Consultation outcome

Reforming the leasehold and commonhold systems in England and Wales: summary of responses and government response

Updated 27 November 2023

Ministerial foreword

In January 2022, the Department sought views on recommendations made by the Law Commission to reform the leasehold and commonhold systems in England and Wales. This is part of our programme to tackle unfair practices in the leasehold market.

These changes would broaden access to the right to manage and enfranchisement so more leaseholders can own and manage their homes, and make minor changes to improve how commonhold functions. We sought further views on the impact of these proposals.

I am grateful to all of those who responded to our consultation. Over 2,000 people or organisations got in touch to provide evidence. The Department has listened carefully to how we can deliver a better deal for leaseholders as consumers whilst taking into account the legitimate rights of freeholders. This information has supported our decision making and helped us understand why broadening access to these rights is important to promoting fairness and transparency in the housing system.

Many leaseholders responding to the consultation were clear that they want to own and manage their homes. The government will help those in mixed-use buildings achieve this by accepting the Law Commission’s recommendations to raise the non-residential floorspace limit for collective enfranchisement and the right to manage from 25 to 50% and introduce a limit at the same level for individual freehold acquisitions. This significant reform will give tens of thousands of leaseholders the opportunity to acquire greater control through freehold ownership of their homes.

Many leaseholders want to collectively enfranchise but cannot afford to do so. In January 2021 the UK government announced its intention to bring forward reforms to make it cheaper for leaseholders to buy their freehold by committing to abolishing marriage value, capping the treatment of ground rents at 0.1% of the freehold value, and prescribing rates for enfranchisement valuation calculations at market value. The Department will go further by accepting the Law Commission’s recommendation to introduce mandatory leasebacks to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process. This will significantly reduce the upfront cost for many, broadening access to true ownership.

We are now bringing forward legislation to reform the leasehold system, including increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement and the right to manage, and introducing mandatory leasebacks to freeholders. These changes will provide a better deal for homeowners, giving them greater opportunity to choose how they own their property and how much say they have in its management.

Lee Rowley MP
Minister of State (Housing and Planning)

1. Introduction

1.1 The UK government and Welsh government are committed to creating a fair and just housing system for current and future homeowners. We are taking forward a comprehensive programme of reform to end unfair practices in the leasehold market and to revitalise commonhold.

1.2 Leasehold is a major tenure. Latest figures show that in 2021-22, there were an estimated 4.98 million leasehold dwellings in England, equating to 20% of the English housing stock. More than two thirds (70%, 3.5 million) of the leasehold dwellings in England were flats; 30% (1.5 million) were houses.^{[footnote 1]} There are 235,000 leasehold properties in Wales, equating to 16% of the Welsh housing stock.^{[footnote 2]}

1.3 We introduced the Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Act 2022 that came into force on 30 June 2022 making homeownership fairer and more transparent for thousands of future leaseholders, by preventing landlords under new residential long leases from requiring a leaseholder to pay a financial ground rent. We asked the Competition and Markets Authority to investigate potential mis-selling of homes and unfair terms in the leasehold sector. To date they have secured commitments benefitting 20,000 leaseholders and their investigation continues.

1.4 However, for many leaseholders the system still does not match their expectations of homeownership. In 2017 we asked the Law Commission to recommend improvements to the leasehold and commonhold systems. As part of this work, we asked the Law Commission to consider the case to improve access to enfranchisement and the right to manage (RTM) and to reinvigorate commonhold. The Law Commission delivered their reports in July 2020.

1.5 The Law Commission identified that leaseholders often want to take a greater role in the ownership and management of their properties but find they cannot. Access to enfranchisement and the RTM is restricted by rules relating to who owns the freehold, the number of units owned on a leasehold basis, and the usage of the whole building.

1.6 Some of these are reasonable restrictions, for example, leaseholders of at least half of the flats in a building must participate for an enfranchisement or RTM claim to be successful. This makes sure a minority of residents cannot take control over the interests of the majority of other residents. Others argue that some of these restrictions are arbitrary, unfairly limiting leaseholder’s access to a greater role in the ownership and management of their property. For example, the non-residential limit prevents enfranchisement or RTM claims in mixed-use buildings where more than 25% of the total floorspace is allotted to non-residential usage.

1.7 Commonhold addresses many of the limitations of leasehold, by granting homeowners the freehold of their unit from the outset and providing a framework for collective ownership of the shared parts of their building governed by standardised rules and obligations, permitting owners far greater control over how the building is run than traditional leasehold arrangements allow. Although commonhold was introduced in England and Wales in 2002, it has failed to take off, in large part because it had to compete with the more established leasehold model which allows additional income to be derived for developers or investors. This was primarily via ground rents, up until the introduction of the Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Act 2022 which restricts the charging of ground rents in most new leasehold properties. There are also some limitations in the current legal design of commonhold which can limit its use in some settings, including for Shared Ownership properties which are discussed in this consultation.

1.8 Having considered the Law Commission’s reports, the UK government and Welsh government agreed in principle with proposals that would improve access to enfranchisement and the RTM but wanted to seek views and further evidence on their impact before making a final decision. We also wanted to seek views in respect of how shared ownership might work in terms of decision-making rights within a new commonhold system.

1.9 The Law Commission recommendations would give more leaseholders rights to buy their freehold or take over management, in buildings where the non-residential floorspace is over 25% up to a maximum of 50%. The recommendations would also introduce mandatory leasebacks to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process and amend landlords’ voting rights in RTM companies. The consultation also detailed proposals to make the new Shared Ownership model work effectively and equitably within a commonhold setting, and to improve the provision of key information necessary for the buying and selling of a commonhold property.

1.10 In January 2022 we launched a consultation seeking views and further evidence on the impact of the Law Commission’s proposals. This report summarises the views we heard and government’s response to these recommendations.

Consultation process and responses

1.11 Our public consultation Reforming the leasehold and commonhold systems in England and Wales ran for 6 weeks from 11 January to 22 February 2022. The consultation received 2,087 responses, 1,940 via Citizen Space and 147 via email.

1.12 Of those responding, 1,901 identified themselves as private individuals, 121 as replying on behalf of an organisation and 65 did not identify themselves. Of those private individuals 663 identified themselves as leaseholders, two as freeholders and one as a commonhold unit owner. Four hundred and thirty-three respondents identified themselves as living in a building with ‘Up to and including 25%’ non-residential floorspace, 276 with ‘More than 25% up to 50%, and 44 with ‘More than 50%.

1.13 Organisations who provided responses included 21 resident led groups ‘resident management companies (RMCs)/ right to manage (RTM) companies/residents’ associations (RAs)/ recognised tenants associations (RTAs)’, 19 ‘Investors’, 14 ‘Representation/Campaign Groups’, 12 ‘managing/letting agent/property advisor’, 11 ‘Housing Associations’, 7 ‘charities’, 7 ‘developers/freeholders’, 7 ‘law firms’, 7 ‘local authorities’, 5 ‘accountants/surveyors/valuers’, 5 ‘professional Bodies’, 4 ‘trade associations’ and one ‘government Body’. A more detailed breakdown of respondents and their responses to questions can be found at Annex A.

1.14 This report summarises respondents’ views by considering comments made in relation to each of the questions included in the consultation document. It also sets out the government’s proposed response in each case.

Summary of government response

1.15 The UK government and Welsh government in this response set out the following positions with regards to the following of the Law Commission’s recommendations and options:

The non-residential limit

• For collective freehold acquisitions: we accept the Law Commission’s Leasehold home ownership: buying your freehold or extending your lease report Recommendation 38. It will be possible for qualifying leaseholders living in a mixed-use building to collectively enfranchise provided they meet all other requisite qualifying criteria and no more than 50% of a building’s total floorspace excluding common parts is occupied or intended to be occupied for non-residential use.

• For right to manage claims: we accept the Law Commission’s Leasehold home ownership: exercising the right to manage report Recommendation 7. It will be possible for qualifying leaseholders living in a mixed-use building to claim the right to manage provided they meet all other requisite qualifying criteria and no more than 50% of a building’s total floorspace excluding common parts is occupied or intended to be occupied for non-residential use.

• For individual freehold acquisitions: we accept the Law Commission’s Leasehold home ownership: buying your freehold or extending your lease report Recommendation 31 (3) (b) (ii). It will be possible for the long leaseholder of premises which contain at least one residential unit, but no other residential units sublet on long leases, to exercise the right of an individual freehold acquisition, provided they meet all other requisite qualifying criteria and no more than 50% of a building’s total floorspace excluding common parts is occupied or intended to be occupied for non-residential use.

Further changes

• Mandatory leasebacks: we accept the Law Commission’s Leasehold home ownership: buying your freehold or extending your lease report Recommendation 21. Leaseholders making a collective freehold acquisition claim will be able to require the landlord to take a ‘leaseback’ of any units (other than common parts) not let to leaseholders participating in the claim. We will prescribe that such leases must be granted for 999 years and at a peppercorn ground rent and will consider further terms as part of drafting legislation.

• Landlords voting rights in right to manage companies: we accept the Law Commission’s Leasehold home ownership: exercising the right to manage report RTM voting rights Option 3. The total votes exercisable by landlords under leases in RTM companies will be reduced such that they do not exceed one third of the votes exercisable by qualifying tenants.

Commonhold

• Shared Ownership: we are minded to agree with the Law Commission that Shared Ownership should be permitted in commonhold, and in agreeing we are minded to allow the providers of new model Shared Ownership homes to participate in decision-making during the Initial Repair Period, where those decisions relate to funding repairs that the provider is responsible for.^{[footnote 3]} Where the provider wishes to delegate these voting rights to the shared owner, they will be able to do so.

• Buying and selling commonholds: we are minded to cap the maximum fee chargeable for a Commonhold Unit Information Certificate (CUIC) at around £50, and that no fee will be payable as a sanction on commonhold associations if they fail to issue a CUIC within 14 days.

2. The non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement

Question 1. Do you agree or disagree that increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement from 25% to 50% meets government’s aim of addressing the historic imbalance of rights between freeholders and leaseholders?

Question 2. Do you support or oppose a 50% non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement?

Question 2a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement from 25% to 50%?

Question 2b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, of a 50% non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement?

Summary of responses

2.1 In responding to question 1 the vast majority (81%) of ‘Individuals’ agreed that increasing the limit would meet government’s aim. Amongst ‘Leaseholders’ and ‘Leaseholders in mixed-use buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ this rose to 83% and 96% respectively. The majority (68%) of ‘Organisations’ agreed but a majority (69%) of ‘Investors’ disagreed.

2.2 In responding to question 2 the vast majority (82%) of ‘Individuals’ supported increasing the non-residential limit to 50% for collective enfranchisement. Support was highest amongst ‘Leaseholders’ and ‘Leaseholders living in mixed-use buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ at 86% and 96% respectively. A majority (55%) of ‘Organisations’ supported the change but a majority of ‘Investors’ and ‘Developers/Freeholders’ opposed at 74% and 57% respectively.

2.3 The vast majority (76%) of those who supported an increase did so because it would improve access to enfranchisement. Many respondents were supportive of any change that made leaseholder led ownership and management more accessible. For some leaseholders in mixed-use buildings the current 25% limit was their only barrier to enfranchisement and if the limit was increased they would enfranchise. Some respondents were leaseholders in buildings that did not qualify because they had for example 26% non-residential floorspace. They felt their building was residential, that it was unfair that they couldn’t enfranchise and supported an increased limit that would address this.

2.4 Some respondents argued that a 50% limit is a more accurate measure than 25% for determining if a building is residential. Others highlighted that a 50% limit would be consistent with the existing limit for the Right of First Refusal established in the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987. It was asserted that the development of mixed-use buildings is becoming more common and therefore it was an appropriate time to amend the non-residential limit which has not changed since it was increased from 10% to 25% in the Commonhold and Leasehold Reform Act 2002.

2.5 The Leasehold Knowledge Partnership, a charity that provides advice to and lobbies on behalf of leaseholders, strongly supported the change arguing it would “massively democratise” leasehold ownership by broadening access to enfranchisement and bring the system for collective ownership in England and Wales closer to that of other countries where common ownership is the default. This position was echoed by the National Leasehold Campaign, a campaign group with 23,000 members that argues for leasehold reform, who supported broadening access to enfranchisement and conversion to commonhold.

2.6 A number of respondents argued that a 50% limit would incentivise landlords to manage their mixed-use buildings to a high standard. If they did not, poor performing landlords could be removed via enfranchisement. Some respondents indicated they supported a 50% limit but used their comments to argue for a limit above 50% including no restriction on enfranchisement regardless of the percentage of non-residential floorspace usage in a mixed-use building.

2.7 The majority of those opposed to an increased limit were organisations involved in the development and management of mixed-use buildings, larger developments, and high streets. The most common argument against an increased limit was that it would act as a major disincentive to future mixed-use development in England and Wales. Respondents asserted that being able to guarantee freehold ownership is essential to securing investment for a development. Investors want to be assured that they will receive regular returns and that value will be safeguarded by professional long-term management.

2.8 It was argued an increased non-residential limit would jeopardise this. Firstly, returns could be realised at any point, when leaseholders choose to enfranchise, rather than at regular intervals over a long period. This would make the development less attractive to investors who are looking for regular, long term, guaranteed returns. Secondly, any interest that an investor retains in a development after a successful enfranchisement claim, for example in non-participating residential or commercial units, will be affected by leaseholder-led management. If this management is of a poor quality the value of any retained interest could be negatively affected.

2.9 It was argued that bringing more mixed-use buildings into the scope of enfranchisement rights would have several practical consequences for mixed-use development. Firstly, securing funding for mixed-use developments that may not retain long term value would become increasingly challenging, with some developments becoming unviable. Secondly, developments would be built to avoid an increased non-residential limit, either by including more non-residential units or more residential units built to rent rather than for sale as leasehold, with both measures reducing the supply of housing for sale. These consequences were highlighted as counter to government’s goals to regenerate mixed-use spaces such as high streets and increase the supply of homes to encourage home ownership.

2.10 The British Property Federation, a trade association for companies involved in property ownership and investment, argued increasing the limit would weaken investment in mixed use buildings and investor led management, to the detriment of the regeneration of town and city centres and large mixed-use development place-making such as the King’s Cross development. Cadogan Estates, a freeholder and property manager, investor and developer in central London, echoed this position and highlighted the potential for an increase in the limit to undermine long term estate management undertaken by organisations such as theirs.

