Decision

Decision for Carmel Coaches Ltd (PH1145790) and Anthony Hazell – Transport Manager

Published 10 December 2020

In the Western Traffic Area

Decision of the Traffic Commissioner

Public Inquiry in Bristol, 21 September 2020

1. Background

Carmel Coaches Ltd is the holder of a standard international public service vehicle operator’s licence currently authorising the use of fifteen vehicles. The licence was considered in December 2016 at a conjoined public inquiry with Michael Hazell (PH1140601). This was due to the history of directors Anthony Hazell and Michael Hazell, who had previously been named on a revoked licence and were disqualified as directors. At the public inquiry, I found that Anthony Hazell’s good repute was restored and I granted the licence.

There is a considerable licencing background for Anthony Hazell, his son Michael Hazell and his daughter, Carolyn Alderton as can be seen from the following:

• PH1060745 - Michael James Hazell, t/a Hirethisbus.Com - Standard national licence authorised for three vehicles, granted 10 August 2006. Unsatisfactory maintenance investigation report was received in July 2013 and the subsequent public inquiry was held 20th March 2014 at which the licence was revoked with effect from 6 June 2014. Michael Hazell was disqualified for a period of eighteen months from acting as a director or transport manager for any licence.

• PH1098535 - Carmel Coaches Ltd, t/a Carmel Coaches - Standard international licence authorising the use of forty vehicles, granted in May 2011. The directors were Anthony Hazell, Michael Hazell and Carolyn Alderton. This was called to a conjoined public inquiry with Michael Hazell in March 2014 where the licence was revoked with effect from November 2014. Anthony Hazell was disqualified for a period of eighteen months from acting as a director or transport manager.

• These decisions were appealed to the Transport Tribunal and the outcome was that the appeals by Carmel Coaches Limited, Anthony Hazell and Michael Hazell were dismissed on 17 October 2014.

• PH1089682 - Keith Sibbick & Darren Sibbick, t/a E & S Chauffeur Services. Michael Hazell was specified as transport manger between February 2012 and April 2014. There is no adverse compliance history found for this licence which was surrendered on 27 May 2014.

• PH0005111 – Anthony Hazell, t/a Carmel Coaches - this was a standard international licence and authorised the use of thirty vehicles. It was surrendered in November 2011 after the limited company licence was granted.

• PH1127110 – Carolyn Alderton, t/a Carmel Bristol - This is a standard international authorising the use of nine vehicles. The licence was granted at a public inquiry on 6 May 2014. Ms Alderton is also the nominated transport manager. There is no adverse history associated with this licence.

• PH1143878 - Michael Hazell and Hazellways Ltd, t/a Mike Hazell’s the Road to Success Transport - This was a new partnership application seeking a standard international licence for eleven vehicles. The application was due to be considered at a public inquiry but was subsequently withdrawn by Mr Hazell because he was unsure of the legal status of the applicant partnership (Michael Hazell was the sole director and shareholder of Hazellways Ltd). The withdrawal was referred to the Traffic Commissioner and accepted.

• PH1132411 - C M Coaches Ltd - Standard international licence authorised for fifteen vehicles. The directors at application were Colin Holt and Christopher Hilditch. The application was granted at a public inquiry on 16 January 2015 with the following condition: “Mr Tony Hazell and Michael Hazell shall take no part in the business of C M Coaches Ltd whatsoever.” The licence was called to public inquiry in March 2019 and the licence was revoked with Michael Hazell being disqualified for a period of three years. This decision was appealed at the Upper Tribunal and was remitted for re-hearing. The further public inquiry took place in October 2019, where the licence was revoked and Michael Hazell was disqualified for an indefinite period. That disqualification is currently under appeal. Anthony Hazell attended the hearing to give support to his son and his evidence was the subject of significant concern to the presiding commissioner who requested a DVSA investigation. In the event, that investigation was overtaken by the events that generated this inquiry.

