Impact assessment

Film and TV Production Restart Scheme: impact evaluation - addendum

Updated 2 May 2025

Prepared by Nordicity & Saffery LLP

August 2024

Commissioned by the British Film Institute for the Department for Culture, Media and Sport.

For further information, please contact:

Vic Taylor

Senior Evaluation Manager, British Film Institute

Vic.Taylor@bfi.org.uk

Executive summary (revised)

Addendum note

Please note: This addendum contains the final figures for the total value of claims, Scheme delivery costs and the benefit-cost ratio (BCR), updated as of August 2024, which differ from the interim figures found in the original report published in April 2023. At the point of publication, some claims had not yet been settled and a conservative estimate was included for the final costs. That estimate has now been revised and the result is in an improved BCR.

With the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic in Spring 2020, the risks of film and TV production stoppages or even cancellations rose dramatically. In fact, at the beginning of the pandemic, many producers were unable to obtain insurance against COVID-19 risks at commercially feasible terms or were even completely forestalled from the insurance market. This ’market closure’ was particularly acute among smaller domestic independent producers^{[footnote 1]}, as the large studio productions often originated by US studios or global subscription video-on-demand (SVOD) services were better able to self-insure or continue filming under pre-existing insurance policies that had yet to expire.

In response to this market closure, the UK Government introduced the Film and Television Production Restart Scheme (the ‘Scheme’) – a government-backed indemnity scheme to cover certain COVID-19 related losses incurred by domestic film and TV producers – such as losses that arose if material cast or crew were unable to work or if a production was interrupted, postponed or abandoned because a UK civil authority imposed restrictions.^{[footnote 2]}

The Scheme was first announced by the government on 28 July 2020 and became effective from that date, although it officially opened to receive registration applications on 16 October 2020. The Scheme was initially meant to stay open until 31 December 2020; however, it was subsequently extended a number of times. Under the final extension, the Scheme remained open to registrations until 30 April 2022 and covered losses incurred up until 30 June 2022.

Prior to 1 November 2021, film and TV productions that registered for the Scheme were required to pay a fee equal to 1% of the value of the total production budget. On 1 November 2021, the government raised the fee rate to 2.5%. The fee increase was viewed as an appropriate means to balance the needs of the film and TV production industry, and the government’s need to deliver value for money – i.e. ensure that government intervention is delivered in a cost-efficient manner whilst maximising its positive impact on the UK’s economy and society.^{[footnote 3]} The fee increase was also considered an important step towards a return to commercial insurance market rates after the scheme’s closure.

The following report details the results of the impact evaluation of the Scheme conducted by Nordicity and Saffery LLP. This impact evaluation is distinct from the process evaluation of the Scheme, completed by RSM Consulting and published by the Department for Culture, Media & Sport (DCMS) in January 2022. That process evaluation assessed how the Scheme had operated between October 2020 and September 2021, and provided DCMS with recommendations for improving the Scheme’s delivery for the balance of its tenure.

Considering the complexity of the situation, the unprecedented nature of the policy challenge, the turmoil in the insurance markets and real economy and the multiple stakeholders involved, the government was able to introduce the Scheme relatively quickly. Indeed, it was the unified commitment of stakeholders from across the government and the film and TV industry which was a key factor in this quick rollout.

The Scheme take-up was very robust. Indeed, some producers had hoped the Scheme would have started earlier, so they could resume production sooner, after the British Film Commission (BFC) and Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television (Pact) had introduced guidelines and COVID-19 safe working practices. Nevertheless, the Scheme was introduced early enough such that once film and TV production had resumed, the UK was well-positioned vis-à-vis other countries as a location for both international and domestic production.

Over the span of 23 months plus 2 days (i.e. 28 July 2020 through to 30 June 2022), the Scheme supported 1,259 individual film and TV productions and £3.06 billion in production expenditure. High-end TV (HETV) programming accounted for over half of this total production expenditure (£ 1.67 billion).

