Research and analysis

Electoral Integrity Programme evaluation: Year 2 - executive summary

Published 15 May 2025

Policy background

The Elections Act 2022 contained measures designed to strengthen the integrity of the electoral system and ensure that elections remain secure, fair, modern and transparent. These measures were delivered through the Electoral Integrity Programme (EIP) as part of the previous UK government’s electoral reform agenda. This evaluation assesses the implementation and impact of the following EIP measures at the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Election:

• Voter identification: the requirement to show an accepted form of photographic identification to vote in person at polling stations.

• Accessibility: broadening the requirement for Returning Officers to provide support for people with a wide range of disabilities to vote in the polling station and removing restrictions on who can act as a companion to assist disabled voters.

• Absent voting: changes relating to the duration of postal voting arrangements, the handling and secrecy of postal votes, identity checking processes and a new online service for absent vote applications.

• Overseas electors: changes to allow all British citizens living abroad who have been previously registered or resident in the UK the right to vote in UK Parliamentary Elections, and extending the registration period for British citizens living abroad.

• Digital imprints: a requirement for promoters of certain types of digital campaigning material in scope of the rules to explicitly state who they are, and on whose behalf, they are promoting the material.

Evaluation approach

The Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) commissioned IFF Research to evaluate both process and impact components of the EIP.

The evaluation adopted a theory-based approach using theory of change models to set out how measures might affect change in the short, medium and long term. IFF Research developed a series of contribution claims to articulate how each measure within the theory of change models could lead to change, while recognising the importance of other influencing factors. The extent to which claims had been met was then assessed through synthesis of evidence across a broad range of data sources. This included MHCLG’s implementation survey and monitoring data, Ipsos’ public opinion surveys (commissioned by MHCLG), the Electoral Commission’s Polling Staff Survey and qualitative research conducted by IFF Research. Each chapter in this report sets out the findings in relation to each of the five electoral measures, and the contribution claims for each.

The evaluation sought to provide timely evidence of the impacts of the measures and was therefore not able to gather some evidence that will take longer to emerge. As such, not all claims could be assessed conclusively in the evaluation timeframe, and the report highlights where further investigation would be needed in future to reach a more definitive view.

This report follows a year 1 evaluation report, which explored the implementation and impact of voter identification and accessibility measures for the May 2023 local elections in England.

Overall findings

Overall, the July 2024 General Election was well-run and the EIP measures were implemented effectively. Evidence showed that, across all measures evaluated, the responsible parties met the requirements of the law for this election. For voter identification, accessibility, absent voting and overseas elector measures, local authorities and polling station staff were well trained and prepared for polling day, and electoral administrators were confident that their delivery met the requirements. For digital imprints, evidence suggested that the police and the Electoral Commission fulfilled their responsibilities as enforcing bodies.

Electors’ awareness varied across measures. Although there were high levels of awareness amongst most electors of the need to present photographic identification on polling day, awareness of the other EIP measures was relatively poor. This was also the case among elector groups for whom the measures were most relevant. For example, there was low awareness of Voter Authority Certificates (VACs) among electors without accepted photographic identification, low awareness of the new accessibility measures among disabled electors, and low awareness of changes to absent voting among postal and proxy voters (although the high proportion of electors applying for their absent votes online may indicate electors were simply unaware of the change, rather than unaware of the service itself).

Electoral services teams identified several areas where administrative processes could be made more efficient. Usually, these related to the challenges they had faced with applications for VACs, for absent voting and from overseas electors. Challenges largely related to errors and/or misunderstandings among electors when applying, which required time-consuming communications and liaison from staff to rectify. Sometimes this was compounded by limitations of the Electoral Registration Officer Portal (ERO Portal)’s functionality.

The nature of the changes and evidence available meant it was not possible to reach conclusive verdicts on whether some of the intended impacts had been (fully) achieved. In some instances, this was because of the low incidence of electors who were directly affected by the measures – this made it difficult to capture their views adequately (for example, disabled electors who voted in person, electors who wanted to have their identification document checked in private, and proxy voters).

Additionally, for evidence relating to campaigners (awareness of changes to postal vote handling limits and the new requirement for digital imprints on campaign materials), evidence was weak, as campaigner perspectives were not captured within this evaluation.

It was also difficult to draw confident conclusions on the extent to which the new measures impacted the security and integrity of, and trust in, voting processes. This was partly due to the limited evidence available. It was also the case that participants’ views in relation to ‘security, integrity and trust’ varied.

Some electors, polling station staff and electoral administrators questioned the extent of the problems the new voter identification measures sought to address. This was particularly for personation; someone pretending to be someone else so they can use that person’s vote. Here, some participants perceived that the scale of the issue did not warrant the introduction of new measures.

More broadly, electors felt the new measures (across all policy areas) would neither positively nor negatively affect the integrity and security of elections, but did feel that these measures would increase their trust.