• PH1140601 - Michael Hazell - This was granted at a public inquiry on 26 April 2016 for one vehicle. It was granted with an undertaking precluding the involvement of Anthony Hazell and an undertaking to provide future financial evidence in the form of bank statements. Whilst accepting grant of the licence, Michael Hazell appealed the undertakings. The Upper Tribunal dismissed the appeal in relation to the involvement of his father but upheld the appeal in relation to being able to take credit card statements in to account. A variation application was made less than a month later, on 18 May 2016, to vary the licence to authorise fourteen vehicles. Due to the size of the increase so soon after the licence grant, the application was considered at public inquiry, the inquiry where Carmel Coaches Ltd’s new application was also heard. Following disqualification of Michael Hazell as transport manager, Anthony Hazell was nominated as transport manager in April 2019.

On 2 March 2020, DVSA Vehicle Examiner Lee Balsdon made an unannounced visit to the operating centre following the issue of an s-marked prohibition to vehicle AL08ASH at Okehampton Railway Station on 27 February. His subsequent maintenance investigation identified a number of shortcomings:

• Records showed that AL08ASH had been off the road awaiting crash repairs from 5 July 2019 to 19 August 2019. No PSV112 notification of an incident had been submitted to DVSA.
• Inconsistent evidence that driver walk-round checks were carried out
• A prohibition issued to CR56RMR for a driver detectable defect
• The prohibition to AL08ASH on 27 February demonstrated a weakness in the maintenance system
• Test failure rate, at 46%, was well above the national average of 7.4% over the past two years
• Some MOT failures appeared serious, for example, relating to brakes, steering and suspension
• Driver defect reports for NX53AAA between 31 January and 14 February 2020 showed an emissions warning light fault reported on ten occasions, and
• No evidence to support that drivers had been trained in accordance with Article 16 of EU Regulation 181/2011 (passenger rights, with particular reference to disabled passengers)

On inspection of four vehicles, VE Balsdon found advisory defects on three and the fourth was clear.

Traffic Examiner David Cresswell carried out a further investigation, visiting the operator on 4 March 2020. He identified the following concerns:

• Driving licences were checked only 3 times per year
• Lack of training around the working time directive and drivers hours *No system in place for monitoring working time
• No disciplinary system for breaches of drivers hours
• Forward planning only online and not freely available to view
• Vehicle YN55NJU specified on the licence was owned by Michael Hazell
• Michael Hazell had reportedly been driving for the operator

These shortcomings caused me to call the company to public inquiry in the following terms:

Under Section 17(1)(a) that the holder of the licence may no longer satisfy the requirements of Section 14ZA(2), namely that the licence holder no longer meets the requirement of:

• Section 14ZA(2)(a) to have an effective and stable establishment in Great Britain (as determined in accordance with Article 5 of the 2009 Regulation),

• Section 14ZA(2)(b) to be of good repute (as determined in accordance with paragraphs 1 to 5 of Schedule 3 of the Act),

• Section 14ZA(2)(c) to be of the appropriate financial standing (as determined in accordance with Article 7 of the 2009 Regulation),

• Section 14ZA(2)(d) to be professionally competent (as determined in accordance with paragraphs 3 to 7 of Schedule 3 of the Act).

Under Section 17(1)(b) of the Act and Section 14ZA(3) of the Act, that the nominated transport manager may not be exercising continuous and effective management of the transport operations;

Under Section 17(3)(aa) of the 1981 Act, that any undertaking recorded in the licence has not been fulfilled, specifically:

• that the rules on drivers hours and records would be observed

• that vehicles would be kept fit and serviceable

• that there would be effective driver defect reporting

• that maintenance records would be properly kept

Under Section 17(3)(c) of the Act, that vehicles had been issued with prohibition notices

Under Section 17(3)(e) of the Act, material change in relation to financial standing

Mr Anthony Hazell was called to consider his good repute as transport manager.

2. The Public Inquiry

Mr Anthony Hazell and Ms Carolyn Alderton attended the public inquiry represented by Andrew Banks, solicitor. Vehicle Examiner Lee Balsdon was present for DVSA via a Microsoft Teams video link.

