Corporate report

Conflict, Stability and Security Fund annual report 2022 to 2023

Published 16 January 2024

Ministerial foreword by Baroness Neville-Rolfe, DBE CMG

As Minister of State in the Cabinet Office, and lead Minister for the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund (CSSF), I am delighted to be sharing this Annual Report for Financial Year 2022 to 2023, highlighting the Fund’s critical contribution to UK national security.  

The CSSF has now begun its transformation to the Integrated Security Fund (ISF). In March 2023, the Government published the Integrated Review Refresh (IRR 2023) which announced the creation of the new Fund.  In his foreword, the Prime Minister pointed to the challenges to our national security from a more volatile and contested world. The ISF is designed to help address these challenges and will build on the excellent role that has been played by the CSSF.

The CSSF is a cross-government fund tackling conflict, stability and security challenges overseas which threaten UK national security. The CSSF has played an important role helping to deliver the government’s national security objectives.

Ukraine has been, and remains, a key priority for the government and the Fund.  Since 2016, CSSF programming has been helping to build capability within Ukraine’s armed forces. Following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Fund expanded to support stabilisation activities. It supported the implementation of the Women, Peace and Security National Action Plan and war crimes accountability, provided non-lethal military training, and strengthened civilian oversight and anti-corruption efforts.

The CSSF has played a key role in strengthening international partners’ cyber security against increasingly complex threats. It has bolstered Ukraine’s resilience to Russia’s cyber-attacks at the start of Russia’s illegal invasion. It has also improved cyber security capability in Georgia, Iraq, the Indo-Pacific, the Commonwealth and Africa, and worked with India to strengthen partners’ ability to counter ransomware.

Other transnational threats such as terrorism and serious organised crime have continued to evolve, growing yet more complex. The Fund has stepped up to meet this challenge. For example, the CSSF has funded work to build the resilience of borders along class A narcotics supply routes through West Africa and Europe. This has improved the detection and seizure of illicit drugs along these routes before they reach the UK.

The Integrated Security Fund will retain the many strengths of the CSSF and its key features – its unique cross-government approach, flexibility, innovation, catalytic effect and ability to take high risks. It will offer the government a strengthened means of delivering on the most pressing of national security priorities outlined in IRR 2023 by integrating overseas and domestic work. The Fund will continue to help protect the UK, our people and our interests. 

Ten key points from the annual report

In financial year (FY) 2022 to 2023 the CSSF:

• supported Ukraine’s resilience against Russian-led aggressive hybrid tactics
• enabled more than 32,000 gender-based violence (GBV) survivors and people at risk of GBV to access services in Ukraine
• increased significantly the detection and seizure of illicit drugs along the main trafficking routes to the UK
• countered grand corruption and illicit finance in the Western Balkans and Latin America
• brought about a significant drop in the sales of blank firearms in Turkey and a decrease in imports of blank firearms into the UK
• undercut Daesh propaganda through communications that reached 40 million people across the Middle East leading to a tangible reduction in support for Daesh
• strengthened international partner cyber security capabilities and resilience to cyber threats
• responded swiftly to the Turkey-Syria earthquake, providing funding for shelter and other basic needs and urban search and rescue
• supported over 600 women in conflict-prone areas in the Philippines to participate in peace processes and local governance; improving gender equality in the region and decreasing risk of future conflict

and we:

• began the transformation from the CSSF to the new Integrated Security Fund (ISF) which will build on the success of the CSSF, work both domestically and internationally and be focussed on a wider range of security threats to the UK

Introduction

1. The CSSF invested over £830 million in FY 2022 to 2023 through integrated programmes across 12 government departments and agencies. Since its conception in 2015 this integration has enabled the government to transform its approach to threats to UK national security emanating from overseas, especially conflict, transnational threats and hostile state activity. The ISF will take a similarly integrated approach.

2. In FY 2022 to 2023 the Fund continued to focus on assisting Ukraine; expanded its work in cyber to help the UK and allies prevent attacks on critical infrastructure; and increased programming to enhance our relationships in the Indo-Pacific. The CSSF maintained a presence in over 90 countries and territories, delivering more than 90 programmes. 

3. Four principles set the Fund apart from other UK and international funding instruments. These principles provided a guiding framework:

• integrated approach: the CSSF supports integration by blending Official Development Assistance (ODA) and non-ODA funding and drawing together government departments, agencies and external experts to co-design and co-deliver programmes
• agility: the CSSF enables programmes to respond quickly to changing situations and shifts in UK national security priorities. The Fund’s agility and drive for innovation allow it to act as a platform to test new responses to emerging challenges
• catalytic effect: the CSSF has a catalytic effect through interventions designed to enable further change in the longer term. When an intervention has been tried and tested, the CSSF works with partners to scale up the response to tackle the biggest threats to UK security in an integrated way
• high-risk: the CSSF encourages programmes to test new, innovative approaches in response to threats and opportunities, balanced by prudent risk management. High-risk tolerance means that the CSSF can use experimental approaches, learn lessons quickly and continue to innovate.

4. The CSSF delivered 4 fund-level outcomes:

• Conflict and instability: building resilience and stability overseas, including catalysing political settlements in order to mitigate threats to UK national interests
• State threats: strengthening the defence of the UK and its partners from hostile state activity
• Transnational threats: enabling a more secure UK by tackling serious organised crime and countering terrorist threats from abroad
• Women, peace and security: progressing gender equality through the protection and promotion of the rights and inclusion of women and girls, and addressing the gender-specific impacts of conflict

5. In FY 2022 to 2023, the CSSF invested £830 million. Of this, ODA funding constituted £324.4 million (39.1% of spend); and non-ODA £506 million (60.9%). CSSF funding was invested by 12 government departments and agencies, with other departments providing expertise. The Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office was the largest CSSF spending department (£678.27 million), with the Ministry of Defence (£86.73 million) and Home Office (£39.89 million) as the next 2 largest spending departments.