The costs to deliver the Scheme totalled £5.1 million (revised from £5.7 million), while £40.7 million (revised from £49.5 million) in compensation claims were paid, thereby bringing total Scheme costs to £45.8 million (revised from £55.2 million). The Scheme collected £36.4 million (revised from £35.6 million) in registration fees from producers (net amounts contractually retained by Marsh Commercial). As a result, the net cost to the government was £9.4 million (revised from £19.6 million).

Table 1 Summary of revisions to programme statistics (£m)

	Conservative estimates (April 2023)	Addendum final figures
Delivery costs	5.7	5.1
Compensation paid	49.5	40.7
Less: collected registration fees	35.6	36.4
Total Scheme cost	19.6	9.4

Source: Nordicity / Saffery calculations based on data from DCMS, Marsh Commercial, BFI Screen Business 2021, producer survey (2022) and ONS

The Scheme required producers to attest that their production would not have otherwise proceeded with Scheme support (i.e. the production may be considered additional on account of the Scheme). So based on this ‘de jure’ definition, the Scheme was 100% additional. The survey research conducted as part of this evaluation indicated that on a ‘de facto’ basis, the Scheme’s additionality is actually closer to 73% - although that is still relatively high. Most of the producers who participated in the interview research for this evaluation felt very strongly that they would not have been able to restart or start production without the Scheme, thereby putting their businesses in clear jeopardy of financial failure. That impact would have deprived audiences of new TV programmes and films and the ability of the sector to recover.

Scheme-registered producers reported that their productions created 63,500 crew positions plus a further 37,100 cast roles, for a total of 100,700 roles.^{[footnote 4]} Indeed, given that large swathes of the film and TV workforce were not eligible for the Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) or Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS), the Scheme turned out to be an essential lifeline for thousands of production industry workers and their families.

The evaluation team’s economic analysis found that the Scheme generated 48,500 full-time equivalents (FTEs) of additional employment and £2.25 billion in additional gross value added (GVA) for the UK economy, when direct, indirect and induced economic impacts are included. This total additional impact included 23,100 FTEs of employment and £ 1.15 billion in GVA directly within the UK’s film and TV production industry, with the balance of the impact generated within the supply chain (i.e. indirect economic impacts) and across the wider UK economy (i.e. induced economic impacts).

The Scheme not only helped production businesses by allowing them to resume production, but it also restored their business confidence, meaning that many production companies could start to plan for the future again and look to innovate. Indeed two-thirds of producers reported that the Scheme had a positive impact on their innovation, although the impact on their ability to take risks was less. Crucially, the Scheme allowed many production companies to create content so they could tap into what was fast becoming a sellers’ market. This bolstered UK production companies’ international sales, thereby, further adding to the Scheme’s economic contribution.

In terms of wider policy objectives, the Scheme made a positive contribution to the government’s levelling up agenda by stimulating a larger share of film and TV production outside of London than had previously been reported by the BFI (in 2019 for film and HETV production). The Scheme guidelines encouraged producers to increase equity and diversity in the film and TV production industry; the evaluation evidence suggests that one-third of participating producers increased the diversity of their creative teams and their on-screen content.

With a net cost to the government of £9.4 million and £2.25 billion in additional GVA generated, the Scheme yielded a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 239.8:1. Government guidance indicates that a BCR of over 4:1 should be considered ‘very high’ in terms of delivering value for money.^{[footnote 5]} Whilst the Scheme’s BCR was very high, it is important to recognise that the government did assume a high degree of fiscal risk with the Scheme, within a market environment of extreme uncertainty. Indeed, the market uncertainty was too high for the insurance market to function and so the government had to intervene.

Ultimately, the Scheme paid £40.7 million in claims. However, the government did commit to paying up to £500 million. Under a different scenario, the government could have faced a much higher cost, without commensurately higher economic benefits. Simply put, if claims had approached the £500 million ceiling, the BCR would have dropped to 5:1 – although that would have still been considered very high.

Whilst the government set aside £500 million to cover Scheme claims, the Scheme design and producers’ diligence and commitment to the mitigation of COVID-19 meant that claims (£40.7 million) are less than one-tenth of this earmarked amount.

