Research and analysis

Experiences of victims of fraud and cyber crime

Published 14 January 2025

Applies to England and Wales

Acknowledgements

Ipsos UK designed and delivered the fraud and cyber crime victim survey and conducted the qualitative interviews. The Home Office Analysis and Insight Unit commissioned the research and prepared this summary report, based on the data collected by Ipsos.

We would like to thank the following individuals for their support in delivering the fraud and cyber crime victim survey:

From the Home Office: Laura Blakeborough, Isabel Preston, Tom Cracknell, Eben Mitchell, Eliz-Leyla Mani, Helen Jones, Victoria Smith, Steve Bell and Samantha Dowling.

From Ipsos: Hannah Shrimpton, James Stannard, Galini Pantelidou and Olivia Lohoar-Self.

From City of London Police and the National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit: Pauline Smith, Seb Francis, Hafizur Khan, Neil Postins, Penny Antorkas and Claire Walton.

We would also like to thank the interviewees who gave up their time to share their experiences for the survey.

Executive summary

This research report aims to understand the impacts of fraud and cyber crime victimisation on individuals, and perceptions of support received through Action Fraud, the National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (NECVCU) and the police. Findings are based on 2 large-scale telephone surveys and exploratory qualitative research. The surveys are representative of victims who reported their crime to Action Fraud in England and Wales between July 2017 and May 2018. Some surveyed victims went on to receive support from a pilot, proof-of-concept service, the NECVCU, designed to deliver services to primarily vulnerable victims. The research sought to help inform:

• understanding of best practice in response to victims of fraud and cyber crime in order to provide a consistent and high-quality response to victims
• decisions about the rollout of NECVCU to other police force areas

Fieldwork for this research was undertaken between February and May 2019. It should be noted that since the research was conducted, findings were fed in to help improve NECVCU service delivery and NECVCU has been gradually rolling out amongst police force areas.

Key findings

Victims of fraud and cyber crime experienced a wide range of emotional, physical and financial harms. For example, 86% of respondents experienced anger, 73% stress and 63% anxiety. Over half of victims experienced financial loss (57%). In addition, 18% of respondents reported depression as a result of their victimisation, while 3% experienced suicidal thoughts and 1% reported that they self-harmed. Several day-to-day impacts were also experienced; for example, just under half reported that their trust in other people had been impacted either a great deal or a fair amount (48%), along with their willingness to use the internet (29%).

Among those respondents who experienced financial loss, the average loss was £4,600. However, the median loss was £100, suggesting that most victims lost a relatively small amount of money. Qualitative findings demonstrate though that the amount of money lost did not always correlate with the extent of wider harms experienced.

Around 60% of victims reported being satisfied with the support received, and this was similar regardless of whether support was received from Action Fraud, NECVCU or the police. Satisfaction was driven by several factors, including the time taken to be contacted by the service providing support, the amount of contact received, transparency about the likelihood of the case being investigated, and the method of reporting to Action Fraud. On the last point, the research found that 74% of victims who reported to Action Fraud via telephone were satisfied with the advice, information or support received, compared to just 47% of those who reported online.

In terms of support needs amongst victims in receipt of NECVCU services, immediate support was the form of assistance most commonly needed (45%) followed by wider crime prevention advice (42%). ‘Immediate support’ was defined as advice regarding where to go, or who to talk to, to stop the crime or prevent further loss. This further underlined the importance of timeliness in providing support to victims.

A large majority (80%) of victims said they would report to Action Fraud again if they were a victim of fraud or cyber crime in the future. However, amongst those who said that they would not report to Action Fraud again, 25% said this was due to a previous bad experience. Intended behaviour around future victimisation is particularly important as around 1 in 10 victims reported experiencing another fraud or cyber crime since their report to Action Fraud.

Awareness of the risks did seem to improve following receipt of support from NECVCU though, with 62% of victims agreeing that they felt more aware about potential fraud and cyber crime and had talked to friends or family about the risks and how to protect themselves.

This research builds our understanding of the impact that fraud and cyber crime victimisation can have on individuals. It also demonstrates the value of victim support services and highlights some areas for improvement to support future policy and service delivery decisions. Key implications are outlined below.

Key implications

Victims experienced a wide range of emotional, health and financial harms from fraud and cyber crime, as well as impacts on day-to-day behaviours. There were differences in harms experienced by victim groups, notably cyber victims, females and ethnic minority victims. Support tailored for specific groups, as well as support targeted at rebuilding trust, relationships and dealing with emotional harms, might be helpful in reducing longer-term impacts and vulnerability.

Timing of contact is key to improving victim support and ensuring that behaviour change advice is acted upon. The importance to victims in identifying immediate support to stop the crime or prevent further loss is also clear. Future support services could give further consideration on how to give victims advice as soon as possible following the crime.

Overall satisfaction with the advice, information and support provided by NECVCU was positive, as were responses across a range of victim outcome measures, such as victims reporting feeling safer, being more aware of fraud and cyber crime, and increased confidence in the police’s ability to respond to these crimes. Compared to victim perceptions of advice provided by Action Fraud and the police, responses were similarly positive. This suggests Action Fraud, NECVCU and law enforcement could further consider where in the reporting and response system more broadly it is best to deliver support, taking into consideration resource implications and practicalities for each service.

Satisfaction with NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police varied by victim group, with some victim groups more typically reporting dissatisfaction, such as some younger age groups, more affluent groups and those who were in work. Improving the service for these groups should be addressed.

Victims reporting via telephone, across all 3 services, were consistently more likely to be satisfied than those reporting online. This suggests that more consideration is needed regarding the initial point of contact for reporting the crime, in the context of services typically becoming more digitised.

Clarity of branding and messaging is likely to be important for further improving victim experience. This includes clarity on who is providing the service, and for expectation management, in terms of whether a victim’s case is going to be investigated.

1. Introduction

This report presents a summary of quantitative and qualitative findings from a survey of victims of fraud and cyber crime who reported their crime into Action Fraud, the national reporting centre for fraud and cyber crime, between July 2017 and May 2018. Some surveyed victims also went on to receive support from law enforcement and the National Economic Crime Victim Care Unit (NECVCU), a pilot proof-of-concept model designed to deliver services to primarily vulnerable victims.

The research is based on a programme of research, comprising 2 large-scale telephone (computer assisted telephone interviewing or CATI) surveys and an exploratory qualitative survey. The methods section and the technical report, published alongside this summary, provide more detail on the research approach.

1.1 Background to the research

The Home Office Serious and Organised Crime Strategy (2018) makes clear the government’s commitment to improving the response to victims of fraud and cyber crime. It outlines the importance of “working with law enforcement to strengthen the central reporting, triage, advice and victim support services for policing provided by City of London Police” and the intention to establish integrated national to local support for victims of fraud and cyber crime. This aims to improve overall levels of service for victims, with a particular focus on identifying those who are most vulnerable and require targeted support, as well as reducing repeat victimisation. The 2023 Fraud Strategy further emphasises the importance of victim support by setting out the following objectives:

• enhance and streamline how victims report fraud, starting with replacing Action Fraud with a state-of-the-art new system
• implement consistent support for victims across England and Wales by expanding NECVCU and the National Trading Standards’ multi-agency approach to fraud
• ensure victims of identity theft get the support they need to repair their identities and introduce an identity checklist outlining the steps needed to recover and secure a stolen identity
• improve awareness and increase support by creating a new dedicated police PROTECT network aligned with the Cyber PROTECT network

Previous Home Office research (The scale and nature of fraud: a review of the evidence (Home Office, 2018)) demonstrated several gaps in knowledge in relation to victims of fraud. For example, while there was some understanding of the potential financial losses associated with fraud, there were significant gaps in our understanding of the full range of harms and impacts, including non-financial harms. There was also little understanding of how harms varied for particular victims, or particular types of fraud, and how harms change over time. The position has been largely similar for cyber crime, although a report by Portsmouth University (Victims of Computer Misuse: Main Findings (Button et al., 2020)) revealed how victims of computer misuse offences could suffer a wide range of financial and non-financial harms, some of which were very serious.