The oral evidence is electronically recorded and a transcript is available on request; I repeat here only that which is central to my decision.

The operator and its solicitor both fully complied with the Covid directions and provided all requested documents in advance for which I was grateful. Financial standing was satisfied as a preliminary matter.

2.1 The evidence of Vehicle Examiner Lee Balsdon

Mr Banks had requested Mr Balsdon’s attendance as there was a disagreement over the status of a prohibition issued to AL08ASH which was issued on 27 February this year when Mr Balsdon had inspected a number of Carmel vehicles. There were two items. One was a leaking exhaust which the driver said had happened that morning – it was very loud as it drove in to the school. The second was a cut to the cords to an inner rear tyre and Mr Balsdon confirmed he would not have expected the driver to see it. The previous PMI was 24 days earlier. Mr Balsdon’s view was that the degree of corrosion was such that, in his view, the defect would have been present at the PMI. Mr Hazell had produced evidence from a tyre technician that the damage could have occurred in a much shorter period of time. Mr Balsdon did not accept that position. He reiterated his view that the severity of the damage of the rubber and the severity of the corrosion of the tyre cords, some of which had corroded right through suggested that the tyre damage was of long-standing; it would not have corroded all the way through in that period. Mr Balsdon felt that the tyre cords would have been visible to the inspector at PMI.

Mr Balsdon referred to Mr Hazell’s response to him about the condition of the road. If Mr Hazell was aware of the road condition he should have considered intermediate tyre inspections. Due to Covid restrictions, the prohibition was removed without the tyre being inspected and was done remotely based on evidence provided by Mr Hazell.

Mr Banks referred Mr Balsdon to another prohibition issued that day to CR56RMR for an emergency exit not working. Mr Balsdon indicated that the prohibition was issued by VE Heal. He was aware that the emergency door was not operating properly but could not comment on the detail.

In terms of the outcome from the maintenance investigation, a major concern was MOT test history. Mr Balsdon had worked the test history out himself as that was more reliable for PSVs. It had worked out to be 46.1%. This was in the period since the previous maintenance investigation conducted by VE Fuller on 5 December 2018. Mr Balsdon had suggested that the maintenance staff undergo “irtec” accreditation. Mr Banks referred Mr Balsdon to this year’s MOT performance. Mr Balsdon confirmed that he had run a test history report for the period since March 2020. It identified six tests with one PRS on CR56CMR and no final failures. The remote clearance of AL08ASH was not included in the stats as it had not undergone a full inspection.

Mr Banks told Mr Balsdon that pre-MOT inspections were now conducted by Balsdon Vehicle Services (“BVS”) and asked Mr Balsdon, as an ex-employee of that company, for his opinion on its competence. Mr Balsdon declined to comment.

I asked Mr Balsdon about a comment made in the response to him by Mr Hazell that the technician had adjusted rear brakes. Mr Balsdon confirmed that the adjustment would have been of an automatic slack adjuster, although it was possible that there would be an automatic adjuster inside the drum. Mr Balsdon further confirmed that any need to manually adjust an automatic slack adjuster would indicate an inherent failure within the adjuster itself.

2.2 The evidence of Mr Anthony Hazell

Mr Hazell’s written statement was adopted. He had decided before Mr Balsdon’s visit to put Mr Waters (his technician) and Mr Waters’ son through irtec accreditation. This followed an audit by Bellingham in January. The audit had been commissioned following attending his son’s public inquiry last year where the Traffic Commissioner had made some unflattering comments.

Vehicles are always tested at the same ATF. They had done pre-tests on brakes lights and steering and were now doing full pre-MOT inspections. This allowed for comparison with Mr Waters’ performance. He intended to continue with that. He would use BVS for any additional assistance. He was quite happy to work with BVS. I clarified whether Mr Hazell would allow BVS to conduct all his PMIs. With clearly discernible reluctance, Mr Hazell confirmed that he would allow BVS to conduct all PMIs.