From a value-for-money perspective, the Scheme was also very economic for the government. Without the Scheme enabling a large swathe of film and TV production to restart, the government would have likely faced an additional fiscal cost to support unemployed film and TV production workers via the CJRS, SEISS or Universal Credit.

The evaluation research demonstrates that the Scheme had a significant positive impact and delivered value for money. This positive result is more important, given that the Scheme was developed at pace in an environment of high market uncertainty. And whilst it is unlikely that the Scheme itself will have to be introduced again in the foreseeable future, the design and delivery of the Scheme can offer several recommendations for the development of other government programmes in the future, particularly those that must be developed quickly and in an environment of high uncertainty.

For the most part, these recommendations reflect key learnings and good practices observed within the Scheme that could be applied to other government programmes in the future. In some cases, however, the recommendations do reflect areas of Scheme delivery that the evaluation research indicated could have been approached differently by the DCMS Oversight Team or Steering Board.

1. Provide clear and accessible guidelines accompanied by an information campaign to fully explain new guidelines

Producers noted how many of the types of costs that they thought would have been covered by the Scheme did not qualify as eligible losses, so they felt the coverage was less than expected. This may have been due to a misinterpretation of the Scheme rules, or the expectation by producers that the Scheme would operate in a similar manner to insurance coverages that they were accustomed to using. These instances of misinterpretation emerged despite the fact that DCMS convened regular meetings with producers and offered a channel for producers to submit questions.

In the same way that DCMS sought to ensure that producers had all the information they needed to engage with the Scheme, it is important that novel – and even existing – programmes similar to the Scheme offer clear and accessible guidelines. This could be done by adopting information campaigns that included explanatory information sessions (i.e. physical or virtual roadshows), which would help reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation of the guidelines.

2. Direct industry business knowledge must be readily accessible to government

Government was able to design and launch the Scheme at pace because there was deep knowledge of how the production business worked residing directly within Pact, BFI and DCMS. This may not always be the case, where an industry may not be subject to the same regulation or policy support as film and TV production is. The same applies to the insurance or financial industry subject matter expertise needed to design, launch and deliver an indemnity or compensation programme such as the Scheme. Above all, the government needs to be able to help build trust among all subject matter experts in order to deliver such a programme at pace, as it provides the foundation for the necessary collaboration and information sharing.

3. Enhanced evidence of commercial viability and additionality

Within the Scheme, productions with budgets under £30 million could self-assess commercial viability and thereby the additionality of the Scheme. The evaluation’s survey research revealed, however, that this self-assessment could have been inaccurate in at least 6%^{[footnote 6]} of cases, and possibly higher. Wherever possible, the government should ensure that it can collect evidence to ensure that it can effectively scrutinise the additionality of intervention.

This is not an issue that is specific to the Scheme or even government programmes similar to the Scheme. In fact, the need to collect evidence to assess the additionality of government intervention is a key issue across all programme and policy evaluation. However, the key learning from the Scheme is that even where a programme is considered to be additional from a de jure perspective that does not necessarily mean that it also is on a de facto basis, and so alternate methods for assessing additionality should be incorporated into the programme monitoring and evaluation plan.

4. Real-time programme reporting and dashboard

For a novel programme such as the Scheme, it is vital that the government can continually monitor its progress. It may not be sufficient to wait several months for a process evaluation to be commissioned and carried out. Instead, similar novel programmes – particularly where delivered by a third party – should incorporate as much as possible real-time or daily reporting and the use of dashboards. The Scheme itself did this using the key performance indicator (KPI) dashboard maintained by DCMS using weekly data supplied by Marsh Commercial. This type of KPI dashboard and real-time reporting, in general, will enable continued programme improvement to ensure it remains fit for purpose and responds to industry developments.

5. Unenforceable social commitments should be included in guidelines and monitored, where specific interventions may not feasible

Whilst most of the Scheme’s social commitments were not enforceable, the inclusion of them in the rules formed an important channel for the government to signal its policy intentions and encourage industry. Indeed, despite the unenforceability of the social commitments, the evaluation research did find that one-third of producers increased their social impact by increasing the diversity of their content. For other programmes, therefore, social commitments or other types of requirements that cannot necessarily be reasonably enforced should not be left out. Even in the absence of enforceability, such ‘encouragement’ requirements should be kept and monitored.

