Independent report

Report of the Inquiry into the Death of Jalal Uddin (accessible)

Updated 17 July 2025

Presented to Parliament pursuant to section 26 of the Inquiries Act 2005 Ordered by the House of Commons to be printed on 10 July 2025

Foreword

Jalal Uddin was a respected teacher of Islam, a gentle and courteous man noted for his personal integrity and kindness to others. On 18 February 2016, he was brutally murdered by two young Islamists for no better reason than that he happened to practise a form of Islam they regarded as incompatible with their own violent and unforgiving ideology. One of Mr Uddin’s killers, Mohammed Kadir, escaped from the UK before he could be arrested. His accomplice, Mohammed Syeedy, was convicted of Mr Uddin’s murder on 16 September 2016 and sentenced to life imprisonment. A third man, Mohammed Syadul Hussain, was subsequently sentenced to five years’ imprisonment for assisting an offender by knowingly helping to fund Mohammed Kadir’s flight from the jurisdiction.

In November 2021, I was nominated as coroner in the inquest touching the death of Jalal Uddin. I have outlined the somewhat complicated procedural history of the inquest in greater detail elsewhere in this Report (see Appendix 1). Having gathered and considered the available evidence, I wrote to the then Home Secretary, the Right Honourable Suella Braverman KC MP, on 7 November 2022 requesting that she cause an inquiry to be held pursuant to section 1 of the Inquiries Act 2005. My reason for making that request was that the relevant evidence included a significant body of sensitive material (that is, materials with government security classification above ‘OFFICIAL-SENSITIVE’), public disclosure of which would create a real risk of harm to an important public interest, namely national security. Unlike an inquest, a statutory inquiry may lawfully receive such material in restricted-access hearings (known as ‘closed’), enabling all the relevant evidence to be considered without harm to the public interest.

The Home Secretary in due course granted my request and, on 9 November 2023, appointed me to chair this Inquiry. The Inquiry’s full Terms of Reference are set out in Appendix 2.

It is axiomatic that an investigation of this kind should, wherever possible, be held in public and, therefore, be exposed to the scrutiny of the reporting media. In the particular circumstances of this case, however, I found myself driven to the reluctant conclusion that only a statutory inquiry would enable me to carry out the full and fearless investigation of Mr Uddin’s murder that the law rightly expects. Indeed, to have proceeded otherwise would have been unlawful. Had I conducted my investigation entirely in public I could not have considered much of the evidence that I regarded – and continue to regard – as being of greatest relevance to the circumstances in which Mr Uddin came by his death. Having kept the legal and factual basis for that assessment under constant review from beginning to end, I remain convinced that no conventional inquest would have been able to undertake an investigation as exhaustive as this Inquiry or as rigorous as the law stipulates.

Two obvious consequences of the decision to proceed by way of a statutory inquiry are, first, that the Inquiry had to receive the greater part of the evidence in closed hearings, and, second, that this open report can only reflect what I am able to say publicly about the circumstances surrounding Mr Uddin’s murder and the backgrounds of those responsible for it. I have therefore written an additional, closed report, which reflects the totality of the evidence and provides a fuller narrative and a more detailed analysis of all the relevant circumstances. For obvious reasons, that closed report cannot be publicly disclosed. At the same time, I have taken pains to include as much information in this open report as I can safely reveal without damage to the public interest.

In his report into the Manchester Arena atrocity, Sir John Saunders emphasised the value of hearing evidence from ‘frontline’ staff, that is to say those who were personally involved in taking the relevant decisions and actions. ^{[footnote 1]} My experience in this Inquiry closely echoes his.

I am grateful for the helpful overviews provided in so-called ‘corporate’ statements. Such statements are, however, subject to certain inevitable limitations. With the best will in the world – and I am entirely satisfied that all such statements in this case were conscientiously prepared with the very best of intentions – they necessarily involve an element of ‘curation’ caused by the filtering of first-hand evidence through an intermediary. Further, the evidence they contain cannot be satisfactorily interrogated because the author can hardly be expected to explain the thought processes of those individuals whose decisions and actions are described in the statement. For these reasons, I am firmly of the view that in an Inquiry such as this there is no substitute for hearing evidence directly from those frontline staff who were involved at the time. While I am appreciative of the assistance provided by corporate statements, therefore, I make no apology for my insistence on hearing and interrogating the first-hand accounts of frontline participants.

In this Report, I have included a ‘narrative conclusion’ (see Appendix 5). I have done so for two reasons. The first is that any inquest into Mr Uddin’s death would have culminated with such a narrative conclusion and the position ought to be no different simply because the investigation was conducted by means of this Inquiry. The second, related, reason is that my Terms of Reference require me to fulfil the functions that an inquest into Mr Uddin’s death would have discharged, and so it is important that I address the statutory questions which would have been formally answered in an inquest.

It will be seen from Chapter 4 of this open report, and from the narrative conclusion in Appendix 5, that a succession of mistakes was made in the investigations of both Hussain and Kadir before the murder of Jalal Uddin. Those made in relation to the investigation of Hussain do not represent a missed opportunity directly influencing the course of events that led to the murder of Jalal Uddin, but those made in relation to Kadir led to the irretrievable loss of opportunities which, if acted upon, might have averted Mr Uddin’s murder.

I have not made any recommendations in this open report. I do not consider that any now need to be made, in light of the evidence I have heard in open session. That is partly because more than nine years have passed since Mr Uddin’s murder. During that period, many changes have been made in the conduct of investigations, particularly in the light of recommendations from the Manchester Arena Inquiry, the Westminster Bridge Inquests, the London Bridge and Borough Market Inquests and the Forbury Gardens Inquests, and also through the work of the Intelligence and Security Committee. I address separately the issue of closed recommendations in the closed report.

Mr Uddin’s family have understandably preferred not to take part or be legally represented in this process, although the Inquiry has consulted and updated them at regular intervals, in accordance with their expressed wishes. I should like to assure them that I and my team have considered them at each stage of the process and have sought to keep them at the heart of the work we have done.

Finally, I should like to thank the Core Participants and their representatives, the administrative and other court staff who assisted the Inquiry at hearings in London, and the Queen Elizabeth II Law Courts, Liverpool, for their conscientious and co-operative approach to the Inquiry’s work.

I am also grateful to the Recorder of Liverpool, His Honour Judge Andrew Menary KC, for making a courtroom available for the open hearing. Above all, I owe a great debt to the Inquiry’s legal team, specifically Jason Beer KC, Sophie Cartwright KC, Alasdair Henderson, Tim Suter, Laura Taylor and Gabriella Quick, and the Secretary to the Inquiry, Sue Curran, without whose combined efficiency and industry this Inquiry could not have succeeded in fulfilling its Terms of Reference within the allotted timetable and budget.

His Honour Thomas Teague KC

Chairman of the Inquiry

Chapter 1: Jalal Uddin

1.1. Jalal Uddin was born on 5 March 1944 in Satpur, Bangladesh, at the home of his parents, Abdul Wahid and Ashabun Nessa. He had two younger brothers, Giash Uddin and Nurul Islam, and a sister called Mahbuba Khatun. ^{[footnote 2]}

1.2. As a child and young man Mr Uddin studied the Quran and the Hadith (the sayings of the Prophet Mohammed) at a madrasa (Islamic school). By the age of 21, he had qualified as an ‘alim’ (Islamic scholar) and received the title ‘Qari Saab’, a term of respect recognising his deep knowledge and understanding of the Quran and his proficiency in teaching it to others. ^{[footnote 3]}

1.3. After spending several years as an imam at a madrasa in a local village called Satpara, Mr Uddin was appointed imam in a village about 45 miles away. Among other duties, he taught the Quran at the local madrasa. Some years later, he returned to Satpara, where he resumed his former position as imam and schoolteacher. On 5 February 1980, he married Kamorun Nessa. The couple went on to have five sons and two daughters: Sharif Al Hasan, Tahmina Ferdusi, Shahara Masuma, Saleh Al-Arif, Al Maruf and twins Hafiz Al Asad and Mushtaq Al Noor. ^{[footnote 4]}

1.4. In or around 1990, Mr Uddin took up the role of imam at the mosque in Buraia, a village about 17 or 18 miles from Satpur. His wife and children continued to live in the village of Satpur. Mr Uddin lived alone in Buraia but would return home to spend a day or two each week with his family. ^{[footnote 5]}

1.5. In 2002, Mr Uddin travelled on a visa to the UK in the hope of making better financial provision for his family in Bangladesh. He taught the Quran in London, Birmingham and Rochdale, where he initially worked as an imam at the Jalalia Jaame Mosque on Trafalgar Street. Having settled in the Rochdale area, Mr Uddin continued to teach privately, sending most of his earnings home to his family. ^{[footnote 6]} In February 2016, he told his second son, Saleh Al-Arif, that he was hoping to return to Bangladesh within the next few months. ^{[footnote 7]}

1.6. Mr Uddin was a man of honour and integrity – polite, gentle and widely respected. He was a devoted husband, father and grandfather, whose great love was reciting the Quran and teaching it to others. Friends and former students remember his pacific personality, his warm smile and the beautiful way in which he recited from the Quran. ^{[footnote 8]} His sudden death deeply shocked all who knew him. ^{[footnote 9]} Over 2,000 mourners attended his funeral in Rochdale. ^{[footnote 10]}

Jalal Uddin’s pattern of life

1.7. By 2016, Mr Uddin’s visa had expired, with the result that he was no longer able to obtain conventional paid employment within the UK. As a result, he became dependent on accommodation and financial donations provided by Muslims in the Rochdale area. He did not settle at any permanent address, preferring to rely upon the hospitality of members of the local community. ^{[footnote 11]}

1.8. Although Mr Uddin no longer worked as an imam at the Jalalia Jaame Mosque, he prayed there five times a day and carried on teaching the Quran to members of the Muslim community in and around Rochdale. ^{[footnote 12]}

1.9. At the time of his death on 18 February 2016, Mr Uddin had the use of more than one address in Rochdale. The house at which he was then staying was in Samson Street. His mail, however, was delivered to a house in Trafalgar Street, opposite the Jalalia Jaame Mosque. ^{[footnote 13]} Mr Uddin would visit the Trafalgar Street address twice a day, first to eat his lunch after second prayers and later to teach children the Quran. After evening prayers at the Jalalia Jaame Mosque, he regularly ate his main meal at a friend’s home in South Street before returning to his overnight accommodation in Samson Street. ^{[footnote 14]}

Chapter 2: The murder of Jalal Uddin

2.1. On the evening of 18 February 2016, two young Islamist fanatics stalked, ambushed and brutally murdered Jalal Uddin in a children’s playground in Wardleworth Park, Rochdale. Their names were Mohammed Kadir and Mohammed Syeedy. At the time, they were 23 and 22 years of age. ^{[footnote 15]} Syeedy drove Kadir to Wardleworth Park, where Kadir clubbed Mr Uddin to death with an implement similar to a hammer. Syeedy then drove Kadir away from the scene. ^{[footnote 16]} Several days later, with the help of a man called Mohammed Syadul Hussain, Kadir disappeared abroad before he could be arrested. ^{[footnote 17]} His whereabouts – if, indeed, he is still alive – remain unknown to this day.

