Research and analysis

Economic Crime Plan 2: outcomes progress report

Published 2 September 2025

Applies to England and Wales

Executive summary

The Economic Crime Plan 2 (ECP2), published in March 2023, set out how public and private sectors would cut economic crime, protect national security, and support the UK’s legitimate economic growth and competitiveness. It placed focus on achieving tangible outcomes and measuring progress and performance across the system, from the delivery of the actions to the ultimate impacts of the plan.

Under Action 43 within the plan, the Home Office committed to developing an outcomes framework. This report summarises key insights from the priority outcomes and indicators being monitored as part of the ECP2 outcomes framework, as well as progress in developing new data to address limitations and improve our ability to comprehensively measure performance.

Summary of key insights and indicators

There are several new key insights to highlight from the ‘Snapshot of key indicators’.

Criminal justice outcomes for money laundering

The availability of prosecution and convictions data at the ‘all-offence’ level has revealed positive outcomes previously unobserved in the data. In the year ending December 2024, there were 6,845 prosecutions and 3,756 convictions for the combined number of principal and non-principal money laundering offences in England and Wales. This is a 36% increase in prosecutions and 7% increase in convictions from the previous year. As such, the all-offence data tells us money laundering is often not prosecuted as the principal offence and provides a fuller picture of the criminal justice response to money laundering. While time lags in the criminal justice statistics and the length of prosecutions mean it is unlikely ECP2 activity has influenced these outcomes, they give us a more accurate baseline upon which to assess future progress.

Law enforcement disruptions

Law enforcement measures the impact it has against serious and organised crime through ‘disruptions’. System-wide disruptions against fraud and illicit finance have been increasing year on year. In the financial year ending 2024, there were 2,050 system-wide disruptions for illicit finance, a 3% increase over the previous year, and 2,862 system-wide disruptions for fraud, a 54% increase on the previous year. ‘High-harm’ disruptions – those which involve the highest risk groups and achieve the highest impact – have also been increasing. In the financial year ending 2024, there were 90 system-wide high-harm disruptions for illicit finance, an 18% increase over the previous year, and 85 system-wide high-harm disruptions for fraud, a 55% increase.

Contributions of SARs to asset recovery

Novel analysis of data held on the Joint Asset Recovery Database (JARD) explored the contributions of Suspicious Activity Reports (SARs) to asset recovery, indicating that SARs assisted in asset denials totalling £230.4 million in the financial year ending 2023. This represents 36% of the total value of assets denied in that financial year. This new analysis contributes to understanding a common question by reporters and supervisors about the utility of SARs and how they contribute to law enforcement outcomes at the aggregate level. It also compliments pre-existing analysis of ‘Defence Against Money Laundering’ (DAML) SARs undertaken by the UK Financial Intelligence Unit (UKFIU), which shows the total value denied due to DAML requests in the financial year ending 2023 was £272.6 million and for the financial year ending 2024 was £240.1 million (please see the main report for full details and caveats in relation to the analysis of SARs).

Companies House reform

As of 31 March 2025, 32,000 entities have registered on the Register of Overseas Entities (ROE), reducing hidden foreign ownership and improving transparency. Between 4 March 2024 and 31 March 2025, over 106,000 addresses were removed from the Companies House register where personal data was used without consent.

Snapshot of key ECP2 indicators

Reduce money laundering and recover more criminal assets:

• £100 billion laundered through and within the UK, or UK corporate structures, each year is a realistic possibility according to the National Assessment Centre (NAC), with £12 billion laundered using cash

• 2,050 system-wide illicit finance disruptions in the financial year 2024, a 3% increase on the previous year, and 90 system-wide high-harm disruptions for illicit finance, an 18% increase on the previous year

• 3,756 convictions for money laundering in 2024 (as the principal or non-principal offence), a 7% increase on the previous year; 1,036 of these convictions were where money laundering was the principal offence, a 10% increase on the previous year

• 53% conviction rate for money laundering as the principal offence over the 5-year period ending December 2024, a decrease of 2 percentage points on the previous year

• £243.3 million of assets recovered in the financial year ending 2024, a 29% nominal term decrease on the previous year

• the average value of pre-reform Company Register information is around £4,400 per anti-money laundering (AML) supervised business per year, with the aggregate benefit around £170 million to £460 million per year – research suggests the Economic Crime Corporate Transparency Act (ECCTA) reforms could double the value of the Register to businesses

• 32,000 entities have registered on the ROE, reducing hidden foreign ownership and improving transparency

• over 106,000 addresses have been removed from the Companies House register where personal data were used without consent

• 73% of firms compliant or generally compliant as assessed by AML supervisors in the financial year ending 2024, which equates to 3,534 firms and a decrease of 2 percentage points on the previous year

• SARs assisted in asset denials totalling £230.4 million in the financial year ending 2023, representing 36% of the total value of assets denied in that financial year

• £240.1 million denied to suspected criminals due to DAML requests in the financial year ending 2024, a 12% decrease on the previous year; the 3-year rolling average is £272.7 million

Combat kleptocracy and drive down sanctions evasion:

• 396 recorded cases of financial sanctions breaches in the financial year ending 2024, a 16% decrease on the previous year, but there were 242 closed cases – more than tripling the number of closed cases from the previous year

• 4,331 designated persons subject to an asset freeze in the financial year ending 2024, a 12% increase on the previous year

• £24.4 billion of funds reported as frozen to the Office of Financial Sanctions Implementation (OFSI) in 2023, an increase of £2.8 billion (up 13%) over the previous reporting year

• 2,287 individuals and entities (as of July 2025) sanctioned under the UK’s Russia sanctions regime since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022

• in the financial year ending 2025, the cumulative value of assets confiscated via the UK Action Against Corruption (UK ACT) Programme since 2015 was £286.8 million

Cut fraud:

• the Crime Survey of England and Wales (CSEW) estimated there were 4.16 million fraud offences in the year ending March 2025, a 31% increase on the previous year

• in the year ending March 2025, around 3 million fraud offences were estimated by the CSEW to involve a loss and victims were fully reimbursed in 2.1 million of these cases with the proportion of incidents without a loss accounting for 27% (1.1 million incidents), an increase of 2 percentage points on the previous year

• £1.17 billion in value of losses recorded by UK Finance in the year ending December 2024, broadly unchanged (0.4% increase) from the total losses in 2023 despite the rise in incidents

• 1.23 million fraud offences were reported to the National Fraud Intelligence Bureau (NFIB) from Action Fraud, Cifas and UK Finance in the year ending March 2025, a 1% increase on the previous year (1.21 million)