Global reach of CSSF country and regional programmes

List of countries and territories the CSSF operated in the FY 2022 to 2023:

Americas

• Colombia
• Peru
• Panama
• Ecuador
• Brazil
• Venezuela

Overseas Territories

• Anguilla
• Bermuda
• British Antarctic Territory
• British Indian Ocean Territory
• British Virgin Islands
• Cayman Islands
• Falkland Islands
• Gibraltar
• Montserrat
• Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands
• South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands
• Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia
• St Helena, Tristan da Cunha and Ascension Island
• Turks and Caicos Islands

Africa

• Cameroon
• Chad
• Kenya
• Nigeria
• Niger
• Somalia
• Tanzania
• Uganda
• Mozambique
• Ethiopia
• Ghana
• Malawi
• Zambia
• Mali

Eastern Europe and Central Asia

• Ukraine
• Moldova
• Armenia
• Belarus
• Estonia
• Georgia
• Latvia
• Lithuania
• Kazakhstan
• Kyrgyzstan
• Tajikistan
• Uzbekistan
• Turkmenistan

Western Balkans

• Albania
• Bosnia and Herzegovina
• Kosovo
• Montenegro
• Serbia
• North Macedonia

Europe, Middle East and North Africa

• Algeria
• Iraq
• Jordan
• Lebanon
• Libya
• Morocco
• Syria
• Tunisia
• Yemen
• Occupied Palestinian Territories and Israel
• Turkey

South Asia and Afghanistan

• Afghanistan
• Pakistan
• Sri Lanka
• Maldives

Asia Pacific

• Myanmar
• Fiji
• Papua New Guinea
• Philippines
• Malaysia
• Indonesia
• Kiribati
• Samoa
• Solomon Islands
• Tonga
• Tuvalu
• Vanuatu
• Marshall Islands
• Federated States of Micronesia

Multilateral organisations funded by CSSF

• United Nations (UN)
• Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
• Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
• North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO)
• International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)

CSSF contribution to Sustainable Development Goals

6. In FY 2022 to 2023, the CSSF continued to support the delivery of the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The Fund primarily supported:

• Goal 16: To promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies
• Goal 5: Achieve gender equality and empower all women and girls

7. The CSSF also supported the delivery of several other SDGs, notably:

• Goal 1: End poverty in all its forms everywhere
• Goal 8: Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all
• Goal 13: Take urgent action to combat climate change and its impacts
• Goal 17: Revitalise the global partnership for sustainable development

Conflict and instability

8. The UK’s ability to respond in a timely and effective manner to emerging conflicts remained critical to global stability during FY 2022 to 2023. For example, in response to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, the CSSF was able to change the focus of the existing Ukraine programme to respond. £20 million of CSSF funding was invested in the Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU), a UK-led multi-donor stabilisation mechanism rapidly developed to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience against Russian-led aggressive hybrid tactics.

9. With support from the CSSF, Ukraine developed both war crimes and conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) strategies which enabled strategic focus on high-level perpetrators, and improved Ukraine’s ability to prosecute complex war crimes.  More effective investigations will lead to more support for victims and, one day, to accountability for Russian war criminals.

10. Unexploded ordnance can continue to have a devastating effect on vulnerable communities long after fighting has ended. In FY 2022 to 2023, the CSSF worked with the UN Mine Action Service in the Lake Chad basin region to improve detection and disposal of improvised explosive devices (IEDs). CSSF support enabled improved data collection, analysis and sharing between the military and police on their IED and explosive ordnance disposal activities. As a result, IEDs and ordnance discovered and disabled in the region were preserved to enable forensic examination of the devices and an improved response to the threat they posed to local communities.

11. The CSSF also supported the Free Fields Foundation (3F), a Libyan NGO, who implemented activities that led to reduced harm, increased freedom of movement, and improved livelihoods for residents and returnees in Tripoli. Between 2020 and 2022 the national mine action authority reported 130 deaths and 196 injured by landmines or abandoned or exploded ordnance. 3F implemented activities including explosive remnants of war clearance and hazard awareness training, and contributed to reducing the number of demining accidents in target areas to less than 10. 95% of households surveyed felt safer and less anxious, reducing tensions and improving stability in the country. 

State threats

12. State threats are overt and covert actions by foreign governments or their proxies which fall short of direct armed conflict but still damage and undermine UK security, prosperity, and values. The IR and IRR 2023 highlighted state threats as a concern for UK national security and the stability of international order. In FY 2022 to 2023, the CSSF increased activities to counter this threat.

13. State threats include physically threatening UK citizens; interfering in democratic institutions; seeking to sow discord; disrupting or destroying critical assets; and stealing sensitive information from government and the private sector. The threats have become increasingly interconnected, blurring the lines between domestic and international, online and offline, states and their proxies.  They exacerbate geopolitical risks and tensions, and efforts to reshape global norms and institutions.  State actors can also use organised crime and terrorist groups to threaten the UK’s people, democracy, critical infrastructure and information.

14. In FY 2022 to 2023 the CSSF’s Counter State Threats Portfolio reduced risk to the UK by detecting, disrupting, and deterring threats such as the use of illicit finance, disinformation, cyber-attacks, economic coercion and electoral interference. This strengthens the UK’s resilience and that of its allies and fosters a more open and democratic global order.  The CSSF’s Counter State Threats Portfolio funded projects to better understand, identify, and counter threats, thereby raising the costs for states seeking to undermine UK interests.     