Still, it should be noted that the Scheme was designed primarily to stimulate film and TV production activity during the pandemic that would not have otherwise occurred. This policy goal is not necessarily contradictory to the government’s policy goals related to increasing diversity and equality, and reducing bullying, harassment and racism in the workplace. However, specific policy objectives often require targeted intervention to achieve those objectives, rather than relying on indirect outcomes. So where the government wishes to move beyond simply signalling its policy direction and would prefer to achieve tangible outcomes, it would be better to implement programmes that target social impact goals.

Value for money assessment

Introduction

In accordance with National Audit Office guidance, the value for money of the Scheme was assessed in terms of effectiveness, efficiency and economy. Effectiveness

By all accounts, the Scheme has been effective from an economic perspective. Whilst ex ante targets were set for the Scheme’s outputs, outcomes and impacts, the ex post results are compelling. As outlined in Section 3.1, the Scheme has supported 1,259 productions and over 400 production companies. These productions have generated £3.06 billion in production expenditure in the UK across a 23-month period, or £ 1.60 billion on an annualised basis.

The overall £3.06 billion in production expenditure itself generated a total of £2,254.4 million in net GVA. When excluding the induced economic impacts, the net GVA impact was £1,803.3 million.

Efficiency

Addendum note

Please note: This addendum contains the final figures for the total value of claims, Scheme delivery costs and the benefit-cost ratio (BCR), updated as of August 2024, which differ from the interim figures found in the original report published in April 2023. At the point of publication, some claims had not yet been settled and a conservative estimate was included for the final costs. That estimate has now been revised and the result is in an improved BCR.

Data supplied by DCMS indicates that the delivery costs of the Scheme were £5.1 million (revised from £5.7 million) (Table 1). The value of compensation paid by the government was £40.7 million (revised from £49.5 million). Therefore, the Scheme’s total cost to the government is was £45.8 million (revised from £55.2 million). The Scheme collected a total of £36.4 million (revised from £35.6 million) in registration fees (net amounts contractually retained by Marsh Commercial) (Table 1). When set against the claims paid of £40.7 million, the total Scheme cost falls to £9.4 million (revised from £19.6 million).

Based on these estimates of the net economic benefits and total Scheme costs, the Scheme yielded a benefit-cost ratio (BCR) of 191.8:1 (excluding induced economic impacts) and 239.8:1 (total economic impact inclusive of induced economic impacts). Both BCRs can be considered ‘very high’. Indeed, according to government guidance, a BCR of over 4:1 indicates ‘very high’ value for money.^{[footnote 7]}

Whilst the BCR was very high, it is important to recognise that the government did assume a high degree of fiscal risk with the Scheme, within a market environment of very high uncertainty. Indeed, the market uncertainty was too high for the insurance market to function and so the government had to intervene to take on the risk. Ultimately, the Scheme’s claims totalled £40.7 million. However, the government did commit to paying up to £500 million in claims. Under a different scenario, the government could have faced a much higher cost, without commensurately higher economic benefits. Simply put, as claims approached the £500 million ceiling, the BCR would have dropped to 5:1 (total economic impact inclusive of induced economic impacts). Nevertheless, even under this worst-case scenario, the BCR would still have been very high when viewed in relation to government guidance.

The sector’s low claim rate (is) a reflection of the risk management protocols adopted. It was an excellent scheme delivered at a time of need.

– Factual/entertainment producer

The results of sensitivity analysis for the BCR can be found in Appendix F. The sensitivity analysis demonstrates that the rate of additionality could drop as low as 1% to 2% and still yield a BCR of 1.0 or higher.

