Research and analysis

Risk assessment for SARS-CoV-2 variant V-23AUG-01 (BA.2.86)

Updated 1 September 2023

Applies to England

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Part 1. Context and UK case

As of 3pm, 18 August 2023, 6 unrelated cases of a new variant BA.2.86 have been identified in 4 countries. This variant is notable due to a high number of mutations.

Israel published the first genome on 13 August 2023. Subsequently Denmark has identified 3 cases, and a single case has been identified in both the US and the UK.

The UK case was identified in a patient tested at a London hospital on 13 August 2023, with no recent travel history. The sample was sequenced routinely as part of local hospital based genomic research.

Part 2. Variant technical group assessment

Meeting and assessment 1pm, 18 August 2023.

  1. The newly identified variant BA.2.86 has a high number of mutations and is distant from both its likely ancestor BA.2 and also currently circulating XBB-derived variants.

  2. Despite the small number of sequences, the appearance of the variant rapidly in multiple countries which are still operating genomic surveillance, in individuals without travel history, suggests that there is established international transmission.

  3. The sequences are similar across the world, potentially suggestive of a relatively recent emergence and rapid growth, but this is a low confidence assessment until further sequences are available.

  4. The UK case has no recent travel history, also suggesting a degree of community transmission within the UK. This clinical site sequenced data rapidly locally, and data from surveillance systems from the same period is likely to follow, thus a more complete assessment of UK transmission will be possible in 1 to 2 weeks.

  5. It is unreliable to attempt to predict the combined effect of the large number of mutations, however there is sufficient information to expect significant antigenic change. There are also mutations in spike which may be associated with changes in other viral properties.

  6. At present the UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) has designated this a variant for the purposes of tracking and assessment (V-23AUG-01). We will consider as signals of escalating concern the presence of phenotypic data confirming significant immune escape, other relevant phenotypic data, and signals of rapidly changing epidemiology in the UK or other countries where the variant has been detected.

  7. UKHSA will share data from surveillance systems, variant growth rates, and phenotypic laboratory data when available. It is not possible to assess comparative severity by variant based on UK surveillance at present.

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