Decision

Decision for GS UK Transport Ltd (OD2017149) and Komalpreet Kaur - Transport Manager

Published 27 August 2024

0.1 In the West Midlands Traffic Area

1. Written Decision of the Traffic Commissioner

2. Public Inquiry held on 16 July 2024 at Birmingham

2.1 Operator: GS UK Transport Ltd (OD2017149) and Komalpreet Kaur -Transport Manager

3. BACKGROUND

GS UK Transport Ltd holds a standard national goods vehicle operator’s licence that was granted on 18 December 2018. It currently authorises 6 vehicles and 3 trailers with 5 vehicles in possession. The directors are Dilpreet Singh and Karanjit Kaur. The transport manager was Komalpreet Kaur who is the wife of Dilpreet Singh.

As a result of an immediate and “S” marked prohibition (the “S” denotes a significant failure in maintenance) being issued at MOT on 14 March 2024 the Driver and Vehicle Standards Agency (“DVSA”) undertook an announced Maintenance Investigation Visit Report (“MIVR”) on 27 March 2024. That report was scored the operator’s maintenance compliance as being unsatisfactory. As a result the operator, and transport manager (as she was then) were called to a public inquiry on 16 July 2024 by call up letter and case management directions dated 10 June 2024.

An application to add a new transport manager, Mr Tarvinderjit Grewal, was submitted by the operator. Mr Grewal was invited to the hearing.

4. PUBLIC INQUIRY ON 18 JULY 2024

Only one director, Mr Dilpreet Singh, attended along with transport manager Komalpreet Kaur and the proposed transport manager Mr Tarvinderjit Grewal. Neither the operator nor the transport manager were represented.

An interpreter was also present. They had been provided by the Office of the Traffic Commissioner. During the hearing the clerk, Mrs Johal, also assisted in translating as she is fluent in the same first language for Mr Dilpreet Singh. She assisted to explain the technical terms that the tribunal appointed interpreter was not familiar with.

I heard evidence from everyone present. I also heard from Mr Dilpreet Singh about the effect of regulatory action that may be taken against the licence.

Both Dilpreet Singh and Komalpreet Kaur were given the opportunity to address me in closing remarks before I reserved my decision into writing.

5. BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF

The burden of proof was upon the DVSA and the Office of the Traffic Commissioner to prove any allegations made against the operator/transport manager. The standard of proof was the civil law standard; the balance of probabilities. In other words what was more likely than not to be correct.

6. FINDINGS OF FACT

After applying the correct burden and standard of proof to the evidence before me I have made the following findings of fact.

All operators are responsible for ensuring that the general undertakings (formal and binding promises to the Traffic Commissioner) on the operator’s licence are fulfilled at all times. The general undertakings that this operator agreed to are detailed on pages 32 and 33 of the public inquiry bundle.

One of those general undertakings is to ensure that “Vehicles and trailers, including hired vehicles and trailers, are kept on a fit and serviceable condition.”

Part of the requirement to fulfil the above undertaking is for the vehicle to be presented for annual test; its MOT. That is the one day of the year, known about in advance, when the operator knows that the vehicle must meet the bare minimum level of roadworthiness in order to pass the MOT.

It is up to the operator who they use to service and repair their vehicles if they do not do the maintenance themselves. However, if an external maintenance provider is used the operator is still responsible for ensuring that the vehicles are properly maintained because it is the operator, and not the external maintenance provider, who has given the above undertaking to ensure that “Vehicles and trailers, including hired vehicles and trailers, are kept on a fit and serviceable condition.”

The DSVA publication “Guide To Maintaining Roadworthiness” (“GTMR”) has been in the public domain for over 10 years and is considered by the Upper Tribunal to be best practice. The Upper Tribunal in the appeal case of MGM Haulage and Recycling Ltd 2012 /030 made it clear that operators are deemed to know the advice and guidance that is in the public domain. That clearly includes the GTMR.

Paragraph 5.3 of the current GTMR deals with brake testing. That paragraph details brake testing at MOT and how all vehicles and trailers, since 01 January 2023, must be presented sufficiently laden at an MOT. That is because at an MOT a rolling road brake test will be undertaken and, as per the GTMR, for it to be meaningful the vehicle/trailer must be laden to at least 65% of its gross vehicle weight.