Table 2 Calculation of the Film and TV Production Restart Scheme value for money, net of Scheme registration fees (£m)

	Direct + Indirect economic impact	Total economic impact
Economic benefit - additional GVA	1,803.30	2,254.40
Delivery costs	5.1	5.1
Compensation paid	40.7	40.7
Less: collected registration fees	36.4	36.4
Total Scheme cost	9.4	9.4
Benefit-cost ratio	19 1.8:1	239.8:1

Source: Nordicity / Saffery calculations based on data from DCMS, Marsh Commercial, BFI Screen Business 2021, producer survey (2022) and ONS

Economy

The economy of the Scheme should be viewed in the context of the other Coronavirus business support schemes offered by the UK Government. During the COVID-19 pandemic, the government offered several pan-economy support schemes to UK workers and business, including:

● The Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme (CJRS) ran from 1 March 2020 to 30 September 2021 and provided grants to employers to cover 80% of furloughed employees’ wages up to a maximum of £30,000 annually. This scheme distributed a total of £70 billion to 1.4 million employers in relation to 1 1.7 million furloughed jobs.

● Self-Employment Income Support Scheme (SEISS) provided five rounds of grants to self-employed workers. The scheme distributed £28.1 billion to 2.9 million individuals between July 2020 and October 202 1.

● Coronavirus Business Interruption Loan Scheme (CBILS) provided businesses with an annual turnover under £45 million with loans of up to £5 million. The government assumed up to 80% of any losses incurred by lenders. As of May 2021, the scheme had backed 109,877 loans with a total value of £26.4 billion.

As noted in Section 3.2, this evaluation analysis indicates that without the Scheme, up to £2.17 billion in film and TV production in the UK would likely not have proceeded. The loss of production expenditure would have put the employment of 73,400 production-industry jobs or 48,500 FTEs of employment – including direct, indirect and induced impact employment – in jeopardy. Without work in film and TV production or at businesses that supply those productions, many of these workers would have had to resort to accessing either the CJRS or SEISS to provide them with household income.

At the outset of the pandemic and lockdown, one of the most troubling aspects for the film and TV workforce was that a large swathe of it was neither eligible for the CJRS nor SEISS. According to a survey of 998 film and TV workers in April 2020 conducted by the Film and TV Charity, only 18% of the workforce was eligible for the CJRS and approximately 27% was eligible for the SEISS.^{[footnote 8]} This left 55% of the film and TV workforce ineligible for the government’s Coronavirus support at the outset of the pandemic, namely because of their freelance status. Indeed, data published by DCMS indicates that 50% of the workforce employed in the film and TV production industry were self-employed, compared to only 16% across the entire economy.^{[footnote 9]} According to the Film and TV Charity’s survey research, many freelance workers in the film and TV production industry were ineligible for the SEISS because they either operated as one-person limited companies, were working on PAYE freelance contracts or had been working as a freelancer for less than one year.

Without the ability to access the CJRS or SEISS, many of these freelance film and TV production workers may have been forced to seek employment in other industries – to a much higher degree than would have been the case in other sectors of the economy. Indeed, according to Film and TV Charity, approximately 20% of film and TV workers reported in April 2020 that they were ‘definitely’ going to leave the industry; a further 29% reported that they might leave the industry.^{[footnote 10]} This out-migration would have drained the film and TV production industry of human capacity, thereby only further exacerbating the skills shortage within the industry, which was already slowing its potential for growth prior to the pandemic.

Whilst it was not an ex ante objective of the Scheme to address this gap in Coronavirus support coverage within the film and TV production industry, to demonstrate the Scheme’s economy it is important to note that if the Scheme did not exist and the additional production activity did not resume, a higher number of film and TV production workers would have availed themselves of the CJRS, SEISS (if they were eligible) or Universal Credit (if they were not eligible for either the CJRS or SEISS, and did not necessarily find work in another industry at the beginning of the pandemic).

Detailed and comprehensive data is not available to effectively quantify the counterfactual cost to the government of resorting to pan-economy Coronavirus government support schemes to support the film and TV production workforce. However, the evaluation team notes that the £9.4 million net cost to the government of the Scheme means that the Scheme cost, on average, only £194 per additional FTE supported (48,500 FTEs). It is highly likely that these 48,500 FTEs would have collected more than £194 in government Coronavirus financial support from either the CJRS, SEISS or Universal Credit during the pandemic. With that in mind, the Scheme was very economic for the government. In other words, it permitted the government to support the film and TV production workforce at a much lower average and total cost than would have been the case via the government’s pan-economy Coronavirus support schemes.