The previous Home Office research also highlighted there is little evidence regarding the appropriate support, advice or other interventions required to prevent and mitigate victim harms. Portsmouth University similarly reported that amongst the interviews they conducted with victims of computer misuse crime, few appeared to receive much support following their crime, but many had a variety of unmet support needs.

Building the evidence base regarding victim support needs is important given the number of organisations and police forces currently attempting to provide different types of fraud and cyber crime victim support services. It will improve understanding of what support is required - when, for who and what is most likely to be suitable or effective. This includes:

• developing our understanding of how well support services, such as NECVCU, are received by victims
• what kinds of outcomes result from the service
• how it could be improved to inform the development of future victim support services

1.2 Aims and scope of the survey

In response to these evidence needs, the Home Office commissioned Ipsos to undertake a large-scale survey of victims of fraud and cyber crime. The survey had 3 broad aims:

1. To explore the scale and nature of impacts experienced by victims of fraud and cyber crime, and what support is needed to mitigate these impacts.
2. To explore victim’s perceptions of Action Fraud and law enforcement.
3. To feed into an evaluation of NECVCU.

Outputs of this research are intended to be used to:

• improve understanding of the scale of the social and economic costs of fraud and cyber crime
• help identify best practice in response to victims across fraud and cyber crime in order to provide a consistent and high-quality response to victims
• help inform decisions about any potential rollout of NECVCU to other police force areas

1.3 Background to Action Fraud and NECVCU

Action Fraud is the national reporting centre for fraud and cyber crime and is run by the City of London Police (CoLP). Victims can report fraud or cyber crime online via the Action Fraud website, or over the phone.

The core part of the reporting process involves reports received by Action Fraud being analysed by the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) to identify information that could assist investigation and identify links between incidents. Where there is sufficient evidence and a viable lead, the NFIB creates intelligence packages and sends (‘disseminates’) them to an appropriate local police force to investigate, with the force then responsible for investigating the case. Those reports that are deemed not viable for investigation are not closed but remain under constant consideration for links to newly reported crimes.

The outcome of disseminated cases relies on many factors. The decision whether to investigate the crime rests with the respective police force who consider available resources, the likely eventual outcome, and other criminal cases already under investigation. Therefore, a case which is disseminated may not be investigated or reach a positive judicial outcome.

Action Fraud may typically advise victims when reporting and as part of subsequent letters or communications, explaining how to mitigate the impacts of the crime or protect themselves from being revictimised. Additionally, victim lists are sent to local forces who may provide victim care where they deem appropriate; for example, if the victim is considered vulnerable and in need of further support. Victims may also potentially receive advice from the police if their case is disseminated. However, at the time of this research, the provision of advice on the whole for victims was minimal outside of the NECVCU pilot.

The NECVCU pilot was built on an early London-based trial (beginning in 2014) for vulnerable victims led by the Metropolitan Police Service and CoLP. In July 2017, the Home Office committed to funding an extension to this trial. This saw the model for vulnerable victims introduced to 2 police forces outside of London (West Midlands and Greater Manchester) to look at its applicability for wider rollout^{[footnote 1]}.

NECVCU intends to help fill a gap in service provision from the Victim’s Code of Practice (VCOP) and improve the ‘Prepare’ response to victims of fraud and cyber crime. The principles of the NECVCU model are to:

• make people feel safer
• enable them to cope and recover from fraud and cyber crime victimisation
• prevent them from becoming a repeat victim of fraud or cyber crime
• improve trust and confidence in Action Fraud / the police

The NECVCU model contacts individuals who report a fraud or cyber crime to Action Fraud but who might not receive any focused service or tailored support from services, including the police, because their cases are not disseminated to forces for further investigation. The model provides different levels of support to victims, depending on how vulnerable they are deemed to be. To note, this report refers to these different forms of support as ‘Tiers’, but since the research was undertaken they are more commonly called ‘Levels’. At the time of the research, a self-assessment questionnaire completed by the victim during the reporting phase determined whether a victim was initially categorised as ‘vulnerable’ or not, which was followed by a more in-depth manual review of the case. To provide a sense of scale, approximately 7,000 victims who reported a crime to Action Fraud between July 2017 and May 2018 were subsequently provided a service by NECVCU as part of the pilot.

Figure 1.1 summarises the reporting and subsequent NECVCU process as of autumn 2018, when the survey sample was drawn.

Figure 1.1: Summary of Action Fraud and NECVCU triage process

As outlined in figure 1.1, it is possible to be triaged through one route, but then be re-assessed to receive a greater or lesser level of service depending on need. The NECVCU Service Tiers are summarised below:

Tier 1 - is for victims who do not identify themselves as vulnerable at the reporting stage and whose cases have not been disseminated to the police for investigation. They receive a call from a victim contact advisor (VCA)^{[footnote 2]} at the Action Fraud call centre offering guidance and signposting.

Tier 2 - is the main element of NECVCU, set up within CoLP and staffed with victim care reviewers (VCR)^{[footnote 3]}. They provide enhanced support and guidance to vulnerable victims and make further assessments about their vulnerability to ensure they receive appropriate victim care.

Tier 3^{[footnote 4]} - at the time of research, this service was being piloted only within local police forces at West Midlands and Greater Manchester. The forces receive referrals from the Tier 1 and Tier 2 VCAs when they deem that face-to-face support is required to provide appropriate support to the victim. This may be an immediate call for service or a visit within a 48- or 72-hour period. The setup of this response and who delivers the support varies between forces; however, the response is based on the same principles and set out in a memorandum of understanding between CoLP and the police forces.

1.4 Changes to services since the survey

The Home Office has worked closely with CoLP, Action Fraud and NECVCU throughout the research process, providing interim findings for improvements to services.

Examples of changes to NECVCU services include:

• reducing the time between reporting and receiving victim support from NECVCU, meaning that victims speak to NECVCU staff within a few weeks of reporting to Action Fraud
• refining the approach to categorise victims as vulnerable or non-vulnerable to capture wider victim impacts
• reviewing and improving the triage process from what were largely manual to automated technological systems, increasing documentation around decision-making, streamlining processes across different levels of service, and developing clear guidance on Tier eligibility
• creating NECVCU-specific branding to distinguish services from Action Fraud
• improving consistency of messaging and communications (for example, through letters sent to victims)
• introducing training for call handlers to build rapport with victims

Since the time of the research, wider changes in terms of Action Fraud have also occurred. Action Fraud is being replaced with an improved national reporting service and work is underway with CoLP to carry out this transformation. The new service will use the latest technology to improve reporting tools and support services for victims, providing far greater intelligence to policing for investigations, and allowing for greater prevention and disruption at scale. Several improvements to the existing system have already been put in place to improve the victim reporting experience and the quality and timeliness with which cases are sent to police forces for action. The new service will have a phased launch in 2025.

2. Methods

This section summarises the methods used in this research. For more information on the methodology and the technological elements of this research, such as the sampling framework, response rates and data processing, please see the technical report.

2.1 Programme of research

The project comprised a quantitative and qualitative element. The quantitative element of the research involved 2 surveys with a combined sample of 2,450 victims, representative of victims who reported their crime to Action Fraud in England and Wales between July 2017 and May 2018^{[footnote 5]}. The surveys were completed via telephone interviews (computer assisted telephone interviewing or CATI); all victims surveyed were aged 18 and over, and the telephone interviews lasted an average of 27 minutes.

Survey 1 - NECVCU Victim Survey: 753 telephone interviews with victims of fraud and cyber crime in NECVCU pilot areas (70 cyber crime victims and 683 fraud victims).

Survey 2 - Action Fraud Victim Survey: 1,697 telephone interviews with victims of fraud and cyber crime who reported to Action Fraud but did not receive NECVCU support (595 cyber crime victims and 1,102 fraud victims).

