their behaviour to avoid an initial penalty.

Awareness of the penalties regime prior to receiving the penalty varied amongst participants. Some were more aware and were able to recall the possible consequences for fraud, such as fines and going to prison. When recalling the possible penalties, some participants said this came directly from reading the declaration. Others said that their knowledge came from TV and other media, or hearing from their friends or family members’ experiences of penalties. On the other hand, some participants were completely unaware of the penalties regime. This was either because they felt it was too complicated to engage with, or because they had not meaningfully engaged with the declaration and therefore did not recall possible consequences for fraud or error.

Even where relative knowledge of penalties was higher, penalties had a limited deterrent effect. For those who were aware, this is because they were not able to see why these penalties should and would apply to them. Generally, this stemmed from participants not perceiving themselves as being dishonest when submitting the initial claim and not having the intention to commit fraud further down the line. Participants tended to assume that the declaration only applied to the information submitted in their claim and lacked an understanding that it applied to future changes of circumstances too. Many were also unaware that negligence leading to an error could have a consequence. Participants assumed that where an error had been made, they would be required to repay the overpayment but not receive a penalty.

I didn’t think about them at the time as I had nothing to hide and expected the penalties would not apply to me anyway.

(Civil Penalty, ESA)

Where participants were unaware of the penalties regime, they were then unable to engage with the possible consequences of fraud or error. Therefore, penalties could not act as a deterrent.

I read it [the declaration] at the time but I don’t remember any … I don’t remember anything about the consequences, any penalties.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

Therefore, for those interviewed, the effectiveness of penalties as a deterrent before allowing the overpayment was low. However, penalties did have the possibility to affect future behaviour changes and limit recidivism.

3.3.2. After receiving a penalty

After receiving a penalty, participants’ perceptions of penalties and their behaviours around claiming benefits could change significantly. For some participants, receiving a penalty could lead to positive and desired changes in future behaviour and limit recidivism. For others, the desired behaviour change was unclear, and this led to more unexpected behaviour changes by those who received a penalty.

Desirable behaviour changes

A crucial precursor to limiting recidivism, was changing participants’ perspectives on what negligent and fraudulent behaviour looks like. For those who received a Civil Penalty, the penalty came with a realisation that negligence and error could result in a penalty. After receiving an Administrative Penalty or facing prosecution, although participants often felt it was unfair, they tended to have a greater understanding of what fraud looks like. Specifically, participants had a clearer understanding that, even if they perceived their actions to be unintentional, their behaviour could be classed as fraudulent and could lead to receiving a penalty. This realisation that their behaviour was negligent or fraudulent led participants to enact other positive behaviour changes, ultimately reducing recidivism.

The main behaviour changes which were likely to limit recidivism involved increasing awareness of the role and responsibilities of participants as claimants. Many participants became aware of their reporting responsibilities. However, this did lead some participants to report every change of circumstance, no matter how small. One participant described that when they reported a small change in their circumstance to DWP, the phone operator asked them why they were reporting such a small change. This demonstrates that although participants became aware of their duty to report, they were still uncertain of what they needed to report – out of fear, they reported everything.

I look into things a little bit more, if I was to come into money again, I would definitely know to tell universal credit.

(Ad Pen, UC)

Similarly, participants became aware that government entities and financial providers (for example pension providers) do not communicate to share information about individuals. This further emphasised to participants their role in communicating changes to DWP, rather than assuming this would be done by someone else, for example their pension provider, HMRC, or social services.

Some participants became more aware of how to report changes of circumstances. For example, understanding the appropriate mode of contact. However, for some participants, DWP’s preferred mode of contact was not accessible to them, which may limit the impact of greater awareness on reducing recidivism in the long term. For example, one older participant who had limited digital literacy, was not able to access and use the Universal Credit online portal. Therefore, it was difficult for them to report changes of circumstances. Instead, they had to phone someone at the job centre, but this worried them as there was no record of these calls.

Case study: Now reports every minor change of circumstances to DWP after the penalty but is unsure of which changes are relevant.

This participant’s claim was completed by their ex-spouse, who failed to declare that they were working at the time. The participant was passive in applying for the joint claim and assumed their spouse had told DWP about their job. They were unaware of the overpayment and the circumstances that led to it at the time. They felt that the communication from DWP at this time was inadequate and inconsistent. They spoke to one person who was willing to help them, but then another who ignored them. They said when they spoke to DWP in an interview, they made them feel like a criminal. They report every change to DWP but finds it frustrating that they have to wait until after the overpayment has happened to report it. Because they report minor changes (due to lack of awareness of what changes are relevant to report), they have been asked by DWP phone operators ‘why are you reporting this?’.

Like every little penny that could change…I automatically tell them straight away because I don’t want to be put into that situation where I’m in an interview…because of an overpayment in the future.

(Universal Credit claimant, Civil Penalty)

Undesirable behaviour changes

The behaviour changes after receiving a penalty were not always aligned to DWP’s needs. The research identified that following the fraud or error and penalty, some participants exhibited emotionally driven and unpredictable behaviour changes, and others were more calculated in their undesirable behaviour changes.

