Closed consultation

Approach to monitoring consultation

Published 1 February 2024

About this consultation

This consultation seeks views on the approach proposed by the Subsidy Advice Unit (SAU) for its monitoring function.

The consultation contains:

• the background to the SAU’s monitoring function and what we have considered in developing our proposed approach

• our proposed approach to assessing the effectiveness of the operation of the Act

• our proposed approach to assessing the impact of the Act on competition and investment within the UK

At the end of each section, we pose questions to which stakeholders are invited to respond.

The Department for Business and Trade (DBT) recently published a report on public authorities’ experiences of subsidy control under the UK–EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement (which applied to subsidies given between 2021 and 4 January 2023) which will serve as a baseline for DBT’s future monitoring and evaluation of the Subsidy Control Act.^{[footnote 1]} We may draw on DBT’s findings (and the findings of any further such work it may undertake) as part of our overall evidence base, however the SAU’s monitoring function is independent of DBT and the work it is doing.

Background

Overview of subsidy control regime

The Subsidy Control Act 2022 (the Act) came into force in January 2023, providing for the UK’s new subsidy control regime. The purpose of the regime is to prevent public authorities from giving financial advantages to enterprises in a way that could distort competition and risk causing distortive or harmful economic impacts, including to the UK internal market. At the same time, the regime seeks to: empower public authorities to design subsides that deliver strong benefits for the UK taxpayer, deliver strategic interventions to support the UK’s economic growth and policy priorities, provide certainty and confidence to businesses investing in the UK, and contribute to meeting the UK’s international commitments on subsidy control. ^{[footnote 2]}

Under the new regime, public authorities have overall responsibility for ensuring compliance with the Act in both subsidy design and assessment against the subsidy control principles (the Assessment of Compliance). Details of subsidies and schemes made must be published in the Subsidy Database operated by DBT. ^{[footnote 3]}

Third parties can challenge subsidy decisions at the Competition Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal) which has jurisdiction to review subsidy decisions made by public authorities.

DBT is the UK-wide policy owner for subsidy control. This means that it is responsible for the overall functioning of the regime. It is responsible for providing guidance to public authorities on compliance with the Act, fulfilling the UK’s international obligations, and realising the benefits of the regime. ^{[footnote 4]}

The SAU has 2 defined roles under the regime – undertaking evaluations of Assessments of Compliance that are referred to it (the SAU’s referral role), and monitoring the effectiveness and impact of the regime (the SAU’s monitoring role).

This consultation relates only to the second of these roles. Further information on the SAU’s referral role can be found in the SAU Guidance and the Statutory Guidance to the regime.

The Subsidy Advice Unit’s monitoring role

The focus of this consultation is the SAU’s responsibility, as set out in section 65^{[footnote 1]} of the Act, to monitor and review:

• the effectiveness of the operation of the Act

• the impact of the Act on competition and investment within the UK

The SAU must carry out reviews in relation to the following periods:

• commencement and 31 March on the third year following the year of commencement (31 March 2026)

• the following 3 years (1 April 2026 to 31 March 2029)

• each subsequent 5 years ^{[footnote 5]}

The SAU must prepare a report on the outcome of each review.^{[footnote 6]} The report will be published in a manner the SAU considers to be appropriate, as soon as practicable after the end of the period to which it relates, ^{[footnote 7]} and each report will be laid before Parliament. ^{[footnote 8]}

In gathering evidence from public authorities, business and individuals, the SAU can use information gathering powers to require the provision of documents and other information.^{[footnote 9]}

Further information about the SAU’s information gathering powers and approach to the enforcement of those powers can be found in the SAU’s statement of policy on the enforcement of its information gathering powers.^{[footnote 10]}

Considerations in developing our proposed approach

The Act is not prescriptive on how the SAU is to conduct its review role. In developing our proposed approach, we have therefore taken into account:

• the aims of the Act as set out in the Explanatory Notes and Statutory Guidance that public authorities can design and implement subsidies to deliver policy priorities, while protecting against those subsidies that risk causing harmful economic impacts see paragraph 2.1 ^{[footnote 11]}

• the views of Parliament and stakeholders during the passage of the Act, in particular to ensure that the regime is monitored effectively to provide confidence in its operation, ^{[footnote 12]} and expectations that the review role considers the operation of the regime in its entirety (not just the functions undertaken by the SAU itself)^{[footnote 13]}

• our own understanding of the overarching aims of the regime set out in the Statutory Guidance ^{[footnote 14]}

• the responses to our consultation on the functioning of the SAU carried out prior to commencement of the regime see paragraph 2.14

We expect that the first monitoring report will form a baseline for future monitoring reports, allowing us to build up a picture over time of how the Act is working and its impact.^{[footnote 15]}

When analysing the evidence that we obtain, we will consider the effect and impact of the regime against what might have been expected to occur absent the regime being in place.