The 2 survey samples profiles are as described in table 2.1.

Table 2.1: Survey sample profile (unweighted)

Sample breakdown		Survey 1 - NECVCU victim survey	Survey 2 - Action fraud victim survey
Age	18-24	5%	4%
	25-34	15%	9%
	35-44	13%	11%
	45-54	16%	17%
	55-64	19%	21%
	65+	32%	37%
	Refused	1%	1%
Ethnicity	White	67%	88%
	Ethnic minority	30%	11%
	Refused	3%	1%
Gender	Male	50%	52%
	Female	49%	48%
	In another way/ prefer not to say	1%	n/a (<1%)
Social grade	A, B	23%	22%
	C1/C2	43%	46%
	D, E	17%	19%
Disability	Yes	18%	18%
	No	77%	78%
	Refused	5%	4%
Crime type	Fraud	91%	65%
	Cyber crime	9%	35%
Total		31% (753)	69% (1,697)

For each dataset, data was weighted to the original corresponding sample profile (NECVCU victims and profile of victims who report to Action Fraud) by crime type (fraud/cyber), police force area and Tier (or equivalent^{[footnote 6]}) of support received. Checks were made, for example, on the demographics of victims and the level of impact experienced, to ensure that the final sample profile largely reflected those reporting to Action Fraud, including ensuring that victims had experienced a range of impact levels, as defined when they reported to Action Fraud. The 2 survey samples were combined for analysis on the harms and impacts of fraud and cyber crime (n=2,450). For the combined dataset, an additional weight was applied to factor for the NECVCU/Action Fraud victim splits.

Analysis of the survey results included statistical significance testing (at the 5% risk level) between victim groups derived from the survey and from the sample (for example, crime type, age). This allowed conclusions on the experiences of different victim groups to be drawn. This analysis has been used to compare between victim groups throughout the research, unless stated otherwise.

Table 2.2 below outlines how each of the NFIB codes for fraud offences has been grouped into categories for comparison throughout the report.

Table 2.2: Fraud category reference table

Fraud category	NFIB detail	NFIB code
Banking and credit industry fraud	Cheque, plastic card and online bank accounts (not Payment Service Providers (PSPs))	NFIB5A
	Application fraud (excluding mortgages)	NFIB5B
	Mandate fraud	NFIB5D
	Dishonestly retaining a wrongful credit	NFIB5E
Consumer and retail fraud	Online shopping and auctions	NFIB3A
	Consumer phone fraud	NFIB3B
	Door to door sales and bogus tradespeople	NFIB3C
	Other consumer and retail fraud	NFIB3D
	Computer software service fraud	NFIB3E
	Ticket fraud	NFIB3F
Advance fee payments	‘419’ Advance fee fraud	NFIB1A
	Lottery scams	NFIB1B
	Dating scams	NFIB1D
	Fraud recovery	NFIB1E
	Inheritance fraud	NFIB1F
	Rental fraud	NFIB1G
	Other advance fee frauds	NFIB1H
	Lender loan fraud	NFIB1J
Miscellaneous frauds	Business trading fraud	NFIB16C
	Insurance related fraud	NFIB18
	Telecom industry fraud (misuse of contracts)	NFIB19
	Charity fraud	NFIB2A
	Fraudulent applications for grants from charities or lottery fund organisations	NFIB2B
	Share/bond sales or boiler room fraud	NFIB2C
	Pyramid or Ponzi schemes	NFIB2D
	Prime bank guarantees	NFIB2E
	Time shares and holiday club fraud	NFIB4A
	Other financial investment	NFIB4B
	Pension liberation fraud	NFIB6A
	Fraud by failing to disclose information	NFIB7
	Fraud by abuse of position	NFIB9
Other fraud (NFIB90)	Other fraud (not covered elsewhere)	NFIB90

2.2 Interviews with NECVCU victims

The exploratory qualitative element of the research comprised 15 in-depth interviews^{[footnote 7]} with victims of fraud and one in-depth interview with a victim of cyber crime, all of whom received NECVCU support. There was a mix of age, gender, location and vulnerability (which was self-defined by the victim). The purposes of these interviews were to further explore themes in relation to the survey and add required understanding of the perceptions of NECVCU victims.

Table 2.3: Sample profile of interviewed victims

Type of crime	Vulnerability of victims	Location	Gender	Tiers
15 Fraud cases 1 Cyber case 1	8 Vulnerable 8 Non-vulnerable	11 London 3 Birmingham 2 Manchester	8 Female 8 Male	15 Tier 2 1 Tier 3
Total	16

Notes:

1. The number of available cyber crime victim cases was much lower than cases of fraud and subsequently cyber crime victims were much more difficult to reach.

All qualitative data was transcribed before being analysed using a thematic framework. This also included stimulus materials and data captured outside of the interview recordings (such as pictorial or diagrammatic representations of victims’ journeys). Verbatim quotes were added to the analysis framework to maintain reference to the raw interview data.

3. Findings

This section describes the key findings from the surveys and interviews with victims. Further details can be found in the accompanying tables. The findings are discussed in 3 sections:

1. Victim impacts.
2. Victim support needs.
3. Victim perceptions of NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police.

Note that where differences between groups are described in the text, these are statistically significant differences at a 95% confidence level, unless otherwise stated.

The majority of findings discussed result from the survey, unless explicitly stated that it is drawing upon the qualitative elements of the research. Quotes from victims who received NECVCU support are used throughout to help illustrate some of the harms and experiences linked to the crimes and support services victims received. Victims quoted are denoted as either ‘vulnerable’ or ‘non-vulnerable’ based on their own self-assessment as part of the research.

3.1 Victim impacts

The survey explored a range of impacts, going beyond financial losses to explore health and emotional impacts, and other ways the crime affected victims’ everyday life. The top 15 impacts experienced by victims are depicted in figure 3.1. Raising awareness of the full spectrum of harms can help direct the most appropriate response and resource to support victims.

Key findings

Emotional harms such as anger, stress and anxiety were the most common types of harms experienced by victims of fraud and cyber crime.

While rarer, some victims reported serious health harms, including suicidal thoughts and self-harm. For some victims, harms had a long-term impact.

Females and ethnic minority victims were significantly more likely to experience some types of emotional and health harms, compared with males and non-ethnic minorities, respectively.

Cyber crime victims were more likely to experience some emotional impacts compared with fraud victims.

Differences in the impacts seen between specific types of fraud or cyber crime are less clear. Victims of miscellaneous frauds (for example, investment, charity and pension fraud) appear more likely than victims of the other fraud types to experience health impacts, like depression, and higher average financial losses.

Victims experienced a range of wider day-to-day impacts on both their online and offline activities. Cyber crime victims were more likely to experience certain types of impacts relating to online safety and their willingness to use the internet compared to fraud victims. Fraud victims were also more likely to experience impacts on their trust in other people.

Victims reported financial losses ranging from £10 to £460,000. However, the impacts of loss varied by individual circumstances and did not necessarily correlate with the amount lost.

Figure 3.1: Proportion of respondents reporting negative impacts - top 15 impacts experienced

Bases: 2,450 fraud and cyber crime victims.

Notes:

1. The categories of harms involving trust/relationships and sense of safety are grouped responses of ‘a great deal / fair amount’ of impact.

3.1.1 Emotional harms

The most common types of harms experienced by victims (n=2,450) were emotional harms^{[footnote 8]}, as shown in figure 3.1, particularly anger (86%), stress (73%) and anxiety (63%). By comparison, 57% of victims reported a financial loss.

Findings from the qualitative interviews suggest victims found immediate reassurance after the crime important (see also section 3.3), which could link to the fact emotional harms are so commonly experienced.

“Affected me a lot psychologically - couldn’t sleep well… Felt heart sinking. It was hard earned money. I should have realised. Really fed up for a while. Quite angry. Anxious.”

Non-vulnerable fraud victim

Figure 3.2: Proportion of fraud and cyber crime victims reporting emotional impacts as a result of the crime

Bases: 1,785 fraud victims, 665 cyber victims.