• 2,862 system-wide fraud disruptions in the financial year ending 2024, a 54% increase on the previous year, and 85 system-wide high-harm disruptions for fraud, a 55% increase on the previous year

• 3,521 convictions for fraud as the principal offence in the year ending December 2024, with an 83% conviction rate over the 5-year period ending December 2024, a 5% increase in convictions and a decrease of 1 percentage point in the conviction rate on the previous year

• the finance industry prevented £1.45 billion of unauthorised fraud in the year ending December 2024, equivalent to 67p in every £1 of attempted unauthorised fraud

• £823 million in detected fraud and error in the public sector in the financial year ending 2022, a 52% increase on levels reported in the previous year

While individual data points show there are some positive indications of trends in how the system is performing, making a robust assessment of overall progress towards ECP2 outcomes is currently challenging. Further data development is required to more directly measure outcomes and improve our ability to determine progress. There are several examples of where work is already underway to do this:

• the Home Office Economic Crime Survey 2024 will provide insights on business experiences of money laundering, fraud and corruption, including an understanding of the risk of money laundering and mitigations in place; it also covers confidence in preparedness for financial sanctions compliance, and measures in place to mitigate the risk of breaching financial sanctions; the full survey findings are due to be published later in 2025, but initial findings presented in this report include:

  • in the 12 months prior to the survey, 2% of businesses with employees experienced known or suspected money laundering incidents, equating to around 33,500 businesses

  • in the 12 months prior to the survey, 27% of businesses with employees experienced fraud, equating to around 389,000 businesses

• HM Treasury’s Effectiveness Framework will better evaluate the effectiveness of AML and counter-terrorism financing supervision through the development of a set of enhanced data requests made of supervisors; new metrics have been collected on a ‘best endeavours’ basis as part of the financial year ending 2024 reporting period and published in the Supervision Report 2023-24 including on assessing enforcement action taken against firms by supervisors by risk categorisation – HM Treasury (HMT) anticipates having a more comprehensive picture in 2026

• Companies House and the Department for Business and Trade (DBT) are currently undertaking monitoring, research and evaluation to understand the impact of the ECCTA as it is being implemented to understand whether it has met policy objectives – findings of this work will be published by 2028

We intend to publish an update to this report to capture further data development activities in the financial year ending 2027.

1. Introduction

ECP2, published in March 2023, set out how public and private sectors would cut economic crime, protect national security, and support the UK’s legitimate economic growth and competitiveness. It placed focus on achieving tangible outcomes and measuring progress and performance across the system, from the delivery of the actions to the ultimate impacts of the plan.

Under Action 43 within the plan, the Home Office committed to developing an outcomes framework. This report addresses the milestone to publish an update on progress in developing new data and indicators as part of that outcomes framework.

As outlined in ECP2, much of the existing readily available data in the economic crime area are not well suited as performance indicators. It recognised that developing new indicators would be challenging, take time and require tackling longstanding evidence gaps. This report reflects developments and progress made to date to develop suitable indicators and begin new data collection, but also acknowledges that further work is still required to address outstanding evidence gaps.

This report provides:

• a summary of the key insights from some of the outcomes and indicators being monitored and developed under each ECP2 sub-pillar

• an outline of the approach taken to develop the outcomes framework

• an overview of the summary Theory of Change (ToC) for ECP2 (provided in Annex A)

We intend to publish an update to this report to capture further data development activities in the financial year ending 2027.

2. Approach to the ECP2 outcomes framework and data development

The Home Office led the development of the outcomes framework, supported by key stakeholders from the public and private sectors. Extensive consultation with stakeholders was undertaken, drawing on a broad range of expertise to identify the anticipated short- and long-term outcomes from ECP2 activity as well as what indicators would be needed to measure them.

This informed both the outcomes framework and an underpinning ToC (see Annex A). These were used to identify which outcomes and indicators to prioritise to monitor the performance of ECP2. Currently available indicators (that is where data already exists to measure performance), as well as future measures (where new data should be collected in areas lacking suitable performance measures) are included in the outcomes framework. The outcomes framework and ToC are iterative products with the aim for them to be continually developed and improved as new data comes to light. As ECP2 has progressed, engagement with stakeholders has continued to ensure that the indicators being monitored and developed are the most appropriate and effective to measure progress. Engagement has also developed understanding on the context in which trends in the indicators occur.

The approach used to develop the outcomes framework has provided a consistent focus on the outcomes set out in the plan and enabled us to begin to track and measure progress from the delivery of actions to the outcomes and ultimate impacts of ECP2. However, the issues with individual indicators identified in the data annex published alongside ECP2 have not disappeared and, while individual data points show there are some positive indications of trends in how the system is performing, making a robust assessment of overall progress towards ECP2 outcomes is currently challenging, for the following reasons:

• new data to fill outstanding (and longstanding) evidence gaps still require development and collection

• proxy measures substituting in several areas rather than being able to directly measure desired outcomes

• determining what drives trends or what ‘good’ looks like

• time lags in the data means that recent ECP2 activity may not be captured

While collectively this currently makes it difficult to assess overall progress towards ECP2 outcomes, there is a significant amount of work underway to address these challenges, as outlined in the data development updates below.

3. Key ECP2 indicators and data development updates

The main body of this report is structured using the pillars of activity which sit under the 3 ECP2 outcomes. Under these we set out:

• a key indicator(s) being monitored to show how the system is performing, including basic trend description for each ECP2 activity pillar

• an update on the data that has or is being developed and how this will help us fill gaps to measure the outcomes identified in the ToC and improve our ability to assess progress

Due to the volume of indicators included in the ECP2 outcomes framework, the data presented below represent the current and key priority data points under each of the activity pillars, rather than the totality of those being monitored. It is recognised that several of these indicators are preliminary and/or proxies where the desired data do not currently exist and could change as new indicators are developed.

Data presented in this report reflect the latest available and are accurate as of 25 July 2025. Some sources such as criminal justice data are regularly updated retrospectively so are subject to change.

3.1 Reduce money laundering and recover more criminal assets

3.1.1 Limit abuse of UK corporate structures

Key indicator – the value of Companies House for the purpose of tackling crime

In October 2024, DBT and Companies House published research on the value of corporate transparency in tackling crime. This explored the pre-reform value of Company Register information and the expected impact of the ECCTA reforms (noting they were not yet implemented), for private sector and public sector users, specifically for the purpose of tackling crime.

For this study, private sector users are those subject to the Money Laundering Regulations (AML-supervised businesses) and their supervisors (AML supervisors), while public sector users comprise law enforcement agencies and public organisations who use corporate transparency information to serve the public interest.