Aim of this consultation

We included some questions on monitoring in our consultation on the functioning of the SAU, published prior to launch in July 2022. ^{[footnote 16]} The responses to the consultation were generally supportive of the high-level approach set out, with suggestions about specific issues that should be considered and information that should be included in any report.^{[footnote 17]}

This consultation provides a more detailed explanation of our proposed approach, including the evidence we plan to gather, to carry out our monitoring responsibilities. It seeks stakeholder views on:

• our proposed approach to examining the effectiveness of the operation of the Act

• our proposed approach to examining the impact of the Act on competition and investment within the UK

• the evidence we intend to gather

The effectiveness of the operation of the Act

Proposed scope

As set out in s.65(1)(a) of the Act, the first requirement of the SAU’s monitoring function is to review the effectiveness of the operation of the Act.

In light of the considerations set out in Section 2, we propose assessing effectiveness by considering how well the Act is operating with respect to the delivery of the regime’s purpose and policy aims as set out in paragraph 2.1 (taking account of any changes over time).

In doing so we propose to consider 2 overarching questions:

• whether the Act works as intended

• whether the practical arrangements in place to facilitate the operation of the Act are working and sufficient

Whether the Act works as intended

To assess whether the Act works as intended, we propose to examine:

• public authorities’ ability to design subsidies that deliver strong benefits for the UK taxpayer and enable them to deliver strategic interventions to support the UK’s economic growth and deliver their policy priorities in ways which do not distort competition and risk distortive or harmful economic impacts

• whether the regulatory framework (including the advisory and enforcement functions of the SAU ^{[footnote 18]} and the Tribunal) allows public authorities to deliver desired subsidies in ways which do not distort competition and risk distortive or harmful economic impacts^{[footnote 19]}

• the appropriateness of thresholds (as set out in secondary legislation), in particular the Minimum Financial Assistance (MFA), Subsidies and Schemes of Interest (SSoIs) and Subsidies and Schemes of Particular Interest (SSoPIs) thresholds^{[footnote 20]}

• the suitability of streamlined routes (their scope and usage) under the new regime

Whether the practical arrangements work

We propose to assess how the processes and systems in place to facilitate the operation of the regime are operating, including:

• public authorities’ ability to comply with the requirements of the Act, such as their ability to carry out assessments against the subsidy control principles

• the support public authorities can access, including templates, the effectiveness of the published guidance and other materials^{[footnote 21]}

• whether the referral process to the SAU (such as the Public Authority Portal) is efficient and effective in supporting the aims of the Act

• whether the transparency and accountability arrangements (in particular the Subsidy Database) allow public authorities to be held to account and interested third parties to challenge subsidy decisions

• whether the process of challenging subsidy decisions through the Tribunal is efficient and effective in supporting the aims of the Act

Methodology and evidence

We propose using quantitative and qualitative analysis drawing upon primary and secondary sources, including:

• statistical research (quantitative surveys), qualitative research and other information gathering (including public authority feedback obtained on SAU referrals) see paragraphs 3.6 to 3.8

• analysis of data held within the Subsidy Database (for information on subsidies such as size, sector, location, type of subsidy and type of subsidy giver etc) see paragraphs 3.9 to 3.11 ^{[footnote 20]}

• analysis of SAU reports and challenges to the Tribunal; and d) reviewing third party sources of evidence, including literature reviews, seminars and data from any relevant existing research see paragraph 3.12

Research and information gathering

We propose to conduct quantitative surveys and/or qualitative research exercises (for example, in-depth interviews) to gather views of relevant stakeholders on whether the Act works as intended and whether the practical arrangements work see paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4. We intend to focus this work on public authorities, but we may also seek views of other relevant stakeholders such as businesses (including subsidy recipients and their competitors) and the advisory community (such as legal firms, economic consultancies and the academic community).