Experience of emotional impacts varied by crime type, as seen in figure 3.2. Cyber crime victims were more likely to experience some emotional harms (stress, anxiety and fear), compared with fraud victims. For example, 47% of cyber crime victims reported experiencing fear, compared with 38% of fraud victims. Fraud victims on the other hand, were more likely to experience embarrassment, shame or self-blame (56%) compared with cyber crime victims (45%).

Experiences of emotional harms also varied by victim characteristics, most notably for ethnic minority victims and females. For example, 61% of ethnic minority victims experienced fear, compared with 35% of white victims, and 53% of females experienced fear, compared with 25% of males.

Computer virus victims were typically less likely to report some emotional harms (such as stress), compared to other cyber crime types^{[footnote 9]}. For example, 87% of hacking and social media victims reported feeling stress, compared with 67% of computer virus victims.

“There’s a lot of anger after the crime… I must admit - if I could have got hold of [the perpetrators] or had some retribution I would have done that willingly.”

Non-vulnerable cyber victim

Victims of miscellaneous frauds (which included a range of fraud types such as investment, charity, pension, telecom and insurance fraud) were the fraud group most likely to experience emotional harms such as anger and anxiety (see table 2.2 for the fraud group/category reference table). This was typically followed by banking and credit industry fraud victims or consumer and retail fraud victims. For example:

• 98% of miscellaneous fraud victims experienced anger, compared with 81% of advance fee payment victims.
• 77% of miscellaneous fraud victims experienced embarrassment/ashamed/self-blame or similar, compared with 46% of advance fee payment fraud victims.

“Feel so low. Feel like such a fool. Such a silly fool. I didn’t want to get out of bed, didn’t want to see anyone.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

Advance fee payment fraud victims were often the fraud group with the lowest proportion of victims experiencing emotional harms (for example, 67% of advanced fee payment fraud victims experienced stress, compared with 73% of all victims). However, given the relatively high proportions of advance fee payment fraud victims still experiencing emotional harms, it suggests these are hardly regarded as trivial incidents.

“I actually fell for it, I can’t believe I did because I am not a stupid person and if I can fall for it… there must be lots of people.”

Non-vulnerable fraud victim

3.1.2 Health harms

Figure 3.3 shows the health harms experienced by all victims, with difficulty sleeping/fatigue being the most cited health impact^{[footnote 10]}, experienced by 2 in 5 (37%) victims. Panic and/or anxiety (20%), stress (19%) and depression-related illnesses (18%) were experienced by around 1 in 5 victims. While rarer, some victims reported experiencing significant health impacts including suicidal thoughts (3%) and self-harm (1%).

Figure 3.3: Proportion of all victims reporting health impacts as a result of the crime

Bases: 2,450 fraud and cyber crime victims.

Similarly to emotional impacts, females were more likely to experience a range of health harms, as were less affluent and ethnic minority groups. For example, 29% of ethnic minority victims experienced change in appetite or weight gain/loss, compared with 14% of white victims, and 42% of female victims had difficulty sleeping/fatigue compared with 31% of male victims.

There were no significant differences in reported health impacts seen between fraud and cyber crime victims overall. However, as seen in figure 3.4, when comparing the different fraud categories, victims of miscellaneous frauds were consistently more likely to report nearly all health impacts, except for panic or anxiety-related impacts, where banking and credit industry fraud victims were most likely to report these. For example, 58% of miscellaneous fraud victims reported difficulty sleeping/fatigue, compared with 32% of ‘advance fee payment’ victims.

Figure 3.4: Proportion of victims reporting health impacts by fraud type

Bases: 84 miscellaneous fraud victims; 371 other fraud (NFIB 90) fraud victims; 624 consumer and retail fraud victims; 550 advance fee payments fraud victims; 157 banking and credit industry fraud victims.

“I now suffer from depression, I’m so stressed that I had a heart attack last year… I am on stacks of medication - the doctors have recently given me more.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

Banking and credit industry fraud was the fraud group which typically followed miscellaneous frauds in terms of the proportion of victims reporting impacts. As with emotional harms, computer virus victims appear less likely to suffer health impacts compared with other cyber crime types. There were very few significant differences in terms of health harms experienced by the other different crime types.

The miscellaneous fraud (for example, investment, charity and pension fraud) victim category was the group most likely to suffer more severe harms (self-harm and suicidal thoughts):

• for self-harm, 7% of miscellaneous fraud victims, compared with 1% of all victims
• for suicidal thoughts, 14% of miscellaneous fraud victims, compared with 3% of all victims

The high impacts suffered by these groups are potentially linked to the higher amount of losses experienced. For example, the mean loss was £45,599 for miscellaneous frauds compared with the next highest mean losses for other fraud (NFIB90), which was £7,072 and banking and credit industry fraud with £6,791. Across all fraud types, some victims will have subsequently received some level of reimbursement. Miscellaneous frauds had the highest proportion receiving no reimbursement (81%). It is important to note that the frauds within the miscellaneous category represent a wide range of fraud types, necessarily grouped together for analysis purposes. Future research could look to further examine the specific types of fraud in this category at a more granular level to better understand whether there are any other features, or particular fraud types, that may be contributing to the increased reporting of harms amongst these victims.

“Everything was gone [from the savings account]. All we worked for, my money, [daughter’s] money, [husband’s] money] - gone I was very emotional. I was suicidal - my husband wouldn’t leave me on my own.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

3.1.3 Length of impact

The impacts were particularly long-lasting for some victims. One in 5 who experienced fear (22%) and anxiety (18%) still felt the effects at the time of the survey, and 4 in 10 (39%) still experienced depression, the second most long-lasting impact, after self-harm (41%). Since victims were surveyed anytime from 9 to 22 months after the crime was reported, this indicates just how impactful these crimes can be and support provided in response may therefore need to be more than just a one-off.

“It’s taken a year to feel a bit more normal - I just didn’t want to be around anymore. Everything frightened me.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

3.1.4 Day-to-day impacts

Almost half of all victims (n=2,450) reported impacts on their trust in other people a great deal or a fair amount (48%), along with their willingness to use the internet (29%), their sense of safety online (44%) and offline (23%). Negative impacts were further experienced regarding relationships with family or friends (11%).

As shown in figure 3.5, there were differences in day-to-day impacts experienced by cyber crime compared to fraud victims. Cyber crime victims were more likely to say:

• the crime affected their sense of safety online a great deal or a fair amount (cyber crime, 63%; fraud, 43%)
• the crime affected their willingness to perform tasks online a great deal or a fair amount (cyber crime, 39%; fraud, 28%)

Whereas fraud victims were more likely to:

• experience a great deal or a fair amount of impact in terms of trust in other people (fraud, 49%; cyber crime, 37%)

Figure 3.5: Proportion of victims saying ‘a great deal/fair amount’ of impact as a result of the crime by category

Bases: 1,785 fraud victims, 665 cyber victims.

Fraud victims were also more likely than cyber crime victims to experience a range of other practical implications, such as:

• have their retirement or pension plans impacted (fraud, 8%; cyber crime, 1%)
• need to borrow money from family or friends (fraud, 12%; cyber crime, 5%)
• incur bank charges or overdraft charges (fraud, 8%; cyber crime, 4%)
• take out a loan from a bank (fraud, 5%; cyber crime, 1%)

3.1.5 Financial impacts

The mean amount stolen across all victims was £5,517, but the median loss of £100 reflects the greater volume of smaller losses. As shown in figure 3.6, the average net amount lost, considering that some victims were subsequently reimbursed money, was £4,600. Financial losses varied by individual circumstances - victims in higher social grades tended to lose more initially (£8,527) from the crime, but on average they were reimbursed more as a proportion of their initial loss (£2,159; 25% of initial loss). This suggests lower social grades may not be as well equipped to seek reimbursement so may need more support in this respect (loss £4,161; reimbursed £365; 9% of initial loss).