15. In Montenegro an election monitoring project improved trust in the electoral process and reduced space for disputing election results. Previously, interference in the electoral process had caused political instability. In the 2023 elections the CSSF’s election project ensured long-term monitoring of the electoral process and provided a mobile phone application for citizens to learn about their electoral rights, report violations and have them addressed by authorities. It provided real-time projections of election results by a credible local NGO for both rounds of the presidential elections. This helped to assure the public that the results were not tampered with and led to acceptance of the election outcome by both presidential candidates. CSSF support also provided support for long-term observation through a trusted multilateral institution (OSCE mission), and the development of policy recommendations for electoral reform.  This contributed to the peaceful transition of power in Montenegro. 

16. The CSSF supported work to help the Czech Republic to establish its first central Strategic Communications Unit. This work increased the Czech government’s ability to respond to disinformation operations and to design a major strategic communications campaign following Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine.

17. In 2021, Ukraine’s Ministry of Culture and Information Policy (MCIP) founded Filter, a national media literacy project to build the resilience of the Ukrainian population to disinformation. Filter aimed to increase the public awareness of media literacy and coordinate all government, civil society and international stakeholders’ efforts to counter disinformation. CSSF support enabled it to build societal resilience and increase media literacy. Filter was in place nationwide in the lead up to, and during, Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine, which was accompanied by relentless information warfare tactics meant to dilute support for the Ukrainian government and to divide Ukrainians. The Ukrainian government has committed to sustaining the project given its role in defending against disinformation.

Transnational threats

18. The IR 2021 highlighted transnational security challenges, including serious and organised crime (SOC), illicit finance and corruption, cyber threats, terrorism and hostile state activities that threaten the UK’s security and prosperity. IRR 2023 noted the worsening of transnational challenges, increasing interlinkages and complexities. SOC, terrorism and malign state actions can be mutually reinforcing and linked to cybercrime, cyber-attacks and disinformation.

19. The CSSF’s programming recognises the evolving threat of serious and organised crime, most of which has an international element because either the commodities or people being exploited are from overseas, the criminals are foreign nationals, or their criminal activity is based overseas. For example, most class A drugs are smuggled into the UK from Latin America and Afghanistan, via West Africa, Turkey and Europe. Working alongside UK anti-narcotics law enforcement teams overseas, CSSF programmes have provided capacity building, equipment and advice which have increased the detection and seizure of illicit drugs along the main trafficking routes to the UK. CSSF-funded support in Nigeria enabled the Nigerian National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA) Marine Unit to detect and seize over 3 tonnes of illicit drugs in FY 2022 to 2023, compared to no seizures in the previous 5 years.

20. In Turkey, CSSF-funded capacity building and equipment have led to improved intelligence gathering and collaboration with Turkish border authorities. It has increased the capacity of specialist officers to target criminal organisations linked to class A drug shipments from South America.  

21. Whilst the number of firearms offences in the UK continues to be stable and amongst some of the lowest in the world, they continue to fuel violent crime. The firearms that are preferred by organised criminals are often unavailable in the UK and are smuggled into the country. To counter the increase in the threat by Turkish-manufactured converted blank-firing weapons on UK streets, CSSF programmes have invested in capacity building and advice which has supported Turkish lawmakers to implement changes to Firearms legislation. This has resulted in a drop in the sales of blank firearms in Turkey and a decrease in imports of blank firearms into the UK.

22. Serious and organised crime continues to threaten other states’ security, particularly where they are undermined by grand corruption and illicit finance. These are critical enablers of the transnational serious and organised crime threat to the UK and undermine the achievement of the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals. Over FY 2022 to 2023, the CSSF has increased its efforts in countering grand corruption and illicit finance, launching new activities across the Western Balkans, Latin America and supporting jurisdictions at risk (including of hostile state infiltration). For example, the CSSF supported the Seychelles Anti-Corruption Commission in obtaining their country’s first court-issued restraint order for the freezing of suspected proceeds of corruption. CSSF investment enabled the Seychelles government to close a critical loophole in their anti-money-laundering legislation by passing the Anti-Corruption (Amendment) Act 2022.

23. In Montenegro, CSSF-funded capacity building contributed to the arrests of the Director General of the Customs Administration in October 2022 and of the Assistant Director Organised Crime Police in March 2023 on suspicion of being a member of and assisting an organised crime group.  

24. CSSF programmes have supported the development and global roll out of the new UN-owned Organised Crime Strategy Toolkit for Developing High-Impact Strategies to prevent and combat organized crime, including mainstreaming of gender and human rights. In FY 2022 to 2023, the 191 Parties to the UN Transnational Organised Crime Convention adopted a resolution endorsing this approach and the toolkit methodology as best practices in developing strategies to tackle organised crime. This has already assisted 10 national governments in developing more effective strategies against SOC.

25. CONTEST, the UK’s counter-terrorism Strategy 2023, noted that the terrorist threat is enduring and evolving: the UK faces a domestic terrorist threat that is less predictable and harder to detect.

26. The CSSF continued to be a key tool in the UK’s fight against terrorism. For example, in FY 2022 to 2023, the CSSF Counter Daesh Communications Cell (CDCC) helped to undercut Daesh propaganda by highlighting the group’s failures. CDCC reached over 40 million people in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and West Africa and tens of millions of satellite television viewers across the Middle East. The number of people engaging with the Coalition’s key Arabic language digital platform has grown by over 300% since 2020, with video views doubling. Meanwhile a reduction in residual support for Daesh has been recorded in communities across Iraq and North East Syria.