2.2. As this Report will explain, all three had previously come to the attention of the police, and Kadir was subject to a police investigation at the time of the murder.

2.3. The motive for the murder was theological. Kadir and Syeedy were supporters of Islamic State (IS) and the radical Salafist version of Islam favoured by that movement. ^{[footnote 18]} Mr Uddin was known to practise a form of healing known as ‘ruqyah’, ^{[footnote 19]} involving the use of written spells inserted into amulets called ‘taweez’. Although some strands of Islamic teaching accept the practice of ruqyah and the use of taweez, Salafism regards it as not merely forbidden but a serious form of unbelief meriting capital punishment. ^{[footnote 20]}

2.4. I have concluded that Mr Uddin’s attackers intended not merely to cause their victim serious injury but to bring about his death. While I am unable to disclose in full my reasons for reaching that conclusion in this Report, they include the facts that: (i) Kadir had already made arrangements to flee this country before the murder; (ii) Kadir and Syeedy had, over a period of months, been keeping Mr Uddin under observation and exchanging messages about his activities; and (iii) the radical Jihadist strand of Islam to which Kadir and Syeedy adhered regarded Mr Uddin’s practice of ruqyah as an un-Islamic activity demanding punishment by death.

Jalal Uddin and the practice of ruqyah using taweez

2.5. Although Mr Uddin did not advertise his services, his reputation as a skilled practitioner of healing through ruqyah had spread within the local community, with the result that many people approached him for help. ^{[footnote 21]} One witness reported how, when she had felt unwell while awaiting an operation, her mother had suggested she meet Mr Uddin.

She said:

‘Mr Uddin did prayers with me. He also gave me a ‘Tabeez’ [sic]. This could be called an Amulet in English. It is a prayer or a passage from the Qu’ran which is written out on paper and rolled up into a small metal cylinder which I keep around my neck.’ ^{[footnote 22]}

2.6. The witness reported feeling better as a result. ^{[footnote 23]} Another person, who went to Mr Uddin with serious headaches, said that Mr Uddin had “placed his hands on my head and traced some words on my head with his fingers … from suffering regularly, I have not had a serious headache since he helped me”. ^{[footnote 24]} The Inquiry received evidence to similar effect from many other witnesses, some of whom made the point that Mr Uddin refused payment for his services, which he provided “out of the goodness of his heart”. ^{[footnote 25]}

Muslim views on ruqyah and taweez

2.7. In a written statement provided to the Inquiry, Professor Robert Gleave, Professor of Arabic Studies at the University of Exeter, defined ruqyah as follows:

This is a cultural ritualistic practice that is used to help people at times of need or ill health. Effectively it is about using verses from the Quran together with written prayers in order to bring about a positive effect on the inflicted person through a ritual blessing. ^{[footnote 26]}

2.8. Taweez is one of the names given to the amulet which a person practising ruqyah might produce. ^{[footnote 27]} The person receiving the taweez keeps it on their person at all times (often wearing it around the neck) in order to protect against a “potentially evil external supernatural force”. ^{[footnote 28]}

2.9. According to Professor Gleave, persons may seek help from a practitioner of ruqyah where they feel there may be some supernatural barrier or evil spirit behind a dispute or ailment, which they wish to remove. Typical examples include women struggling to conceive a child, or people suffering from illness or wishing to repair a family rift. ^{[footnote 29]}

2.10. Ruqyah is, however, widely regarded as a form of magic, a controversial topic within Islam. The Quran generally uses an expression conventionally transliterated as ‘sihr’ to refer to magic. It is not regarded as evil or impermissible by all forms of Islam. ^{[footnote 30]} Although the Quran contains both positive and negative references, it does not expressly distinguish between good and bad forms of magic. Islamic scholars, however, generally divide sihr into ‘black magic’ and ‘white magic’. ^{[footnote 31]} Black magic involves the conjuring of spirits, often referred to as ‘jinn’ (from which the English word ‘genie’ derives), to carry out harmful acts against individuals. ^{[footnote 32]} By contrast, white magic – the form of ruqyah practised by Mr Uddin – usually includes the use of charms, incantations and amulets for personal protection from evil spirits or to bring about auspicious events. ^{[footnote 33]}

2.11. That magic exists as a practical reality is something widely accepted throughout the Muslim world. It is, however, regarded as an art or science that must be carefully controlled. ^{[footnote 34]} All Islamic scholars hold black magic to be forbidden, but some treat magic as permissible if it is carried out by a suitably qualified person for beneficial purposes as defined by Islamic law. ^{[footnote 35]} Within that strand of opinion, ruqyah and the use of taweez are seen as acceptable forms of white magic. ^{[footnote 36]} However, not all Islamic traditions permit the use of magic. Most Salafi Muslims reject all kinds of magic without distinction of purpose. ^{[footnote 37]}

2.12. Salafism is a reform movement whose adherents believe that Islam has strayed so far from its roots that it must be purified through a return to the religious practices of the seventh century. It has become increasingly influential during the last 300 years. ^{[footnote 38]} While some Salafis are content to pursue their aim of returning Islam to its original form by preaching and spreading the message within Muslim communities, ^{[footnote 39]} others hold that it is necessary to secure the implementation of Salafist policies in the Muslim world through active participation in politics. ^{[footnote 40]} In recent decades, a more radical strain of Salafism has appeared, which regards political engagement as ineffective and believes it is necessary to engage in Jihad – that is, a fight against those who have compromised the true message of Islam. ^{[footnote 41]} This strain of so-called ‘Jihadi Salafism’ emerged in the 1990s, was spearheaded by Al-Qaeda and has divided into a number of different factions. ^{[footnote 42]} One of these is IS, which was formed in or around 2010. IS has a particularly violent attitude towards the control of what it considers un-Islamic practices, enforcing its view of Islamic law by means of public execution. ^{[footnote 43]}

2.13. While there is no unanimity among Salafi Muslims as to whether magic is practically effective, most agree that it is completely forbidden by Islamic law. ^{[footnote 44]} In their eyes magic is ‘shirk’, a serious form of unbelief that falsely attributes to ordinary creatures divine powers that properly belong to God alone. ^{[footnote 45]} It is therefore something to be expelled from all those Muslim communities it has managed to infiltrate. ^{[footnote 46]} All Salafis regard the use of taweez as being completely impermissible and those who use them as being guilty of shirk and thus liable to the death penalty. ^{[footnote 47]}

2.14. As Professor Gleave explained:

Islamic State [is] … a form of radical Jihadi Salafism, and, like all Salafis, they condemn the use of taweez and magical practices. They had a particularly … violent and public attitude towards the control of these un-Islamic practices, by public execution of those who were suspected … or found guilty … under the Islamic State legal system.

[T]here are numerous documented cases in which, when Islamic State had created its area of control in Iraq and Syria, people who were suspected of participation in ruqyah … or the construction of taweez, or the making of spells, were publicly beheaded as part of the Islamic State’s … enforcement of Islamic purity in the public realm. ^{[footnote 48]}

2.15. It was to IS, and its distinctively violent brand of radical Jihadi Salafism, that Kadir and Syeedy had pledged their allegiance.

The targeting of Jalal Uddin

2.16. By August 2015, a group that included Syeedy, Kadir and an associate of theirs called Juhel Miah had begun taking a close interest in Mr Uddin. Miah and Syeedy had both accompanied an aid convoy to Syria on 21 December 2013, the same convoy by which British humanitarian aid worker Alan Henning (subsequently murdered by IS’s ‘Jihadi John’) had travelled to Syria. ^{[footnote 49]} I have reconstructed the following chronological account of the interactions that took place between the three men via a WhatsApp group and other real-time messages that were recovered by police officers from the North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU) and the North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU).

2.17. The reader will appreciate that the content of the relevant exchanges was not known to police officers at the time. Some were not recovered until much later, during the subsequent murder investigation, and the full significance of those recovered earlier was not appreciated until long after they first came to light. The extent, if any, to which the failure to identify and interpret significant messages is culpable is something I consider in my conclusions (see Chapter 4). The purpose of this section of my report is simply to provide a chronological narrative summary of relevant interactions between Kadir, Syeedy and others, regardless of whether or not police officers knew about them or understood their significance at the time.

2.18. On 20 August 2015, at 10:14, Miah sent a message to Syeedy that read: “just currently doing a taweez raid with ustadh in jalalia”. ^{[footnote 50]} The word ‘ustadh’ (teacher) may have referred to an associate of Syeedy, Kadir and Miah, who worked as a teacher at a local Islamic centre. Immediately afterwards, Miah sent another message to Syeedy saying: “Found curry shaabs stash.” ^{[footnote 51]} ‘Curry shaabs’ is clearly a reference to Qari Saab and therefore to Mr Uddin, given the title afforded to him by the local community as a mark of respect. I have concluded that Miah’s messages were describing an intrusion into the Jalalia Jaame Mosque in order to find and remove material belonging to Mr Uddin that confirmed his practice of ruqyah using taweez. It is impossible to be sure how the group had come to know that Mr Uddin stored his belongings at the Jalalia Jaame Mosque, but Syeedy’s brother worked at the mosque as a cleaner and hearsay evidence suggests that he may have been responsible for the later removal of books belonging to Mr Uddin. ^{[footnote 52]}

2.19. Within seconds, Syeedy replied to Miah’s messages with the words, “Burn it”, inciting Miah to destroy the material belonging to Mr Uddin. ^{[footnote 53]} During the late evening of the same day, Miah sent a series of messages to Syeedy confirming that he was destroying the items and adding, “Don’t tell anyone, gonna call border force and get him sent off” and “Keep an eye on where he lives”. ^{[footnote 54]} Finally, at 23:11, Syeedy replied “Allahu Akbar”, and confirmed that he had seen Mr Uddin entering a house in “Ramzy” (plainly a reference to Ramsay Street, where Syeedy lived). ^{[footnote 55]}

2.20. These brief exchanges reveal that a group of men who objected to Mr Uddin’s practice of ruqyah had found, removed and destroyed the taweez and accompanying prayer books that he used. ^{[footnote 56]} They were well aware that his visa had expired, with the result that his presence in the UK was unlawful, and were planning at this stage to inform Border Force officials in the hope of getting Mr Uddin deported. To that end, they were observing his movements in order to learn where he resided.