2.11 Owners of existing high streets argued that single freehold ownership of all the properties on a high street facilitates positive holistic long-term management. They believed that a third-party freeholder can balance the needs of leaseholders, commercial tenants, and the wider community whilst taking a very long-term view. This would not be possible if ownership was fragmented as a result of collective enfranchisement claims. It was suggested that fragmented ownership risks disjointed leaseholder led management which would lack the necessary expertise and would not take a long-term holistic view on management, ultimately degrading the high street for all. It was argued that the consequences of this would be a disincentive to regeneration of high streets for the same reasons as detailed in paragraphs 2.7-2.9.

2.12 Some respondents argued that the government’s leasehold reforms are intended to benefit owner-occupier qualifying leaseholders, rather than those who own leasehold interests as investments. They suggested that in certain areas, such as prime central London, the majority of leasehold owners in mixed-use buildings will be commercial entities. They argued it would be wrong for the primary beneficiaries of an increased non-residential limit to include investors and foreign non-residents rather than solely owner-occupier leaseholders. They suggested the reintroduction of some form of residence test for collective enfranchisement claims to mitigate this.

Government response

2.13 We said previously we agreed in principle with the Law Commission’s recommendation to increase the non-residential limit to 50% for collective enfranchisement. This change would fulfil our objective to improve access to enfranchisement. We recognised the Law Commission did not consult specifically on the option of a 50% limit and believed there was benefit in further consultation. In consulting we wanted to give stakeholders an opportunity to share their views and provide further evidence on the impact of these proposals before a final decision was made.

2.14 Our objective in considering increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement was to consider the case for improving access to enfranchisement. We want to promote transparency and fairness in the residential leasehold sector and provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers whilst taking into account the legitimate rights of freeholders.

2.15 We view the Law Commission’s recommendation to increase the non-residential limit to 50% for collective enfranchisement as a proportional change that will improve access to enfranchisement. We are not convinced by the arguments presented in opposition to this change.

2.16 We believe qualifying leaseholders in residential buildings should be able to choose how they own and manage their properties. We do not think it can reasonably be argued that a building with 74% residential floorspace is a commercial building. The current limit does not fulfil its purpose. We agree with the Law Commission that where half or more of the floorspace of a building, excluding common parts, is occupied, or intended to be occupied, for residential use, it can reasonably be considered a residential building. We believe a 50% limit provides a more accurate measure than a 25% limit of whether a building is residential. This limit strikes a fairer balance between the rights of qualifying leaseholders and those of landlords than the status quo. It is clear from responses to our consultation that the current limit is preventing many in such mixed-use buildings from collectively enfranchising when they want to do so.

2.17 If all other requisite qualifying criteria are met, we believe it is not fair that qualifying leaseholders cannot collectively enfranchise because of the 25% non-residential limit. As we explain in Chapters 3 and 5, we will accept the Law Commission’s recommendations to increase the non-residential limit for RTM claims to 50% and introduce a non-residential limit at 50% for individual freehold acquisitions. This will bring these limits in the line with the 50% non-residential limit for the Right of First Refusal. This will create a proportionate and consistent measure for determining whether qualifying leaseholders in a mixed-use building can manage and own their building through the right to enfranchisement or the RTM.

2.18 Collective enfranchisement is the compulsory acquisition of a landlord’s interest. Access to it cannot be broadened without a knock-on effect on landlords. The government’s programme aims primarily to improve the leasehold system for leaseholders. However, any improvements must be proportionate and take in to account the legitimate rights of landlords. We have listened carefully to those who responded to the consultation to oppose increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement.

2.19 The most common argument against an increased limit was that it would act as a major disincentive to mixed-use development in England and Wales. The government recognises that decisions on the form and structure of any regenerative development will be affected by many factors of which the non-residential limit is one. The shape and scope of new regeneration schemes are affected by a range of factors including the ownership of land (e.g., a solely privately led scheme may have different requirement to a joint scheme with a local authority or a local authority led scheme), local planning requirements and the viability of different housing and non-housing tenures in a particular area.

2.20 We are unconvinced that an increase of the non-residential limit to 50% for collective enfranchisement will significantly detrimentally affect investment in mixed-use buildings and developments in England and Wales. Firstly, we note the non-residential limit has been raised before, from 10% to 25% in 2002, and mixed-use development in England and Wales has continued. Investors and developers will need to adjust to an increased limit as they did in 2002 but this adaptation is possible. The market has recently adapted following our announced leasehold house ban and the commencement of the Leasehold Reform (Ground Rent) Act 2022. Development has continued but models have adjusted to sell the vast majority of houses on a freehold basis and long leases with peppercorn ground rents.

2.21 Secondly, the restriction on charging a ground rent above a peppercorn in long residential leases has changed the attractiveness of a freehold as a long-term investment option. Without the ability to charge a ground rent above a peppercorn much of the investment value of a freehold has been removed. This change was deliberate and stems from government’s belief that homes that have been bought should be leaseholders’ to live in and enjoy, not primarily designed as an income stream for investment. We do not believe that a 50% non-residential limit will have a greater impact on the attractiveness of investment than the restriction on ground rent, to which the market has adjusted.

2.22 Thirdly, whilst we do accept that a 50% non-residential limit will have some impact on investment in mixed-use development, we believe this limited disruption is justified given the significant benefit the change will bring to qualifying leaseholders in mixed-use buildings.

2.23 It was suggested that fragmented ownership risks disjointed leaseholder led management which would lack the necessary expertise, not take a long-term holistic view on management, and ultimately degrade the high street for all. We do not see why leaseholders need be any less invested in the successful long-term management of their high streets and developments. They have a significant interest in ensuring their investment retains and accumulates value, arguably their interests are equally aligned with the long-term value of their building as freeholder landlord’s interests (who are almost always investors in this mixed-use context). Leaseholders who live in their properties have the added incentive of ensuring their local environment is well maintained and managed for their needs as a resident. Whilst some may decide to manage their buildings themselves, we expect, as is already the case with many institutional landlords, that many will employ professional managing agents to ensure successful day to day management.

2.24 We understand that fragmented ownership may prolong decision making on mixed-use developments and regeneration, in this context because leaseholders who have enfranchised may take a more active role in decision making. The interests of residential and commercial owners may not always align, and an additional time commitment may be required to reach an equitable compromise. However, on balance we think it is fair that qualifying leaseholders have an opportunity to acquire their freehold and that this includes having a say in decision making for their street or development, even if this may sometimes prolong decision making.

2.25 For the reasons explained above we accept the Law Commission’s recommendation to increase the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement from 25% to 50%.

Question 3. If you were to benefit from a new 50% non-residential limit, would you buy your freehold?

Question 4. If no/not sure to Q 3, please select all relevant reasons?

a. Cost i.e., can’t afford cost of buying freehold
b. Do not want ownership and management responsibility
c. Not enough qualifying tenants
d. Not enough support from other qualifying tenants
e. Other (please specify)

Summary of responses

2.26 In response to question 3 the majority (61%) of respondents answered ‘Yes’ agreeing that they would enfranchise if they were to benefit from a 50% non-residential limit. This rose to 69% and 67% respectively amongst ‘Leaseholders’ and ‘Leaseholders living in building with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’.

2.27 In response to question 4 by far the most selected reason was a. Cost which was selected by 44% of respondents. 17% of respondents selected b. Not wanting ownership and management responsibility and 9% of respondents selecting both c. Not enough qualifying tenants and d. Not enough support amongst qualifying tenants. 22% of respondents selected e. Other although some respondents who did not select this option also used the free text box to provide additional comment.

2.28 By far the most common reason highlighted by free text responses was uncertainty about the cost of enfranchisement (43%). Responses were received from leaseholders with 999-year leases with peppercorn ground rents. They recognised they already own practically all the value in their residential units but were concerned about the cost of non-residential units in their building as part of the enfranchisement calculation. They believed that the Law Commission’s mandatory leasebacks proposal would provide them with the certainty needed to take forward an enfranchisement claim. Other responses highlighted concern about the administrative cost of the enfranchisement process, including being made to pay a landlord’s costs.

2.29 Other reasons highlighted by free text responses included worry about taking on responsibility for building safety defects or recladding (5%), uncertainty about the implications of enfranchisement (3%) and worry about the landlord frustrating and delaying the enfranchisement process (3%).

Question 5. Are there any individuals, organisations or types of properties that you believe should be exempt from the proposed increase in the non-residential limit to 50%?

Question 5a. If Yes - Please set out what type of individual, organisation or property should be exempt. Please provide information on the following:

Why you think they should be exempt, providing evidence where possible; and the criteria for how an exemption would work in practice.

Summary of responses

2.30 The majority (63%) of respondents did not believe there were any individuals, organisations or types of properties that should be exempt from an increase in the non-residential limit and answered ‘No’. This increased slightly for ‘Individuals’ (64%) and ‘Leaseholders’ (64%) and significantly for ‘Leaseholders living in building with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ (80%).

2.31 Responses from organisations were more divided, 38% answered ‘No’ and 35% ‘Yes’. The majority of investors (63%), local authorities (86%) and accountants/surveyors/valuers (60%) answered ‘Yes’, as did 50% of trade associations and managing/letting agents/property advisors. A majority of charities (86%), representation/campaign groups (64%) and resident led groups (67%) answered ‘No’.

2.32 Exemptions suggested included “properties where maintenance is crucial to safety”, “retirement/supported living properties”, “properties containing emergency/social/medical services” and “local authority properties”.

2.33 Four exemptions received the support of over 10% of respondents to question 5a; “properties within large mixed-use estates or developments with a single freeholder”, “rights available to owner occupiers”, “complex properties with multiple shared services (e.g., containing a hotel, cinema, or shopping centre)” and “property owned by charities or non-profit organisations”.

2.34 It was argued an exemption for properties that are part of a larger mixed-use estate or high street would protect professional management and the value in placemaking that single freehold ownership is argued to deliver. It was suggested this could operate via applications to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) with the Tribunal being given the discretion to consider properties in proximity to one another that are managed as a single estate, with the landlord’s management record and historic connection with the area and the present character of the area being considered.

2.35 It was argued an exemption for mixed-use buildings that could be considered ‘complex’, (for example, those that contain a hotel, cinema, or shopping centre) would ensure management was undertaken by a single party, in line with new building safety regulations, and carried out by professional landlords. It was suggested the exemption could operate by prohibiting rights in large buildings containing more than a certain number of residential and non-residential units, ‘significant communal facilities’, or with landlords under leases who were the ‘responsible person’ for commercial building safety regulations.

2.36 Respondents argued that increasing the non-residential limit would extend enfranchisement rights to some arguably commercial buildings, these being buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential usage. In such building respondents argue that flats are more likely to be owned by commercial investors not owner-occupiers. It was argued, this justifies the reintroduction of a residential test to restrict enfranchisement rights to owner-occupier leaseholders as government should be broadening access to enfranchisement rights for such leaseholders, not commercial entities. It was suggested a residential test could restrict enfranchisement to those who occupied a leasehold property as their primary residence, or those who owned only one leasehold property in the building.

2.37 It was suggested that properties owned by charities, non-profit organisations or housing associations should be exempt. Justifications for this included that affordable housing provided by housing associations should be protected so that it remains affordable, any organisation that provides an element of social support should be exempt, and property leased to employees of charities, for example property leased to National Trust employees but which is not itself held inalienably, should be protected.

Government response

2.38 Our aim is to broaden access to enfranchisement and the RTM, making enfranchisement easier and more cost effective, and facilitating and streamlining the exercise of the RTM. We do not wish to restrict access to these rights and add complexity to the system unless there is an overwhelming reason to do so. Considering this, our overall response to this question is we do not think the suggested exemptions are justified. We have addressed the four exemptions which received the most support below.

2.39 We agree with the Law Commission that these rights should be available to all residential leaseholders and that drawing a distinction between commercial investors and residential leaseholder would be neither workable nor desirable. As the Law Commission have noted it would be difficult to distinguish accurately between commercial investors who should not benefit from enfranchisement rights, and those who should, and attempting to restrict the former may well disenfranchise the latter. Any restriction would add a layer of complexity to the criteria system we aim to simplify and in doing so create additional opportunities for disputes. Residential leaseholders in buildings with high numbers of commercial investors would be disadvantaged and potentially unable to enfranchise entirely.

2.40 We also agree with the Law Commission and do not consider that any landlord should be exempt from enfranchisement or RTM claims on the basis that they are a charity or housing association. As the Law Commission noted, like all landlords, charities generally grant long leases as a means of making money from their property assets. We do not see why the purpose or purposes for which that money will be used should have any bearing on whether enfranchisement rights are available to a leaseholder, nor why a leaseholder who enjoys enfranchisement rights should be restricted from exercising the RTM.

2.41 We have considered the suggested exemptions for properties that are part of a larger mixed-use estate or high street, and ‘complex’ mixed-use buildings. As we explain in paragraph 2.23, we do not believe that leaseholders will be unable to undertake successful long-term management of mixed-use buildings, nor that leaseholders will be less invested in such long-term management. We expect in most cases leaseholders will employ professional managing agents. We therefore do not think the nature of the mixed-use element of a building should affect leaseholder’s rights.

2.42 We note the successful role many landlords take in the management of mixed-use buildings and places. However, enfranchisement and the RTM are no fault rights. Their availability does not depend on mismanagement on the part of the landlord. Under the suggested exemption the availability of enfranchisement rights and the RTM would be dependent upon demonstrating poor management on the landlords part. We do not think it would be justified to deprive leaseholders of these rights solely because of successful management on the part of the landlord. This change would add complexity to a system we are trying to simplify and may deprive existing leaseholders of enfranchisement rights and the RTM. We also note that if a landlord is performing well, it is less likely that leaseholders will pursue an enfranchisement or RTM claim. As we explain in paragraph 2.23, we do not see why leaseholders need be any less invested in the successful long-term management of their high streets and developments. We therefore do not think an exemption for properties that are part of a larger mixed-use estate or high street is justified.

2.43 For the reasons explained above we will not introduce additional exemptions to a 50% non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement, the RTM, and individual freehold acquisitions.

3. A non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions

Question 6. Do you support or oppose a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Question 6a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Question 6b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, of a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Question 7. What are the potential impacts of introducing a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Summary of responses

3.1 In responding to question 6 the vast majority (74%) of ‘Individuals’ supported a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions. Amongst ‘Leaseholders’ and ‘Leaseholders living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ 76% and 57% respectively supported the change. Amongst ‘Organisations’ 39% supported the change, 29% were opposed, and 21% neither supported nor opposed. The vast majority (74%) of ‘Investors’ were opposed to the change.