Where participants’ behaviour changes were less predictable, this tended to be an emotional reaction to the process of receiving a penalty. For example, after being investigated and receiving an Administrative Penalty, one participant explained how they had stopped claiming benefits out of fear of possible future investigations. This was despite being eligible for and needing to claim benefits.

I’m scared to try and claim anything… I’m reluctant to have any dealings with them [DWP] whatsoever.

(Ad Pen, ESA)

In another case, a participant, who had a distressing experience of being investigated for fraud, no longer felt able to speak to DWP. They felt that the trauma caused by the investigation and interview under caution made them disengage. This participant was still claiming benefits but handed over all responsibility for their claim to their spouse.

Similarly, another participant explained that they had become disengaged, but this was a more calculated decision, rather than being led by an emotional reaction. They described being reluctant to speak to or declare anything to DWP in case it “harmed” them further. In this context, they saw the “harm” as financial, as their benefits had previously been paused whilst an outcome of the investigation was decided.

I’m more reluctant in giving information that would harm me in any way shape or form.

(Ad Pen, UC)

Another calculated, rather than emotionally driven reaction, was a participant becoming more aware of how to avoid getting caught by DWP. Specifically, they have asked their family, when receiving gifts, to give these to them in cash rather than through their bank. They did not want DWP to be able to question why they were getting small sums of money (~£50) from family members.

Whether or not I’ve been gifted money from a family member as a birthday present, I’d rather they gave it to me in cash.

(Ad Pen, UC)

Question 8

4. Opportunities for behaviour change

Accepted Answer

This section explores potential changes that could help deter fraud or reduce recidivism, drawing on specific suggestions from participants and the analysis of current behaviours discussed above. While some of these changes relate directly to strengthening or adapting deterrents, more often they focus more on how the process of claiming benefits, as well as the penalties regime specifically, interacts with levels of claimant understanding. These suggestions are framed in relation to the dominant perceptions and circumstances identified by the research previously.

4.1. Defining desired behaviours

Before examining opportunities for behaviour change, it is important to revisit the barriers that may prevent individuals from meeting DWP’s expectations. This research indicates that – as reported by participants – they could try to follow all the desired behaviours and still receive an overpayment and penalty. The table below sets out the key challenges discussed throughout this research in relation to each of the three desired behaviours.

Desired behaviour	Read the declaration and engage with the claimant’s responsibilities.	Apply the declaration to their own circumstances.	Report a change of circumstances to DWP.
Challenge	1) Difficulty engaging with and understanding the declaration. 2) Declaration not clearly communicating the claimant’s responsibilities.	1) Understanding what circumstances were relevant. 2) Knowing what counts as a change.	1) Being able to report (long phone wait times). 2) Knowing you have reported successfully.

Therefore, this research indicates it would be valuable for the department to clearly establish what behaviours they want from claimants to avoid fraud and error, to ensure the system is set up to encourage these. To prevent fraud and error, claimants need to know the specific actions that, if taken together, can help them avoid a penalty and it needs to be possible for everyone to follow these.

4.2. A model for behaviour change

Considering behaviour change in terms of awareness, motivation, and action – as in the table below - can help assess the degree to which current policies influence behaviour. If all these components are in place, it is generally more likely that a desired behaviour will happen.

Phases in behavioural change	Desired behaviours to avoid fraud and error
1. Awareness: Do people understand the rules and consequences? 2. Motivation: Are incentives and deterrents shaping decisions effectively? 3. Action: Are people able and willing to comply?	Read the declaration. Apply to their own circumstances Report to DWP through the correct channels and in a timely manner

4.3. Effectiveness and potential role of deterrents

Among those interviewed, deterrents had a limited role in reducing first-time fraud. Low levels of awareness and engagement of penalties meant that most participants did not consider the risk of receiving a penalty before being notified of fraud or error. As explored throughout this report, perceptions of penalties and difficulties reporting played a larger role than these potential consequences.

Furthermore, participants did not feel that penalties were effective in targeting the “worst offenders”, specifically, those who repeatedly overclaimed or defrauded the government of large sums. Participants generally believed “benefit cheats” would not be deterred by harsher penalties, and referenced the behaviour or individuals they felt would fit this category, including neighbours and even family members, as evidence. As described above, even those aware of their fraud were often disengaged with the threat of a penalty and did not believe this applied to them.

Deterrents work when people have a conscience. This scared me to death! But it won’t stop people who do it on purpose and who do not have a conscience.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

However, penalties appeared to be much more effective in reducing recidivism, through fear of a repeat occurrence. Penalties reduced reoffending among participants by making them extremely motivated to avoid another one in the future. Participants were extremely fearful of the emotional and financial consequences of a second offence. Receiving a penalty also led to greater awareness of the penalties regime in general and what might qualify as a change of circumstances for any one individual.

Even with reducing recidivism, the effectiveness of penalties were limited when individuals had successfully applied the declaration to their circumstances, because they still struggled to act (report the correct change or issue to DWP). There were multiple examples where participants had received a penalty previously and were upset and frustrated at receiving the same penalty again after failing to successfully report second changes in circumstances.