2.21. The surveillance continued. Two days later, on 22 August 2015, somebody photographed Mr Uddin in a street. It was Miah who forwarded the photographs to Syeedy, from whose iPhone they were later recovered by police officers investigating Mr Uddin’s murder. ^{[footnote 57]}

2.22. During the following weeks, members of the group exchanged messages proclaiming their support for the Salafist ideology of IS. On 10 September 2015, Kadir sent Hussain what is described as an “image of severed heads on bricks”. ^{[footnote 58]} The following day, which was the 14th anniversary of the notorious attack on the World Trade Center in New York, Kadir sent a further message to Hussain which stated, “Happy 9/11 by the way”. ^{[footnote 59]} Throughout September, Hussain and Kadir continued to share videos relating to IS ideology. ^{[footnote 60]}

2.23. During September, members of the group exchanged a series of WhatsApp messages showing that their view of Mr Uddin and their plan for dealing with him had begun to harden. On 5 September 2015, Kadir, using the pseudonym Abu Qital, ^{[footnote 61]} sought answers on Facebook to a question that plainly related to Mr Uddin:

Iv got a question for you all in sha Allah answer with sincerity!!!!! The scenario is that ther are ‘imams’ of local masjid [mosques] dealing with taweez and sihr [magic] ect ect. ^{[footnote 62]}

2.24. Kadir’s question elicited a number of responses, including a proposal that Mr Uddin’s forbidden use of sihr should be publicly exposed. However, one Facebook user replied with a more sinister suggestion:

Kill them akhi straight outb, Muhammad (saws) said kill the magician. ^{[footnote 63]}

2.25. In response to messages posted to the group in answer to his question, Kadir said this:

Jazak Allah khair we have decided that we will take this on properly in sha Allah [God willing]. Exposing ther kufr [unbelief] isn’t suffiecent ther are tooo many of them soo we may do what ever to paralyse them in sha Allah starting from the ring leader that we know.

Soo please do make dua [pray] that this happens and we do it in a systematic way so that we do not get caught. ^{[footnote 64]}

2.26. Kadir had clearly rejected the idea of exposing Mr Uddin’s activities. Further, his desire not to “get caught” indicates that he was now contemplating an unlawful solution. By implication, therefore, he was losing such faith as he ever had in the existing plan to engineer Mr Uddin’s deportation by legal means.

2.27. Meanwhile, surveillance of Mr Uddin continued. A female relative of Miah seems to have recorded video footage of Mr Uddin (possibly before the Facebook exchanges of 5 September). ^{[footnote 65]} On 6 September, the day after the Facebook exchanges, Syeedy was sent some covertly recorded film footage of Mr Uddin (later recovered from Syeedy’s iPhone). There are indications that the monitoring extended to taking photographs of the house where Mr Uddin was thought to be staying. On 24 September, in an apparent reference to a photograph or film clip that he had seen, Syeedy sent Miah a message via WhatsApp:

Is that a taweez on top of his curtains? ^{[footnote 66]}

2.28. The image in question has not been recovered but the message confirms that the group was keeping Mr Uddin under close observation and was displaying a particular interest in evidence of his practice of ruqyah.

2.29.During the succeeding months, members of the group continued to exchange IS-related messages, including further references to taweez. ^{[footnote 67]}

2.30. The next significant development occurred towards the end of the year. On 23 December 2015, Miah posted a photograph to the WhatsApp group showing Mr Uddin standing next to Simon Danczuk (at that time MP for Rochdale) outside the door of the Jalalia Jaame Mosque. Miah followed that post with an enlargement of the image showing Mr Uddin, adding this message: “Oh crap, Voldemort, NVR GNA B busted by immigration now.” ^{[footnote 68]} In referring to him as ‘Voldemort’ – a powerful and dangerous fictional dark wizard – Syeedy and his associates clearly continued to view Mr Uddin as deserving punishment for practising sihr. Further, this message reflects an assessment that the plan to secure Mr Uddin’s deportation was doomed to fail; that, as a former imam at the mosque, Mr Uddin would be able to exploit his local political connections to stay in the UK or at least delay his removal.

2.31. Contact between Syeedy, Kadir and Miah carried on into the new year. On 2 January 2016, Syeedy sent a text message simply reading: “Jalal Uddin”. ^{[footnote 69]} On 18 January 2016, Syeedy made repeated but unsuccessful efforts to contact Kadir by phone. Having obtained Kadir’s most recent number from a friend, Syeedy finally managed to get in touch with Kadir. During the ensuing days and weeks, many communications passed between the two men. ^{[footnote 70]} On 6 February 2016, Syeedy and Miah exchanged messages about black magic and jinns: “Bro evil eye, jinns and black magic by [a UK-based imam] we gotta organise that.” ^{[footnote 71]} Syeedy then sent a message to Miah reading: “Actioning these things is a problem.” ^{[footnote 72]}

2.32. On 13 February 2016, Syeedy sent a message to Kadir saying: “Akhi [brother], it’s Syeedy, need to chat. When is a good day for you?” ^{[footnote 73]} Contact between the two continued on 13, 14 and 15 February. On 16 February, Kadir placed an order for a gold bar. ^{[footnote 74]} With the advantage of hindsight, it is plain that Kadir purchased the gold bar because he was planning his permanent departure from the UK. I have concluded that by that date at the very latest, Kadir had decided that Mr Uddin should be put to death in accordance with the punishment prescribed by Islamic law as enforced by IS.

2.33. At 21:53 on 17 February 2016, less than 24 hours before Mr Uddin’s murder, Kadir telephoned Syeedy. The two men spoke for just over four minutes, after which Kadir sent Syeedy a text message. The contents of the phone call and text remain unknown, but that they concerned Mr Uddin is evident from a text message that Syeedy sent to Miah a few minutes later. That message read: “Do you have any pictures of the taweez of the magician?” ^{[footnote 75]} In the ensuing exchange of texts, Syeedy and Miah discussed the idea of persuading Mr Uddin to make a taweez and recording him as he did so. Miah’s view was that the plan would not succeed: “Bro, believe me, this is not an ordinary matter. This is the ex Imam of Jalalia.” ^{[footnote 76]}

The events of 18 February 2016

2.34. What follows is an account of the events established by Greater Manchester Police in relation to the murder.

2.35. On the afternoon of 18 February 2016, Kadir and Syeedy exchanged text messages in which they arranged that Kadir would travel to Rochdale from Oldham. ^{[footnote 77]} At 18:03, Kadir sent Syeedy a text message confirming that he was setting off and would arrive in Rochdale within 20 minutes. ^{[footnote 78]} Cell site analysis shows that Kadir was at that time still in Oldham. Kadir then travelled from Oldham to Rochdale in his Nissan Micra car. CCTV footage captured the vehicle’s arrival at 18:32 as Kadir parked it near Syeedy’s address in Ramsay Street. ^{[footnote 79]}

2.36. Having alighted from his own vehicle, Kadir got straight into the front passenger seat of Syeedy’s Vauxhall Astra, which was parked outside his home and had Syeedy at the wheel. ^{[footnote 80]} Almost immediately, at 18:35, the Astra was driven away from Ramsay Street. Syeedy drove it to a petrol station on Yorkshire Street, where CCTV recorded the driver fuelling the vehicle (which still contained a passenger) and going to the payment kiosk. ^{[footnote 81]} Banking records confirm that Syeedy’s debit card was used to make the payment. ^{[footnote 82]}

2.37. By 19:35, the Astra was parked near the Jalalia Jaame Mosque. Kadir and Syeedy got out of the car and entered the mosque. ^{[footnote 83]} The object of their interest, Mr Uddin, was inside the mosque attending evening prayers. It seems likely that Kadir and Syeedy were not there simply to pray, for they left the mosque within 15 minutes of their arrival. The true purpose of their visit was to conduct surveillance on Mr Uddin. ^{[footnote 84]}

2.38. CCTV footage confirms that Kadir and Syeedy, having left the mosque at 19:50, returned to the parked Astra car and drove back to Ramsay Street. Having arrived there at 19:55, Syeedy got out of the vehicle and ran towards his house, reappearing just two minutes later. CCTV footage shows that Syeedy had retrieved an object while he was out of view of the camera and was carrying it back to the car. Almost certainly, the object was the weapon with which Kadir was later to murder Mr Uddin. ^{[footnote 85]}

2.39. At exactly the same time as Syeedy fetched the weapon, 19:55, CCTV footage shows Mr Uddin leaving the Jalalia Jaame Mosque after evening prayers. ^{[footnote 86]} He walked towards the house in South Street where he was accustomed to take his evening meal , ^{[footnote 87]} reaching South Street at or just before 20:00. ^{[footnote 88]}

2.40. CCTV footage makes it possible to reconstruct the movements of Mr Uddin and the two murderers with considerable accuracy. The Astra stopped at the junction of Buckingham Street and South Street and then turned left into South Street. It drove straight past Mr Uddin, before turning right onto Trafalgar Street and returning to South Street. Again, Syeedy drove the car past Mr Uddin. It is obvious that its two occupants were now stalking their victim. ^{[footnote 89]}

2.41. At 20:04, Mr Uddin entered a house on South Street where he was accustomed to take his evening meal. ^{[footnote 90]} The Astra drove to that address and parked nearby. Kadir and Syeedy waited in the car, using their phones (as confirmed by cell site analysis). ^{[footnote 91]}

2.42. Having finished his meal, Mr Uddin left the house at 20:40 and began to walk back to the house in Samson Street where he was staying. ^{[footnote 92]} On his way he walked past the Astra containing Syeedy and Kadir. A minute later, the Astra left its parking space with the lights extinguished, performed a U-turn and drove in the same direction as Mr Uddin was walking. Kadir and Syeedy were stalking Mr Uddin as his journey took him into Wardleworth Park. ^{[footnote 93]}

2.43. Mr Uddin entered the park at 20:41. CCTV footage shows the Astra on South Street at 20:42, still in motion but showing no lights. ^{[footnote 94]}

2.44. Kadir got out of the car. He walked along South Street, following Mr Uddin, before breaking into a jog. By 20:43, Syeedy had moved to the opposite side of the park, where he stopped to pick up Kadir. ^{[footnote 95]}

2.45. During the intervening time, Kadir had attacked Mr Uddin, using the weapon to strike him repeatedly with blows to the head and the face before returning to the waiting Astra. Kadir and Syeedy then left the scene in the car, driving straight to Syeedy’s home in Ramsay Street. There, Kadir left the Astra, got into his Nissan Micra and drove away at 20:46, heading back towards Oldham. ^{[footnote 96]}