Mr Hazell had provided invoices from the major parts suppliers and BVS; there were others such as for tyres. The current authorisation is 15. The pandemic had a disastrous effect on private hire work. Some contracts had been lost so he was prepared to reduce the fleet size which would reduce the money needed to be held for financial standing.

Mr Hazell had been a transport manager for 36 years. Mr Banks asked Mr Hazell whether he would be prepared to have an additional or a replacement transport manager. Mr Hazell told me that he was happy to have extra assistance but did not want to leave the industry. He would not volunteer to give up completely and retire.

The business served village communities and provided transport to the market towns. They were a key service. It was not a big profit-earning business but a social service. They had maintained their service throughout the pandemic.

I asked about the relationship with other family businesses. There were no other family businesses apart from Carolyn’s own sole trader business in Bristol. Apart from the occasional loan of a vehicle, the businesses stood alone.

I took Mr Hazell to the comments made by TC Jones at the public inquiry in October 2019 where he had attended to provide support to his son. At page 21 of Mr Jones’ decision, page 135 of my bundle, Mr Hazell is describing the system used by his son’s company whereby part of an inspection was carried out in Exeter and then completed in Northlew. Mr Hazell is recorded as saying that, in effect, he knew better than the two DVSA examiners dismissing the Vehicle Enforcement Manager as “well he’s only a youngster”. Mr Hazell told me that he felt under pressure and was only trying to support his son against what he felt to be unfair accusations by the DVSA staff.

I asked Mr Hazell how he responded to Mr Jones’ comment that “Anthony Hazell is a danger to the PSV industry as he is so grossly incompetent”. He told me that he was disappointed that such a comment was made without access to the evidence relating to his company and that making such comments was damaging to the relationship between operators and the regulator.

I took Mr Hazell to the brake test reports he had provided, noting in the positive that brake tests were being carried out in accordance with the undertaking on the licence. I asked who reviewed the brake test reports. Mr Hazell confirmed it was him. I referred to a brake test printout for YN06PCY on 4 June which showed a defect with the parking brake. I was told that had been picked up and it had new pads and a calliper fitted. I was told of the difficulty in getting a brake test at the local ATF and that was why they were not coincident with the remainder of the inspection. Mr Hazell referred me to the PMIs and told me that there would be reference to the rectification work and a subsequent confirmatory brake test. I could not find the evidence referred to. Mr Hazell found reference to a front calliper change in July but not a rear. I then noted that the parking brake defect was exactly the same and persisted to a brake test in August. Mr Hazell told me that the rear brakes had been changed on 29 July and the linings would not have bedded in by the time the brake test was conducted. I put it to him that the brakes would bed in the same on both sides “it’s a mystery”, I was told. But the overall efficiency was met so Mr Hazell was not overly concerned.

I then asked Mr Hazell why his technician was adjusting automatic slack adjusters. “Because they can unwind” I was told. The mechanic would always check they were adjusted up. He knew from experience that the self-adjuster can fail. He would never tell his mechanic not to check the automatic slack adjuster and he would do that by trying to tighten them up. I asked Mr Balsdon how a slack adjuster should be inspected. Mr Balsdon told me that the procedure was to apply the brake and measure the travel, comparing that with the manufacturers technical data.

I asked why he had BVS undertake pre-MOT inspections. Mr Hazell told me it was to improve the MOT pass rate. A second pair of eyes. I asked why, if the technician could not be trusted to prepare a vehicle for MOT, how could he be trusted to conduct inspections for the remainder of the year. I was told that the technician had been in the business a long time and had now had irtec accreditation. All MOT failures were investigated and they never appeal the examiner’s decision.

I asked Mr Hazell why AL08ASH had been off the road for so long in 2019. I was told that someone drove in to the back of it. It needed new parts. It was used on school runs and the collision was in July so there was no rush getting it back. There had been a delay while insurers checked it. He had told BVS that they could take their time.