Overarching recommendations

Overall, the July 2024 General Election was well-run and, crucially, responsible parties met their requirements of the law across the measures evaluated. Despite increased workloads being an expected outcome of the new requirements, as reflected by the allocation of New Burdens funding, workloads were a recurrent theme raised by electoral services teams. As such, the evaluation has produced recommendations for future delivery aimed at improving workload pressures and efficiency for electoral services teams and polling station staff. This includes exploring the feasibility of improving interaction between the various Electoral Management Systems and the ERO Portal, along with improved functionality within the ERO Portal. Some such changes have already been implemented since the July 2024 UK Parliamentary General Elections.

Another recommendation to help with future delivery is for the Electoral Commission to continue to collect and share examples of good practice across the implementation of all measures, reflecting on learnings. This would add to sources of support and guidance for electoral services teams and polling station staff.

To address gaps in elector awareness, future communications could better highlight accepted identification documents, emphasise options for those without valid photographic identification, promote VACs distinctly, engage more with individuals who are likely to need a VAC, and highlight provisions for private identification checks. National communications could be used to raise awareness of accessibility measures, and local authorities could further work with disability-related community groups to raise this awareness too. For postal voting, clear communication around the time electors can expect to wait before receiving their postal vote could be beneficial. Finally, exploration of reasons for confusion relating to constituency application rules for overseas elector registration is also recommended.

To address current gaps in evidence, further research could continue to monitor data on personation (noting, however, that numbers are very low and it is not possible to attribute any changes to the introduction of voter identification), gather data from campaigners on relevant measures, and evaluate the extent to which digital imprints allow the Electoral Commission to better enforce spending rules.

Summary of key findings across all measures

The subsequent tables outline the findings for each of the EIP measures. They present the contribution claims, and the conclusions reached against each one.

Table 1. Overview of voter identification contribution claims and conclusions

Claim title	Claim outcome	Claim conclusion
Claim 1: Local authority staff meet their requirements by law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that local authority staff were well prepared for polling day and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 2: Polling station staff meet their requirements by law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that polling station staff were well prepared for polling day and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 3: Communication campaigns raise electors’ awareness of voter identification	Claim partially met	Evidence indicates high awareness amongst electors of the need to present ID, but confusion persists surrounding which types of ID are accepted.
Claim 4: Communication campaigns raise electors’ awareness of Voter Authority Certificates	Claim not met	Despite communication efforts, awareness and understanding of VACs remains low among electors, including those without ID.
Claim 5: Electors, who want a VAC and are eligible, are able to obtain one	Claim partially met	Evidence suggests that most electors who wanted a VAC obtained one, but there is still evidence of barriers to uptake amongst some groups.
Claim 6: Electors who want to have their identification document checked in private are able to do so	Claim partially met	Evidence shows most polling stations, but not all, had the appropriate provisions for private ID checks. However, there is not enough evidence to determine whether electors who wanted a private ID check had one.
Claim 7: Personation is identified more easily and reduces in the longer-term	Inconclusive	While ID checks were carried out successfully and feedback indicates that voter ID should make personation more difficult, there is currently limited evidence of the impact of voter ID on personation. Note that this is due to the challenge of proving personation, the low number of cases, and difficulties with attribution.
Claim 8: Electors remain satisfied with the process and ease of in-person voting	Claim partially met	Voter identification had little impact on the experience of voting in person for most electors. There were mixed views on its impact on electors’ confidence in the security and integrity of elections, but electors broadly felt it increases their trust.

Table 2. Overview of accessibility contribution claims and conclusions

Claim title	Claim outcome	Claim conclusion
Claim 1: Local authority staff meet their requirements by law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that local authority staff were well prepared for polling day and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 2: Polling station staff meet their requirements by law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that polling station staff were well prepared for polling day and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 3: Communications effectively raise awareness of reform amongst electors with a disability and their carers	Claim not met	There is consistent evidence, across a variety of sources, that confirms awareness among disabled electors of the new measures was relatively low.
Claim 4: Disabled electors are enabled to vote in person as a result of the new measures	Claim partially met	There is evidence to suggest that disabled electors are able to vote in person and find it relatively easy. However, there is limited evidence to confirm this was due to the new measures.

