Policy paper

State threats prevention and investigation measures (STPIMs): National Security Bill factsheet

Updated 12 February 2024

Summary/key points

• State Threats Prevention and Investigation Measures (STPIMs) will provide a suite of restrictive measures which can be used, where necessary and proportionate, to prevent an individual’s further involvement in state threats activity where prosecution and other disruptive actions are not possible.
• Such measures would be used sparingly and as a measure of last resort to mitigate the immediate threat an individual poses while they continue to be investigated.
• Breaching any of the individual measures would constitute a criminal offence.
• The STPIMs framework largely replicates that of Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures (TPIMs), including several key safeguards.

Background

• The Government has publicly committed to provide operational partners with the tools needed to combat state threats.
• Restrictive measures are available in a range of contexts (for example counter-terrorism, serious crime prevention, sexual offending prevention, anti-social behaviour prevention) to mitigate the risk of individuals further engaging in harmful conduct. Such tools are available, accepted and found to be effective in these other contexts and will add similar value in protecting the UK and the public from state threats.
• The measures are designed as a last resort tool to disrupt and prevent further involvement in foreign power threat activity which covers the offences of espionage, sabotage, obtaining trade secrets, entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK, foreign interference or assisting a foreign intelligence service. They will also be available for serious violence where the foreign power condition is met, this would cover the following acts: a) serious violence against another person, b) endangering the life of another person, or c) creating a serious risk to the health and safety of the public or a section of the public.
• The measures can be split into those that can be used to address the specific threat the individual poses and those that can be used to support compliance with imposed measures. The Secretary of State (SofS) is only able to impose these measures if five specific conditions are met.
  1. The SofS must reasonably believe that the individual is, or has been, involved in ‘foreign power threat activity’.
  2. Some, or all, of the activity is new.
  3. The SofS reasonably considers that imposition of the measures is necessary to protect the UK from the risk of threats from foreign powers.
  4. The individual measures applied are necessary to prevent the individual’s involvement in foreign power threat activity.
  5. The Court provides the SofS with permission to impose the measures.
• As with other civil measures available in the national security space which involve restrictions being applied outside the criminal justice process, safeguards have been included within the STPIMs framework.

Key facts

• While civil measures like TPIMS have only been used sparingly and that is the expectation for STPIMs, they have proved to be an essential part of the toolkit.
• Between 2011 and December 2020, there have been 24 individuals served with a TPIM notice.
• As of 30 November 2021, there were 4 individuals on a TPIM.

Key quotes

“Britain is under threat from malign interference that ranges from the theft of valuable intellectual property, such as the Oxford Covid vaccine, to crass assassination plots. We need new legislation. We are in a position now where we are relying on powers that are over 100 years old. New laws, would mean MI5 not having to find really creative ways every time to disrupt what is increasingly damaging activity. Espionage is no longer the stuff as being spy on spy, old school movies and novels territory, but impacts every area of society, potentially every individual in the UK.” Director K, Head of MI5’s Hostile States Counterintelligence, Telegraph Interview, Dec 2021.

What harm do the measures tackle?

• They are designed to prevent, restrict, and disrupt an individual’s involvement in state threats activity in cases where prosecution and other disruptive action isn’t a realistic prospect.
• Activity which would fall in scope would be that relating to an offence of espionage, sabotage, obtaining trade secrets, foreign interference, entering a prohibited place for a purpose prejudicial to the UK, assisting a foreign intelligence service or serious violence where the foreign power condition is met.
• A prosecution might not be possible where the investigation is at an early stage and so there is not yet enough evidence to meet the criminal standard of proof of an offence; or where disclosure of relevant evidence as required in a criminal trial would be damaging to national security. In such a circumstance, the ability to disrupt the activity may prevent significant damage to the UK from being carried out.
• The measures imposed will be tailored to the specific threat an individual poses, for example an association measure could be used to prevent an individual from associating with a known or suspected foreign intelligence officer who is operating under diplomatic cover within the UK.

How will they be enforced?

• The Bill will provide the police with additional powers to support enforcement of the measures and further investigation of the individual.
• Failure to comply with or contravening a measure would constitute a criminal offence which would carry a maximum penalty of 5 years’ imprisonment, or 10 years for breaching the travel measure.

What measures are available?

• The measures include restricting: where an individual resides (can only apply in a case of serious violence etc and can include requiring an individual to reside at a specified residence and a requirement to remain at/within the residence between specified hours),​ an individual’s access to weapons and explosives, access to certain places, or where they can work and study;​ who an individual can associate with, an individual’s access to financial services, or use of electronic communications devices; an individual’s ability to leave the UK or areas within the UK.
• Enforcement measure include: monitoring an individual’s whereabouts;​ requiring an individual to report to a police station, attend an appointment, declare any property they own or have an interest in, provide notification of the address at which they reside, undergo a polygraph test, comply with directions provided by a police constable; and​ the ability for police to retain a photo of the individual.​

What are the safeguards?

• The SofS must first consult with the police on whether prosecution is possible and the Court must give the SofS permission to impose measures.
• The measures can only be in place for 1 year and can then be extended on an annual basis up to a maximum of 5 years with the SofS required to review the ongoing necessity of the measures.
• Proceedings for an automatic review by the Court will commence as soon as the STPIM is imposed and in addition the individual will be able to appeal a decision made by the SofS in relation to the STPIM.
• The SofS will be required to publish a quarterly Written Ministerial Statement on the exercise of her powers and will also be required to appoint an independent person to review the operation of the powers and produce an annual report.

Case study

Highly sensitive intelligence obtained via a foreign liaison partner indicates that a UK national (J) has been tasked by a foreign intelligence officer to undertake activity on their behalf in relation to 6 identified dissidents living in London. J is tasked with identifying the address of the dissidents and their families, as well as ascertaining details of their day-to-day routine. It is assessed likely that this information could be used to assist assassinations or forced repatriation operations.

Due to the inability to use the intelligence emanating from a foreign liaison partner in an open court, a STPIM could be useful as a last resort for disrupting potential acts of serious violence. A relocation measure to move J to an area where potential targets are less likely to reside, would significantly reduce the risk to all victims in the area (both identified and unidentified). Upon relocation, a travel measure prohibiting J from leaving a designated area would complement this and would prevent J travelling to the vicinity of any potential victims.