2.46. The weapon was not found at the scene and has not been identified or recovered.

2.47. Within minutes of the killing, two girls, aged 12 and 16, found Mr Uddin lying on the ground in Wardleworth Park. Realising that he was seriously injured, they acted promptly and decisively. One girl ran to fetch her 19-year-old brother, a medical student, while the other used her mobile phone to make a 999 call to the emergency services. ^{[footnote 97]} That call was placed at 20:53, the caller reporting that an “Asian male aged 40–50 has been hit between nose and eyes and bleeding badly [sic]”. ^{[footnote 98]}

2.48. The other girl’s brother arrived during that emergency call and began to tend to Mr Uddin, speaking to the emergency services as he did so. He noted that the victim had head and facial injuries that were bleeding heavily and that he was struggling to breathe. It was obvious to him that the man had been seriously assaulted. ^{[footnote 99]} He moved Mr Uddin onto his side and continued to assist, placing a coat under his head, trying to stem the bleeding with a scarf and keeping his airway open. ^{[footnote 100]}

2.49. Police Constables (PCs) Simon Butler, David Rowbotham and Darren Davies were the first police officers to reach the scene. They arrived a few minutes before 21:00. ^{[footnote 101]} They found Mr Uddin lying on his back with extensive head trauma. PC Butler checked Mr Uddin’s airway and found he was not breathing. ^{[footnote 102]} PC Rowbotham could feel a very weak pulse. The officers therefore began to administer cardio-pulmonary resuscitation (CPR). ^{[footnote 103]}

2.50. At 21:03, a single-crewed rapid response vehicle from the North West Ambulance Service arrived at the scene, followed nine minutes later by a full ambulance crew. The paramedics conveyed Mr Uddin to the Royal Oldham Hospital, where he was pronounced dead by Dr Thomas Leckie at 22:08. ^{[footnote 104]} At that stage his identity had still not been established.

2.51. Later that evening, after the police had cordoned off the area of the murder, Syeedy returned to Wardleworth Park. A witness reported seeing him standing at the scene with Miah. ^{[footnote 105]}

2.52. Three days after the murder, Kadir travelled from Manchester Airport to Istanbul via Copenhagen, arriving at 06:00 on 22 February 2016. ^{[footnote 106]} Before leaving the UK, Kadir changed his appearance, withdrew cash from his bank accounts and left a note instructing his brother to sell his car.

2.53. Attempts to trace Kadir have been unsuccessful. At that time, Istanbul was a popular staging post for would-be fighters seeking to join IS in Syria. Kadir’s subsequent movements have not been traced, and his eventual fate can only be a matter for speculation. He has not returned to the UK. A warrant for his arrest was issued on 3 March 2016 and remains in force. ^{[footnote 107]}

Medical evidence

2.54. A forensic pathologist, Dr Philip Lumb, carried out a post-mortem examination on the afternoon of 19 February 2016. The examination confirmed that Mr Uddin had suffered seven severe injuries to his head and face. The bones of the face were extremely badly fractured. To the right side of Mr Uddin’s forehead were two lacerations, beneath which lay a depressed skull fracture, indicating that Mr Uddin had sustained brain damage as a result of a blow inflicted with a weapon, a blow so powerful that it forced the skull fracture into the cranial cavity, causing direct injury to the brain. ^{[footnote 108]}

2.55.Mr Uddin had also sustained an unusual injury to his mouth, of sufficient severity to break his dentures. Professor Craig Barclay, a forensic odontologist, investigated that injury, concluding that it had resulted from a “very significant blow”, ^{[footnote 109]} probably a kick or a violent blow inflicted with a blunt instrument. ^{[footnote 110]}

2.56. Collectively, these injuries had, in the judgement of Dr Lumb, been caused by the application of severe force with a blunt weapon, probably a hammer, and there was no sign of any defensive action being taken by Mr Uddin resulting in defensive injuries on other parts of his body. ^{[footnote 111]} Dr Lumb’s overall conclusion was that blunt force head injury caused Mr Uddin to stop breathing and go into cardiac arrest. He gave the medical cause of death as “blunt force head injuries”. ^{[footnote 112]}

2.57. The actions of three very young members of the public and the emergency services are to be commended. They did all they could in traumatic circumstances, and I have seen nothing to suggest that any different actions would have saved Mr Uddin’s life.

Murder investigation: Operation Swan

2.58. Greater Manchester Police launched an immediate investigation into the murder of Jalal Uddin. ^{[footnote 113]} By the following morning Detective Chief Inspector Terrance Crompton had been appointed as the Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) to the murder investigation (Operation Swan). ^{[footnote 114]}

2.59. After retrieving CCTV footage from cameras sited in the area of Wardleworth Park, the police were able to reconstruct the movements of Mr Uddin and his assailants during the minutes leading up to his murder (see paragraphs 2.35 to 2.43).

2.60. By 21 February 2016, police investigators had identified Syeedy as the registered keeper of the Vauxhall Astra used in the attack. Syeedy was arrested the following day on suspicion of Mr Uddin’s murder and his home address in Ramsay Street was searched. ^{[footnote 115]}

2.61. In the course of the search, officers seized a black iPhone belonging to Syeedy. ^{[footnote 116]} This proved to contain material demonstrating Syeedy’s extreme Islamist mindset, including:

• images of a fighter walking with an IS flag
• a photograph of two men wearing balaclavas, performing what is known as the IS salute (a single raised index finger)
• a child shown brandishing a knife in front of an IS flag
• a photograph of Kadir performing the IS one-fingered salute
• a photograph of an IS flag in a Facebook post
• a photograph of a group of five young men, three of whom – including Syeedy and Miah – are performing the IS salute
• photographs and video footage of Mr Uddin
• a video clip (apparently not recorded using the phone on which it was found) that shows Mr Uddin receiving first aid after the fatal attack. ^{[footnote 117]}

2.62. In a second search of the house in Ramsay Street, conducted on 24 February, police officers found a micro-SD card, laptops and a computer hard drive. ^{[footnote 118]}

2.63.On the micro-SD card was stored a collection of images and recordings demonstrating that Syeedy was a supporter of IS. These included:

• a photograph taken on or before 16 October 2014 showing Syeedy and another man holding an IS flag while each man performs the IS salute
• a photograph taken on or before the same date showing three men, one of whom is Syeedy, again performing the IS salute
• a photograph of three men, one of whom is Syeedy, holding an IS flag over a road sign in Rochdale, which has been altered to read “war zone ends”, with Syeedy performing the IS salute
• a similar photograph showing a different sign altered to read “war zone” with a different IS flag. Syeedy and another man are shown performing the IS salute ^{[footnote 119]}

2.64. On the Samsung laptop (which contained Syeedy’s personal curriculum vitae) was stored a large quantity of Jihadist and Islamist material, including: a photograph of IS fighters with a quote from a companion of the Prophet Mohammed; a photograph of a cake with an IS motif on it; a picture of a blurred IS flag with a message over the top – “I am here but my heart is in Syria”; and further Islamist propaganda, including the slogan “We are the men who love death as much as you love life”. ^{[footnote 120]}

2.65. The separate computer hard drive (on which was stored an image of Syeedy’s student card) proved to contain a number of significant photographs, including: images of Syeedy and three others wearing Jihadist overalls, holding a sign promoting an aid convoy and making the IS salute; a photograph of a cap bearing an IS motif; a photograph of patches depicting Jihadist flags and emblems that might be sewn onto clothes; and a photograph of Syeedy outside the Jalalia Jaame Mosque wearing a stab-proof vest. ^{[footnote 121]}

2.66. When Syeedy was interviewed at Bury Police Station between 22 and 25 February 2016, he gave a short, prepared statement denying responsibility for Mr Uddin’s death but thereafter answered “no comment” to all questions asked.

2.67.Although Syeedy was released on police bail on 26 February, he was rearrested the next day following the discovery of his connection to Kadir (who by this time had left the jurisdiction). ^{[footnote 122]}

2.68. On 26 February, following a review of the available CCTV footage, Kadir was identified as the registered keeper of the Nissan Micra that had been left outside Syeedy’s home address. ^{[footnote 123]}

2.69. A search of Kadir’s home address took place on the same day. By that time, of course, no one was present, Kadir having fled abroad five days earlier. Nevertheless, the police recovered a number of significant exhibits. ^{[footnote 124]} These included:

• an audio file containing the words “To die for my beliefs cut off my head make me a martyr”
• images found on laptops which related to IS, such as those of the then IS leader, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, and of Osama Bin Laden and the World Trade Center Twin Towers in New York
• WhatsApp messages between Kadir and Hussain, dated between 14 December 2013 and 27 December 2013, which contained images relating to IS such as weaponry, bombs and IS flags. ^{[footnote 125]}

2.70. Following the identification of Kadir, NECTU reviewed the online material its officers had previously obtained in relation to Kadir, ^{[footnote 126]} including the Facebook exchange of 5 September 2015 (see paragraphs 2.23 to 2.25). NECTU had captured those exchanges on 10 September 2015 as part of a wider intelligence-gathering exercise into people potentially motivated by an extremist ideology (including those associated with proscribed organisations). ^{[footnote 127]}

2.71. Detective Chief Superintendent James Dunkerley, who gave evidence on behalf of Counter Terrorism Policing North East (CTPNE, formerly NECTU), explained that, although the police had obtained this Facebook post, and the replies to it, within five days, they had not reviewed the material at the time because it formed part of a large volume of information. Further, even if a review had been possible at that stage, it was highly unlikely that investigators would have appreciated its significance. ^{[footnote 128]}

2.72. To the extent that I am able in this open report, I address this issue further within the Conclusions chapter (see paragraphs 4.3 to 4.8).

2.73. The police also examined the role played by Mohammed Syadul Hussain in facilitating Kadir’s escape from the jurisdiction. In particular, they re-examined a mobile phone that had been seized from Hussain in 2014 during an earlier police investigation (Operation Prideling). Although the contents of the phone had been downloaded and partially reviewed in 2014, its communications data had not been analysed. In the course of revisiting the material stored on the phone, officers investigating Hussain’s role in Kadir’s escape discovered images of IS extremists and a photograph of Kadir. The presence of that photograph on Hussain’s phone demonstrated a connection between the two men that dated back at least as far as 2014, when the phone had been seized.