Table 3. Overview of postal voting contribution claims and conclusions

Claim title	Claim outcome	Claim conclusion
Claim 1: Local authorities meet the requirements of the law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that local authority staff were well prepared for polling day and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 2: Polling station staff meet the requirements of the law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that polling station staff were well prepared for polling day and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 3: Targeted communications raise electors’ awareness of changes to postal voting	Claim not met	Evidence across multiple sources suggests general awareness of changes to postal voting was low amongst electors, including those who voted by post.
Claim 4: Targeted communications raise campaigners’ awareness of changes to postal voting	Inconclusive	There is insufficient evidence that campaigners were aware of changes to postal voting. However, evidence from Electoral Services Managers, Electoral Registration Officers and Returning Officers suggests campaigners were made aware of the changes.
Claim 5: Electors who are eligible and want a postal vote are able to obtain one and continue to maintain their status as a postal voter	Claim met	Evidence across sources suggests few instances of postal vote application rejection.
Claim 6: The application process for absent voting is more modern, accessible and efficient	Claim partially met	Evidence across sources suggests the introduction of the Online Absent Voting Application service made the process easier for electors, but Electoral Management Systems and Electoral Registration Officer Portal limitations created difficulties for local authority staff.
Claim 7: Postal votes are more secure	Inconclusive	There is insufficient evidence to determine whether postal votes are more secure.
Claim 8: Electors are confident that postal voting is secure	Claim partially met	There is evidence to suggest that some electors are confident postal voting is secure, but it is difficult to determine the impact of the new measures on this.

Table 4. Overview of proxy voting contribution claims and conclusions

Claim title	Claim outcome	Claim conclusion
Claim 1: Local authorities meet the requirements of the law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that local authority staff were well prepared for polling day and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 2: Targeted communications raise electors’ awareness of changes to proxy voting	Claim not met	Evidence across multiple sources suggests low awareness amongst proxy voters about changes to proxy voting.
Claim 3: Electors who are eligible and want a proxy vote are able to appoint an eligible proxy	Claim met	Evidence across sources suggests few instances of proxy vote application rejection.
Claim 4: Proxy votes are more secure	Inconclusive	There is insufficient evidence to determine whether proxy votes are more secure.
Claim 5: The application process for absent voting is more modern, accessible and efficient	Claim partially met	Evidence across sources was inconsistent on whether the process of applying for a proxy vote was easy for electors. Multiple sources suggest it was inefficient for electoral services teams.
Claim 6: Electors are confident that proxy voting is secure	Inconclusive	There is insufficient evidence to determine whether electors feel proxy voting is secure.

Table 5. Overview of overseas elector contribution claims and conclusions

Claim title	Claim outcome	Claim conclusion
Claim 1: Local authority staff meet their requirements by law	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that local authority staff were well prepared for overseas elector requirements and implemented their requirements in line with the law.
Claim 2: Local authority staff workloads are manageable at peak points around the election cycle	Claim partially met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that most electoral administrators felt the number of applications was manageable. However, there is also evidence, across multiple sources, of concerns around time-consuming registration checks.
Claim 3: Communications effectively raise awareness of reform amongst eligible British citizens living abroad	Inconclusive	As evidence is limited to overseas electors who had applied to vote, this claim cannot be fully assessed. The evidence available points to overseas electors being a hard-to-reach audience.
Claim 4: Overseas electors who want to vote are able to correctly apply in time to vote	Inconclusive	There is insufficient evidence for this claim, as it is not possible to know the proportion of British citizens living abroad who wanted to register to vote and successfully did so.
Claim 5: Newly enfranchised British citizens living abroad register to vote as overseas electors	Claim partially met	There is insufficient evidence for this claim, with indications that some newly enfranchised British citizens living abroad registered to vote as overseas electors.
Claim 6: Overseas electors who want to vote are satisfied with the process of registration	Inconclusive	There is insufficient and mixed evidence for this claim, relying solely on qualitative interviews with overseas electors and electoral services teams.
Claim 7: Integrity of overseas elector registration is maintained	Claim partially met	There is insufficient evidence for this claim. Some electors tried to register in the wrong constituency, but the new measures were not seen as a risk to the integrity of elections. There were some mentions of increased trust.

Table 6. Overview of digital imprints contribution claims and conclusions

Claim title	Claim outcome	Claim conclusion
Claim 1: Police and the Electoral Commission fulfil their responsibilities as enforcing bodies under the new requirement consistently.	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the police and Electoral Commission staff consistently enforced the digital imprint rules
Claim 2: Non-compliant materials are found, reported, investigated and sanctioned as appropriate	Claim met	There is sufficient evidence that non-compliant materials were found, reported, investigated and sanctioned as appropriate.
Claim 3: Campaigners are aware of the new requirement and comply with the requirements of the law	Claim partially met	Evidence suggests campaigners were aware of the new requirement, but lacked understanding, leading to a lack of compliance in the first instance.
Claim 4: Digital imprints allow the Electoral Commission to better enforce spending rules	Inconclusive	There is no evidence that supports or denies the claim that digital imprints allow the Electoral Commission to better enforce spending rules.
Claim 5: Public perceptions of transparency and integrity around political campaigning are maintained or improved	Inconclusive	The evidence demonstrates that public perceptions around political campaigning have not been improved, and there is no evidence to support or deny that they have been maintained.