Finally, a range of impacts on participants were discussed in the previous chapter from all three penalties. These encouraged participants to make efforts to avoid fraud and error in the future. More severe penalties will have more negative consequences for claimants, but it is not clear these will have any greater effect on preventing recidivism. Therefore, these may not offer clear advantages from DWP’s perspective.

Therefore, among those interviewed, harsher penalties alone appeared unlikely to more effectively drive desired behaviours. While getting a penalty appeared to motivate participants to report in the future, they did not feel properly equipped to know what constitutes a change in their circumstances or how to report it.

Higher penalties are harsh and they hurt people more rather than helping them, [DWP] need to be more humane.

(Prosecuted, Pension Credit)

Based on participant responses, “more proportionate” deterrents (such as smaller penalties for disclosure and first-time offences) and wider changes to the system tailored to address current behaviour appear to have greater potential for reducing fraud and deterring recidivism. These are explored in more detail below.

4.4. Wider opportunities for behaviour change

Discussions identified five main areas in which participants felt changes might have prevented them receiving a penalty.

The first four relate directly to the perceptions and contextual factors discussed in the above section on 2.3 Behavioural context for receiving a penalty. These also address the two areas in which current deterrents were felt to not be effective: raising claimants’ awareness and making it easier for them to act. The final area of opportunity for behaviour change focuses on potential ways to increase participants’ motivation to report before receiving a penalty.

1. More clarity in the declaration about fraudulent behaviour

Participants discussed changes that would encourage their reading of and engagement with the penalty, to address them not perceiving negligent or fraudulent behaviour.

Helping ensure individuals understand what they are agreeing to. Examples of this that would have helped participants avoid a penalty included:

Provide an in-person walk-through of the agreement, either with DWP staff or another trusted expert, to ensure clarity.
Given the length of the benefit declaration, participants also suggested a set of tailored questions alongside the declaration to prompt reflection and better understanding.

Everything is buried behind so many different pages of text on the Internet now… I just think the communication and the information available is it’s just not fit for purpose in my opinion… and they need a more robust system that can’t let things slip through the gaps.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

Ensuring information is presented in a clear, digestible format, with an emphasis on explaining the consequences of non-compliance. For example, this was believed to include:

Highlighting key parts of the declaration, by bringing them forward in the document or capitalising them to draw attention to critical responsibilities.
Presenting relevant, real-life examples of penalties that have been issued and the reasons behind them.
Clearly outlining what prosecution would look like in practice and what it would mean for the individual, to make the risk tangible.

[It happened] because I probably read like the first maybe two sides to the letter and I think there was 4 pages to this letter double sided, so it was probably about 3 pages in where it said the terms are under 16 hours or whatever. Yeah, I hadn’t noticed that.

(Civil Penalty, ESA)

I can’t really say there wasn’t enough information, but I just didn’t have the awareness.” “The leaflet is very informative, but I think it goes to show that there must be a lot of people who don’t read it or pay attention to it because I didn’t. If I had read it, I would have known, but I didn’t.

(Prosecuted, Income Support)

2. Awareness-raising to help recognise relevant changes of circumstances

Encouraging claimants to apply the declaration to their own circumstances. To avoid fraud or error in the future, participants felt they could have been helped to better understand and apply their responsibilities from the declaration. This would support those with limited capability to recognise and disclose. Suggestions included:

Issuing more frequent reminders and prompts, via text message, phone calls, letters, or portal notifications, to encourage claimants to actively consider whether their circumstances have changed.
Providing a clear and accessible list of ‘dos and don’ts’ at the point of each new claim, helping set expectations early.
Introducing more regular in-person meetings or check-ins with DWP staff to reinforce understanding and clarify responsibilities.

Maybe there should be like an information sheet, you know, which tells them all the terms you can’t do so they can’t make mistakes like I did.

(Ad Pen, ESA)

Supporting claimants to monitor changes in circumstances. Ongoing awareness of potential changes of circumstances was linked by participants to avoiding fraud and error. To aid this, participants discussed opportunities for changes from DWP during interviews such as:

Enhancing the Universal Credit journal with more dynamic tools, such as built-in calculators or AI-powered prompts that suggest potential areas for reporting based on individual circumstances.
Implementing functionality to flag users who may have limited financial capability, offering targeted support or signposting to additional resources where appropriate.

If you’re going to do something as serious as accuse someone of a criminal offence, then… you can’t expect people to just know that process and to… comply with it and adhere to it when (they) have no idea what the process is.

(Ad Pen, UC)

3. Improvement of tools and prompts to encourage more regular reporting behaviour

Participants also discussed ideas around improving monitoring tools and removing elements that were perceived to discourage reporting changes in circumstances. These focused on addressing a lack of understanding of individuals’ responsibility and encouraging more accurate and regular reporting of circumstances such as:

Tightening specific elements of the journal’s structure to discourage under-reporting or delays (suggested by a participant who believed the journal encouraged under-reporting).
Simplifying the reporting and repayment process after receiving a penalty by clearly breaking down what is owed, what has already been repaid, and what steps the claimant needs to take.