Paragraph 5.3 of the GTMR also points of the statutory requirement set out at regulation 18 of the Construction and Use Regulations 1986. The GTMR states:

“Operators must satisfy themselves that that the methods used to assess brake performance are sufficient to meet the requirements of Regulation 18 of The Road Vehicle (Construction and Use) Regulations 1986 18(1):

“Every part of every braking system and of the means of operation thereof fitted to a vehicle shall be maintained in good and efficient working order and be properly adjusted.”

It is required that brake test reports are reviewed and understood to ensure the brakes are working correctly.”

Therefore, pulling everything together so far, this operator was deemed to know that its vehicles would have a rolling road brake test at its MOT and this operator was responsible for ensuring that every part of every braking system was working properly so that the vehicle would pass the brake test at the MOT as part of the requirement to fulfil the general undertaking quoted in paragraph 15 above.

Vehicle PO64 DHN was presented for MOT on 14 March 2024 and at the MOT was issued with an immediate prohibition for a braking component defect and brake performance. The prohibition was issued with an “S” marking that, I find, demonstrated a significant failure in the maintenance of the vehicle.

Not only does this prohibition fly in the face of everything I have set out above with regards to the operator’s requirement to keep its vehicles in a fit and serviceable condition (because it could not even do that for the one day of the year it knew about in advance when its vehicle had to meet the bare minimum standard of roadworthiness) but the defects identified were clearly road safety critical in nature. Brakes are there for road safety and when they do not work properly, such as here, road safety is put at a significant risk.

The operator and transport manager cannot plead ignorance or blame the maintenance provider because at MOT on 30 September 2021 one of this operator’s vehicles, YN63 OYR, was presented for MOT and was issued with an immediate prohibition at that MOT for service brake performance.

As a result this operator/transport manager should have made absolutely certain that after 30 September 2021 all vehicles and trailers had a thorough and effective pre-MOT check/service and as part of that brakes were given particular attention to ensure (a) that every part of every braking system worked properly and (b) that having done so the vehicle passed the MOT and did not fail it for any brake related issue and under no circumstances should a further brake related prohibition have been issued at MOT after 30 September 2021.

The MIVR, and the findings in the report from vehicle examiner Mr Paul Matthews, were not challenged, or materially challenged, by the operator in the written response to it at pages 78 and 79 of the public inquiry bundle or at the public inquiry.

In any event I find that the MIVR was evidence based, credible, cogent and highly persuasive. I accepted it as such and have found that all of the allegations made by vehicle examiner Matthews are proven. I have adopted all of those proven allegations as my own findings of fact, principle amongst those findings are:

(a) The authorised operating centre at Cross Transport was not being used and two unauthorised operating centres at KSD Concrete and Weston Lawns Farm were being used; and
(b) Maintenance inspection records were not being properly completed; and
(c) Preventative maintenance inspections (“PMIs”) were not being completed on time; and
(d) There were no meaningful brake tests on the 3 vehicle files inspected for the previous 15 months apart from at MOT test (where the MOT tester tests the brakes as part of the MOT test, see above); and
(e) There was no effective driver defect reporting system in place with “…Numerous serious driver related defects being identified at PMI that should have been noticed by drivers during a satisfactory walk round check”; and
(f) The fact that those defects were found at the PMI and not by the driver meant the vehicle had been in service on a public road with those defects present, a clear risk to road safety; and
(g) An initial MOT failure rate of 36.84% compared to the national average of 12.18% (so just over three times higher than the national average) when the MOT was the one day of the year, known about in advance, when the vehicle had to meet the bare minimum standard of roadworthiness; and
(h) (see page 67 of the public inquiry bundle) The vehicle examiner determined that the transport manager had “no control” and that he had had no contact with the transport manager concluding that “…contact should have been made from the current transport manager.” I find that had the transport manager been effective (as per her statutory responsibility to have “effective and continuous management of the transport undertaking”) then the serious areas of non-compliance identified (and now proven) by the vehicle examiner would not have been present. Given that the MIVR was undertaken on an announced basis (normally 7 days notice is given) and given the transport manager is the wife of one of the directors there was no excuse for her not meeting with the vehicle examiner at the MIVR.

The operator and transport manager offered no persuasive excuse for the unlawful use of two unauthorised operating centres. A transport manager should know, as it is basic compliance, that only an authorised operating centre can ever be used. That is also spelt out on the actual operator’s licence at Note 6. It is also a general undertaking on the operator’s licence that states (see page 33 of the public inquiry bundle) “An unauthorised operating centre is not used in any traffic area.”