This work may also involve follow-up interviews with key stakeholders to understand in more detail their experience and perception of the regime. This may include understanding the impact the regime may have had on their policy development and implementation or on their day-to-day planning and design of related activity. 3.8 Should we undertake such follow-up interviews, we would look to capture a range of perspectives from those with different experiences of, and requirements from, the regime.

Analysis of the Subsidy Database

Public authorities are required to upload details of their subsidies and schemes to the Subsidy Database, a searchable database of subsidies awarded in the UK (which includes details of the recipient, purpose and amount).^{[footnote 22]} We propose to analyse schemes and subsidies awarded under the new regime captured in the database according to a range of factors such as size, value, location, sector, timeframe and subsidy type.

We will use this data to gain insights into, for example, the distribution of subsidies across the country and the economy including distribution by size, to identify patterns or trends in how subsidies are given.

We note that the ability to draw robust conclusions from this data (along the lines suggested in paragraph 3.10 will depend on the accuracy and completeness of the information provided. Similarly, our ability to draw any insights will be affected by the quantity of data which in some cases may not be sufficient to draw conclusions even if the data is accurate. As noted in paragraph 3.4, our review of the practical arrangements underpinning the regime will include looking at the effectiveness of the Subsidy Database.

Reviewing third party sources of evidence

There is a wide range of stakeholders with a direct and indirect interest in the operation of the new regime. This interest leads to articles, studies, seminars and conferences involving academics and professional advisers, as well as public authorities and beneficiaries concerned with the effectiveness and impact of the Act and its practical arrangements. We will consider this evidence to see what it can tell us about the questions we set out in paragraphs 3.3 and 3.4.

Questions

Do you agree with the SAU’s proposed scope for monitoring the effectiveness of the operation the Act? If not, what should be changed and why?

Do you agree with the methodology and evidence proposed? If not, what should be done or used?

Competition and investment

Proposed Scope

The second requirement of the SAU’s monitoring function is to review the impact of the operation of the Act on competition and investment within the UK.^{[footnote 23]}

In light of the considerations set out in Section 2, we propose examining how the operation of the Act may be having an impact on competition and investment in the UK and the extent to which it achieves the aim of preventing public authorities from giving subsidies in ways which distort competition and investment within the UK. We propose looking at:

• short-term effects on competition (such as market shares, entry/exit decisions, price changes etc)

• long term dynamic effects on incentives to invest and compete

• effect on input markets (eg raw materials, land, or labour), including choice of location

Methodology and evidence

Competition and investment in the UK are influenced by a wide range of factors, such as the general health of the economy,^{[footnote 24]} specific regulatory changes, or tax system interventions. It will be difficult to isolate the impact of the operation of the Act from these other factors and draw straightforward conclusions. The 3-year time frame of the first report may also make it hard to reliably identify trends.^{[footnote 25]}

Additionally, while we may be able to assess to some extent the impact of particular subsidies on competition and investment (eg in a particular geography or sector), this would not allow us to assess the impact of the regime as a whole. It would not pick up, for example, any deterrent effect of the regime (ie potentially distortive subsidies abandoned as a result of needing to be consistent with the Act).

Ultimately the limitations inherent in attempting to measure the impact of a single factor on competition and investment may mean that we are limited in the analysis we can undertake and the conclusions we can draw. ^{[footnote 23]}

Bearing these limitations in mind, the evidence we propose to gather to assess the impact on competition and investment may include:

• relevant indicators of competition and investment, including those used by the CMA in its State of Competition reports see paragraphs 4.7 to 4.8

• statistical research (quantitative surveys) (both carried out by the SAU and using existing Office for National Statistics (ONS) or other available survey evidence (see paragraphs 4.9 to 4.10)

• case studies see paragraphs 4.11 to 4.14

• other relevant sources of evidence (see paragraph 4.15)

Metrics

We propose considering available metrics on subsidies granted, and indicators of competition and investment:

• some indicators of competition are developed and used by the CMA in its periodic State of Competition reports, including industry concentration, price-cost markups and dynamic indicators such as entry and exit rates^{[footnote 26]}

• the ONS produces estimates of business investment by sector based on statistical survey responses

• data uploaded to the Subsidy Database by public authorities

In addition to the challenges noted in paragraphs 4.3 to 4.5, there are additional challenges of data quality and granularity which would need to be overcome in order to produce robust analysis of causal relationships between subsidies (or the subsidy regime) and outcomes for competition or investment using these data sources.