3.2 The reasons given by respondents who supported the change broadly matched those given in response to question 2a regarding a 50% non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement. Respondents were supportive of improving access to enfranchisement and resident ownership and management. Respondents again argued that a 50% limit was a more accurate measure of whether a building was residential and therefore was fairer. Many thought that any limit for individual freehold acquisitions should be consistent with the limit for collective enfranchisement and could see no justifiable reason why they should differ.

3.3 Opposition to the change came both from those opposed to improving access to enfranchisement rights and those in favour who thought a 50% limit did not go far enough. Those who were opposed for this reason argued there should be no non-residential limit or that it should be higher than 50%.

3.4 The arguments of those opposed to improving access to enfranchisement through a 50% non-residential limit broadly matched those given in response to question 2b. They argued that it would act as a major disincentive to mixed-use development and that residential leaseholders lack the knowledge and expertise required to successfully manage mixed-use buildings and places. They asserted that the owners of leases over mixed-use buildings that contain a single residential unit are often institutional investors rather than owner occupiers and did not believe it was the government’s intention to extend rights to commercial entities.

3.5 Question 7 asked for respondents to give any potential impacts of the proposal that they felt government should consider. The responses to this question almost entirely mirrored the free text question responses to questions 6a and 6b rather than providing new matters for consideration.

Government response

3.6 We recognised in our consultation that the Law Commission did not consult specifically on the option of a 50% limit for individual freehold acquisitions. We wanted stakeholders to have an appropriate opportunity to share their views on the impact of the introduction of a non-residential limit set at 50% should the Law Commission’s recommendations on individual freehold acquisitions be accepted.

3.7 Our objectives in considering introducing a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions are to consider the case for improving access to enfranchisement, making it easier and more cost effective. We want to promote transparency and fairness in the residential leasehold sector and provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers whilst taking into account the legitimate rights of freeholders.

3.8 We view the Law Commission’s recommendation to introduce a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions as a proportionate change that will improve access to enfranchisement. It will create a fair measure for determining in which mixed-use buildings individual freehold acquisitions are available. We are unconvinced by the arguments presented in opposition to this change.

3.9 In most cases, individual freehold acquisitions will replace the right to acquire the freehold of a house, a single residential unit making up a whole property. In this scenario the non-residential limit is not relevant and need not be considered. In mixed-use buildings let under a single long lease that contain at least one residential unit the non-residential limit is relevant. For example, a flat above a shop where a single party holds a long lease for the whole building.

3.10 Under the current law, if the shop comprised, for instance, 30% of the floorspace of the building, the leaseholder might be able to acquire the freehold as the building might reasonably be considered a house. Under the Law Commission’s proposed regime to replace enfranchisement of a house, the leaseholder’s right to acquire the freehold would instead be determined by the non-residential limit. This will depend upon the level the limit is set at and the floorspace dedicated to residential and non-residential usage in the specific property. We recognise that a strong argument for a 50% limit is that it will ensure leaseholders in most ‘flat above a shop’ scenarios continue to enjoy enfranchisement rights where under a 25% limit they would not. A 25% limit would disenfranchise leaseholders who likely currently enjoy enfranchisement rights by virtue of being able to argue their building can reasonably be considered a house.

3.11 As we have explained at paragraph 2.23 we do not see why leaseholders need be any less invested in the successful long-term management of their properties than existing freeholders. We think this is more likely to be the case in scenarios where they already hold the single long lease for a mixed-use building with at least one residential unit. In this case they may in effect already be managing the whole building, often utilising the services of a professional managing agent. Any added complexity that comes with ownership of the freehold will be something leaseholders will need to consider when deciding whether to pursue an individual freehold acquisition. Nevertheless, the government feels that the case has not been made that this complexity is so great as to prevent leaseholders from acquiring the freehold of their building.

3.12 Regarding the argument that a 50% non-residential limit would act as a major disincentive to mixed-use development, as we have explained at paragraph 2.20, we are unconvinced that improving access to enfranchisement will have a significant detrimental effect. Similarly, as we have explained at paragraphs 2.23 – 2.24, on balance we think it is fair that leaseholders have an opportunity to acquire their freehold and that this may include a say in decision making for their street or development, even if this may sometimes prolong decision making.

3.13 For the reasons explained above we accept the Law Commission’s recommendation to introduce a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions.

4. The introduction of mandatory ‘leasebacks’ as part of collective freehold acquisitions

Question 8. Do you agree or disagree that mandatory ‘leasebacks’ to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process will reduce the cost of purchasing a freehold?

Question 9. Do you support or oppose mandatory leasebacks to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process?

Question 9a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of mandatory leasebacks as part of the collective enfranchisement process, on the presumption of a 50% non-residential limit?

Question 9b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits of mandatory leasebacks as part of the collective enfranchisement process, on the presumption of a 50% non-residential limit?

Summary of responses

4.1 In responding to question 8 the majority (64%) of ‘Individuals’ agreed that introducing mandatory ‘leasebacks’ to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process would reduce the cost of purchasing a freehold. Amongst ‘Leaseholders’ and ‘Leaseholders in mixed-use buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ 62% and 75% respectively agreed. The majority (58%) of ‘Organisations’ agreed but the proposal did not enjoy majority support amongst the ‘developer/freehold’ (29%), ‘investor’ (42%), and ‘managing/letting agent/property advisor’ (42%) subgroups.

4.2 In responding to question 9 the majority (63%) of ‘individuals’ supported mandatory leasebacks to landlords. Amongst ‘leaseholders’ and ‘leaseholders in mixed-use buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ 62% and 74% respectively supported the proposal. The proposal did not receive the majority support of ‘Organisations’ with 41% supporting, 34% opposed, 20% not answered and 5% marking neither. Opposition was highest amongst the ‘investor’ and ‘developer/freehold’ subgroups with 84% and 57% respectively opposed.

4.3 The most common benefit mentioned in 66% of responses to question 9a was that mandatory ‘leasebacks’ would improve access to enfranchisement and resident ownership. Respondents highlighted a 50% non-residential limit for enfranchisement would in theory grant them the right to enfranchise. However, in practice without mandatory ‘leasebacks’ they would be unable to afford the cost of buying the freehold interest of the non-residential units within their building. Some leaseholders only want to be responsible for their residential units and not take on responsibility for non-residential units and saw ‘leasebacks’ as a way of achieving this in essence. Many respondents raised that although they already qualify for enfranchisement under the existing 25% non-residential limit, they cannot afford to do so because of the cost of buying the freehold interest of non-residential units. Many believe mandatory ‘leasebacks’ would remove this barrier and make it certain when enfranchisement was and was not affordable.

4.4 22% of respondents highlighted that mandatory ‘leasebacks’ would also benefit those in wholly residential buildings. They highlighted that if leaseholders representing half the flats in a building want to enfranchise, they often cannot because they can afford to buy the freehold interest for all residential units. ‘Leasebacks’ would mean that the affordability of enfranchisement would no longer by determined by the number of units participating in an enfranchisement claim. Other leaseholders living in wholly residential buildings also highlighted that mandatory ‘leasebacks’ would benefit them where there were large number of non-qualifying units, for example shared ownership properties or those let on short tenancies.

4.5 Further benefits raised included that it was beneficial for both parties as landlords could maintain control of valuable commercial assets and that it would provide clarity at the beginning of the enfranchisement procedure as to the configuration and cost of the claim. It was claimed that freeholders often include in the freehold cost of a unit the potential value of further development and ‘leasebacks’ of such units would allow previous freeholders to retain this value, reducing the cost of enfranchisement for leaseholders. Many responses that were otherwise supportive of mandatory ‘leasebacks’ highlighted that the continued involvement of the previous landlord in the management of the building may be considered a negative by many leaseholders, and that government should address this.

4.6 The most common dis-benefit given in response to question 9b, which 41% of responses mentioned, was that forcing a landlord to exchange a freehold interest for a leasehold interest was unfair. Respondents recognised that whilst enfranchisement is compulsory, under the existing process a landlord can elect to sever all involvement with a property in return for monetary compensation. The introduction of mandatory ‘leasebacks’ would force landlords to retain a leasehold interest in a property, with this interest replacing some of the monetary compensation they would have received under the existing process. Respondents believed this was unfair on landlords who may no longer wish to take a leasehold interest in a property if they do not own the freehold.

4.7 The next most common dis-benefit, which 18% of responses mentioned, was that ‘leasebacks’ would complicate the management of commercial units and mixed-use buildings. Respondents highlighted that any ‘leaseback’ introduces an intermediate landlord to the property. This intermediate landlord will have rights and obligations to their tenants and their superior landlord, the freeholder. They may also choose to employ their own managing agent to manage the units over which they have a head lease. Taken together they argued this will complicate management of the whole building, increasing costs and the likelihood of poor management.

4.8 Respondents also argued that ‘leasebacks’ do not represent fair compensation when compared to the monetary value landlords would receive under the existing process. They believe there would be a limited market for ‘leasebacks’ where ownership of the freehold is held by another party, and even more so when that other party is comprised of the leaseholders of the property. Respondents also believed it would lead to increased conflicts between leaseholders and their old landlord who are forced to maintain a relationship.

Government response

4.9 We said in our consultation that we agreed in principle with the Law Commission’s recommendation to introduce mandatory ‘leasebacks’ to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process because it would improve access to enfranchisement. We consulted because we recognised that the Law Commission did not consult specifically on the option of a 50% non-residential limit. This change would have implications for mandatory ‘leasebacks’ because they were likely to be used more often when an enfranchisement claim related to a property with a significant non-residential element, although we noted they would also likely be used as part of enfranchisement claims for wholly residential buildings. We wanted all stakeholders who would be affected by this change to have an appropriate opportunity to share their views before a final decision was made.

4.10 Our objective in considering introducing mandatory ‘leasebacks’ to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process was to consider the case for improving access to enfranchisement. We want to promote transparency and fairness in the residential leasehold sector and provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers whilst taking into account the legitimate rights of freeholders.

4.11 We believe introducing mandatory ‘leasebacks’ to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process will achieve this objective as they will make enfranchisement more affordable and therefore more accessible. In other parts of this response, we detail changes to the qualifying criteria for collective enfranchisement to increase the number of buildings and leaseholders who qualify. This is an important step in broadening access, enabling more leaseholders to take ownership and management responsibility for their buildings if they choose to.

4.12 However, we also recognise, and responses to our consultation have confirmed, that for many leaseholders the largest restriction on enfranchisement is cost. Cost restricts leaseholders with existing rights and will restrict those who qualify under any new broadened regime. Cost is more likely to affect leaseholders who are collectively enfranchising because they must purchase the freehold interest in non-participating, non-qualifying and non-residential units as well as their own units. Whilst a resident leaseholder may already own most of the financial interest in their own unit, it is unlikely they will own any interest in these other units, and therefore the cost of a collective enfranchisement can be prohibitively expensive, and more so for mixed-use buildings containing significant non-residential elements. A 50% non-residential limit will allow enfranchisement of mixed-use buildings with such significant non-residential elements, but this will remain a theoretical right if leaseholders simply cannot afford to do so.

4.13 We have previously recognised the often-prohibitive cost of enfranchisement and asked the Law Commission to produce options for a simpler, clearer and consistent valuation methodology. Following the Law Commission’s report on these options in January 2021 we announced we would make changes to the enfranchisement valuation methodology to remove some of these prohibitive costs by capping ground rents, abolishing ‘marriage value’, setting calculation rates, and introduce an online calculator. This will make enfranchisement fairer, cheaper and more transparent. However, we recognise that these changes will not alter the valuation of non-residential units which will likely mean collective enfranchisement remains prohibitively expensive for many in mixed-use buildings.

4.14 We think, and in this we agree with the Law Commission’s conclusion, that without the ability to require the landlord to take ‘leasebacks’ of non-participating units, an increased non-residential limit may be of little to no benefit to leaseholders in mixed-use buildings with large non-residential elements.

4.15 We also recognise that mandatory ‘leasebacks’ will improve the affordability of enfranchisement, and therefore broaden access, for leaseholders in wholly residential properties. This will be most impactful in properties that qualify for enfranchisement but have high numbers of non-participating or non-qualifying residential units, for example shared ownership properties or units let on short tenancies. We also note that whilst ‘leasebacks’ will be mandatory for landlords where leaseholders request them, leaseholders are not required to make use of them. Leaseholders may already make use of alternative funding sources to cover the cost of enfranchisement including personal loans, extensions of mortgages and ‘white knight’ investors. Mandatory ‘leasebacks’ provide leaseholders with a further option.

4.16 Many leaseholders who supported mandatory ‘leasebacks’ in principle were opposed to the ongoing involvement of their previous freeholder with the building. Many leaseholders may enfranchise precisely because they want to remove their freeholder from any functions relating to the property. For this reason, some may elect not to make use of mandatory ‘leasebacks’ and therefore be unable to afford to collectively enfranchise. However, for other leaseholders mandatory ‘leasebacks’ will be an agreeable mechanism without which collective enfranchisement will be unaffordable. We think it is right that leaseholders can choose to make use of mandatory ‘leasebacks’ if they wish, it being a decision for individual groups of leaseholders when considering their specific circumstances.

4.17 We do not agree with those who responded to the consultation that a requirement on landlords to take ‘leasebacks’ is unfair. As the Law Commission observed in their report, if the grant of a leaseback to a landlord will reduce the premium payable to that landlord, then it must follow that the leaseback constitutes a valuable interest. Leaseholders are most likely to elect to use leasebacks in situations where they reduce the premium payable significantly and enfranchisement would otherwise be unaffordable. A landlord will therefore receive an asset with value which they can then choose to sell if they wish to sever all involvement with the property or retain the interest and any income derived from it. Landlords are already able to require enfranchising leaseholders to grant them a ‘leaseback’ of certain units as part of the collective enfranchisement process. The Law Commission’s recommendation will allow leaseholders to require landlords to take them. We do not believe this represents a disproportionate impact on landlords given the clear and significant benefit to leaseholders that mandatory leasebacks provide.