2.3 The evidence of Ms Carolyn Alderton

Ms Alderton had little day-to-day involvement in the running of the business besides tachograph analysis. She used Trutac, a system endorsed by CPT. Cards are read in Northlew and the data uploaded to a database which she could access and produce the relevant reports. If an infringement was identified, she would check to see what had happened and pass it to her father (Mr Hazell) to deal with the driver. There had been no EU work in the last 6 months. The TE visit was just before lockdown.

The Trutac system had the functionality to manage working time direct from the driver cards. Ms Alderton’s own sole trader business used the same system.

It was Ms Alderton’s view, as a statutory director, that the maintenance solution was for all PMIs to be carried out at BVS. It wasn’t necessary to shut the Northlew workshop completely but inspections should be done at BVS. She thought that there should be an external transport manager with her father stepping back and taking partial retirement. That view was not popular with her father. Ms Alderton did not have the capacity to take on the role. She was looking at applying for DVSA Earned Recognition status. An independent audit had been undertaken by Lloyd Morgan in January and she had changed maintenance provider as a result, moving to one in Chepstow.

2.4 Further evidence of Anthony Hazell

I asked about a comment made by the Traffic Examiner that an infringement report generated in July 2019 had not been debriefed with the driver until November. Mr Hazell told me that he had a driver who went away in the winter so an infringement just before he went away would not get dealt with for some time. I got no specific response in relation to the 4-month delay from July to November. I asked what had been done about the shortcomings identified by the Traffic Examiner. I was told it had all been done bar recording his own working time where he had been expecting the Traffic Examiner to provide him with the necessary spreadsheet.

Mr Hazell reminded me that the DVSA fleet check had included the inspection of four vehicles, none of which had any prohibitable defects. Mr Hazell reminded me that one of the company’s vehicles had been involved in a fatal collision in 2014 and for that reason the safety of his vehicles was uppermost in his mind.

2.5 Closing submissions

Mr Banks appreciated that the licence had a history but the present shortcomings were remediable. There were two issues. First was the competence of the technician. This could be gauged by comparing the inspections undertaken by him with those done by BVS. Mr Hazell was prepared to have all inspections undertaken by BVS which would reduce the technician’s workload, which had reduced anyway due to the pandemic. There had been no further prohibitions since February and there were solutions for the maintenance issues.

An external audit had been undertaken in January prior to the DVSA visit. It was prepared in good faith and it had been openly shared with me.

Mr Hazell has been a transport manager for a long time. The adverse comments of TC Jones had been made in the heat of a difficult public inquiry. This is an operation that has systems in place. Ms Alderton was clear that a new transport manager would be put in place.

All the shortcomings identified were a reflection that Mr Hazell had been in the business a long time and needed to be brought up to speed. This was an operator that could be compliant in the future. He was prepared to learn. The dual inspection system was with CM Coaches, not this company. The co-director was in a situation where her business had been invited to apply for Earned Recognition status.

With undertakings requiring an external maintenance provider and to appoint a new transport manager, along with a potential reduction in the fleet size, the business could continue. Undertakings for brake testing had been complied with.

3. Consideration And Findings Of Facts

The first matter cited in the calling in letter is that the operator appeared not to have abided by the undertaking to observe the rules on drivers hours and records. This arose from the Traffic Examiner Visit Report of David Cresswell relating to a visit on 4 March 2020. The operator has (pre-Covid) a mixed domestic and EU operation. The main concern of TE Cresswell in relation to drivers hours was the long gap between an infringement report generated on 6 July 2019 and a debrief on 5 November, a debrief that gave no explanation as to the cause of the issue, no corrective action and was not signed by either party. This point was clearly put to Mr Hazell at the inquiry. He chose not to respond to it directly, instead citing that another driver went abroad over winter.

The licence undertaking is worded thus “The licence holder shall make proper arrangements so that the rules on drivers hours and tachographs are observed and proper records kept”. The nature of the operator’s work is such that breaches should be rare. Tachographs are downloaded and analysed – the element undertaken by Ms Alderton. But they appear not to be acted upon, at least, not for some considerable time by which time any interview with a driver will be hopeless. On balance, I find s.17(3)(aa) made out in relation to drivers hours but, perhaps more by luck than design, no significant issues have arisen and I attach only moderate weight to it.

