Decision

Decision for Lincolnshire Road Car Company Ltd

Published 11 December 2024

0.1 IN THE EASTERN TRAFFIC AREA

1. LINCOLNSHIRE ROAD CAR COMPANY LTD – PF0007038

2. TRANSPORT MANAGER 1 – ZACHARY McASKILL

3. TRANSPORT MANAGER 2 – SAMUEL SMITH

4. TRANSPORT MANAGER 3 – DAVID SKEPPER

5. DRIVER: JOHN TIMOTHY SEWELL

6. DRIVER: IVO MATOS

7. CONFIRMATION OF THE DEPUTY TRAFFIC COMMISSIONER’S DECISION

8. Introduction

This conjoined public inquiry, first listed for 10.00am on 15 October 2024, relates to a bridge strike incident that occurred on 14 June 2024 at Marsh Lane, Misterton, Doncaster and caused by the driver Mr John Timothy Sewell who was driving a passenger carrying vehicle (PCV) on behalf of the operator: Lincolnshire Road Car Company Ltd trading as Stagecoach East Midlands. The original purpose of the inquiry was to consider allegations that the Operator, holding Licence PF0007038, had acted contrary to the provisions of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (PPVA 1981); whether its Transport Manager, Zachary McAskill, met the requirements of good repute and professional competence; and to consider the vocational entitlement of John Sewell under the Road Transport Act 1988. The Operator and Transport Manager were to be represented at the inquiry by solicitors, Backhouse Jones Ltd.

On 3 October 2024, Backhouse Jones Ltd emailed the Office of the Traffic Commissioner (OTC) [558-566] with a report on a further bridge strike that had occurred on 19 September 2024 at Wharton Road, Blyton, Gainsborough. This incident had been reported to the OTC on 20 September 2024 [567-568]. In the light of the latest bridge strike and the need to ensure that these associated matters were dealt with efficiently and without repetition, I adjourned the hearing until 11:00 am on 11 November 2024. The Operator’s two other nominated transport managers: Mr Samuel Smith and Mr David Skepper were also called to the inquiry along with driver Mr Ivo Matos.

Appearing before me was Matthew Cranwell, the Operator’s Managing Director; the three nominated transport managers: Zackary McAskill, referred to as an Operations Director; David Skepper, as the Commercial Director, and Samuel Smith, referred to as the Engineering Director. However, while the Transport Managers are referred to within their organisation as directors, it is only Mr Cranwell that is currently listed at Companies House as one of three company directors. Mr Cranwell was the only company director attending the public inquiry. The Operator was represented by James Backhouse of Backhouse Jones Ltd. Driver Ivo Matos also attended along with John Sewell who appeared by video link.

9. Background

The full history of this matter is within the inquiry and driver conduct briefs with a concise background in the inquiry case summary [4-6] and the letters of 30 August 2024 calling the Operator and the Transport Manager to the inquiry [I6-23]. I do not repeat the history and background here. In outline, the Operator was granted a Public Service Vehicle (PSV) Standard International Licence (Licence PF0007038) authorising 270 vehicles on 21 August 1991, it currently has 220 vehicles in its possession. There is also a linked PSV Licence PB0001484 authorising 460 vehicles.

On 20 June 2017 the Operator and Transport Manager, David Skepper, were called to a public inquiry on licences PB0001484 and PF0007038 in relation to maintenance and a traffic incident. The Operator was issued with a warning and no further action in relation to Mr Skepper.

On 17 March 2021, the Operator was called to a preliminary hearing under licence PB0001484 in relation to a bridge strike. The Operator was issued with a warning by TC Tim Blackmore, who added that it was a ‘soft marker’ against the licence [533].

On 2 March 2022, another of the Operator’s vehicles was involved in a bridge strike relating to licence PF0007038. A letter of 27 August 2022 from the OTC stated that:

• “The Traffic Commissioner has noted the contents of your letter and no action will be taken with regards this matter. It has been retained on file and may be taken into account if the Traffic Commissioner eve has to consider disciplinary action against the company’s licence in the future.”

In 2021 and 2022 the Traffic Commissioners were referred to the developing new technology that intended to reduce bridge strike incidents. This technology called GreenRoad was rolled out across the Operator’s business and I understand across Stagecoach as a whole from 2022. I was told that GreenRoad is a complex technology which once set up and running includes providing loud aural warnings to drivers as they are driving towards a low bridge. The warning alarm increases with intensity when the vehicle is very close to a low bridge.