Because they could say ‘oh your X amount of overpayment for the Council or for the DWP is £1000 and you’re currently paying £50 a month on your balance. Your overall balance left over is £600’. That will then help people be able to know how long they’ve got leftover as well.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

The journal system, I think, is appalling… these need to be monitored more closely.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

4. Work to increase capacity or unblock channels

Reducing barriers to reporting through improved channels and communication. Based on participants’ difficulties engaging with DWP phone lines, improved channel capacity and communication methods would have lowered existing barriers to accurate and timely reporting to address difficulty identifying ways to report. For some benefit types, such as UC, participants reported that there was no option to proactively report changes of circumstances before they occurred, leading to a higher chance of overpayment. Proposed changes include:

Introducing more flexible reporting options, such as a dedicated phone line or messaging service for reporting changes which may affect their entitlement, including out-of-hours access.
Allowing claimants to choose preferred communication methods (e.g., receiving and responding to messages via email or text), particularly for document submissions such as Fit Notes.
Ensuring greater transparency by logging conversations and agreements in accessible locations, such as the claimant’s Universal Credit journal or follow-up letters, to improve clarity and reduce disputes.
Allowing claimants of all benefit types to report upcoming changes of circumstances, rather than having to report them as they happen, to reduce the likelihood of overpayments occurring.

They just said, well,… until it’s all finalised, just carry on as normal and if you get an overpayment it will be worked out. And I was thinking but I’m telling you now; I don’t want to be in a position where I get an overpayment.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

I’ve got no evidence to say ‘yes, I had phoned’ because every time that conversation was brought up they never had a record of it.

(Prosecuted, ESA)

5. More tailored, considered and empathetic treatment of individuals based on circumstances to encourage reporting

Finally, reflecting widely-held perceptions of unfair and inconsiderate treatment from DWP, participants discussed changes that would have increased their motivation to report and reduced their fear of unknown or more severe penalties. Participants highly valued changes that would support people to report even when unsure whether something constitutes fraud or if they were worried about the consequences:

One participant discussed having an amnesty option for cases where an offence resulted from a genuine error, in order to encourage voluntary reporting.
Others believed DWP could also work to establish a clearer distinction between how “mistaken” and “repeat” offenders are treated (reflecting how participants distinguished between errors and fraudulent behaviour), both in messaging and in practical enforcement. Communications that made clear that DWP accepted claimants may make mistakes were felt to be likely to encourage reporting. Smaller penalties for disclosure and first-time offences were also discussed.

I’ve never took the benefits until 2019. I’m 62. You know what? I, I’ve worked all of my life, so there’s no intention there.

(Prosecuted, UC)

Investigators have very outdated or one sided opinions about the claimants they are serving which I don’t think [are] correct.

(Ad Pen, UC)

Encouraging redress of overpayments promptly. Finally, participants discussed changes that could be made to incentivise timely action in cases of overpayment:

One example was for a smaller initial penalty that increases progressively in response to continued inaction. This may encourage faster resolution while acknowledging that delays, especially those perceived to stem from DWP’s side, can worsen outcomes.
Given the distress of the proactive notifications when an overpayment occurs, pair this with clear guidance on how to initiate a repayment plan before the debt grows further.

They panic because they rely on that money, so that graduated penalisation not just a letter saying, oh, this is what you’ve overpaid, that’s what you’re paying. Pay it back now.

(Civil Penalty, UC)

Question 9

5. Conclusions

Accepted Answer

This section outlines the key conclusions from interviews in response to the four research question themes. These are designed to help guide future policy developments to the penalties regime. It also aims to provide findings and recommendations on claimant engagement with their responsibilities for making and managing their claim. As discussed throughout the report, these conclusions are based on the perceptions of participants about their experiences before and after receiving a penalty. The findings based on these perceptions reflect the perspective of these participants specifically and the research is not designed to establish the objective truth. The findings should be considered in light of the limitations outlined in the methodology section above (1.3 Methodology), such as the potential differences between the participants who opted into the research and those who did not.

1. Current awareness and perceptions of penalties

What was the level of knowledge of the penalties regime prior to receiving a penalty?
How likely did they feel that they would get caught, and to what extent did this affect their behaviour?
How quickly did they think they would get caught and have penalties applied. To what extent did this affect their behaviour?

Participants’ knowledge of the DWP penalties regime was limited before receiving a penalty. Wider awareness of the penalties regime was low mainly because participants appeared unlikely to have closely read and digested their benefit declaration or applied it to their own circumstances. Limitations in capability, including challenges with cognition and financial literacy, were felt to be partly responsible for this lack of engagement.

Some participants discussed how before receiving a penalty, they had felt anxious about changes of circumstances which they suspected might lead to fraud if unreported. However, this did not appear to lead to specific changes in behaviour. For the most part, participants did not appear to be worried about getting “caught”, or have expectations of how long it would take for their case to be detected. This was generally because they were either unaware or unsure whether their circumstances and behaviour were against the rules. This reflected a spectrum of intention around benefit fraud in which participants often did not perceive their action as deliberately leading to fraud.

For some participants, limited understanding of the penalties regime and of specific penalties continued even after they had received a penalty. For example, some of those who received a Civil Penalty regarded this as a simple repayment or fixing of an issue rather than a penalty. However, these participants still discussed distressing experiences and attempting to change behaviour to avoid fraud or error in the future.