Research and information gathering

We propose using a mixture of existing and bespoke surveys to aid our understanding of the impact of the Act on competition and investment. We have identified existing surveys carried out by the ONS which may be useful, including:

• the Quarterly Inward Foreign Direct Investment Survey^{[footnote 27]}

• surveys used to generate ONS Business Investment statistics^{[footnote 28]}

• The UK Innovation Survey ^{[footnote 29]}

As well as these existing surveys, we may carry out bespoke statistical research (quantitative surveys) and other evidence gathering (such as qualitative research or calls for evidence) to seek views from businesses and other relevant stakeholders on how the regime has impacted competition and investment. The proposed focus of any such work will be to seek views on matters similar to those covered in the case studies see paragraphs 4.11 to 4.14 , specifically views on the market impacts of subsidies in respondents’ sectors, including whether respondents have changed approach on investment and other issues as a result of subsidies.

Case studies

Given the limitations noted above with attempting to use macro data to measure the impact of the Act on competition and investment in the UK, we propose supplementing our approach with more granular case studies.

We propose identifying a number of subsidies and subsidy schemes as case studies. We will obtain information in relation to those subsidies from the relevant public authority, the beneficiary, and from other market participants (including competitors).

We propose basing the choice of case study mainly on the following characteristics:

• the type of public authority (eg national, devolved or local government)

• the territorial extent of the subsidy; (eg national, regional or local)

• sector (eg economic sectors designated as sensitive under the Act)

• subsidy and scheme type (eg Streamlined Routes and Rescue & Restructuring)

Approach to case studies

In carrying out the case studies we propose approaching the relevant public authority, the beneficiary and other relevant market participants with questions aimed at understanding:

• the public authority: how they developed the subsidy proposals, including how the need for a subsidy was identified, the level of analysis (particularly with respect to the impact on competition and investment and general compliance with the subsidy control principles) and expertise involved, and whether the subsidy was delivering as expected

• the beneficiary: their awareness and experience of the process, including awareness of legal issues and risks, views on market impact and what made them request or apply for the subsidy

• other market participants: their awareness of the subsidy, any concerns (and if so whether they considered any challenge), ability to engage with the public authority and impact on them and the market

Other sources of evidence

We propose using the third-party evidence set out in Section 3, and reviewing literature and discussions (for example at seminars) regarding the impact of the Act to see what that tells us about the effect on competition and investment.

Questions

Do you think the proposed evidence and sources identified are appropriate to meet the scope of the review? If not, what other evidence and sources should be considered and why?

Are there particular factors that should be considered as part of the proposed case studies?

Timeline and next steps

How to respond

The SAU is seeking views from public authorities, businesses and representative organisations, legal and economic advisers and academics (and any other interested parties) to the questions and issues set out in this consultation. Please note that submissions on matters outside the scope of this consultation will not be addressed.

We encourage those with an interest in responding to send submissions, and any queries, by email to SAUconsultations@cma.gov.uk.

When responding to this consultation, please state whether you are responding as an individual or are representing the views of a group of organisation. If the latter, please make clear who you are representing and their role or interest.

In line with our policy of openness and transparency ^{[footnote 30]} we will publish a non-confidential version or summary of responses on our webpages.

We may also refer to comments received in response to this consultation in future publications. If your response contains any information that you regard as sensitive and that you would not wish to be published (information which, if published, might significantly harm the individual’s interests, or, as the case may be, the legitimate business interests of that business), please provided a non-confidential version for publication which omits that material, explaining why you regard it as sensitive and confidential.

Duration

The consultation will run for 8 weeks from Thursday 1 February 2024 to Thursday 28 March 2024. Responses should be submitted no later than 17:00 on Thursday 28 March.

Statement about how we use information and personal data that is supplied in consultation responses.