The second concern was with roadworthiness. VE Balsdon found the MOT failure rate to be 46.15% against a national average of 7.45%. That is a shocking statistic. In his statement, Mr Hazell seeks to cast doubt on that figure. There is no legal requirement for PSVs to be specified on a licence which makes DVSA’s task more challenging. But Mr Hazell has ticked the box on the licensing system which confirms that he will keep the data up to date. That aside, and I attach no weight to it as it was not put to Mr Hazell at the hearing, VE Balsdon told me that he had undertaken a manual exercise using the best information he could get. The only person who knows the true MOT failure rate for the vehicles owned and operated by Carmel Coaches is Anthony Hazell. Whilst seeking to question the VE’s figures, he has strikingly failed to provide his own analysis. He refers to records going with vehicles that may have been sold. But I would expect any operator of a moderate to small fleet, or any fleet for that matter, to be able to say, for the last 2 years at least, which vehicles were in possession and when. From that, it takes but a few minutes to consult the publicly available MOT test history record and to derive a failure rate. That has not been done. I can only conclude that the true position is either as reported by VE Balsdon or worse.

There appears to have been some improvement in the last few months. Large vehicle testing was suspended from 18 March until August so there is not much to go on, but I accept it is better. The operator puts that improvement down to a process improvement whereby BVS conduct pre-MOT inspections with the vehicles having been already inspected by the in-house technician. I sought an explanation from Mr Hazell as to why special attention was placed on pre-MOT inspections and was told it was to improve the pass rate. That is laudable. But it misses the point.

MOT standard is the lowest standard that a vehicle should never fall below. Any vehicle should be able to be taken out of service, put immediately through an MOT and, a bulb failure aside, pass. It should not need an in-house inspection followed by a third-party inspection prior to MOT. One inspection is good practice and wise but a further, MOT-specific, inspection is a clear admission that the year-round procedures are insufficient.

The tyre prohibition in February 2020 to AL08ASH is a cause of deep concern. The operator argues that it would not have been there at the inspection on 3 February 2020. He provides in supporting evidence an email from Aaron Thompson, Zone Manager at Tructyre ATS. No credentials for Tructyre are provided. Mr Thompson states that tyres run in the wet will corrode more quickly than tyres running inside in the dry. He makes no statement either way on whether or not the defect would have been apparent at the PMI. Against that, I have the evidence and opinion of a qualified DVSA Vehicle Examiner. I prefer the latter. In the alternative, Mr Hazell’s response to VE Balsdon was that the road was known to be in a bad condition. Mr Balsdon asked the question why, if that was known, had the operator not introduced additional tyre checks? I find that a fair question and one on which Mr Hazell did not comment.

The operator has had vehicles brake tested on a roller brake tester. It is unfortunate that these do not seem to be part of the PMI process, but they are, at least, done. The brake test on YN06PCY in June this year is a cause of grave concern and a clear indication that the maintenance system is itself broken. The brake test is stand-alone, that is, it does not feature on any PMI. It is blindingly obvious from the most cursory view that there is a defect with the parking brake. It does not take any technical knowledge to at least raise alarm bells. The braking components across an axle are identical. The applied weight on each wheel station will be very similar if not identical. So the brake force achieved should be very similar. If a brake locks, then it is unknowable how much more effort is available. If it does not lock, then no more is achievable. It is simple. It is unarguable. Any experienced qualified transport manager should know that. If they are so incapable of interpreting a brake test report then they should have steps in place to provide assistance although I find it difficult to comprehend that such assistance might be needed.

On 4 June 2020, YN06PCY achieved brake efforts on the parking brake on the rear axle of 1438kgf, locked, off-side, 832 kgf, no-lock, near side, with an imbalance indicated of 42%.