The 14 June 2024 bridge strike occurred at 07:25 am and related to the same bridge as the 2022 incident. There was one passenger on the bus at the time. Mr Sewell, the driver, was interviewed after the event and was dismissed on 24 June 2024. Mr Graham Renshaw who signed off Mr Sewell’s training record has since resigned.

I am informed that the 19 September 2024 bridge strike occurred at 16:27 hours and was on a school service with 20 passengers. Mr Matos was a newly qualified driver and was accompanied by his mentor, Mr Stuart Naylor. In the light of the incident Mr Matos was suspended pending an internal investigation and Mr Naylor was summarily dismissed.

10. The call to Public Inquiry

The call-in letter referred to potential breaches of the following provisions of the Public Passenger Vehicles Act 1981 (PPVA 1981):

• section 17(3)(aa) and failing to honour undertakings given on the licence including those relating to the driving and operation of vehicles used under the licence would be observed;
• section 17(3)(b) and a breach of licence conditions
• section 17(3)(c) and that prohibition notices have been issued;
• section 17(3)(e) and that there has been a material change in circumstances that the traffic commissioner would wish to be satisfied about.

The call-in letters sent to Mr McAskill, Mr Smith and Mr Skepper explained that the inquiry would consider whether they continued to meet the requirements to be of good repute and can accordingly exercise effective and continuous management of a transport operation in accordance with the provisions of Schedule 3 of the PPVA 1981.

I explained at the outset of the hearing that the key concerns for the inquiry were understanding how the two recent bridge strikes occurred; the extent of any failure to honour undertakings and/or the breach of conditions and in particular that the laws relating to the driving and operation of vehicles used under the licence are observed; the management of drivers including new drivers and the role of mentors and line managers.

11. The evidence

I heard oral evidence from Mr Sewell and Mr Matos the two drivers, from Mr McAskill and Mr Cranwell and also from Mr Smith and Mr Skepper who broadly accepted and adopted everything that was said by Mr McAskill and Mr Cranwell. I had also read the transcripts of the various interviews with the drivers and their line managers as part of the internal disciplinary procedures along with the reports prepared by Backhouse Jones Ltd following the Operator’s internal investigations. I had already reviewed many of the policy and training documents provided by the Operator, although some of these were considered only briefly. As indicated at the hearing, there were around 1,000 pages of documents relating to the hearing.

11.1 The 14 June 2024 bridge strike

Mr Sewell told of his experience as an HGV driver for around four years prior to joining the Operator and training to be a PCV driver. He set out and reaffirmed much of what was said in his interviews although he was able to expand on certain aspects noting that the transcripts were non-verbatim accounts and did not include certain matters surrounding the events. He explained the extent of his training prior to the bridge strike and also that he had been signed off as a driver after being supervised on just 12 of 37 routes. Having been signed off, he offered to drive on a bus route that he had not been supervised on but completed the service without incident. Bolstered with confidence of being able to work on routes he had not previously been supervised on, Mr Sewell offered to work on route DC7, and which led to the bridge strike. He explained that he did this in order to obtain gain some overtime. He also felt that he would be helping his employer out by offering to cover a route. However, once he had offered to drive on this particular route he started to have second thoughts and hoped that he would be persuaded by his colleagues to reconsider taking that route, or that someone else would step in to take the route. Unfortunately, this did not happen and he drove the bus on route DC7.

The events surrounding the bridge strike itself were explained by Mr Sewell. He had become anxious about the route and being on the right course. This was a cause of stress and was aggravated by other causes of stress in his personal life. He was aware that he was heading for the low bridge and that he heard the low bridge alarm but, convinced he was on the right route, he continued along the road and scraping the roof of the bus on the underside of the bridge. He considered that the bridge alarm related to another bridge in close proximity and simply felt he had to continue on the route. After the bridge strike he continued with the service only reporting the incident when he returned to the depot. This was contrary to the Operator’s bridge strike policy which included the need for preventative action, caution and contact with the operator if there was any doubt that a vehicle could have difficulty in travelling under a bridge. Mr Sewell also failed to comply with the policy that on causing a bridge strike a driver was required to call Network Rail and the Operating Centre and take instructions as to next steps. He described the incident as almost as if he was a passenger in the vehicle looking on; knowing that the incident may arise but continuing anyway. He believed that his personal circumstances may have also been a distraction.

I was informed that there were no adverse external social or economic consequences arising from the incident; that is to say, trains were not delayed, the bridge itself was not damaged, and neither the police nor the DVSA were involved in the incident or any follow-up.

