Decision

Decision for Platinum Coach Hire Limited (PF1122675) and Mohammad Ahmed – transport manager

Published 26 October 2020

In the Eastern Traffic Area.

Confirmation of the Traffic Commissioner’s decision.

1. Background

Platinum Coach Hire Limited holds a Standard International Public Service Vehicle Operator’s Licence authorising 14 vehicles. The Director is Qamar Zaman (from 11 April 2016) and the Transport Manager is shown as Mohammad Ahmed, who has acted since grant of licence 10 April 2014 and was a Director until 11 April 2016.

There are two Operating Centres: Idressia Auto, High Wycombe, HP15 6LJ and P&W Commercials Ltd, High Wycombe HP15 6LJ. There are two declared maintenance contractors carrying out Preventative Maintenance Inspections at 6 weekly intervals: P & W Commercials Ltd and Ashwood Travel.

Platinum Coach Hire Ltd was originally incorporated on 11 July 2012 as UK Minibus Travel Ltd until a change of name on 3 March 2016.

The operator was called to a Public Inquiry on 21 January 2014 regarding the proposed Transport Manager, financial standing and the size of the Operating Centre. Following a change in Operating Centre and the director passing his CPC exam, the application proceeded to grant.

2. Hearing

The Public Inquiry was listed for today, 12 August 2020, in Tribunal Room 1 of the Office of the Traffic Commissioner in Cambridge. The operator was present in the form of Qamar Zaman, who appeared by video link. Mohammad Ahmed, Transport Manager, appeared in person. Both were represented by Mark Davies of Counsel, instructed by Harry Bowyer of Smith Bowyer Clarke. They were accompanied by a consultant. Mr Miles, whose attendance was not confirmed in advance.

3. Issues

The Public Inquiry was listed to allow the applicant opportunity to pursue its application and specifically in relation to the following sections of the Public Service Vehicles Act 1981:

• 17(3)(a) - statement where vehicles normally kept, comply with laws on driving and operation,
• 17(3)(aa) – undertakings on rules on driver’s hours and tachographs, vehicles to be fit & serviceable,
• 17(3)(e) material change including FPN:
• 17(1)(a) repute, financial standing, professional competence
• 17(3)(b) TM repute, Article 4, Schedule 3,
• 28 - disqualification.

Financial evidence was produced by email on 31 July 2020 consisting of online unverified bank statements covering April, May and June 2020, a copy of an email from the bank confirming the availability of a sum and a company credit card statement for July 2020. Additional and admissible evidence was produced at the hearing and found to meet the prescribed sum.

The operator served a copy of an audit dated 4 August 2020 on the Office of the Traffic Commissioner on 7 August 2020. Mr Miles then attended the hearing, at the invitation of the operator.

On 10 August 2020 the OTC was informed that the Director was due to arrive from Pakistan on the afternoon before the Public Inquiry. He was apparently tested before being permitted to depart but Pakistan is not on the Government list of exempt countries and is therefore required to quarantine for 14 days. A statement served at 11 am on the day before the Public Inquiry suggested that the Director has been resident in Pakistan since December 2019. It is clear from the bank correspondence that correspondence is addressed to Mr Ahmed, not the Director. At no point was this communicated to the OTC prior to that statement. In order for the operator to be present I was forced to allow the attendance of this Director by way of video link.

The operator’s audit asserts that there was no reason to contact the OTC prior to the DVSA stop. It has not occurred to the operator that I should be notified of the Director’s absence. The preparation of this case and notification to the tribunal leaves something to be desired. It is particularly unfortunate when attendance of staff at the tribunal is necessarily limited and places an unnecessary burden on the administration.

4. Summary of Evidence

A roadside check at Canterbury on 1 August 2019 showed periods in the previous 28 days where the vehicle had been driven without a drivers’ card inserted and where the tachograph had been manually set to ‘out of scope’. DVSA Inquiries were extended, which revealed two additional daily rest offence and one of exceeding 4.5hrs driving without required breaks.

On 6 November 2019, the Traffic Examiner, Paul Clarke, visited the operator when he met with Mr Ahmed. The following shortcomings (page 64 onwards) were identified:

• Drivers are given verbal training regarding general rules. Drivers are issued with driver’s hours booklets, but these are not signed for.
• CPC records are held for each driver but the expiry dates are not updated.
• Driving licences are checked every 12 months.
• Drivers are not following their schedule, sometimes deciding to start early and on one occasion liaised with the client directly to start early.
• Printouts are not being produced by drivers.
• Driver cards are not being downloaded every 28-days, one driver was 11 days behind with downloading. She had been allowed to work after card should have been downloaded.
• Infringement reports were seen but undated.
• Verbal warnings have been issued to drivers, but no written records have been kept.

The operator was asked to produce all downloaded data from 1 July 2019 to 30 September 2019. The data was analysed and the following infringements were identified (pages 74-77):

• 2 x weekly rest offences
• 3 x daily rest offences
• 2 x exceeding 4.5hrs driving rule
• 4 x mode switch offences
• 9 x vehicle driven when no driver card was inserted.