The operator has given an undertaking that vehicles will be kept fit and serviceable. “Fit and serviceable” is not the same as meeting MOT minima. Regulation 18(1) of the Road Vehicles (Construction and Use) Regulations SI 1986/1078 requires that “Every part of every braking system and of the means of operation thereof fitted to a vehicle shall be maintained in good and efficient working order and be properly adjusted”. The roller brake test report of 4 June was clear and obvious evidence this was not the case.

Mr Hazell told me that he had identified that defect from the brake report. He told me that a calliper had been changed and a confirmatory brake test done. He was unable to find evidence of this in the PMI records although some brake pads appear to have been changed on 29 July, 8 weeks after the brake test that identified a foundation brake defect. Whatever was done, it was ineffective. The brake test on 3 August, which Mr Hazell told me had been done after the defect identified on 4 June had been rectified on 29 July, showed almost identical performance with parking off-side rear achieving 1497 kgf and locking and near-side 854 kgf not locking, an imbalance of 43%. Mr Hazell told me this was because the new brakes would need time to bed-in. He could not explain why identical components fitted to the same vehicle and braking system would so dramatically need different bedding-in periods.

There are two possible conclusions here. The first is that nothing was done to address the parking brake problem probably because there was no-one competent to identify it. The second is that the rectification was ineffective and no-one noticed on the brake test, or no-one took any notice of the brake test. There are probably other conclusions but none is that there is a maintenance system that is effective and that ensures vehicles are fit and serviceable.

I am particularly concerned at the attempts by Mr Hazell to explain this issue away. Whilst he may categorise DVSA Vehicle Enforcement Manager Trott as “only a youngster”, I do not believe he could level that criticism at me. Over 30 years ago, I drafted elements of the MOT inspection manual, 25 years ago I was responsible for heavy vehicle testing quality in the Vehicle Inspectorate, and for managing heavy vehicle testing throughout the South West. Sadly, I am no longer a youngster. His attempts to claim that the brake imbalance in August was due to lack of bedding in was demonstrative, in the most positive interpretation, of a shocking lack of knowledge.

Our conversation in relation to the manual adjustment of automatic slack adjusters was equally shocking. Automatic slack adjusters have been required on vehicles for at least 25 years. They incorporate a clutch mechanism that adjusts them up as needed based on length of stroke. Manufacturers advise against manual adjustment as it can cause premature wear and premature failure. It was not put to Mr Hazell so I take no account of it, but there is evidence that manual adjustment of automatic slack adjusters causes fatal crashes. What really concerned me was the lack of acknowledgement of Mr Hazell that he may be doing something wrong. He appears so certain in his own flawed thinking that he has simply lost the ability to listen and therefore to learn.

Ultimately, the evidence speaks for itself. As VE Balsdon notes, the PMIs record few significant defects yet the MOT pass rate has been abhorrent. So I find that vehicles are not being kept fit and serviceable and that is by a very wide margin. Section 17(3)(aa) is made out in relation to maintenance and I attach significant weight to this finding.

The door defect leading to a prohibition on vehicle CR56RMR appears to indicate a lack of effective driver defect reporting, as does the condition of the exhaust on AL08ASH the same day, accepting that the condition was so bad that it must have been a failure in service that morning. There are significant numbers of bulb failures on PMIs but I also saw that defects are reported by at least some drivers. Whilst I make an adverse finding in relation to driver defect reporting, I attach relatively little weight.

There is no evidence that maintenance records are not being kept. I find nothing in that ground.

Prohibition notices have been issued and for serious and preventable defects. Section 17(3)(c) is made out. Significant weight is attached given the severity of the defects and that they should have been prevented by an effective maintenance regime.

The call-in did not cite any particular material change. It would be inappropriate now to find that one was made out without the operator having been put on notice specifically of it in advance.

Financial standing is satisfied.

Anthony Hazell at one moment argues technical matters with me yet at another it is submitted by Mr Banks that he is not technical and relies upon his technician. It is difficult to have it both ways. PMIs are signed-off by Mr Hazell as supervisor and it appears that he conducts much of the decelerometer brake testing as it is his signature on the printouts. It appears to me that he is a key part of the maintenance management of this operation and that is fully appropriate for an operation of this size with in-sourced maintenance.