Those who accepted an Administrative Penalty appeared to recognise that they had a choice to decline it and go to court, but often felt pressured to accept it. There were two main reasons for this. Those with mental and physical health issues felt unable to go to court in fear that their health would worsen. Others felt scared into accepting the Administrative Penalty due to being told by DWP investigators and legal advisors that going to court may lead to prison time.

Implications: The benefit declaration appeared to be a key stage for awareness-raising where current engagement was low. Participants believed more could be done to encourage them to read and engage with the declaration and its implications. These requests focused on receiving more guidance around what they were agreeing to and having information presented in a format that was easier to read and understand.

Participants who are given the option to accept an Administrative Penalty could be given a fuller and more balanced view of what the consequences of a court hearing may be. For example, they could be informed about suspended sentences and community service rather than just hearing about going to prison. This would allow participants to make a more informed decision when accepting an Administrative Penalty.

2. Impact of penalties for driving deterrence

To what extent were potential penalties a deterrent?
If they were not aware of the penalties, would they have acted differently if they had known about the current penalties?
What was the impact of the penalty?
Did the enforcement / repayment of penalties impact on behaviours?
What would have been more of a deterrent?

This research indicated that, due to these limited levels of awareness and engagement, the threat of a penalty was a limited deterrent. Instead, a collective set of perceptions and contexts appeared to influence individuals, leading to fraud or error. These included not perceiving behaviour as negligence or fraud, limited recognition of what constituted fraud or error, a lack of understanding of individuals’ responsibility, and difficulty reporting.

Implications: The research highlighted perceived system-related issues that, if improved, could have helped remove barriers and help encourage more disclosing behaviour among those interviewed.

3. Discussing potential new policy interventions

What are claimant views on prompted disclosure?
Would a higher penalty in monetary terms (or loss of benefit) make / have made a difference?

This research did not test specific interventions with participants. Participants were asked about what changes, if any, would have prevented fraud or error in their case. Participants believed there was clear room for improvement of the penalties regime, and DWP’s approach and treatment of benefit claimants more generally. In line with this, while some participants highlighted specific actions they could have taken to avoid fraud or error, others were reluctant to say they would act differently based on their current knowledge and wanted to see changes in DWP practices.

Prompted disclosure was raised spontaneously by participants, for example in the form of an ‘amnesty’ option where admission of potential fraud or error would encourage leniency. This appealed to participants because they often believed they had made genuine mistakes and should be rewarded for bringing this to DWP’s attention. This was especially the case for those who believed as this was their first offence that should be considered.

Participants did not believe a more severe penalty (for example a higher financial penalty or loss of benefits) would have made a difference in their case. Receiving a penalty appeared to be sufficient motivation for these individuals to try to change their behaviour, even if some continued to struggle with reporting a change of circumstances. Participants’ low levels of engagement before receiving a penalty (for example, being unaware of what the potential penalties were or not thinking this would ever apply to their case) indicate that more extreme penalties would remain limited at deterring fraud. One solution to this could be connecting the threat of a specific penalty with individual circumstances, for example through the declaration and case studies.

Implications: This research indicates that harsher penalties are likely to have greater impact on lives but not necessarily on deterring fraud more generally. This suggests that changes focused on encouraging disclosure would be more effective in preventing fraud for those interviewed by increasing awareness and removing stigma.

4. Impact of penalties for reducing recidivism

If this is a repeat occurrence, why was the penalty from the first occurrence not a deterrent?
How and why would getting a penalty affect future behaviour?

In contrast with the limited role, for those interviewed, of the penalties regime in deterring fraud prior to an overpayment, receiving a penalty subsequently increased individuals’ motivation to report, therefore reducing recidivism. Because penalties had a wide-ranging negative impact on individuals’ lives, participants sought to avoid them in the future.

However, due to issues with reporting changes of circumstances, this did not always lead to action that specifically prevented a future overpayment. For example, where participants claimed UC, they shared that they had been told by DWP that, due to how the system worked, they could only report a change in circumstances after the change. Where participants received the same penalty again even though they believed they had correctly reported, it was largely attributed to misunderstanding reporting responsibilities.

Implications: Research indicates that penalties can reduce recidivism and change behaviour. For those interviewed, penalties would be even more effective at reducing recidivism when paired with measures to increase capacity and more clarity around channels for reporting changes of circumstances.

Question 10

Appendices

Accepted Answer

Appendix 1: Achieved sample

Total

	Achieved
In-depth interviews	48

Primary quotas

Penalty received	Achieved
Prosecuted for benefit fraud	19
Received/accepted an Administrative Penalty	19
Declined an Administrative Penalty	0
Received a Civil Penalty	10

Secondary quotas

Age (record from sample)	Achieved
18 to 35	6
36 to 50	13
51+	29

Gender (record from sample)	Achieved
Male	19
Female	29

Benefit relating to overpayment (record from sample)	Achieved
UC (Universal Credit)	19
JSA (Job Seekers Allowance)	3
PC (Pension Credit)	1
IS (Income Support)	5
PIP (Personal Independence payment)	3
ESA (Employment and Support Allowance)	17

Appendix 2: Discussion guide

1. Introduction (5 minutes)

Section aims: Introduce research, reassure about confidentiality, and set tone of discussion.