The infringements involved Drivers Asam Iqbal (no longer employed), Adeel Ali (no longer employed), Geoffrey Pryke (no longer employed), Zahid Khan, Taslim Bibi (no longer employed), Rehial Riaz, Raja Ashfaq, Abid Hussain (no longer employed), and the Director, Qamar Zaman. Periods of driving with no digital card inserted were recorded on units for DG58UCF, FJ60EGX, PO19CCE, PO68CCD, BF16XRG, PO14ASX (stolen in November from outside a driver’s house), BJ15BDX, RX12HBD. Two more vehicles have now been acquired BV69LMU and FJ09MDU.

The response to the request for an explanation dated 9 May 2020 indicates that the transport manager was booked for refresher training on 28 and 29 May 2020. This was apparently booked in January 2020, but it was delayed, whilst sufficient candidates were gathered, in order to run the course (in the name of another operator). I was also informed that drivers had completed a training course provided by A-class on drivers’ hours in January 2020. The response referred to 9 certificates (for drivers, the TM and the director) of attendance on a Driver Skills, Tachograph and Work Time Directive course provided by A Class on 26 January 2020.

The response indicates that the operator had decided not to remain with Tachomaster software but had opted for Webfleet GPS instead. That allows utilisation of the Disccheck system. This was preferred as it ‘integrates’ with tachograph analysis software. I was provided with a screen print of the tracking system. The response tells me that the vehicles were downloaded automatically on a weekly basis and that the driver card was downloaded at the end of shift. In this way the drivers will have access to an app on their mobile telephones which will tell them when their weekly rest is due. The operator was apparently still using coach manager as the main booking system but intended to cross check those arrangements with the GPS system before allocating work. That was to be checked by the office controller and Transport Manager before dispatch. The operator indicated that drivers had been given strict instructions not to take vehicles home with them. I was provided with driver declarations to that effect. The operator also referred me to 3 infringement reports for February 2020 and a summary for March showing no infringements.

I was asked to accept assurances that vehicles are not hired out and that the incident on 28 July 2019 was a one off. The director sought to correct his interview under caution and finally stated that the driver was not in fact an employee of the operator but that he was covered by their insurance policy. The incident was described as a family outing, which would never occur again. Driver Manzor apparently failed to use a driver card as instructed. I have read the email exchanges appended to the TE’s statement and noted his understandable scepticism. In evidence it has emerged that there is no certainty that he was in fact covered by the company insurance, as he was not an employee.

In his statement of 10 August 2020, the Transport Manager, suggests that he was shocked by the number of infringements found. This can only suggest to me that he failed to exercise effective and continuous management. It is a clear inference from the statement that he was aware that drivers were taking the vehicles home and not parking where the operator told me they would be normally kept. He readily admits that it was only the visit of the Traffic Examiner, which has made him address the identified shortcomings. He has only now invested in a vehicle unit download system and commissioned an audit report. That too was served late but identified issues with the maintenance provision, which the Transport Manager should have identified. The Transport Manager states ‘with confidence that Platinum Coach Hire Ltd is a different business’. I do not currently share that level of confidence.

I am told in evidence that the pandemic has had a significant effect on this operator. At the same time, I am asked to accept that the Director has maintained oversight whilst family circumstances have detained him abroad. However, the coaches have been off the road since March 2020.

The one immediate ‘S’ roadworthiness prohibition issued for a road spring on CN08 ZVA in the last five years, is a matter of record, page 220. In addition, six vehicles PMI records were emailed. On my dip sampling I observed: DG58UCF – PMIs for 15 July 2019 to 10 February 2020, with rolling brake tests on each occasion. Very few defects recorded but on 28 August 2019 a couple of bulbs replaced which might have been detected by drivers. Not one of the forms contained a signed declaration of roadworthiness, with no contractor’s stamp. All of the inspections were completed by reference to standards dating from 2013. I would make similar observations in respect of FJ09NDU, where I have seen PMI forms (but no driver defect reports) from 25 July 2019 to 10 February 2020. The inspection on 3 January 2020 refers to inoperative washers – the bottle needed filling, 22 November 2019, bulbs replaced and seatbelt casing missing, 9 October 2019, seatbelt not retracting, entry step light inoperative, ‘advised’ off-side front tyre worn on outer edge. Brake pads were apparently left between the July and August inspections. Again, no VOR record has been produced. A number of inspection records are wrongly stamped with Ashwood Travel, the contractor. I am told that the contractor is operating itself under the management of a Tom Murphy.

The audit report does not identify the sources of the tabulated conclusions. I can attach limited weight to its content as it appears that the auditor secured the contract to provide that refresher training, namely over the last two days (10 and 11 August 2020), with a certificate seen. I note the auditor’s belief that with some additional guidance and support ‘Mr Ahmed will make a good transport manager in the very near future’ but the approach has been very casual to date. Mr Ahmed told me that inspection forms are being returned after the vehicle, which might explain why the declaration of roadworthiness has not become an issue. He told me that he was not aware that it needed to be signed, until my questioning today.