The research shows for private sector users:

• the average value of the pre-reform Company Register information is estimated to be around £4,400 per organisation per year; however, there is a lot of variation between large and small organisations

• the average value for large organisations is £4,600 and for small organisations it is £1,100

• the aggregate benefit for private sector users is estimated to be around £170 million to £460 million per year

• the ECCTA reforms could lead to an additional £210 million to £400 million of value per year for AML-supervised businesses and AML supervisors in aggregate, almost doubling the estimated pre-reform value to these users

• private sector value was measured through the users’ demand and willingness to pay, per organisation, for Company Register information that enables them to undertake required activities under the Money Laundering Regulations (MLRs) such as performing customer due diligence, reporting discrepancies or performing supervisory duties including desk- and site-based reviews of their supervisees compliance with the MLRs

The research shows for public sector users:

• the average value of the pre-reform Company Register information is estimated to be around £2,600 per user per year

• the ECCTA reforms may contribute as much as £1,300 per user per year in additional value – a 50% increase in the estimate pre-reform value to this group

• the number of public sector users is uncertain, so the research does not report the aggregate benefits for the public sector

• public sector value was measured through the users’ willingness to wait (longer) to secure the necessary corporate transparency information (for example, law enforcement agencies with a statutory remit who require information to investigate and gather intelligence on suspected instances of crime), where the value of time was estimated using public sector salary information

Both user groups considered the introduction of identity verification for company directors to be the greatest contributor to the expected increase in value.

Notwithstanding the progress made by the research, it recognised several limitations including there being a higher level of uncertainty associated with the expected post-reform values of the private sector users since these relate to respondent assessments of changes in the Company Register that are yet to be fully implemented and experienced. It further acknowledges that a relatively small sample size of public sector users may have led to overestimating the benefits to users from public sector organisations. User values should therefore be interpreted as indicative of the potential order of magnitude of benefits. More detail can be found in the policy summary.

Key indicator – number of entities registered on the Register of Overseas entities

As of 31 March 2025, 32,000 entities have registered on the ROE, reducing hidden foreign ownership and improving transparency.

Source: DBT and Companies House

Key indicator – number of addresses removed from the Companies House register where personal data was used without consent

Between 4 March 2024 and 31 March 2025, over 106,000 addresses have been removed from the Companies House register where personal data was used without consent.

Source: DBT and Companies House

Data development – limit abuse of UK corporate structures

DBT and Companies House are monitoring the impact of the ECCTA as it is being implemented.

The 2019 research on the value of Company Register information aims to be repeated or adapted within 2 to 3 years’ time to help assess the post-reform value of the data once properly implemented.

DBT will also evaluate the impact of the ECCTA policies as well as the ROE – of which both aim to decrease economic crime and bring greater transparency to business and real estate markets – in the coming years.

3.1.2 Increase the effectiveness of the UK’s Anti-Money Laundering/ Combatting Financing of Terrorism regulatory and supervisory regime

Key indicator – proportion of compliant firms

Between the financial years ending 2022 and 2024, across the regulated sector, the majority of firms subject to a desk-based review (DBR) and onsite visit (OSV) were compliant or generally compliant.

In the financial years ending 2022 and 2023, the proportion of DBRs and OSVs with a compliant outcome remained at 27% before decreasing to 20% in the financial year ending 2024. The proportion with a generally compliant outcome has steadily increased in this timeframe from 44% to 53%. The proportion with a non-compliant outcome decreased from 29% to 25% between the financial years ending 2022 and 2023 before increasing to 27% in the financial year ending 2024.

Variation in these proportions exists between supervisors due to the specific attributes and differences between the regulated sectors, such as the size of the supervised population, differences in risk distribution within the population and approach to selection for assessment. For example, the Gambling Commission had the highest proportion of DBRs and OSVs with compliant outcomes in the financial year ending 2024. This does not reflect the scope and intensity of the OSVs and DBRs undertaken.

The overall proportions have been calculated excluding the number of DBRs and OSVs without outcomes. Outcomes for DBRs and OSVs may not be recorded until the following year due to the timings of when they were conducted.

Figure 1: The proportion of desk-based reviews and onsite visits with an outcome of compliant, generally compliant and non-compliant

Source: HMT anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism: supervision reports

Some supervisors also undertook random dip sampling by randomly selecting some medium- and low-risk businesses within their populations for a DBR or OSV in the financial year ending 2024. Of the 681 businesses randomly selected, 68 were found to require a higher risk categorisation and 142 were found to be not compliant. The outcomes from these DBRs and OSVs are not included in Figure 1.

Data development – increase the effectiveness of the UK’s Anti-Money Laundering/ Combatting Financing of Terrorism regulatory and supervisory regime

HM Treasury Effectiveness Framework

Some indicators currently measuring the outcomes in the ‘increase the effectiveness of the UK’s Anti-Money Laundering/ Combatting Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT) regulatory and supervisory regime’ activity pillar are ‘proxies’, meaning they do not directly measure the associated outcome. As part of ECP2, HMT committed to develop a framework to better evaluate the effectiveness of anti-money laundering (AML) and counter-terrorism financing (CTF) supervision. HMT developed a set of enhanced data requests to be made of supervisors by which it can better measure the effectiveness of supervision, known as the Effectiveness Framework. The Framework will strengthen HMT’s oversight of supervision, support the continuous improvement of supervision and improve understanding of risk amongst the supervised population.

Additional new metrics began being collected as part of the financial year ending 2024 reporting period. Since data collection for some of the new metrics was not possible retrospectively, for the financial year ending 2024, supervisors were asked to provide this data on a ‘best endeavours’ basis with a view to providing the data in full for the financial year ending 2025 period. New data collected included a variety of measures, such as the proportion of businesses found to be non-compliant or require a higher risk categorisation after being randomly selected for assessment and enforcement actions against firms by supervisors split by different risk categorisations. Collectively, these will provide further insight into how risk is viewed and the existence of vulnerabilities within the AML/CFT regulatory sector.

Economic Crime Survey 2024

The Home Office has undertaken a survey of UK businesses to learn more about whether they have experienced economic crime, and the approaches they take to tackle it – the Economic Crime Survey 2024. This survey represents the first comprehensive effort to examine fraud, money laundering and corruption across the population of businesses with employees in the UK. Utilising rigorous quantitative survey techniques, supplemented by qualitative interviews, this study provides a robust and unique perspective on the experiences of UK businesses with these forms of economic crime. Questions included relate to business experiences of money laundering – in both the AML regulated and non-regulated sectors, the types of incidents experienced and business response to those. It also covers the business impacts associated with money laundering and the perceived risk from, and preparedness for, money laundering incidents. Early findings from the survey found that 2% of businesses with employees experienced known or suspected money laundering incidents in the 12 months preceding the survey, equating to around 33,500 businesses. The full findings are due to be published in 2025.