4.18 We do not agree that mandatory leasebacks will lead to the unacceptable degradation and complication of management in leaseholder owned properties. As we have explained at paragraph 2.23 we do not believe leaseholders will be any less invested in successful management and will in most cases employ professional managing agents. Whilst a leaseback will result in an intermediate landlord being introduced to a property, the extent to which the previous freeholder, as an intermediate landlord, chooses to involve themselves in the property will differ on a case-by-case basis. Some may involve themselves heavily holding the leaseholders who now run the property to account for their management responsibilities. Others may come to arrangements with the leaseholders such that they take no part in the management of the property. We believe it is unlikely that in all cases the introduction of an intermediate landlord will complicate the management of a building and expect most buildings will come to a workable arrangement. ‘Leasebacks’ taken on a voluntary basis by landlords already exist and we have received no evidence that they generally act to complicate or degrade management of buildings and it is unlikely landlords would volunteer to take them if this was the case.

4.19 For the reasons explained above we accept the Law Commission’s recommendation to introduce mandatory leasebacks to landlords as part of the collective freehold acquisitions.

5. The non-residential limit in right to manage claims

Question 10. Do you agree or disagree that increasing the non-residential limit for the right to manage from 25% to 50% meets government’s aims of addressing the historic imbalance of rights between freeholders and leaseholders?

Question 11. Do you support or oppose a 50% non-residential limit for right to manage claims?

Question 11a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of increasing the non-residential limit for right to manage from 25% to 50%?

Question 11b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, of a 50% non-residential limit for right to manage?

Summary of responses

5.1 In response to question 10 the vast majority (76%) of ‘Individuals’ agreed that this measure would meet government’s aim. Amongst ‘Leaseholders’ and ‘Leaseholders in mixed-us buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floor space’ this rose to 78% and 93% respectively.

5.2 The majority (58%) of all ‘Organisations’ agreed but only 50% of ‘Managing/Letting Agents/Property Advisors’ agreed. The vast majority (68%) of ‘Investors’ disagreed and the statement did not enjoy majority support amongst ‘Law Firms’ and ‘Local Authorities’.

5.3 In response to question 11 78% of all respondents supported the proposal to increase the non-residential limit for RTM claims from 25% to 50%. This rose to 82% for ‘Leaseholders’ and 94% for ‘Leaseholders living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’. A majority of respondents identifying themselves as either an ‘Individual’, ‘Leaseholder’, ‘Charity’, ‘Managing or letting agent/property advisor’, ‘Professional body’, ‘Representation or campaign group’, ‘Right to Manage company/Residents’ Association’, ‘Trade association’ and ‘Accountant/surveyor/valuer’ supported the proposal.

5.4 The most common benefit given in response to question 11a was that it would improve access to resident management. 80% of free text responses mentioned this benefit. Further reasons given for supporting the proposal were that it would improve transparency and oversight of building management, result in better management of buildings and that 50% more accurately captures that a building is residential in nature. The majority of responses were from individuals and leaseholders who broadly believed that improved access to the RTM would incentivise improved management of buildings. Many noted that the current 25% limit is unfair because they believed that, for example, a building with 26% non-residential floorspace should be considered a residential building.

5.5 5% of all respondents opposed the proposal but this rose to 26% for ‘organisations’. 57% of ‘developers/freeholders’ and 79% of ‘investors’ opposed the proposal. Whilst a majority of respondents were not opposed, the proposal did not receive majority support from the ‘Housing Association’, ‘law firm’ and ‘local authority’ subgroups.

5.6 The most common reason given for opposing the proposal was that it would complicate the management of properties with significant commercial elements. This reason was mentioned in 43% of free text responses. Respondents argued that mixed-use properties with significant commercial elements already present a complex management proposition for a sole party. They believed the involvement of multiple parties in the management of such buildings, as a consequence of improved access to the RTM, would inevitably complicate and undermine good management and increase costs. Respondents argued that leaseholders lack the necessary skills and experience to successfully manage mixed-use buildings, including adhering to new building and fire safety obligations.

5.7 Respondents echoed their argument in opposition to a 50% non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement claims and asserted that a 50% limit for the right to manage would reduce investment in and development of mixed-use buildings. They argued that the potential loss of management control would undermine freeholders’ ability to successfully manage developments and therefore lead to a drop in value. The possibility of this would reduce appetite for investment in such developments. Respondents also believed that third party landlords are more likely to manage buildings and sites professionally and balance the interests of residential tenants, commercial tenants, and the wider development. Resident led management would, they argued, inevitably favour residential tenants at the detriment of commercial tenants and the wider development.

5.8 It should be noted that 7 respondents said that they opposed the proposal because the 50% limit was too low. A further 7 said they opposed the proposal because they thought there should be no limit at all.

Government response

5.9 We said on our consultation that we agreed in principle with the Law Commission’s recommendation to increase the non-residential limit to 50% for RTM claims. We believed this change would achieve our objective of improving access to the RTM. We recognised that the Law Commission did not consult specifically on the option of a 50% limit for the RTM and thought there was benefit in further consultation. In consulting we wanted to give stakeholders an opportunity to share their views and provide further evidence on the impact of this proposal before a final decision was made.

5.10 Our objectives in considering changes to the RTM are to consider the case for improving access to the RTM and make sure it meets the needs of users. We want to promote transparency and fairness in the residential leasehold sector and provide a better deal for leaseholds as consumers whilst taking into account the legitimate rights of freeholders.

5.11 We believe increasing the non-residential limit to 50% for the RTM will achieve these objectives, improving access to the RTM and providing a better deal for qualifying leaseholders in mixed-use buildings. We think this is a proportionate change that will extend the RTM to qualifying leaseholders in arguably residential buildings. We have not been convinced by the arguments presented in opposition to this change.

5.12 As we have explained in Chapter 2, we believe qualifying leaseholders in residential buildings should be able to choose how they own and manage their buildings. Improving access to the RTM achieves this. In paragraph 2.16 we agreed with the Law Commission that where half or more of the floorspace of a building, excluding common parts, is occupied for residential use, it can reasonably be considered a residential building. We think a 50% limit more accurately captures whether a building is residential or not and we believe strikes a fairer balance than the existing 25% limit between the rights of qualifying leaseholders and landlords. We do not think it is reasonable to deny leaseholders access to the RTM because more than 25% of the floorspace of their building is dedicated to non-residential use. Responses to the consultation indicated that leaseholders in mixed-use buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace would use the RTM if the limit was increased.

5.13 We therefore believe that if all other requisite qualifying criteria are met, it is not proportionate that qualifying leaseholders cannot claim a RTM because of the 25% non-residential limit. As we explain in Chapters 2 and 3, we will accept the Law Commission’s recommendation to increase the non-residential limit to 50% for collective enfranchisement claims and introduce a non-residential limit at 50% for individual freehold acquisitions. As we explained in paragraph xx this will bring these limits in line with the 50% non-residential limit for the Right of First Refusal. A 50% limit for RTM claims will create a proportionate and consistent measure for determining whether qualifying leaseholders in a mixed-use building can manage or own their building through the RTM or the right to enfranchisement.

5.14 In opposition to this change some respondents said that increasing access to the RTM would complicate the management of properties with significant commercial elements and that residential leaseholders do not have the expertise to successfully manage such buildings. We recognise that the result of any successful RTM claim is management of a building being split between the RTM company and the landlord, the landlord retaining responsibility for parts of the building in respect of which management functions may not be acquired. This may result in prolonged decision making and more involved management arrangements for the building. However, we do not think this necessarily needs result in increased costs or degraded management.

5.15 As we have explained at paragraph 2.20 we are unconvinced by the argument that leaseholders will be unable to successfully manage mixed use buildings in relation to collective enfranchisement and believe this applies equally to leaseholder management stemming from a successful RTM claim. Arguably, leaseholders take on less responsibility when exercising the RTM than in enfranchisement, given the RTM company has responsibility for residential units and any common parts shared exclusively between them.

5.16 We do not believe that leaseholders will be unable to successfully fulfil this management role. Furthermore, the Law Commission noted that although RTM companies are not legally required to appoint managing agents, respondents to their consultation said that in practice most do, and we would expect this to continue. We also note that landlords retain the right to make an application to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) under Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 for the appointment of a manager if they believe the RTM company has failed on the listed grounds. This provides an appropriate safeguard for landlords to act in the case of poor management.

5.17 On the issue of reducing investment in mixed use developments in future as we have explained at paragraph 2.20, the government recognises that decisions on the form and structure of any regenerative development is affected by a number of factors of which the non-residential limit is only one. The shape and scope of new regeneration schemes are affected by a range of factors including the ownership of land (e.g. a local authority led scheme may have different requirements to a private led scheme), local planning requirements and the viability of different housing and non-housing tenures in a particular area.

5.18 Furthermore, this change will come as part of a major package of reforms to residential leasehold which will make it easier and cheaper for qualifying leaseholders to take management control of their buildings or buy their freehold. That being the case, developers will want to take account of the totality of changes to the leasehold system and take decisions about the type of schemes they wish to pursue in future.

5.19 For the reasons explained above we accept the Law Commission’s recommendation to increase the non-residential limit for the right to manage to 50%.

6. Reducing landlords voting rights in right to manage companies

Question 12. Do you agree or disagree that right to manage company voting rights should be amended to ensure leaseholders continue to have effective control of decisions?

Question 13. Do you support or oppose capping the total votes allocated to landlords in right to manage companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants (Law Commission’s Option 3)?

Question 13a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of capping the total votes allocated to landlords in right to manage companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants?

Question 13b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, of capping the total votes allocated to landlords in right to manage companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants?

Summary of responses

6.1 In responding to question 12 the vast majority (89%) of individuals agreed RTM company voting rights should be amended. Amongst ‘leaseholders’ and ‘leaseholders living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ this rose to 92%. The majority (58%) of organisations agreed but a majority of ‘investors’ and ‘developers/freeholders’ disagreed at 74% and 57% respectively.

6.2 In responding to question 13 the vast majority (80%) of individuals supported the Law Commission’s Option 3 capping the total votes allocated to landlords in RTM companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants. Support was highest amongst ‘Leaseholders’ and ‘Leaseholders in mixed-use building with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace’ at 83% and 86% respectively. Capping did not have majority support amongst organisations with 43% supporting the proposal and 35% opposing. Opposition was highest amongst ‘Investors’ at 79%, ‘Housing Associations’ at 64%, and ‘Developers/Freeholders’ at 57%.

6.3 The vast majority (81%) of those who supported the change did so because it would limit landlord control and guarantee resident control. Most respondents highlighted that the RTM exists to facilitate leaseholder-controlled management and it would be counter intuitive if landlords could gain effective control of RTM companies. Others highlighted that the RTM is often pursued precisely because of poor management by the landlord, and it would be ridiculous for the landlord to in effect continue controlling management through the RTM company. Many responses questioned why landlords should have any votes in a RTM company, especially if they have sold long leases on all units and therefore leaseholders hold the majority of the financial interest in the property.

6.4 Opposition to the change centred on the belief that it was unfair on landlords. Respondents felt that it was unfair for landlords who may still have a significant interest in the building, and ultimately still own it, to have their say over its management limited. Many respondents felt that limiting landlord voting rights by one third was an arbitrary and blanket approach and that landlords votes should reflect the interest they hold in the building as proposed under Law Commission Option 1. Some argued that landlords often have more experience managing buildings and that it would be beneficial for the buildings management if their votes were maintained. Some landlords worried they would be unable to fulfil their responsibility to commercial tenants if their voting rights were limited. Landlords involved in existing RTM companies worried about the destabilising affect this would have on the established management relationship in their building.

Government response

6.5 We said in our consultation that we agreed in principle with the Law Commission’s Option 3 to cap the total votes allocated to landlords in RTM companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants. The Option offered a simple approach that guaranteed leaseholders would have effective control of decisions made in the RTM company, whilst maintaining involvement from the landlord. In their report the Law Commission said Option 3 was preferable for this reason.

6.6 Our objectives in considering changes to the RTM are to consider the case for improving access to the RTM and make sure it meets the needs of users. We want to promote transparency and fairness in the residential leasehold sector and provide a better deal for leaseholders as consumers whilst taking into account the legitimate rights of freeholders.

6.7 We will increase the non-residential limit to 50% for the RTM. This change will improve access to the RTM for qualifying leaseholders in mixed-use buildings. However, without changes to RTM company voting rights leaseholders will no longer be able to guarantee effective control of an RTM company. This would be counter to the purpose of the RTM, to allow leaseholders to acquire management functions under residential leases relating to residential units and common parts. RTM company voting rights need to be amended if we are to achieve our objectives.

6.8 Option 3 provides certainty, if all leaseholders vote unanimously, they will always be able to exercise an absolute majority. We believe this is justified because the RTM is designed to transfer management functions from landlords to leaseholders, if leaseholders cannot be guaranteed control the function of the RTM is undermined. Leaseholders responding to the consultation questioned why they should exercise the RTM if it does not guarantee them control over the very management functions they are exercising a RTM to acquire. Others worried that landlords would use disproportionate control to frustrate leaseholder’s legitimate aims for the management of their properties.

6.9 Option 3 guarantees leaseholder control by capping landlords votes at no more than one-third of the total votes exercisable by qualifying tenants. Many respondents opposed to the change thought this was unfair on landlords. For example, a landlord may retain non-residential elements making up more than a third of the building but have their votes limited to one-third. They believed landlords should retain voting rights in proportion to their retained interest in the building with no cap.

6.10 We are unconvinced by this argument for two reasons. Firstly, the RTM is primarily concerned with the management of the residential and common parts of a building. It is not proportionate for non-residential and residential elements to be allocated equal voting rights in a RTM company that primarily manages residential space. Secondly, landlords will still enjoy voting rights in the RTM company, they will simply be limited, and leaseholders will all need to vote unanimously to exercise an absolute majority. We think this strikes a fair balance between the rights of landlords and leaseholders. We also note that landlords retain the right to make an application to the First-tier Tribunal (Property Chamber) under Part 2 of the Landlord and Tenant Act 1987 for the appointment of a manager if they believe the RTM company has failed on the listed grounds. This provides an appropriate safeguard for landlords to act against poor management of the building.

6.11 For the reasons explained above we accept the Law Commission’s Option 3 to cap the total votes allocated to landlords in RTM companies to one-third of the total votes to qualifying tenants.

7. Commonhold

7.1. Commonhold offers freehold ownership to homeowners in properties with shared fabric and infrastructure, like blocks of flats. This model provides unit owners the permanent ownership of their home, without a third-party landlord and with the opportunity to participate in collective decision-making about how the building is governed, financed and managed. All unit owners within a commonhold will belong to a commonhold association which owns and manages the common parts of the estate.