The investigation of the incident led by Mr McAskill discovered that Mr Sewell had been signed off after being trained on just a third of routes. It also found that his sign-off records included confirmation that a sign-off meeting had taken place when it had not. This had been carried on by Mr Sewell’s supervisor, Mr Renshaw. Mr McAskill explained to me during the hearing that Mr Renshaw had appeared to have fraudulently completed Mr Sewell’s development records. The interview with Mr Renshaw suggests at [171] that he may have been falsifying paperwork.

Mr Sewell stated that he regretted the incident and has continued to do so ever since. He was interviewed the next working day after the bridge strike and then suspended for around a week until the disciplinary hearing a week later; thereafter he was summarily dismissed on 24 June 2024. Mr Sewell explained that he had returned to HGV driving immediately after his suspension. However, on receipt of his notification of the driver conduct hearing in a letter of 30 August 2024 he had stopped all vocational driving and was carrying out agency work in coordinating HGV transport.

While the direct responsibility of the bridge strike of the 14 June 2024 lays with Mr Sewell, this was aggravated by errors of judgment in his management and supervision. Mr Sewell’s over-confidence in offering himself up for routes he was not trained for coupled with a lack of sufficient close supervision formed part of the factual matrix surrounding the incident.

11.2 The 19 September 2024 bridge strike

The bridge strike involving Mr Matos was factually quite different but had a common component of inappropriate supervision. The transcripts of interviews detail the events leading up to this bridge strike. Mr Matos clarified a number of matters in leading up to the incident, the strike itself and events in the following weeks.

Mr Matos had held an ordinary driving licence for around 25 years although he had never driven professionally whether in buses, heavy goods or otherwise. He joined the Operator because he wanted to work in a role where he would be able to help others. At the start of his employment he went through around two weeks of what may be regarded as induction training and then started to learn to drive buses. He passed his driving test after a further two weeks and then progressed onto ‘Types’ training which started with driving within the depot and also included matters such as ticket machine training and so on. Mr Matos then started to drive outside the depot. I was told he had undertaken one supervised trip a day or two before the day of the bridge strike and that he had passed his category D test on 13 September 2024.

Mr Matos had been assigned a mentor to ride with him on the services; this was Mr Stuart Naylor. Mr Naylor had many years of driving experience with the Operator. However, on 20 August 2024, Mr Naylor was informed by the DVLA that his application for a vocational licence had been refused for health reasons. According to the Operator, from 25 August 2024 Mr Naylor commenced a non-driving role assisting Leading Drivers with customer enquiries. Then the week commencing 1 September 2024 he began a mentoring role. He completed the mentor of one other new driver a week before being assigned to Mr Matos on 18 September 2024. However, as far as Mr Naylor was concerned he has subsequently stated that he was not a mentor. Mr Naylor was dismissed by the Operator on 2 October 2024. Mr Naylor stated that he was unable to attend the inquiry because he had had a stroke on 22 October 2024 due to the stress in the way the Operator had dealt with his dismissal.

I understand that on the day of the bridge strike Mr Matos was available to drive on bus services providing he was accompanied by an experienced driver who knew the routes. Mr Naylor was considered to be an experienced driver, but was, due to his health, unable to drive a bus.

The afternoon of 19 September Mr Matos and Mr Naylor began on route 526 a school service with 20 passengers on board. However, the route included a road closure, Mr Matos at interview explained that:

• “We did the school run, we drove towards Gainsborough, then we were on a road and a sign the road was closed, I asked my mentor, and he advised to keep going the road will not be closed, we passed a second sign saying the road was closed, he told me to keep going after the second sign, we reach the point to where the road was closed.

• I stopped the bus, I told him that we should contact the Depot for advice, and he told me that there was nothing else to do but to reverse the bus, he told me that if I couldn’t do it, then he would do it. But knowing that he couldn’t drive, I didn’t let him.

• He then went outside to assist me reversing, I then heard a loud noise and the air tank fell off, he contacted the depot , and we waited for the engineering and kept the passengers safe, when the replacement bus arrived, I took the students to the bus, the mentor stayed with the engineers, I waited for him to return and then we started the route that he told me to follow.” [579]

Mr Naylor and Mr Matos continued on the school service. The transcript of interview by Paul McKenna, the Operator’s Operations Manager, of Mr Matos (IM) explains the events immediately leading to the bridge strike:

“…

PM Q2      Did you or your mentor check the diversion notice board? Or read the Blink chat with the diversion on?