The use of an unauthorised operating centre is also a criminal offence contrary to section 7 of the Act which creates an “absolute” offence; an offence where knowledge does not have to be proven in order for the offence to be committed.  This operator, by its use of two unauthorised operating centres is found to have committed a significant number of offences contrary to section 7 of the Act until the application to add Weston Lawns as the new operating centre was received at the Central Licensing Office within the Office of the Traffic Commissioner on 02 April 2024 and the interim licence to use that address was granted on 11 April 2024 (with full grant being made in June 2024).

The failure to complete maintenance related documents properly is a breach of the following general undertaking on the operator’s licence; “Records are kept (for at least 15 months) of all driver reports that record defects, and all safety inspection, routine maintenance and vehicle repair reports, and that these are made available upon request.”

The lack of any meaningful brake tests for 15 months for the three vehicle files examined by vehicle examiner Matthews is alarming. As I have already stated, with statutory authority and best practice guidance, brakes are there to protect road safety and as a result if no meaningful brake tests are undertaken then the operator/transport manager does not know (as required by regulation 18 of the Construction and Use Regulations 1986) that every part of every braking system works properly. That failure by the operator/transport manager to have meaningful brake tests for 15 months created a significant risk to road safety for the whole of the 15 months of records looked at by the vehicle examiner.

The operator and transport manager tried to explain this by telling me that the mechanic was doing a “road test” and that they trusted the mechanic to know what they were doing. That argument is without foundation of any kind. First, I repeat all I have already said about brake testing in this decision and how paragraph 5.3 of the GTMR sets out clearly what types of brake testing are classed as “meaningful” and second (as I explained in the hearing) a road test will never, ever, tell you that every part of every braking system is working properly as is required to meet regulation 18 of the Construction and Use Regulations 1986. That is because the mechanic merely gets into a vehicle, drives it and then applies the brakes. Doing that cannot tell you, as the driver, that every wheel on each axle locked and it cannot tell you what the braking efficiency is for each axle. A road test cannot do that even if someone else is present because their visual observation will not be able to see what is happening to the braking components in each wheel or whether the wheel locked or what the braking efficiency for each axle is (notwithstanding they could only observe, at best, one side of the vehicle/trailer and one wheel at a time).

In addition, the Transport Tribunal (as it was then) stated in the appeal case of Alison Jones T/A Jones Motors L56 1999 that a director of a company that holds an operator’s licence has to “constantly monitor and supervise” all aspects of the transport business to ensure compliance. The Transport Tribunal explained that “constant monitoring and supervision” did not mean taking things at face value; it meant checking, scrutinising and challenging what people said and the paperwork they provided. Had there been any effective “constant monitoring and supervision” of the PMI sheets cross referenced to paragraph 5.3 of the GTMR then it would have been blindingly obvious to the transport manager and to the operator that brakes were not being properly checked at a meaningful brake test by the maintenance provider. The fact that the vehicle examiner found a full 15 months where the only meaningful brake test undertaken for the three vehicles he looked at was at the MOT speaks volumes to me about the lack of management control of the operator and the then transport manager.

The initial failure rate at MOT of 36.84% is a deep concern to me. Not only does it mean that vehicles were not being properly prepared for MOT it also means that the transport manager and operator had clearly failed to monitor the first time MOT pass rate. That is something that either of them could have done by looking at the OCRS (Operator Compliance Risk Score) online to see (a) the MOT history, (b) whether each MOT presentation was a “pass”, “fail” or “PRS” and (c) what each vehicle that failed an MOT failed for with details given of each defect. This online facility has been available to operators and transport managers for many years and it is common knowledge within the industry. There is absolutely no excuse for an operator/transport manager to allow its initial MOT failure rate to reach such a scary percentage as this.

The fact that more than a third of the vehicles presented for MOT failed first time meant (a) the MOT failure proved that the vehicle presented was not in a fit and serviceable condition and (b) that the vehicle had been in service, and on a public road, in that unroadworthy condition previously to the MOT.

Driver spottable defects should not be present at a PMI if drivers are doing an effective walk round inspection of the vehicle save for the rare occasion when a defect occurs spontaneously after the driver has undertaken the walk round inspection but before the PMI takes place. The proven allegation of vehicle examiner Matthews satisfied me that (a) drivers were not doing any, or any effective, walk round inspection
(b) serious driver related defects were not being rectified,
(c) the vehicle was in service on a public road with those driver spottable defects present that
(d) presented a real and ongoing risk to road safety.

Had the transport manager/operator effectively monitored this by looking at each PMI sheet, seeing if driver spottable defects were present and then cross referencing with the driver defect reporting sheet that immediately preceded the PMI then this issue would not/should not have been present.