7.2. Current legislation, however, does not allow leases over seven years within a commonhold, which excludes Shared Ownership leases from commonhold.

7.3. As part of a wider review of leasehold and commonhold reform, government asked the Law Commission to make recommendations to reinvigorate the use of commonhold, including to consider ways of incorporating Shared Ownership.

7.4. Their report, Reinvigorating commonhold: the alternative to leasehold ownership (PDF, 5.8MB), outlined an array of proposed improvements to the commonhold legal framework, including allowing Shared Ownership leases to operate.

7.5 In addition to permitting shared ownership leases, the Law Commission proposed that shared owners should be able to exercise all the voting rights that are available to any other commonhold unit owner, with the exception of a decision to terminate the commonhold which should be exercised jointly with the provider. This means that the shared owners who pay the service charge and will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the services provided have the opportunity to have their say on their costs. The proposal would apply in either a new commonhold or in a building which has converted to commonhold (and where the shared ownership lease is granted after conversion).

7.6 We are reviewing the full set of the Commission’s recommendations and will respond in due course. The UK government agrees in principle that shared ownership should be allowed as part of commonhold developments.

7.7 Since the Law Commission made its recommendations, the UK government has introduced a new model for shared ownership, which includes a 10-year period during which the shared owner will receive support from their provider to pay for essential repairs, bridging the gap between renting and home ownership. The new 10-year repair free period will prevent shared owners living in new build shared ownership homes from being hit with unexpected repairs and maintenance bills in the initial years, better supporting them to put money aside towards buying more of their home.

7.8 We consulted to seek views on how voting rights in commonhold associations should operate under the new shared ownership model in England.

Question 14. Do you support or oppose that, where Shared Ownership providers are liable for paying for repair and maintenance during the ‘Initial Repair Period’ of a new Shared Ownership lease, they should have the right to vote on matters relating to these works and their costs?

a) Support strongly
b) Support
c) Neither support nor oppose 
d) Oppose
e) Oppose strongly 

If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of allowing Shared Ownership providers the right to vote on matters relating to the works and costs for which they are responsible during the ‘Initial Repair Period’? (Max 500 words)

If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits of allowing Shared Ownership providers the right to vote on matters relating to the works and costs for which they are responsible during the ‘Initial Repair Period’? (Max 500 words)

Summary of responses

7.9 The democratic form of commonhold ownership gives homeowners, as members of a commonhold association, voting rights on how their building is run. These include decisions such as agreeing an annual budget, spending on repairs and whether to make improvements to the building.

7.10 As far as practical, where there is opportunity to have a say over decisions affecting a building and particularly where there are associated costs, we believe that those who pay should have a say.

7.11 This means that shared owners who pay the service charge and will be the ultimate beneficiaries of the services provided have the opportunity to have their say on these costs and services.

7.12 In this question, we asked respondents to consider how voting rights in a commonhold setting should work for leaseholders of the new model of Shared Ownership for England – which introduced a 10- year repair period (the ‘Initial Repair Period’) during which the landlord will assume responsibility for the cost of essential repairs to the external fabric of the building.

7.13 In responding to question 14, the vast majority (84%) of respondents strongly supported or supported the proposal to give providers, who are liable for paying for repairs during the ‘Initial Repair Period’ of a new Shared Ownership lease, the right to vote on matters relating to these works and their associated costs. Ten percent neither supported or opposed the proposal, and 5% opposed or opposed strongly.

7.14 Among providers who responded to this question, 88% either supported or strongly supported the proposal, 6% neither supported nor opposed, and 6% opposed or strongly this proposal.

7.15 The most common reason given by respondents for supporting the proposal was to agree with the principle that those who pay for repairs should get a say in decisions about them.

7.16 The British Property Federation succinctly summarised the main reason given for supporting the proposal:

Based on the principle of no taxation without representation, this is a fair proposal. Those who are being asked to pay for such works should have the right to vote on them.

7.17 Others felt that the proposal would be in the best interest of the long-term repair of the building, as housing associations take a strategic view of planning for the life of their assets. Sage, a for-profit provider of social housing felt that:

…retaining us as a provider in the decision making around our properties will protect long-term investment programmes and our ability to ensure the quality of residents’ homes over their lifetime. Conversely, separating out the responsibility to pay from the decision-making responsibility, could create significant financial uncertainty, open up providers to open ended costs and prevent effective long-term investment in housing stock.

7.18 Metropolitan Thames Valley Housing, another housing association, also noted that voting rights for housing associations could allow swifter responses to emergencies:

We strongly support the proposal for shared ownership providers to have voting rights on repair and maintenance matters during the ‘initial repair period.’ With voting rights, we would be able to make decisions quickly, shortening repair times and reducing overall costs. Voting rights for shared ownership providers during the ‘initial repairs period’ would also allow us to deal with emergencies more effectively.

7.19 Other common reasons given by respondents who supported the proposal was that it would improve fairness, transparency and accountability around decisions taken and costs incurred, and that it would prevent shared owners from voting through premature or unnecessary repairs so others would be liable for the costs.

7.20 Of those who supported or strongly supported this proposal, a small number included conditions upon which their support was based, most notably that support for the proposal to give providers voting rights on maintenance and repair during the ‘Initial Repair Period’ was predicated on the shared owners being able to provide input into the decision-making process – some of this group suggested splitting the voting rights, others suggested that there should be consultation about all works required.

7.21 The reasons given by the small number of respondents opposing the proposal mainly focused on the principle that the rights of shared owners would not be fully equivalent to other unit owners. Other reasons given included a concern that providers could use these voting powers to delay costs (until after the 10-year point where their liability for the cost would fall) and that providers may will fail to use the voting rights in the best interests of the unit owners.

Government response

7.22 The government wants commonhold to accommodate the full range of affordable housing products, so that neither the supply of commonhold, nor products such as Shared Ownership in England, are inhibited by technical barriers.

7.23 We think that Shared Ownership should be permitted in commonhold, and think that shared owners within a commonhold should have a say in how their building is run, including over the charges they are expected to pay with other homeowners to keep the building in good repair.

7.24 The new model of Shared Ownership for England places obligations on the provider of the shared ownership property to meet particular costs of repair during an Initial Repair Period in addition to the normal maintenance and upkeep costs paid for by the homeowner. This introduces costs paid for by providers which they would otherwise have no say over within a commonhold block.

7.25 Because we are asking providers of Shared Ownership properties to meet the costs of repairs within the Initial Repair Period, and that we believe it is right that those who pay should get a say, we are minded therefore, to permit providers to vote on matters relating to the repair of the commonhold over costs for which they are responsible. These voting rights ought to be limited – matters relating to wider budgets, or other commonhold decisions, will be held by the shared owner throughout, and when this period ends, those voting rights will pass from the provider to the shared owner.

7.26 There is clear evidence of support among respondents for this proposal.

7.27 We think this strikes the right balance between giving shared owners the rights to participate in the commonhold community, while acknowledging the key role the provider will play in meeting the costs of repairs during the Initial Repair Period.

7.28 We are not convinced that adopting this approach will encourage providers to delay essential repairs. We think this is unlikely in practice for two reasons. First, the provider would only have voting rights over the units they own, and therefore in most cases there will be other unit owners also taking part in repair decisions. The provider would thus be bound by decisions taken on scheduling of repairs and maintenance by the wider commonhold association. Second, the Initial Repair Period applies to repairs required to the external fabric of the building, for which minimum standards of repair exist in commonhold legislation today, and could be augmented by further Law Commission recommendations that we are considering, including the ability for individual commonhold associations to create a local rule requiring a higher standard of repair, should members of the association wish to introduce such a rule. We also do not think that there is incentive for providers to lower the standards of repair to reduce costs, due to the negative impact this could have on the value of their assets.

7.29 We are not convinced of the necessity to grant shared owners the right to input on decisions exclusively related to the Initial Repair Period. We noted concerns from consultees that shared owners will, temporarily, not enjoy the exact same rights as other commonhold unit owners. But until a shared owner has acquired full equity in their home there will remain two parties with an interest in the property, unlike other commonhold owners. In these cases, the shared owner would be benefiting from repairs to their building, without having to meet the cost. The shared owner would have voting rights on all other matters of governing the commonhold, including voting on the budget, electing and replacing directors, and taking decisions around local rules.

7.30 Decisions around the winding up or sale of the commonhold would, on the basis of Law Commission recommendations, be taken jointly by the provider and the shared owner, in recognition of their shared interests in the equity, and therefore, value of the property. Providers will be able to delegate voting rights over repairs during the Initial Repair Period should they wish to do so, as detailed below in our response to question 15.

Question 15. Do you support or oppose that, where Shared Ownership providers wish to delegate this right over decision-making to the shared owner, they should be able to do so?

a. Support strongly
b. Support
c. Neither support nor oppose
d. Oppose
e. Oppose strongly

If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of allowing Shared Ownership providers to delegate this right over decision-making to the shared owner? (Max 500 words)

If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits of allowing Shared Ownership providers to delegate this right over decision-making to the shared owner? (Max 500 words)

Summary of responses

7.31 Whilst we think that where providers are responsible for certain costs, they should expect to be able to participate in the decision making of these costs, some providers may expect to incur very modest, if any, costs, associated with the Initial Repair Period in any given block, and may prefer to not participate in such decision making, particularly where they own a limited number of Shared Ownership leases within a commonhold, or are otherwise content for the shared owner to exercise full voting rights during the ‘Initial Repair Period’. In these circumstances, it would seem appropriate to allow providers to delegate their rights to the shared owner, should they choose to do so.

7.32 In this question we asked consultees whether a provider of a new model Shared Ownership property should be able to delegate commonhold voting rights over repairs during the Initial Repair Period to shared owners, if they wished to.

7.33 The vast majority of respondents were in favour of the option to delegate decision making to the shared owner, with some 83% of all responses in favour and 3% opposed. The remaining 14% neither supported or opposed the recommendation.

7.34 The vast majority of leaseholders were in favour (84%), compared to a small minority (2%) who were opposed.

7.35 Of those who identified themselves in their responses as organisations, only 5% were opposed to the option to delegate voting rights. This opposition represented four respondents, three of whom were housing associations.

7.36 However, overall, a majority of housing associations were in favour, with 64% of housing associations who answered this question either supporting or strongly supporting the proposal.

7.37 Most investors (64%) and most managing agents (56%) who responded to this question indicated that they neither supported nor opposed the proposal.

7.38 The most common reason offered in favour of the proposal was that it would mean that shared owners would be empowered to participate in decisions in the same way as any other commonhold unit owner. It also supports the principle that residents are best placed to take decisions on their homes. Other common reasons for supporting the proposal included that it would give individual providers autonomy in deciding whether they wanted or needed to participate in decision making, and that it would help to improve fairness.

7.39 As an example, Notting Hill Genesis (a large housing association) took the view that the option to delegate was sensible on the basis that shared owners who live in the building are well placed to participate in decisions:

As shared owners are ultimately the end-users who have an obligation to pay costs, allowing NHG to delegate this decision to them will give them more influence over decisions on how money [is] spent on repairs. It will also ensure consistency between units that are shared ownership leasehold vs 100% leasehold.

7.40 Sage, a for-profit provider of social housing, implied that delegation might function best in simpler buildings:

There may be instances in which it is advantageous for the shared owner to take on this decision making in partnership with the provider and it is therefore useful for the provider to have this flexibility in some limited circumstances. For example, where there are only a small number of units in a large block.

7.41 Few written responses were provided for those opposing the proposal, but of these, the most common reasons for not supporting the proposal were that, first, delegating voting rights risks fragmenting decision making, impacting on efficiency of decision making and costs of repair, and second, that providers would be responsible for costs and so should be required to take decisions over those costs.

Government response

7.42 There is clear evidence of support from consultees in favour of an optional delegation of voting rights during the Initial Repair Period amongst responses from individuals and organisations – including among providers of social housing who will be key to deciding whether the delegation of rights should go ahead.

7.43 We do not think that providers should be required to take decisions relating to the repair of the commonhold if they do not wish to do so. Empowering the shared owner to take decisions on their behalf may be beneficial. First, it will prepare the shared owner for taking on this responsibility after the Initial Repair Period comes to an end. Second, it can save both time and resource for providers by passing the decision-making power to the shared owner.

7.44 Critically, the government is minded to give providers the choice as to whether they wish to delegate these voting rights during the Initial Repair Period. This would allow them to take account of the concerns that they have highlighted in their consultation feedback around whether the building in which they have issued a Shared Ownership lease is soundly built, professionally managed, and kept in good repair.

7.45 Moreover, we expect that repair costs in a new building during the Initial Repair Period should, by virtue of it being new, be limited. Many of these costs may be covered by a range of product warranties that would limit the exposure of providers and shared owners in having to finance these repairs. This may give comfort and confidence to providers that their level of involvement in decision making should be limited in well-built and well-maintained buildings.

Question 16. What should be the maximum fee (£) for issuing a Commonhold Unit Information Certificate (CUIC)?

151 - 200
101 - 150
51 - 100
0 - 50
Other (Please specify) (£)

Why do you think your chosen maximum fee (£) is most suitable? (Max 500 words)

Summary of responses

7.46 A Commonhold Unit Information Certificate (“the CUIC”) is often used to inform the buying and selling process of a commonhold unit. This certificate outlines, at the date of issue, the level of arrears owed by a unit owner towards the commonhold assessment (the equivalent of a service charge in leasehold) and/or arrears to an established reserve fund. This provides the prospective new owner with a clear statement of the amounts they are required to pay in respect of the arrears, should they complete the purchase of the home.

7.47 We want to make the buying and selling of commonhold units as efficient and transparent as possible. In principle, we want to retain the CUIC as a key part of the conveyancing process, as recommended in the Law Commission’s report.

7.48 The fees for producing a CUIC are not prescribed in law at present. The Law Commission were minded to recommend a maximum fee.

7.49 To prevent excessive fees being levied in a commonhold setting, the Law Commission have recommended that maximum fee for the provision of a CUIC is set by regulation, and kept under review, and we are minded to accept this proposal.

7.50 In this question we asked consultees what the maximum fee that a commonhold director or managing agent could charge for issuing a Commonhold Unit Information Certificate (CUIC).

7.51 Respondents generally preferred a lower fee. Thirty-four percent of respondents felt a fee of £0-50 would be appropriate, and 44% of respondents thought a fee of £51-100 would be appropriate.

7.52 A combined 16% felt the figure should be between £101-200, while 6% thought a figure outside of the ranges offered would be appropriate – a range of individuals and organisations opted for this category, but for very different reasons, including a number of respondents to the ‘Other’ category suggesting that there should be no fee at all.