IM             I didn’t.

PM           Do you know if your mentor did?

IM             No, I can’t say, I don’t know the road names. I was just following my mentors guidance

PM Q3      Why did you go on that route towards the low bridge?

IM             Because, I followed my mentor’s instructions, I do not know the routes.

PM Q4      Why did you not notice the low bridge sign, on the lead up to the bridge?

IM             I was stressed with the situation, I was concentrating on the road and missed the sign.

PM           Did your mentor say anything about the sign?

IM             No.

PM Q5      Why did you ignore the low bridge alarm system?

IM             The alarm system was sounding on the way towards the bridge, but it had also sounded when we’d been at the roadworks near the other bridge.

PM           Did your mentor comment on the alarm?

IM             No.

PM Q6      Why after stopping before the bridge did you continue towards it?

IM             Because my mentor told me the bus would fit.

PM           We have CCTV footage, do you wish to view this?

IM            No, I know what happened.

PM Q7      You appear to be discussing with the mentor just before proceeding towards the bridge, what was said?

IM             I was telling him that I think the bus will not fit, and I was checking for visible signs of the bridge height.

PM Q8      What was said on the phone to Ben Taylor when you called him after reaching the road closed sign?

IM             I do not know, my mentor spoke to him.

PM Q9      When you were stuck at the road closed sign Ben asked you both to call him back once the replacement vehicle had arrived, why did you not do this?

IM             Because my mentor was dealing with this.

PM Q10    What did the engineer say to you?

IM             He didn’t say anything to me, he was talking to my mentor.

PM           Did you hear any instructions regarding a diversion route?

IM             No.

The day after the interview, Mr Matos was suspended from duties. Around a week later his suspension was lifted and he was given a final writing warning for 12 months. He has not been driving since, although he has been supporting the Operator and helping to provide training to other drivers on matters such as bridge strikes.

I am told that this second bridge strike incident happened at a very low speed of around 3 mph; that no injuries were sustained to the 20 passengers on board; that there was minimal damage to the bus limited to upstairs glass and a tree bar; that Network Rail who attended the scene confirmed that there was no damage to the bridge, and that there was no Police involvement although they were notified. I was not told of any delays to rail services as a result of the incident.

11.3 Pre and post bridge strike action by the Operator

The written reports from the Operator of 11 July 2024 [138-143] and 3 October 2024 [558-566] together with the supporting documents helped me to better understand the factual context of the bridge strikes, including many of the Operator’s post-incident actions. The oral evidence from the Operator expanded upon this, including an extensive list of training measures for drivers to seek to address the concern and to avoid bridge strikes in the future. Most of the actions were set out in an itemised list prepared by the Operator at [815-816].

Mr McAskill as Operations Director was the Transport Manager with the primary responsibility for addressing the concerns. He took direct action and was involved in overseeing the investigations of the incidents. He was the primary witness for the Operator. Mr Skepper (as the Operator’s Commercial Director) and Samuel Smith (as its Engineering Director) agreed with Mr McAskill’s evidence and supported his actions. Similarly, Mr Cranwell as the Operator’s Managing Director, approved Mr McAskill’s actions and accepted his evidence.

I was informed that the geographical area covered by the Operator has a particularly high number of low bridges. I was told that this may be, in part, due to socio-historical factors as an industrial area and the need to incorporate a network of rail routes across the locality. Whatever, the reason, I accept that this bus area has to contend with a comparatively large number of low bridges compared to other areas. To provide more context the Operator’s two licences authorise over 700 vehicles. Mr Cranwell clarified that the operator currently employs over 1,100 drivers.

Overall, the Operator’s driver training in place prior to the bridge strikes appeared to me to be comprehensive and had a series of checks and balances in place to ensure that the information provided to drivers was received. This included low bridge training as part of the initial driver inductions, staff handbook and low bridge handbooks, the use of low-bridge technology, toolbox talks given by engineers to drivers, a ‘think bridge’ training course with signed driver declarations of course completion, printed warnings about low bridges, poster campaigns and so on [815]. I accept that both Mr Sewell and Mr Matos had received bridge strike training.

The post-incident training and additional actions included each driver being issued with a pocket guide on drivers hours and bridge heights; bridge strike audits carried out every six months; safety memos issued on bridges with staff sign off; a mentor overhaul with the use of a five step plan including annual mentor refresher training, mentor monitoring and random covert checks [816].