The failure of drivers to properly undertake an effective walk round check of their vehicle meant the following general undertaking on the operator’s licence was breached; “Drivers report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and/or trailers, and that any defects are recorded in writing.”

The supplemental public inquiry statement dated 09 July 2024 from vehicle examiner Matthews considered the previous 3 months of maintenance related documents supplied by the operator/transport manager in response to the case management directions that accompanied the calling in letter. This supplemental statement clearly scored the operator as being unsatisfactory because the following areas of non-compliance identified in the MIVR were still present namely:

(a) Meaningful brake tests were still not always being undertaken; and
(b) Driver spottable defects were being found at PMI; and
(c) A vehicle that was not in a fit and serviceable condition was still being operated.

The operator and transport manager clearly had not read this up to date report properly, or at all, before the public inquiry. It was sobering reading and the following is but a sample of the non-compliant issues identified by vehicle examiner Matthews:

(a) Of the 12 PMIs looked at 8 either showed no brake test had been undertaken or there was insufficient load on one or more axles. Where there is insufficient load on an axle it takes less effort to lock the wheel on a rolling road brake test. Any wheel that locks will pass the test. That can be a “false pass” because it does not tell the operator/transport manager that the wheel will lock under sufficient load when more effort is required to lock the wheel. This clearly fails to meet the clear test in regulation 18 of the Construction and Use Regulations 1986 because the operator/transport manager will not know that every part of every braking system is working properly unless it is tested to simulate the vehicle in service, i.e. with sufficient load on each axle; and
(b) Vehicle G5 UKT went into PMI on 22 May 2024 where a driver spottable defect was identified; engine MIL illuminated [in other words a warning light on the dashboard] but the corresponding driver defect reporting sheet of the same date is marked “NIL defects”; and
(c) Vehicle G5 UKT went into PMI on 13 June 2024 where the following driver spottable defects were identified; ABS warning light illuminated, wiper blades worn and no end trim on offside guard. The nearest corresponding driver defect reporting sheet was dated 10 June 2024 and was marked “NIL defects”. Between the driver walk round check on 10 June and the PMI on 13 June the vehicle had apparently driven 2,666 kilometres. Clearly that could not have occurred on a single day so (a) there were missing driver defect reporting sheets and (b) it is more likely than not that the vehicle had been driven on a public road with one or all of the driver spottable defects present; and
(d) Vehicle G5 UKX was presented for PMI on 23 April 2024 where the following non-driver spottable defects were identified; spring eye bushes worn, ball joint worn and cut in nearside rear inner tyre wall. These defects were reported to the operator with no evidence of them being rectified shown on the PMI sheet. In the absence of evidence to show that those defects were rectified before the vehicle went back into service I find that it is more likely than not that the vehicle entered service in an unroadworthy condition as the general undertaking on the operator’s licence compels the operator to demonstrate that “Records are kept (for at least 15 months) of all driver reports that record defects, and all safety inspection, routine maintenance and vehicle repair reports, and that these are made available upon request.” [emphasis added]. In other words in the absence of those records to show rectification had taken place before the vehicle went back into service I am bound to conclude that it is more likely than not that the repairs were not completed before the vehicle went back into service.

The director, Mr Dilpreet Singh had not done any CPD as an operator or operator licence refresher training before the public inquiry and he told me that he had never read the GTMR. It is hard to see why he would not have done both of those things after the sobering prohibition issued on 14 March 2024 at MOT and the unsatisfactory MIVR shortly afterwards. When pressed he told me that he had not even booked himself onto any training. Without the necessary knowledge and understanding of operating licensing how could he “constantly monitor and supervise” in the way the appeal case of Alison Jones T/A Jones Motors required?

Were this in isolation I would have still been deeply concerned that he could check, scrutinise and challenge what people said, and the paperwork they provided, due to his lack of knowledge but it was not in isolation. Throughout the hearing Mr Dilpreet Singh displayed a significant lack of insight and knowledge regarding the basics of operator licensing. This was not down to poor translation or things getting lost in translation because on several occasions during the hearing the clerk had to assist the interpreter to explain to Mr Dilpreet Singh, in simpler terms, what was being asked of him and despite that he still did not understand.

I therefore have (as at today) very little confidence in Mr Dilpreet Singh understanding what is required of him, as the director of a company that holds an operator’s licence, in order to ensure compliance with the general undertakings on this operator’s licence.  