7.53 The most common justifications for lower fees (£0-100) was that this level would adequately compensates the commonhold director / managing agent for finding the information. Other arguments in favour of lower fees included that the administrative effort involved in finding the information and producing the form is relatively minimal and that setting a cap at this level would prevent people in the buying and selling process being ‘ripped off’.

7.54 Several major conveyancing representative bodies felt that a fee of below £100 was appropriate. Notable stakeholders supporting a lower level of fee include the Council for Licensed Conveyancers, who stated the administrative cost of providing this information should be minimal as it is “standard-level due diligence” and that the figures that would go into the CUIC were likely to be easily obtainable. The Conveyancing Association also support a modest fee, noting that the associated administration expenses involved would be nominal.

7.55 Arguments made for advocating higher fees (£101 and above) include that a fee at this level adequately compensates the commonhold director / managing agent for finding the information. In cases where the costs of collecting the information exceed a lower cap, it is unfair to expect industry to conduct this as a loss-making activity. Additionally, respondents made the point that the information required would differ from unit to unit and fixing a low cap would fail to properly account for where more sophisticated information would be required.

Government response

7.56 When buying a commonhold, or any other home, it is important that potential buyers are aware of any outstanding charges relating to the property. The Commonhold Unit Information Certificate (“the CUIC”), provides the prospective new owner with a clear statement of the amounts they are required to pay in respect of the arrears, should they complete the purchase of the home. This can then be factored into any negotiation over the sale price, and the debt can be cleared on the sale of the home.

7.57 In their review of the commonhold legal framework, the Law Commission proposed keeping this certificate, and capping the costs that a commonhold association can request in issuing it. We are minded to agree to a cap, which is in keeping with our wider ambitions to make the home buying and selling process better for consumers by reducing the associated time and costs.

7.58 The government do not agree that a £0 cap should be applied as some have proposed or, put alternatively, that there should be no charge allowed for issuing the CUIC. The feedback from consultees was clear that a degree of time and resource would be required, and preventing a commonhold association director or managing agent from recouping these costs directly from the seller would mean that these costs would have to be picked up by the rest of the commonhold association. This would be unfair, especially if an individual requests multiple certificates if the property takes longer than expected to sell.

7.59 Based on the feedback received, however, the government believe the costs of preparing such a form should be modest – the information requirements are matters the commonhold association or directors should be recording as a matter of course, and updating regularly for the budgeting process. They should therefore be relatively simple to produce and readily accessible.

7.60 The requirements are significantly, and deliberately, narrower than those of the more comprehensive LPE1 form, which are used for providing consumers with a range of information regarding the costs and arrangements associated with buying a leasehold property.

7.61 We are therefore minded to cap the maximum fee chargeable for a CUIC within the range of £0-100(+VAT). We are of the view that VAT should be applicable to remain consistent with other homebuying and selling forms. In addition, we are minded to agree with suggestions made by consultees that there should be a mechanism for the fee to rise, from time to time, to account for changes in prices.

7.62 We were not convinced by representations that fees should be significantly higher, or that more complex developments would render accessing the figure a more expensive exercise. From feedback from consultees involved in the buying and selling process, the information requested should be readily available to either a director or managing agent of a well-run commonhold. As emphasised above, and through many responses from consultees - through their sound management of the finances of the commonhold, directors or managing agents should have recorded precisely what an individual unit owner has been charged through their share of the commonhold assessment, and critically what they have paid back over time.

Question 17. Do you support or oppose a sanction on the commonhold association that no fee is payable, if the deadline for the CUIC’s provision is missed?

a. Strongly support 
b. Support
c. Neither support nor oppose
d. Oppose
e. Strongly oppose

If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of placing a sanction on the commonhold association that no fee is payable, if the deadline for a CUIC is missed? (Max 500 words)

If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits of placing a sanction on the commonhold association that no fee is payable, if the deadline for a CUIC is missed? (Max 500 words)

Summary of responses

7.63 To ensure an efficient buying and selling process, the commonhold association has a duty to provide the CUIC within 14 calendar days. Currently, if the association (or managing agent acting on its behalf) delays issuing the CUIC, the current unit owner has little power to accelerate the process, beyond the existing disputes resolution process or ultimately resorting to using the courts.

7.64 The Law Commission recommended that, as a sanction, the commonhold association should not be entitled to charge a fee for providing the CUIC if it is not issued within the prescribed time limit of 14 days, and they should have the continued obligation to issue it. In the context of consulting on the maximum fee, we also gave consultees the opportunity to provide views on whether the fee should be refunded if the deadline is missed.

7.65 In this question, we gave consultees the opportunity to provide their views on whether the fee charged for issuing the Commonhold Unit Information Certificate should be refunded if the deadline is missed.

7.66 There were 1,387 responses to this question. The vast majority (75%) of the responses were in support of the proposed sanction on the commonhold association, should the deadline for the CUIC provision be missed. 4% of respondents were opposed.

7.67 Views of the proposed sanction were more divided among organisations than individuals. Of the 45 responses we received from freehold/landlord organisations 38% supported or strongly supported the proposal while 18% opposed/strongly opposed. The most prevalent organisations to approve were Resident Management or Right to Manage Companies. The most prevalent organisations to oppose were housing associations.

7.68 Common reasons offered in support of the sanction were that the will proposal will incentivise directors to act promptly, that the proposal is an appropriate method to penalise poor performance and that it will ensure an efficient home buying and selling process

7.69 The following quote from a leaseholder reflects the sentiment of many respondents around the importance of issuing the CUIC promptly, in relation to the sales process:

The benefits of placing a sanction on the Commonhold Association are that it incentivises a timely response for production of a CUIC and reinforces that the Association should have robust processes and governance in place. Delays in the conveyancing process can lead to lost sales and it is in the interests of all commonhold unit-owners that the Association is supporting the sales of units within the commonhold and not creating barriers to sale…

7.70 Of those opposed to applying the proposed sanctions, the most common arguments made were that a “One size fits all” is an inappropriate remedy – different sanctions are necessary for a lay or professional director / unfair to expect too much from lay directors, and that a sanction should be levied but more time is needed than 14 days.

Government response

7.71 The government want to ensure that homebuyers experience an efficient buying and selling process, and the commonhold association already has a duty in place to provide the CUIC within 14 calendar days.

7.72 We agree with stakeholder feedback that unnecessary delays in the buying and selling process can result in sales falling through, and that without an incentive in the system to issue the CUIC at pace, the current unit owner has little power to accelerate the process, beyond the existing disputes resolution process or ultimately resorting to using the courts.

7.73 The government consider the availability of a modest sanction to be an important signal to commonhold directors and managing agents to conduct and conclude what is – on the evidence of feedback from consultees - a relatively simple administrative task quickly.

7.74 For this reason, we do think that an extension to the current 14-day limit is necessary, or that policy should discriminate between lay and professional management. Commonholds will be expected to be effectively and efficiently managed, irrespective of whether they are run by their unit owners or externally appointed professionals. By law a commonhold is required to have more than one director, providing cover in the event of one being absent, and for those commonholds which employ a professional managing agent, responding promptly to unit owner queries will be a standard part of their contracts. Therefore, management should consistently be in place to provide responses in a timely manner.

7.75 The government therefore think that no charge should be levied by the commonhold association for a CUIC which is issued 14 calendar days after it is requested by the seller.

Annex A: Analysis of consultation responses

Overview of identification questions

Are you responding as an individual or on behalf of an organisation?

The consultation received 2087 responses, 1901 from individuals, 121 from organisations and 65 from those who did not identify themselves.

Individuals

Do you live in a building with non-residential elements?

753 respondents identified themselves as living in mixed-use buildings. 433 in buildings with up to and including 25% non-residential floorspace, 276 with more than 25% up to 50%, and 44 with over 50%.

Where is your home?

761 respondents identified where their home was located.

Location	Responses
Central London	281
Greater London	224
South East	73
North West	47
South West	40
West Midlands	24
Yorkshire and the Humber	23
East of England	22
North East	16
Wales	9
East Midlands	2

Are you a freeholder/leaseholder/common unit owner?

Of those who identified themselves as individuals, 663 identified themselves as leaseholders, two as freeholders and one as a commonhold unit owner.

Approximately, what percentage of the building you live in is non-residential?

433 respondents identified themselves as living in a building with ‘Up to and including 25%’ non-residential floorspace, 276 with ‘More than 25% up to 50%, and 44 with ‘More than 50%.

Who manages the building?

Management type	Responses
Freeholder/Landlord with an appointed Managing Agent	508
Freeholder/Landlord with no Managing Agent	83
Right to Manage Company with an appointed Managing Agent	51
Unknown (not sure)	21
Resident owned freehold with an appointed Managing Agent	6
Right to Manage Company with no Managing Agent	6
Commonhold Association with an appointed Managing Agent	2

Organisations - What is your organisation?

Type	Responses
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	21
Investor	19
Representation/Campaign Group	14
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	12
Housing Association	11
Charity	7
Developer	7
Law Firm	7
Local Authority	7
Accountants/Surveyors/Valuers	5
Professional Body	5
Trade Association	4
Government Body	1

121 respondents marked that they were responding on behalf of an organisation however only 120 reported their organisation type.

In what region are the majority of the properties that your organisation owns or manages located?

Location	Responses
Central London	15
Greater London	11
South East	7
North West	5
South West	5
North East	3
Wales	2
West Midlands	2
East Midlands	1
East of England	1
Other	1
Yorkshire	1

Question 1. Do you agree or disagree that increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement from 25% to 50% meets government’s aim of addressing the historic imbalance of rights between freeholders and leaseholders?

Responses	Agree	Disagree	I don’t know	Not answered	Total
Total	1683 (81%)	126 (6%)	187 (9%)	91 (4%)	2087
Individual	1543 (81%)	99 (5%)	183 (10%)	76 (4%)	1901
Leaseholder	553 (83%)	30 (5%)	58 (9%)	22 (3%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	265 (96%)	4 (1%)	4 (1%)	3 (1%)	276
Organisation	82 (68%)	25 (21%)	4 (4%)	9 (8%)	120
Charity	5 (71%)	1 (15%)	0	1 (15%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	3 (43%)	3 (43%)	0	1 (14%)	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	7 (64%)	1 (9%)	2 (18%)	1 (9%)	11
Investor	4 (21%)	13 (69%)	0	2 (11%)	19
Law Firm	6 (86%)	1 (14%)	0	0	7
Local Authority	4 (57%)	2 (29%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	9 (75%)	2 (17%)	0	1 (8%)	12
Professional Body	3 (60%)	0	0	2 (40%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	13 (93%)	0	0	1 (7%)	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	19 (91%)	1 (5%)	1 (5%)	0	21
Trade Association	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	4 (80%)	1 (20%)	0	0	5

Question 2. Do you support or oppose a 50% non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement?

Responses	Support/Strongly Support	Oppose/Strongly Oppose	Neither	Not answered	Total
Total	1685 (81%)	131 (6%)	188 (9%)	83 (4%)	2087
Individual	1558 (82%)	93 (5%)	174 (9%)	76 (4%)	1901
Leaseholder	567 (86%)	26 (4%)	48 (7%)	23 (3%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	264 (96%)	5 (1%)	4 (1%)	3 (1%)	276
Organisation	66 (55%)	36 (30%)	5 (4%)	13 (11%)	120
Charity	5 (71%)	1 (15%)	0	1 (15%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	3 (43%)	4 (57%)	0	0	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	7 (64%)	2 (18%)	2 (18%)	4 (36%)	11
Investor	4 (21%)	14 (74%)	0	1 (5%)	19
Law Firm	4 (57%)	3 (43%)	0	0	7
Local Authority	1 (14%)	3 (43%)	0	3 (43%)	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	6 (50%)	5 (42%)	0	1 (8%)	12
Professional Body	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	18 (86%)	0	3 (14%)	0	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	19 (91%)	1 (5%)	1 (5%)	0	21
Trade Association	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	2 (40%)	2 (40%)	0	1 (20%)	5

Question 2a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of increasing the non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement from 25% to 50%?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Improves access to enfranchisement/resident ownership	1057	76%	82%
Doesn’t answer the question	107	8%
Improves access to resident management	87	6%	7%
Incentivises better building management/Residents will be active freeholders/Better VfM	59	4%	5%
A 50% limit more accurately captures that a building is residential/Fairer percentage	49	4%	4%
Supportive - No limit	7	1%	1%
Mixed use buildings are becoming more common - appropriate time to amend leaseholder rights	5	0%	0%
Supportive - Higher limit	5	0%	0%
ENF rights based on costs contributed to running of block not resi/non resi split	4	0%	0%
Better matches the rights of homeowners in other countries	3	0%	0%
Make conversion to Commonhold more accessible	2	0%	0%
Encourages redevelopment/development in blocks where current freeholder blocks	1	0%	0%
Matches limit for Right of First Refusal 1987 Act	1	0%	0%
No limit	1	0%	0%
Support conditional on introduction of mandatory leasebacks	1	0%	0%

Question 2b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, of a 50% non-residential limit for collective enfranchisement?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Reduces investment in/development of mixed use building especially in city/town centres	66	31%	43%
Doesn’t answer the question	57	27%
Expertise - LHs/residents lack the expertise to successfully own/manage buildings with up to 50% commercial floorspace	49	23%	32%
50% too low - There should be a higher limit	10	5%	6%
50% too low - There should be no limit	7	3%	5%
Complicates management of mixed-use buildings	7	3%	5%
Negative effect on LA/HAs	6	3%	4%
Appetite - LHs/residents do not want to own/manage building with up to 50% commercial floorspace	3	1%	2%
Cost - enfranchisement will still be too expensive	3	1%	2%
Should need to be 51% residential	2	1%	1%
Non-participating leaseholders can still be taken advantage of	1	0%	1%
Potential unintended consequences for individual freehold acquisitions	1	0%	1%

Question 3. If you were to benefit from a new 50% non-residential limit, would you buy your freehold?