3.1.3 Combat criminal abuse of cryptoassets

Key indicator – number of regulated crypto firms

Since January 2020 and as of 12 May 2025, the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) has received 372 applications from cryptoasset companies to join the FCA’s AML/CFT regime. Of the 359 applications with outcomes, 14% were registered, 70% have been withdrawn and 4% refused. Twelve percent of cases were rejected due to insufficient documentation being supplied, which prevented the FCA being able to assess these applications.

Typical reasons for firms withdrawing their registration include:

• not being ready, willing and organised to demonstrate that they meet the required standards when an application is submitted

• needing time to address FCA’s concerns, or produce or gather missing information 

• understanding that registration is likely to be refused

Firms may reconsider their business model and/or seek registration again, either in the UK or in another jurisdiction.

Figure 2: The number of applications to be a FCA-regulated crypto firm from January 2020 to 12 May 2025

Source: FCA

Data development – combat criminal abuse of cryptoassets

Work is ongoing to explore datasets which enable the recording of cryptoasset seizures and forfeitures using criminal and civil powers. This will enable the total volume and value of crypto assets which are realised following seizure by law enforcement to be identified.

3.1.4 Improve intelligence, feedback and analysis through SARs reform

Key indicator – value of funds denied from Defence Against Money Laundering SARs

The UKFIU request details from law enforcement agencies on the immediate action taken following a DAML decision, including the value of any assets denied. A variety of asset denial actions are captured here including the Proceeds of Crime Act (POCA), Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) and agency specific powers.

The total value denied to suspected criminals resulting from DAML requests (refused and granted) has increased since the financial year ending 2018 to £240.1 million in the financial year ending 2024, following a peak of £305.7 million in the financial year ending 2022. The current rolling 3-year average is at a high of £272.7 million.

DAML outcomes in any given year will fluctuate depending on several factors, including the value of the assets reported in SARs, the availability of financial investigators to undertake money laundering investigations, and sufficient evidence to demonstrate to the judiciary that the funds are criminal property. Due to this and the nature of DAML reporting, a baseline is difficult to determine. However, figures do demonstrate how DAMLs directly contribute to asset denial opportunities across law enforcement agencies. The DAML ‘threshold amount’ was increased in January 2023 from £250 to £1,000, alongside introducing a new exiting and paying away exemption, leading to a reduction in the number of DAMLs and no marked impact on the volume of assets denied. In fact, there have been significant increases in the number of DAMLs refused and cases where assets have been denied, reflecting a better direction of DAML reporting to where it has greater impact.

Figure 3: The value of funds denied through DAML SARs

Source: UKFIU SARs annual report

Data development – improve intelligence, feedback and analysis through SARs reform

The desired long-term outcome of ECP2 activity on the SARs reform programme is for SARs to contribute to more law enforcement outcomes. This can be challenging to measure due to the flow of intelligence through different data systems.

Home Office analysts conducted novel analysis of the JARD to explore the aggregated contributions of SARs to asset recovery and associated convictions. The analysis indicates that SARs assisted in asset denials totalling £230.4 million in the financial year ending 2023, representing 36% of the total value of assets denied.

At the order imposition stage (the point at which funds have been designated by a court as proceeds of crime, made up of Confiscation and Forfeiture Orders), the analysis indicates that SARs assisted in order impositions totalling £51.6 million in the financial year ending 2023, representing 18% of the total value of order impositions.

Using SAR-assisted confiscation impositions as a proxy, the analysis also indicates that SARs assisted with at least 73 convictions (either in the conviction itself or post-conviction asset recovery) in the financial year ending 2023. This follows the assumption that individuals must be tried and convicted before a confiscation order can be imposed on them, so we can assume that any SAR-assisted confiscation imposition also involved a SAR-assisted conviction.

True figures for the volumes and values of asset denials are likely to be higher than this analysis suggests. This is because of the sanitisation of SAR intelligence which results in:

• the investigation teams not knowing that SARs have contributed when adding or updating asset recovery cases on JARD

• time lags between a SAR report and any subsequent asset denial/order imposition meaning that SARs contributions get forgotten over time and are not recorded

• lack of clarity among practitioners on the threshold for when the SARs-assisted flag should be used.

Figures presented are therefore likely to be underestimates and should be treated as a lower threshold for where SARs have assisted with asset recovery outcomes. The degree to which a SAR has ‘assisted’ an investigation is also likely to vary greatly.

The value of SARs-assisted asset denial in this research is lower than the UKFIU estimate of £272.6 million denied due to DAML requests in the same time period. This is due to differing scopes in the activities included within denial figures – JARD analysis focuses on asset denial through POCA powers, while UKFIU figures consider a broader range of activities undertaken by law enforcement and regulators.

SARs play an important role in alerting law enforcement to potential instances of money laundering and terrorist financing, as well as being a vital source of financial intelligence for tackling economic crime and supporting investigations into a wide range of criminal activity.

The JARD is an operational database that records information on asset denial and recovery activity within England, Wales and Northern Ireland, and includes a tick-box to indicate where SARs of any kind assisted. This analysis looked at asset denial specifically via restraint orders, asset freezing orders, cash seizures and listed asset orders / order impositions via confiscation orders and forfeiture orders.

3.1.5 Recover more criminal assets

Key indicator - Value of assets recovered through POCA powers

In the financial year ending 2024, there was £243.3 million of assets recovered from confiscation, forfeiture and civil recovery orders, a 29% nominal term decrease on the previous year. While in line with past performance, this is below the 3-year median of £341.5 million due to the previous 2 financial years being exceptional. When compared with the financial year ending 2019, this a small increase of 3%.

Figure 4: The value of proceeds of crime recovered from confiscation orders, forfeiture orders, and civil recovery order receipts for England, Wales and Northern Ireland

Source: Home Office asset recovery statistical bulletin

Figure 4 shows that of the £243.3 million recovered in financial year ending 2024:

• £128.5 million was recovered through confiscation order receipts

• £107.3 million was recovered through forfeiture order receipts

• £7.4 million was recovered through civil recovery order receipts

Data development – recover more criminal assets

Action 12 in ECP2 sets out milestones related to the development of a performance framework for asset recovery agencies, including the implementation of a new agency level performance framework. The Home Office Asset Recovery Agency Performance Tool is a non-published, agency-facing performance dashboard. Using data from the JARD, it provides a comprehensive picture of the asset denial and asset recovery process, including:

• what is flowing through the system upstream and driving performance for each respective power

• what translates into asset recovery receipts

The objective is to:

• enable the Home Office and asset recovery community to better understand performance at an agency level and allow a structured approach to measure, evaluate, and improve asset recovery performance for law enforcement agencies

• assess and compare performance between agencies within suitable groupings, to identify and share best practice and support poorer performing agencies’ performance and use of powers

• track micro-level system performance trends that show the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall asset recovery system and what future performance might look like

• support operational decision-making and dedication of resources, and address issues in earlier stages of the asset recovery process

3.1.6 Lead the cross-system operational response to money laundering

Key indicator - number of illicit finance disruptions

Law enforcement measures the impact it has against serious and organised crime through disruptions. A disruption is any event, activity, piece of work that disrupts criminal activity. For example, it could be an arrest, a preventative education campaign, a denial of illicit assets or the takedown of a website.

