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Research and analysis

Methodology Note: Assessing the Economic Impact of the UK–EU Youth Experience Scheme

Published 20 November 2026

1. Introduction

1.1 On 20 November the European Commission and the United Kingdom have concluded negotiations on a Youth Experience Scheme (YES) that will give young people (aged 18-31) the chance to live, travel, study or work for up to three years in the UK and EU respectively.[footnote 1]

1.2. The YES is a visa scheme open to 18–31-year-old EU[footnote 2] and UK nationals,[footnote 3] capped at 100,000 inbound and 100,000 outbound participants, with places allocated in proportion to each Member State’s population.[footnote 4] The YES entitles participants to stay for two years, with the possibility to extend for a further year. Dependents are not permitted and neither UK nor EU citizens will have access to benefits in each other’s territories as a result of the scheme. The UK YES costs £340 and requires evidence of sufficient financial resources. The Immigration Health Surcharge applies at the discounted rate of £776 p.a., on par with the Government’s existing Youth Mobility Schemes.[footnote 5] UK nationals will be able to reside in up to three Member States over the duration of the scheme. The scheme will be implemented in 2030.

1.3. Government modelling suggests the UK–EU YES will boost the level of GDP by up to 0.2% by five years after implementation, if the net migration impact follows the trajectory in Table 1, relative to a baseline of no YES.

1.4 The EU and UK will work towards a supplementing agreement to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement on tuition fees for EU students in the UK and for UK students in the EU. Any changes that may be implemented in the future have not been modelled.

2. Modelling Inputs

2.1 Net Migration: The migration modelling estimates the effect of the YES on net migration. This requires an estimate of how many people from the EU will use the scheme to come to the UK, and how many people from the UK will use it to go to the EU.

2.1.1. Net migration is the number of inbound minus outbound individuals that stay longer than 12 months. It is smaller than the cap of 100,000, because the inflows are offset by UK participants going to the EU, and by EU participants returning home at or before the end of their stay limit.

2.1.2. There is no direct evidence on how many people would use a scheme that does not yet exist. In the absence of other options, the analysis therefore uses flows from when the UK was a member of the EU as a proxy, comparing 2018 and 2019 volumes with the volumes seen after free movement ended. This is likely to overstate additional demand as participants now face visa and Immigration Health Surcharge costs, and the time taken to apply, none of which applied under free movement. Net migration is therefore adjusted down substantially (by 25% to 75%) to reflect the additional friction now. These adjustments are judgement based.

2.1.3. Demand has two components. Displaced demand is participants who would have migrated regardless of the YES through a different route. They are not additional, so they are excluded from the net migration impact. Additional demand is participants who would not have migrated without the scheme.

2.1.4. 1. Net migration is estimated separately for inbound and outbound flows, each with low and high estimates. To reflect the uncertainty, the two flows are treated as independent. The high estimate is high net immigration minus low net emigration,[footnote 6] and the low estimate is low net immigration minus high net emigration.

2.1.5. Table 2 sets out the migration estimates alongside other key inputs and their sources. Government analysis estimates that this policy will generate additional net migration of +18,000 to +43,000 in the first year, which is expected to decline to +8,000 to +14,000 in the fourth year and slightly further thereafter once people return to their country of origin. Changes are expressed relative to the baseline scenario in which no youth experience scheme is established between the UK and EU.

2.1.6. Net migration remains positive beyond the third year because some participants stay in the UK after their three-year YES visa expires. These participants move onto other immigration routes, such as the Skilled Worker or Family routes, which they would not have used without the YES.

2.2 Inbound employment rate: The employment rate of inbound participants is estimated from the expected mix of students and non-students and from the activities of comparable people who have previously arrived on similar schemes. The key employment rate assumptions can be found in Table 1.

2.2.1. The employment rate for students is assumed at 37% according to the Office for National Statistics Labour Force Survey (LFS), and 65% in a report from the Higher Education Policy Institute.[footnote 7] As a simplified assumption the average of the two figures (51%) is used to assume the employment rate of inbound students. Students’ employment contribution is further scaled down by 0.4 to reflect their lower average weekly hours worked relative to the UK average, based on 14 hours per week for students from the HEPI report compared with 32 hours per week for the UK average from LFS data.[footnote 8]

2.2.2. Students, including potential Erasmus+ participants, are expected to make up just over a fifth of inbound participants. For the remaining participants, the employment rate is based on research of the activities of inbound participants on existing Youth Mobility Schemes. Weighting by these shares gives an inbound employment rate of 65% across all inbound participants.