Note for interviewers: allow sufficient time to check participant understanding of all aspects, focusing on informed consent and reiterating the value of taking part.

Introduce interviewer, Verian and DWP. Explain we have been asked to carry out research by the government and particularly the Department of Work and Pensions. They have asked Verian as we are completely independent from the government, so it means they do not know who is taking part.
Purpose is to hear different stories and journeys of claiming benefits, and it gives a chance to hear your story. We are particularly interested in hearing people’s experiences who have been investigated for overpayment of benefits, and who received a penalty.

When people receive an overpayment of benefits this means that they receive benefits that the government do not think that they should have and they could receive a penalty. The overpayment could be because of an error the person has made (such as forgetting to tell the government about a change in circumstances that affects benefits), they may not realise there has been an overpayment or they may do it on purpose. By penalty we mean things such as losing future benefits, receiving different types of fine or going to prison.

Overall, we’d like to know more about the different stages and decisions people make, to help shape potential future changes.

The research is completely voluntary, which means I’ll check in a moment you are still happy to take part and if you don’t want to that is no problem. Equally, there might be questions I ask that you don’t want to answer and that’s ok too. Even after today, if you decide in the next month, before we put all the findings together, that you don’t want your data from this interview included we can do that.
Confidentiality and anonymity: All of your data is stored confidentially, and only people in the research team at Verian know who has taken part. We only use the information for this research and your data will be deleted 3 months after the end of the project.

When we write up the findings, your responses will be anonymised and analysed alongside other participants. This means nobody who sees the report will know who has taken part.

This also means that anything you tell us about current or previous claims or any overpayments of benefits will not be shared with DWP with your name or details. If you mention any overpayments that DWP do not know about we do not pass this on, but this means to report it you would still need to contact them. I can share their details at the end in case you would like to get in touch about anything to do with a claim or overpayment.
Breaking confidentiality: The only time that we have to break confidentiality is if you tell me something that makes me think you or someone else is at serious risk of harm, I might need to talk to someone outside the research team about that to make sure you or they have support. I’ll check in with you about this if possible.
Time: Interviews last about 45 minutes. We understand that you may need a break or want to pause, so just let us know.
Support: We’ll be talking about lots of different things, and sometimes people want to talk to someone about the experiences they mention or just in general about different topics and issues. We’ll make sure at the end that we share some links to organisations that support people. You should have these as part of the information sheet we shared with you too.

Recording

Explain we need to record the interview as this helps use to capture accurately what is said.
Reassure that the recording will not be shared with anyone beyond the immediate research team for analysis, and will be destroyed 3 months after the research has completed.
Ask participant permission to record, start recording and confirm consent.

2. Life context (5 minutes)

Section aims: Situate the participant and their experiences at the heart of the interview, ensuring participants start to feel comfortable opening up, talking about their lives, emotions and thinking. Build trust and rapport to facilitate the next stages, as well as context to probe around in later discussions.

Notes for interviewers: This section should be really open and participant-led as much as possible.

To start, it would be good to get to know you and learn a bit more about your life in general. Can you tell me a bit about yourself and your life?

Probes if needed: Can you tell me a bit / bit more about…

Places that you have lived over your life? What did you like about them? What less so?
If you’ve worked, can you tell me about that?
What things do you enjoy doing?

3. Mapping experiences of claiming benefits and early awareness of penalties (10 minutes)

Section aims: Understand the participant’s individual journey with benefits and in particular those related to the penalty. Introduce penalties as part of their story early on without referring to the specific penalty they received to ensure they become comfortable talking about penalties.

Notes for interviewers: The different types of benefits participants may have claimed could include:

Universal Credit (UC), Job Seeker’s Allowance (JSA), Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), Child Benefit.

Before the interview, check the sample for the benefit combination attached to the penalty to start to focus this section on that experience as below.

Questions are provided below, but interviewer to start with chronological mapping and ladder across experiences, through to how participants felt and made decisions at each stage as feels appropriate.

I’d like to move on to hear more about your experiences of claiming benefits.

I’d like to focus on when you’ve claimed for [benefits combo from sample], can you tell me a bit about that?

When was this?
What led to you deciding to claim? How did you feel about claiming?
How did you check if you were eligible?
Did you get advice from anywhere? What was that like?

How would you describe the communication from or contact with the government over this time? The department that oversee benefits is called the Department for Work and Pensions in case helpful.

What type of communication did you have? PROBE: letters, emails, calls, in-person.
What was this like?

When you applied for benefits, there is declaration everybody signs. If you remember that, can you tell me a bit about it?

What was the process for signing it? When were you asked to sign it?
What kinds of things did it include?
How did you feel about that declaration at the time?
Can you tell me about any consequences it mentioned if people received an overpayment in error or on purpose?

As a reminder when people allow an overpayment of benefits this means that they receive benefits that the government do not think that they should have and they have not reported it. The overpayment could be because of an error the person has made (such as forgetting to tell the government about a change in circumstances that affects benefits), or doing this on purpose. If this happens, in can lead to a ‘penalty’ – by penalty we mean things such as loss of benefits, different types of fine or a prison sentence.