Pulling everything together, and in summary:

(a)   The director, Mr Dilpreet Singh, had demonstrated no, or no effective management control of the transport business to ensure compliance with the particular general undertakings recorded on the operator’s licence that I have highlighted and explained; and
(b)   The director, Mr Dilpreet Singh, had failed to constantly monitor and supervise the transport manager, external maintenance provider and drivers effectively or at all; and
(c)   The transport manager, as clearly evidenced by the MIVR and supplemental statement from vehicle examiner Matthews dated 09 July 2024, had failed in her statutory duty to be “effective” in the management of the transport business; and
(d)   As a result, road safety had been put at clear risk for at least the 15 months before the MIVR and from the time of the MIVR up to the date of the supplemental statement from vehicle examiner Matthews and two unauthorised operating centres had been used.

There were positives since the MIVR. With the assistance of others, including the proposed transport manager Mr T Grewal, drivers had been given training, a new maintenance provider was being used with PMIs scheduled on time, a previously unauthorised operating centre was now authorised by myself, two vehicles had been presented for MOT and had passed first time. Mr Dilpreet Singh stated to me that he would do whatever it took to be a compliant operator including undertaking properly laden and meaningful brake tests at every PMI and Mr T Grewal thought that the operator was capable of being turned around with him as the transport manager. I have given as much credit (evidential weight) as I can for all of those positives.

7. BALANCING EXERCISE

I have given as much credit (evidential weight) as I can give to the positives in this case but the negative findings that I have made are long standing, serious and many of them show that road safety has, right up to the date of the supplemental report from vehicle examiner Matthews, been put at real risk. The risks to road safety carry the maximum evidential weight because the primary purpose of this jurisdiction is to protect road safety.

Looking at the operator as at the date of the public inquiry, and after carefully balancing the weight I have given for the positive findings in this case against the weight I have given for the negative findings in this case, it is clear to me that the negative findings carry far more evidential weight than the positive findings. The balance tips firmly in favour of the negatives.

8. STATUTORY DOCUMENT NUMBER 10, ANNEX 4 CONSIDERATION

After repeating all of my findings (including the credit that I have given to the operator), and after careful consideration of Statutory Document number 10, Annex 4 in particular, issued by the Senior Traffic Commissioner for Great Britain I have determined that this case falls into the “Serious” category (and at the top of that scale) as an entry point for consideration of regulatory action.

The real issue here is the length of time that serious non-compliance was occurring on the watch of the transport manager and Mr Dilpreet Singh as director. That is set against a very short period of time when positive changes have been made and which are starting to show improvements in compliance but full compliance has still not been achieved. What is not clear is whether (a) the operator can maintain that move towards full compliance, (b) that if full compliance were achieved in the near future that it could be maintained and (c) whether Mr Dilpreet Singh will simply go back to his old ways in the future.

9. DECISIONS

To assist me in my decision making I have first considered the Upper Tribunal appeal case of Priority Freight 2009/225 and asked myself the question posed therein; “how likely is it that this operator will be compliant in the future?” Based upon the findings that I have made, particularly regarding Mr Dilpreet Singh the director, I answer that question in the negative as I do not think, from the evidence before me, that Mr Dilpreet Singh (and therefore the operator) will be compliant in the future even with the help of the proposed transport manager Mr T Grewal.

I have next asked myself the question posed in the Upper Tribunal appeal case of Bryan Haulage Ltd 2002/217 “Is the conduct of this operator such that it ought to be put out of business?” After repeating all of my findings, and despite the credit that I have given for the positive findings, I determine that it is proportionate to answer that question in the affirmative because right up to the date of the supplemental statement from vehicle examiner Mathews road safety was still being put at real risk and had been for about 18 months before that statement (the 15 months stated in the MIVR re lack of meaningful brake testing and the time from the MIVR to the supplemental statement dated 09 July in addition = c.18 months). I also have had regard to the fact that the management control of director Mr Dilpreet Singh and transport manager Konalpreet Kaur had been so poor and ineffective that other serious areas of non-safety related compliance had been permitted, caused or allowed to occur. This was a classic case of too little being done too late for me to answer the Bryan Haulage question any other way.

As a result of answering the Bryan Haulage question in the affirmative this operator has lost its good repute. The operator’s licence is therefore revoked under section 27(1)(a) of the Act.