Figure 3.6: Mean amount stolen and reimbursed by crime type

Base for amount taken: 1,785 fraud victims; 665 cyber victims; 2,450 fraud or cyber crime victims (all victims)
Base for amount reimbursed: 1,061 fraud victims, 260 cyber crime victims and 1,321 fraud or cyber crime victims who lost money as a result of the crime

Qualitative findings suggested large losses are not always perceived as life-changing, whereas smaller losses can have significant impacts for those on lower incomes. This suggests that directing victim response or support simply according to the amount lost may not always be appropriate.

“I had to borrow money for the week to survive and put some food in the fridge.”

Non-vulnerable fraud victim (lost £75)

“I could afford it. Basically, it didn’t leave me in poverty or anything like that… not really a big financial loss. I still have savings… the money hasn’t affected me in the long term.”

Vulnerable fraud victim (lost £40,000)

3.2 Victim support needs

When providing victim support, it is important to consider what victims feel they need most. The research explored the types of support victims received across services, whether these were useful to them and what other types of support they needed. Together with the findings on victim harms, the research also considered options for tailoring of victim care.

Key findings

The majority of victims found all types of NECVCU support useful; however, the timing of support provision appears to impact strongly on how useful victims viewed the support.

Victims did not always receive the types of support they deemed most useful - immediate support (for example, where to go and who to talk to during, or immediately after, the crime occurred to stop the crime and prevent further loss or damage) and crime prevention advice (for example, specific guidance to help individuals avoid being a victim of fraud or cyber crime). This suggests a slight mismatch between needs and provision.

There is a need for a service that can appropriately target vulnerable victims. The definitions adopted for vulnerability are key to further developing the triage system for targeting appropriate support.

Findings indicate that tailored support could be suitable for some victim groups, and victim needs may differ depending on the impacts experienced as a result of the crime.

The nature of support provided by services could ensure that victims more likely to experience harms are identified, and support is appropriately tailored.

Some types of bespoke support could be important in reducing longer-term impacts, such as rebuilding trust, relationships and reducing emotional harms.

3.2.1 What support do victims need?

Support provided by NECVCU

NECVCU offered various types of support including crime prevention advice, emotional and practical support and advocacy. As shown in figure 3.7, crime prevention advice was the most frequently cited type of support provided by NECVCU to victims (62% of all victims). Referrals to, or information about, other support services and provision of immediate support (for example, where to go and who to talk to during, or immediately after the crime) were the second (39%) and third (34%) most likely to be cited, respectively.

Around 8 in 10 victims regarded almost every form of advice as helpful; however, as shown in figure 3.7, it was immediate support (45%) and crime prevention advice (42%) that were most needed at the time of the crime^{[footnote 11]}. However, NECVCU recipients regarded referrals to or information about other support services as one of the least required forms of support (24%), yet victims were more likely to receive referrals (39%) than immediate support (34%), which suggests a slight mismatch between the types of support needed and provided.

“The best part of it was knowing that I’m not alone… not alone being a victim of that kind of crime… there are lots of things out there that you can or could do.”

Non-vulnerable cyber victim

Figure 3.7: Proportion of victims reporting different types of support received and different types of support they needed when the crime happened

Base: 719 NECVCU victims.

Despite almost half (45%) of those in receipt of NECVCU stating they required immediate support at the time of the crime, 24% said they did not need any help. This figure was higher amongst males (29%), those aged 75 and over (33%), and those who reported no health impacts (33%).

As shown in figure 3.8, Tier 2 victims were more likely than Tier 1 to receive all types of support or advice captured in the survey. For example, 59% of Tier 1 victims received crime prevention advice, compared to 78% of Tier 2 victims; and 33% of Tier 1 victims received immediate support, compared to 42% of Tier 2 victims. This is probably due to Tier 2 victims being more likely to be vulnerable. Although the aims for Tier 1 support are slightly different to Tier 2, NECVCU could still provide all forms of support for both Tiers. A review of differences in these services in practice could inform any required changes.

Figure 3.8: Proportion of Tier 1 and Tier 2 victims reporting different types of help received from NECVCU

Bases: 540 Tier 1 victims; 178 Tier 2 victims.

Qualitative interviews with victims in receipt of NECVCU explored further why victims found some types of information more useful than others. The findings indicate that when advice was not acted upon, this was often because it was too late to be helpful or other steps had already been taken. This emphasises the importance of providing support early in the process, a theme further addressed later in this report.

“I’d accepted what had happened, I couldn’t change what had happened. [The advice] just felt like shutting the door after the horse had bolted in some ways.”

Non-vulnerable cyber victim

“I didn’t contact [the organisations signposted by NECVCU - Age UK and CAB] because I felt I had all the support within the family - my 3 children - my brother just lives round the corner.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

Additional support

A third of victims (33%) from the Action Fraud victim sample (n=1,697) sought support or information later from other services outside of Action Fraud or the police. This was more common for victims who:

• self-identified as vulnerable (40%)
• were in more affluent groups (AB group^{[footnote 12]}, 40%)
• experienced health impacts (39%)
• were working (37%)
• experienced a cyber crime (36%)
• were dissatisfied with Action Fraud overall (41% compared to 26% of those satisfied)

This suggests there is scope to provide further support from Action Fraud to those who may be harder to reach or have particular needs (even if they are not triaged in to NECVCU as ‘vulnerable’ victims) which would otherwise result in them seeking support elsewhere.

Within the Action Fraud sample (n=1,697), it was noted some victims (20%) with non-disseminated cases (that is, their crime was not forwarded to police forces for investigation) still reported receiving police contact. This is potentially reflecting other victim care initiatives by local forces. This group of victims was more likely to:

• be satisfied with speed of response (74% satisfied in non-disseminated cases versus 58% satisfied in disseminated cases)
• be more likely to be ‘very satisfied’ with advice received (39% in non-disseminated cases versus 28% in disseminated cases)
• strongly agree they feel safer as a result of advice, information or support received from the police (33% in non-disseminated cases versus 22% in disseminated cases), compared to the disseminated group who were contacted by the police

Some of the positive results observed in relation to this non-disseminated group suggests there may be possible benefits from local force initiatives that may be worth exploring and testing further^{[footnote 13]}.

Action Fraud classification of vulnerability

Understanding vulnerability is important for providing victim care. At the time of the research, an initial self-assessment of vulnerability by victims when they report to Action Fraud indicates the type of care that victims might receive^{[footnote 14]}. Findings suggest that the Action Fraud assessment of vulnerability did not always match with the victim’s self-identification with feeling vulnerable, and victims might not have initially received the service they needed. For example, half of those who did not meet Action Fraud’s vulnerability criteria (46%) said in the survey they were vulnerable immediately following the crime. This indicates that some victims would have perhaps required more support than received from the Tier 1 service they would have been provided (Tier 1 victims can be referred for Tier 2, if this is deemed appropriate). Vulnerability definitions may be worth further consideration to support future expansion of NECVCU.

3.2.2 How could support be tailored for different victim groups?

Exploring the harms experienced by all victims (n=2,450) has highlighted differences in the harms experienced by different victim groups. For example, compared with fraud victims, cyber crime victims were more likely to say:

• they felt vulnerable immediately following the time of the crime (cyber crime, 65%; fraud, 55%)
• they felt vulnerable at the time of the survey (cyber crime, 31%; fraud, 24%)

As outlined in section 3.1, cyber crime victims were also more likely to experience particular emotional harms, compared to fraud victims (stress, anxiety, fear); while fraud victims were more likely to experience feelings of embarrassment, shame or self-blame. Section 3.1 also outlined differences between cyber crime and fraud victims in their experiences of a range of day-to-day impacts, such as in relation to their sense of safety online, willingness to perform tasks online and a range of practical impacts regarding retirement or pension plans, having to take out loans or borrow money from others.

This suggests not only that victim support may need to be tailored to address these different types of impacts, but also that cyber crime and fraud victims may have differing levels and types of support needs.