The previous experience in the taxi and private hire sectors has not equipped the Transport Manager to ensure compliance. As the auditor has identified, this is his first position as a Transport Manager and his first role within a PSV operation. In reality he has also been running this business since late November 2019 and at a time of considerable stress for all those in the coach industry. The weekly calls with his uncle., Mr Zaman, have not resulted in oversight that produced compliance. In an absence of required systems and processes, the auditor’s comments about the ability to follow advice are slightly tempered. The statutory duty does not require someone who will react to advice when some-one else intervenes. It requires a Transport Manager to be able to effectively and continuously manage the transport operation.

The audit report usefully summarises the DVSA recommendations, which have been acted upon:

• driving licence checks are more frequently carried out.
• investment in an automated VU and Driver card downloading system.
• additional training.
• an immediate stop to drivers taking vehicles home and put this in writing to the drivers.

However, drivers continue to be ‘self-employed’ so were not furloughed but the lack of ability to discipline is evident from the circumstances outlined above.

5. Decision

On the evidence summarised above, I am satisfied that I should made adverse decisions under sections 17(3)(a), 17(3)(aa), 17(3)(e).

The circumstances around the use of BJ15 BDX on 28 July 2019 to a driver, “Mansoor” whilst covered by the operator’s insurance required explanation but that explanation changed.

The initial roadside encounter is of some age now but identified incidents of driving without a card. Further analysis prompted the TE investigation which identified repeat offending. Infringement reports were apparently produced and put to drivers but with no other action taken. That is particularly concerning given the mixture of driver and operator offences that were subsequently identified. I noted: the reliance on verbal training for drivers and reliance on a booklet but that was not signed for; a failure to update CPC dates; that driving licences were only checked once a year; the reliance on ‘Coach Manager’ and the concerns expressed by the TE about the allocation of work, with drivers doing their own thing; a failure to produce printouts; despite having 28 day downloads, driver Bibi was 11 days behind; and a failure to manage agency drivers.

In 2001/074 B E Clark the Transport Tribunal indicated that adherence to the rules relating to drivers’ hours is fundamental to road safety.

The explanations identified by the Transport Manager do not suggest continuous and effective management. I also note that vehicle lists are specified on the O/L so that OCRS is more meaningful. However, the operator cannot claim to have cooperated with this office when Directions are ignored but again this reflects the lack of appreciation but also the current position in the market. Mr Ahmed was the only person from the company present on site at the time of the audit, due to COVID 19. The Director was stuck in Pakistan so I have had no prior contact with Mr Zaman.

I am satisfied that there has been ineffective management control and insufficient or no systems and procedures in place to prevent operator licence compliance failings, there has been ineffective analysis procedures in place to detect drivers’ hours (EC & domestic) infringements. There has been ineffective or insufficient driver training with insufficient or ineffective monitoring and disciplinary procedures put in place. That is mitigated in part by the willingness to change and the formal promises to do so. I am obliged to view the lack of action in the context of the pandemic restrictions. This is the first Public Inquiry. If those actions are now taken and the Transport Manager exercises the statutory duty, then there is some future for this operation.

I must be able to trust the operator to comply - 2006/277 Fenlon:

It has been said on many occasions that trust is one of the foundation stones of operator licensing. Traffic Commissioners must be able to trust operators to comply with all the relevant laws, rules and regulations because it would be a physical and financial impossibility to police every aspect of the licensing system all day and every day. In addition operators must be able to trust other operators to observe the relevant laws, rules and regulations. If trust between operators breaks down and some operators believe that others are obtaining an unfair commercial advantage by ignoring laws, rules or regulations then standards will inevitably slip and the public will suffer.

As the Upper Tribunal has recently identified in 2019/025 John Stuart Strachan t/a Strachan Haulage: “one of the aims of the regime is deterrence, both for the appellant and for operators as a whole, who might be tempted to flout the system”.

I weigh the following undertakings into the balance:

• Compliance Audit – 6 months, will need to check the following;
• Drivers will be employed by the operator with contracts and disciplinary processes;
• There must be effective oversight with key performance indicators to ensure full compliance. I noted that Mr Ahmed will be appointment as a Director, hopefully by 1 September 2020.

The repute of the operator is severely tarnished, as is that of Mr Ahmed as Transport Manager. There is a clear need for deterrent action so as to ensure future compliance and in a way which has a material impact on the operator. I listened carefully to the business plan and details of the reduced contractual obligations. I understand that 9 vehicles are in possession with 5 discs, which have not been returned. The licence will be curtailed to 7 vehicles with effect from 23:45 today, 12 August 2020. The operator has 7 days to update the list of vehicles on the record and to return 6 discs to the office in Cambridge (one having been stolen with a vehicle, and not reported).

RT/TC/12/8/20