Any personal data that you supply in responding to this consultation will be processed by the SAU, as controller, in line with data protection legislation.^{[footnote 31]} ‘Personal data’ is information which relates to a living individual who may be identifiable from it.

We are processing this personal data for the purposes of our work under Part 4 of the Subsidy Control Act 2022. This processing is necessary for the performance of our functions and is carried out in the public interest, in order to take consultation responses into account.

For more information about how the SAU processes personal data, your rights in relation to that personal data, how to contact us, details of the CMA’s Data Protection Officer, and how long we retain personal data, see our Privacy Notice. ^{[footnote 32]}

Our use of all information and personal data that we receive is also subject to Part 9 of the Enterprise Act 2002. ^{[footnote 33]}

Please note that information and personal data provided in response to this consultation may be the subject of requests by members of the public under the Freedom of Information Act 2000. In responding to such requests, we will take fully into consideration representations made by you here in support of confidentiality. We will also be mindful of our responsibilities under the data protection legislation referred to above and under the Enterprise Act 2002.

If you are replying by email, this statement overrides any standard confidentiality disclaimer that may be generated by your organisation’s IT system.

After the consultation

As noted above, we propose to publish non-confidential versions or summary of the responses received. These documents will be available on our webpages and respondents will be notified when they are available.

We will reflect on the responses received and consider the need to adapt our proposals. 5.14 We intend to begin gathering evidence late 2024 and across 2025, before publishing our first report as soon as is practicable after the reporting period ends in March 2026.

Glossary

Term	Definition
Act, the	The Subsidy Control Act 2022
Assessment of Compliance	The assessment carried out by the public authority as to whether the subsidy or scheme complies with the Subsidy Control Requirements and the reasons for that conclusion
Beneficiary	Persons receiving a benefit or advantage (i.e., from a subsidy)
Competition and Markets Authority (CMA)	The Competition and Markets Authority, the body responsible for ensuring that competition and markets work well for consumers
Competition Appeal Tribunal (the Tribunal)	A specialist judicial body with jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving competition or economic regulatory issues within the United Kingdom
DBT	Department for Business and Trade
Devolved Administrations	The governments of Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland
Local Authority	An administrative body in local government
Monitoring Function	The SAU’s statutory responsibility, set out in s65(1) of the Act, to monitor and review the effectives of the operation of the Act and the impact of the Act on competition and investment within the UK
Public Authority	Any person who exercises functions of a public nature
Public Authority Portal	A dedicated, auditable communication channel that allows 2-way communications between the SAU and public authorities in relation to referrals
Office for National Statistics	The national statistical institute of the UK. It is responsible for collecting and publishing official statistics related to the economy, population and society at national, regional and local levels.
Rescue & Restructuring	Subsidies for rescuing ailing or insolvent enterprises
Streamlined Route	A type of subsidy scheme made by the UK Government for the use of any public authority in the UK
Subsidies or Schemes of Interest (SSoI) and of Particular Interest (SSoPI)	Subsidies or schemes that have greater potential to lead to undue distortion and negative effects on competition or investment within the United Kingdom or on international trade or investment. Defined in The Subsidy Control (Subsidies and Schemes of Interest or Particular Interest) Regulations 2022
Subsidy Advice Unit (SAU)	Unit within the Competition and Markets Authority with responsibility for giving advice on certain subsidies
Subsidy Control Principles	The Subsidy Control Principles as set out in Schedule 1 of the Act
Subsidy Database	The database provided for in Chapter 3 of Part 2 of the Act, where public authorities are required to enter certain information about subsidies they give or subsidy schemes they make
Subsidy Scheme	A scheme made by a public authority providing for the giving of subsidies
UK Internal Market	The trading relationships that exist between all parts of the UK in respect of labour, capital, goods, and services

1. UK subsidy control regime - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) ↩ ↩²

2. Page 17, UK subsidy control regime: statutory guidance ↩

3. View subsidies awarded by UK government: View subsidies awarded by UK government - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) ↩

4. Guidance on the operation of the subsidy control functions of the Subsidy Advice Unit - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) and UK subsidy control regime: statutory guidance - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) ↩