Responses	Yes	No	Not sure	Not a leaseholder	Not answered	Total
Total	1267 (61%)	80 (4%)	382 (18%)	202 (10%)	156(7%)	2087
Individual	1232 (65%)	76 (4%)	368 (19%)	138 (7%)	87 (5%)	1901
Leaseholder	456 (69%)	23 (3%)	153 (23%)	8 (1%)	23 (3%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	185 (67%)	7 (3%)	27 (10%)	0	57 (21%)	276

Question 4. If no/not sure to Q 3, please select all relevant reasons?

a. Cost i.e., can’t afford cost of buying freehold

b. Do not want ownership and management responsibility

c. Not enough qualifying tenants

d. Not enough support from other qualifying tenants

e. Other (please specify)

Responses	Cost	Own/man resp.	No. qual ten.	Sup qual ten.	Other	Total
Total	303 (44%)	60 (9%)	62 (9%)	117 (17%)	151 (22%)	693
Individual	293 (46%)	59 (9%)	60 (9%)	113 (18%)	119 (19%)	644
Leaseholder	117 (46%)	23 (9%)	21 (8%)	43 (16%)	53 (21%)	257
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	20 (29%)	7 (10%)	3 (4%)	6 (9%)	34 (49%)	70

Respondents could select multiple answers therefore the total number of responses exceeds the total number of respondents to this question.

151 respondents selected ‘Other’ however, 219 respondents submitted text in the ‘Other (Please Specify)’ free text box. The total number of responses exceeds the total number of respondents to this question. This is because some respondents’ answer’s referred to multiple reasons which have been counter separately.

Other (please specify) responses

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Doesn’t answer the question	99	43%
Cost	88	38%	66%
Worry about taking on responsibility for building safety defects/recladding	12	5%	9%
Not enough qualifying tenants want to ENF	9	4%	7%
Unsure of implications	6	3%	5%
Worry about FHs frustrating/delaying process	6	3%	5%
Building is already well managed	3	1%	2%
Worry about paying FHs legal costs	2	1%	2%
Management responsibility sits with the head lease	2	1%	2%
Worry about ENF process	2	1%	2%
Worry about buying out head lease	1	0%	1%
Selling leasehold interest soon	1	0%	1%
Would like to convert straight to commonhold	1	0%	1%
Total	232	100%	100%

Question 5. Are there any individuals, organisations or types of properties that you believe should be exempt from the proposed increase in the non-residential limit to 50%?

Responses	Yes	No	I don’t know	Not answered	Total
Total	113 (5%)	1316 (63%)	527 (25%)	131 (6%)	2087
Individual	70 (4%)	1214 (64%)	506 (27%)	111 (6%)	1901
Leaseholder	20 (3%)	427 (64%)	187 (28%)	29 (4%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	3 (1%)	221 (80%)	10 (4%)	42 (15%)	276
Organisations	42 (35%)	46 (38%)	21 (18%)	11 (9%)	120
Charity	0	6 (86%)	0	1 (14%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	3 (43%)	3 (43%)	0	1 (14%)	7
Government Body	0	1	0	0	1
Housing Association	3 (23%)	1 (9%)	4 (36%)	3 (27%)	11
Investor	12 (63%)	4 (21%)	0	3 (16%)	19
Law Firm	3 (43%)	1 (14%)	3 (43%)	0	7
Local Authority	6 (86%)	0	1 (14%)	0	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	6 (50%)	3 (25%)	2 (17%)	1 (8%)	12
Professional Body	2 (40%)	0	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	0	9 (64%)	4 (29%)	1 (7%)	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	2 (10%)	14 (67%)	5 (24%)	0	21
Trade Association	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	3 (60%)	2 (40%)	0	0	5

Question 5a. If Yes - Please set out what type of individual, organisation or property should be exempt. Please provide information on the following:

Why you think they should be exempt, providing evidence where possible; and the criteria for how an exemption would work in practice.

Exemption	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Doesn’t answer the question	80	41%
Properties within large mixed-use estates/developments with a single freeholder	18	9%	16%
Rights available only to owner occupiers	18	9%	16%
Complex properties with multiple shared services (i.e. containing hotel, cinema, shopping centre)	14	12%	12%
Property owned by charities or non-profits/housing associations	12	6%	10%
Properties where maintenance is crucial to safety	9	5%	8%
Retirement/supported living properties	9	5%	8%
Properties containing emergency/social/medical services	5	3%	4%
Local authority properties	4	2%	3%
Larger buildings	3	2%	3%
Protected historical buildings/buildings of significant cultural heritage	3	2%	3%
Landlords with ownership of adjacent property	2	1%	2%
Non-resident and overseas owners	2	1%	2%
Opposed to change to 50% limit	2	1%	2%
Properties in AONB or Conservation Areas.	2	1%	2%
Properties where commercial units contribute a significant(?)% to the running costs of the building	2	1%	2%
Buildings in public ownership	1	1%	1%
Buildings not originally designed for part residential use/residential element added later	1	1%	1%
Buildings that contain/overhang public transport infrastructure rail	1	1%	1%
Exempt unless RMC directors will be IRPM/ARMA affiliated	1	1%	1%
No exemption but managing agent mandatory	1	1%	1%
Properties containing commercial units with flat roofs that are used as a walkway	1	1%	1%
Properties in ‘industrial/commercial’ zones	1	1%	1%
Properties with existing Fire/Buildings Safety concerns	1	1%	1%
Residential units additional to the original structure	1	1%	1%
Smaller buildings	1	1%	1%
Total	195	100%	100%

Question 6. Do you support or oppose a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Responses	Support/Strongly Support	Oppose/Strongly Oppose	Neither	Not answered	Total
Total	1452 (70%)	130 (6%)	276 (13%)	229 (11%)	2087
Individual	1408 (74%)	94 (5%)	251 (13%)	148 (8%)	1901
Leaseholder	504 (76%)	26 (4%)	96 (14%)	37 (6%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	157 (57%)	4 (1%)	15 (5%)	100 (36%)	276
Organisation	47 (39%)	35 (29%)	25 (21%)	13 (11%)	120
Charity	4 (57%)	1 (15%)	1 (15%)	1 (15%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	2 (29%)	3 (43%)	0	2 (29%)	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	1 (9%)	4 (36%)	1 (9%)	5 (45%)	11
Investor	2 (11%)	14 (74%)	1 (5%)	2 (11%)	19
Law Firm	2 (29%)	3 (43%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	7
Local Authority	0	3 (43%)	3 (43%)	1 (14%)	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	6 (50%)	3 (25%)	2 (17%)	1 (8%)	12
Professional Body	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	2 (40%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	10 (71%)	3 (21%)	0	1 (7%)	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	16 (76%)	0	4 (19%)	1 (5%)	21
Trade Association	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	2 (50%)	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	1 (20%)	2 (40%)	2 (40%)	0	5

Question 6a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Improves access to enfranchisement/resident ownership	416	28%	32%
Consistent with limit for collective enfranchisement	413	27%	32%
Doesn’t answer the question	224	15%
A 50% limit more accurately captures that a building is residential/Fairer percentage	167	11%	13%
Improves access to resident management	152	10%	12%
Incentivises better building management/Residents will be active freeholders/Better for commercial tenants	89	6%	7%
Mixed use buildings are becoming more common - appropriate time to amend leaseholder rights	41	3%	3%
Better matches the rights of homeowners in other countries	2	0%	0%
Supportive - No Limit	2	0%	0%
Total	1506	100%	100%

Question 6b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Doesn’t answer the question	195	53%
50% too low - There should be a higher limit	35	10%	20%
Owners of these leases are often commercial investors not owner occupiers	33	9%	19%
Expertise - LHs/residents lack the expertise to successfully own/manage buildings with up to 50% commercial floorspace	28	8%	16%
50% too low - There should be no limit	23	6%	13%
50% doesn’t accurately capture residential buildings	14	4%	8%
Reduces investment in/development of mixed use building especially in city/town centres	13	4%	8%
Removes professional landlords who balance the interests of both residential and commercial tenants	11	3%	6%
Cost - enfranchisement will still be too expensive	6	2%	3%
Appetite - LHs/residents do not want to own/manage building with up to 50% commercial floorspace	4	1%	2%
Commercial tenants should enjoy similar rights	1	0%	1%
Leasehold should have 999-year peppercorn leases but no right to ownership of the freehold	1	0%	1%
Legal system that separates ownership of commercial and residential units is required	1	0%	1%
Negative affect on redevelopment at end of buildings life	1	0%	1%
Would go beyond original intention of the law	1	0%	1%
Total	367	100%	100%

Question 7. What are the potential impacts of introducing a 50% non-residential limit for individual freehold acquisitions?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Positive - Improves access to enfranchisement/resident ownership	310	35%	44%
Positive - Clear, consistent system	197	22%	28%
Doesn’t answer the question	185	21%
Negative - Unintended consequences for houses that are interconnected with other properties	68	8%	10%
Negative - Buy to let investors will benefit not owner occupiers	32	4%	5%
Negative - LHs/residents lack the expertise to successfully own/manage buildings with up to 50% commercial floorspace	28	3%	4%
Positive - Improves access to enfranchisement/resident ownership	22	2%	3%
Limited impact - leaseholders not interested/no appetite	10	1%	1%
Negative - Removes professional landlords who balance the interests of both residential and commercial tenants	9	1%	1%
50% too low - There should be no limit	6	1%	1%
50% too low - There should be a higher limit	5	1%	1%
Negative - Negative affect on value of commercial tenancies	4	0%	1%
Negative - May remove enfranchisement rights from some leaseholders	3	0%	0%
Negative - Less properties for sale, more rental	3	0%	0%
Positive - Improves resale value of freehold	3	0%	0%
Positive - Incentivises better management/VfM	3	0%	0%
Limited impact - small number of buildings that apply	1	0%	0%
Positive - Lower management costs	1	0%	0%
Total	890	100%	100%

Question 8. Do you agree or disagree that mandatory leasebacks to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process will reduce the cost of purchasing a freehold?

Responses	Agree	Disagree	I don’t know	Not answered	Total
Total	1251 (65%)	117 (6%)	488 (23%)	131 (6%)	2087
Individual	1223 (64%)	97 (5%)	465 (24%)	116 (6%)	1901
Leaseholder	414 (62%)	23 (3%)	193 (29%)	33 (5%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	207 (75%)	7 (3%)	54 (20%)	8 (3%)	276
Organisation	69 (58%)	20 (17%)	22 (18%)	9 (8%)	120
Charity	5 (71%)	0	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	2 (29%)	3 (43%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	7 (64%)	2 (18%)	1 (9%)	1 (9%)	11
Investor	8 (42%)	9 (47%)	1 (5%)	1 (5%)	19
Law Firm	5 (72%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Local Authority	4 (57%)	0	3 (43%)	0	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	5 (42%)	1 (8%)	4 (33%)	2 (17%)	12
Professional Body	4 (80%)	0	0	1 (20%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	10 (71%)	0	3 (21%)	1 (7%)	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	11 (52%)	4 (19%)	5 (24%)	1 (5%)	21
Trade Association	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	4 (80%)	0	1 (20%)	0	5

Question 9. Do you support or oppose mandatory leasebacks to landlords as part of the collective enfranchisement process?

Responses	Support/Strongly Support	Oppose/Strongly Oppose	Neither	Not answered	Total
Total	1306 (63%)	186 (9%)	402 (19%)	193 (9%)	2087
Individual	1198 (63%)	143 (8%)	377 (20%)	183 (10%)	1901
Leaseholder	411 (62%)	42 (6%)	144 (22%)	66 (10%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	205 (74%)	13 (5%)	39 (14%)	19 (7%)	276
Organisation	49 (41%)	41 (34%)	6 (5%)	24 (20%)	120
Charity	4 (57%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	2 (29%)	4 (57%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	4 (36%)	3 (27%)	4 (36%)	0	11
Investor	2 (11%)	16 (84%)	1 (5%)	0	19
Law Firm	3 (43%)	3 (43%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Local Authority	4 (57%)	0	3 (43%)	0	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	3 (25%)	4 (33%)	4 (33%)	1 (8%)	12
Professional Body	2 (40%)	0	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	12 (86%)	1 (7%)	1 (7%)	0	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	11 (52%)	4 (19%)	4 (19%)	2 (10%)	21
Trade Association	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	2 (40%)	0	5

Question 9a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of mandatory leasebacks as part of the collective enfranchisement process, on the presumption of a 50% non-residential limit?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Improves access to enfranchisement/resident ownership	714	66%	72%
Affordability of ENF not determined by no. of qualifying tenants that participate	235	22%	24%
Doesn’t answer the question	90	8%
Positive for both parties	12	1%	1%
General support of principle	10	1%	1%
Improves access to resident management	8	1%	1%
Clarity as to what is/isn’t part of the cost	7	1%	1%
Prevents development rights inflating freehold price	3	0%	0%
Commercial landlords retain control over commercial units	2	0%	0%
Freeholder may be more cooperative as part of enfranchisement process	1	0%	0%
Freeholders should be able to require leasebacks of units let non-participating qualifying tenants	1	0%	0%
Residential leaseholders don’t want to be involved with commercial units	1	0%	0%
Supports Government’s Levelling Up policy	1	0%	0%
Total	1085	100%	100%

Question 9b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits of mandatory leasebacks as part of the collective enfranchisement process, on the presumption of a 50% non-residential limit?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
“Mandatory” is unfair	88	41%	51%
Doesn’t answer the question	43	20%
Complicates management of commercial units/whole building	39	18%	23%
Valuation/valuing leaseback	10	5%	6%
Previous freeholder remains involved in building	9	4%	5%
Will lead to conflict between residential leaseholders and owner of leasebacks	6	3%	3%
Leasehold should be banned	5	2%	3%
Cost of ENF process will increase	4	2%	2%
Negative for both parties	3	1%	2%
Social landlords as head lessees will struggle to fulfil obligations to tenants	2	1%	1%
Uncertain that previous long term income stream will continue	2	1%	1%
Depresses value of mixed-use buildings/Discourages investment	1	0%	1%
Freeholders legal costs must be covered	1	0%	1%
May not be appropriate for all properties	1	0%	1%
Supportive of leasebacks on empty units, otherwise opposed	1	0%	1%
Will lead to an increase in litigation	1	0%	1%

Question 10. Do you agree or disagree that increasing the non-residential limit for the right to manage from 25% to 50% meets government’s aims of addressing the historic imbalance of rights between freeholders and leaseholders?