Conclusions

This evaluation research clearly points to the Scheme successfully meeting most of its objectives in terms of impact and economic impact in particular. There was a clear market failure rationale for the introduction of the Scheme, as the insurance market had completely foreclosed to most UK film and TV producers, leaving them unable to secure broadcaster or third-party financing to proceed into production.

Considering the complexity of the situation, the unprecedented nature of the policy challenge, the turmoil in the insurance markets and real economy, and the multiple stakeholders involved, the government was able to introduce the Scheme relatively quickly. Indeed, it is the unified commitment of stakeholders from across government and the film and TV industry which was a key factor in this quick rollout.

The Scheme take up was very robust. Indeed, some producers had hoped the Scheme would have started earlier, so they could resume production sooner, after the BFC and Pact had introduced guidelines and COVID-19 safe working practices. Nevertheless, the Scheme was introduced early enough such that once film and TV production had resumed the UK was well-positioned vis-à-vis other countries as a location for both international and domestic production.

It was a godsend.

– Film and TV financier

(The) Scheme was a world leader.

– Film producer

It was incredibly effective, everyone should be congratulated.

– Film and TV financier

We are very grateful to the government to have the foresight to put the Scheme in place.

– Comedy producer

(The) Scheme was crucial for the continuance of production in the sector enabling staff to be retained, business sustained and original programming for audiences.

– Factual/entertainment producer

Overall the Scheme was an excellent use of government intervention to keep the production sector working - which kept production companies in business, personnel employed and content on screen for citizens.

– Factual producer

Overwhelming feeling is thank you… it was market-leading, worked for indie-level productions/ An overwhelming success and inspired of the government to do this.

– Film and TV financier

A solution that worked. Made me feel proud to be British.

– Film and TV financier

By ‘de jure’ definition, the Scheme was 100% additional. However, even on a de facto basis, the additionality was relatively high (73%). Producers who participated in the evaluation research were virtually unanimous that they would not have been able to restart or start production without the Scheme, thereby putting their businesses in clear jeopardy of financial failure.

Given that large swathes of the film and TV workforce were not eligible for the CJRS or SEISS, the Scheme turned out to be an essential lifeline for thousands of production industry workers and their families.

The Scheme not only helped production businesses by allowing them to resume production, but it also restored their business confidence, meaning that many production companies could start to plan for the future again and look to innovate. Indeed two-thirds of producers reported that the Scheme had a positive impact on their innovation, although the impact on their ability to take risks was less. Crucially, the Scheme allowed many production companies to create content so they could tap into what was fast becoming a sellers’ market. This bolstered UK production companies’ international sales, thereby further adding to the Scheme’s economic contribution.

In terms of wider policy objectives, the Scheme made a positive contribution to the government’s levelling up agenda by stimulating a larger share of film and TV production outside of London than had previously been reported by the BFI (in 2019 for film and HETV production). The Scheme guidelines encouraged producers to increase equity and diversity in the film and TV production industry; the evaluation evidence suggests that one-third of participating producers increased the diversity of their creative teams and their on-screen content.

With over £3.06 billion in production expenditure stimulated and 73% additionality, the economic benefits of the Scheme on a GVA basis were over one hundred times the costs of delivering the Scheme. Whilst the government set aside £500 million to cover Scheme claims, the Scheme design and producers’ diligence and commitment to the mitigation of COVID-19 meant that maximum Scheme claims will only total one-tenth (£40.7 million) of this earmarked amount. Scheme delivery costs were nominal (£5.1 million). The Scheme collected a total of £36.4 million in registration fees (net amounts contractually retained by Marsh Commercial), which partially offset both claims and delivery costs. The net cost of the Scheme to the government was, therefore, £9.4 million. As a result, the Scheme yielded a BCR of 19 1.8:1, based on the value of the total economic impact, or 239.8:1, when induced economic impacts are excluded from the BCR calculation.