“It’s had a large impact - I don’t trust anyone, if anyone phones I don’t answer… 10 months off work in total - my job involves answering phones and talking to people all the time… I couldn’t face it.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

Other findings further suggest support may need tailoring for different types of victim. As outlined in section 3.1, victims of miscellaneous frauds and banking and credit industry fraud were the groups most likely to experience health impacts, suggesting that specific support may benefit this particular group of victims. Additionally, females, ethnic minority groups and those in less affluent groups were also more likely to experience particular health and emotional impacts.

It is challenging to interpret from the survey findings why some victim groups experience harms differently. For specific crime types, such as miscellaneous frauds, there is some indication of what may be driving harms as these fraud victims were more likely to experience higher losses than for other types of fraud. However, further research needs to be completed to more fully understand why certain crimes impact on people differently.

Rebuilding trust, relationships and tackling emotional harms to reduce longer-term harms and vulnerability

Key driver analysis - conducted on the 2 variables of ‘Still feeling affected by the crime’ and ‘Still feeling vulnerable’ - explored which factors contributed to victims experiencing longer-term impacts from the crime. Analysis found that the biggest predictors were if the victim’s trust in others was impacted, relationships with friends and family were damaged and they had reported difficulty sleeping^{[footnote 15]}. Rebuilding trust and relationships may therefore be useful areas for NECVCU and other victim support services to emphasise and tailor victim support towards. The more vulnerable Tier 2 NECVCU victim group were more likely than the Tier 1 group to report negative impacts on relationships and trust in other people, indicating this could be a particularly valuable form of support for the Tier 2 group.

A second key driver analysis explored what contributed to long-term vulnerability in victims, finding that experiencing fear and victim’s sense of safety offline were the 2 biggest predictors. Support tailored to deal with emotional harms and sense of safety may further lessen feelings of vulnerability, but at the same time there should be a focus on what measures can be taken to prevent revictimisation.

Table 3.1 summarises some of the potential support needs for different victim groups, bringing together findings from the survey as a whole, as well as the key driver analysis. Key areas of potential support likely to be important for all victims include re-building trust in others, re-building relationships and social networks; as well as addressing emotional harms, notably feelings of fear and safety.

Further research in this area could help to test and refine these suggestions for victim support, as well as identify additional avenues for tailoring support needs to different types of victims.

Further details on the key driver analysis can be found in the technical report.

Table 3.1: Summary of harms experienced and potential support needs for different victim groups

Victim group	Examples of the types of harms experienced	Examples of potential support needs
Cyber crime victims	Feeling vulnerable at the time of the crime; emotional harms (for example, stress, anxiety, fear): day-to-day impacts (for example, sense of safety online), financial impacts (for example, changing bank accounts, paying to clean-up computer/tablet/smartphone)	Support addressing emotional harms, notably feelings of fear, stress, anxiety, and sense of safety online
Less affluent groups	Emotional impacts (for example, fear); health (for example, panic or anxiety related illness; stress-related illness, depression, including severe harms) feeling vulnerable immediately following the crime	Immediate support focussing on emotional harms and specific health harms related to stress and anxiety
Female victims	Health impacts (for example, difficulty sleeping, panic or anxiety-related illness); emotional impacts (for example, stress, fear, feeling alone); felt immediately vulnerable following the crime	Specific advice related to emotional support, including feelings of fear and specific health harms.
Ethnic minority victims	Emotional impacts (for example, anger, stress, fear, shame); health impacts (for example, difficulty sleeping, panic or anxiety related illness;); felt immediately vulnerable following the crime; financial impacts (for example, borrow money, credit rating impacted) and less likely to be reimbursed following financial loss	Practical financial support and advice for reimbursement as well as specific support for emotional and health impacts
Banking and credit industry fraud victims	Day-to-day impacts (for example, changing bank accounts, taking time off work), health impacts (for example, difficulty sleeping/fatigue, panic or anxiety-related illness, stress-related illness)	Providing practical support and advice for health impacts
Miscellaneous fraud for example, investment and charity fraud victims	Multiple emotional and health impacts (including severe harms), impacts on relationships and trust in other people, higher financial losses and associated financial impacts (for example, borrowing money, credit rating impacted, taking out loans) and less likely to be reimbursed; and feeling affected/vulnerable long term	Range of support to address long-term effects of the crime and relationships with friends and family, and to address financial impacts

Notes:

1. Table 3.1 is not an exhaustive list of all significant differences in experienced impacts and types of support needed among these victim groups. Further significant differences in relation to harms experienced by different groups can be found in the accompanying data tables.

3.3 Victim perceptions and experiences of NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police

This section addresses how victims felt about overall satisfaction with the information, support and advice from the service that they received. Victims were asked questions around satisfaction with the services they received, whether this was just from Action Fraud, the police or NECVCU. The survey also explored whether the services met specific outcomes, such as victims being satisfied with the timeliness of contact by Action Fraud or NECVCU, whether they felt more aware of fraud and cyber crime, and whether their contact with services had resulted in changes in behaviour.

Key findings

Overall, services from NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police were viewed favourably, with around 3 in 5 satisfied with the information, advice and support received.

However, there is scope for improvement, as some victim groups (often affluent, working, some younger age groups) more typically reported dissatisfaction more often than their counterparts.

The method used to first report to Action Fraud was a consistent driver for satisfaction across all 3 services, with those reporting over the phone having higher levels of satisfaction than those reporting online.

Other important drivers included satisfaction with timeliness of support (time it took for the service to make first contact), clarity over whether their case was being investigated and the outcome of their case.

Services had strikingly similar responses across a range of outcome measures, such as victims reporting feeling safer, being more aware of fraud and cyber crime, and increased confidence in the police’s ability to respond to fraud and cyber crime.

There is some limited self-report evidence that victims may change behaviour because of NECVCU services received.

A small minority across all services were revictimised, suggesting the cycle of revictimisation is hard to break for some.

3.3.1 How satisfied are victims with the services they received?

As figure 3.9 shows, the proportion of victims who reported being satisfied was broadly the same across all 3 services (Action Fraud, 61%; NECVCU, 61%; police, 61%)^{[footnote 16]}. However, satisfaction is not the same across different victim groups. Across these services, older victims (those aged 65 to 74 years, and 75 plus), less affluent^{[footnote 17]} and those not in work were more likely to be satisfied with the services received than younger and more affluent, working groups. There were further differences in satisfaction for other victim groups in relation to some of the specific services received:

• for the Action Fraud and NECVCU services specifically, victims who were white and those with lower educational attainment were more likely to be satisfied with these services than ethnic minority groups and those with higher educational attainment
• for the Action Fraud and police services, female victims were more likely to be satisfied with these services than male victims

There were no significant differences in satisfaction between fraud and cyber crime victims for any service.

Figure 3.9: Proportion of victims satisfied with the information, advice and support provided by the NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police

Bases: 387 who received police contact; 712 who received Action Fraud (and no police contact) support; 719 who received NECVCU support.

Possible explanations for dissatisfaction (occurring for 25% of the Action Fraud sample; police, 25%; NECVCU, 24%) include the higher financial losses suffered by some groups, as well as potentially being harder to reach for support services (for example, being less available for contact than other victim types). However, more research is needed to fully explore these hypotheses.

3.3.2 What are the drivers of satisfaction with services?

Across all 3 services, those reporting over the phone (Action Fraud, 74%; police, 68%; NECVCU, 69%) had higher levels of satisfaction than those reporting online (Action Fraud, 47%; police, 47%; NECVCU, 49%). Qualitative findings (NECVCU only), as exemplified by the victim quotes, suggest the initial reassurance provided by speaking to someone directly may have a significant impact on victims and so may also reflect in their perception of services. Further consideration regarding how appropriate it is to encourage online reporting for these crime types could be required, as the initial reassurance provided by someone over the phone is important and also may impact on victim satisfaction. Service-specific drivers are outlined below.