Thinking back to before you claimed for [benefit combo], had you heard about the different types of penalties that exist for if someone who allows an overpayment or doesn’t report it in error or on purpose?

What did you know about them? Did you know about the different types of penalties?
When did you become aware of them?
What ways did you hear about them? Was this through…friends and family, work, DWP, government in general?

When you applied for benefits, were potential penalties something that you thought about at all?

How did you feel about them?

Were you concerned or worried at this stage at all?
What was your thinking about them?
What did you think happened if people allowed an overpayment and didn’t report it?

4. Experiences of overpayment (20 minutes)

Section aims: Explore experiences of being investigated and receiving a penalty. This section delves more into the decision making and behavioural factors involved in over-claiming.

Notes for interviewers: The first part of this section focused on the processes before we ask about the decision making to commit fraud. We frame this as an overpayment that can happen in error or on purpose to avoid ‘fraud’ as this may mean participants are less likely to open up. If a participant is insistent that it didn’t happen, use projection techniques to explore why they think others might make the decision – it can include focussing on their type of crime and others as feels most comfortable.

Explain/Intro: It would be good to explore the different stages involved when the government think someone has allowed an overpayment on their benefits and not reported it.

I’ve got a timeline here of some of the different stages that happen when there is investigation. They can vary for each case and not everyone will experience all of them, but it would be really helpful for us to learn about your journey across them.

Show Powerpoint timeline including:

1. Being informed that the government think that there has been an over payment. It might be DWP, HMRC or your local authority that get in contact with people.

2. Asking questions or challenging that it happened.

3. Attending an interview with DWP.

4. Agreeing a repayment plan with DWP.

5. Being told to, or given the option, to pay a fine. Interview read out / not included on slide: This might include a fixed amount called an administrative penalty, or something called a civil penalty.

6. Going to a tribunal.

7. Going to court.

8. Loss of benefits.

9. Receiving a suspended sentence, which is a type of community sentence.

10. Going to prison – on remand or as part of a sentence given by a judge.

Can you talk me though your personal journey of being investigated and receiving a penalty?

When did you first find out about the overpayment? How did you feel?
What did DWP say had happened?
What happened at each stage?
Can you tell me about the type of communication you received? Was it clear? What was the tone like?
Did you talk to anyone else across the stages?
How did you feel when you first heard about the penalty? What concerns did you have?
Did you challenge the penalty?
How were the communications from DWP at different stages? What did this look like? How did it make you feel?
Was it clear what you need to do at each stage?
What was the final penalty you received?

That’s been really helpful – thank you. I’d like to think about to when the overpayment happened.

Looking back to the point in time that the overpayment happened in your case can you tell me a bit about this time and your thinking?

Interviewer seek to unpick active and passive decisions, fears and risks.

Were you aware of the overpayment?

If participant says they were not aware, briefly ask about what pros and cons people in general might see of doing this and move to the next question.

What was happening in your life over this time? Had something changed in your circumstances?
Did you attempt to contact DWP at all? What made you not tell them about the overpayment?
Was allowing the overpayment this something that you thought about the pros and cons of doing? Was this similar or different to how you approach things normally – do you normally weigh things up?
Was allowing the overpayment this something you were aware was against the rules?
Was there any information you needed that would have helped?
Did you think you would be caught?
What did you think would happen if you were caught?
Would you say you are someone who thinks about risks in life in general or was this different? What made it different?
What emotions were you feeling at that time?

If not covered in detail: Can you tell me a bit more about if you thought about the different penalties you might end up receiving if you allowed an overpayment and didn’t report it?

What were you thinking about them?
How important where they in your thinking? Did you think you would receive a penalty?

Did you talk to your friends and family about receiving penalty at all?

Why / why not?
To what extent does it matter to you what people you know well think about this type of thing? Is that similar to other aspects of life? How about people you don’t know well?

How did receiving the penalty impact your life?

Was there any financial impact?
Impact on anything you do day-to-day or your lifestyle?
Impact on friends and family?
How they felt over this time?
Did you stop claiming financial support altogether or need to claim things like hardship support?

5. Shaping the future (10 minutes)

Section aims: Focus on the future of deterrence in general. Explore what factors the participant thinks acts as a deterrent or would ensure people did not allow an overpayment in general, and in particular the role of penalties.

Notes for interviewers: The focus is on things that might help to stop people allowing an overpayment generally, but please guide participants towards discussing penalties and how that could be improved. Probe around differences in allowing an overpayment in error and on purpose.

Reflecting back on all the stages we have spoken about from claiming benefits to the investigation, is anything you think you would do differently?

Explore different stages:

What is it that makes you say that?
What else could other people have done? What else would you want DWP to have done?

There are lots of different reasons people say penalties for allowing an overpayment exist. Some of these include:

To punish people.
To pay something back to society.
To payback any administration costs for processing the over payment through fines or loss of benefits.
As a deterrent to stop people allowing an overpayment.
Briefly. what are your views on why they exist?

To what extent has getting this penalty changed your behaviour so you avoid getting an overpayment in the future?

Sensitively tailor as appropriate, in terms of:

Providing accurate / truthful information.
Being careful to ensure your claim is correct.
Reporting an overpayment.
What makes you say that?
What role does the penalty have in this? What else is a factor?