Mr McAskill explained that he considered the established training coupled with the latest measures were extensive and were likely to be more comprehensive than most other operators. However, he added that as well as the continuing training and observations of drivers, the Operator felt it was necessary to try to understand how some employees were still taking decisions that were contrary to their training and the awareness raising that was in place. It was for this reason that the Operator had recently decided to pursue some Occupational Psychology Centre research to look at behaviour. In particular, the Operator wanted to better understand why an employee may ignore a low bridge alarm and may not take preventative or precautionary action when the alarm engaged, and why he or she may make driving decisions contrary to training. Looking at the specific incidents, the Operator wanted to understand why Mr Sewell and Mr Naylor would take driving decisions that were contrary to the training, guidance and advice provided and why they would ignore the alarms notifying them of a dangerous situation.

12. Burden and standard of proof

As this is an existing licence, the burden is on me to be satisfied that there is sufficient evidence as against the civil standard of proof, (i.e. on the balance of probabilities or more likely than not) before making an adverse finding. Applying those standards to the evidence before me I have made the following findings of fact

13. Findings of fact

I found that all the witnesses I heard were credible and to be believed. I accept that Mr Sewell was probably trying to impress his new employer and was genuinely trying to help out when the Operator was seeking to cover all services. I also find that he probably was over-confident. I am of the view that he did not act responsibly in continuing to drive under a low bridge when a low-bridge alarm had been activated. I am also concerned that as a new driver had already appeared to take the view that there were occasions when it was acceptable to ignore the low-bridge alarm. The approach should be one of precaution and, as the Stagecoach guidance on preventing bridge strikes states: “Stop - If you find yourself off route, stop in a safe place.” [770]. I am further concerned that Mr Sewell continued driving on the route after the bridge strike and failed to notify the Operator and Network Rail immediately. This is contrary to the Operator’s policy and to good practice for all drivers, especially vocational drivers, who need to drive to high driving standards for the benefit of all road users.

The above said, I felt that Mr Sewell’s approach to his vocational driving responsibilities may well have been encouraged by the very casual and cavalier attitude and approach of his line manager, Mr Renshaw. Mr McAskill’s view was much stronger in terms of suggesting Mr Renshaw had been falsifying paperwork. Overall, I find that while the Operator seeks to distance itself from Mr Sewell, through the vicarious actions of Mr Renshaw it bears some responsibility for Mr Sewell’s decision-making. Mr Sewell was signed off as ready for routes when this was premature and was likely to encourage a false sense of over-confidence in Mr Sewell as a PCV driver. There is a reason why the training and induction should be extensive and comprehensive and to short circuit this will risk further incidents again. Any research on behaviour should cover managers and those in responsibility as well as drivers to try to understand how driver management may influence driver culture.

For Mr Matos, I find him to be a very responsible and cautious driver who was placed in an unfair position by someone who was given responsibility for guiding him; namely Mr Naylor. He properly questioned the incorrect driver judgements of Mr Naylor in considering it acceptable to drive when he was not permitted to do so and deciding a bus should not proceed under a low bridge when it should not.  While I do not doubt Mr Naylor had a good record as a vocational driver, he did not act responsibly as someone being responsible for a very new driver.

Given the circumstances, I find that Mr Matos should bear no responsibility for the bridge strike of 19 September 2024. On the contrary, in my view, Mr Matos came across as an extremely responsible driver and employee. I understand that the Operator recognises this by asking Mr Matos to help with training and development of other drivers. Mr Matos is precisely the sort of driver that should be encouraged and rewarded for acting responsibly and be held out as a responsible driver to others.

In terms of Mr Naylor being a mentor, I find it surprising that the Operator’s criteria for being a mentor does not include being entitled to drive a bus. I would think that one of the key comforts for a very new driver such as Mr Matos would be that someone beside them could, if need be, actually get them out of a spot of driving bother. This was the position Mr Matos was in when they first went down the closed road on Mr Naylor’s poor guidance. He had to carry out a reversing manoeuvre when that was just the sort of thing an effective mentor/experience driver should have stepped in and taken over as a driver. It is credit to Mr Matos that he insisted that Mr Naylor should not drive if he did not have his PCV entitlement.

There is a further concern about Mr Naylor as a mentor and encouraging a new driver to repeatedly ignore road closure signs. This then goes to how it was that Mr Naylor was given the role to support Mr Matos. As with Mr Renshaw, I find the Operator to some extent vicariously liable for Mr Naylor’s errors and bad driving judgement. In correspondence, Mr Naylor noted that he was not ‘a mentor’.