“She was so patient with me on the phone. It couldn’t have been easy for her because I kept getting upset, but she was as patient as anything. She said don’t worry - what’s happened is very distressing.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

“Tremendously helpful. They listen to you, they advise you. They ask not just about the scam, but also about how you’re feeling in yourself - about my health.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

NECVCU

Additional drivers behind satisfaction with NECVCU appeared to be satisfaction with the timeliness of contact by NECVCU (80% of those who were satisfied with the time it took NECVCU to first contact them were satisfied overall) and the amount of contact (80% of those who said they had the right amount of contact were satisfied overall).

“I think they’ve been superb really. They’ve kept me in the loop and asked how I am and whether I’ve heard anything and whether I’ve had any more phone calls.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

The qualitative work further suggested that whether victims understood why their case was not being investigated was also likely to be a driver in terms of satisfaction. Some victims interviewed mentioned they expected their case to be investigated as the Action Fraud letter mentioned the possibility of this - so this could also have been a source of disappointment or anger if this did not appear to happen. These appear to be key areas for improving satisfaction for NECVCU service in the future^{[footnote 18]}.

“They haven’t even said sorry there’s nothing we can do about this. I would have liked a bit more input about this, what they are doing… From my own point of view there was no point in calling them.”

Non-vulnerable fraud victim

Action Fraud

Similarly, satisfaction with Action Fraud also appeared to be driven by expectations around whether their case was being investigated. Those dissatisfied with Action Fraud were also dissatisfied across other areas of service such as police response and case outcome. For example, those dissatisfied with Action Fraud were also more likely to be dissatisfied with the police (64%) than satisfied (7%), were more likely to have reported their case online (35%) than by phone (17%), and more likely to be dissatisfied with the outcome of their case (60%) than satisfied (2%). However, notably, victims whose cases were not disseminated to the police were actually more likely to be satisfied (65%) with Action Fraud than those with a disseminated case (57%). A possible explanation for this is that raised expectations associated with a disseminated case, which has the potential for investigation and a judicial outcome, can negatively impact opinions of support services if cases are not solved or investigated. Further efforts to manage victim expectations may therefore help to improve satisfaction.

“Received letter. Easy to understand but mostly just said sorry for what happened and thanks for contacting us. I felt angry it wasn’t going to be investigated.”

Non-vulnerable fraud victim

“I would want them to tell me whether or not they have any intention of looking into what I told them, I wouldn’t blame them for saying they have other priorities which are more important.”

Non-vulnerable fraud victim

Police contact

Around a quarter of victims (24%) who reported to Action Fraud were contacted by the police at some point, with fraud cases (as opposed to cyber crime cases), older victims (aged 75 plus) and unemployed victims, rather than employed, being more likely to be contacted. However, dissemination itself did not appear to guarantee police contact, with just a third of victims (34%) with disseminated cases saying they were contacted by the police. When victims were contacted, it appears there was a lack of consistency in terms of what types of information victims were receiving from police, for example, 4 in 10 received updates (39%), but a quarter (25%) said they were not given further information about their case after the initial Action Fraud letter.

Similarities between services

However, overall levels of satisfaction were the same regardless of who the victim had contact with (Action Fraud, 61%; police, 61%; NECVCU, 61%). While it is difficult to know how much of an impact victim recall - and their ability to distinguish between services - had on this finding, it still indicates that support received overall was perceived positively. It also suggests further consideration could be given regarding where in the reporting and response system it is best to deliver support and what other models are available, taking into consideration resource implications and practicalities for each service.

3.3.3 How do services impact on victims’ attitudes and behaviours?

Figure 3.10 shows the majority of victims reported feeling more aware of potential fraud and cyber crime as a result of the advice, information or support received across all services (Action Fraud, 65%; police, 65%; NECVCU, 62%).

Figure 3.10: Proportion of victims from each sample who agree, or disagree that support received positively impacted the following

Bases: 712 receiving Action Fraud (no police contact) support; 387 receiving police contact; 719 receiving NECVCU support.

Around half of victims say they feel safer because of the advice, information or support received (Action Fraud, 49%; police, 50%; NECVCU, 49%), and, as shown in figure 3.10, have more confidence in the police to respond to fraud and cyber crime (police, 52%; Action Fraud, 48%; NECVCU, 51%).

However, we also know from the qualitative interviews that victims could struggle to distinguish between NECVCU, Action Fraud and police support. For those in receipt of NECVCU support, recall of the service was challenging; there was often confusion around what support, if any, was being provided and by who. Regarding the range of contact they received, one victim stated, “in my head it’s all Action Fraud”. This may relate to clarity of branding of the NECVCU service on letters, or other contact received, and suggests further consideration may be needed around branding and messaging in relation to different services, so that it is clear to victims what support and services they can expect to receive.

Behaviour change

There were indications some NECVCU advice was acted upon - two-thirds (64%) said they acted on crime prevention advice received, and more than half (55%) stated they acted on practical advice.

Around 3 in 10 who received NECVCU support said they started performing secure behaviours as a direct result of NECVCU advice, including checking the legitimacy of websites (33%), turning on 2-factor authentication (30%) and using strong passwords for email (29%).

While these are self-reported behaviours, it suggests some victims are following some direct practical advice, so NECVCU support could focus on supporting key behaviours for specific audiences where possible.

Around 6 in 10 who received NECVCU support (62%) said they had talked to friends or family about the risks of fraud and cyber crime and how to protect themselves. This outcome was fairly consistent across services (Action Fraud, 67%; police, 64%).

For those who did not receive NECVCU support, there appeared to be a more limited impact on behaviour change as a result of other support received after the crime. Amongst those in the Action Fraud sample, most victims claimed they had been engaging in cyber-secure behaviours before the crime (for example, 89% said they were already shredding documents containing personal information). Only a small minority said that they adopted specific cyber security behaviours as a result of advice, information or support received after the crime, for example:

• 4% of victims said they now turn on or use 2-factor authentication for their main email account following advice received after the crime
• 6% said that they now check the legitimacy of websites before using them

Comparatively, it was more common for behaviours in the Action Fraud victim sample to be triggered as a direct result of the crime, for example:

• 20% of victims said that they began checking the legitimacy of websites as a direct result of the crime
• 14% said that they turn on or use 2-factor authentication for their main email account as a direct result of the crime

This suggests that for some victims at least, the crime itself may be a more prominent driver of behaviour change.

“The whole episode has alerted me. I think the experience itself was the most informative, the most impactful.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

Action Fraud contact

There were positive findings regarding the Action Fraud service itself. Four in 5 victims (80%) stated they would report again to Action Fraud if something similar happened. As shown in figure 3.11, reasons for not wanting to re-contact the police or Action Fraud were mainly rooted in previous bad experiences (25%) or feeling as though Action Fraud would not be interested (19%) or able to help (16%).

Figure 3.11: Top 10 reasons why victims stated they would not recontact Action Fraud if something similar happened

Bases: 130 victims in receipt of Action Fraud care who said they wouldn’t contact Action Fraud if something similar happened.

“All I wanted was a call in the first few days saying they were looking into it… I didn’t hear anything.”

Vulnerable fraud victim

Those who were dissatisfied with the outcome of their report to Action Fraud were less likely to say they would contact Action Fraud again (64% versus 85% satisfied with the outcome). Amongst those who received a letter from Action Fraud after their report (n=1,287), 87% felt the information provided in the Action Fraud letter was clear.

Revictimisation

Revictimisation rates for victims are consistent across the 3 services (NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police), reporting no statistically significant differences, as shown in figure 3.12.

Since their initial report to Action Fraud, those who received support from:

• NECVCU - 5% were a victim of another fraud and 3% a victim of another cyber crime
• Action Fraud - 7% were a victim of another fraud and 4% were a victim of another cyber crime
• the police - 6% were a victim of another fraud and 4% were a victim of another cyber crime.