Illicit finance disruptions cover a variety of crimes including money laundering, bribery and corruption. The data presented includes agencies from across England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

In the financial year ending 2024, there were 2,050 system-wide disruptions for illicit finance, a 3% increase over the previous year and more than double the number of disruptions recorded in the financial year ending 2021.

There are likely to be several contributing factors to the rising trend from the financial year ending 2021, including increased system capacity and capability, and improved reporting due to greater education as to what can and cannot be recorded as a disruption.

Figure 5: The number of system-wide illicit finance disruptions per financial year

Source: National Economic Crime Centre annual report

The National Crime Agency (NCA) and the wider system’s impact against the illicit finance threat actors causing most harm to the UK economy, reputation and public, has also increased over the last 5 years. In the financial year ending 2024, there were 90 system-wide high-harm disruptions for illicit finance, an 18% increase over the previous year.

Figure 6: The number of system-wide high-harm illicit finance disruptions per financial year

Source: National Economic Crime Centre annual report

Key indicator – 5-year conviction ratio for money laundering

In England and Wales, the conviction rate for money laundering over the 5-year period ending December 2024 was 53%, a 2 percentage point decrease compared to the previous year. This follows the continued decline since the peak in 2019 of 67%.

Figure 7: Five-year conviction rate for money laundering as a principal offence in England and Wales

Key indicator – sentence length for money laundering

In 2024, the average sentence length in months for money laundering as a principal offence in England and Wales was 30.6, a 3% decrease on the previous year. Since 2014, the average sentence length was following a rising trend until 2019, increasing from 20.6 months to 29 months. The average sentence length decreased to 22.1 months in 2020 before increasing to 30.6 in 2024.

Figure 8: Average length of custodial sentences in months for money laundering as a principal offence in England and Wales

Source: Ministry of Justice criminal justice statistics^{[footnote 1]}

Data development – lead the cross-system operational response to money laundering

Principal and non-principal money laundering criminal justice outcomes

The availability of prosecutions and convictions data at the ‘all-offence’ level has revealed positive outcomes previously unobserved in the data. In the year ending December 2024, there were 6,845 prosecutions and 3,756 convictions for the combined number of principal and non-principal money laundering offences in England and Wales, a 36% increase in prosecutions and 7% increase in convictions from the previous year.

Figure 9: The number of money laundering convictions as a principal and non-principal offence in England and Wales

Source: Ministry of Justice criminal justice statistics^{[footnote 1]}

These figures reflect prosecutions and convictions on an all-offence basis, that is, the total number of offences a defendant is prosecuted for (principal offences plus non-principal offences). Where a defendant is found guilty of 2 or more offences, the offence selected as the principal is the one for which the heaviest sentence is imposed. Accordingly, this means that if an offender commits 2 offences, including a money laundering offence, but the greater sentence is handed down for the other offence (for example, drug supply), the money laundering offence would be considered a non-principal offence. As such, the all-offence data tells us money laundering is often not prosecuted as the principal offence and provides a somewhat fuller picture of criminal justice system outcomes for money laundering.

While time lags in the criminal justice statistics and the length of prosecutions mean it is unknown whether these outcomes are influenced by ECP2 activity, they give us a more accurate baseline upon which to assess future progress in this regard. It is also important to note that prosecution and convictions can be affected by more than just law enforcement activity, including Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) charging practices and the use of civil outcomes, and do not necessarily reflect a change in the overall scale of money laundering.

Criminal justice outcomes for Scotland and Northern Ireland

Criminal justice outcomes published by the Ministry of Justice cover only England and Wales. To understand trends across the UK, data has also been collated directly from Scotland and Northern Ireland.

In Scotland, between the financial years ending 2016 and 2021, the number of money laundering convictions as a principal offence has fluctuated between 6 and 31. In the financial year ending 2022, the number of convictions increased from 10 in the previous financial year to 46. This increase has continued into the financial year ending 2023 where the number of convictions was 60.

Figure 10: The number of money laundering convictions as a principal offence in Scotland

Source: Scottish Government criminal proceedings database

The Scottish Government has noted that the COVID-19 pandemic affected the number of convictions for the financial years ending 2021 and 2022. This was because of the subsequent court closures and reduced court capacity due to physical distancing measures, and delays to cases where key participants were forced to self-isolate after testing positive for COVID-19.

In Northern Ireland, between the financial years ending 2016 and 2019, the number of convictions for money laundering as a principal offence fluctuated between 25 and 42. In the financial year ending 2020, the number of convictions more than doubled compared with the previous year, from 42 to 99. The number of convictions saw a slight decrease in the financial year ending 2021 before increasing and reaching 107 convictions in the financial year ending 2023.

Figure 11: The number of money laundering convictions as a principal offence in Northern Ireland

Source: Northern Ireland Department of Justice

Scale and cost of money laundering

In the National Strategic Assessment of Serious and Organised Crime, the NAC estimated that it is highly likely that over £12 billion of criminal cash is generated annually in the UK, and a realistic possibility that the scale of money laundering impacting on the UK (including through UK corporate structures or financial institutions) is in the hundreds of billions of pounds annually. However, due to inherent challenges including the hidden nature of money laundering, the variety of methods used to launder proceeds from both inside and outside of the UK and a lack of adequate data, it remains difficult to estimate the scale and cost of money laundering. These challenges are widely recognised by academics who critique estimates that exist due to the known uncertainties and limitations.

Internal Home Office work is ongoing to help fill this evidence gap and develop our understanding of the scale and cost of money laundering, and target research to fill gaps in our modelling. Initial findings and progress in terms of methodological development will be published in the future. This work will initially focus on considering possible approaches to estimating the total annual proceeds of crime generated in England and Wales and estimating how much of these proceeds is laundered. In the longer term, it also aims to consider possible approaches to calculating the economic and social harms associated with these crimes and the money laundering process.