27. The CDCC also engaged vulnerable communities, increasing its campaigns to enhance trust between them and legitimate institutions, foster cohesion and help to stabilise communities still suffering from the consequence of Daesh’s occupation. New campaigns began to address the radicalising effect of the al-Hol refugee camp by reintegrating Syrian and Iraqi nationals out of the camp and back into their communities. 

28. In FY 2022 to 2023, the CDCC tackled new threats in Afghanistan stemming from extremist propaganda. CDCC initiated a pilot campaign to inform and protect audiences who may be at risk of recruitment by Daesh in Afghanistan. The Pashto language content reached an audience of over a million internet users in key locations targeted by Daesh.

29. In Africa, the CDCC responded to Daesh’s expansion and the increased insecurity in West Africa with a new Coalition public communications platform, the first example of Coalition activity in Africa. This complemented other CSSF investments, building international partners’ capabilities to respond to terrorist incidents, investigate and prosecute terrorists in compliance with human rights.

30. In Jordan, CSSF-funded CT training improved the Jordanian police crisis response capabilities.  In Sub-Saharan Africa the CSSF has helped respond to the threat from violent extremists by building capability in multi-agency CT Investigations and supporting sustained defections. In northeast Nigeria, the CSSF has supported more than 500 defectors to be re-settled into communities following rehabilitation involving vocational training, religious counselling, psychosocial support, drug counselling and numeracy and literacy lessons. In Somalia, CSSF investment and expert advice has helped to strengthen the Somali government leadership of its national defections programme by increasing civilian oversight and improving inter-ministerial coordination in support of a more effective defections process.     

In northeast Nigeria, the CSSF has supported more than 500 defectors to be re-settled into communities following rehabilitation involving vocational training, religious counselling, psychosocial support, drug counselling and numeracy and literacy lessons. In Somalia, CSSF investment and expert advice has helped to strengthen the Somali government leadership of its national defections programme by increasing civilian oversight and improving inter-ministerial coordination in support of a more effective defections process.has supported more than 500 defectors to be re-settled into communities following rehabilitation involving vocational training, religious counselling, psychosocial support, drug counselling and numeracy and literacy lessons.

Women, peace and security

31. The CSSF has continued to make an important contribution to advancing the UK’s commitments to Women, Peace and Security under the UK National Action Plan (NAP) 2023. One important element of the NAP is assisting women in conflict-affected regions and implementing projects that facilitate gender inclusion in conflict mediation. Conflict and instability have a disproportionate impact on women, yet women are often excluded from peacebuilding and mediation processes. A 2015 UN report found that in peacebuilding, women’s participation increases the probability of a peace agreement lasting at least 2 years by 20%, and the probability of a peace agreement lasting 15 years by 35%.

32. The CSSF focuses on building a more representative and effective approach to tackling conflict and instability, and ensuring that women and girls’ needs are included in conflict response.

33. The CSSF supported a major project in Ukraine during FY 2022 to 2023, aimed at tackling conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and Gender-Based Violence (GBV), which have both been a defining feature of the illegal Russian invasion. UK support led to the creation of the CRSV Strategy and National Action Plan. The CSSF worked with the United Nations Population Fund to improve the access of people at risk of CRSV and GBV to shelters, crisis rooms, psychosocial care and outreach service for women and girls - moving services close to where they are needed. Remote assistance was provided via phone consultations, teleconferencing or texting and an app developed for safe case reporting to the National Police. Over 32,000 GBV survivors and people at risk of GBV accessed services last year, as well as 91 survivors of CRSV. In addition, funding led to 5 CRSV cases being prosecuted, with 115 CRSV crimes registered by government prosecutors by the end of January 2023.

34. In Mali, where the UK has invested in stabilisation, the CSSF adapted its operations following 2 coups and the increased presence of terrorists across the territory. The CSSF continued to support crucial peace processes through the Ehanal Algafiat project, which addressed the immediate needs of women amid violence and instability, and set the foundations for more resilient, inclusive communities. The project focused on including women in conflict resolution - making it more effective and more likely that peace will be sustained. Traditionally, women in Mali do not play a significant role in decision-making processes related to local governance, peacebuilding or security, despite conflict disproportionately affecting their safety.  Ehanal Algafiat provided women with training in conflict management skills and supported their integration into previously all-male community conflict committees. Since women were included in the committees, 14 local disputes have been resolved through dialogues facilitated by the conflict management committees. These resolved disputes including cases of conflict between herders and farmers in locations that have seen attacks by armed terrorist groups, tensions related to the presence of conflict refugees and conflict between traditional authorities and minority ethnic groups. 

35. The CSSF aims to make Western Balkan governments and populations more resilient to deliberate destabilisation and better able to respond to threats. Rates of violence against women and girls remain high across the region and legal protections and services are weak, reflecting high levels of gender inequality. Issues such as cyber-attacks and data leaks, online gender-based violence, and disinformation campaigns have the potential to further limit progress towards gender equality and continue to contribute to destabilisation.

36. CSSF analysis in Bosnia and Herzegovina found that gender inequality was a key driver of local conflict, meaning that institutions were not equipped to deal with issues that were impacting women and girls such as domestic violence, cybercrime and gendered disinformation. Removing barriers to recruitment and progression helped to increase the number of senior women in the Armed Forces. Communications campaigns on roles available in the armed forces reached over 29 million people, with a 5.5% increase in applications by women in just 1 year. Guard accommodation was also refurbished, providing adequate facilities for women for the first time. These upgrades are an important step towards NATO Partnership Goal compliance and BiH’s fulfilment of promises set out in its 2018 to 2022 WPS National Action Plan, which highlights the need for increased participation of women, including in decision-making roles, in military, police and peacekeeping forces. 