However, even if he was, the practice and policy on mentoring appears in some way to be at fault.

14. Determination

Having regard to the above, I find that contrary to section 17(3)(aa) and/or section 17(3)(b) of the PPVA 1981 there has been breach of the following condition/undertaking of the licence that: ‘The laws relating to the driving and operation of vehicles used under the licence are observed; …’ [95]. This, in my view, arises as a result of Mr Naylor and Mr Renshaw failing to ensure that the new drivers they were responsible for were capable fully complying with the laws of the road including driving with reasonable consideration for other road users or fully driving with due care and attention. I do not go as far as finding that offences have been committed but the licence condition/undertaking requires the laws to be ‘observed’; which, taking an ordinary meaning, includes obeying, abiding by, or adhering to a law (see e.g. the Oxford English Dictionary accessed 26.11.24).

14.1 Relevant considerations (balancing exercise)

Having made the above findings of fact and legislative breaches, I consider the positive and negative factors of the case in deciding what regulatory action to take. I remind myself that paragraph 4 to the Senior Traffic Commissioner’s Statutory Document 10 provides that:

“The legislation exists to ensure the promotion of road safety and fair competition and traffic commissioners will have regard to the relevant decisions of the higher courts and the principle of proportionality in deciding what intervention is commensurate with the circumstances of each individual case.”

In terms of positive factors, as far as I understand, the recent bridge strikes did not result in any instances of personal injury and there was no significant damage to the buses. Nor have I been made aware of any disruption to rail services and there was prompt action by the Operator on learning of the incident. Moreover, the Operator has invested in technology to warn of bridges and I consider its driver training and information, pre and post bridge strikes to be comprehensive.

The negative factors are the fact that there are continuing bridge strikes. These include in 2021 when Traffic Commissioner Tim Blackmore OBE gave the operator a ‘soft warning’ [484-485] and again in 2022 when Traffic Commissioner Richard Turfitt stated that on that occasion there would be no further action. For the two recent bridge strikes I consider that there has been an act by a driver, Mr Sewell, that led to undue risk to road safety, and as a result of the actions or inactions of Mr Renshaw and Mr Naylor there has been ineffective management control together with insufficient driver training and/or ineffective monitoring. These amount to negative features found in Annex 4 of Statutory Document 10.

15. Decisions

In terms of the Operator, and taking into account the positive and negative factors and also the effect of regulatory action proposed on the business and, with reference to the suggested starting points of regulatory action found in Annex 4, Statutory Document 10, I find that this case may be regarded as moderate to low and I issue a strong formal warning to the Operator that if further incidents occur, more formal regulatory action could not be ruled out. In particular, it does need to address the concerns that some employees that have been given management responsibilities including the management of drivers have been taking unacceptable decisions. The Operator is aware of this. The Occupational Psychology Centre research that I am told it is pursuing may well be of value and provide some guidance as to how to address the ‘driver culture’ concern, which includes but may not be limited to ignoring vehicle alarms.

In relation to the Transport Managers, I find that all three retain their good repute. The bridge strikes are a continuing concern but I do not find that their collective management is less than continuous and effective. They do need to address the ‘driver culture’ and it is the case that they and the Operator are, ultimately, responsible for the actions of Mr Renshaw and Mr Naylor. They need to continue working on this.

In terms of driver conduct, I find that John Sewell bears much, but not all, of responsibility for the bridge strike. I have found that the circumstances were influenced to some degree by the management approach surrounding his sign-off by Mr Renshaw. Also, as indicated above, the indirect consequences of this strike were relatively minor. Further, I also take into account that Mr Sewell informed me that he had placed a self-imposed suspension on his professional driving since receiving his call-in letter sent on 30 August 2024 and that this matter has, through no fault of Mr Sewell’s, dragged on. It is some six months since the incident on 14 June 2024 Thus, having regard to the suggested starting points for regulatory action in Statutory Document 6: Driver Conduct, and taking into account his period of non-vocational driving over the last 3 months, I suspend his licence for a further month and until 23:45 hours on 27 December 2024.

For Ivo Matos, I find that he acted entirely properly in all respects and using my discretion, I decide that no action should be taken in relation to his licence. I hope that the Operator values what appears to me to be his maturity and judgement as a driver, employee and colleague and puts it good effect.

Dr Paul Stookes

Deputy Traffic Commissioner

27 November 2024