2.3. Outbound employment rate: As the Government does not hold information on British nationals’ employment abroad, UK outbound participants are assumed to have broadly the same employment rates as inbound participants. No adjustment is made for Erasmus+ since it is uncertain as to how this will be facilitated in different EU member states.

2.4. Earnings: Earnings are assumed to be an age-weighted average of £26,500 from the Annual Survey of Hours and Earnings (2025),[footnote 9] and are used to calculate the earnings ratio relative to UK’s average hours worked.

Table 1 Key migration inputs and sources

Variable Value Source
Net migration

Year 1


Year 2


Year 3


Year 4


Year 5


+18,000 to +43,000

+21,000 to +46,000

+19,000 to +50,000

+8,000 to +14,000

+8,000 to +14,000
Government estimates
(see section 2 for more detail)
Employment (inbound) 65% Government estimates
Student employment (inbound) 51% Average of Labour Force Survey and Higher Education Policy Institute
UK median earnings £32,900 ASHE (2024/25)
Earnings ratio[footnote 10](outbound and inbound) 0.81 Government calculations using ASHE

3. Economic Modelling

3.1. This section sets out the analytical framework used to estimate the economic impact of the YES. Higher net migration increases the size of the population and, all else equal, expands the potential labour force, with the scale of this effect depending on the composition of the additional net migration. This raises the level of potential output supplied in the economy – the level of output consistent with stable inflationary pressures. This additional supply is assumed to generate additional demand, consistent with Say’s Law, leading to higher GDP.

3.2. Population effect: The effect on the UK population is derived from the net migration impacts as set out in the previous section. These estimates are particularly uncertain and are provided as ranges. They are based on historical inflows and outflows between the UK and EU Member States, accounting for displacement from existing migration routes.

3.3. Employment effect: The population change is multiplied by the respective employment rates of the inbound and outbound cohorts to estimate the change in employment for each cohort. The change in employment for each cohort is converted into a change in total hours worked using UK average hours per worker. For students, this is scaled by the ratio of average student hours worked to average UK hours worked, as set out in the previous section.

3.4. Productivity adjustment: The inbound and outbound cohorts may also differ in their productivity relative to the average UK worker. Productivity for each cohort is estimated by adjusting UK average productivity using an earnings ratio as a proxy: the cohort’s average annual earnings divided by UK median annual earnings (from ASHE). The resulting ratio is set out in Table 2.  Given limited available evidence, the inbound earnings ratio is assumed to be equal to the outbound ratio.

3.5. GDP effect: To estimate the GDP impact, the change in total hours worked by the inbound and outbound cohorts is multiplied by the respective productivity level of each cohort. The difference between the resulting inbound and outbound GDP effects gives the overall impact on GDP.

GDP estimation equation

I = additional inbound migrants

O = additional outbound migrants

 eI, e0 = respective employment rates

AVHI, AVHO = respective average hours worked

pI, pO = respective productivity levels of the inbound and outbound cohorts, calculated by adjusting UK average productivity using the respective earnings ratios.

3.6. Capital adjustment: The GDP impact also depends on how the capital stock responds to the increase in labour supply. Initially, a larger workforce reduces the amount of capital per worker. Over time, businesses would be expected to invest in additional capital to complement the larger workforce, increasing the GDP impact. The scale and speed of this adjustment are highly uncertain, so partial capital adjustment is assumed, using the midpoint of the range between no adjustment and full adjustment.

3.7. Ranges: The above steps are applied to the lower and upper bounds of the net migration impacts to generate lower and upper bounds for the GDP impact.

3.8. Timing: While the policy is expected to be implemented in 2030, for modelling purposes we use fiscal year 2027/28 as the implementation date.

3.9. GDP value change: The method used to calculate the value figures is the same as used for the UK-EU Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) Agreement.[footnote 11] It is based upon the dollar value of 2040 GDP projections in the 2025 Global Trade Outlook[footnote 12] and adjusted according to the Bank of England exchange rate.[footnote 13] The calculation assumes that the impact of the YES on the level of GDP is maintained beyond the fifth year.

4. Results

4.1. Based on the assumed effect on net migration and economic assumptions set out in section 2, the YES policy is estimated to increase aggregate GDP up to 0.2%[footnote 14] by five years after implementation.  The lower bound of this estimate is 0.1%.

4.2. The lower and upper estimates of the GDP ranges reflect the lower and upper bounds of net migration. Other parameters, such as employment rates and earnings, are held constant in the analysis, although they are also subject to significant uncertainty.