37. The CSSF also supported a ‘Women in Cyber’ initiative in Georgia as outlined in the Cyber section of the report.  

Ukraine

38. UK intelligence highlighted the likelihood of the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine and the CSSF’s agility enabled it to respond quickly to meet the challenges faced in Ukraine and neighbouring regions.  

39. The CSSF Ukraine Programme was designed in late 2021 to align with the UK’s commitment of continued defensive, stabilisation and economic support to Ukraine. After Russia’s illegal invasion in February 2022, the programme was swiftly redesigned and re-prioritised to contribute to the new UK national security objectives for Ukraine. Several projects were able to pivot and respond to security, defence, and humanitarian needs. Humanitarian support in Ukraine was overwhelmed in the aftermath of the illegal Russian invasion but the CSSF was able to use partners already under contract to meet urgent needs until other donor funds were available and the humanitarian system was able to take over.  

40. The Partnership Fund for a Resilient Ukraine (PFRU); a UK led multi-donor stabilisation mechanism, was developed in FY 2021 to 2022 to strengthen Ukraine’s resilience against Russian-led aggressive hybrid tactics. The PFRU provided the UK Embassy in Kyiv with a mechanism to enable the Government of Ukraine to respond to needs on the ground following Russia’s invasion. The shared ownership of the mechanism with multiple donors, all with an agreed way of working, allowed for critical, rapid decision-making and a high-risk approach that meant PFRU could respond to the evolving situation.

41. With a new focus on building resilience between communities and government at all levels, the PFRU is organised around 3 components: recovery, which focusses on newly liberated areas; resistance, which works in occupied territories and frontline communities; and revitalisation, which aims to support the transition towards longer-term sustainable peace. Involvement in and support to the PFRU has positioned the UK as a trusted source of expertise in the approach to the illegal Russian invasion. 

42. The CSSF was also used to launch a new Observatory of Illicit Markets and Conflict in Ukraine working with civil society, academia, investigative journalism and law enforcement to gather and assess information on SOC in Ukraine and the wider SOC impact of the illegal Russian invasion. This is informing policy decisions by improving government understanding of the SOC threat and providing the UK government with regular monitoring of changes. The information gathered from the observatory is also being used by international partners to assess the global impact of the Ukraine war on SOC dynamics and their links with other transnational threats.

Cyber

43. Over FY 2022 to 2023, cyber threats to the UK have continued. The new UK National Cyber Strategy (NCS) was published in 2022. Its implementation is core to IRR 2023 objectives. It is focused on detecting, disrupting, and deterring cyber threats, building cyber resilience, strengthening UK’s cyber ecosystem, advancing UK leadership and influence and leading in vital technologies, such as Artificial Intelligence (AI).

44. The CSSF played a key role in strengthening international partners’ cyber security through building capacity, hardening cyber resilience and fighting cyber-crime. This enabled the UK to respond to global cyber incidents, protecting the UK and its allies.

45. Following an increase in the number of destructive cyber-attacks by Russia on Ukraine, the CSSF bolstered the cyber resilience of Ukraine. Russian activity, and that of state-aligned groups, has raised the risk of wider effects in the region and beyond, including to the UK. The vast majority of the most serious cybercrime threats originate from Russian speaking groups.

46. The most significant threat continues to be cybercrime, and in particular ransomware. The portfolio pivoted to assist Ukraine defend itself against the illegal Russian invasion by establishing a new Ukraine Cyber Programme that provided £7.3 million from the beginning of the invasion to March 2022.  Following IRR 2023, this support will be increased by up to £25 million. The package will include £16 million from UK funding, and potentially a further £9 million contribution from international allies. 

47. The programme provided expertise, software and hardware to enable Ukraine to detect, respond to and deter Russian aggression. It supported incident responses to destructive and espionage malware such as the supply chain attack against critical infrastructure providers. It also provided software and hardware packages such as firewalls and protection from distributed denial of service to ensure that Ukrainian citizens could continue to access vital public information. The programme provided forensic capabilities to enable Ukrainian analysts to understand system compromises, where they emanated from and how to restrict future attacks.

48. The CSSF also increased support to Georgia. New investment is supporting the National Security Council of Georgia to implement their new national cyber security strategy and identify and respond to threats from those seeking to undermine Georgian and wider European security. CSSF funding enabled the delivery of Georgia’s first Public Private Partnership on Cyber, bringing together cyber security professionals from across government and companies in the banking and energy sector, to tackle shared challenges and establish a formal cooperation mechanism. The CSSF ‘Women In Cyber’ Initiative (WIC) raised awareness of the importance of women and girls in cyber security, bringing academia, the public and private sectors together, to enhance their cyber knowledge and skills, and to support and promote their participation in the Georgian cyber sector. WIC has already acted as a catalyst for youth in cyber security in Georgia and attracted strong interest from other schools and universities, leading to further activity in 2023.

49. In Iraq, the CSSF supported Iraq’s Ministry of Defence (IMoD) to strengthen their cyber security capabilities. Iraq is at high risk of cyberattacks from malign actors. The CSSF funded an assessment of Iraq’s cyber security capabilities and vulnerabilities which has led to the establishment of a dedicated cyber unit within IMoD. To support this new unit, CSSF worked with the Iraqi government and NATO to design and implement training aimed to build cyber security practices across the chain of command. The CSSF’s support helped Iraq to deter and defend against malicious cyberattacks.

50. The CSSF has also supported building the capacity of UK partners across the Indo-Pacific region, delivering cyber exercises in Malaysia, Indonesia, and Japan to help test their response to a major national cyber-attack. The project helped to identify strengths and weaknesses in national responses and helped foster cooperation (including between private organisations and state agencies) strengthening their ability to respond to a real incident.