2.74. Financial enquiries established that, on Saturday 20 February 2016, Hussain had withdrawn £700 from his Lloyds Bank account, money that Kadir had used to flee the UK. ^{[footnote 129]}

2.75. By this stage, the murder inquiry had been declared a terrorist investigation. On 28 April 2016, Hussain was arrested under section 17 of the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT). When interviewed, he made no comment in response to the matters put to him. ^{[footnote 130]}

Criminal proceedings

2.76. In Kadir’s absence, Syeedy alone stood trial for the murder of Jalal Uddin. The trial took place at the Crown Court at Manchester before the Honourable Mr Justice David Maddison. On 16 September 2016, Syeedy was convicted and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum term of 23 years and 161 days. During the trial, the court heard evidence that Kadir and Syeedy held extreme views of Islam, including a shared conviction that the practice of taweez amounted to a form of black magic that had to be stamped out, and that, following the discovery of books about taweez in the Jalalia Jaame Mosque, the two men had targeted Mr Uddin for his practice of ruqyah involving the use of taweez. ^{[footnote 131]}

2.77. In March 2017, Hussain was tried at the Crown Court at Manchester for assisting an offender, contrary to section 4 of the Criminal Law Act 1967. The basis of the charge was that he had knowingly provided material assistance to Kadir following the murder of Jalal Uddin by giving Kadir £700 to enable him to escape to Syria. ^{[footnote 132]} In Hussain’s case, besides establishing his support for IS, the evidence showed that he had tried to obtain a video of Mr Uddin as he lay dying and had subsequently posted a social media message proclaiming: “One less shaitan [devil] in England, innit.” ^{[footnote 133]}

2.78. On 3 April 2017, Hussain was convicted of assisting an offender and sentenced to five years’ imprisonment. ^{[footnote 134]}

Chapter 3: Earlier police investigations

3.1. Mohammed Syeedy, Mohammed Syadul Hussain and Mohammed Kadir were all known to the police before the murder of Jalal Uddin. To the extent that it can be presented in this open report, what follows is a summary of the intelligence that was available about each of them before Mr Uddin’s death.

Mohammed Syeedy

3.2. Counter-terrorism police were aware that Syeedy had travelled in a human aid convoy to Syria, which had left the UK on 21 December 2013. ^{[footnote 135]}

Mohammed Syadul Hussain

3.3. In August 2012, SO15 (the Metropolitan Police Service unit responsible for counter- terrorism investigations) made enquiries into Hussain’s Facebook activity. ^{[footnote 136]} The outcome of that operation was that Hussain was referred to the Prevent programme, which aims to steer individuals away from terrorism and forms part of the Government’s counter- terrorism strategy.

3.4. In January 2013, Hussain was interviewed by Prevent officers from Greater Manchester Police, who concluded that he held extremist beliefs and referred him to the Channel programme, which falls within the Prevent strategy. ^{[footnote 137]}

3.5. Hussain was re-interviewed in July 2013. Because he continued to express alarming views, he was once again offered support from the Channel programme. Hussain refused to engage with Channel (as he was legally entitled to do). ^{[footnote 138]}

3.6. On 21 October 2013, Hussain was interviewed yet again with a view to assessing whether further intervention was necessary. On this occasion, Hussain attempted to justify some of the previous comments he had made. ^{[footnote 139]} While admitting that he had posted extremist material online, he also claimed that he had deleted his Facebook account in 2012, attributing his former online activities to immaturity. ^{[footnote 140]} He made it clear that any further engagement with counter-terrorism police would have to be organised through his solicitor. ^{[footnote 141]} It does not appear that Hussain received any further communication from Prevent or Channel officers at this time and the investigation into his online activity was closed. ^{[footnote 142]}

3.7. There the matter rested until February 2014, when the North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU) launched an investigation (Operation Prideling) into Hussain’s activities. Operation Prideling arose out of information passed to NWCTU by Humberside Police, reporting that Hussain had spoken to his eight-year-old nephew about the Taliban. The nephew had said at school that he wanted to join the Taliban, adding that his uncle had shown him YouTube footage of the Taliban. ^{[footnote 143]}

3.8. Having established that the subject of the Humberside Police report was indeed Mohammed Syadul Hussain, Greater Manchester Police appointed Detective Inspector (DI) Frank Morris, who was aware of the previous investigation by SO15, as Operation Prideling’s Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). ^{[footnote 144]}

3.9. DI Morris discovered that Hussain, despite his claim to have closed his Facebook account in 2012, had later reactivated the account and was using it to post material proclaiming his own extremist views, including support for proscribed organisations. ^{[footnote 145]}

3.10. One of Operation Prideling’s objectives was to identify any associates with whom Hussain was or had been in communication and who might share his extremist mentality. On 31 July 2014, Greater Manchester Police sought and obtained a warrant to search Hussain’s home address in Oswald Street, Rochdale, with a view to recovering any material that might demonstrate criminality. ^{[footnote 146]} They executed the warrant on 14 August 2014. One of the items seized during the search was Hussain’s mobile phone. ^{[footnote 147]}

3.11. An officer raised actions for a forensic download of the phone to take place and for any media recovered from it to be analysed. ^{[footnote 148]} By 13:45 on 18 August 2014, the officer had received discs containing the mobile phone download and handed them to an analyst for review. ^{[footnote 149]}

3.12. The report on the media from the mobile phone was dated 21 August 2014 and revealed that the phone contained a number of disturbing images depicting terrorists, weapons and ammunition, and combat scenes. Although the media disclosed no evidence that Hussain had committed any offences under the Terrorism Act 2000 (TACT), there was material suggesting that he had an extremist mindset and posed a risk of radicalising others. ^{[footnote 150]} The report concluded:

[An analyst] has been provided a copy of the … data disc and will report separately her findings in relation to the mobile phone call data. ^{[footnote 151]}

3.13. On 8 October 2014, however, Operation Prideling was closed, without the analysis of the mobile phone data having been received or, indeed, conducted. ^{[footnote 152]} The reason for the operation closure, as provided in the official closure form, was that the “Investigative strand of this enquiry is now complete and there are no TACT/Criminal offences”. The closure form recommended that Hussain and his nephew should be “engaged by Channel officers with a view to turning them away from extreme Islam”. ^{[footnote 153]}

3.14. DI Morris approved the closure report and agreed with the recommendation that Hussain and his nephew should be engaged by Channel officers. He explained that it was “not unusual to find imagery of this kind on devices seized at this time”, and it would not have crossed the threshold for charging and prosecution. ^{[footnote 154]}

3.15.Detective Superintendent Andrew Meeks, NWCTU Head of Investigations and SIO for the counter-terrorism investigation into the murder of Jalal Uddin, and DI Morris both accepted that the communications data should have been reviewed and that Operation Prideling should not have been closed without such a review taking place. ^{[footnote 155]}

3.16. I address this question further within the Conclusions chapter (see paragraphs 4.9 and 4.10).

Mohammed Kadir

3.17. Kadir was under police investigation at the time of Mr Uddin’s murder. For reasons I have already explained (see Foreword), I am unable to provide full details within this open report. The following summary contains all the information that can be properly disclosed.

3.18. In August 2015, a referral was made to NWCTU about a Facebook profile in the name of ‘Mohammed Kadz’. ^{[footnote 156]} The account holder was responsible for a number of extremist Facebook posts, including a photograph of a television screen showing an Islamic State (IS) emblem and a threat to the “kuffar” collecting for the charity Help for Heroes:

Otherwise they will see more lee rugby’s [sic] about. Ask Rigby if it was worth it. ^{[footnote 157]}

3.19. That month, the North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU), a collaboration of seven police forces including West Yorkshire Police, ^{[footnote 158]} also became aware of the same Facebook profile in the name of ‘Mohammed Kadz’. ^{[footnote 159]}

3.20. NECTU made various enquiries with a view to identifying ‘Mohammed Kadz’. ^{[footnote 160]} By October 2015, the profile in the name ‘Mohammed Kadz’ had been identified as belonging to Kadir, who was assessed to be a person of high risk and significant concern. ^{[footnote 161]}

3.21. For reasons I have only been able to explain fully in my closed report, the management of the investigation into Kadir was seriously flawed. I can, however, state the following within this open report:

• On 10 December 2015, NWCTU received a request to appoint an SIO in relation to Kadir, ^{[footnote 162]} who had been assessed to be a person of high risk requiring further investigation. ^{[footnote 163]}
• NECTU understood that an SIO had been identified in the North West. ^{[footnote 164]}
• Although, on 10 December 2015, a potential SIO was identified within NWCTU to investigate Kadir, for reasons beyond the control of both the SIO and NWCTU, the SIO was not placed in a position to discharge his duties as SIO prior to the murder of Jalal Uddin. ^{[footnote 165]}
• NECTU continued to obtain intelligence about Kadir and a number of other individuals. ^{[footnote 166]}
• On 22 January 2016, NECTU informed the counter-terrorism units of several regions, including NWCTU, that it had a capacity issue regarding the number of individuals on whom it was obtaining intelligence. NECTU requested assistance. ^{[footnote 167]}
• On 22 January 2016, and twice in February 2016, NECTU provided intelligence about Kadir to NWCTU ^{[footnote 168]} (but this intelligence did not reach the person potentially identified as the SIO).
• At a meeting on 4 February 2016, attended by representatives of NWCTU and NECTU, NWCTU agreed in principle to provide support in respect of an investigation into Kadir, subject to certain steps being taken. ^{[footnote 169]}

3.22. To the extent that I can, I address this issue further within the Conclusions chapter (see paragraphs 4.3 to 4.8).

Chapter 4: Conclusions

4.1. Jalal Uddin’s murder was an act of serious violence, perpetrated against a person in order to advance an ideological cause, and designed to intimidate members of the public, particularly those of the Muslim faith. ^{[footnote 170]} Mohammed Kadir and Mohammed Syeedy both embraced the ideology of Islamic State (IS), including its position on ruqyah and taweez. They killed Mr Uddin because they shared a fundamental theological objection to his practice of ruqyah using taweez and wished to convey to others a strong message that such practices would not be tolerated. In short, the murder was an act of terrorism.

4.2. The investigations into the activities of Kadir and Mohammed Syadul Hussain (who subsequently assisted Kadir in fleeing the country) before the murder of Jalal Uddin were hampered by serious mistakes.

Mohammed Kadir

4.3. By 30 October 2015 at the latest, Kadir had been assessed to be a person of high risk and significant concern. His activities, including the Facebook posts of 5 September 2015, therefore warranted detailed investigation and analysis. I have concluded that no blame attaches to anyone for the failure to appreciate the significance of the online exchanges at the time they were retrieved. Realistically, the necessary close analysis could only take place within the context of a properly targeted and resourced investigation led by a duly appointed Senior Investigating Officer (SIO). The need for such an investigation had been recognised by 10 December 2015, more than two months before Mr Uddin’s murder. Nevertheless, for reasons explained more fully in my closed report, I have concluded that no SIO was ever formally appointed to lead the necessary investigation into Kadir.

4.4. Although a potential appointee was identified within North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU), for reasons beyond the control of that officer and of NWCTU, the steps necessary to place him in a position to discharge the duties of an SIO were not taken prior to the murder of Jalal Uddin.

