Guidance

National Security (State Threats) Act 2026: factsheet

Published 17 July 2026

Summary

The National Security (State Threats) Act 2026 received Royal Assent on 8 July 2026.

This legislation creates a new power for the Home Secretary to designate bodies engaged in state threat activity, equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000.

Designation will disrupt and deter the activities of designated bodies and those working with and supporting them.

New offences will apply to those supporting, assisting or obtaining material benefits from a designated body.

This will make it easier to disrupt proxy bodies that are designated, with offences that deal with them in the same way as foreign intelligence services.

Individuals acting for a designated body will feel the full force of our National Security legislation, with accompanying sentences of up to 14-years.

Background

The threat to the UK from foreign states and their proxies has grown in scale and complexity, putting lives at risk and undermining our democratic values.

The National Security Act 2023 modernised the suite of powers and tools available to law enforcement to counter state threats. We have seen a number of charges and convictions under it which have significantly helped in making the UK a much tougher operating environment for states and their actors seeking to undertake hostile action.

However, new powers were needed to keep pace with the evolving threat landscape. Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, was commissioned by the Home Office to review terrorism legislation and identify areas which could be emulated under state threats legislation.

Jonathan Hall KC’s report, published in May 2025, recommended that the Government should legislate for a new power, equivalent to terrorism proscription, but tailored to address the threat from state entities and their proxies. This legislation gives effect to that recommendation.

Key facts

In 2025, the Director General of MI5 said that the UK had seen a 35 per cent increase in state threat activity from the previous year. Over the same period, MI5 had tracked more than twenty potentially lethal Iran-backed plots.

In his annual threat speech, he described the threat from a range of state actors, including espionage against our Parliament, universities and critical infrastructure, as well as the commission of surveillance, sabotage, arson and physical violence here in the UK.

Key quotes

Jonathan Hall KC, the Independent Reviewer of State Threats Legislation, concluded in his May 2025 report that “there are solid reasons for creating a classification power, equivalent to proscription under the Terrorism Act 2000, which is additional to existing measures such as sanctions”.

Designation criteria

This legislation inserted section 33A into the National Security Act 2023, providing that the Home Secretary may designate a body if they (i) reasonably believe a body is, or has been, involved in foreign power threat activity and (ii) consider that designating the body is necessary to protect the safety or interests of the UK.

Designated bodies are listed in Schedule 6A to the National Security Act 2023, which was inserted by the National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026 (S.I. 2026/847) on 17 July 2026.

Aliases

The Home Secretary also has the power to list alternative names (aliases) that are, or have been, used by designated bodies in Schedule 6A to the National Security Act 2023.

What is meant by foreign power threat activity?

Foreign power threat activity is defined under section 33 of the National Security Act 2023 and includes a range of activity done for, on behalf, or with the intention to benefit, a foreign power including espionage, sabotage and new offences under this legislation.

Designation offences

The legislation inserted sections 17A to 17C into the National Security Act 2023 (“the designation offences”), meaning it is a criminal offence to:

• Support a designated body – offences apply where a person invites support for or expresses an opinion or belief that is supportive of a designated body and does so for a prohibited purpose. There are also offences around meetings to support designated bodies etc. (section 17A).

• Assist a designated body – offences apply where a person engages in conduct and intends for it to materially assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities; or where a person engages in conduct likely to materially assist a designated body and knows, or ought reasonably to know, their conduct is likely to materially assist a designated body in carrying out UK-related activities (section 17B).

• Obtain etc material benefits from a designated body – offences apply where a person obtains, accepts or retains a material benefit (or obtains or accepts the provision of such a benefit to another person) that is or was provided by or on behalf of a designated body and the person knows, or ought to reasonably know, it was; or where a person agrees to accepts a material benefit (or the provision of such a benefit to another person) that is or was provided by or on behalf of a designated body and the person knows, or ought to reasonably know it was (section 17C).

What harms do the designation offences tackle?

The offence of supporting a designated body will disrupt individuals who promote the interests and objectives of designated bodies. This includes glorifying designated bodies.

Dual offences of assisting and obtaining material benefits from a designated body aim to treat those working with designated bodies in the same way as those working for foreign intelligence services, improving our ability to disrupt those bodies through prosecutions.

What are the penalties for a designation offence?

The penalties for designation offences are a maximum of 10 or 14 years in prison and/or a fine, depending on the offence.

Do the designation offences apply to sanctioned entities?

The designation offences apply in relation to designated bodies i.e. those listed in Schedule 6A to the National Security Act 2023. These offences do not apply in relation to entities subject to sanctions under the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018, unless such an entity is also a designated body for the purposes of this legislation.

How does designation help disrupt state threats?

In addition to the criminal consequences, designation sends a clear signal to designated bodies and the public that state threat activity against the UK or its interests will not be tolerated. Designation can also support other disruptive activity including the use of other criminal offences, immigration powers or sanctions.

Do the designation offences apply overseas?

Yes, the offences apply to conduct taking place outside the UK if the person is a “UK person” (as defined under section 3 of the National Security Act 2023) or is employed by or holds office under the Crown.

What are the safeguards?

The Government considers the legislation compatible with the European Convention on Human Rights (including freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention) and the UK’s obligations under international law (including the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations), while tackling the serious harms perpetrated by designated bodies.

Legitimate activity, such as diplomatic and humanitarian engagement and journalistic freedoms, is protected. For example, there is a specific defence for conduct carried out for the purpose of humanitarian activities in accordance with internationally recognised principles and standards in sections 17B and 17C.

The designation of a body through regulations will ordinarily be subject to approval by both Houses of Parliament.

There is a process, at section 33C of the National Security Act 2023 onwards, for applying to remove a designation and, where an application is refused, appealing to a specialist tribunal.