51. In India, the CSSF funded a ransomware virtual exercise co-hosted with India as part of the International Counter-Ransomware Initiative. It aimed to test preparedness in the electricity distribution sector. Fourteen other countries participated in this exercise that simulated wide-scale cyber-attacks across national boundaries. This was part of the Enhanced Cyber Security Partnership agreed in 2021 by the Indian and UK Prime Ministers and a commitment to a joint programme of cooperation.

Africa Cyber Surge Operation II

Transnational operation disrupts key cyber threats:

• USD 40 million in financial losses
• 14 arrests
• 25 participating countries
• 5 private sector partners
• 20,674 suspicious networks identified
• 150 cyber activity reports disseminated
• 18,062 digital enquiries
• 3,663 pieces of data exchanged via INTERPOL

52. The CSSF Global Cyber Programme (GCP) partnered with the Commonwealth Secretariat to fund a project strengthening the cybercrime fighting capabilities of 37 Commonwealth countries. The project acted as a catalyst for the development of effective domestic and pan-Commonwealth cyber-resilience frameworks and established, and strengthened, legal frameworks and institutions to enable effective investigation and prosecution of cybercriminals. The programme’s awareness raising and consensus building initiatives have enabled member countries to strengthen their anti-cybercrime and cyber security frameworks, including helping 2 Commonwealth countries sign up to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime. Between 2018 and 2023, the Commonwealth Cyber Programme assisted over 1,000 officials from 55 Commonwealth countries in realising their countries’ goals of enhancing cyber resilience.

53. In Africa, the CSSF co-funded the Africa Joint Operations Against Cybercrime which has strengthened the capability of African law enforcement agencies to prevent, detect, investigate and disrupt cybercrime in Africa. This enabled the Africa Cyber Surge II operation across 25 African countries, coordinated by INTERPOL and AFRIPOL, which resulted in the arrest of 14 suspected cybercriminals and identified 20,674 suspicious cyber networks, linked to financial losses of more than $40 million.

Indo-Pacific

54. IRR 2023 reaffirmed the UK’s commitment to enhance our relationships in the Indo-Pacific, a region critical to the UK’s economy and security. Geopolitical competition has increased the risk posed by the region and developments there have a disproportionate influence on the global economy, supply chains, strategic stability and norms of state behaviour. CSSF support is integral to the UK’s objective of a free and open Indo-Pacific where no single power dominates and states can make choices free from coercion, disinformation and interference; territorial integrity is respected and disputes resolved in line with international law. In addition to the important work on cyber set out above, the CSSF has programmes across the region on defence and security, especially maritime security, freedom and democracy, climate, counter-terrorism and serious organised crime.   

55. In the Philippines, poverty, underdevelopment and violence resultant from armed conflict have disproportionately impacted the women in the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (BARMM). The CSSF has supported over 600 women (some former combatants) in conflict-prone areas by training them in conflict mediation and governance. Women are now holding seats on governance and peace discussions, with some intending to run for the next local elections. The CSSF also supported the development of the Bangsamoro Regional Action Plan on Women, Peace and Security 2023 to 2028. This aims to support the participation of women in the Bangsamoro governance and peace processes.

Earthquake

56. The Turkey/Syria Earthquake demonstrated the agile nature of the CSSF in its ability to respond to a changing situation. On 6 February 2023, a 7.8 magnitude earthquake struck southern and central Turkey and northern and western Syria. The affected region had a population of circa 12 million.

57. The CSSF Migration Portfolio invested £600,000 to support the immediate needs of Syrian refugees impacted by the earthquake. This funding renovated 510 containers at a temporary accommodation centre which reopened after the earthquake and hosts around 10,000 Syrian refugees. CSSF funding provided non-food support and hygiene kits to refugees and in doing so met the basic and immediate needs of earthquake-displaced refugees. This support was also effective as a measure to reduce social tensions between Turkish and Syrian survivors through removing refugees from post-earthquake temporary settlements. Following UK support, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees provided funding to renovate other temporary housing containers in other centres demonstrating the catalytic effect of this project and CSSF funding.   

58. The CSSF provided an extra £3.8 million to the Syria Civil Defence (SCD), known as the White Helmets, a Syrian volunteer-led organisation that provides urban search and rescue, early recovery and health services to 4.1 million IDPs in north-west Syria. SCD were at the forefront of responding to the earthquake, providing life-saving search and rescue operations and recovery efforts. Women volunteers of SCD played a vital role in supporting the response to the earthquake.

CSSF governance

59. Ministerial accountability to Parliament for the CSSF lies with the Cabinet Office. The Minister of State at the Cabinet Office, Baroness Neville-Rolfe DBE CMG, followed the Rt Hon Michael Ellis, KC MP in October 2022 as lead Minister for the CSSF.  The CSSF’s Senior Responsible Owner is the Deputy National Security Adviser for International Affairs, Sarah MacIntosh. Oversight and management of the CSSF is provided by the Joint Funds Unit (JFU) within the National Security Secretariat of the Cabinet Office. The JFU undertakes the following key functions:

• ensuring that the Fund delivers against National Security priorities articulated in the 2021 Integrated Review and 2023 Integrated Review Refresh, through a strategic, cross-government approach
• ensuring that programming represents value for money and evaluating impact
• setting the operating framework that underpins CSSF programme design and delivery
• ensuring that programmes across the Fund follow government best practice and have the appropriate structures in place to manage risk and their allocated funds to a high standard

60. The JFU also provides extensive advisory support to the CSSF network. The JFU places strong emphasis on lesson learning and sharing of best practice.