4.5. The failure to secure the appointment of a functioning SIO amounted to a serious blunder that had a series of significant consequences, each of which is described in my closed report. Overall, it led to the loss of at least two opportunities to detect or disrupt the activities of Kadir and Syeedy before Mr Uddin was murdered.

4.6. The first is the real possibility that close analysis of the Facebook posts of 5 September 2015 by counter-terrorism police officers under a police SIO might have led to the detection or disruption of the planned activities of Kadir and Syeedy. Even if Mr Uddin had not been identified as the intended target of the plot, the discovery of its existence might have enabled the police to take effective action.

4.7. The second is that, even if the plot itself had not been detected through close analysis of the Facebook posts, other police investigative actions concerning Kadir might have detected the plot or, even if only incidentally, disrupted it.

4.8. The failure to make a prompt and effective appointment of an SIO thus led to the irretrievable loss of opportunities which, had they been acted upon, might have prevented the murder of Jalal Uddin.

Mohammed Syadul Hussain

4.9. As Greater Manchester Police has candidly acknowledged, the force failed to meet all Operation Prideling’s objectives by completing a professional analysis of the communications data stored within the mobile phone seized from Hussain in 2014.

4.10. Had such an analysis been completed, it would have revealed that Kadir was Hussain’s second most frequent phone contact and that both men shared a similar extremist outlook. It would probably have generated an intelligence report documenting their contact and the concerning nature of their exchanges. ^{[footnote 171]} In hindsight, Detective Superintendent Andrew Meeks, NWCTU Head of Investigations and SIO for the counter- terrorism investigation into the murder of Jalal Uddin, took the view that Hussain would have been arrested and, depending on the views of the Crown Prosecution Service, might have been charged with terrorism offences. ^{[footnote 172]} He considered that Kadir would not have been arrested but might have been recommended for a referral to Prevent. ^{[footnote 173]} Even if the identification of Kadir as an associate of Hussain had led to a separate investigation into Kadir’s activities at that time, it is impossible to say whether the outcome of such an operation would have altered the course of the later investigation into Kadir’s activities that took place between August 2015 and February 2016. In those circumstances, I cannot say that the premature closure of Operation Prideling directly influenced the course of events that culminated in Mr Uddin’s murder.

Appendix 1: Procedural history of the Inquiry

The opening, adjournment and resumption of the original inquest

1. Following Jalal Uddin’s murder on 18 February 2016, the Senior Coroner for North Manchester, Joanne Kearsley, opened and adjourned the inquest into his death pending the outcome of criminal proceedings against Mohammed Syeedy and Mohammed Syadul Hussain (as she was required to do by paragraph 2 of Schedule 1 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (the 2009 Act)).

2. Following the conclusion of the criminal proceedings in autumn 2019, His Honour Judge Patrick Field KC was appointed as the nominated judge coroner to conduct the coronial investigation into Mr Uddin’s death. ^{[footnote 174]}

3. The purpose of an inquest is to answer the four factual questions set out in section 5 of the 2009 Act, namely:

• the identity of the deceased
• where the deceased died
• when the deceased died
• how the deceased came by his or her death

In cases where Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights (the Convention) is engaged, the duty to answer the fourth question (‘how’) is expanded beyond simply ascertaining the means by which the deceased came by his or her death to include an investigation of the wider circumstances.

4. On 4 November 2019, Judge Field directed Interested Persons ^{[footnote 175]} to provide written submissions as to whether: (i) there was sufficient reason to resume the inquest into Mr Uddin’s death; and (ii) it was necessary to disclose documents in the possession of Interested Persons before that decision could be made. In doing so, Interested Persons were invited to indicate whether they wished to lodge any claim to withhold relevant materials from use in the inquest, alongside the lawful basis for any such claim and whether some such material could be summarised (or ‘gisted’) or disclosed in a redacted form. This is known as an application for public interest immunity (PII), where the requirement for open justice must be balanced against the need to protect national security or other sensitive information. Judge Field also invited submissions on whether the enhanced investigative obligation under Article 2 of the Convention applied to the inquest.

5. Following a delay caused by the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic, Judge Field held a Pre-Inquest Review hearing on 20 November 2020 to consider the above issues, and heard submissions from all Interested Persons, including Mr Uddin’s son, Saleh Al-Arif. In a ruling dated 27 November 2020, ^{[footnote 176]} Judge Field summarised the relevant background facts, with reference to a gist of sensitive evidence that had been prepared (see Appendix 3). He considered that the matters set out in paragraphs 11 to 13 of the gist gave rise to a credible suggestion that: (i) Mohammed Kadir represented a present and continuing risk to the lives of members of society at large; (ii) the authorities knew or ought to have known of that risk; and (iii) they failed to take measures to avoid it. In those circumstances, Judge Field determined that the enhanced investigative duty under Article 2 of the Convention was engaged and that the investigation into Mr Uddin’s death should accordingly be resumed.

6. Judge Field’s ruling of 27 November 2020 set out the proposed scope of the matters to be investigated at the inquest. These related to the assessments of Kadir as being of high risk and significant concern, and as posing a high risk of acting on his Islamist extremist aspirations. Judge Field concluded that it was necessary to investigate the basis for each of those assessments, the nature and extent of the risks, and the authorities’ response to them. ^{[footnote 177]}

7. Judge Field directed the Interested Persons to provide him with all material potentially relevant to the issues he had identified within his ruling. ^{[footnote 178]}  The State Interested Persons ^{[footnote 179]} were invited to indicate those materials that could properly be disclosed to the family and any other Interested Persons, and those over which there was a claim to withhold disclosure in whole or in part, on the grounds that such disclosure would harm the public interest (a claim for PII).

8. In August 2021, before a procedural hearing could be held to determine issues arising from the disclosure of materials, Judge Field informed Interested Persons that a close family member had taken up a role working with the Deputy Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police, the force that had investigated the murder of Jalal Uddin and which was an Interested Person in the inquest. Greater Manchester Police, supported by the other State Interested Persons, invited Judge Field to recuse himself. In a ruling dated 3 September 2021, he agreed to do so. ^{[footnote 180]}

9. I was appointed as the nominated judge coroner in accordance with Schedule 10 to the 2009 Act on 15 November 2021. I adopted the decisions previously made by Judge Field and listed a private ^{[footnote 181]} procedural hearing for 16–18 May 2022 to consider the disclosure issues. For a reason that I am unable to disclose publicly, that hearing had to be adjourned part-heard and was concluded on 6 September 2022.

The need for closed evidence and conversion to a public inquiry

10. In the course of the hearing in May and September 2022 I considered four questions, as set down in the authorities on PII:

• Was there a public interest in bringing material for which PII had been claimed into the public domain?
• Would disclosure of that material bring about a real risk of serious harm to an important public interest, and if so what interest?
• Could that real risk of serious harm be protected by other methods, or by limited disclosure?
• If the alternatives were insufficient, where did the balance of the public interest lie?

11. I concluded that there was a real and important public interest in bringing the material over which PII was claimed into the public domain, as it would be necessary in order to understand the circumstances of Mr Uddin’s murder. However, should such public disclosure occur, it would bring about a real risk of serious harm to an important public interest, namely the detection and prevention of terrorism, which is necessary for the wider protection and safety of the public. I concluded that more limited disclosure of the material would not allow the inquest to be a full, fair and fearless investigation into the matters within the provisional scope of the inquest, and the critical importance of protecting national security meant that the public interest in non-disclosure of certain materials outweighed the public interest in disclosure.

12. As an inquest must generally be held in public, and certainly in the presence of all Interested Persons, the effect of this ruling was that material of central importance to the inquest could not be considered in the course of the inquest. Excluding the PII material meant that the inquest could not properly answer the statutory questions set out in section 5 of the 2009 Act and would not comply with Article 2 of the Convention.

13. Accordingly, on 7 November 2022, I wrote to the Home Secretary, the Right Honourable Suella Braverman KC MP, requesting that she establish without delay an inquiry pursuant to section 1 of the Inquiries Act 2005 (the 2005 Act) in order to allow evidence to be heard in closed session under sections 19 and 20 of the 2005 Act on matters that would otherwise be too sensitive to be made public. This was the only way in which an independent judge-led investigation of the issues could take place with some evidence heard in closed session.

14. The Home Secretary established this Inquiry into the death of Jalal Uddin on 9 November 2023, appointing me as Chairman, with Terms of Reference as set out in Appendix 2 to this Report.

Inquiry proceedings

15. On 7 December 2023, I held a preliminary hearing at which I directed that the inquest should be suspended pursuant to paragraph 5 of Schedule 1 to the 2009 Act. ^{[footnote 182]} That step was necessary because the Inquiry’s Terms of Reference had been designed to ensure that the requirements of section 5 of the 2009 Act would be met and the Inquiry would thus discharge the functions of the original inquest.

16. The Interested Persons were formally designated as Core Participants and I gave directions for the preparation of oral hearings. At this first hearing, I fixed the dates for the final hearings, both closed and open, in September 2024. This was a deliberately ambitious timetable, directing the final hearing to start less than ten months after the Inquiry had been set up. That demanding schedule has been fully respected by all concerned: there have been no adjournments or delays.

17. On 31 July 2024, I made a Restriction Order under section 19 of the 2005 Act, giving effect to the Inquiry’s ability to receive evidence in closed session and making restrictions on the access to and publication of that evidence. ^{[footnote 183]} In my assessment, such an order was necessary in the public interest to prevent the causing of real harm or damage to an important public interest, namely national security. I gave two rulings explaining this decision; one of which cannot be published. ^{[footnote 184]}

18. The gist previously shared at the time Judge Field made his decision in respect of resumption of the inquest in 2020 was published with the open ruling that followed the hearing on 31 July 2024, reflecting as much information as could be summarised publicly at that stage. That gist is set out in full in Appendix 3 to this Report.

19. The Inquiry held both closed and open hearings in September 2024. ^{[footnote 185]}

Appendix 2: Inquiry Terms of Reference

Terms of Reference

1. Subject to paragraph 2 below, the Chairman is to conduct an inquiry into the death of Jalal Uddin to meet the requirements of section 5 of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and section 1 of the Inquiries Act 2005.

2. The purpose of the Inquiry is:

• to identify who the deceased was
• how and in what circumstances he came by his death
• when he died
• where he came by his death and the particulars, if any are required by the Births and Deaths Registration Act 1953, to be registered concerning the death

Method

1. The Inquiry will examine and review all materials relevant to the issues of the terms of reference as the Inquiry Chairman shall judge appropriate.

2. The Inquiry will receive such oral and written evidence as the Chairman shall judge appropriate, within the Terms of Reference. It should take account of previous disclosure and work undertaken in the coroner’s investigation into the death of Jalal Uddin, and the criminal cases linked to Jalal Uddin’s death, in particular the trials of Mohammed Syeedy and Mohammed Syadul Hussain.