Removing a designation

This legislation expands the appeals route available under the Terrorism Act 2000 to designations made under the National Security Act 2023. This enables designated bodies, and those affected by designations, to challenge a designation by applying to the Home Secretary for a designation to be removed.

If the Home Secretary agrees to lift a designation, the relevant entry will be removed from Schedule 6A to the National Security Act 2023.

If the Home Secretary refuses an application, there is a route of appeal – as under the Terrorism Act 2000 – to the Proscribed Organisations Appeal Commission, a tribunal specialising in handling sensitive national security cases of this kind.

Business impact

There is expected to be minimal impact on businesses arising from this legislation. The potential cost to businesses largely comprises of monetised familiarisation costs alongside some unmonetised minor administration costs arising from potential reports to the National Crime Agency.

Guidance available to businesses encourages them and their staff to take steps to minimise their risk of prosecution for new offences. It also reminds them of existing obligations to submit Suspicious Activity Reports to the National Crime Agency when at risk of dealing with property linked to money laundering or terrorist financing under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 and Terrorism Act 2000.

This legislation does not create any new legal obligations for businesses.

An Impact Assessment detailing the anticipated impact on businesses is accessible.

Hypothetical case studies

Hypothetical 1 (assisting a designated body)

A state-backed company, based outside the UK, is designated for facilitating espionage against the UK on behalf of a foreign power. Person A is a senior employee at a UK-based military technology company which has several contracts with the UK government to provide it with military-grade weapons and defence systems. Person B is an intelligence officer for the foreign power, working in a cover role for the designated body, but approaches Person A as an employee seeking commercial opportunities.

Person A knows that the state-backed body is a designated body, and during the course of discussions with Person B, when queried about the details of existing contracts with the UK government, willingly provides access to sensitive information that is likely to assist the company in its activities.

Hypothetical 2 (obtaining material benefits from a designated body)

An organised criminal group, which operates in the UK and internationally on behalf of a foreign power, is designated following a series of sabotage and physical threat cases in the UK. The organised criminal group primarily targets dissidents and outspoken political opponents in the UK. The organised criminal group is intent on conducting arson against a UK-based media station that is publicly critical of the related foreign power.

Person C is approached online by Person D, an unknown individual, to set fire to the offices of the media station on a specific evening for a sum of £1,000. Person D does not give any indication of their motivation for the attack or that it will benefit the designated body. However, Person C is aware of other information indicating that payment is coming from a designated body. Person C accepts the sum and task assigned but is unable to act before law enforcement intervenes.

List of designated bodies

Three bodies are designated under section 33A of the National Security Act 2023. These are included in the list of designated bodies at Schedule 6A.

The three bodies were designated under the National Security Act 2023 (Designated Bodies) Regulations 2026, and the designations came into force on 17 July 2026. The Regulations inserted Schedule 6A to the 2023 Act.

The Explanatory Memorandum to the Regulations provided information about the bodies for Parliament.

Users should bear in mind that there is no universal standard for transliterating Arabic and other languages into Latin characters. Therefore, the spelling of the names of designated bodies appearing in other publications may differ slightly from that given in this list.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC): Designated July 2026

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (“IRGC”) is an integral part of the Iranian State. Its influence is multi-dimensional, spanning military, economic, domestic, security and foreign policy issues.

The IRGC is a branch of the Iranian armed forces but is independent from Iran’s regular army. The IRGC is ultimately accountable to the Supreme Leader of Iran, who is responsible for setting the IRGC’s overarching strategic aims. It consists of six main branches: IRGC Ground Force, IRGC Navy, IRGC Aerospace Force, IRGC Qods Force (IRGC-QF), IRGC Intelligence Organisation (IRGC-IO) and the Basij. While each is a separate branch, they all regularly collaborate and have a degree of shared decision-making at senior level within the larger body.

The IRGC-QF and IRGC-IO, together with the Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS), form the Iranian intelligence apparatus. Within the IRGC, the IRGC-IO is the main body responsible for intelligence, while the IRGC-QF undertakes foreign military operations. IRGC-QF maintains and operates covert intelligence networks around the world and plays a central role in extending Iranian influence across the Middle East and beyond.

Islamic Movement of the Companions of the Right (Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah): Designated July 2026

The Islamic Movement of Companions of the Right (“IMCR”) (Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamiyah) first emerged online on 9 March 2026, when its founding statement was shared across a small cluster of pro-Shia and pro-Iran Telegram accounts.

The first public statement by IMCR appeared immediately after an explosion outside the Synagogue of Liège, Belgium. The group have since claimed a number of attacks (and attempted attacks) across Europe over recent months targeting Jewish and Israeli interests. IMCR have publicly claimed seven attacks at UK locations linked to Jewish and Israeli communities, and Persian-language media, including the antisemitic arson attack on four Hatzola ambulances in Golders Green on 23 March 2026. Sitting behind IMCR were members of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Qods Force, who almost certainly directed IMCR attacks across Europe.

GRU Volunteer Corps: Designated July 2026

The Government has designated the Main Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation Volunteer Corps (“GRU Volunteer Corps”) because it assesses that the organisation forms part of a network of volunteer and proxy formations directed and controlled by the Main Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation (“GRU”). The GRU is Russia’s military intelligence service, which operates under the Russian Ministry of Defence.

The GRU has been responsible for a range of hostile activities against the United Kingdom and its allies, including the 2018 Salisbury nerve agent attack and wider sabotage and intelligence operations across Europe. The Government assesses that the GRU Volunteer Corps supports Russian military and intelligence objectives by providing a structure through which the GRU can recruit, organise and deploy volunteer and proxy forces. The organisation forms part of a wider GRU-directed network that combines state capabilities with volunteer and proxy formations, including elements previously associated with Wagner Group.