3.2 Combat kleptocracy and drive down sanctions evasion

3.2.1 Continuously improve financial sanctions design, implementation, and enforcement

Key indicator - number of reports of suspected financial sanctions breaches reported to OFSI by industry

OFSI works to improve understanding, implementation and enforcement of financial sanctions in the UK.

Between the financial years ending 2020 and 2022, the number of suspected breaches of financial sanctions remained between 132 and 147. In the financial year ending 2023, the number of suspected breaches more than tripled to 473. In the financial year ending 2024, the number of suspected breach decreased by 16%, but the number of closed cases increased to 242, more than triple compared to the previous year.

Many suspected breaches recorded by OFSI since 2022 were reported out of caution or where there was insufficient evidence that a breach has occurred.

Figure 12: The number of suspected breaches of financial sanctions reported to OFSI since the financial year ending 2019

Source: OFSI annual report

Key indicator - Value of frozen funds held by UK businesses

Each year, OFSI undertakes a frozen asset review, requiring all persons holding or controlling assets (including funds and economic resources) frozen because of UK financial sanctions to report the nature and value of these assets to OFSI. The 2023 Frozen Asset Review saw £24.4 billion of funds reported to OFSI as frozen, an increase of £2.8 billion since 2022. This figure includes the value of funds frozen in the UK and overseas, where those funds or economic resources are subject to UK financial sanctions legislation. It does not include the value of all assets reported to OFSI as part of the annual frozen asset review due to difficulties in defining their values with accuracy. This may include the contents of safety deposit boxes or tangible assets.

Source: OFSI annual report

Key indicator - Number of designated persons subject to an asset freeze

OFSI maintains and publishes the consolidated list of asset freeze targets. The list provides identifying information for persons subject to UK financial sanctions to support businesses and individuals in determining whether they are dealing with a designated person. OFSI added 564 designated persons to the consolidated list in the financial year ending 2024, a 12% increase on the previous year. This took the total number of those subject to financial sanctions in the financial year ending 2024 to 3,463 designated individuals, 853 entities and 15 ships, totalling 4,331 entries across 35 regimes.

Source: OFSI annual report

Data development – continuously improve financial sanctions design, implementation, and enforcement

For the first time, business awareness of financial sanctions has been included in the Economic Crime Survey 2024, along with businesses’ perceived risk of breaching financial sanctions and the measures they had in place to prevent this. The survey findings are due to be published later this year.

3.2.2 Strengthen operational and international response to kleptocracy

Key indicator – Value of assets confiscated through the UK ACT programme

The aim of the UK ACT programme is to reduce the incentives for corrupt individuals in developing countries to use the UK to launder money, and to reduce incentives for UK companies and nationals to bribe in developing countries.

In the financial year ending 2021, the cumulative value of assets confiscated via the UK ACT programme since 2015 was £213.2 million. The value steadily increased to £240.6 million in the financial year ending 2024. In the financial year ending 2025, the cumulative value confiscated was £286.8 million.

Figure 13: Cumulative value of assets confiscated since 2015 through the UK ACT programme

Source: FCDO development tracker - UK ACT annual reviews

Key indicator – number of designated persons sanctioned under the UK’s Russia sanctions regime

As of July 2025, there were 2,287 individuals and entities sanctioned under the UK’s Russia sanctions regime since the start of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022.

Source: OFSI and HMT list of asset-freeze targets under the Russia financial sanctions regime

Data development – strengthen operational and international response to kleptocracy

The cross-system strategy to tackle professional enablers, a core commitment within ECP2, aims to galvanise a whole system response to deliver a step-change in reducing the threat posed by professional enablers. This was developed by the National Economic Crime Centre (NECC) and the Office for Professional Body AML Supervision (OPBAS) in close partnership with HM Government, supervisory bodies, law enforcement, the CPS and private sector.

The strategy encompasses a series of actions under 6 pillars of activity. Some of these are aimed at improving:

• UK law enforcement operations against professional enablers

• UK law enforcement disruptions against professional enablers

• supervisory interventions against professional enablers

• the sanctions response against professional enablers

Data will be collected from across the system to feed into ECP2 performance monitoring.

3.3 Cut fraud

3.3.1 Cut fraud against the individual and businesses

Key indicator – number of fraud incidents

Fraud has risen to an estimated 4.16 million offences experienced by individuals in England and Wales in the year ending March 2025, a 31% increase on the previous year. Fraud now accounts for approximately 44% of all CSEW estimated crime in England and Wales, an 8 percentage point increase on the same period last year (36%).

Figure 14: Number of fraud incidents estimated by the CSEW

Source: Office for National Statistics CSEW

Out of the estimated 4.16 million incidents of fraud, 3.05 million involved a loss. Victims were fully reimbursed in 2.15 million of these cases. The proportion of incidents without a loss accounted for 27% (1.11 million incidents), an increase of 2 percentage points on the previous year.

Figure 15: Proportion of CSEW fraud incidents with or without a loss

Source: Office for National Statistics CSEW

Key indicator – number of fraud victims

There were an estimated 3.44 million adult victims of fraud in England and Wales in the year ending March 2025, a 25% increase on the previous year. Approximately 1 in 14 (7.1%) adults are estimated to have been a victim of fraud in England and Wales in the year ending March 2025.

Figure 16: Number of fraud victims estimated by the CSEW

Source: Office for National Statistics CSEW

Key indicator – value of fraud losses reported by UK Finance

While the number of cases recorded by UK Finance rose by 12% (to 3.3 million) in the year ending December 2024 from the previous year, the value of losses remained broadly stable, at £1.17 billion. This stability is driven by different trajectories in authorised and unauthorised fraud. Gross losses for unauthorised fraud increased slightly (up 2%) while losses for authorised fraud decreased slightly (by 2%).

Fraudsters are now continuing to shift towards high volume (but low value) fraud, potentially explaining the relative rise in incidents despite relative loss stability.

Figure 17: UK Finance reported losses

Source: UK Finance annual fraud report

Key indicator – NFIB reports

There were 1.23 million fraud offences reported to the NFIB from Action Fraud, Cifas, and UK Finance in the year ending March 2025, a 1% increase on the previous year (1.21 million). Of the offences referred to the NFIB:

• UK Finance reported a 2% decrease (554,000 to 545,000)

• Cifas reported a 10% increase (348,000 to 382,000)

• Action Fraud reported a 4% decrease (312,000 to 299,000)

Figure 18: Number of fraud offences referred to the NFIB by Action Fraud Cifas and UK finance

Source: Office for National Statistics CSEW

Key indicator – number of convictions for fraud as the principal offence

In the year ending December 2024, there were 4,176 prosecutions, 3,521 convictions and 3,446 sentenced for fraud as the principal offence.