I repeat all of my negative findings. They all occurred on the watch of the transport manager who had the statutory responsibility to be effective on a continuous basis to ensure compliance. Her failings were admitted in the response to the MIVR that appears at pages 78 and 79 of the public inquiry bundle and in her letter dated 07 July 2024. Her failure to ensure a compliant transport operation put road safety at risk and permitted, caused or allowed two unauthorised operating centres to be used when at no point in time had I, as the Traffic Commissioner, been put on notice of that happening either before the use of those addresses commenced or immediately afterwards. Only as a result of an application to add a new operating centre being received on 02 April 2024 was I first made aware of new operating centre being applied for but it was not until I received a copy of the MIVR from the DVSA that it was brought to my attention that this new address was already in use and had been for many months previously. It was totally unacceptable of the transport manager to keep me in the dark about that.

I have then considered all of the positive findings I have made in this case and added to them was the fact that the transport manager was apologetic in the public inquiry for her failings. She has been working with the proposed transport manager to change systems and procedures and she promised to give sufficient time to the role in the future.

The real issue here is the gravity of her failings, the risk to road safety that she permitted, caused or allowed to occur, the length of time that risk was present for, her failure to inform me of an illegal (criminal) move to an unauthorised operating centre before, or after, it happened (the application to add the new operating centre was not notification to me that the unauthorised address was already in use as an operating centre or for how long and why). The positives carry evidential weight but they are a tiny snapshot in time and her past behaviour has been so bad for so long that I just do not trust her anymore. For this transport manager it is also a case of doing too little too late.

Komalpreet Kaur lost her good repute as a transport manager a long time ago and despite the positive findings I have made in her favour her good repute as a transport manager had not been restored as at the date of the public inquiry. It is therefore a mandatory requirement that I disqualify her as a transport manager. Under paragraph 16(2) of Schedule 3 of the Act I disqualify her as a transport manager with immediate effect for a period of 18 months until 2359 hours on 25 January 2026. As for her rehabilitation measures required before she can apply for her good repute as a transport manager to be restored after her disqualification end she must (1) have completed a 2 day transport manager CPC refresher training course and (2) she must have shadowed a competent transport manager to learn from them for a period of at least 3 months with written evidence from that other transport manager as proof.

The operator is now no longer professionally competent as its transport manager has lost her good repute and has been disqualified with immediate effect. As a result it is proportionate that the operator’s licence is revoked under sections 27(1)(a) and 27(1)(b) of the Act.

Repeating all of my findings, including the positive findings for which I gave the operator credit, I have determined that it is also proportionate to revoke the operator’s licence under my discretionary powers pursuant to the following sections of the Act:

26(1)(a)           Use of an unauthorised operating centre; and

26(1)(b)            The breach of the licence condition to notify me within 28 days           of an act or event that could effect the operator’s ability to remain of good repute; the “S” marked immediate prohibition issued at MOT on 14 March 2024 and the use of two unauthorised operating centres; and

26(1)(c)(iii)       The prohibitions received. In particular the immediate and “S” marked prohibition at MOT on 14 March 2024; and

26(1)(e)            Breaches to the statement of expectation made when the operator’s licence was granted that PMIs would be completed on time; and

26(1)(f)             Breaches to the general undertakings recorded on this operator’s licence that I have particularised in this written decision, namely:

(a) “Vehicles and trailers, including hired vehicles and trailers, are kept on a fit and serviceable condition.” (breached)
(b) “An unauthorised operating centre is not used in any traffic area.” (breached)
(c) “Records are kept (for at least 15 months) of all driver reports that record defects, and all safety inspection, routine maintenance and vehicle repair reports, and that these are made available upon request.” (breached)
(d) “Drivers report promptly any defects or symptoms of defects that could prevent the safe operation of vehicles and/or trailers, and that any defects are recorded in writing.” (breached); and

26(1)(h)           The material changes that have occurred to this operator since the operator’s licence was granted.

All orders of revocation take effect three months from now at 2359 hours on 25 October 2024. From that time and date this operator’s licence will cease to exist and the operator will have no lawful authority to operate any vehicle over 3.5 tonnes. Were the operator to breach my statutory decisions to revoke this operator’s licence then I would ask the DVSA to prosecute any breach(es) in the criminal courts and to impound any vehicle so operated. The operator now has actual knowledge of that DVSA power to impound when a vehicle is operated without an operator’s licence.

No order is made under section 28 of the Act.

The application to add Mr Tarvinderjit Grewal as the transport manager specified on this operator’s licence will be granted with immediate effect from the point in time that he confirms (in writing via letter or email) that he still wishes to be the transport manager for this operator despite my decision to revoke the licence.

Signed electronically by
Traffic Commissioner Mr M Dorrington

25 July 2024.