Table 2 Net migration ranges, based on the Government’s net immigration and net emigration estimates for a Youth Experience Scheme with a cap of 100,000

Year 1 2 3 4 5
Net Migration +18,000 to +43,000 +21,000 to +46,000 +19,000 to +50,000 +8,000 to +14,000 +8,000 to +14,000

4.3. The policy increases both GDP and the population (through higher net migration) by similar proportions, so the impact on GDP per capita is 0.0% at one decimal place. This results from a compositional change where YES participants, being younger than the general population, are assumed to earn less than the UK average based on the earnings ratio of the same age cohort in the UK (no further assumption is made about the relative earnings of the YES cohort compared to their UK equivalent cohort). Therefore, the average falls very slightly. This does not affect the earnings of UK residents.

4.4. The GDP level increase is equivalent to between £3bn and £8bn (in 2024 prices) when compared to projected GDP levels in 2040, assuming that the YES impact on the level of GDP is maintained beyond the fifth year.

5. Key Analytical Caveats

5.1. Estimates are sensitive to assumptions around behavioural responses, timelines, and labour market characteristics of YES users.

5.2. The expected change to EU–UK migration is uncertain. This relates both to the method used in forecasting these figures (in that 2018–19 flows are an imperfect proxy), and the original data that those forecasts are based on (under free movement, movements between EU Member States were not recorded systematically, and so are relatively uncertain).

5.3. It is possible the positive net inflow is supported by having the most widely spoken international language and relatively high incomes. The relatively larger EU population would also suggest a positive net inflow.

5.4. For outbound volumes, Home Office data on outflows of UK nationals from the UK border is used. This data has limitations for the purpose of modelling outflows. It is only split by UK passengers’ disembarkation country, and provides no information on the length of stay, or the age of British nationals leaving the UK. This means that it includes outflows for all ages and for all length of stays (from one day to permanent emigration. However, it is overlaid with assumptions to account for those eligible for the scheme.

5.5. A YMS visa (£340) is cheaper than a Student visa (£558), which may make it a more attractive option for some prospective students. However, not all eligible students would be expected to switch from the Student route. Some may prefer to remain on the Student route because of course duration, access to post-study immigration options such as the Graduate Route, dependant provisions, or a preference to preserve their YES eligibility for later use. This choice has been accounted for in the model, but it remains uncertain.

5.6. In the near term, the estimate for the increase in GDP is primarily driven by additional employment. Over the long term, a larger workforce would also be expected to encourage additional business investment, increasing the capital stock and productive capacity of the economy. The scale and speed of this adjustment are uncertain. As the modelling assumes only partial capital adjustment, the estimates may understate the long-term GDP impact if the capital stock responds more fully.

5.7. The model does not account for changes in participants’ earnings over time, particularly among inbound participants who remain in the UK through alternative immigration routes after their YES visa expires. Those who remain may need to meet earnings requirements under alternative routes, such as the Skilled Worker route, and their earnings are therefore likely to be higher than assumed in the modelling. The current estimates may therefore be conservative. However, this effect is uncertain and likely to be small over the five-year modelling horizon, given the relatively small proportion of participants who stayed in the UK through alternative routes by year five.

  1. From the Explanatory Memorandum published on gov.uk by the Cabinet Office on 28 August 2025. ↩

  2. This includes all participating EU Member States. ↩

  3. Participants have to be 31 or younger when they start the scheme, but their visa remains valid up to the age of 34. ↩

  4. There is a minimum floor for the smallest member states of 500 participants. ↩

  5. Existing Youth Mobility Schemes cover Andorra, Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, Iceland, Japan, Monaco, New Zealand, San Marino, South Korea, Taiwan and Uruguay. ↩

  6. Net immigration refers to EU citizens migrating to the UK minus those returning to the EU. Net emigration refers to UK citizens migrating to the EU minus those returning to the UK. ↩

  7. Higher Education Policy Institute, The Student Academic Experience Survey 2026; Office for National Statistics, Labour Force Survey, series AIXA ↩

  8. Office for National Statistics. (2026). HOUR01 SA: Actual weekly hours worked (seasonally adjusted) ↩

  9. ASHE (2025). Employee earnings in the UK: 2025 ↩

  10. The earnings ratio is the median earnings of the cohort relative to median UK earnings. ↩

  11. DEFRA & BIST (Formerly DBT) Methodology note: assessing the long-run growth impact of a UK-EU sanitary and phytosanitary measures agreement, May 2025 ↩

  12. BIST (Formerly DBT), Global Trade Outlook: June 2025 report ↩

  13. Bank of England, Statistical Interactive Database, “Annual average Spot exchange rate, US $ into Sterling (XUAAUSS)” ↩

  14. Detailed modelling suggests GDP growth of up to 0.22% but given uncertainties the results are presented to one decimal place (0.2%). ↩