From a value-for-money perspective, the Scheme was also very economic for the government. Without the Scheme enabling a large swathe of film and TV production to restart, the government would have likely faced an additional fiscal cost to support unemployed film and TV production workers via the CJRS, SEISS or Universal Credit.

Appendix A: sensitivity analysis

Please note: This addendum contains the final figures for the total value of claims, Scheme delivery costs and the benefit-cost ratio (BCR), updated as of August 2024, which differ from the interim figures found in the original report published in April 2023.

The sensitivity analysis in this appendix shows how the Scheme BCR varies as the rate of additionality – which is the key uncertain variable within the analysis – varies from 0% to 100%. This sensitivity analysis reveals that the economic benefits generated by the Scheme are such that the BCR would still be breakeven (i.e. ≥ 1:1) at very low rates of additionality (i.e. 1% 2% additionality).

List of abbreviations

Term	Definition

BCR	Benefit-cost ratio

BFC	British Film Commission

BFI	British Film Institute

CJRS	Coronavirus Job Retention Scheme

FTE	Full-time equivalent

GVA	Gross value added

HETV	High-end TV

KPI	Key performance indicator

ONS	Office for National Statistics

Pact	Producers Alliance for Cinema and Television

SEISS	Self-Employment Income Support Scheme

SVOD	Subscription video on demand

References

BFI (2021) Screen Business: How screen sector tax reliefs power economic growth across the UK 2017–2019. Prepared by Olsberg-SPI with Nordicity.

BFI (2022) Film and high-end television programme production in the UK: January – June (H1) 2022. 28 July.

DCMS (2021) DCMS Sectors Economic Estimates: Employment in DCMS sectors: October 2019 to September 2020. January.

Department for Transport (2020) Value for money indicator 2019. December (updated 19 December 2022).

Film and TV Charity (2020) The Film, TV and Cinema Industry Survey. April.

RSM Consulting (2022) Process Evaluation of the Film and TV Restart Production Restart Scheme.

1. Independent producers and independent production includes producers, production companies, films and TV programmes made without the financial support of one of the five major global film studios – Walt Disney Studios, NBCUniversal, Warner Bros. Entertainment, Paramount or Sony Pictures. Without this financial backing, independent producers and production companies must raise their own financing from broadcasters or other third parties to make television programmes or films. ↩

2. UK civil authority restrictions include regulations, written directions or written guidance issued by government entities that prevent a film or TV production cast or crew from accessing a studio facility, filming location or other place of work required to continue the production. In particular, it includes any government-imposed lockdown or self-isolation requirements that prevent production personnel from accessing their place of work. ↩

3. RSM Consulting (2022) Process Evaluation of the Film and TV Restart Production Restart Scheme. P. 16. ↩

4. The sum of the number of crew and cast roles created across Scheme-registered productions is higher than the numbers of FTEs and will overstate the number of people employed because an individual may work on more than on production, particularly, subsequent editions of the same television series. The sum of crew and cast roles will also overstate the level of employment on a full-time equivalent basis since most crew and cost employment lasts for less than one year. In fact, most crew and cast roles last for a period of months, weeks or even days. ↩

5. Department for Transport (2020) Value for money indicator 2019. December (updated 19 December 2022). ↩

6. On the evaluation research survey, producers were asked to rate (on a scale of 0 to 10) the likelihood that their Scheme-registered productions would have proceeded without Scheme support. Six percent of survey respondents reported a likelihood of ‘10’ (i.e. 100%), under the 1% fee regime. Under the 2.5% fee regime, 7% of survey respondents reported a likelihood of ‘10’ or (i.e. 100%). ↩

7. Department for Transport (2020) Value for money indicator 2019. December (updated 19 December 2022). ↩

8. Film and TV Charity (2020) The Film, TV and Cinema Industry Survey. April. ↩

9. DCMS (2021) DCMS Sectors Economic Estimates: Employment in DCMS sectors: October 2019 to September 2020. January ↩

10. Film and TV Charity (2020). ↩