If they received overpayment due to an error: Based on your experience, what types of things do you think could change to help people who get an overpayment in error to make sure that doesn’t happen in the future?

Is there anything that could help across the stages we have discussed?
What type of information could be provided? At what stage? What would you have liked to have known?
What could people like DWP do?

If they received an overpayment on purpose/actively: Based on your experience, what types of things do you think could change to help stop people overclaiming on purpose in the in the future?

Is there anything that could help across the stages we have discussed?
What type of information could be provided? At what stage? What would you have liked to have known?
What could people like DWP do?

Are there any changes you think could happen to the different types of penalty, that might help to deter people from allowing an overpayment? For example, if fines were increased, people lose benefits for longer, or prison sentences are made longer.

Why do you say that?
What else is needed?

Do you have any final thoughts on what you think could be changed to help ensure people do not allow overpayments on their benefits in general?

6. Close (2 minutes)

Section aims: Thank the participant. End on a positive note. Finalise anything needed.

Notes for interviewers: Share the support information, confirm that the participant would like to see the summary of the key findings.

Thank the participant.
Reassure participant around confidentiality / disclosure.
Check if they are happy for us to contact them for clarifications.
Answer any questions.
Share the support organisation links, and DWP details.

Benefit declaration: A statement made by claimants when applying for or renewing benefits, confirming that information provided is complete and truthful and accepting that they may be prosecuted or fined if they do not report changes. ↩
As noted, these responses also reflect their own interpretations of whether they had engaged in any wrongdoing, how they chose to present their experiences in the context of the research and likely some recall bias. ↩
Please note the research limitations described above around speaking to those who deliberately committed fraud. ↩

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Executive summary

Contextualising the findings

Key findings

1. Behaviour and circumstances leading to a penalty

2. Impact of penalties

3. Opportunities for behaviour change

Acknowledgements

Authors

Glossary and use of terms

Receiving an overpayment

Fraud and error

Penalty

Types of penalty

Prompted disclosure

Investigation

1. Introduction

1.1. Research background

1.2. Research aims and questions

1.3. Methodology

1.3.1. Sample design

1.3.2. Recruitment

1.3.3. Development of research material

1.3.4. Safeguarding

1.3.5. Limitations

2. Behaviours and circumstances leading to a penalty

2.1. Defining the desired behaviour change

2.2. Awareness and perceptions of the penalties regime and of non-compliant behaviour

1. Those who claimed to have been unaware of their non-compliance.

2. Those who felt they had made a “mistake”.

3. Those who admitted to being aware of the fraud or error.

2.3. Behavioural context for receiving a penalty

2.3.1. Not perceiving non-compliant behaviour

Case study: Unaware that taking on a voluntary role would contradict their claim of being unable to work, and they were unclear when to report changes in their health.

2.3.2. Limited capability to recognise and disclose

Case study: Dealing with severe mental health issues due to grief led to challenges executing their parents’ will and not declaring information to DWP.

2.3.3. Lack of understanding of responsibility for reporting

Case study: Allowed overpayment as they expected DWP would stop payments after not hearing from them, based on their interpretation of the wording in the UC journal.

2.3.4. Difficulty identifying ways to report

Case study: Reported a change of circumstances by telephone but unaware that they should have also reported it on their Universal Credit journal, so felt their penalty was extremely “unfair”.

3. Impact of penalties

3.1. Attitudes towards penalties

3.2. Impact of the penalties regime on claimant’s lives

3.2.1. Physical and mental wellbeing

Case study: Accepted an Administrative Penalty due to “overwhelming” experience of the interview under caution and desire not to go to court.

3.2.2. Social life and relationships

3.2.3. Financial wellbeing

3.3. Impact of penalties on behaviour

3.3.1. Before instance of fraud or error

3.3.2. After receiving a penalty

Desirable behaviour changes

Case study: Now reports every minor change of circumstances to DWP after the penalty but is unsure of which changes are relevant.

Undesirable behaviour changes

4. Opportunities for behaviour change

4.1. Defining desired behaviours

4.2. A model for behaviour change

4.3. Effectiveness and potential role of deterrents

4.4. Wider opportunities for behaviour change

1. More clarity in the declaration about fraudulent behaviour

2. Awareness-raising to help recognise relevant changes of circumstances

3. Improvement of tools and prompts to encourage more regular reporting behaviour

4. Work to increase capacity or unblock channels

5. More tailored, considered and empathetic treatment of individuals based on circumstances to encourage reporting

5. Conclusions

1. Current awareness and perceptions of penalties

2. Impact of penalties for driving deterrence

3. Discussing potential new policy interventions

4. Impact of penalties for reducing recidivism

Appendices

Appendix 1: Achieved sample

Total

Primary quotas

Secondary quotas

Appendix 2: Discussion guide

1. Introduction (5 minutes)

Recording

2. Life context (5 minutes)

To start, it would be good to get to know you and learn a bit more about your life in general. Can you tell me a bit about yourself and your life?

3. Mapping experiences of claiming benefits and early awareness of penalties (10 minutes)

I’d like to move on to hear more about your experiences of claiming benefits.