Compared with the year ending December 2023, the number of prosecutions has increased (7%), the number of convictions and the number sentenced has also increased (by 5% and 3% respectively).

The conviction rate over the 5-year period ending December 2024 is 83%, a decrease from 84% in the 5-year period ending December 2023.

Figure 19: Number of convictions for fraud

Source: Ministry of Justice criminal justice statistics^{[footnote 2]}

Key indicator – sentence length for fraud

Excluding COVID-19 pandemic fluctuations, the average sentence length for fraud offences has increased from 13.8 months in 2010 to 19.8 months in the year ending December 2024. This follows the all-crime trend of increasing sentence lengths.

Figure 20: The average sentence length for fraud

Source: Ministry of Justice criminal justice statistics^{[footnote 2]}

Key indicator – number of fraud disruptions

System-wide disruptions against fraud have increased year on year, from 186 in the financial year ending 2020 to 2,862 in the financial year ending 2024.

Figure 21: The number of system-wide fraud disruptions

Source: National Economic Crime Centre annual report

In the financial year ending 2024, there were 85 system-wide high-harm disruptions for fraud, a 55% increase over the previous year.

Figure 22: The number of system-wide high-harm fraud disruptions

Source: National Economic Crime Centre annual report

Key indicator – Unauthorised fraud prevented

According to UK Finance, the finance industry prevented £1.45 billion of unauthorised fraud in the year ending December 2024, equivalent to 67p in every £1 of attempted unauthorised fraud. This is a small increase on the year ending December 2023 (64p per £1) and stable with the levels for 2020.

Figure 23: Proportion of unauthorised fraud prevented by the finance industry

Source: UK Finance annual fraud report

Key indicator – Authorised Push Payment fraud returned to victims

Fifty-nine per cent of Authorised Push Payments (APP) losses were reimbursed to victims in the year ending December 2024. UK Finance figures indicate fewer victims are receiving reimbursements for APP in the year ending December 2024 than in the previous year (59% versus 62%). For the third year in a row, over half of victims of authorised fraud were reimbursed and reimbursement is expected to increase dramatically with the introduction of the mandatory reimbursement requirement.

Figure 24: Proportion of APP fraud returned to victims

Source: UK Finance annual fraud report

Key indicator – origination and enablers of fraud

APP reports in the year ending December 2024 suggest the majority of cases of APP fraud originate online (70%). These cases only account for 29% of total losses, suggesting a tendency towards online-enabled APP frauds being lower value scams, such as purchase frauds.

Frauds originating from telecoms tend to be higher value; despite only 16% of APP cases originating from telecoms, they accounted for 36% of total losses.

Figure 25: Proportion of APP fraud originating from different enablers in 2024

Source: UK Finance annual fraud report

Data development – cut fraud against the individual and businesses

As outlined in Section 3.1.2, the Home Office has undertaken a survey of UK businesses to learn more about whether they have experienced economic crime, and the approaches they take to tackle it – the Economic Crime Survey 2024. Early findings from the Economic Crime Survey 2024 found one in four businesses with employees (27%) experienced fraud in the 12 months prior to the survey, equating to approximately 389,000 businesses. Between them, it is estimated that these businesses incurred approximately 6.04 million instances of fraud. The full survey findings are due to be published in 2025.

3.3.2 Modernise the response and reduce the impact of fraud against the public sector

Key indicator – value of detected fraud and error reported by departments and public bodies

The Public Sector Fraud Authority (PSFA), as set out in its mandate, works with departments and public bodies to better understand and reduce the impact of fraud across the public sector. As part of this, the PSFA publishes a Fraud Landscape Report which sets out levels of detected, prevented and recovered fraud and error (excluding tax and welfare which His Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) and the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) separately report and publish data on), as reported by departments and public bodies.

From the most recent Fraud Landscape Report (covering the financial year ending 2022), reported levels of detected fraud and error increased by 52% from the previous year, rising from £541 million to £823 million.

Data is not yet available for the period after the publication of ECP2. This will be set out in the next Fraud Landscape Report.

Figure 26: Value of detected fraud and error reported by departments and public bodies

Source: PSFA cross-government fraud landscape report

3.4 Reduce the threat international illicit finance poses to the UK and UK interests

Data development – reduce the threat international illicit finance poses to the UK and UK interests

Action 29 in ECP2 required HMT to provide technical assistance to eligible priority countries to improve the implementation of global AML, counter-terrorist financing and counter proliferation financing standards.

As part of this, HMT has undertaken data recording of outcomes from the technical assistance programmes delivered across 4 areas:

• Financial Action Task Force (FATF) Mutual Evaluation Reports (MERs); the number of instances in which a jurisdiction’s MER grades have exceeded a baseline taken at the start of HMT’s assistance programme

• Post-observation Period Reports: the number of recommendations a jurisdiction has received which do not need to be taken forward via an International Cooperation Review Group (ICRG) action plan due to HMT assistance

• FATF ICRG action upgrades: the number of ICRG action plan items which receive an upgrade as a result of HMT programming

• Technical Compliance: the number of improvements in technical compliance scores that jurisdictions receive as a result of HMT programming

Since 2023, HMT has run 28 Technical Assistance programmes where the recipient country has actively engaged. This work has directly resulted in:

• 15 scorings in FATF MERs being upgraded

• 6 examples of a country not being placed back into ICRG for a specific ‘immediate outcome’

• 23 ICRG actions which HMT’s work has addressed for countries

• 54 examples of a country getting a technical compliance upgrade following a submission of a follow-up report

3.5 Cross-cutting system reforms and capabilities

3.5.1 System prioritisation

The System Prioritisation project will set threat-led economic crime operational priorities with sufficient endorsement to allow the regulated sector to better allocate resource to high impact economic crime activity while maintaining their regulatory responsibilities. This work aligns to Action 33 of ECP2, which assigned NECC, FCA and UK Finance as owners.

This public-private project has agreed a set of 9 economic crime threat priorities which have been endorsed through public-private governance. It has also identified some ‘lower value’ activity currently undertaken by the AML regulated sector which, with appropriate regulatory and government support, can be reduced to enable the reallocation of resource against the priorities.

A pilot will test the concept and governance of the model with a few participants, who are expected to be major stakeholders in the model, before it is potentially applied to the whole of the AML regulated sector.

The responsibility to monitor, test and evaluate this work will sit with an FCA and NECC co-chaired System Prioritisation governance group, including where it can lead to measurable progress on joint public-private outcomes relating to the response to priority economic crime threats. Reporting will feed into future ECP2 performance monitoring.

