Press release

Report 09/2016: Runaway and collision at Bryn station

RAIB has today released its report into a runaway and collision at Bryn station, Wigan, 27 November 2014.

Image of runaway on-track machine

Image of runaway on-track machine


At 00:11 hrs on 27 November 2014 two engineering vehicles (that were part of a new overhead line wiring train) ran away on a gradient close to Bryn station, near Wigan. They collided with two mobile elevating work platforms in the station; seven members of staff who were on and around the work platforms narrowly escaped injury.

The two coupled vehicles were a haulage vehicle, an existing item of track maintenance plant, and a specially-adapted wagon, on which the overhead wiring team were located.

The driver of the haulage vehicle did not correctly operate the controls to change from a travelling mode to a working mode before he left the cab. This caused the brakes to release and, because it also caused the brake controls on the wagon to become disabled, the wiring team were unable to reapply them. No design, change management, approval or risk assessment work had identified the need for a safety measure to prevent or mitigate the consequences of the error.

RAIB has identified two underlying factors that help explain why the parties involved had not realised the significance of changes that were proposed to the use of the haulage vehicle. In summary, when developing the new train, they followed a philosophy of minimising technical change and they did not adopt a systematic and integrated approach to the identification and management of requirements and interfaces (a system-based design approach).


As a consequence of this investigation, RAIB has made five recommendations.

Three are to Balfour Beatty Rail, the operator of the vehicles, concerning:

  • ensuring improved hazard identification when introducing and operating railborne plant
  • properly assessing and managing the risk implications of making changes to the design and use of its equipment
  • improving the quality of the alterations it makes to electrical systems on its equipment.

One recommendation is to RSSB concerns clarification of its guidance to the rail industry concerning the management of changes relating to the design, operation and maintenance of vehicles and plant operating in engineering possessions.

One recommendation is to Network Rail to ensure the risks associated with the introduction of new and modified railborne plant are properly managed before such plant is allowed to operate on its infrastructure.

Notes to editors

  1. The sole purpose of RAIB investigations is to prevent future accidents and incidents and improve railway safety. RAIB does not establish blame, liability or carry out prosecutions.
  2. RAIB operates, as far as possible, in an open and transparent manner. While our investigations are completely independent of the railway industry, we do maintain close liaison with railway companies and if we discover matters that may affect the safety of the railway, we make sure that information about them is circulated to the right people as soon as possible, and certainly long before publication of our final report.
  3. For media enquiries, please call 01332 440015.

Newsdate: 09 May 2016


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Published 9 May 2016