Monitoring, evaluation and learning (MEL)

61. Investing in MEL allows us to understand better what works and what does not, so the CSSF can improve programming and support evidence-informed decision-making at strategic levels. It ensures that the CSSF can demonstrate what it is achieving and how the Fund contributes to UK national security priorities. It provides evidence that programming is delivering value for money and is compliant with legislation.

Data analytics

62. The JFU’s Data Analytics team supports CSSF programme delivery through in-house analytical skills and commercial capability and expertise. The team delivers data support to the JFU across all stages of the programme cycle, improving the ability of the JFU to manage the Fund. It also delivers data analytics projects to programme and portfolio teams so they can access the best data and analytical expertise and capabilities the commercial sector can offer.

Gender

63. The JFU works with all portfolios to ensure that gender is incorporated into all project-level activities.  Since April 2022, Gender Equality and Social Inclusion (GESI) Markers have provided the CSSF with a means of integrating gender from the design stage.  These use data points to measure gender equality and inclusion and to consolidate evidence of gender being addressed for each project.

Non-discretionary funding and the Rapid Response Mechanism

64. The CSSF oversees non-discretionary funding commitments for several of the UK government’s international obligations, including mandatory assessed contributions for peacekeeping (to the UN, OSCE, and NATO) and Criminal Tribunals (the International Criminal Court (ICC), and the International Residual Mechanism for Criminal Tribunals (IRMCT). This also includes the net additional costs for UK troop deployments to UN Peacekeeping Missions, and the UK’s bilateral contribution to support the African Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the UN Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS).

65. The Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM), overseen by the JFU, allows for the mobilisation of emergency non-ODA resources.

66. In FY 2022 to 2023, the RRM had a provision of £20 million of non-ODA from within the CSSF’s budget and had access to a further £20 million from the government’s Special Reserve. The RRM has been used to support the government’s response to several major international crises since the CSSF was set up.  It was most recently used to fund part of the immediate UK government response to the illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Budget allocations

67. CSSF Spending is reviewed annually through the budget allocation exercise, although much of CSSF’s funding is allocated to multi-year programmes. HM Treasury commissions a comprehensive review of the CSSF annually, to ensure that funds are allocated to the highest strategic priorities and deliver value for money for the taxpayer.

Annex A: Financial spend 

The final CSSF FY 2022 to 2023 cross government allocation was £840.5 million. Total CSSF spend was £830.4 million (98.8%). This is subject to final departmental audits.

Figure 1

• final CSSF allocation FY 2022 to 2023: £840.5 million   
• CSSF spend FY 2022 to 2023: £830.4 million

The total CSSF 2022 to 2023 spend of £830.4 million can be split by:

1. UK government department or agency  

In FY 2022 to 2023 the largest spender of CSSF funding was the FCDO, in large part, due to the peacekeeping contributions (£301.8 million).   

Final spend performance on departmental baselines was:

• Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office (FCDO) 99.1%
• Ministry of Defence (MOD) 98.1%
• Home Office (HO) 99.0%
• Department for Transport (DFT) 98.1%
• Cabinet Office (CO) 82.1%
• UK Health Security Agency (UKHSA) 100.0%
• Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA) 100%
• National Crime Agency (NCA) 100%
• UK Hydrographic Office (UKHO) 100.6%
• Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs (HMRC) 99.5%
• Ministry of Justice (MoJ) 83.9%
• Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy (BEIS) 100%

Figure 2: CSSF spend by UK government department for FY 2022 to 2023

Department	2022 to 2023 £ million	2021 to 2022 £ million
FCDO	£678.27	£715.20
MOD	£85.08	£86.09
HO	£39.48	£38.36
DFT	£14.07	£3.40
CO	£6.42	£7.01
UKHSA/DHSC (2021 to 2022)	£2.40	£1.89
DEFRA	£1.60	£1.79
NCA	£0.98	£1.86
UKHO	£0.70	£1.01
HMRC	£0.70	£1.10
MOJ	£0.66	£0.75
BEIS	£0.06	£0.00
CPS	£0.00	£0.21
Total	£830.41	£858.66

Figure 3: Proportion of FY 2022 to 2023 CSSF spend by UK government department

Department	2022 to 2023 %	2021 to 2022 %
FCDO	81.7%	83.29%
MOD	10.2%	10.03%
HO	4.8%	4.47%
DFT	1.7%	0.40%
CO	0.8%	0.82%
UKHSA / DHSC	0.3%	0.22%
DEFRA	0.2%	0.21%
NCA	0.1%	0.22%
UKHO	0.1%	0.12%
HMRC	0.1%	0.13%
MOJ	0.1%	0.09%
BEIS	0.01%	No data
CPS	No data	0.02%

Figure 4: CSSF discretionary spend by UK government department for FY 2022 to 2023

Department	Total spend £ million	% of discretionary spend
FCDO	£345.84	41.6%
MOD	£53.34	6.4%
HO	£39.48	4.8%
DFT	£14.07	1.7%
CO	£6.42	0.8%
UKHSA	£2.40	0.3%
DEFRA	£1.60	0.2%
NCA	£0.98	0.1%
UKHO	£0.70	0.1%
HMRC	£0.70	0.1%
MOJ	£0.66	0.1%
BEIS	£0.06	0.01%
Total	£466.25	no data

2. Regional and thematic spend  

Corporate Delivery Support includes the Joint Funds Unit (JFU) and Evidence and Data Hub, which includes Global Monitoring Evaluation and Learning (GMEL), allocated as follows:  

• JFU: £7.07 million
• Evidence and Data Hub: £4.03 million

Figure 5: FY 2022 to 2023, CSSF spend by regional, cross regional and non-discretionary theme