3.5.2 Information sharing, data, and technology

The Home Office and UK Finance are jointly drafting the Public-Private Economic Crime Data Strategy. The monitoring and evaluation of the Strategy to measure its commitments is being considered as part of drafting.

3.5.3 Law enforcement capacity and public private workforce strategy

Key indicator – proportion of the 475 full time equivalent staff uplift which has been recruited

One of the key reforms of ECP2 was increasing law enforcement capacity dedicated to economic crime, with a 475 full-time equivalent (FTE) uplift of financial crime investigators. The target date for this uplift to be completed is by the end of the financial year ending 2026.

As of the end of February 2025, 59% of the 475 FTE staff uplift has been completed on track (280 FTE).

Figure 27: Proportion of the 475 FTE uplift which has been recruited as of the end of February 2025

Source: City of London Police, CPS, HMRC, NCA, Regional Organised Crime Units

Data development – law enforcement capacity and public private workforce strategy

Evaluation of staff uplift

To further understand the implementation and outcomes of the staffing uplift, the Home Office is undertaking an evaluation. This involves 2 parts:

• a process evaluation will explore whether the uplift of FTEs across the system is being implemented as intended and determine what is working more or less well and why

• at the same time, we are exploring options to understand the feasibility of conducting an impact evaluation of the uplift of 475 FTEs; this would look to determine whether any measurable changes have occurred and assess the extent these could be attributed to the uplift

Cross-sector Economic Crime Profession

At a broader level, the Home Office (with support from City of London Police and NECC) is developing a cross-sector Economic Crime Profession, designed to increase attraction, retention and capability of the workforce.

In future, data captured through this workstream may include baseline and year-on-year figures for workforce attraction and retention, workforce composition (including the spread of roles and workforce demographics), and engagement with profession initiatives.

4. Conclusion

This report sets out how the Home Office, with input from public and private sector partners, has approached the development of an outcomes framework for the Economic Crime Plan 2 (ECP2), identifying key outcomes and indicators to measure progress from the delivery of actions to the outcomes and ultimate impacts of ECP2.

Indicators presented demonstrate where robust data is available that enables us to identify progress and/or strategic insights. For example, data on the value of assets recovered enable good insight into the system’s ability to recover more criminal assets, and analysis of criminal justice outcomes and law enforcement disruptions give us a more accurate baseline upon which to assess future progress of the cross-system operational response.

While individual data points show there are some positive indications of trends in how the system is performing, making a robust assessment of overall progress towards ECP2 outcomes is currently challenging. Further data development is required to more directly measure outcomes and improve our ability to determine progress. There are several examples of where work is already underway to address the current challenges:

• the indicators currently being used to measure the effectiveness of the UK’s supervisory and regulatory regime are proxies directly measuring the desired outcome; HM Treasury’s Effectiveness Framework has developed a set of enhanced data requests that have been made of supervisors to collect additional data on risk-based supervision and enforcement by supervisors

• crypto is one area where a lack of data is generally impeding our ability to determine overall progress; exploration of datasets on seized/realised crypto assets and crypto-related investigations/disruptions will enable greater understanding

• while the available quantitative data on sanctions enforcement is relatively comprehensive, more qualitative data is needed for a better understanding of the drivers behind trends, the context in which they sit and what ‘good’ looks like

• the Home Office’s Economic Crime Survey 2024 will provide insights on business experiences of money laundering, fraud and corruption, understanding of risk of money laundering and mitigations in place, confidence in preparedness for sanctions compliance and measures in place to mitigate sanctions – findings are being published later in 2025

• time lags in the data mean that recent ECP2 activity may not yet be captured

We intend to publish an update to this report to capture further data development activities in the financial year ending 2027.

Evaluation activity is also being undertaken to enhance our understanding of impact. The Home Office, for example, is conducting a process evaluation of the 475 law enforcement staffing uplift and exploring feasibility options for conducting an impact evaluation of the uplift.

Furthermore, DBT and Companies House are monitoring the impact of the ECCTA as it is being implemented. In line with statutory obligations, DBT will evaluate the impact of the ECCTA policies as well as the ROE – which both aim to decrease economic crime and bring greater transparency to business and real estate markets – in the coming years. Findings of this work will be published by 2028 for the ECCTA and by 2027 for ROE. DBT are also looking to repeat previous studies which aimed to put a value on the Companies House register once the ECCTA policies are fully implemented.

The Home Office also welcomes input from the wider academic and research community to help address the evidence gaps in this space. To support this, the Home Office and the NECC have published a document on ‘Areas of Research Interest for Economic Crime’. This document sets out the key research questions on economic crime. It aims to help external research partners and funding bodies identify our priorities when conducting new research and enhance the evidence base for policy development and operational enforcement.

Annex A: ECP2 Theory of Change

Annex A shows the Theory of Change (ToC) for the Economic Crime Plan 2 (ECP2). It provides a high-level summary of the activities being undertaken under each ECP2 sub-pillar, the causal pathways (indicated by arrows) and the anticipated outputs (milestones), outcomes and ultimate impacts.

A Theory of Change (ToC) is a tool used in policy making and evaluation to capture how an intervention is expected to work and achieve the desired outcomes.

Producing a ToC involves synthesising existing evidence and typically includes engaging and collaborating with a range of stakeholders including those involved in designing and executing the intervention.

Developing a ToC typically involves considering the proposed inputs (what actions will take place) and the causal chain that leads from these inputs through to the expected outputs and outcomes. It considers the causal mechanisms by which an intervention is expected to achieve its outcomes, basing this theory on the gathering and synthesis of evidence (Government Magenta Book).

ECP2 has 3 commitments (pillars):

• reduce money laundering and recover more criminal assets

• combat kleptocracy and drive down sanctions evasion

• cut fraud

And 2 cross-cutting outcomes:

• reduce the threat international finance poses to the UK and UK interests

• cross-cutting system capabilities and reform

While each sub-pillar involves distinct activity, outputs and outcomes, the ToC demonstrates how each of the ECP2 pillars collectively aim to contribute to the anticipated impacts and overall outcomes of ECP2.

The ToC is presented at a summary level and therefore does not include all ECP2 activity, outputs and outcomes.

1. The money laundering data from the criminal justice statistics was gathered using the Outcomes by Offence data tool for the principal offences and the All-Offence prosecutions and convictions data tool. The pivot tables in both data tools were filtered for the HO Offence codes from 03801 to 03809. ↩ ↩²

2. The fraud data from the criminal justice statistics was gathered using the Outcomes by Offence data tool. The pivot tables in both data tools were filtered for the Offence 51, 52, 53.4, 53.6, 53B.1, 53C, 53D, 53E and 53F. ↩ ↩²