Figure 3.12: Revictimisation rates for victims who received support from NECVCU, Action Fraud and the Police

Bases: 712 Action Fraud victims; 387 who were contacted by the police; 719 NECVCU victims.

Some victims were victims of cyber crime or fraud before being victimised in the crime that led to them being part of this sample; these victims are referred to as prior victims of cyber crime or fraud. Revictimisation was more common than average for prior victims of cyber crime or fraud:

• 12% of prior victims who received support from Action Fraud and 10% of prior victims who received support from NECVCU were revictimised by another type of fraud (7% average for Action Fraud sample; 5% for NECVCU sample)
• 8% of prior victims who received support from Action Fraud and 6% of prior victims who received support from NECVCU were revictimised by another type of cyber crime (4% average for Action Fraud sample; 3% for NECVCU)

Revictimisation was also more common than average for vulnerable victims:

• 10% of vulnerable victims who received support from Action Fraud and 8% of vulnerable victims who received support from NECVCU were revictimised by another type of fraud (7% average for Action Fraud sample; 5% for NECVCU sample)
• 7% of vulnerable victims who received support from Action Fraud and 5% of vulnerable victims who received support from NECVCU were revictimised by another type of cyber crime (4% average for Action Fraud sample; 3% for NECVCU sample)

This suggests the cycle of revictimisation may be hard to break for some.

4. Discussion

This research enhances our knowledge of victim experiences with support services from the point of reporting a crime to Action Fraud. It also adds to the limited evidence on impacts experienced by victims of fraud and cyber crime, outside of financial losses incurred. The findings of this research aimed to help inform development of the response to victims across fraud and cyber crime and the rollout of the NECVCU model to other local police forces. This report has summarised the key findings and specific points for discussion are reiterated below.

The research found that there were notable differences in the harms experienced by different victim groups, with cyber crime victims, females, ethnic minorities and less affluent victims experiencing more significant harm than other groups. This suggests that support should be tailored for specific groups. The findings also suggest that targeting support for activities aiming to rebuild trust and relationships, and to help victims deal with emotional harms could reduce the longer-term impacts of victimisation and address vulnerability.

Qualitative interviews suggested that where victims did not act on advice, this was often because it was too late to be helpful or other steps had already been taken. This emphasises the importance of timing and of reviewing how to provide support earlier in the process and as soon as possible after the crime.

Victims viewed favourably the information, advice and support provided by NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police, with overall satisfaction and a range of victim outcome measures strikingly similar across all 3 services. This indicates that further consideration could be given to determining the best place for support services and what other models for support are available, taking into consideration resource implications and practicalities for each service.

However, satisfaction across the services varied by victim group, with victims who were older, less affluent and not in work more likely to be satisfied with services than some younger groups, more affluent and working groups. There were further differences in satisfaction for other victim groups in relation to some of the specific services received. This suggests that it may be beneficial to consider how to improve satisfaction levels amongst those groups who are less likely to be satisfied.

Higher satisfaction levels with services appear to be linked to reporting via the phone, rather than online, across all 3 services. Findings from the qualitative interviews suggest speaking to someone directly provided reassurance in a way that is difficult to achieve by reporting online. Consideration regarding how appropriate it is to encourage online reporting for these crime types could therefore be required.

Clarity of branding and messaging, such as in relation to any letters or contact received from NECVCU, Action Fraud and the police, is likely to be important for improving victim experience. This includes clarity on who is providing the service, and for expectation management, in terms of whether a victim’s case is going to be investigated, which were both areas of confusion for victims.

While this research contributes to the limited existing knowledge around the experiences of victims of fraud and cyber crime, clear evidence gaps still remain. We hope this research helps inform further research in this area. Additional research could include:

• further exploration of why some victims experience greater or different harm compared to others
• improving understanding of how harm varies by particular types of fraud or cyber crime, for example, exploring further the fraud types captured under miscellaneous fraud
• how harms may change over time in response to new forms of technology
• what models of support are appropriate for different victims
• exploration of the most efficient delivery of victim support
• the impact of other victim support interventions to mitigate harms and prevent revictimisation

1. NECVCU has been rolled out gradually amongst forces since the time of this research. At the time of publishing this report, consistent support has been implemented across England and Wales following expansion of NECVCU. ↩

2. VCA staff are employed by an outsourced company. ↩

3. VCR staff are employed by CoLP as police employees. ↩

4. Note that following cognitive interviewing and one qualitative interview with a Tier 3 victim, it was decided not to continue to include Tier 3 victims in the main stage of the research due to concerns about the potential impact on the participant of discussing the crime they had experienced. ↩

5. This was the largest time frame of available data at the time of sampling. ↩

6. The ‘Tier equivalent’ for the Action Fraud only dataset was a flag added to the cleaned sample to help proxy the likely equivalent Tier (or vulnerability level) of the respondent to support the sampling phase, it was not used for analysis or reporting. Further details can be found in the technical report. ↩

7. One interview was conducted before it was decided that Tier 3 cases should not be included due to their high vulnerability. ↩

8. Victims were asked if they experienced anger, stress, anxiety, feeling embarrassed/ashamed/self-blame or similar, fear and feeling alone. ↩

9. For purposes of analysis, cyber crimes were categorised into 4 groups broadly reflecting categorisation in the NFIB / Home Office Counting Rule codes: ‘Computer viruses’, ‘Hacking - personal’, ‘Hacking - social media’ and ‘Other cyber’ (extortion, distributed denial-of-service (DdoS), hacking servers, hacking a Public Broadcasting Service (PBS)). ↩

10. Victims were asked if they experienced difficulty with sleeping/fatigue, panic or anxiety-related illness/condition, depression, change in appetite/weight loss/weight gain, suicidal thoughts and self-harm. ↩

11. This finding was also consistent for other victims who did not receive NECVCU support and had received support from Action Fraud or the police. ↩

12. Based on the socio-economic classification made by the ONS. AB group refers to those in higher and intermediate management, administrative and professional occupations. ↩

13. Analysis was conducted on a small group (n= 232) of fraud and cyber crime victims whose case had not been disseminated, but they had received police contact. It is possible this group could have received victim care / check-ins as part of local force initiatives, although this cannot be confirmed. The alternative hypothesis is that some, or all victims, were simply responding in relation to their initial report or contact via the police and did not receive local police victim care. ↩

14. Note that the process to classify victims as vulnerable and non-vulnerable has changed since the time of the survey. The previous system’s assessment of vulnerability was based on the victim’s own assessment at the time of reporting. The new vulnerability assessment is based on a 4-stage approach, considering a range of factors including the nature of the crime, existing vulnerabilities, financial losses and a range of impacts, such as whether the crime has impacted relationships with friends and family. If the victim is deemed subject to immediate risk of further harm, the victim can be referred for immediate local force support, or an emergency response. ↩

15. A type of ordinal logistic regression using Shapely Values was run to discover which harms experienced were most closely related to victims who still felt affected by the crime at the time of the survey, and those who still felt vulnerable. This method calculated the contribution of each explanatory variable in the model to the overall R-squared. ↩

16. Drawing exact comparisons between services is challenging as in some instances victims may have received more than one service and sometimes struggled to differentiate between services. Comparisons should therefore be viewed cautiously. Where possible, comparisons are made between 3 samples: (1) the 719 victims who recalled receiving NECVCU support; (2) the 712 victims who recalled receiving contact from Action Fraud whose cases were not disseminated, and they did not receive NECVCU or police support (labelled as AF (no police contact) in data tables); and (3) the 387 victims who recalled receiving contact from the police, including those whose cases were disseminated and non-disseminated. However, differences in results were still negligible even when using an AF comparator sample that included police contact. ↩

17. Based on socio-economic classifications produced by the Office for National Statistics (ONS). For this analysis, less affluent social grades (D, E) incorporate the category of semi-skilled and unskilled manual workers, unemployed and lowest grade occupations. ↩

18. Please note that changes in response to these survey findings are already being addressed by the Home Office and CoLP. ↩