5. See Section 65(3) of the Act. Under section 65(4) of the Act, the Secretary of State may direct the SAU to prepare a report in relation to any ’specified period’ from the time that the SAU has prepared its reports in relation to the first 2 periods specified in section 65(3) of the Act. Where this occurs, subsequent reports will relate to the period between the last day to which the report directed by the Secretary of State relates and 31 March in the fifth year after the year in which the day after the period specified by the Secretary of State falls. From then on, reports will relate to each subsequent 5-year period (section 65(6) of the Act). ↩

6. Section 65(2) of the Act. ↩

7. Section 65(7) of the Act. ↩

8. Section 65(8) of the Act. ↩

9. See sections 41(2) and 41(3) of United Kingdom Internal Market Act 2020 ↩

10. Statement of policy on the enforcement of the SAU’s information gathering powers - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) ↩

11. See also paragraph 6, Subsidy Control Ac 2022 Explanatory Notes. ↩

12. See, for example Hansard, Public Bill Committee, Subsidy Control Bill (Ninth sitting), 16 November 2021 ↩

13. Lords Hansard, Committee Stage (Fourth Day) 9/2/2021 ↩

14. Paras 1.24-1.26 of the Statutory Guidance. ↩

15. As noted in paragraph 1.4, DBT has published a baseline for its own monitoring and evaluation exercises on the Subsidy Control Act which we may draw on as appropriate. ↩

16. See Draft guidance and draft policy statement for the CMA’s Subsidy Advice Unit - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) ↩

17. See Draft guidance and draft policy statement for the CMA’s Subsidy Advice Unit - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) for more detail on the responses received and our response at the time. ↩

18. Such as the SAU’s ability to properly evaluate assessments and the impact of the SAU’s evaluations on public authorities’ decision making and Tribunal decisions (ie whether public authorities (PAs) find our reports useful, whether they are helpful to third parties in holding PAs to account, and whether they are useful to other PAs who will be undertaking assessments). ↩

19. Such as whether interested parties can effectively challenge subsidies as appropriate and the extent to which they face any obstacles to doing so, such as difficulties in accessing pre-action information about a subsidy and the duration of the limitation periods created by the Act, and the extent to which the possibility of challenge is an effective disciplining tool on public authorities. ↩

20. Looking at the extent to which the various thresholds prevent inappropriate subsidies or result in potentially distortive subsidies not receiving proper scrutiny, and the impact of cumulation rules (whereby several smaller subsidies granted to the same recipient will count, or “cumulate”, together towards the SSoPI/SSoI thresholds when the subsidies are genuinely related). ↩ ↩²

21. Note that Section 79(4) places an obligation on the SoS to keep the guidance under review. A first revised version of the guidance was published on 18 December 2023. ↩

22. See The Subsidy Control (Subsidy Database Information Requirements) Regulations 2022 (legislation.gov.uk) for full details of the information required. See DBT Statutory Guidance, Chapter 12 for information on exemptions from transparency rules. ↩

23. Section 65(1)(b) of the Act ↩ ↩²

24. For example, the recession in 2008 to 2009 led to an increase in industry concentration (The State of UK Competition; CMA; November 2020) ↩

25. As noted in paragraph 2.12, the evidence we gather in the first monitoring report will allow us to build up a picture over time of how the Act is working and its impact. ↩

26. The strength of competition is not generally directly observable but must instead be inferred by analysing relevant indicators (see page 5, State of UK competition report 2022 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk)). ↩

27. Quarterly Inward Foreign Direct Investment Survey - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk) ↩

28. Business investment in the UK Statistical bulletins - Office for National Statistics (ons.gov.uk) ↩

29. UK Innovation Survey - Office for National Statistics ↩

30. Transparency and disclosure - statement of CMA’s policy and approach: CMA6 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) ↩

31. The General Data Protection Regulation 2016 (GDPR) and the Data Protection Act 2018. See Data protection: The Data Protection Act - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk). ↩

32. Personal information charter - Competition and Markets Authority - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk) ↩

33. Part 9 of the EA02 imposes a general restriction on the disclosure of information which the CMA obtains during the exercise of any of its functions (referred to as ‘specified information’) to other persons. This will include the functions of the CMA under the Act, as exercised by the SAU. Guidance on the application of Part 9 EA02 and when disclosure of specified information may be permitted is set out in Transparency and disclosure - statement of CMA’s policy and approach: CMA6 - GOV.UK (www.gov.uk). ↩