Region or theme	£ million
Peacekeeping	£301.80
MOD Ringfences	£31.74
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	£119.28
Sub-Saharan Africa	£98.57
Middle East and North Africa	£83.64
Western Balkans	£40.13
Counter Terrorism	£36.40
Cyber	£25.50
Overseas Territories	£24.42
Serious and Organised Crime	£16.00
Corporate Delivery Support	£11.10
South East Asia and Pacific	£10.09
Americas	£8.61
International State Threats	£7.27
Multilateral Strategy	£6.88
Migration	£6.24
India and Indian Ocean	£6.04
National Security Communications	£3.79
Gender, Peace and Security	£3.09
Afghanistan and Pakistan	-£10.19*

*The CSSF received a lot of credits in relation to unspent funds connected to the ANATF (Afghanistan National Army Trust Fund), resulting in overall spend for the region being a negative. 

Figure 6: Proportion of FY 2022 to 2023, CSSF spend by regional, cross regional and non-discretionary theme

Region or theme	%
Peacekeeping	36.34%
MOD Ringfences	3.82%
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	14.36%
Sub-Saharan Africa	11.87%
Middle East and North Africa	10.07%
Western Balkans	4.83%
Counter Terrorism	4.38%
Cyber	3.07%
Overseas Territories	2.94%
Serious and Organised Crime	1.93%
Corporate Delivery Support	1.34%
South East Asia and Pacific	1.21%
Americas	1.04%
International State Threats	0.88%
Multilateral Strategy	0.83%
Migration	0.75%
India and Indian Ocean	0.73%
National Security Communications	0.46%
Gender Peace and Security	0.37%
Afghanistan and Pakistan	-1.23%

3. ODA/non-ODA   

The FY 2022 to 2023, total spend was split by £324.4 million (39.1%) of ODA and £506.0 million (60.9%) of non-ODA.   

A breakdown of calendar year 2022 CSSF ODA spend by department can be found in the Statistics on International Development report published on GOV.UK.

Figure 7: Total CSSF FY 2022 to 2023, ODA spend - £324.4 million by region, cross-regional, and non-discretionary theme

Region or theme	£ million
Peacekeeping	74.70
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	65.40
Middle East and North Africa	51.80
Sub-Saharan Africa	32.99
Western Balkans	30.46
Counter Terrorism	21.38
Cyber	9.43
South East Asia and Pacific	8.73
Serious and Organised Crime	8.68
Americas	6.88
India and Indian Ocean	5.06
Migration	4.92
Corporate Delivery Support	4.70
Overseas Territories	4.54
Multilateral Strategy	4.09
Gender Peace and Security	2.65
Afghanistan and Pakistan	-12.03

Official Development Assistance  

• ODA: 39.1%
• non-ODA: 60.9%  

CSSF achieved 63% spend against the 63% ODA spending target by 31 December 2022. This contributed to the UK’s commitment to spend 0.5% of GNI on aid.   

ODA 

The top 5 recipients of ODA were:   

1. Ukraine £41 million   
2. Syria £11.1 million
3. Somalia £9.6 million
4. Lebanon £8.2 million
5. Occupied Palestinian Territories £6.9 million   

Non-ODA   

The top 5 geographical recipients of non-ODA were:  

1. Somalia £47.5 million   
2. Overseas Territories £19.9 million
3. Ukraine £12.5 million    
4. Yemen £9.6 million      
5. Lebanon £9.3 million       

When combined with MOD ringfences of £31.7 million and peacekeeping non-ODA £227.1 million, this accounts for 71% of total non-ODA spend.  

Figure 8: Total CSSF FY 2022 to 2023, non-ODA spend, by region, cross-regional and non-discretionary theme

Region or theme	£ million
Peacekeeping	227.10
MOD Ringfences	31.74
Sub-Saharan Africa	65.58
Eastern Europe and Central Asia	53.88
Middle East and North Africa	31.85
Overseas Territories	19.88
Counter Terrorism	15.02
Cyber	16.08
Western Balkans	9.66
Serious and Organised Crime	7.32
International State Threats	7.27
Corporate Delivery Support	6.40
National Security Communications	3.79
Multilateral Strategy	2.78
Afghanistan and Pakistan	1.84
Americas	1.73
South East Asia and Pacific	1.36
Migration	1.32
India and Indian Ocean	0.98
Gender Peace and Security	0.44

Annex B: CSSF peacekeeping spend FY 2022 to 2023 

UN peacekeeping and other multilateral contributions	Spend (£ million)	ODA (£million)	Non-ODA (£ million)
United Nations Organisation Stabilisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)	44.5	7.9	36.6
United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS)	53.3	9.3	44.0
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)	54.6	10.0	44.6
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)	50.1	8.8	41.3
United Nations African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)	5.6	0.5	5.1
United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS)	23.9	0.0	23.9
United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)	23.9	4.3	19.6
United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)	12.4	2.2	10.2
United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)	2.9	0.0	2.9
United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	2.6	0.5	2.1
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	1.9	0.3	1.6
United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP)	1.3	0.0	1.3
UN Peacekeeping Credits	-3.8	0.0	-3.8
Sub total	272.2	43.8	229.4
UN Special Political Missions	23.9	22.2	1.7
UN Tribunals	2.8	0.0	2.8
International Criminal Court	11.2	0.0	11.2
Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe Field Missions	11.6	8.7	2.9
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR)	1.6	0.0	1.6
Total	324.3	74.7	249.6
Foreign Exchange Adjustment (gains and losses on advance purchases of foreign currency)	-22.5	0.0	-22.5
Total peacekeeping budget	301.8	74.7	227.1