Mr Hazell’s approach is old-school. There might be nothing wrong with that normally but with Mr Hazell the degree is such that it makes him dangerous. Routinely adjusting automatic slack adjusters in a way not seen for 25 years is a recipe for a fatality.

Mr Hazell appears to lie at will. His account of the braking defect on YN06PCY was a classic example of someone making up a story on the spot. None of it was confirmed by the evidence. He told me a rear calliper had been replaced; it was a front. He told me a confirmatory brake test had then been undertaken; the brake test showed the defect still present exactly as it had been. When questioned about a delay from July to November on an infringement report he put it down to a driver who spent winter abroad. I find that he will say whatever he thinks appropriate to get him out of a spot. Indeed, he accepts as much in his explanation for the comments made to TC Jones about Vehicle Enforcement Manager Trott.

Anthony Hazell is accepted to be the controlling mind of this operation; Ms Alderton noting that she had little day-to-day involvement and could not take on the role of transport manager. Mr Hazell was, by Mr Banks, pushed to a great degree to accept that he would have a second or alternative transport manager and a second or alternative maintenance provider. The reluctance with which those concessions were made was considerable. Even his daughter said that, whilst those changes were needed, they were not popular with her father. She also indicated clearly that she had no real influence in the day-to-day operation.

A change of transport manager might have been a way forward for this operation but, for it to be convincing, the new transport manager designate should have made an application before the public inquiry and been there. Mr Hazell made it clear that he would not cede control. He might accept assistance, but not step back. This is far more apparent from listening back to the recording, as I have done on several occasions, than it may appear from the transcript. Mr Hazell also did not accept that all maintenance would be outsourced; that was a concession made by his daughter who admits a lack of involvement.

The Traffic Examiner Visit Report identifies significant shortcomings all of which fall at the transport manager’s door. The maintenance shortcomings also lie there. There are positives. The undertaking to have regular roller brake tests has been adhered to, albeit they appear not to have been acted upon and are not part of the PMI. Vehicles are inspected on time. The fleet inspection found four vehicles substantially clear of defects. The MOT history has improved. A voluntary audit was undertaken in January this year. There have been no significant drivers hours matters.

The question I face is whether I trust this operator to comply in the future. Anthony Hazell has been in the industry 36 years. Unfortunately, he appears to mistake experience for expertise. He is totally set in his ways. I saw no sign that he would cede control nor work in any true partnership whether with another transport manager or maintenance provider. He is certain in his own knowledge and that knowledge is awry. The result is obvious in the 46% failure rate at MOT. I find that Mr Hazell is incapable of managing the transport operation and so his good repute as transport manager is forfeit. As the Upper Tribunal found in T/2017/55 Alistair Walter it is difficult to find loss of repute of transport manager without finding loss of good repute of the operator where the transport manager is the controlling mind. However, I do make that distinction here. There is a second director, albeit she accepts that she has minimal involvement. This is, in essence, a family business. There may be reasons why Ms Alderton is a statutory director and she certainly did not shirk her statutory responsibilities. She was open and frank. A finding of loss of good repute of the operator and so Ms Alderton would in my view be disproportionate.

4. Decisions

Mr Anthony Hazell has forfeit his good repute as transport manager and is disqualified from acting as such until he sits and passes again the transport manager certificate of professional competence.

Pursuant to adverse findings under Section 17(1)(a), that is that the operator is no longer professionally competent, and further and separate adverse findings under Sections 17(3)(aa) and 17(3)(c), that vehicles are not kept fit and serviceable and that prohibitions have been issued, the licence is revoked with effect from 31 December 2020.

For the avoidance of doubt, nothing in this decision makes any adverse finding in relation to Ms Carolyn Alderton as a transport manager or her sole trader licence.

Kevin Rooney

Traffic Commissioner for the West of England

25 November 2020