Responses	Agree	Disagree	I don’t know	Not answered	Total
Total	1568 (75%)	186 (9%)	204 (10%)	129 (6%)	2087
Individual	1441 (76%)	155 (8%)	194 (10%)	111 (6%)	1901
Leaseholder	516 (78%)	45 (8%)	70 (11%)	32 (5%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	256 (93%)	8 (3%)	6 (2%)	6 (2%)	276
Organisation	69 (58%)	30 (25%)	10 (8%)	11 (9%)	120
Charity	5 (71%)	1 (14%)	0	1 (14%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	4 (57%)	2 (29%)	0	1 (14%)	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	6 (55%)	2 (18%)	2 (18%)	1 (9%)	11
Investor	4 (21%)	13 (68%)	0	2 (11%)	19
Law Firm	2 (29%)	3 (43%)	2 (29%)	0	7
Local Authority	1 (14%)	2 (29%)	1 (14%)	3 (43%)	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	6 (50%)	4 (33%)	2 (17%)	0	12
Professional Body	3 (60%)	0	0	2 (40%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	12 (86%)	0	1 (7%)	1 (7%)	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	19 (90%)	0	2 (10%)	0	21
Trade Association	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	4 (80%)	1 (20%)	0	0	5

Question 11. Do you support or oppose a 50% non-residential limit for right to manage claims?

Responses	Support/Strongly Support	Oppose/Strongly Oppose	Neither	Not answered	Total
Total	1617 (78%)	114 (5%)	215 (10%)	141 (7%)	2087
Individual	1492 (78%)	81 (4%)	198 (10%)	130 (7%)	1901
Leaseholder	542 (82%)	20 (3%)	63 (10%)	38 (6%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	260 (94%)	4 (1%)	6 (2%)	6 (2%)	276
Organisation	66 (55%)	31 (26%)	16 (13%)	7 (6%)	120
Charity	5 (71%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Developer/Freeholder	3 (43%)	4 (57%)	0	0	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	5 (45%)	3 (27%)	3 (27%)	0	11
Investor	3 (16%)	15 (79%)	0	1 (5%)	19
Law Firm	3 (43%)	3 (43%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Local Authority	0	1 (14%)	3 (43%)	3 (43%)	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	7 (58%)	2 (17%)	1 (8%)	2 (16%)	12
Professional Body	3 (60%)	0	1 (20%)	2 (20%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	14 (100%)	0	0	0	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	18 (86%)	0	2 (10%)	1 (5%)	21
Trade Association	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	3 (60%)	0	5

Question 11a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of increasing the non-residential limit for right to manage from 25% to 50%?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Improves access to resident management	1203	80%	88%
Doesn’t answer the question	132	9%
Improved transparency/oversight of building management	62	4%	5%
Better management of buildings	31	2%	2%
A 50% limit more accurately captures that a building is residential/Fairer percentage	22	1%	2%
Will lead to reduced management costs	22	1%	2%
Incentivises better building management/Residents will be active freeholders/Better VfM	14	1%	1%
Better matches the rights of homeowners in other countries	5	0%	0%
Supportive but managing agents need to be regulated	2	0%	0%
Supportive of a higher limit >50%	2	0%	0%
Mixed use buildings are becoming more common - appropriate time to amend leaseholder rights	1	0%	0%
Supportive but commercial tenants should have a say	1	0%	0%

Question 11b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, of a 50% non-residential limit for right to manage?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Complicates management of properties with significant commercial elements	76	43%	50%
Expertise - LHs/residents lack the expertise to successfully own/manage buildings with up to 50% commercial floorspace	26	15%	17%
Doesn’t answer the question	24	14%
Reduces investment in/development of mixed-use building especially in city/town centres	17	10%	11%
Removes professional landlords who balance the interests of both residential and commercial tenants	13	7%	9%
50% too low - There should be a higher limit	7	4%	5%
50% too low - There should be no limit	7	4%	5%
Again, the limit (if there is a limit at all, and it is not clear that there should be one) this should be set at at least 60%	2	1%	1%
Appetite - LHs/residents do not want to own/manage building with up to 50% commercial floorspace	1	1%	1%
Not in the spirit of original RTM legislation restricted to residential buildings	1	1%	1%
Unintended consequences for social landlords	1	1%	1%

Question 12. Do you agree or disagree that right to manage company voting rights should be amended to ensure leaseholders continue to have effective control of decisions?

Responses	Agree	Disagree	I don’t know	Not answered	Total
Total	1814 (87%)	88 (4%)	64(3%)	1421 (8%)	2087
Individual	1693 (89%)	53 (3%)	56 (3%)	99 (5%)	1901
Leaseholder	610 (92%)	10 (2%)	17 (3%)	26 (4%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	254 (92%)	2 (1%)	7 (3%)	13 (5%)	276
Organisation	69 (58%)	34 (28%)	8 (7%)	9 (8%)	120
Charity	4 (57%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	2 (29%)	4 (57%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	7 (64%)	2 (18%)	1 (9%)	1 (9%)	11
Investor	3 (16%)	14 (74%)	0	2 (11%)	19
Law Firm	3 (43%)	2 (29%)	2 (29%)	0	7
Local Authority	2 (29%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	3 (43%)	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	8 (67%)	4 (33%)	0	0	12
Professional Body	3 (60%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	0	5
Representation/Campaign Group	13 (93%)	0	0	1 (7%)	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	18 (86%)	0	2 (10%)	1 (5%)	21
Trade Association	2 (50%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	3 (60%)	2 (40%)	0	0	5

Question 13. Do you support or oppose capping the total votes allocated to landlords in right to manage companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants (Law Commission’s Option 3)?

Responses	Support/Strongly Support	Oppose/Strongly Oppose	Neither	Not answered	Total
Total	1627 (78%)	121 (6%)	191 (9%)	148 (7%)	2087
Individual	1521 (80%)	79 (4%)	173 (9%)	128 (7%)	1901
Leaseholder	548 (83%)	18 (3%)	55 (8%)	42 (6%)	663
Leaseholder living in buildings with over 25% up to 50% non-residential floorspace	238 (86%)	2 (1%)	17 (6%)	19 (7%)	276
Organisation	51 (43%)	42 (35%)	17 (14%)	10 (8%)	120
Charity	3 (43%)	1 (14%)	1 (14%)	2 (29%)	7
Developer/Freeholder	2 (29%)	4 (57%)	1 (14%)	0	7
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	3 (27%)	7 (64%)	0	1 (9%)	11
Investor	1 (5%)	15 (79%)	0	2 (11%)	19
Law Firm	3 (43%)	2 (29%)	2 (29%)	0	7
Local Authority	0	3 (43%)	2 (29%)	2 (29%)	7
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	6 (50%)	4 (33%)	2 (17%)	0	12
Professional Body	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	5
Representation/Campaign Group	12 (86%)	0	1 (7%)	1 (7%)	14
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	14 (67%)	2 (10%)	4 (19%)	1 (5%)	21
Trade Association	2 (50%)	1 (25%)	1 (25%)	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	2 (40%)	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	0	5

Question 13a. If response Strongly support or Support - What are the benefits of capping the total votes allocated to landlords in right to manage companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Limits landlord control/Prioritises resident control	770	81%	90%
Doesn’t answer the question	93	10%
Management control given to those with greatest financial interest	26	3%	3%
Change to 50% for RTM undermined without this change	23	2%	3%
Supportive - Doesn’t go far enough - Limit landlord directors to 1/3rd as well	19	2%	2%
General comment about RTM	13	1%	2%
Reduced cost/improves focus on VfM	1	0%	0%

Question 13b. If response Strongly oppose or Oppose - What are the challenges or dis-benefits, of capping the total votes allocated to landlords in right to manage companies to one-third of the total votes of qualifying tenants?

Response	Number of responses that referred to…	Percentage	Percentage excluding ‘Doesn’t answer the question’
Unfair on landlords/freeholders	46	35%	48%
Doesn’t answer the question	35	27%
Should reflect interest held in building - not an arbitrary 1/3rd	28	22%	29%
Criticism of blanket approach	4	3%	4%
Landlords have more experience managing buildings	4	3%	4%
Support Option 1 votes based on floorspace fairer	4	3%	4%
Landlords unable to fulfil responsibilities to commercial tenants	3	2%	3%
Shouldn’t apply to HAs	3	2%	3%
Landlords should have requisite rights if granted leaseback	1	1%	1%
Slows decision making and works	1	1%	1%
Unfair on commercial tenants	1	1%	1%

Question 14. Do you support or oppose that, where Shared Ownership providers are liable for paying for repair and maintenance during the ‘Initial Repair Period’ of a new Shared Ownership lease, they should have the right to vote on matters relating to these works and their costs?

Responses	Strongly Support or Support	Strongly Opposed or Opposed	Neither support nor oppose	Total
Total	1261 (85%)	74 (5%)	149 (10%)	1484
Individual	1205 (86%)	65 (5%)	125 (9%)	1395
Not specified	1200 (86%)	65 (5%)	125 (9%)	1390
Charity	2 (100%)	0	0	2
Investor	1 (100%)	0	0	1
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	2 (100%)	0	0	1
Organisation	56 (63%)	9 (10%)	24 (27%)	89
Charity	2 (67%)	0	1 (33%)	3
Developer/Freeholder	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	0	4
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	1
Housing Association	9 (82%)	1 (9%)	1 (9%)	11
Investor	3 (30%)	1 (10%)	6 (6%)	10
Law Firm	3 (50%)	1 (17%)	2 (33%)	6
Local Authority	5 (100%)	0	0	5
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	5 (50%)	0	5 (50%)	10
Professional Body	3 (100%)	0	0	3
Representation/Campaign Group	7 (58%)	2 (17%)	3 (25%)	12
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	9 (56%)	2 (13%)	5 (31%)	16
Trade Association	4 (100%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	1 (50%)	0	1 (50%)	1
Not answered	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0	2

Question 15. Do you support or oppose that, where Shared Ownership providers wish to delegate this right over decision-making to the shared owner, they should be able to do so?

Responses	Strongly Support or Support	Strongly Opposed or Opposed	Neither Support nor Oppose	Total
Total	1204 (83%)	36 (2%)	208 (14%)	1448
Individual	1144 (84%)	32 (2%)	183 (13%)	1359
Not specified	1139  (84%)	32 (2%)	183 (13%)	1354
Charity	2 (100%)	0	0	2
Investor	1 (100%)	0	0	1
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	2 (100%)	0	0	2
Organisation	60 (67%)	4 (4%)	25 (28%)	89
Charity	2 (67%)	0	1 (33%)	3
Developer/Freeholder	3 (75%)	0	1 (25%)	4
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	1
Housing Association	7 (64%)	3 (27%)	1 (9%)	11
Investor	3 (30%)	0	7 (70%)	10
Law Firm	4 (67%)	0	2 (33%)	6
Local Authority	4 (80%)	0	1 (20%)	5
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	5 (50%)	0	5 (50%)	10
Professional Body	3 (75%)	1 (25%)	0	4
Representation/Campaign Group	10 (83%)	0	2 (17%)	12
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	11 (69%)	0	5 (31%)	16
Trade Association	4 (100%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	2 (100%)	0	0	2
Not answered	1 (100%)	0	0	1

Question 16. What should be the maximum fee (£) for issuing a Commonhold Unit Information Certificate (CUIC)?

Amount (£)	Number of responses which supported…	Percentage
151-200	58	4%
101-150	171	12%
51-100	623	44%
0-50	480	34%
Other (£)	83	6%

Responses	0-50 (£)	51-100 (£)	101-150 (£)	151-200 (£)	Other	Total
Total	480 (34%)	623 (44%)	171  (12%)	58 (4%)	83 (6%)	1415
Individual	466 (35%)	607 (45%)	161 (12%)	46 (3%)	67 (5%)	1346
Charity	0	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0	0	2
Investor	0	1 (100%)	0	0	0	1
Not specified	465 (35%)	605 (45%)	159 (12%)	45 (3%)	67 (5%)	1341
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	1 (50%)	0	1 (50%)	0	0	2
Organisation	14 (20%)	16 (23%)	10 (14%)	13 (19%)	16 (23%)	69
Charity	0	0	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0	2
Developer/Freeholder	1 (33%)	1 (33%)	0	0	1 (33%)	3
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	0	0	1
Housing Association	1 (13%)	0	0	6 (63%)	1 (13%)	8
Investor	1 (20%)	0	0	1 (20%)	3 (60%)	5
Law Firm	2 (40%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	1 (20%)	0	5
Local Authority	0	0	1 (33%)	0 (67%)	2	3
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	0	2 (29%)	3 (43%)	0	2 (29%)	7
Professional Body	0	1 (33%)	1 (33%)	1 (33%)	0	3
Representation/Campaign Group	1 (9%)	4 (36%)	2 (18%)	0	4 (36%)	11
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	7 (47%)	6 (40%)	1 (7%)	0	1 (7%)	15
Trade Association	0	1 (33%)	0	0	2 (67%)	3
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	0	0	0	2 (100%)	0	2
Not answered	0	0	0	1 (100%)	0	1

Question 17. Do you support or oppose a sanction on the commonhold association that no fee is payable if the deadline for the CUIC’s provision is missed? 

Responses	Strongly Support or Support	Strongly Opposed or Opposed	Neither Support nor Oppose	Total
Total	1046 (75%)	50 (4%)	291 (21%)	1387
Individual	999 (76%)	35 (3%)	272 (21%)	1306
Charity	2 (100%)	0	0	2
Not specified	996 (76%)	34 (3%)	272 (21%)	1302
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	1 (50%)	1 (50%)	0	2
Organisation	47 (58%)	15 (19%)	19 (23%)	81
Charity	2 (67%)	0	1 (33%)	3
Developer/Freeholder	2 (50%)	2 (50%)	0	4
Government Body	1 (100%)	0	0	1
Housing Association	2 (29%)	3 (43%)	2 (29%)	7
Investor	3 (30%)	2 (20%)	5 (50%)	10
Law Firm	3 (50%)	2 (33%)	1 (17%)	6
Local Authority	1 (33%)	1 (33%)	1 (33%)	3
Managing/Letting Agent/Property Advisor	4 (44%)	2 (22%)	3 (33%)	9
Professional Body	3 (100%)	0	0	3
Representation/Campaign Group	6 (55%)	2 (18%)	3 (27%)	11
RMC/RTM Company/RA/RTA	12 (80%)	0	3 (20%)	15
Trade Association	4 (100%)	0	0	4
Accountant/Surveyor/Valuer	2 (100%)	0	0	2
Not answered	2 (100%)	0	0	2

1. MHCLG, Leasehold dwellings, 2021 to 2022 ↩

2. Welsh Government, Research into the sale and use of leaseholds in Wales: summary, published 16 March 2021 ↩

3. MHCLG (2021) Consultation outcome New model for Shared Ownership: technical consultation Updated 1 April 2021 ↩