Reporting

• The Inquiry will report to the Home Secretary as soon as practicable with appropriate focus on concluding expeditiously.
• Given the sensitive nature of the material, the Chairman may choose to produce both an OPEN and a CLOSED report.
• The inquiry report(s) will make any such recommendations as may seem appropriate, including those that are deemed necessary to prevent future deaths.

Delivery

• Any issues which could have a significant impact on the expeditious completion of the Inquiry should be brought to the attention of the Home Secretary.

Appendix 3: Gist prepared during the inquest proceedings

Gist provided to properly interested persons for the purposes of the resumption hearing

1. In August 2015 an open source referral was made within the police about a Facebook profile in the name of ‘Mohammed Kadz’ (later identified as Mohammed Kadir). Police noted the contents of a number of extremist Facebook posts, including a photograph of a television screen showing an ISIS emblem and a threat to the “kuffar” collecting for the charity Help for Heroes:

Otherwise they will see more lee rugby’s [sic] about. Ask Rigby if it was worth it.

2. Police began to make enquiries with a view to (i) identifying ‘Mohammed Kadz’ and (ii) identifying the threat and risk he posed to the community.

3. Separately, in August 2015, another branch of the police identified the same user.

4. On 5 September 2015 the Facebook user referred to above (Kadir) posted, asking his followers what they would do about “imams” of “local masjid dealing with kaweez and sihr ect etc … The imams have network of people they it with probz 40+ in the town”.

5. Kadir received responses from 18 Facebook profiles including:

“Get in someone knowledgeable upon the Haq who can explain to them the dangers of this … if after they fail to accept the haq then bust their backsides and publically name and shame what they do”, “pin them down and start reciting”, “Don’t pray behind him; pray afterwards,” and “Kill them akhi straight outb, Muhammad (saws) said kill the magician”.

6. Kadir commented in the string that “Akhi one of the brothers has actually taken one of the main guys books and they have seen many shirky stuff in it and have disposed of it properly by reciting over it and bowl of ruqyah water ect ect [sic] and river …”

7. Kadir ended the comments by stating, “Ther are tooo many of these dirty kufr people and exposing isnt sufficient … we have decided that we will take this on properly in sha Allah … we may do what ever to paralyse them in sha Allah starting from the ring leader that we know Soo please do make dua that this happens and we do it in a systematic way so that we do not get caught.”

8. The posts of 5 September 2015 were (i) captured, but (ii) not reviewed by any person before Jalal Uddin’s murder.

9. In October 2015 reporting suggested that Kadir had access to large knives and had posted pictures of them on Facebook.

10. By 2 November 2015 the full name, date of birth and home address of Kadir were identified.

11. From 30 October 2015 Kadir was assessed and continued to be assessed as a person who was of high risk and significant concern, and latterly as someone who posed a risk of acting on his Islamist extremist aspirations.

12. On 7 December 2015 a request was made for the appointment of a Senior Investigating Officer in respect of Kadir. There is some uncertainty as to who had primary responsibility thereafter for the investigations involving Kadir.

13. In January 2016 intelligence suggested that Kadir had access to openly available extremist literature, including bomb-making manuals and other material providing instructions on how to undertake violent jihad.

Appendix 4: Chronology of key events

Date	Event(s)
5 March 1944	Jalal Uddin was born in Satpur, Bangladesh. [footnote 186]
2002	Jalal Uddin moved to the UK, initially working in East London before moving to Birmingham and then Rochdale. [footnote 187]
14 August 2014	North West Counter Terrorism Unit (NWCTU) searched the address of Mohammed Syadul Hussain as part of Operation Prideling and seized various devices, including a mobile phone exhibited as ICW/1.
8 October 2014	Operation Prideling was closed. [footnote 188]
August 2015	North East Counter Terrorism Unit (NECTU) identified a Facebook profile, ‘Mohammed Kadz’, posting pro-Islamic State content and threats against non-Muslims. [footnote 189]
20 August 2015	Associates of Mohammed Kadir and Mohammed Syeedy stole items related to Jalal Uddin’s practice of ‘ruqyah’ (a cultural ritualistic practice to heal, using verses from the Quran together with written prayers) from the Jalalia Jaame Mosque and destroyed them. [footnote 190]
5 September 2015	Kadir posted on Facebook seeking views on the punishment of those who practised ‘taweez’ (amulet-based spiritual healing). One of the responses referred to executing magicians. [footnote 191]
October 2015	Kadir was identified by police as the owner of the ‘Mohammed Kadz’ Facebook profile. [footnote 192] He was assessed as a person of high risk and significant concern due to his extremist views. [footnote 193]
10 December 2015	NWCTU received a request to appoint a Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) to investigate Kadir further. [footnote 194]
18 February 2016	Murder of Jalal Uddin: Kadir and Syeedy followed Jalal Uddin during the evening. Kadir attacked Jalal Uddin as he walked through Wardleworth Park at around 20:42, striking his head with a blunt weapon. Syeedy drove Kadir away from the scene. [footnote 195] Two girls found Jalal Uddin injured, and alerted emergency services at 20:53. [footnote 196] He was pronounced dead at Royal Oldham Hospital at 22:08. [footnote 197]
19 February 2016	A post-mortem examination conducted by Dr Philip Lumb confirmed blunt force trauma as the cause of Jalal Uddin’s death, with severe head injuries, multiple skull fractures and signs of extreme force. [footnote 198]
21 February 2016	Kadir fled the UK, taking a flight from Manchester to Copenhagen. [footnote 199] He took a flight from Copenhagen to Istanbul, likely en route to Syria to join Islamic State. [footnote 200]
22 February 2016	Police searched Syeedy’s home address, having traced him as being the owner of the Vauxhall Astra car that had been at the scene of the murder. [footnote 201]
26 February 2016	Police searched the home address of Kadir. [footnote 202]
27 February 2016	Syeedy arrested. [footnote 203]
28 February 2016	Syeedy charged with murder and conspiracy to murder. [footnote 204]
3 March 2016	An arrest warrant was issued for Kadir. [footnote 205]
28 April 2016	Hussain arrested. [footnote 206]
16 September 2016	Syeedy convicted: Syeedy found guilty of murder at Manchester Crown Court and sentenced to life imprisonment with a minimum of 23 years and 161 days. [footnote 207]
26 September 2016	Hussain was charged with assisting an offender. [footnote 208]
3 April 2017	Hussain convicted: Hussain sentenced to five years in prison for assisting Kadir after the murder by providing financial aid for his flight to leave the UK. [footnote 209]
February 2018	Inquest opened and adjourned.
Autumn 2019	His Honour Judge Patrick Field KC appointed as coroner.
15 November 2021	A new nominated judge coroner was appointed, His Honour Judge Teague KC.
16–18 May 2022	Procedural hearing held to assess the disclosure of sensitive evidence.
6 September 2022	Further procedural hearing held.
7 November 2022	Judge Teague asked the Home Secretary to establish a public inquiry, as key national security sensitive evidence could not be disclosed in an open inquest.
9 November 2023	The Home Secretary established the Inquiry into Jalal Uddin’s death, allowing for closed sessions to examine sensitive evidence. [footnote 210]
7 December 2023	A preliminary hearing was held and the inquest was suspended. [footnote 211]
31 July 2024	A preliminary hearing took place and a Restriction Order was issued under section 19 of the Inquiries Act 2005 to allow sensitive evidence to be heard in closed sessions. [^212]
September 2024	The Inquiry heard evidence in both closed and open (public) hearings.
10 July 2025	Report of the Inquiry into the Death of Jalal Uddin published.

Appendix 5: Narrative conclusion

Had this investigation proceeded as an inquest, I would have returned the following narrative conclusion:

1. Jalal Uddin was born on 5 March 1944 and was 71 years old at the time of his death.

2. At the time of his death, Mr Uddin was married and was residing in Samson Street, Rochdale.

3. His occupation was as a former imam and scholar of the Quran.

4. The medical cause of death, as given by Dr Philip Lumb following post-mortem examination, was: 1a Blunt force head injuries.

5. On the evening of 18 February 2016, Mr Uddin was unlawfully killed by two Islamic extremists whose motivation was theological hatred. The killing was an act carried out for the purposes of terrorism.

6. At the time of the killing, one of the men had been under investigation for seven months.

7. The man subject to investigation had been assessed from at least 30 October 2015 as a person of high risk and significant concern and latterly as someone at risk of acting on his Islamist extremist aspirations.

8. There was a failure to appoint a functioning Senior Investigating Officer (SIO) to lead an investigation into the man who had been assessed as presenting a high risk and being of significant concern. This was a serious failure and a grave error. It had two principal consequences:

• In the course of the investigation a Facebook exchange was captured. It was not analysed or investigated prior to Mr Uddin’s death. The Facebook exchange disclosed that the man under investigation and his associates had decided to plan and carry out some form of serious crime – possibly involving the use of extreme violence – against one or more imams in their locality. Had a functioning SIO been appointed, there was a real possibility that analysis of the exchange would have led to the detection or disruption of the activities of the men who would later kill Mr Uddin.
• Even if the plot itself had not been detected through analysis of the Facebook exchanges, then other police investigative action in relation to one of the men might have detected or disrupted the plot.

9. The significant failures in the course of the investigation, the detail of which I cannot include in this narrative conclusion, meant that opportunities were lost to prevent Mr Uddin’s death.

Copyright

© Crown copyright 2025

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Enquiries

Any enquiries related to this publication should be sent to: info-jalaluddininquiry@jalaluddin.public-inquiry.uk

Footnotes

1. See: Sir John Saunders, Manchester Arena Inquiry Volume 3: Radicalisation and Preventability, March 2023, paras 24.26– 24.30 ↩

2. 23 September 2024 58/4–8 ↩

3. 23 September 2024 58/9–20 ↩

4. 23 September 2024 58/21–59/13 ↩

5. 23 September 2024 59/14–21 ↩

6. 23 September 2024 59/21–60/4 ↩

7. 23 September 2024 60/19–22 ↩

8. 23 September 2024 60/23–61/17 ↩

9. 23 September 2024 64/23–25 ↩

10. 23 September 2024 64/23–65/1 ↩

11. 23 September 2024 40/1–14; 23 September 2024 66/24–67/18 ↩

12. 23 September 2024 40/12–17 ↩

13. 23 September 2024 40/15–25 ↩

14. 23 September 2024 41/1–10 ↩

15. 23 September 2024 30/5–6; 23 September 2024 31/4–5 ↩

16. 23 September 2024 55/6–20; 23 September 2024 56/13–15 ↩

17. 23 September 2024 9/14–15 ↩

18. 23 September 2024 43/1–10 ↩

19. 23 September 2024 43/11–22; 23 September 2024 44/4–20 ↩

20. 23 September 2024 43/1–4 ↩

21. 23 September 2024 43/19–22 ↩

22. INQ001492 ↩

23. INQ001492 ↩

24. INQ001492 ↩

25. INQ001492 ↩

26. 23 September 2024 67/21–68/1 ↩

27. 24 September 2024 43/23–44/19 ↩

28. 24 September 2024 42/13–14 ↩

29. 24 September 2024 42/18–43/8 ↩

30. 24 September 2024 36/4–10 ↩

31. 24 September 2024 33/20–21 ↩

32. 24 September 2024 47/1–10 ↩

33. INQ001243/8 ↩

34. 24 September 2024 36/6–10 ↩

35. 24 September 2024 36/6–14 ↩

36. 24 September 2024 36/10–14 ↩

37. 24 September 2024 39/4–15 ↩

38. 24 September 2024 50/14–17 ↩

39. 24 September 2024 50/14–20 ↩

40. 24 September 2024 50/22–25 ↩

41. 24 September 2024 51/2–14 ↩

42. 24 September 2024 51/8–25 ↩

43. 24 September 2024 52/1–5; 24 September 2024 52/13–25 ↩

44. 24 September 2024 40/11–12 ↩

45. 24 September 2024 41/10–17 ↩

46. 24 September 2024 41/23–42/2 ↩

47. 24 September 2024 40/24–41/5; 24 September 2024 48/13–49/23 ↩

48. 24 September 2024 52/14–53/3 ↩

49. INQ001301/16 para 60; 24 September 2024 150/13–23 ↩

50. INQ001301/65 para 197(viii); 23 September 2024 45/19–20 ↩

51. 23 September 2024 46/2; INQ001494 ↩

52. INQ001301/40 para 131 ↩

53. 23 September 2024 46/11–13 ↩

54. 23 September 2024 46/13–20 ↩

55. 23 September 2024 47/1–10 ↩

56. INQ001301/29 paras 93–94 ↩

57. 23 September 2024 47/20–24 ↩

58. INQ001494 ↩

59. INQ001301/82 para 217(xv) ↩

60. INQ001301/82 para 217(xvi) ↩

61. Abu Qital means the ‘father of fighting’: 24 September 2024 59/9–60/8 ↩

62. INQ001301/35 para 116; INQ001290/6–7 para 38 ↩

63. INQ001301/35 para 116; INQ001290/7 para 39 ↩

64. INQ001290/7 para 43 ↩

65. INQ001301/25–26 para 85(ii–iii) ↩

66. 23 September 2024 50/6 ↩

67. INQ001301/66 para 198 ↩

68. 23 September 2024 50/13–23 ↩

69. 23 September 2024 51/4–6 ↩

70. 23 September 2024 51/6–13 ↩

71. INQ001494 ↩

72. 23 September 2024 51/15–16 ↩

73. 23 September 2024 51/17–20 ↩

74. 23 September 2024 51/17–25 ↩

75. 23 September 2024 52/10–11 ↩

76. 23 September 2024 52/17–18 ↩

77. INQ001301/51 para 148(xix) ↩

78. INQ001301/52 para 148(xix) ↩

79. INQ001301/18 para 66 ↩

80. INQ001301/18 para 66 ↩

81. INQ001301/15 para 52; 23 September 2024 53/12–14 ↩

82. 23 September 2024 53/15–16 ↩

83. 23 September 2024 53/17–19 ↩

84. 23 September 2024 53/19–21 ↩

85. 23 September 2024 53/21–54/6 ↩

86. 23 September 2024 54/7–9 ↩

87. 23 September 2024 54/9–11 ↩

88. 23 September 2024 54/11–15 ↩

89. 23 September 2024 54/13–19 ↩

90. 23 September 2024 54/9–11 ↩

91. 23 September 2024 54/24–55/2 ↩

92. 23 September 2024 55/3–4 ↩

93. 23 September 2024 55/9–11 ↩

94. 23 September 2024 55/11–13 ↩

95. 23 September 2024 55/14–18 ↩

96. 23 September 2024 55/18–56/1 ↩

97. INQ001301/9 paras 30–31; 23 September 2024 27/9–19 ↩

98. INQ001301/8 para 26 ↩

99. 23 September 2024 27/22–24 ↩

100. INQ001301/9 para 31 ↩

101. INQ001301/9–10 para 32 ↩

102. 23 September 2024 98/2–4 ↩

103. INQ001301/10 para 32 ↩

104. INQ001301/10 paras 33–36; 23 September 2024 114/9–11 ↩

105. INQ001301/22 para 76; INQ001493 ↩

106. INQ001301/20–21 para 72(a–c) ↩

107. 23 September 2024 9/16–17 ↩

108. 24 September 2024 5/7–19/14; INQ001301/13–14 para 48 ↩

109. 24 September 2024 14/20 ↩

110. 24 September 2024 12/24–15/14 ↩

111. 24 September 2024 22/2–24/13; 24 September 2024 20/1–13 ↩

112. 24 September 2024 25/8–15 ↩

113. INQ001301/11 para 39 ↩

114. INQ001301/12 para 40 ↩

115. INQ001301/15 paras 52–54 ↩

116. INQ001301/18–19 para 67(ii) ↩

117. INQ001301/48 para 148 ↩

118. INQ001301/54–55 paras 151–155 ↩

119. INQ001301/55 para 154; INQ001243/45–46 ↩

120. 23 September 2024 38/15–22 ↩

121. INQ001301/54 para 151; 23 September 2024 39/2–9 ↩

122. INQ001301/20 para 69 ↩

123. INQ001301/19 para 67(ii) ↩

124. INQ001301/19 para 67(iii) ↩

125. INQ001301/61–62 paras 191–195 ↩

126. INQ001290/6–7 paras 35–38 ↩

127. 25 September 2024 15/3–21 ↩

128. 25 September 2024 16/8–17/3 ↩

129. INQ001301/39 para 126 ↩

130. INQ001301/39 para 127 ↩

131. 23 September 2024 9/18–10/11 ↩

132. 23 September 2024 10/12–25 ↩

133. 23 September 2024 10/21–23 ↩

134. 23 September 2024 11/5–7 ↩

135. INQ001301/16 para 60 ↩

136. INQ000230/2 ↩

137. INQ000335/2 ↩

138. INQ000335/3 ↩

139. INQ000335/3 ↩

140. INQ000230/2 ↩

141. INQ000335/3 ↩

142. INQ000230/3 ↩

143. 24 September 2024 80/17–81/17; 24 September 2024 125/6–18 ↩

144. 24 September 2024 79/7–10 ↩

145. INQ001293/4 para 15; INQ001301/88–89 para 219 ↩

146. 24 September 2024 85/25–86/21; INQ001293/5 para 19 ↩

147. 24 September 2024 90/9–91/8 ↩

148. INQ001293/8 paras 30–32 ↩

149. INQ001293/8 para 33 ↩

150. INQ000226/2 ↩

151. INQ000226/2 ↩

152. 24 September 2024 132/23–133/10 ↩

153. INQ000230/8 ↩

154. INQ001293/11 para 41 ↩

155. 24 September 2024 101/2–102/2; 24 September 2024 107/5–19 ↩

156. 23 September 2024 13/19–25; INQ001290/5 para 26 ↩

157. INQ001290/5 para 26 ↩

158. NECTU was subsequently renamed Counter Terrorism Policing North East (CTPNE) ↩

159. 25 September 2024 8/12–25 ↩

160. 25 September 2024 9/1–9 ↩

161. 25 September 2024 10/13–21; INQ001339/1 para 4 ↩

162. 24 September 2024 142/19–22 ↩

163. 25 September 2024 10/13–21; INQ001339/1 para 4 ↩

164. 25 September 2024 11/3–6 ↩

165. INQ001339/2 para 6 ↩

166. 25 September 2024 11/10–14; 24 September 2024 144/3–13 ↩

167. 25 September 2024 11/18–12/1 ↩

168. 24 September 2024 144/19–25 ↩

169. 25 September 2024 12/2–10 ↩

170. Section 1 of the Terrorism Act 2000 ↩

171. 24 September 2024 104/1–15 ↩

172. 24 September 2024 136/9–17 ↩

173. INQ001293 paras 51–55](https://juiweb-prod.s3.eu-west-2.amazonaws.com/2025/02/INQ001293-Frank-Morris.pdf); 24 September 2024 97/8–25; 24 September 2024 102/3–103/10; 24 September 2024 106/13–25 ↩

174. Schedule 1 to the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, Part 2, paragraph 8 ↩

175. Namely: (i) the family of Jalal Uddin; (ii) the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police; (iii) the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police; and (iv) the Secretary of State for the Home Department. ↩

176. INQ001108 ↩

177. INQ001108/6 para 25 ↩

178. INQ001098 ↩

179. Namely: (i) the Chief Constable of Greater Manchester Police; (ii) the Chief Constable of West Yorkshire Police; and (iii) the Secretary of State for the Home Department ↩

180. INQ001107 ↩

181. In accordance with Rule 11(4) of the Coroners (Inquests) Rules 2013 ↩

182. 7 December 2023 ↩

183. 7 December 2023- Restriction Order 31 July 2024 ↩

184. 7 December 2023Ruling in response to s19 Inquiries Act 2005 Restriction Order application dated 31 July 2024 ↩

185. 7 December 2023 23 September 2024 25/20–22 ↩

186. 23 September 2024 58/4–5 ↩

187. 23 September 2024 59/22–60/1 ↩

188. 24 September 2024 99/8–11 ↩

189. 25 September 2024 8/12–25 ↩

190. INQ001301/29 paras 93 and 94 ↩

191. 24 September 2024 61/1–62/11 ↩

192. 25 September 2024 10/14–18 ↩

193. 24 September 2024 142/15–18 ↩

194. 24 September 2024 142/19–22 ↩

195. INQ001301/42 para 134 ↩

196. INQ001301/8 ↩

197. 23 September 2024 114/9–11 ↩

198. 24 September 2024 25/8–10 ↩

199. 24 September 2024 155/20–24 ↩

200. INQ001301/39 para 126; 24 September 2024 156/20–23 ↩

201. INQ001301/15 ↩

202. 24 September 2024 155/8–15 ↩

203. INQ001301/20 para 69 ↩

204. INQ001301/20 para 70 ↩

205. INQ001301/24 para 81 ↩

206. INQ001301/39 para 127 ↩

207. INQ001301/43 para 139 ↩

208. INQ001301/43 para 140 ↩

209. See Terms of Reference in Appendix 2 ↩

210. 7 December 2023 ↩

211. Ruling in response to s19 Inquiries Act 2005 Restriction Order application dated 31 July 2024 ↩